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This thesis offers a critical analysis of the implications of ideological mediations in the 
translation of English-Kurdish geopolitical texts. It makes an original contribution by enabling 
a deeper comprehension of the role of re-contextualisation of socio-political texts in situations 
of constant contemporary conflict in the Middle East. It does so by exploring the reproduction 
of stance and voice in the translations of a geopolitical commentarial genre commissioned by 
newspapers. The study provides an account of how patterns of translation choices are conveyed 
in newspaper commentary articles on the geopolitical issues originally published in English 
and then how these patterns are re-conveyed in full translations of these articles for four quality 
Kurdish-language newspapers with different editorial policies: Sbeiy, Kurdistan-i-New, 
Xendan, and Rudaw.  
The case study explores the Kurdish translation of English journalistic articles covering 
general political developments in Middle East and Kurdistan in particular over a significant 
four-year period of 2011-2014. It is employed as an example of the rewriting activity that has 
been effective in achieving significant geopolitical results in favour of the media agencies that 
are considered politically aligned outlets. The study questions the extent to which ideologies 
involved in leading translation practice and inquires what the Kurdish case-study apprises us 
about wider practice. The methodology is a hybrid of corpus- and critical narrative-analytical 
methods that operate within the discipline of descriptive translation studies. The study deployed 
tripartite models to analyse and depict the interplay between ideology and a translator’s 
behaviour within media contexts. It adapts Toury’s three-phase descriptive methodology and 
Chesterman’s concept of norms as complementary models in order to describe the type of 
norms operating within the context of Kurdish media translation. It also developed critical 
narrative analysis for further investigating and for describing the normative effects of socio-
political factors on the behaviour of the translator within the same realm. 
The outcomes of the data analysis have revealed that media translation choices are 
driven by ideology. The socio-political ideology plays a significant role, both historically and 
currently in the occurrence of stylistic shifts. On the level of meaning, however, the majority 
of shifts occur due to the current political power dynamics in Kurdistan. The results have also 
shown that media translation in Iraqi Kurdistan is not neutral and it is largely affected by the 
policy of the parties to which the media news agencies are aligned. This study encompasses six 
chapters, a conclusion and appendices.  
 VI 
List of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... III 
Declaration ............................................................................................................................ IV 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... V 
List of Contents ..................................................................................................................... VI 
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................ IX 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................... X 
List of Charts and Figures .................................................................................................. XII 
Kurdish Alphabet .............................................................................................................. XIII 
 
Chapter One ............................................................................................................................. 1 
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Kurdish Media, Geopolitics and Translation ....................................................................... 5 
1.1.1 The Historical and Socio-political Context of Soraní Kurdish ......................................... 7 
1.1.2 Kurdish Language and Translation Pre-Autonomous Region in Iraqi Kurdistan .......... 15 
1.1.3 Kurdish Media and Translation Post-Autonomous Region in Iraqi Kurdistan .............. 17 
1.2 Objectives and Analytical Progression of the Study ......................................................... 22 
 
Chapter Two ........................................................................................................................... 28 
Literature Review .................................................................................................................. 28 
2.0  Introduction ............................................................................................................... 28 
2.1 Ideological Translation Choices and Manipulation in Translation Studies ....................... 29 
2.2. Ideology, Media and Translation Studies ......................................................................... 35 
2.3 Ideology and CDA in Media Translation Studies .............................................................. 39 
2.3.1 Ideology and Text-centred Approaches in Translation Studies ...................................... 42 
 VII 
2.4 Shifts as the Manifestation of Ideological Manipulation and Mediation ........................... 48 
2.4.1 Narrative Strategies as the manifestations of Ideological Shifts .................................... 51 
2.5 Ideology and Search for Media Habitus and Social Norms ............................................... 56 
2.5.1 Models of Norm Analysis ............................................................................................... 60 
2.5.2 Ideology and Search for Laws of Translational Behaviour ............................................ 69 
 
Chapter Three ........................................................................................................................ 75 
Methodology and Corpus Design ......................................................................................... 75 
3.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 75 
3.1 Methodology: the Integration of the Theoretical Models .................................................. 76 
3.1.1 The Possible Integration of the Complementary Models ............................................... 79 
3.1.2 Critical Narrative Analysis (CNA) ................................................................................. 82 
3.2 Corpus Design .................................................................................................................... 87 
3.2.1 Selection Criteria ............................................................................................................ 88 
3.2.2 Data Compartmentalisation ............................................................................................ 94 
 
Chapter Four .......................................................................................................................... 97 
Text-Selection Policies and Stylistic Framing in Kurdish Media Translation ................. 97 
4.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 97 
4.1 Text-Selection Policy in Kurdish Media ........................................................................... 98 
4.1.1 Party Media and Text-Selection Policy .......................................................................... 99 
4.1.2 Shadow Media and Text-Selection Policy .................................................................... 102 
4.2 Text-Selection Strategies in Kurdish Media Translation ................................................. 106 
4.2.1 Historical Context and Borrowing Strategies ............................................................... 108 
4.2.2 Kurdish Media Agencies and Borrowing Strategies ..................................................... 117 
4.2.2.1 Partisan Media and the Strategy of Borrowing .......................................................... 119 
4.2.2.2 Shadow Media and the Strategy of Borrowing .......................................................... 124 
 VIII 
4.3 Chronological Distribution of the Borrowing Strategies ................................................. 128 
4.4 Translational Norms and Stylistic Reframing in Media Translation ............................... 131 
 
Chapter Five ......................................................................................................................... 135 
Reframing Strategies and Lexical Shifts in Kurdish Media Translation ....................... 135 
5.0 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 135 
5.1 Deletion Strategy in Kurdish Media Translation ............................................................. 136 
5.2 Substitution Strategy in Kurdish Media........................................................................... 147 
5.3 Addition Strategy in Kurdish Media Translation ............................................................ 157 
5.4 Translational Reframing Strategies between Mistranslations and Ideological Choices .. 163 
 
Chapter Six ........................................................................................................................... 167 
Reframing Strategies and Political Stance in Kurdish Media Translation .................... 167 
6.0 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 167 
6.1 Kurdish Media Agencies and Translation Reframing Strategies ..................................... 168 
6.1.1 Partisan Media and Translational Reframing Strategies ............................................... 170 
6.1.2 Shadow Media and Translational Reframing Strategies ............................................... 176 
6.2 Chronological Distribution of the Translational Strategies ............................................. 182 
6.3 Translational Norms and Semantic Shifts in Media Translation ..................................... 187 
6.4 Translation Behaviour, Patrons and Reframing Political Conflict .................................. 189 
 
Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 192 
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 201 




List of Abbreviations  
 
BT- Back Translation 
CNA -Critical Narrative Analysis 
CDA- Critical Discourse Analysis 
DTS- Descriptive Translation Studies 
SC- Source Culture 
SFL -Systematic Functional Grammar 
SL- Source Language  
ST -Source Text 
TC -Target Culture 
TL -Target Language 
TQA -Translation Quality Assessment 
TS -Translation Studies 
TT -Target Text 
KRG-Kurdistan Regional Government 
PUK- Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
PDK/KDP-Kurdistan Democratic Party 
Symbols: 
[] information added or changed and not part of the quotations  
()  information is part of the quotation in which the brackets exist.  
 X 
List of Tables 
 
Table 4. 1: Frequency and percentage of translation strategies in the TTs ......................................................... 106 
Table 4. 2 : Frequency and percentage of borrowed cases in the TTs ................................................................ 108 
Table 4. 3: Frequency and percentage of transcription and transliteration cases in the TTs .............................. 109 
Table 4. 4: Frequency and percentage of levels of occurrence of the cases of borrowing at word level and above 
word level in the TTs ................................................................................................................................ 113 
Table 4. 5: Frequency and percentage of parts of speech of the cases of borrowing at word level and above word 
level in the TTs ......................................................................................................................................... 113 
Table 4. 6: Frequency and percentage of cases of noun borrowing in the TTs .................................................. 114 
Table 4. 7: Frequency and percentage of cases of proper nouns borrowed in the TTs ....................................... 114 
Table 4. 8: Frequency and percentage of parts of speech of borrowing cases as part of overall cases of the 
corpus ........................................................................................................................................................ 116 
Table 4. 9: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Kurdish media TTs ................................... 118 
Table 4. 10: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Partisan Kurdish media TTs ................... 120 
Table 4. 11: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Sbeiy media TTs ..................................... 120 
Table 4. 12: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Kurdistan-i-Nwe media TTs ................... 121 
Table 4. 13: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing representation in Sbeiy media TTs ............. 121 
Table 4. 14: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing representation in Kurdistan-i-New media 
TTs ............................................................................................................................................................ 123 
Table 4. 15: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Shadow media TTs ................................. 125 
Table 4. 16: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Xendan media TTs ................................. 125 
Table 4. 17: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Rudaw media TTs................................... 126 
Table 4. 18: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing representation in Xendan media TTs .......... 126 
Table 4. 19: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing representation in Rudaw media TTs ........... 127 
Table 4. 20: Distribution of borrowing strategies according to publication date ................................................ 128 
Table 4. 21: Distribution of borrowing strategies according to publication date ................................................ 129 
Table 4. 22: Distribution of borrowing strategies according to publication date by media agencies ................. 130 
 
Table 5. 1: Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion in the TTs ......................................................... 137 
Table 5. 2 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion in the TTs ........................................................ 138 
 XI 
Table 5. 3: Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion in the TTs ......................................................... 140 
Table 5. 4: Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion at word level in the TTs .................................... 140 
Table 5. 5 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion above word level in the TTs ............................ 143 
Table 5. 6 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of substitution in the TTs ................................................... 147 
Table 5. 7 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of substitution in the TTs ................................................... 149 
Table 5. 8 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of substitution in the TTs ................................................... 150 
Table 5. 9 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of substitution at word level in the TTs ............................. 150 
Table 5. 10 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of substitution above word level in the TTs .................... 155 
Table 5. 11 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of addition in the TTs ...................................................... 157 
Table 5. 12 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of addition in the TTs ...................................................... 157 
Table 5. 13: Frequency and percentage of the cases of addition in the TTs ....................................................... 158 
Table 5. 14 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of addition at word level in the TTs ................................ 159 
Table 5. 15 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of addition above word level in the TTs .......................... 161 
Table 5. 16 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in the TTs ................................................ 163 
 
Table 6. 1 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Kurdish media TTs ............................... 169 
Table 6. 2 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in partisan media TTs ................................ 170 
Table 6. 3 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Sbeiy media TTs ................................... 171 
Table 6. 4 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Kurdistan-i-New media TTs ................. 174 
Table 6. 5 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Shadow media TTs ............................... 176 
Table 6. 6 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Rudaw media TTs ................................. 177 
Table 6. 7 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Xendan media TTs ................................ 179 
Table 6. 8 : Distribution of translation strategies according to publication date................................................. 183 




List of Charts and Figures 
 
Figure 3. 1:Relations between DTS, CDA and Narrative Theory models ............................................................ 79 
Figure 3. 2: Fairclough’s three dimension analytical model ................................................................................. 84 
 
Chart 4. 1: Frequency and percentage of translation strategies in the TTs. ........................................................ 107 
Chart 4. 2: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Kurdish media TTs ................................... 119 
Chart 4. 3:  Distribution of borrowing strategies according to publication date ................................................. 128 
Chart 4. 4: Distribution of borrowing strategies according to publication date .................................................. 129 
Chart 4. 5: Distribution of borrowing strategies according to publication date by media agencies .................... 131 
 
Chart 5. 1: Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion in the TTs .......................................................... 138 
Chart 5. 2: Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in the TTs ................................................... 164 
 
Chart 6. 1 : Frequency and percentage of the total three translation strategies in Kurdish media TTs ............... 169 
Chart 6. 2 : Frequency and percentage of the three translation strategies in Kurdish media TTs ....................... 181 






Latin       Kurdish             Latin    Kurdish 
A  ا      H  ه 
-  ئ      E  ە 
B  ب      U  و 
P  پ      W  و 
T  ت      O  ۆ 
C   ج       Ȗ  وو 
Ҫ  چ       Ȋ  ی 
Ȟ  ح      Y  ی 
X  خ      Ȇ  ێ 
D   د       I  . 
R  ر    
Ř  ڕ  
Z  ز  
J  ژ   
S  س 
Š  ش 
E   ع 
Ğ  غ 
F  ف 
V  ڤ 
Q  ق 
K  ک 
G  گ 
L  ل 
Ļ  ڵ 
M  م 
N  ن
                                                 
1 Available online at: http://www.unilang.org/card.php?res=1462.  
 1 
Chapter One  
Introduction 
Translation is exceptionally important in today's world since it plays a crucial role in an 
expanding worldwide and modern communication. It is regarded as a significant medium for 
knowledge and socio-cultural exchange in the media. As a result of globalisation, media 
translation is becoming increasingly important for rapidly transferring vast amounts of 
information. The discipline of translation studies, therefore, shows an intense interest in 
scrutinising the manifold revelation of power relations involved in the translation process and 
the products of this domain. Translators’ choices play a significant role in revealing how 
knowledge is conveyed and how power relations are communicated within the socio-political 
contexts in which the translational activities take place. Considering extra-textual constraints, 
many translation scholars agree that different translation choices made by different translators 
might indicate different valuable conclusions (e.g., Munday 2012a, p. 2; Toury 2012, 195). 
Lefevere (1992b, pp.11-25), however, links translation choices to ideology, power relations and 
manipulation. In the field of media translation, likewise, specific word choices might lead to 
translation distortions and have a link to the values expressed by the translators belonging to 
different publication agencies. These distortions represent the interaction between ascendency 
and opposition towards narratives elaborated in the source texts (STs) and can be defined in 
terms of ideological mediations in translation. This aspect of translation behaviour is the focus 
of this study within the Kurdish media translation context in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
The thesis is innovative in the way it grounds the studies of the translation of Kurdish 
media texts into the framework of the discipline of translation studies by examining the process 
of geopolitical translation and its textual products in Iraqi Kurdistan. Geopolitical translation 
can be defined as the translation of those texts which are considered politically, historically, 
and/or geographically biased writings, aiming to find answers for a particular widespread 
question (Dalby etal 1998). The study makes an original contribution by facilitating a deeper 
understanding of the role of translation and re-contextualisation of socio-politically 
commentarial texts in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict in the Middle East. It 
 2 
questions the role ideology plays in governing translation practice and inquires what the Kurdish 
case-study informs us about wider practice. The inspiration originates from the fact that Iraqi 
Kurdistan has witnessed gradual transformations in many aspects of Kurdistan’s socio-political 
life in the last two decades and that part of this process is reflected in and informed the 
translations which occurred recently in the media. The Kurdish media, including shadow 
media2, in the post-autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan developed its translation policies and 
practice as a site of political and ideological struggle. This study, therefore, argues that media 
translation has a powerful role to play in shaping the values, ideas, and belief systems in Kurdish 
society and it might be used as a manipulative tool in support of different geopolitical media 
agencies. The translated texts selected for this study are published between 2011 and 2014. They 
provide an introduction to the many ideological struggles over the nature, meaning and causes 
of contemporary geopolitical changes in the territory of Kurdistan. Therefore, the analysis of 
media translation in Kurdistan not only delivers an insight into the translational activities in the 
Kurdish context, but also contributes to a better understanding of media and the politics in 
Kurdistan.  
The outcomes are based on the textual data translated into the translators’ mother 
tongues and the analysis is, therefore, a target-culture oriented study. The texts are written in 
English and translated into Soraní Kurdish3. The thesis argues that media translation in 
Kurdistan is both an institutional operation and a mutual process of norm reorganisation practice 
in specific contextual models. The study tentatively problematises the dominant target-oriented 
approach proposed by Toury (1985/2014, 1995, 2012)4 to translation studies and draws attention 
to the translation practice being undertaken in non -Western contexts such as Kurdistan. The 
actual practice of media translated texts under scrutiny in Kurdistan operates as a special case 
                                                 
2 Shadow media is media which is indirectly or unofficially aligned to political parties. This is explored 
in depth in chapter 4. 
3 The Kurdish context will be outlined in the following section. 
4 The Target-oriented approach to translation studies can be construed by the much-quoted remarks of its 
major theorist Gideon Toury (1985/2014: 19) who puts it as “any research into translation,[...]should start from the 
hypothesis that translations are facts of one system only: the target system. It is clear that, from the standpoint of 
the source text and source system, translations have hardly any significance at all, even if everybody in the source 
culture ‘knows’ of their factual existence (which is rarely the case anyway)”. 
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in that the translated topics are derived from and developed within Middle Eastern cultures, in 
general, and Kurdistan, in particular. As source texts, however, they are written and published 
by various recognisable English sources, including the Kurdish media itself, which is the 
producer of a number of the source texts and their translations as well (see chapter 3 for more 
details about the corpus design of this study). Thus, part of the geopolitical translation in 
Kurdistan becomes the source-culture-based act of reinterpreting and transforming the source 
texts (STs) into the target texts (TTs). The translational activities in the geopolitical texts and 
Kurdish media realm, thus, tend to fulfil unique functions in both ST and TT contexts and 
exhibit unique features in terms of the discursive formation of the STs and its dynamic influence 
on the TT production. They might eventually indicate that ideology is largely shaped and 
informed by the discursive transformation in the domestic spheres and influenced by the 
practice of geopolitical translation and the course of socio-political development in Kurdistan. 
In this sense, primacy is allocated to the professional and socio-cultural norms of both ST and 
TT community. The TTs are considered as textual indicators of ideological manipulations 
conceived to sustain the socio-political order of the source culture, whereas the target readership 
will be accounted for the extent that the significance criterion will not be compromised. This is 
due to the study’s objectives, which are oriented towards the exploration of the growing 
tendency of the translator’s behaviour, and the institutions they belong to, rather than their 
interaction with the target readerships and their response to the translated texts. 
An integrated methodology has been formulated in response to these factors. As power 
and ideology are integrally involved in the analysis of translated media texts, a combined 
methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and Narrative Theory within Descriptive 
Translation Studies (DTS), specifically, the analytical three-phase model suggested by Toury 
(1995, 2012) is employed. The aim is to relate the effect of power performance to text 
production in both source and target contexts. Meanwhile, given that geopolitical translation is 
primarily a norm-governed practice, Chesterman’s (1997) notion of translation norms is 
employed and adapted to the study of Kurdish media translation. It is significant to bear in mind 
that the notions adopted from norms theory tend to be reorganised in a descriptive light and 
integrated with political and socio-cultural analysis to establish a more convincing and 
operational link between texts and their socio-political contexts. The theoretical propositions 
are justified and substantiated by extensive text analysis from a functional perspective. The 
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corpus of data is formed by a set of parallel corpus of 60 English texts along with their Kurdish 
translations (60 texts), covering geopolitical commentary genre articles. All the STs and the 
TTs are online texts collected from official publications from 2011 to 2014. The Kurdish 
translated texts were delivered by four recognisable Kurdish media newspaper agencies5 with 
different editorial policies: Sbeiy, Kurdistan-i-New, Xendan, and Rudaw media agencies. They 
were reproduced on a collective basis by Kurdish political parties that directly or indirectly run 
these institutions (see chapters 3 and 4 for details). The focus is on presenting a whole picture 
of the Kurdish media translation through a wide spectrum of geopolitical genres including 
newspaper commentary articles. This analytic approach appears particularly helpful to identify 
the socio-political changes and their impact on media translation and translators’ behaviour. 
Given the remarkable level of parallels in both wording and context between the STs and the 
TTs, it would be of great interest to discover how this phenomenon is dealt with in the translated 
versions by both the translators and the institutions they translated for. The overall textual 
analysis demonstrates that when translated, geopolitical topics can be interpreted differently by 
different institutions in their attempt to promote their respective political interests and 
narratives.  
Framed within the recognised limits as discussed above, it is reasonable to say that any 
significant textual variations in the TTs might be engendered by the adaptive operation of norms 
accentuated by fluctuating socio-political representations. Thus, the focus in this study is placed 
on finding the indicators of textual change in the Kurdish translations. The analysis, however, 
reflects aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations at both the macro- and 
micro-structural levels. In a more specific sense, translation shifts are seen as “invariant under 
transformation” (Toury 1980, p. 12). Invariant refers to the elements that remain unchanged in 
the process of translation, while transformations occur at various textual levels during the act 
of translation. It should be understood that the transformations are exclusive of the systematic 
differences between the ST and the TT which are static and rule-governed. In this study, 
                                                 
5 Like the BBC, some of the Kurdish media agencies selected in this study are considered part of 
broadcasting organisations that include all the broadcasting devices and facilities. 
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however, only the value-laden6 transformations will be accounted for as the outcome of the 
socio-cultural and political positioned translation behaviour. According to Toury’s (1985/2014, 
pp.35-38) formulation of descriptive translation studies (DTS), the transformations in the latter 
form are achieved through the descriptive comparison of the STs and the TTs, and they are 
ultimately connected to norms. In this study, the compilation of translation shifts obtained at 
the textual-functional level across the range of geopolitical genres over the four years may 
identify the characteristics of geopolitical translation as well as the adjustments of social and 
institutional norms.  
The norms can, therefore, be highlighted by scrutinising the translation shifts and 
comparing the shifts diachronically and synchronically amongst various sets of parallel 
examples consisting of identical textual ST segments and their corresponding TTs extracted 
from the texts. The types of shifts of translation strategies could be better determined and 
analysed along the course of discursive evolution in the socio-geopolitical sphere. According to 
Toury (1980), the description and explanation of shifts in translation ought to be concerned with 
the dynamics of culture rather than the static descriptive contrast of the languages. Therefore, 
since this research is a descriptive study in nature, it favours lines of inquiry seeking to 
determine properties of translated language from a communicative perspective in the Kurdish 
socio-cultural and political context. This ultimately leads to the exploration of the aspects of 
socio-political and institutional conditions for the production of the translations.  
 
1.1 Kurdish Media, Geopolitics and Translation 
The outline above has given an introduction to the theme of this study. It will also be 
more productive if the thesis provides a comprehensive literature review of Kurdish language 
and translation, including its practice and study, diachronically in Iraqi Kurdistan, before 
designating the study’s questions and starting the data analysis. The study is informed by the 
                                                 
6 In line with White’s perspectives (2006, p. 37), this study considers that media geopolitical texts is 
anything but objectives, it is in fact “value-laden, ideologically determined discourse with a clear potential to 
influence media audience’s assumptions and beliefs about the way world is and the way it ought to be”. 
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specific linguistic, political and cultural contexts of the Kurdish language in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
The complex geopolitical history of the region and the development of the Kurdish language 
will help demonstrate the importance of an approach to the translation of media texts that takes 
into account ideology as well as the linguistic and cultural dimensions of translational norms. 
This section, therefore, presents an overview of the Kurdish language, media, and translation 
before and after the establishment of the Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq in 1992 
with the aim of introducing the key elements necessary for understanding this context. 
The codes of repression and the geographical area of Kurdistan have affected the spoken 
varieties of Kurdish pre- and post the 1990s. Since 1992, two Kurdish variations have been “the 
working language of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), schools and the media” 
(Sheyholislami 2009/20157, p. 21). These are the Northern Kurdish variations, also known as 
Kurmanjí (also Badínaní), and the Central Kurdish, also known as Soraní. The former is used 
widely as one of the dialects in Duhok city, while the latter that is known as Soraní Kurdish is 
the language for the rest of the Kurds who live in Iraqi Kurdistan. However, the case-study of 
this research is based on Soraní Kurdish since it has been the second recognised official local 
language of Iraqi Kurds and the majority their publications in Iraq from 1970s (Sheyholislami 
2011, p. 64).  
In recent years, there have been various attempts to standardise Soraní Kurdish by 
making some significant changes in the status of Kurdish, including its recognition as an official 
language in the new Iraqi constitution of 20048. However, its long standing status as a non-
standardised language9 has affected the written form of Soraní Kurdish, in particular, in terms 
of sentence structure and lexico-grammatical choices. This paved the way for the invasion of 
linguistic borrowing on all levels. Regardless of socio-cultural and linguistic norms and 
                                                 
7 It was first published as a conference paper in 2009 and then in 2015 by Research Gate publisher. 
 
8 According to article four of the new constitution of Iraq (approved in June 2004), “the Arabic language 
and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq,” and this can be considered as an updating version 
of the agreement signed three decades before. In 1966, it was also confirmed in the constitution of Iraq that Kurdish 
“is an official status equal to that of Arabic” (Smith 1971, p.66). However, the Kurdish language was only permitted 
as a local language in the Kurdish areas. 
9 “ The authorities, especially the Kurdish Academy, have decided not to have any specific language 
policy in Iraqi Kurdistan with respect to declaring an official language for the region or granting linguistic rights 
to Kurdish varieties with fewer speakers” (Sheyholislami 2012, p. 117). 
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conventions, writers’ agency and stylistically arbitrary preferences might be one of the reasons 
behind such borrowings. 
Similarly to the linguistic development of Kurdish, the Kurdish media context has been 
heavily influenced by the geopolitical development of the region. The Kurdish media has been 
divided into three ideological camps in the post-autonomous region: the authority-affiliated 
media; the opposition media; and the independent media. Each media has its own language of 
use, writers, and translators. This has not only affected the Kurdish language in terms of 
unification and standardisation, but, as this study will demonstrate, it also affects the translator’s 
decision-making by influencing the translation choices made by individuals affiliated to the 
different media in the process of translation. Considering the factors mentioned above, this 
study therefore subjects the Kurdish translation to various questions. Translation choices might 
be regarded as inaccurate, inaccessible, or biased choices and expressions.  
The above notwithstanding, being a stateless nation, Kurds have practiced translation 
from and into their language under the rule of different successive governments, which 
influenced the use and development of the language. This is further proof of the vital importance 
of an ideological dimension in the discussion of translation shifts and translation norms in the 
study of Kurdish translation. Therefore, addressing the issue of translation for the general public 
in the public sphere, without considering the socio-political and ideological events that the 
Kurdish language has undergone throughout its history would be unsatisfactory and misleading. 
The attempts to show the impact of political changes upon the Kurdish language, especially 
Soraní Kurdish, reveal obstacles to its lack of standardisation and development so far and shed 
light on the problems translators face today in Iraqi Kurdistan.  
 
1.1.1 The Historical and Socio-political Context of Soraní Kurdish 
This sub-section provides a historical and socio-political context outlining the influence 
and effect of political and power relations on Soraní Kurdish. This, in turn, might shed light on 
the interpretation of some aspects of translators’ behaviour during the course of data analysis of 
this study. The Kurds were always considered as a threat by the authorities in Kurdish areas, 
which led to them being deprived of their rights as citizens. This has rather caused the Kurds to 
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have less access to matters such as legislating over education in Kurdish which, in turn, has had 
a negative impact upon Kurdish language development and standardisation. According to 
Kurdish Facts and West-Asian Affairs, “the great problems around the Kurdish language” are 
“problems closely connected with oppression and partition in Kurdistan” (1962, p.15). This 
caused the relatively late emergence of the written forms of Kurdish (Kreyenbroek and Allison 
1996, p. 2).  
The Kurdish language is a language of the Kurds in Kurdistan western Asia. It is a part 
of the Indo-Iranian group which is a branch of the Proto-Indo European languages of the Indo-
European languages family (Kreyenbroek 1991, p. 54; Kirchhoff 2006, p. 9; Zaken 2007, p. 2; 
Fortson 2011, p. 10). The Kurds are an ancient ethnic group who have lived for many thousands 
of years in and occupied “a very large portion of the Middle East” (Hay 1921, p. 35). According 
to the Council of Europe (2007), they are estimated to be around 25-30 million in population, 
and the largest stateless nation in the world (p. 37). They are the inheritors of an immensely rich 
cultural heritage, before and after the rise of Islam in the seventh century which led to the partial 
Islamisation10 of the Kurds. The Kurdish language was therefore affected by the waves of 
Arabisation which Islam triggered in the Middle East from the seventh century onwards (Joseph 
1983, p. 18; Henry 2008, p. 179). Partial Islamisation caused the use of Arabic words to enter 
the language in addition to Kurdish ones because Arabic was the language of the Holy Quran 
and, according to Islam, chosen by God to convey the message of that faith and its associated 
law. This affected the cultivation of the Kurdish language and culture as Arabic was the only 
language in which people were educated about religion and people studied at schools which 
formed part of the mosque system. As a result, this led to some of the books being written in 
Arabic by Kurdish scholars and even the poets used many Arabic words in their poems because 
most of them were Mullahs11. This caused some Kurdish words to be forgotten and over time 
to become obsolete. For example, the Kurdish word ريز هو (BT: minister) is derived from the 
Turkish word for vizier that is derived from the Arabic word ريزو, which means a high official 
                                                 
10 Islamisation /Islamization: this term is used to indicate the mass converting of the indigenous population 
of Kurds to Islam as “they were converted to Islam after the Arab conquest of the seventh century” (Smith 1971, 
p. 40). 
11 Mullah means Muslim Scholar, i.e., a Muslim cleric who specialises in the interpretation of Islamic 
religious law 
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in a Muslim government (BT: minister). Therefore, the Kurdish language was affected, to some 
extent, by the waves of Arabisation that Islam emanated from the seventh century onwards in 
the Middle East.  
Due to the political changes in the area, Kurdistan was later divided into four parts and 
annexed to neighbouring countries, namely, Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran and each is considered 
to be a part of these countries today. In other words, the four parts of Kurdistan which are 
northern, southern, western and eastern Kurdistan are referred to as Kurdistan of Turkey, 
Kurdistan of Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), Kurdistan of Syria and Kurdistan of Iran, respectively. Red 
Kurdistan is the fifth part which was annexed to the former Soviet Union. Today, its population 
is known as the Kurds of Armenia. In addition, there is a large Kurdish diaspora worldwide. 
This division was made on two different occasions. In 1514, after the battle of Chaldiran, the 
Ottoman and Persian Empires divided Kurdistan between them. In 1920-1923, Britain and 
France further divided that part of Kurdistan which was conquered by the Ottoman Empire by 
dividing it between Iraq, Turkey and Syria (Meho and Maglaughlin 2001, p. 3; Ember et al. 
2005, p. 215-219). Since then, Kurds have fought various empires for their sovereignty. Having 
a strong connection to their identity, not only Kurds, but also their language, have been 
confronted by different types of suppression from successive authorities in attempts to erase 
any trace of their past. 
In Iraq, the Ottoman Empire’s rule (1534-1917) lasted until the end of First World War 
(1918) and this led to the establishment of the state of Iraq, including the southern part of 
Kurdistan under the British Mandate of 1920-1932. During that era, and after the First World 
War, limited steps were taken to address the Kurdish problem. The British Mandate considered 
southern Kurdistan, which is now known as Iraqi Kurdistan, to be an autonomous region. The 
first printed books were published in Kurdish, e.g., Mam u Zin (BT: Mam and Zin) (Aziz 2011, 
p. 42). Education developed and schools were established where Soraní Kurdish was allowed 
to be studied, e.g., the school of Rushdiye (Gérard 1998). However, the Kurdish language was 
only allowed to be studied at elementary level (Hassanpour 2005, pp.51) and the graduates could 
go to Istanbul to continue their study or receive instruction in the Arabic language. Government 
officials were afraid of the growth of the Kurdish language throughout the educational system. 
Smith (1971) explains further that “although the Local Language Law promulgated in 1931 
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specifies that primary instruction in areas where the majority of the population speak Kurdish 
or Turkish is to be offered in the local language, this provision is not always enforced”. 
Furthermore, “the language of instruction in the primary and secondary schools [was] Arabic” 
(p. 118-119). Therefore, this caused problems of illiteracy amongst the Kurds during that time. 
Although, according to the Lausanne Treaty, there was freedom of the press, namely, no 
restrictions were enforced on the free use of any language in the press or at publication of any 
kind, there was, nevertheless an attempt to undermine the Kurdish language at the same time 
by not allowing it to be studied at high school. It has been argued that not only was there a lack 
in the use of the Kurdish language in the educational system, but also in the provision of Kurdish 
schools and teachers (Sluglett 2007, p. 127). 
Later, in 1932, before the Second World War and the years of the establishment of Iraq, 
limited steps were taken in the direction of Kurdish education by the British Mandate. Kurdish 
was permitted in an Iraqi local-language law for teaching in schools, for the election of local 
Kurdish officials, and for the publication of Kurdish-language books in Kurdish-speaking areas 
only. This protected the status of the Kurdish language to an extent. In 1932 and 1939, two 
books about Kurds and the rationale for writing in Kurdish were published and laid the 
groundwork for Kurdish study (Bengio 2012, p. 7). In 1953, another book entitled The History 
of Kurdish Literature was published (Bois 1966, p. 121). However, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in 
1929 supported the state of Iraq to enter the League of Nations 1932 unconditionally without 
any “formal safeguards for Kurdish interests” (Sluglett 2007, p. 128). Kurdistan became an 
important, oil rich area which led to it being coveted by other countries and, as a result, several 
Kurdish movements were founded in order to be active against these authorities. The emergence 
of different Kurdish movements with different political ideologies typified the Kurdish 
community. 
In 1958, after the dethronement of the monarchy in Iraq and the success of the new 
republican government of Abdul Karim Qasim, in the first constitution, the Kurds were 
considered as part of the new state. The new Iraqi constitution recognised Kurdish national 
rights by stating that “Arabs and Kurds are partners in the Iraqi homeland and their national 
rights are recognised within the Iraqi state” (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, p. 79). 
Furthermore, some Kurdish departments were established in some Iraqi universities. In 1968, 
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the University of Sulaimani was founded in the city of Sulaimani12. On the one hand, this led to 
the Kurdish nationality being recognised as one of the two main ethnic groups with equal rights 
and legal status (Kurds and Arab). On the other hand, this left an ongoing Kurdish problem 
“which has led to such atrocities as mass murder, ethnic cleansing and gassing of the civilian 
Kurds in their cities by various Iraqi governments, from the mandate period to the present” 
(Izady 2004, p. 95-96). By the time the Ba’th party took over, the new constitution of July 1970 
explicitly points to the fact that “the people of Iraq is formed of two principal nationalities, the 
Arab nationality and the Kurd nationality” (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, p. 142). This led 
to Kurdish being recognised as an official local language in the Kurdish region of Iraq since 
then. However, despite this recognition, there has been continuous censorship, conflict and 
sporadic negotiation between the Iraqi government and the various Kurdish movements 
(supported by Iran); this led to the Algiers’s agreement13 between Iraq-Iran in 1975 that caused 
the end of Iranian weapon supplies to the Kurds in their struggle against the Iraqi government. 
Nevertheless, while the Kurds have been free to study, write, publish and broadcast in Kurdish 
under the Algiers’s agreement, no freedom of expression was guaranteed because of severe 
censorship, and military action continued against Kurds. It was difficult for the Kurdish 
language to progress in general and particularly in education as well as in the political field, 
given the taboo of employing Kurdish. According to Human Rights Watch (Black, 1993, p. 33): 
On paper the manifesto of March 11, 1970 was promising. It recognised 
the legitimacy of Kurdish nationalism and guaranteed Kurdish participation in 
government and Kurdish language-teaching in schools. But it reversed judgment 
on the territorial extent of Kurdistan, pending a new census. Such census would 
surely have shown a solid Kurdish majority in the city of Kirkuk and the 
surrounding oilfields, as well as in the secondary oil-bearing area of Khanaqin, 
                                                 
12 Due to the historical events that are happened in the area, there are different spellings of this term such 
as Sulaimani, Sulaimania, Al-Sulaymaniah, Suleymani and Solaymāniya. This thesis will use the term Sulaimani. 
13 According to the Law of Autonomy issued by the Republic of Iraq in 1977, the March 11 Manifesto of 
1970/1974, “Kurdistan region shall enjoy Autonomy, and it shall be referred to as (the region) wherever it exists 
in this Law” (1977:11) and “the Kurdish language shall be, beside the Arabic language, the official language in the 
Region” (Ibid: 13). 
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south of the city of Suleimaniyeh. But no census was scheduled until 1977, by 
which time the autonomy deal was dead. (Black, 1993, p.33) 
In 1979, Saddam Hussein seized power and started a violent campaign against the Kurds 
such as arresting citizens, bombarding villages, Arabizing Kurdish areas and even using 
chemical weapons and Anfal campaigns14 against the Kurdish people. Soon afterwards 
repression extended to education through Arabisation. This technique was executed through 
several methods, such as the displacement of thousands of Kurdish families by pro-government 
Arabs from Kurdish areas to different southern areas of Iraq. Educated Kurds were sent into 
exile. The Kurdish mass media was hampered by various levels of government censorship. 
Arabic was made the only official language of all legal documentation, and prestige was 
conferred upon the Arabic language in terms of its usage. By using these techniques, Arabic 
was nationally recognised and used in official and educational contexts. Iraq's universities 
offered their courses in Arabic and in English. Speakers who used Arabic were considered well-
educated and from a high class. The Kurdish language almost reached the point of no return. 
Therefore, outwardly Kurdish existed, but severe censorship, intimidation, and murder posed 
obstacles to the transmission and diffusion of Soraní Kurdish to develop as a standardised 
language. For example, the regime closed down the University of Sulaimani in Suleimaniyeh 
city in 1981 in order to avoid the development of the Kurdish language and nationalism 
throughout higher education. Although it was re-established in Irbil (Hawler) later, its name 
was changed into an Arabic name, i.e., University of Salahaddin. It has been argued that, 
according to some secret documents which were obtained after the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq, “the regime was planning to put an end to the use of Kurdish as a language of 
instruction in Kurdistan-Iraq” (Sheyholislami 2011, p. 64). In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf 
War, Kurds established the first Kurdish parliament and the Regional Government of Kurdistan. 
In the new phase of freedom, several political parties with different beliefs but which were 
                                                 
14 According to Human Rights watch, Anfal is defined as “a campaign of the Iraqi government and army 
carried out against the village Kurdish population of Iraqi Kurdistan in 1988, the year during which the Iran-Iraq 
War came to an end. Anfal was a name used by the Iraqi army. Taken from Koranic verse, it refers to “the plunder 
of the infidel,” and evidently was intended to give the campaign the veneer of religious justification, though the 
Kurds themselves are Muslims and Iraq is a secular state” (Anderson and Watch1993, p. 4). 
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radical and at violent odds with each other for several years, posed another obstacle for the 
Kurdish language to develop.  
The media had an immense role in reusing, producing and borrowing words that had an 
impact on language standardisation and development. In addition, “broadcasting facilities were 
run by the political parties and the Kurdish government. The two major parties, PUK and KDP15, 
aired programmes for the entire region while other smaller parties had their own stations” 
(Hassanpour 1996, p.73). With having a parallel administration, each of KDP and PUK has 
governed about half of Iraqi Kurdish territory16 and each has its own language, which expresses 
that party’s ideology. Although they started a process of integration of the two governments 
into one after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, the language and mass media 
problem continues and results in the production of two types of media outlet. Gulan and 
Kurdistan-i-Nwe, for example, are two partisan newspapers, which directly belong to the KDP 
and PUK, respectively. Kurdistan TV and Zagros TV are the PDK’s media outlets, while 
Kurdsat TV and Gali Kurdistan Satellite Channel are the PUK’s media outlets. The second type 
of outlet is the shadow media, which are affiliated indirectly to either the KDP or PUK (see 
chapter 4 for an in-depth analysis of the Kurdish political parties, and their media agencies, 
including shadow media). It has been reported that Rudaw Media Company is closely affiliated 
to the KDP (Chomani 2012), although it considered itself as a private media company. Xendan 
for Publishing and Broadcasting, likewise, describes itself as free from party political bias and 
proprietorial influence, but it is known as the PUK affiliated Xendan. This turned the Kurdish 
language into a focus for political and ideological struggles. In 2009, another political 
movement emerged as an official opposition party (known as the Change movement) against 
the ruling two-party coalition that governed the Kurdistan Regional Government. It comprises 
several media outlets, such as the Wusha Corporation, Sbeiy newspaper, Kurdish News Network 
(KNN), and KNN TV. Since then, the Kurdish media has been divided into three ideological 
camps: the authority-affiliated media, the opposition media and the independent media. With 
each media having its own writers, translators and language of use, not only has the Kurdish 
                                                 
15 The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP/ KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
16 The Kurdistan Democratic Party has governed Hawler (Irbil) and Dhok’s provinces and the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan has governed Sulaimania province. 
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language been affected negatively in terms of unification and standardisation, but also the 
translation behaviour was affected in terms of making choices among many alternatives in the 
process of the translation (see subsection 1.1.3).  
The historical overview above has exposed the profound influence of political events 
upon the Kurdish language diachronically and underlined that Soraní Kurdish has undergone 
two significant phases, pre- and post-Kurdish self-government. Before having an autonomous 
region, Kurds had made constant efforts to develop Kurdish and to protect it from 
marginalisation. Being a stateless nation, Kurdish identity was/is based on the language. 
Sheyholislami (2009/2015) describes it as “the most salient symbol of Kurdish identity, both 
culturally and politically, because it separates the Kurds from their neighbouring nations more 
readily than any other cultural or physical characteristic”. After establishing regional 
government in 1990s, several universities and cultural centres (including academic centres for 
studying the Kurdish language) have been established in Kurdistan. Kurdish writers, 
intellectuals, translators, poets and journalists have contributed to the development of their 
language through literary writings and publications. Thus, it can be argued that media and 
modern technologies are able to establish a collective sense of belonging. Being a stateless 
nation, Kurds have lived under different hegemonic cultures, such as Arabic, Turkish and 
Persian, for more than a century. Therefore, similarity and difference coexist between Kurdish 
and these languages. On the one hand, media and modern technologies can help in realising 
how different Kurdish is from the other three languages. On the other hand, they can show the 
impact of the historical and current socio-political factors upon Kurdish and its development. 
Meanwhile, different Kurdish media have developed different ideological directions, which, in 
turn, influenced the way Soraní Kurdish communicated as a language of the public 
communication in society. In this way, the way in which the Kurdish language falls along 
ideological lines has implication for the norms followed by different translators For instance, 
the two words ﯽﺑﺎﺗوﻗ (BT: pupil) and رﺎكدنيوخ (BT: student) are used in the same sense by different 
parties and publication agencies indicating ideological affiliation. They are even placed in most 
of the government’s official documents next to each other due to the ideological diversity of the 
political parties in power. The term ﯽﺑﺎﺗﻭﻗ (BT: pupil) is common in the KDP affiliated media 
while the term رﺎكدنيوخ (BT: student) is more prominent in the PUK affiliated media. 
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1.1.2 Kurdish Language and Translation Pre-Autonomous Region in Iraqi Kurdistan 
The previous subsection has shown the historical and socio-political development of 
Soraní Kurdish before and after the foundation of an autonomous region in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Delivering a historical view of the practice of translation under the rule of different successive 
government preceding Kurdistan regional government in north of Iraq, this subsection has two 
aims. Firstly, it reveals the way historical and socio-political relations might influence 
translators’ behaviour today and shows the role and contribution of translation in the 
development and standardisation of Soraní Kurdish as well. It also shows that in the pre-
autonomous region of Kurdistan, there was considerable translation activity; however, the 
scholarship on such translation activity is virtually non-existent. This, in turn, further underlines 
the significance of undertaking this study. 
It is argued that texts were translated into Kurdish long before the 19th century. 
However, evidence of translated published materials might refer back to the time when “the 
first printing press of Kurdistan was set up in Solaymāniya in 1919” (Kreyenbroek, 2005) under 
the British mandate. The use of Soraní Kurdish was encouraged as a written language. In the 
early 20th century, several Kurdish newspapers, such as Tegeyishtini Rasti and Peshkawtin 
(Kreyenbroek, 2005) and many translations of western works, such as the translation of Pushkin, 
Schiller, Byron and Lamartine, emerged (Izady 1992). Before the termination of the British 
mandate, Britain promised to give the Kurds, as stipulated by the League of Nations17 in 1926, 
their right regarding the use of the Kurdish language as one of the official languages in the area; 
however, no steps were taken to guarantee that. In addition, the Iraqi government did not show 
any sign of “the promised Kurdish translation bureau (which was to deal with laws and school 
textbooks)” (Sluglett 2007, p. 127). Therefore, with Arabic being the dominant language at the 
                                                 
17  According to the Lausanne Treaty, Article 39 signed on June 24, 1923, language rights were guaranteed 
for all ethnic groups: “No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in 
private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings. 
Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of 
non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the courts” (Izady 2004:102). All Kurds, like all 
other nations, were under the domain of the Ottoman Empire at that time. 
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time, most of the works which were written in European languages were translated from the 
Arabic versions (Hasanpoor 1999).  
The activity of translation and publication for the general public continued until the 
collapse of the monarchy on 14 July 1958. However, their publications were usually restricted 
in terms of the content and number. In 1958, the first book entitled Wergêran Hunere 
(Translation is an Art), was published. During the time of Saddam Hussein, the government 
carefully censored all official mass media produced within the autonomous Kurdish region. 
Some materials, such as short stories, were written in and translated into Soraní Kurdish. Some 
Kurdish films that were produced had to pass government censorship. English films were 
available only with Arabic subtitling. According to Ahmadzadeh (2005, p. 71), “there were 
hardly any novels translated into Kurdish before the emergence of the Kurdish novel”. In the 
1970s, the first novel Jan-I Gal (The Agony of People) was published, but it was proscribed by 
the government (Gunter 2010: 202). The Kurdish press and periodicals, including translated 
subjects, were permitted on a very limited scale under government censorship. Up to the end of 
the 1980s, the Kurdish press had not only encountered many difficulties in terms of circulation, 
distribution, newspaper printing and publishing, but also had “been reinforced by the division 
of the Kurdish speech community and political restrictions on the use of language” (Hassanpour 
1992, p 276). Therefore, most of the works were written, translated and published in the 
diaspora. In other words, they are published outside the power of the dominant political system 
because they differed “relatively sharply from the dominant ideology and/or poetics of the time” 
(Lefevere 1992b, 21). In Iraq, Soraní Kurdish was tolerated and treated as an official “local 
language”, by successive Iraqi governments who practiced a policy of Arabisation as a means 
of containing Kurdish nationalism. It might be difficult to study those works within the scope 
of this study due to the lack of their availability because the majority of them were lost and 
many of them had a short-lived existence due to fluctuations in relations between the Kurds and 
successive Iraqi governments. Besides, they are outside the remit of this study. In addition, the 
setting up of a more or less autonomous security zone in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1992, in general, 
and the fall  of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, in particular, initially led to a great deal of 
published  translated works reflecting the political and social issues of  the area. Kurdish literary 
writers have written a number of novels and poems. In the field of translation and media, many 
literary and non-literary works including journals, newspapers, periodicals and films, were 
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translated into Soraní Kurdish. Some research was conducted by Kurdish scholars and linguists 
into language unification, standardisation, and even language borrowing. Nevertheless, so far 
there is very little academic research covering translation studies in Iraqi Kurdistan, especially 
media translation (see the following sub-section 1.1.3 for more details).  
 
1.1.3 Kurdish Media and Translation Post-Autonomous Region in Iraqi Kurdistan 
The subsection builds on the historical view of the practice of translation under the rule 
of different successive government preceding the Kurdistan regional government (KRG) in the 
north of Iraq outlined above, which illustrates the interplay between historical and current socio-
political factors and their impacts on translators’ behaviour today. It builds on this by presenting 
an overview of the latest studies of Kurdish media, geopolitical ideology and power relations in 
Iraqi Kurdistan in order to provide further justification for conducting this study, arguing that 
Kurdish media translation has thus far received little attention. 
The Kurdish media is of great significance in Kurdish society, particularly since the 
1990s with the establishment of an autonomous region in northern Iraq. As explained in the 
previous subsections, since 1992 media facilities have been run by the Kurdish government and 
political parties, including the two major ruling parties (PDK and PUK) and, from 2008, the 
Gorran opposition party. For a long time, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK) has governed 
Hawler (Irbil) and Dhok’s provinces, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has governed 
Sulaimania province. However, the Gorran opposition party surprisingly won the majority of 
votes in the province of Sulaimania in the Kurdish national assembly on July 25, 2009, KRG 
election. Following these dramatic changes in Kurdish society, the Kurdish media represents a 
means of investigating the language used in the field of translation in order to reveal the wide 
political and socio-cultural implications impacting on Kurdish translators’ behaviours. Their 
decisions represent the source words of others and are restricted and guided by textual and extra-
textual factors, such as commissioners (patrons), norms, audience expectations and target text 
functions. In addition, they are affected by translators’ “own sociocultural and educational 
background, ideological, phraseological and idiosyncratic stylistic preferences” (Munday 
2012a, p.2). However, previous studies have usually ignored translation that blurs the difference 
between the impacts of these factors, and overlooked theories that foreground ideology in 
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translation studies. Part of this study’s original contribution lies in the way it identifies what can 
be gained by taking translation into account while investigating the language used in media texts 
in Iraqi Kurdistan.  
The Kurdish media in Iraqi Kurdistan has attracted some researchers’ attention after the 
fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003, including Mawlood’s 2011 work, The Impact of the Press Law 
2008 on the Role of Journalism in the Kurdistan Region post-2003; and Sheyholislami’s 2011 
book, Kurdish Identity, Discourse, and New Media. In the field of translation, very little 
research has been conducted beyond Salih’s (2014) work on the use of English and Kurdish 
connectives in newspaper articles. Birot (2012) has undertaken some work on the role of 
ideology in translation and Kurdish media in Iraqi Kurdistan via newspaper articles. 
Nevertheless, the role of ideology in this field, especially in geopolitical commentary articles, 
has not yet been studied academically. This study thus opens new and important research 
questions, arguing that media translation has an influential role in shaping the values, ideas, and 
belief systems in Kurdish society and it might be used as a manipulative tool in favour of 
different geopolitical media agencies. The translated texts selected for this study provide an 
introduction to the many ideological struggles over the nature, meaning and cause of 
contemporary contextual changes. The aim is to reveal the hidden ideology of geopolitical 
knowledge which leads to the use of a series of repeated translational strategies in Kurdish 
media translation. This, in turn, not only shapes translators’ behaviour and discursive choices, 
but also reveals various historical and socio-political dynamics behind the interactions between 
the Kurdish political blocs, successive authorities and the media in the Kurdish semi-
autonomous region, and considers the particular circumstances in which Kurdish translators 
currently operate.  
As with many complex and multifaceted cultural concepts, ideology has many possible 
definitions. Following Lefevere approach (1992b) and van Dijk’s approach (1998a)18, ideology 
in the context of Kurdish studies can be defined in relation to language, society and culture 
including factors such as power, politics and religion. The language and texts used within the 
field of Kurdish media are thus considered to reflect socio-cultural messages and power 
                                                 
18 Details is given in the section 2.3 of the following chapter 
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relations. In translation studies, it can be argued that the kinds of translations that occur, as texts 
move along the sociocultural, political and media chain, are usually dependent on the interests 
and objectives of the existing dominant power and context into which the discourse is being re-
contextualised. They reflect the translator’s mediation in relation to ideological manipulation in 
translation studies19. The Kurdish media, likewise, might reflect a wide political, socio-cultural 
context which has its own impact on the translations produced within this field. In Iraqi 
Kurdistan, they are often the result of different geopolitical ideologies. Their representation 
could be expected to follow diverse goals and be shaped by different strands of socio-political 
arguments on the past, present and future of Kurdish society.  
Meanwhile, the breadth of knowledge on journalism as an occupation and the adoption 
of respective techniques post-Hussein’s regime in 2003 has led to changes in the modes of 
representation and the diversification of images in the Kurdish media. Describing Kurdish 
media productions, Fischer-Tahir (2013, p. 30) argues that “the process of transforming 
‘occurrences in the everyday world […] into stories’ highly depends on the institutional 
organisational and personal interests of the media producers”. This might also be true for the 
media translation practise in Iraqi Kurdistan. Apart from radio and television, different Kurdish 
print publications and the internet sources strive to affect public discourse by selecting and 
prioritising topics for translation in order to convey certain beliefs and have particular impacts. 
Therefore, the investigation of the notion of ideology within Kurdish media in general and 
Kurdish media translation, in particular, is not so much interested in the specific activities 
depicted in a single newspaper, or media agency. For ideological analysis, the key is the fit 
between the sense and words within a number of media texts translated by different publication 
agencies in order to define various reflections, including socio-cultural and political issues. Due 
to the current political status of Kurdistan, which is a dynamic and ever-changing process, the 
effect of these particular types of translation in the world of geopolitics is more prominent and 
of critical importance.  
Geopolitics can be defined as “a view or a mode of politics with an active concern for 
the overall planetary scheme of life” (Beaugrande 1994, p.5). In this sense, geopolitical texts 
                                                 
19  See section 2.1 of the following chapter. 
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disclose knowledge about a region and often motivate geopolitical theory and practice 
economically, environmentally and so forth. For Dalby et al. (1998), “geopolitical texts are not 
“neutral” writings from a detached position outside politics, history or geography, attempting 
to answer a single commonly agreed upon “question” (p. 311). In today’s Kurdish media, they 
are of interest to the public because they seem to promise unusual insight into the future 
direction of international affairs and the coming shape of the Kurdish political map. However, 
specifications of the relationship between geography, power, ideology and translation vary 
considerably as geopolitical visionaries vie with each other to delimit a “new geopolitics.” For 
some, the current political status of Kurdistan has allowed the emergence of new geopolitical 
media dominated by territorial struggles between competing blocs and nationalism. This, in 
turn, might be reflected in the field of Kurdish media translation when the production of 
geopolitical discourse is treated by translators as part of politics itself and not as a neutral and 
detached description of a transparent objective reality. In this sense, ideology might not only be 
“located in the translated text […], but also in the voice and position of the translator” 
(Tymoczko 2010, p. 213). This study, therefore, argues that ideology might reside in the 
geographical and temporal stance of the Kurdish translators and govern their choices along with 
their cultural and ideological affiliations. It raises several questions as regards the producers of 
these particular types of translations and their impacts, the way they move from the field of 
ideology to that of media texts and the extent to which the knowledge producers are imbricated 
with issues of ideology and power. This might be due to the fact that these “translations are not 
made in vacuum. Translators function in a given culture at given time. The way they understand 
themselves and their cultures is one of the factors that may influence the way in which they may 
translate” (Lefevere 1992a, p.14).  
In the context of this study then, ideology assumes a primary position and becomes an 
important analytical tool and common ground which reflects the occurrence of different 
(re)framings by varied users and reframing strategies for different purposes. The observation of 
such behaviours not only leads to the observation of patterns and trends in Kurdish media 
translation at a particular period of time, but also allows the study to elaborate a more intricate 
picture of the positioning of translators and embed them in the existing political reality. Media 
translation is, therefore, examined as the act of comprehending a context, socially, politically 
and culturally by translators and rendering it into another language and culture. It reflects the 
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role of contextual factors in Kurdish translators’ decision in relation to the lexico-grammatical 
choices and how their acceptance, refusal, or modification affect the Kurdish language 
development and non-standardisation and vice versa. 
In sum, the section above has shown that the wide practice of translation for the general 
public (in the public sphere) from English into Kurdish is not new in Iraqi Kurdistan. However, 
its practice as an independent and emancipated activity on a limited scale is fairly new and dates 
back to the 2000s. The section also revealed that Kurdish translators might be under various 
pressure to make difficult decisions regarding lexico-grammatical choices and finding sufficient 
lexical resources in order to translate from foreign languages, particularly English. Kurdish non-
standardisation results in the lack of, and need for a common ground in terms of how to keep 
this language updated with the passage of time as new ideas, technologies and translations arise 
and how to adopt and spell loan words, calques and so forth. Hasanpoor (1999, p. 40) elucidates 
that “translations have enriched the language with the adoption of new concepts, loans, 
neologisms, and the introduction of punctuation and stylistic codes”. It can be argued that 
Hassanpour's statement refers to Kurdish translation in general. However, this study is 
consistent with what he argues regarding the lack of studies of the contributions and limitations 
of translated works. The contributions of translation choices and ideology, especially in media 
translation, have not yet been studied. Translation choices in relation to the meaning focus may 
be considered as “nothing but arbitrary since there is no reason why a particular perspective 
should be favoured over competing interpretations” (Strugielska and Siek-Piskozub 2013, p. 
20). This makes the present study important and exigent since this study argues that Kurdish 
translation choices are driven by ideology and according to Lefevere (1992a, p. 14) “ideology 
is often enforced by the patrons, the people or institutions who commission or publish 
translations”. Although the existence of a number of translated texts in the public sphere is 
insufficient for today’s growing market demand, nevertheless, the mainstream media has 
continued to grow over the last decade and the translation demand in Kurdistan is ever rising. 
For this reason, Kurdish media translation in Kurdistan deserves a more detailed review so that 
challenges and obstacles to translators’ decisions in the region can be identified. In addition, the 
development of Kurdish language and also translation studies has still to be consolidated. The 
Kurdish language needs to be promoted, especially in terms of its standardisation and language 
policy. Standardisation is important because it defines widely-accepted norms for all purposes 
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of language use in writing in that language. In the Kurdish language, to a great extent, norms 
are considered to be an outcome of spontaneous exchanges between writers and editors 
(translators and editors) over a certain period of time, rather than following guidelines offered 
by an academy or language policy, which does not exist. In the field of translation, this leads to 
a state of confusion and makes the translators believe that they can do what they want in terms 
of lexical choices. However, it is undeniable that language standardisation and unification in 
Kurdish is a gradual process and requires research into different aspects of that language. 
 
1.2 Objectives and Analytical Progression of the Study 
The overview of the history of Soraní Kurdish along with the practice and studies of 
Kurdish media, translation, geopolitical ideology and power relations in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
presented above, revealed that Kurdish media translation has received little attention so far. Due 
to this, the current project, focusing on the period from 2011 to 2014, seeks to shed light on 
English-Kurdish translation and provide an insight into the Kurdish translator’s behaviour in 
the future. This next section, therefore, presents the scope and the main goals of the study and 
sets out the questions the study seeks to answer through its examination of translation practice. 
On the one hand, the initial impulse behind this study is to show the impact of the socio-
political context on the translation choices. This study aims to explore the extent to which 
translation choices/shifts are affected by the historical and current political events in the area, 
the conservative Kurdish society and culture, and the status of Kurdish in terms of non-
standardisation. It thus assumes that the historical, social, cultural, political, and linguistic 
context of Kurdish has a significant impact on Kurdish translators’ lexico-grammatical choices 
in the target language.  
Kurdish media translations are typically produced by translators whose first language is 
Kurdish. Although their classification is not an easy task, they can broadly be distinguished into 
three groups: people who are experienced in the field of translation; people who have graduated 
with English degrees; people who have learnt English in other contexts, e.g., they hold a degree 
in a field related to their specialism, such as doctors or they have lived in abroad, in English 
speaking countries in particular. It can be argued that having knowledge of the linguistic and 
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stylistic aspects of the two languages they work in may not be enough. The occurrence of any 
of borrowing, omission and addition poses questions in terms of their acceptance or refusal in 
the target language and culture and involves not only the translators’ own sociocultural and 
educational background, but also their ideological, phraseological and personal stylistic 
preferences. This study, however, looks at these translators as mediators, and does not explore 
their personal or professional trajectories. The translations of the journalistic articles in the 
corpus of this study are published by recognisable media agencies in Iraqi Kurdistan and they 
are considered to be the production of professional translators. Of the total of the selected 60 
translated texts in the corpus of this study, only the names of 19 translators, who translated 35 
texts, are known. The rest of the texts came under the media agencies’ designations which are 
Sbeiy, Xendan, Rudaw, and PUKpb (Kurdistan-i-Nwe). There would have been a possibility to 
follow a few translators through over the period and map changes. However, this thesis does 
not do this because the focus is on the language in use, and translators as mediators rather than 
as individuals. This study disregards the individual translators, their personal styles and 
idiosyncrasies for they may have made it difficult to make strong claims about general 
translation trends exhibited by each media agency. This orients the analysis to identify patterns 
of textual change and link them to the ideological positioning of the media outlets. 
The study, thus, aims at providing an insight into the significance of the role of various 
contexts in translators’ decision-making. This, in turn, shows the extent to which media 
translation in Kurdistan is an institutional operation and mutual process of norm organisation 
practice in geopolitical context models. The study attempts to find out what is common among 
the factors that determine translation choices in relation to cases of omission, addition, and 
borrowing in order to disclose the regularities of translation behaviour. This may result in which 
translation trends are most commonly followed in the public sphere and provide opportunities 
to reveal the type and effect of operating translation norms in English-Kurdish media today. 
Translation norms can be defined as “options that translators in a given socio-historical context 
select on a regular basis” (Baker 2011b:190) and they can be recognised through regularity of 
translation behaviour (Toury 1995, 2012). Therefore, this study looks at translation mainly as a 
socio-political and ideological act and translators as active actors who play a specific social role 
within two different social-cultural frameworks. They have the ability to start a chain of 
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reflection and see the links between textual items, immediate narrative, metanarrative, the 
function of the source text, and the function of the target text in its target cultural situation.  
In terms of the aim and objectives that the research sets out to achieve, this study thus is 
generally an original, substantial and sustained piece of work. Considering CNA model of 
reframing which provided this study with significant tools to investigate the way ideological 
and evaluative elements in media translation are rendered, the outcomes identifies translation 
shifts in relation to the prevailing socio-political and ideological factors. However, within the 
scope and time length of a PhD study, there are limitations to be considered. One of the main 
limitations in this study was the size of the corpora. As explained in chapter three, corpus 
representation has been viewed as a controversial matter. Since the study comprises texts that 
are translated and published over the period of four years only (from 2011 to 2014), it was not 
possible to include geopolitical journalistic texts translated over a longer time period and of 
more recent dates. This is due to the fact that the compiled corpus consists only of online 
published journalistic texts along with their translations. Being a new area in Kurdistan, online 
translated texts, in particular geopolitical journalistic texts, were not available in large quantities 
before and even at the time of compilation. 
Another limitation originated from the text-based nature of this research, which makes 
the attempts to relate the textual evidence to the socio-political contexts also seem text-bound. 
This approach can be reasonably justified within the Kurdish geopolitical context in which the 
process of text production remains consistently cloudy as a result of the unrecorded regulation 
by institutional norms. In this case, the investigation of textual data from a CNA perspective 
would seem effective to relate the textual evidence to the social functions it intends to achieve 
and to further expound a macro-level of power relation involved in text production. 
Nevertheless, as highlighted by some translation scholars, such as Mason (2008) and Schäffner 
(2012) in their most recent work, the practice of using discourse analysis as a way of discussing 
translator’s behaviour and concluding social process has been reassessed and reformulated in 
an attempt to integrate the research of institutional activities, interactions and agency with text-
based translation studies. 
This study, therefore, confines the study of socio-historical and cultural factors to an 
examination of the way they are reflected in translational constraints. In other words, it analyses 
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the role of context in determining the meaning of texts and shows a variety of factors that 
influence the translation choices with the objective of finding answers to questions generated 
by the observation of the corpora. With reference to the translation of geopolitical texts, 
especially in Kurdistan, this study seeks to find out to what extent geopolitical and contextual 
factors affect the translation choices in Kurdish media translation. It does so by exploring the 
following research questions: 
 To what extent are translation agencies and newspapers allowing ideology to 
inform their news output and translation policies? 
 Are translators manipulating the STs to favour or undermine the dominant 
narratives in the target society and/or reframing the ST to motivate the reader to 
reconsider his/her position regarding these dominant narratives? 
 Are these manipulations driven by ideology?  
 Are there other possible motivations informing translation practice, i.e., the status 
of Kurdish language (e.g., its non-standardisation), the current political status 
(e.g., different political ideologies) in Iraqi Kurdistan, and the translators’ own 
sociocultural and educational background? 
 What strategies do the translators use in disseminating or opposing the narratives 
elaborated in the STs in line with the narrative they accept or dissent from? To 
what extent does each case of borrowing, omission, addition and literal translation 
affect meaning and value of the ST and TT? What norms can be discerned from 
this analysis?  
 What type of shift results from the use of the respective strategies? What is 
common among the factors behind translators’ decision-making in relation to 
these shifts? 
 Why is a particular lexicalisation preferred to other alternatives by the translators 
and/or publishers in the translation process? 
This study encompasses seven chapters. This introduction provides a general 
background to Kurdish translation and the media, and the socio-political and ideological events 
that have historically informed the Kurdish language. Chapter two comprises a literature review, 
investigating relevant theories on the study of manipulation and the translator’s ideological 
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mediation in media outlets. It is guided by the research objective to provide a framework to 
identify the gap this study addresses. This review takes the form of a critical discussion, showing 
insight and an awareness of differing arguments, theories and approaches. Chapter three 
includes the methodology and corpus design. This chapter seeks to illustrate the relationships 
between the methods used to collect and interpret the data and the theoretical models selected 
in this study. A multidisciplinary approach is employed in order to address the role of the socio-
political context in Kurdish media translation. Chapters four, five and six consist of data 
analysis. Chapter four investigates the state of Kurdish media translation from English into 
Kurdish through presenting an overview of the four selected Kurdish media agencies, their text-
selection policy, and the translation strategies used that lead to stylistic shifts. The focus is on 
the impact of the strategy of borrowing in relation to the ideology of the translators and major 
news agencies and newspapers. Chapter five seeks to investigate the strategies used that lead to 
semantic shifts. It investigates the way in which ideology shapes Kurdish translation processes, 
through the analysis of the corpus of collected translations. It discusses the translators’ lexico-
grammatical choices with regard to deletion and addition strategies in the translation of English 
commentary articles into Kurdish. In doing so, it will explore the role of translators in assenting 
or dissenting the narratives elaborated in the STs with the aim of revealing the extent to which 
translators make modifications to the STs to undermine the narratives dominating and/or 
disapproving the target society. Chapter six scrutinises the way that translations identified in 
the corpus are framed by the ideology of the political parties to which the news agencies and 
newspapers are aligned. The research ends with conclusions and appendices. 
Consequently, taking English-Kurdish translation as a case-study, this research 
represents an original contribution to knowledge by discussing the impact of the non-
standardisation of the Kurdish language and contextual factors on Kurdish translators’ decisions 
in relation to lexico-grammatical choices. Following ideological and demographic changes in 
Kurdish society, the state of the Kurdish language and the current political ideology is apparent 
today in the public sphere, in particular the media. The mainstream media in Iraqi Kurdistan is 
in constant flux and the demand for translation is growing. This widespread availability and 
exposure make Kurdish media the primary focus of this research in order to investigate Kurdish 
translation more academically. There has been very little research in this area so far. This 
research, thus, provides an opportunity to study English-Kurdish translation as an academic 
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discipline and sheds light on the Kurdish translators’ decisions with the aim of providing an 
insight into challenges and obstacles they face in the region. Moreover, this research aims at 
identifying major trends in the overall strategy pursed by Kurdish translators in order to arrive 
at culturally determined translation norms that underlie the translators’ choices and strategies 
and identify factors beyond purely linguistic ones, i.e., ideological factors. The concept of 
ideology is investigated in relation to the concept of socio-culture which includes language, 
manipulation and power relations by investigating various target text selections in the Kurdish 
media. The status of the choices made in the TT is examined by comparing them to their 
counterparts in the ST in order to investigate the ideology of individual translators in terms of 
lexico-grammatical choices and the way that this informs the reading. This leads to a collating 
of the semiotic, the linguistic, the social, and the cultural perspectives on communicating and 
helps formulate broader conceptions of what is meant to be understood from the TTs. In 
addition, researching ideological manipulation in media texts aided by socio-linguistic 
approaches will provide translation scholars with the opportunity to explore further relevant 
linguistic methods and media theories for the investigation of particular aspects such as stance 
and attitude in media texts. This study, thus, attempts to form a framework to facilitate such an 
examination. The key concepts in ideology and translation studies are investigated in order to 
support an analysis of the underlying principles and values according to which many social and 





Kurdish Media Translation and Ideology 
2.0  Introduction 
Chapter one has identified the way this study provides an original contribution to 
knowledge by filling a gap in the existing literature and indicating that Kurdish media 
translation has received little attention so far. It also presented a general account of the socio-
political aspects of Soraní Kurdish along with media and translation practice in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
introducing the key elements necessary for understanding this context. This chapter further 
highlights the relevance of this study to the discipline of Translation Studies through developing 
a critical analytical framework for the discussion of ideology and mediation in Kurdish media 
translation in Iraqi Kurdistan. The study employs a multidisciplinary model in order to 
investigate the normative effects that ideological factors (especially the effect of socio-political 
factors) may have on translation behaviour in the translation of the online media commentary 
articles from English into Kurdish.  
With the focus on the role of ideology and possible mediation in Kurdish media 
translation, the framework in this chapter, thus, has two main purposes. Firstly, it provides an 
overview of literature on manipulation and the translator’s mediation in relation to ideology in 
translation studies. It will also outline the basic paradigms of media language, ideology and 
translation studies as a discipline by seeking to define aspects of media and translation studies 
relevant to the tenet of this study. The chapter identifies Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and 
Narrative Theory as useful tools for the exploration of the normative impact of the ideological 
positioning of the translator within the framework of Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS) 
based on Chesterman’s concept of norms. It does so through giving a comprehensive critical 
overview of the theoretical models relevant to this study in order to address the way linguistic 
resources are manipulated to enable such mediation and/or express ideology. This, in turn, helps 
 29 
in the formation of a critical narrative analysis (CNA)20 framework in the following chapter that 
facilitates investigating the connections between the macro-level ideological power and micro-
level interactional positioning of Kurdish media translation.  
 
2.1 Ideological Translation Choices and Manipulation in Translation Studies 
This section presents some similar terms clustered around the translator’s ideological 
choices in translation studies in order to explore the interplay between translation choices and 
ideological constraints in media translation studies. The majority of scholars in translation 
studies acknowledge that translators’ choices are affected by a great variety of external factors, 
often described as constraints. Bassnett (1999) indicates that, “translation always takes place in 
a continuum, never in a void, and there are all kinds of textual and extra-textual constraints upon 
the translator” (p. 123). Álvarez and Vidal (1996) observe translators as being constrained by 
several factors, such as feelings of superiority or inferiority towards the ST, translators’ 
ideologies and common ideologies, dominant poetical rules, the expectations of prevailing 
institutions and public opinion (p. 6). For Fawcett (1995), these factors can be summarised as 
cultural and political pressures (p.186), which play an important manipulating role in the 
production of translations. This study looks at these constraints as ideological factors and 
observes the potential impact they might have on translators’ behaviour and media translation. 
Based on Chesterman’s categorisation of norms (1997), this study explores these factors in 
relation to the existence of norms at a macro-strategic level that may have impact on translators’ 
attitude across different discourse communities within the media domain (see section 2.5.1 for 
details). 
It is crucial to look into the historical development of the study of the concept of 
ideology in translation studies and the extent to which it influences the translator’s behaviour, 
as it is one of the common issues concerning manipulation and the translator’s mediation in 
translation studies. The practice of power relations and ideology in translation is not a new issue. 
                                                 
20 The expression critical narrative analysis (CNA) is used by Souto-Manning (2014) outside the field of 
translation studies to refer to the combination of the two approaches to data analysis as an attempt to explore the 
significant relation between “macro-level power in equities and micro-level interactional positions”. 
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According to Fawcett (1998), “throughout the centuries, individuals and institutions applied 
their particular beliefs to the production of certain effects in translation” (p. 107). This is due to 
the fact that translation has historically often been practised in favour of diverse ideological 
agendas (Tymoczko 2000, p. 25). One of the earliest instances would be the Romans who 
“involved assimilation of the source text to the target culture” and their particular needs 
(Fawcett 1998, p. 108). Fawcett (1998) also labels Marxist-Leninist translation theory as 
another instance from history, for aiming at ideologically recurring translation strategies in 
order to take advantage of translation’s full manipulative effort (pp.109-10). With the arrival of 
new techniques for using mass communications for cultural control in the 1950s and 1960s, 
translators started to attune their translation techniques to accomplish the ideological effects 
they coveted “to produce in their audiences, whether those effects were religious faith, 
consumption of products, or literary success” (Gentzler and Tymoczko 2002, xi). Nevertheless, 
due to the limitation of the linguistic-oriented approaches to address this concept in translation 
studies, a wide range of work on ideology has been published since “the cultural turn” (some of 
the most significant being, Lefevere 1992a, 1992b, 1993; Venuti 1995; Àlvarez and Vidal 
Claramonte 1996; Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997; Flotow 2000; Gentzler and Tymoczko 2002; 
Calzada Pérez 2001, 2003; Faiq 2004; Bermann and Wood 2005).They raise a range of 
challenging questions regarding the definition of this notion within translation studies, the 
boundary line between ideological motivations and culture, and the essence of its interference 
in the selections made during the process of translation (Fawcett and Munday 2011, p. 137).  
The cultural-oriented approach has expanded the scope of research in translation studies 
to include issues of ideology, identity, power relations, and other cultural modes of investigation 
to understand the beliefs or values of an unfamiliar culture. New translation studies, ultimately, 
moved away from the traditional perception of equivalence and aimed at explaining how 
ideological potency can be culpable for shifts in translation. Translation scholars have shown 
interest in the investigation of manipulation and power relations involved in the translation of 
various texts. They became familiar with the manipulative potential of translated texts and used 
functionalist methods that gave rise to early descriptive approaches. In addition, they proposed 
several terminologies for the study of the phenomena of the ideological distortion in translation 
today. In effect, these terminological distinctions map out a basic paradigm for studying 
ideology in translation, fleshed out with a variety of methods and models developed over the 
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history of translation studies. For instance, the name “manipulation school” is employed to refer 
to a group of scholars who are often associated with the descriptive branch of translation 
approaches and mainly concerned with literary texts and culture-related aspects of translation 
(e.g., Hermans 1985; Holmes 1988/2000; Toury 1995; 2012; Lefevere 1992a, 1992b; Bassnett 
1999). They acknowledge that translation choices are affected by a great variety of external 
factors. However, this next section explains that most of the postcolonial studies, which are 
preoccupied with ideological concerns, are conducted predominantly through thematic analysis. 
Few of them considered narratological observations and textual evidence from the texts under 
scrutiny and the identification of textual differences between source and target language texts 
as part of their respective research methodologies and explorations. In other words, it can be 
argued that their textual analysis is not detailed at the level of lexico-grammatical choices, 
which constitute a significant part of critical discourse analysis (CDA) that contributes to better 
inform micro-level discussions of the effect of ideology in translation. Calzada Pérez (2001) 
also suggested that the solution to this “clash” could lie in the translation studies research based 
on CDA. This study would therefore be considered as another contribution to such a theoretical 
and methodological pathway (see section 2.3 for more details). 
It is important to bear in mind that Hermans’ work (2010, p. 193) on translator’s voice 
and positioning does employ linguistic and stylistic analysis, and it is significant in this study. 
He argues for a model of translated narrative that considers the way in which translator’s voice 
ingratiates into the discourse and adjusts to the modification which translation begets. He (1985, 
p. 11) also argues that, from the target perspective “all translation implies a degree of 
manipulation of the source text for a certain purpose”. Shuttleworth and Cowie (1997) further 
explain Hermans’ concept of manipulation as a kind of text handling by the translator who seeks 
to bring “the Target Text into line with a particular model and hence a particular correctness 
notion, and in so doing secure(ing) social acceptance, even acclaim” (p.101). Lefevere and 
Bassnett (1990) claim that translation is not innocent and they compare it to other modes of 
“rewriting”. According to them, “neither the word, nor the text, but the culture becomes the 
operational ‘unit’ of translation” (p. 8). In addition, the idea of Even-Zohar’s21 literary 
                                                 
21 Itmar Even-Zohar defines the polysystem “as a heterogeneous, hierarchized conglomerate (or system) 
of systems which interact to bring about an ongoing, dynamic process of evolution within the polysystem as a 
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polysystem theory argues that various literatures and genres, including translated and non-
translated works, compete for hegemony (Zhang 2012, p. 754). This led to the development of 
recognising the importance of sociocultural norms and the role of ideology at the core of the 
descriptive translation studies (DTS) approach by Toury (1995, 2012). DTS allows this study 
to look at the function that translation choices play not just as textual devices but as discursive 
practices that have an effect on the construction of ideological discourses. In addition, it replaces 
many individual case studies and probabilistic explanations with the so-called translation 
universals (see section 2.5 for more details). Chesterman’s (1997) classification of norms leads 
this study to answer some key questions about the existence of norms at a macro-level that may 
have impact on the behaviour and attitude of the members of the discourse community, such as 
translators and media institutions within the public domain (see subsection 2.5.1 for details). 
Norms thus is believed to be significant tool to examine media translated texts and to describe 
the role of ideological constraints on translators’ behaviour in this field.  
Hatim and Mason (1997, p. 220) underline the role of translators as mediators while 
talking about the potential of translation to create ideological distortions of a ST discourse. 
Nevertheless, more recent work has preferred other terms such as intervention (Munday 2007, 
Halliday 2008), and manipulation (Halliday 2008). However, this study adopts the three terms 
of manipulation, intervention and mediation in relation to Lefevere (1990b) and Hermans’ 
(1985, 1996) key proponent of manipulation. It uses them interchangeably to investigate the 
translator’s ideological choices in terms of stance and voice, which uncover his/her 
interpersonal orientation, implications and indirectness outside the domain of literary translation 
studies. Hermans (1985, 2010) and Lefevere (1992a, 1992b) set out to scrutinise manipulation 
in translation from a slightly different perspective, aiming at the clarification of some 
misconceptions of translation as an inculpable practice acting as an innocuous bridge between 
cultures and societies. Observing from a socio-cultural perspective rather than a purely 
linguistic one, they highlight significant divergences between the source and the target texts, 
                                                 
whole” (Shuttleworth 1998, p. 176). He developed the model in the early 1970s, based on the literary theories of 
Russian formalists. According to Lefevere (1992, p. 14) the Russian formalists considered “a culture, a society 
[…] the environment of a literary system. The literary system and the other systems are open to each other: they 
influence each other. […] they interact in ‘interplay among subsystems determined by the logic of the culture to 
which they belong.’”. 
 33 
and explore the possible reasons for such departures. Lefevere’s model of translation as 
“rewriting” is also considered complementary to polysystem theory (Shuttleworth1998, p.179). 
Lefevere (1992b), however, abandons the notion of the polysystem and observes translation as 
“rewriting”. Writing from a literary-studies perspective, he focuses on the scrutiny of “issues 
such as power, ideology, institution and manipulation” (1992a, p. 2) and dismisses the kinds of 
linguistic theories of translation that “have moved from word to text as a unit, but not beyond" 
(1992b, p.87). Instead, he moves beyond the restraint of language and draws attention to the 
interplay between translation and culture at a macro-level. For him, "translation is a rewriting 
of an original text which reflects a certain ideology and a poetics and as such manipulates 
literature to function in a given society in a given way" (p. vii). He explores the way in which 
texts are refracted through systems of translation, and the way that systems of an existing 
patronage in a society control the reception and production of these texts. Lefevere (1985) 
defines patronage as the group of  “powers (persons, institutions) which help or hinder the 
writing, reading and rewriting of literature [and that] can be exerted by persons […], groups of 
persons […], a social class, a royal court, publishers […] and, last but not least, the media” (pp. 
227-228). Patronage, therefore, helps to combine the study of extra-linguistic factors associated 
with the socio-economic and ideological forces that pervade all social interactions, including 
media translation. It consists of three interrelating components which are the ideological, the 
economic and the status component. The first element is considered as the most significant 
aspect in this study since it indicates that the ideological affiliations of a patron affect the choice 
of texts, topics and the further development of these. Lefevere (1992b, p.16) states that “the 
patrons count on [the] professionals to bring the literary system in line with their own ideology”. 
The same might be true for media texts that are translated by the selected media agencies in this 
study. In other words, since the ideological affiliations of Kurdish media agencies may directly 
or indirectly reflect the existing Kurdish political parties in Kurdistan, the ideological suitability 
and availability of their translated texts for the target market may be cast according to their 
political and ideological orientation. The second aspect of Lefevere’s patronage refers to the 
patrons’ powers over the existence of the translator as a rewriter. Since media translators are 
usually dependent on payment by the media agencies (the patron), they may adapt to the 
parameters specified by the patrons. However, this adaptation might also refer to the belief and 
ideology of the translator. The third aspect is the status element that describes the patrons’ power 
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over the eminence of the translators and the extent to which their translated texts will engage in 
a culture’s literary system and polysystem. A work, for instance, that agrees and complies with 
the patrons’ specified guidelines and/or ideology may have a greater chance of publication and 
success rather than the translator’s name.  
The media agencies in Iraqi Kurdistan arguably fall under the umbrella of 
“undifferentiated patronages” for each has all the three components in the hands of one 
omnipotent patron. Lefevere (1992b, pp. 15-19) argues that undifferentiated patronages do not 
necessarily have to be based on ideology today as was common in the past for recently the 
economic component constitutes a prevailing factor in processes of literary rewriting. 
Nevertheless, this study argues that ideology plays a significant and dominant role in today’s 
Kurdish media translation next to the economic component. Lefevere’s rewriting process, thus, 
provides awareness of agents’ possible manipulations at a macro-level and it is not a prescriptive 
approach since “[t]hose engaged in that study will have to ask themselves who rewrites, why, 
and under what circumstances, for which audience” (Lefevere 1992b, p.7). It, therefore, needs 
to be considered in the course of this study at a macro-level analysis. The notion of rewriting 
enables an analysis of journalistic texts as a tool in the hands of powerful individuals or 
institutions which can have both positive and negative impacts on Kurdish culture and language. 
Translators are under a variety of restrictions that lead them to manipulate their work in favour 
of the prevailing poetics and ideologies in order to satisfy their patrons and thus to succeed in 
their profession. Lefevere (1992b, p. 7) also argues that the influence of ideologies can also be 
a motivating force rather than constraining form. After all, translation as rewriting inevitably 
occupies a dominant position among issues such as power and manipulation and for Lefevere 
and Bassnett (1990) it “is manipulation, undertaken in the service of power” (vii). In this sense, 
rewritten media texts can be turned into an instrument of power by media agencies (patrons).  
In this study, therefore, “stance” can be defined in the sense of Hunston and Thompson’s 
concept of “evaluation” which refers to the translator’s attitudes “towards viewpoints on, or 
feeling about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about” (2000, p. 5) while 
reframing STs in TTs. This study investigates translators’ stance in relation to translator’s 
decisions of adding, deleting, or substituting lexico-grammatical choices in Kurdish media 
translation. Voice can be defined in terms of the translator’s way of reframing the STs into TTs. 
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According to Hermans (1996, p. 27), the translator has a voice or discursive presence. He 
approaches it from a literary narratological perspective, arguing that the translator’s voice is 
always present in his/her linguistic choices (such as word order, idiom, and repetitions) and 
affects the style. In this study, however, translators’ voice will be explored through the cases of 
lexical borrowing (see section 2.3). From this perspective, thus, the passive role of translators 
as mere transmitters of information is abandoned in favour of them being considered as active 
agents participating in the shaping of the ideological discourse of their culture, whose system 
of values they may accept, contributing to their dissemination or subversion. To do so, this study 
needs to investigate the translator’s stance and voice considering Baker’s (2006, 2007/ 201022) 
dichotomy of dominance vs. resistance towards reframing STs in TTs. This helps in the 
exploration of the translators’ ideological positioning in relation to the political and historical 
identity that is projected in STs (see section 2.4 and chapter 3 for more details).  
 
2.2. Ideology, Media and Translation Studies 
The previous section has revealed the interplay between translation choices and 
ideological constraints and defined the behaviour of translators in relation to stance and voice 
in media translation studies. This section describes the relationships between media texts, power 
relations, and ideology in translation studies (TS) in order to further outline the way the studies 
of ideology and power relations are pertinent to Kurdish media translation.  
The field of media studies has recently developed considerably. The study of print 
media, including the language of the press, was highly significant in laying the groundwork for 
critical analysis. Among others, Montgomery (2001, 2007) draws attention to the specific 
lexical, syntactic and stylistic features of the language of the press. Comparative studies opened 
up questions in many other areas, such as language quality, language reporting, journalistic 
ethics, and ideology and/or politics. The study of ideology and power relations has also been 
                                                 
22 First published in: Baker, M. 2007. Reframing Conflict in Translation. Social Semiotics 17(2), pp. 151–
169. Later republished in: Baker, M. 2010. Reframing Conflict in Translation. In: Baker,M. eds. Critical Readings 
in Translation Studies. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 113-129. 
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reflected in the language features and textual structures of media texts (e.g. van Dijk 1985, 
1988a, 1991; Fairclough 1995a, 1995b, 2001). In addition, this consideration has most lately 
been extended to the “new media”, particularly the internet (see van Dijk 2006, p.76, Trimarco 
2015, pp.56-75; Sheyholislami 2011; Tannen, and Marie Trester 2013). Nevertheless, a number 
of researchers have highlighted that translation is typically unobserved in media texts, while the 
study of reporting politicians’ words in translation is common (e.g. Bassnett 2004, 2005, 
Schäffner 2005, Holland 2006, Kang 2007, Bielsa 2007, Bielsa and Bassnett 2009, Bielsa and 
Hughes 2009). There is thus work to be done in examining the role of translation, especially 
online translation, which has not been fully researched in these studies and indeed has gone 
almost unnoticed (Schäffner and Bassnett 2010, p.3). Building on these studies, therefore, this 
study highlights the way translation functions in the context of Kurdish media, arguing that 
media translation reflects the manipulative existing socio-political ideology in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
It can be argued that media and translation share similar characteristics for they are both 
contrivances and devices of communication. They affect the way societies communicate and 
thus how culture is moulded in a variety of ways. Media, both as news and entertainment forms, 
have long been perceived as sites for the dissemination of ideology. According to Gitlin (1980): 
Every day, directly or indirectly, by statement and omission, in picture 
and words, in entertainment and news and advertisement, the mass media produce 
fields of definition and association, symbol and rhetoric, through which ideology 
becomes manifest and concrete. (1980, p. 2) 
When media forms are the product of powerful agents or institutions, they may reflect 
the ideas that support their interests as well. The same might hold true when it comes to the 
translations they provide. Schäffner and Bassnett (2010, p.2) argue that “there is a direct, though 
usually invisible link between politics, media and translation”. As explained in chapter one, 
media outlets in Iraqi Kurdistan are typical forms of politically aligned institutions. Thus, it can 
be argued that the translations they deliver might also support particular forms of socio-cultural 
and political stereotypes. However, while media reflects society and culture through different 
mediums such as words, images, audio-visuals and internet, translation does so only by words. 
The concept of media translation in this study thus is clustered only around media translated 
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texts and the study corpus of this study includes the available Kurdish online translations of the 
electronic English journalistic texts. In addition, the topics of the translated texts under scrutiny 
in this study are derived from and developed within Middle East culture, in general, and 
Kurdistan, in particular. Therefore, since the focus of this study is geopolitics and translation in 
media, the study will narrow down the discussion to one specific communicative context and 
text type, which is geopolitics and translated geopolitical texts (or geopolitical discourse). 
Following Dalby’s definition (1998), geopolitics is understood as a form of politics concerned 
with international global perspectives and therefore geopolitical texts are often writings that are 
underlined by ideological positioning (see the subsection 1.1.3 of chapter one). In this study, 
thus, media translated texts can be interpreted as institutionalised communicational ways of 
obtaining, establishing and preserving power and/or expressing ideology. With the development 
of technology, media texts have taken a significant position in today’s worldwide mass-media 
communication. Briggs and Cobley (2002) state that: 
These texts are important as a result of their ubiquity and because there is 
widespread belief that they contribute to the production of our ‘common-sense’ 
understandings of the world. As such, media texts are thought to affect, in a very 
real sense, the way in which we understand ourselves/others and the way we lead 
our lives. (2002, p. 307) 
Amongst different genres, media geopolitical commentary-texts may seem more 
challenging for translation. Outwardly, they may look as similar to the other text types but the 
ideas behind the lexico-grammatical choice and message of these texts are enigmatic and subtle. 
Ideologies, attitudes, and feelings are communicated through the written or spoken language 
and by scrutinising it we can interpret the writer’s thoughts and attitude about or towards an 
event or phenomenon.  
Thornborrow (2004, p. 52) further explains that “the most important and interesting 
aspects of the potential power of the media from a linguistic point of view are the way that 
people and events get reported.” This reporting comes into view either through a written or a 
spoken language. Languages have relatedness beyond linguistics which uncover the 
mechanisms through which one makes sense of the world (Turner 2003, p.12). In other words, 
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the complex nature of the language of media texts is bound up with socio-cultural relations in 
terms of the actions, opinions and values of dominant groups in society. Lefevere’s (1992b) 
notion of patronage and Chesterman’s (1997) concept of norms help in exploring the way this 
study demonstrates the relationships between media language and the attitude and values of 
dominant groups in Kurdish society. Aspects of political and institutional ideology, which 
emerge from looking at translated media texts, contribute significantly to the way translation 
shapes media discourses. In this sense, media language tends to act ideologically, not so much 
due to prejudice, but simply because of the nature of established routine practices. However, it 
can also be used not only to “steer people’s thoughts and beliefs but also to control their 
thoughts and beliefs” (Jones and Wareing 2004, p. 35)23, with the language of propaganda as a 
prominent example.  
Speaking of journalistic techniques in this respect, van Dijk (1991) contends that the 
journalistic text is like "an iceberg of information," of which only the "tip" is really expressed 
in words and sentences. According to him, the analysis of the implicitness is very helpful in the 
study of underlying ideologies since ideologies and intentions are not always stated clearly and 
explicitly (p.181). Understanding the textual features of media texts, including translated texts, 
thus, inevitably involve the creators and readers of the texts as well as the socio-cultural and 
political relationships holding between the participants involved. This understanding also 
involves possible statuses between parties concerned that, in turn, beget varied power relations. 
Power, here, is interpreted as the social power of groups or institutions over the participant’s 
use of language. Media language, thus, is a very significant tool for obtaining and preserving 
such power in communicative contexts. In this sense, politics can be expounded in relation to 
power. Chilton (2004) talks about two general aspects of politics as follows: 
On the one hand, politics is viewed as a struggle for power, between those 
who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it. […] 
On the other hand, politics is viewed as cooperation, as the practices and 
                                                 
23 Italicisation is the original emphasis. 
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institutions that a society has for resolving clashes of interest over money, 
influence, liberty, and the like. (2004, p.3) 
In any case, since Kurdish media texts are the product of powerful and dominant 
institutions that are directly or indirectly affiliated to the existing political parties in Kurdistan 
(see chapters 1 and 4 for details), the analysis of their language can provide insights into how a 
particular media is used to represent particular social and political groups, and provide ways to 
resist or incorporate those groups and/or events. In this sense, if the power of the media language 
can “influence knowledge, beliefs, values, social identities” (Fairclough 1995b, p. 2), it is also 
feasible to argue that the ability to construct meaning in media translation can be attributed to 
the mechanisms of language within society and culture. This study therefore aims to explore 
ideological mediation in translation by investigating the language used in the geopolitical 
journalistic articles translated into Kurdish from English. This, in turn, might indicate that media 
translation in Iraqi Kurdistan reflects and helps in shaping the manipulative existing ideology 
in society.  
 
2.3 Ideology and CDA in Media Translation Studies 
This section builds on the analysis of the interactions between power, ideology, media 
texts and their translation presented above which described the role ideology and power might 
play in Kurdish media translation. This next section addresses the way critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) might contribute, as a useful toolkit, to the definition and analysis of the concept of 
ideology in media and translation studies (TS), whilst also demonstrating the methodological 
benefits of employing CDA to investigate geopolitical ideology and manipulation in media 
translation. 
As a concept, ideology has come under criticism in terms of its broader scope and 
definition during the last two centuries. This notion was first conceived by Antoine Destutt De 
Tracy in 1796, the French rationalist philosopher, who proposed it to imply a systematic study 
of knowledge, beliefs, and ideas (Williams 2011, p. 126). Despite its original positive-
progressive sense, the meaning of this notion shifted dramatically towards a pejorative meaning 
(Leonardi 2007, p. 35). During the reign of the French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, the term 
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became synonymous with “false understanding” or “mystification”, when he used this notion 
to attack the “proponents of democracy” as those “who mislead the people by elevating them to 
a sovereignty which they were incapable of exercising” (Williams 2011, p. 126). Hence, 
notwithstanding its positive nature, ideology may have a negative or positive connotation 
depending on political and sociocultural contexts and the individual’s own positioning in the 
debate. Irvine (1989, p. 225) redefines ideology as "the cultural system of ideas about social 
and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests”. This 
denotes that ideology can be defined and investigated through the language used within society 
and culture. It has been argued that cultural variations within the same language or between 
languages have been known to reflect deep divisions within society (Scollon and Scollon 1995) 
and that is recognised as an ideology today. 
van Dijk (1998a) expands the notion of ideology further than a mere political sense to 
comprise the knowledge, beliefs and value systems of the individual and society in which s/he 
operates. Following a critical discourse analysis approach (CDA), he proposes a 
multidisciplinary approach to the concept of ideology that encompasses three main elements: 
cognition, society and discourse. He describes cognition as a system of ideas created by the 
symbolic field of thought and belief; society as group interests; power and dominance which 
might be used to support or oppose power; and discourse as language use which expresses 
ideologies in society, often involving concealment and manipulation (van Dijk 1998a, p. 5). His 
approach to the concept of ideology is relative to the definition of ideology in this study. This 
study argues that socio-political ideology plays a significant role in media translation. The 
multidisciplinarity of van Dijk’s approach will help in demonstrating a significant analytical 
framework for  the translation of media texts that takes into account such ideology as well as 
the linguistic and cultural dimension of translational norms (see subsection 2.5.1 on norms 
models for an in-depth description of the contribution of van Dijk’s approach to the study of 
norms). 
Critical discourse analysis develops from a critical theory of language that considers the 
context of language use to be significant. It is, in effect, a discourse that does not consider 
language use free from ideological perceptions. According to van Djik (1993a), CDA is “a study 
of the relations between discourse, power, dominance, social inequality and the position of the 
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discourse analyst in such social relationships”. He considers the notion of “ideology, power, 
hierarchy and gender together with sociological variables” relevant and necessary for providing 
an understanding or explanation of a text (van Dijk, 1993, p. 283). In general, CDA is not a 
single method but is rather an approach. It involves different perceptions and methods for 
analysing the relationship between language use and social context (Wang, 2006, p. 60). One 
of CDA’s toolkits for textual analysis used to measure translator’s ideological behaviour in this 
study is lexicalisation (or lexico-grammatical choices). As van Dijk (1998b) proposes, 
“opinions may be conventionalised and codified in lexicon” (p. 205), and lexico-grammatical 
choices can thus be “the major dimension of [ideologically controlled] discourse meaning” 
(1995, p. 259). They might be used to deliver specific negative or positive meanings and 
inferences about in-group or out-group participants that may have an ideological basis 
(Martínez-Roldán and Malavé, 2004, p. 165). 
As an approach, CDA has been broadly practical in the study of ideological positioning 
in monolingual discourse (see van Dijk 1998a, 1998b, Wodack 1989; Fairclough 1995a, 1995b; 
Wodak and Meyer 2001) and bilingual comparison (see Puurtinen 2000). Several studies of 
media discourse employing the approach of CDA have revealed that diverse ideological 
manipulations can be determined in texts on similar topics and events by different news outlets 
(see Fairclough 1992, 1995b; van Dijk 1995; Fang 2001). Fairclough (1995b) further explains 
that media output is "shaped by ideology and media texts may be said to function ideologically. 
They, therefore, contribute to reproducing social relations of domination and exploitation" 
(pp.2-44). The same holds true for translated geopolitical journalistic texts where authenticity 
to the source text is promoted and anticipated, but might not be pursued in translation practice. 
Nevertheless, whereas CDA has been largely used in the study of ideological manipulation in 
the media and/or monolingual or bilingual discourse comparison, few CDA studies have 
investigated ideological mediation in media translation. Moreover, even fewer have been 
devoted to the ways in which linguistic resources (lexico-grammatical choices) are employed 
to support ideological manipulation in the translation of geopolitical commentary articles. Many 
translation studies, which have chosen a linguistic typology based on text linguistics, on CDA, 
or on systematic functional grammar (SFL), are of great significance for the study of translated 
political discourse, since they denote the first attempts at unfolding translation shifts in political 
discourses. For instance, textual indicators studied in translated political discourses include 
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cohesion (Hatim and Mason 1997), transitivity (Calzada Pérez 2001), or lexical choices 
(Schäffner 2003). Lande (2010) further elucidates that “CDA within TS has been mainly used 
to analyse political discourse due to the fact that the main aim of CDA is to uncover ideological 
and power structures in discourse” ( pp. 26-27). This might be due to the fact that research on 
CDA within the interdisciplinary field of TS is novel and there have been deliberations whether 
CDA should be applied to TS or not (Schäffner, 2002, p. 53). This is explored in detail in the 
following subsection 2.3.1 
 
2.3.1 Ideology and Text-centred Approaches in Translation Studies 
This next sub-section will provide a more thorough picture of the interrelation between 
ideology, culture, society and the textual features that emerge in the texts. It looks into the text-
centred approaches that have been used in translation studies, arguing that few studies are 
devoted to researching the way CDA is employed to deal with lexico-grammatical resources 
that support ideological manipulation in media translated texts 
The integration of text-centred and translation studies approaches has been instigated 
since the development of functionalist theories of translation (Munday 2001, p. 73). Concepts 
of context, functions, culture, textuality, style, genre, and discourse that are studied in 
pragmatics, discourse analysis, cultural studies, and communication studies have developed to 
influence translation studies. Covering text analysis of the ST, they are oriented to the analysis 
of text type, language function, the effect of translation and the participants of the translation 
event. Discourse Analysis has been developed under various labels, such as Critical Linguistics, 
Discourse Analysis, Register Analysis, Text Analysis, Critical Discourse Studies, and so forth. 
The first approach to translation studies employed Halliday’s register analysis model (1973; 
1978; 2007b), which links language with the situation in which it is used. It was mainly used to 
analyse the pragmatic functions of linguistic elements in both ST and TT. Halliday’s systematic 
functional linguistic (SFL) considers language use as a communicative event and describes the 
three strands of functional meaning as ideational, interpersonal and textual meaning. They work 
to explain the socio-linguistic occurrence in both the SL and TL and describe how language-in-
use operates in the SL and how the translator finds its counterpart in the TL. Ideational meanings 
are the outcome of language being utilised to represent experience. Interpersonal meanings are 
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the result of language which is used for human interaction. Power is one of the key types of 
relationship in the analysis of interpersonal meaning. The patterns of choices made by 
translators from the array of lexico-grammatical resources of language can establish the 
interpersonal meaning. Nevertheless, while the SFL model has moulded the basis of some 
eminent work on text and discourse analysis in translation theory since the 1990s, few of them 
are oriented to the way in which translation strategies regarding lexico-grammatical choices 
function to support ideological manipulation, especially in translated media texts. 
The most prominent theoretical frameworks in translation studies were proposed by 
House (1997), Hatim and Mason (1990, 1997), Schäffner (2002, 2003, 2004), Bell (1991), 
Baker (1992, 2011), Teich (2003), Steiner and Yallop (2001), Mason (2004), Munday (2007, 
2008, 2012a), and Calzada Perez (2007). House’s model of analysis (1981, 1997) is based on 
the case study of children’s books and the translational strategies used are particularly 
influential in identifying ‘mismatches’ (shifts) for translation quality assessment, which is 
beyond the scope of this study. Baker’s work (1992, 2011a) adapts the SFL approach and goes 
beyond linguistic equivalence and textual features altogether to investigate how language is 
used to generate meaning at pragmatic level in the real world and how it is manipulated by 
participants in a communicative situation (1992, p. 217). For Baker (1992), there are three 
concepts in pragmatics that are particularly relevant to translation and cross-cultural 
understanding; implicature, presupposition, coherence. She refers to implicature as “what the 
speaker means or implies rather than what s/he actually says”, presupposition as “pragmatic 
inference”, and finally coherence above text level “depends on the hearer’s or reader’s 
expectations and experience of the world” (1992: 219-223).  
Hatim and Mason’s work (1997) explores the role of translation as a form of “mediation” 
and indicates the potency of translation strategies to produce ideological shifts from the ST 
discourse. They scrutinise the occurrence of ideological distortions in translation according to 
lexical choice, cohesion and transitivity. For them (1997, p. 120), ideology covers “the tacit 
assumptions, beliefs, and value systems which are shared collectively by social groups”. They 
make a distinction between “the ideology of translation” and “the translation of ideology”. 
While the former denotes the basic orientation selected by the translator working within a social 
and cultural context, the later refers to the extent of mediation provided by a translator of 
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penetrating texts. Mediation is defined as “the extent to which translators intervene in the 
transfer process, feeding their own knowledge and beliefs into processing the text” (Hatim and 
Mason 1997, p.147). This indicates that, regardless of ‘the situations of cultural hegemony’, 
mediation can be detected, to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the translator’s worldview, 
i.e., the translator’s ideological orientation and background knowledge (linguistic, social and 
cultural). In this view, translation is ideological since it reflects the goals of a social group. As 
an initial study on ideological mediation and shifts in translation, Hatim and Mason’s work, 
therefore, provides “one of the most explicit statements about ideology from a critical linguistic 
and discourse analysis perspective” (Munday 2007, p. 199) in translation studies. However, in 
the investigation of translational strategies employed to examine shifts and their implications at 
the level of lexical choices, it only focused on shifts in modality in translation without taking 
into account other possible language features. In other words, the focus was largely on the 
formal definition of discourse and little attention was paid to the wider effects of discourse that 
extend beyond the linguistic boundaries to consider the social, political and economic 
implications of discourse in translation. This study addresses this gap by connecting linguistic 
shifts, including various lexico-grammatical features, to patronage and ideology. Schäffner 
(2004:136) argues that texts and discourses are the product of human communicative activity 
in sociocultural settings which is common in both CDA and translation studies. In addition, 
Tymoczko (2003, p183) argues that the translator’s choices are also affected by “the translator’s 
cultural and ideological affiliations”. In this sense, the translator is not only a kind of mediator 
who converts one language into another, but rather a producer of a new discourse in the TL. 
Translations, thus, can be observed as target texts in a new socio-cultural environment, which 
are based on a source text which functioned in its original socio-cultural milieu (Schäffner 
2004:138).  
Applying critical discourse analysis (CDA) to translation, Schäffner (1997b, 2002; 
2003; 2004) has carried out significant research focusing on the cultural, social and political 
aspects of translation and text production in the source and target cultures. In her observations, 
she (2004, p. 119) relates linguistic behaviour to politics. She argues that political texts 
commonly reveal the culture-specific backdrop of the texts’ actions and their translations update 
a target audience with a communicative act that had already been achieved in the ST community 
(pp. 127). In this way, the ST can be aimed at a single or manifold TT community. Therefore, 
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it can be argued that her research relates mainly to the translation strategies that are used to 
render a culture-bound source text into another target language community with a restricted 
knowledge of the foreign culture. In addition, her definition of politics is completely general to 
the extent that what is considered political depends on the participants in a communicative 
context. A more rigorous definition, however, describes political texts in relation to either 
political ideas, groups, beliefs and practices of society or part of it or texts that are central in 
establishing a political community or group. Munday (2012a) also approached the translation 
of political speeches by the application of the model of discourse analysis. His study focuses on 
the translation process (rather than the product) and seeks to identify the translator’s decision-
making as mediation through the realisation of interpersonal meaning that is most likely to 
express judgment or evaluation. As an approach, it therefore provides an illuminating image for 
the analysis of new modes of communication affecting the phenomenon of translation, and aids 
translator and interpreter training and descriptive translation analysis. Likewise, the analysis of 
the geopolitical texts in the Kurdish context provides a new angle on the application of CDA to 
translation studies.  
Outlining the way translation scholars adapted CDA and/or SFL in their research, the 
majority of the studies cited Halliday’s SFL (Halliday 1978; 1985/1999; 1994) as the foundation 
and reference for the linguistic aspects of their examination for the purpose of analysing cross-
cultural meaning transfer. Nevertheless, they do not explicitly refer to certain aspects specific 
to translated texts, such as omission and addition, explicitations and implicitation, or the 
translator’s resistance and dominance. The majority of translation scholars working on 
translated political discourse have hitherto adapted linguistic typologies to their work in 
translation studies. These typologies were not mainly developed to explore translational 
phenomena. Moreover, targeting only the linguistic indicators that traditionally used to identify 
ideologies in texts might beget over interpreting the ideological applicability of these textual 
indicators (Gagnon 2006, p. 206). 
It is important to bear in mind that building on Narrative Theory and relying on several 
other theories including SFL, Baker (2006) provides an integrative, well-developed framework 
for the study of political discourse in translation studies. Such a framework can serve as a 
potential model for the description of the features of the translated geopolitical texts display at 
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macro-level in this study. Despite its multidisciplinary nature, Baker’s approach (2006), 
however, is limited to narratives (narratological strategies) only and does not draw very 
extensively on text linguistic findings. Baker’s approach is, therefore, productive for exploring 
how translators, through text production, benefit or withstand the formation and promotion of 
politically charged narratives. Given the nature of this section, the relevant aspects of Baker’s 
Narrative Theory and its contribution to shifting analysis in this study is explored in more detail 
in section 2.4 and chapter three as part of the theoretical outline applicable to the study of 
Kurdish media translation.  
As a model, CDA is thus relevant to fields of social research because it conceives 
language as communication, as a process of meaning-making which evolves from the text 
producer’s lexico-grammatical choices, then relating those choices to a broader political and 
socio-cultural framework. In translation studies, CDA can, therefore, function as a 
complementary framework to the existing methodological approaches in order to provide a 
comprehensive reflection on language and culture (Valdeón, 2007, p. 100). From the 
functionalist perspective, Fairclough’s CDA largely embodies the idea which rejects 
dissociating the act of translating from its context. It focuses on real-world situational features 
which are key contributing factors of meaning and interpretation of meaning. In media 
translation, the question of how to relate the world outside the text to the text is multifaceted. 
However, it relates quite closely to the concept of the use of language “as a form of social 
practice” (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p. 285) in CDA which is, in turn, congruent with the 
analysis required for the translators’ lexico-grammatical choices in the texts in this study. 
Considering translation as a mode of intercultural communication, Trosborg (1997) argues that 
translation should be comprehended in a wider anthropological sense of all socially-
acclimatised dimensions of human life. By providing Vermeer’s (1986) three salient aspects, 
Trosborg (1997) further highlights the socio-cognitive aspect of the concept of culture on which 
translation studies and CDA can be closely established (p. 146):  
(a)The concept of culture as a totality of knowledge, proficiency and 
perception; (b) its immediate connection with behaviour (or action) and events; 
(c) its dependence on norms, whether those of social behaviour or those accepted 
in language usage (Vermeer 1986:33).  
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The first aspect is significant to the observation of “culture” for it encircles the cognitive 
orientation, which, in turn, places the concept of culture into a broad range of social 
representations. The composition of socio-cultural representations, however, reflects the 
knowledge that functions as a bridge having connections with the other theoretical aspects of 
social semiotics, such as discourse and translation events. This indicates that the notion of 
culture engages with the knowledge-mediated context of discourse processes. The second 
salient aspect maintains a relationship between a particular discursive event and its socio-
political associations in Fairclough’s (2006) socio-functional theoretical framework of CDA. 
Establishing this relationship requires the idea of socio-political associations to be presented as 
a mental concept applied in communicative contexts, developing from van Dijk’s socio-
cognitive approach (1998a). Meanwhile, the act of translating “naturally involves the 
transporting […] of languages and their associated cultures […] recuperated by specific target 
reading constituencies” (Faiq 2007:1). The third aspect, however, proposes that culture is 
usually designed under the name of norms. Like many concepts in translation studies, norms 
are generally perceived to be located in the social consciousness that expound “social 
regularity” (Hermans 1999b, p. 80) or the “social reality of correct notions” (Bartsch 1987, p. 
76; Chesterman 1997, p. 54). In this study, the notion of norms is socio-culturally and politically 
embedded and can be seen as part of the ‘tool kit’ (Toury 1999: 16) to describe and discuss the 
socio-cultural practice, such as, habits, skills, and styles from which translators form strategies 
of action on a regular basis. Such regularities are evidence of norms and not to be confused with 
the norms themselves (Chesterman 1999, p 91). In this sense, media “texts may thus be seen as 
carriers of ideological meaning, a factor which makes them particularly vulnerable to changing 
sociocultural norms” when they are translated (Hatim and Mason 1997, p.127). In other words, 
since media translation is interdisciplinary in nature, its process is a multi-level process.  
In this sense, CDA can function as an effective tool to explore the way the translated 
journalistic texts under scrutiny in this study might be informed by the ideology of the Kurdish 
media outlets and their aligned political parties. The study argues that translators’ lexico-
grammatical choices function under a range of constraints that might, in turn, lead the translators 
to work as mediators and manipulate their work in favour of the prevailing aesthetics (e.g. 
mannerism) and ideologies in order to gratify the media agencies they work for. In this way, 
geopolitical translation in the Kurdish context can be integrated into the “orders of discourse” 
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specified in van Dijk and Fairclough’s CDA model as the totality of texts interacting with each 
other for communicative and ideological purposes. Given the nature of this section, the 
extensive discussion of CDA and its contribution to the study of norms will appear in section 
2.5.1 of this chapter and the following chapter (chapter 3) as part of the analytical framework 
given its immediate applicability to the study of Kurdish media translation.  
 
2.4 Shifts as the Manifestation of Ideological Manipulation and Mediation 
The previous section has explored the significant contribution that critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) can make, as a useful toolkit, in the definition and analysis of ideology in media 
translation. This section looks through the models of shift analysis relevant to the course of this 
study in order to distinguish the types and effects of shifts resulting from the translators’ choices 
of functional translational strategies in the corpus of this study. This study argues that ideology 
in Kurdish media translation might result in manipulative shifts by exploiting lexico-
grammatical choices in the translated texts. It therefore focuses on the way models of shift 
analysis might manifest such mediations along with their implications.  
Several studies have shown that ideology has been approached as manipulation and a 
rewriting of the source text and culture in the translation process from the perspective of 
language use and power relations in translation studies since the cultural turn (e.g. Hermans 
1985; Lefevere 1992; Baker 1992, 2006, 2007; Hatim and Mason 1997; Schäffner 2004)24. The 
status of this notion, however, is explained as an inexorably partial representation of the source 
text in translation by Gentzler and Tymoczko (2002), who further state that: 
This partiality is not to be considered a defect, a lack, or an absence in a 
translation; it is a necessary condition of the act. It is also an aspect that makes 
the act of translation partisan: engaged and committed, either implicitly or 
explicitly. Indeed partiality is what differentiates translations, enabling them to 
                                                 
24 Detailed description about these studies is given in sections 2.1 and 2.3 of this chapter 
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participate in the dialectic of power, the ongoing process of political discourse, 
and strategies for social change. (2002, p. xviii) 
In addition, Schäffner (2003) argues that there is a multifarious relationship between 
ideology and translation and that all translations are ideological since “the choice of a source 
text and the use to which the subsequent target text is put are determined by the interests, aims, 
and objectives of social agents” (p. 23). Moreover, the text itself is a carrier of ideological 
meaning both at lexical and grammatical level (Schäffner 2003, p. 23; Hatim and Mason 1997, 
p.127; Hodge and Kress 1993). In that sense, this study argues that ideology operates at both a 
macro-level, which refers to socio-cultural manipulation and power relations and a micro-level 
as it is reflected in the lexico-grammatical choices and that results in partial representation of 
the STs in the TTs. Such partial representation originates in the shifts made by translators and 
it might be the way in which ideologies enter translation and change the macro-level function 
of the text. Studying the nature and distribution of these shifts in translations, however, requires 
some parameters for a comparative analysis, which is associated with the dynamics of society 
and culture rather than static contrastive descriptions of languages and cultures.  
As a concept, shifts in translation can be explained as the changes which happen to the 
ST form and meaning when translated into the target language and “all that appears as new with 
respect to the original, or fails to appear where it might have been expected” (Popovič 1970, p. 
79). Hatim and Munday (2004) defined translational shifts as “the small linguistic changes that 
occur between ST and TT” (p. 26). Nevertheless, linguistic changes arise in both language 
system and behaviour of the ST when translated into the TT. The concept of translational shifts 
in this study, however, refers to the field of linguistic behaviour rather than that of the language 
system. This is due to the fact that translation deals with the type of language-in-use in the 
respective languages. Therefore, the systematic differences between the source and target 
languages and cultures, “which pertain to the level of competence, are part of the opening 
conditions for translation shifts. Shifts, on the other hand, result from attempts to deal with 
systemic differences” (Bakker et al. 1998/2001, p. 226). In other words, in this study 
translational shifts are associated with conveying “certain values of expression or content across 
a semiotic border” (Bakker et al. 1998/2001, p. 226). 
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The investigation of translation shift typology has a long-standing practice in translation 
studies. However, with the availability of parallel corpora which contain source texts alongside 
their translations, it has received more attention in the mid-twentieth century (e.g. Vinay and 
Darbelnet 1958/ 2004; Catford 1965; van Leuven-Zwart 1989, 1990; Toury 1995; Baker 2006, 
2007). van Leuven-Zwart’s approach (1989, 1990a) is generally considered to be part of the 
traditional linguistic-oriented approaches. However, it directs translation towards a more neutral 
and descriptive view by relating a comparison of ST and TT to the description of the impacts 
of minor micro-structural shifts at the macro- narrative levels of story and text. Consistent with 
this approach, the concept of shifts was no longer viewed as “mistranslations” or “deviations of 
the norm” (van Leuven-Zwart 1990b: 228). Translational shifts are considered inevitable, but 
not undesirable as the other approaches noted, and their existences reflect the systematic 
differences between any two languages and/ or cultures. The need to overcome these differences 
is considered to be the admissible reasons behind such occurrences, assuming that minor shifts 
at the lexico-grammatical level might, in certain passages or throughout the course of the whole 
translation, change the macro-level framework of the text. Leuven-Zwart, however, 
distinguishes between two types of shifts that can be used as significant tools in the course of 
analysis of this study25. They are lexical shifts and stylistic shifts. Nevertheless, she claims that 
while the former denotes the degree to which the translator’s choices make the meaning of the 
target text correspond to that of the source text, the latter “are considered stylistic variables […] 
that […] do not affect the semantic or descriptive meaning” (van Leuven-Zwart 1989, p. 162). 
Based on anecdotal data analysis, this study, however, defines stylistic shifts in relation to 
ideology and argues that the majority of stylistic shifts in the context of Kurdish might not be 
neutral. This indicates that the process of rendition is considered to be carried out along with 
the political and socio-cultural norms and principles of translation other than those inherent to 
the language systems involved in this process. 
According to Toury (1980, p. 12), before classifying translational shifts, two 
interdependent concepts need to be distinguished which are invariant and shift. The former 
                                                 
25 As a model of shift analysis, however, it is criticised for its complex classification of thirty-seven 
different types of shift many of which are overlapping, and many rigorous mappings of shifts to apply without any 
real attention to the narrative context and function (Munday 1998, p. 3; Munday 2008, p. 233). 
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refers to the features that remain unchanged in the process of translation, while the latter denotes 
the changes that arise with the transfer of certain values of expressions or contents in the same 
process. In this study, the descriptive classification of shifts as linguistic performance (language 
use) requires the establishment of the degree of correspondence of invariances as functional-
relational variables. Toury (1995) disregards the traditional prescriptive concept of equivalence 
and replaces it with a “functional-relational, historical, variable” notion. According to Toury 
(2012), “[f]eatures are retained, and recast in TL material, not because they are ‘important’ in 
any inherent sense, but because they have been assigned importance: namely, from the recipient 
vantage point” (p. 6). In this study, therefore, the notion of equivalence can be used as part of a 
toolkit in order to explain such relativity as the translator’s attempts to overcome the linguistic 
or cultural differences, while shifts refers to their ideological manipulation that resulted from 
socio-political factors. Understanding and identifying these ideological factors and their 
normative effects on translator’s behaviour, however, requires a systematic study of the nature, 
causes and effects of shifts that have occurred during the act of translation. In other words, this 
study investigates those shifts that reflect personal, institutional and collective manipulation 
(see the subsection below).  
 
2.4.1 Narrative Strategies as the manifestations of Ideological Shifts 
Translational shifts take various forms. They might be manifested as the strategies of 
borrowing, omission, addition, and substitution. They indicate replacements at the lexico-
grammatical level and change the macro-level framework of the text over the course of an entire 
translation. Toury’s distinction between obligatory and non-obligatory shifts (1980, 1995) is 
particularly useful for this study as it enables a first mode of discrimination between 
linguistically and ideologically motivated translation choices. He describes the former as 
linguistically motivated shifts26 while the latter is due to literary or cultural considerations. 
                                                 
26 In this sense, this type of shift refers to functional-relational, historical variables and indicates that both 
the ST and the TT carry similar values via different linguistic features due to the cultural variation of the two 
languages. 
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According to Bakker et al (1998/2001: 228), optional shifts are introduced by the translators 
themselves due to ideological, cultural or stylistic considerations (and manipulations).  
Chesterman (1997, p. 88) further explains that translation strategies are “ways in which 
translators seek to conform to norms […] not to achieve equivalence, but simply to arrive at the 
best version they can think of” (see sub-section 2.5 for more details). The term ‘strategy’ is, 
however, borrowed from the other disciplines. It causes terminological confusion in the field of 
translation studies not only because its usage varies and depends on several approaches, but also 
because it competes with other terms, such as procedures, techniques, shifts, methods, tactics, 
rules, plans and so forth (Chesterman 1997, p. 87; Gambier 2010, p. 412). According to Vinay 
and Darbelnet (1958/1995) and Doorslaer (2007), the term ‘strategy’ refers to the general 
tendency of a translated text towards either free or literal translation. However, what is termed 
as ‘procedure’ by Vinay and Darblenet (1958/1995), Newmark (1988/2003) and Doorslaer 
(2007) is referred to as ‘strategy’ by Chesterman (1997). Chesterman (1997, p. 92) employs the 
term “strategy” to refer to a mechanism used at a certain point in a translated text, such as 
borrowing, addition, deletion, literal translation and so forth. In addition, although he draws two 
important distinctions between global and local strategies, and between comprehension and 
production strategies, nevertheless the analyses are not set out in detail (Gambier 2010, p. 414). 
In this study, strategies are used in the sense of shifts which occur in the TT. They can 
be defined as the ways in which translators deal with types of text and/or types of difficulties 
(or problems) which may include metaphors, collocations, proverbs, puns, homers, proper 
names, culture-specific references, dialects, forms of politeness and so forth. According to Nord 
(1991), although there is a difference between difficulties and problems, this difference is not 
well-defined. Assuming that even in the absence of problems and/or difficulties there is a 
strategic decision, this study focuses on those types of decision that engender shifts with regard 
to the use of choices available and/or finding sufficient lexical resources in order to translate 
from the source text. Therefore, the difficulties and/or problems can be defined as a dynamic 
and relative notion (Toury 2002) since an element or aspect of the ST is not necessarily a 
problem for the potential readers, but might be in the production of the TT (Lörscher 1991). 
According to Chesterman (1997), these difficulties or problems can be observed by comparing 
the translated texts to the source texts and this requires the term ‘strategy’ to make the 
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explanations more concrete and applicable (p. 77). In order to clarify the terminological use, 
this study outlines the points that seem most relevant to the way the term strategy is used in this 
research, before shifting to a more practical level. The adoption is based on the initial data 
analysis which indicates that not all the translational strategies are applicable for the selected 
corpus of English-Kurdish media translation. Accordingly, this term is used in this study to refer 
to both global and local strategies.  
Global strategies relate to macro-levels which encompass cultural and sociological 
constraints that affect the local strategies operated at micro-levels (textual and cognitive level). 
According to Gambier (2010), global strategies are used to “reconstruct and legitimize a certain 
type of text and a certain type of identity and power relationship between languages/cultures” 
(p. 416). In this sense, it can be argued that they are directed by the norms of the target culture. 
In this study, since the translator’s choices need to be investigated in terms of cultural, political, 
ideological and linguistic manipulations at this level, these strategies need to be described in 
relation to Chesterman’s concept of norms (see the following section 2.5.1 for more details). 
Baker’s model (2006, 2007) of Narrative Theory, on the other hand, addresses a wide range of 
issues relevant to translators’ behaviour in relation to the effect of the social and political 
realities in media translation in synchronic and diachronic terms. She describes a model of 
analysis of framing various and competing narratives through the use and discursive impact of 
various framing strategies in the process of translation. As a model, it allows this study to move 
beyond the focus on the supposedly cultural differences to identify the position of individuals 
and groups within the specific cultures and range of narratives they subscribe to27. Baker’s 
model scrutinises (re)framings that react to the larger narratives disseminating beyond the 
immediate texts and cannot be explicated by resorting only to norm theory. This, in turn, informs 
                                                 
27 Hatim and Mason (1997, p. 146-147) also draw direct inferences of ideological shifts in translation (as 
explained in section 2.4.2). They present a close analysis of the different translations of the adjective stand-haftige 
in a study conducted by Knowles and Malmkjaer on the four translations into English of Hans Christian Anderson’s 
fairy tales. However, this type of mediation reflects in the translated texts in terms of unfamiliarity and it can be 
referred to as what Venuti (1995) call a ‘foreignising’ translation (Hatim and Mason 1997, p. 148). They also 
investigate ideological shifts according to “lexical choices”, “cohesion” and “transitivity” and which lead to the 
removal of some significant features of the culture. This, in turn, is indicative that translators apply maximal 
mediation for “intervene[ing] in the transfer process, feeding their own knowledge and beliefs into their processing 
of text “(1997, p. 147). 
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the discursive behaviour of translators in the real world and the power of social structures and 
the workings of the systems in dynamic rather than static terms.  
The model helps in observing both the issues of dominance and resistance through the 
use of translational choices in relation to wider social and political contexts without overlooking 
the individual texts and events in media translated texts. It motivates this study to think of the 
implications of the individual choices as embedded in and contributing to the elaboration of 
concrete political reality. Consistent with this model, the translational choices in the corpus of 
this study, therefore, are considered as choices with implications that actuate narratives of what 
some aspects of the world are like. Her concept of “framing” helps to explore how the ST 
narratives are framed differently in the TL by translator’s use of different strategies. An 
anecdotal data analysis indicates that three of the framing strategies are of particular interest to 
the narratives elaborated in the selected texts of this study. They are frame ambiguity, framing 
by labeling and selective appropriation. Frame ambiguity refers to the strategies that present 
“the same set of events […] in different ways” (Baker 2006, p 107). The outcomes are 
competing or conflicting ways in which those events can be observed. In this study, the use of 
this strategy is apparent in the cases of substitutions where addition and omission function as a 
combined strategy while the ST narratives are framed differently in the TTs. Frame by labelling 
refers to the use of any “lexical items, term or phrase to identify” any “key element in narrative”, 
such as a person, place, group (2006, p. 122). Selective appropriation refers to the choices made 
by translators as regards textual material “realized in patterns of omission and addition designed 
to suppress, accentuate or elaborate particular aspects of a narrative” (Baker 2006, p.114). The 
process of reframing in this study, therefore, draws on the lexico-grammatical choices of the 
translators and their relation to the socio-political factors. However, selective appropriation 
extends to include other textual material realised in patterns of borrowing as well. The three 
reframing strategies of omission, addition, and borrowing provide significant tools for 
performing such an analysis in this study. They constitute part of the local strategies since they 
occur at micro-level and alter the macro-level agenda of the text. 
In the literature of translation studies, however, the choices at macro-level are flanked 
by non-and complete rewriting, or full and summarised translation, or literal and free translation, 
or target-oriented (adequacy) and source-oriented (acceptability) (Toury 2012), domestication 
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and foreignisation translation (Venuti, 1995) and so forth. Besides, each of these dichotomies 
has been discussed from the perspectives of each other. Although they are not synonymous with 
each other, they have features in common and sometimes overlap. They all denote that 
translation is not an unbiased activity and that translators’ choices and options are always 
located between two polarisations which are generally and traditionally known as free vs literal 
translation. Free and literal translations are defined as two strategies (Jensen and Jakobsen 2000, 
p. 113; Hatim and Munday 2004, p. 17; Munday 2009, p.191) in which a “translator’s 
potentially conscious plans for solving concrete translation problems in the framework of a 
concrete translation task” are reflected (Krings 1986, p. 18). In this study, however, since the 
translators’ choices and positions need to be investigated in terms of cultural, political, 
ideological and linguistic manipulations, these strategies are considered to be less likely relevant 
since they refer only to the degree to which translators’ choices make a text adapt to the target 
culture. Apart from decreasing the diversity of positions that translators adopt with regard to 
their texts, authors and socio-cultural and political factors, these strategies also conceal the 
fluctuating positions of translators within the same text. They minimise the convoluted means 
by which a translator negotiates his or her way around diverse aspects of a text into almost a 
forthright choice of domestication vs foreignisation translation, free vs literal translation, 
naturalisation vs alienating, and so forth. This, in turn, means diminishing the aspects of 
translator’s behaviour this study aims at, i.e., the ways in which translators come to occupy a 
central and enduring position in the history of media translation and the effect of the ways they 
intervene and modify the text. 
In sum, this study unites CDA and Narrative analysis into critical narrative analysis 
(CNA) in order to investigate ideological mediation in translation at macro-and micro- levels. 
This, in turn, describes the choices made by translators and their impact on different socio-
cultural and ideological contexts in Kurdish media translation (see chapter 3 for more details). 
It allows this study to consider translational choices not only as local linguistic challenges but 
also as contributing directly to the narratives that shape our social world .This accordingly may 
result in the type and effect of socio-cultural and linguistic norms currently operating in English-
Kurdish translations (see section 2.5). 
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2.5 Ideology and Search for Media Habitus and Social Norms 
Following the discussion of the significance of a CNA approach to the investigation of 
the effects ideological factors may have on translator’s behaviour, this study assumes that media 
translation in Iraqi Kurdistan is a socio-political norm-governed behaviour. This section, 
therefore, provides a critical overview of the concept and type of norms in order to explore the 
factors governing the translator’s behaviour and the interplay between translators and their 
audiences in the corpus of this study. The study argues that socio-political factors might be 
internalised by translators and ultimately reveal themselves in the end-results, i.e., the 
translation product. 
The concept of norms is initially derived from sociology where it applies to a wide range 
of human behaviour of any kind (Coleman and Coleman 1994, p. 241). It denotes a standard, 
usual, or typical pattern of behaviour which is expected from a particular group or society, 
especially in terms of social behaviour. As a concept, however, it has been inevitably decoded 
and re-decoded in translation studies in the last decades (e.g., Levý 1969; Even-Zohar 1971; 
Toury 1995, 2012; Herman 1991, 1996, 1999b; and Chesterman, 1993, 1997)28. Toury made 
norms the centre of his descriptive program for translation studies with the aim of exploring a 
methodology that scrutinises translations in relation to the regularity of translation behaviour 
within particular situations embodying general social values and ideas. Toury’s concept of 
norms is developed from a micro-level textual examination of ST and TT segments. It functions 
at both micro and macro-level, unlike other theories (for example Skopos) which only function 
at one level. His concept of norm theory, therefore, explains two important aspects relevant to 
this study. Firstly, translation norms can focus by presenting a more cognisant descriptive 
outline of the translation products. It also deals with the decision-making process of translating 
that is justified by the study of translation products and other concrete sources. The analysis of 
translation products, thus, can offer an insight into the norms governing translation process and 
translators’ choices as well. 
                                                 
28 This notion was introduced to the field of translation studies by Levý (1969) and then Even-Zohar 
(1971). However, it was developed at the end of the 1970s by Toury in an essay entitled The Nature and Role of 
Norms in Translation Studies first published in In Search of a Theory of Translation (1980). 
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Translation scholars, however, differ in their endorsement of Toury’s concept of norms 
and its value as a conceptual tool for the manifestation of regularities (e.g, Pym 2010; Hermans 
1999; Schäffner 1995; Chesterman 1999). Pym describes norms as a 'back door' which “allowed 
a kind of prescriptivism to be introduced into descriptive studies” (Pym 2010a, p. 75). For 
Hermans (1995), likewise, regularities of behaviour simply appear as instructions or a 
prescriptive level of norms. Nevertheless, Chesterman (1999) argues that norms “allow modern 
translation scholars to take a distance from the prescriptiveness” (p. 90). This line of thought is 
also reflected in Schäffner’s (1995) advocacy of norms when she states that: 
Translational behaviour is contextualised as social behaviour, and 
translational norms are understood as internalised behavioural constraints which 
embody the values shared by a community. All decisions in the translation 
process are thus primarily governed by such norms, and not (dominantly or 
exclusively) by the two language systems involved. (1995, p. 5) 
In addition, this study further argues that the concept of norms is vitally important for 
translation, especially for connecting micro analysis of shifts to socio-historical contexts and 
questions of ideology and power. Along with this view, this study thus considers the kind of 
prescriptivism referred to by Pym and Hermans as a shared knowledge between members of 
every community as to what is considered appropriate or inappropriate as communicative 
behaviour at a certain time. In addition, Hermans himself, argues that translational norms direct 
translators’ decision-making in terms of how they ought to behave and what to choose among 
a range of possible alternatives during the translation process because that type of behaviour is 
expected and considered apposite by the respective society (1999, p. 80; 1991, p. 162). Norms, 
therefore, exist “only in situations which allow for alternative kinds of behaviour, involving the 
need to select among these, with the additional condition that selection be non-random” (Toury 
1999, p. 15). This leads to distinctions between choices that are constrained by language systems 
and choices which are language behaviour (see the previous subsection 2.4 for more details).  
Hermans (1999) raises another concern regarding how to position the regulatory aspect 
of norms against “the translator’s intentionality, and thus to balance constraint with agency. 
After all, translators do not just mechanically respond to nods and winks, they also act with 
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intent” (p. 79-80). Toury, however, argues that (1999, p. 9) “translating as an act and as an event 
is characterised by variability, it is historically, socially and culturally determined, in short, 
norm-governed”. This further explained by Gentzler (1993, p. 129-130) who explicates that the 
main aim behind Toury's norms is to determine a hierarchy of interconnected factors governing 
translation products. Since this study aims at exploring the nature of conventionalised norms 
influencing translation choices at certain periods of time from a descriptive perspective, a more 
interweaving and probabilistic perception of the relationship between various contextual 
aspects, and the translator’s decision process enlightens the debate. Norms, in this way, are more 
similar to the socio-cultural and political factors conditioning the translator’s choices, one type 
among a number of probabilities, and less like perpetual determinants. They are, therefore 
investigated in terms of the significance of their socio-political and cultural impact on the act 
of translating and producing the translation and translator’s behaviour.  
Discussing the role and nature of norms, Toury describes norms “as subject to 
constraints of different types and varying degree” (1978/ 2004, p. 206). With respect to their 
potency, he situates norms between two poles of various degrees of intensity which are rules/ 
laws and idiosyncrasies. The norms rise between these two poles sometimes “stronger and hence 
more rule-like, others are weaker, and hence almost idiosyncratic. The borderlines between the 
various types of constraints are thus diffuse” (1978, p. 206). Hermans (1999), however, sensibly 
narrows the broadness of the two poles down with a range of rules and conventions (pp. 79-85). 
He explains that in the domains where power relations, such as political translation, have a more 
dominant role the potency of norms implies that norms move away from conventions with the 
less dependence on “mutual expectations and internalised acceptance”, and more on “codified 
rules in the form of explicit obligations and prohibitions” (p. 82). The term rule is, thus, 
interpreted as “a strong, institutionalised norm, often issued by an identifiable authority armed 
with the power to impose sanctions for non-compliance” (ibid). As a result of the prevalent 
involvement of power relations in the manifold systems of norms, strong norms, thus, tend to 
acquire an imposed power, stabilise over time and become institutionalised. In this study, thus, 
the norms’ density degree may rise and decline depending on socio-political and cultural factors 
and different conditions, such as the type of texts, the type of the topic of the narratives and also 
the translation and publication agencies. Hermans (1999b, p. 58) takes a step further and 
explicates such social conventions, norms and rules in terms of value. Value is considered a 
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term covering the cultural and ideological factors that are exploited by power relations. Norms, 
thus, function as a way to guarantee that general values are transformed into guidelines 
regulating the existing social action. This explication supports Toury’s and Chesterman’s 
assertion that guidelines are not norms themselves but the evidence of them. 
Socio-political factors, therefore, can be considered as supporting an assumption that 
the act of translating, and the quality of production, is based on a careful examination of the 
context or culture in which such norms obtain. Kurdish media translation might not only reflect 
diverse values and norms that exist in society, but sometimes create them. Sheyholislami (2011) 
argues that some programs like cartoons are not permitted to be aired in their original languages, 
particularly when the languages are Arabic, Persian and Turkish as they are considered as a kind 
of threat towards Kurdish. However, non-dubbed English programs are aired because English 
is seen as a prestigious and instrumental global language (p. 104). This denotes that different 
norms might operate at different levels and contexts in Kurdish media that result in different 
translational behaviour. Nevertheless, it is important to note that since norms shift over time, 
they are dynamic and they can only be learnt and studied through observation of the patterns of 
behaviour at certain period of time (Hermans 1999a, p. 85). According to Hermans, whereas 
norms change according to settings and potentials, translators are considered to be either 
following or opposing these fluctuations (ibid: 84). Nevertheless, they are supposed to mainly 
comply with the prevailing norms of the institutional constraints they belong to. The power and 
effectiveness of these norms lead to the identification of regularity of behaviour in situations of 
the same type.  
In the context of this study thus, norms are considered as the socio-political 
environments under which translated texts are produced in the field of Kurdish media. This field 
reflects the status of the Kurdish world where the majority or group of people share, to some 
extent, the same doctrines, beliefs, and traditions that characterise its inhabitants that may 
change over time (through generations) in terms of the type of norms and their power as well. 
In this way, norms can be analysed and described in relation to the shared knowledge, 
expectation, acceptance and refusal regarding what is considered appropriate or inappropriate 
behaviour in Kurdish society and culture or by a particular group within this society at a certain 
time, and this is consistent with Baker’s narrative view. Having established the concept of 
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norms, this study argues that Kurdish translators’ choices might be impacted by various types 
of norms, including socio-political one and the translator’s own ideology. Moreover, the norms 
that exist within this field are, in turn, influenced by the translators' decision-making. This study, 
therefore, requires a model of norm analysis in order to carry out a detailed data analysis 
between 2011and 2014 in the following chapters. It aims at describing the current patterns of 
translation behaviour in Kurdish media and at mapping trends with regard to Kurdish 
translators’ choices which are made under the impact of various types of norms during the 
translation activity. 
 
2.5.1 Models of Norm Analysis 
This sub-section examines relevant models of translation norms in order to address their 
appropriateness to the course of analysis in this study. Scholars working on translation norms 
tend to develop theoretical models in their elaboration of this concept in translation studies. As 
a result, a variety of models of translational norms are distinguished. In the course of this study, 
it would be more productive to present a brief review of the key paradigms to obtain not only 
an insightful understanding of translation norms, but also an appropriate methodological 
guidance for the ensuing analysis of geopolitical translations in the following chapters. The 
description of the current patterns of translation behaviour in Kurdish media entails revising 
two key prevailing groups of norms. This study argues that the set of norms offered by 
Chesterman (1997), developed from the theory of norms proposed by Toury (1995) and 
Hermans (1999b), is more functional to the description of the types of norms in this study. 
Toury (1995, p. 56-59) considered norms as performance guidelines for translators and 
distinguished three types of norms operating at different stages of the translation process: initial 
norms, preliminary norms, and operational norms. Nevertheless, they are partially applicable to 
the process of norm analysis in this study. Arguing that translation has to do battle with two 
cultural traditions, he defines initial norms as a translation in which the translator’s basic choice 
relies on the norms of either the source text or the target culture. According to Toury’s initial 
norms, a translation’s adequacy means pursuing the norms active in the source language and 
culture which “may well entail certain incompatibilities with target norms and practices, 
especially those lying beyond the mere linguistic ones” (Toury 1995, p. 56). Acceptable 
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translation means the opposite in pursuing the norms active in the target language and culture29. 
Nevertheless, Toury states that actual translation decisions will inevitably “involve some ad hoc 
combination of or compromise between the two extremes implied by the initial norm” (1995, 
p. 57). This perception, however, indicates a sense of broadness or even uncertainty in Toury’s 
theorisation of norms. The identification of initial norms is, thus, considered as the most 
challenging part of Toury’s norms because many translation critics usually use the terms 
adequacy and acceptability with different implications (Hermans 1999a, p. 76-77). This study 
follows the example of key norms theorists (Hermans 1999a; Chesterman 1997; 1999) and 
avoids these two terms on the basis of their vagueness. 
Preliminary norms operate at the macro domains, with “those regarding the existence 
and actual nature of a definite translation policy, and those related to the directness of 
translation” (Toury 1995, p. 58). The former “refers to those factors that govern the choice of 
text types, or even of individual texts, to be imported through translation into a particular 
culture/language at a particular point in time” (Toury 1995, p. 58). It has been claimed that the 
factors that determine the selection of texts to be translated in the Kurdish media in general and 
in Kurdish newspapers in particular is not a random procedure. The publication agencies 
purposefully select particular types of texts to be translated and they are translated to serve a 
certain goal (Birot 2012). This study, however, needs to investigate this further by analysing the 
study corpus of this study to substantiate this claim. With regard to directness of translation, 
Kurdish, as a target language, permits translation from intermediate languages. It has been 
argued that this trend was more common before the twentieth century when Arabic, Turkish 
and Persian were the dominant languages at the time and most Kurdish writers were educated 
in those languages (Hassanpour 1999, p. 62). 
However, it can also be argued that even today Kurdish tolerates translation from those 
three languages. Several Kurdish writers, for example, who have been in continuous contact 
with the Arabs, Persians and Turks as a result of the geographical and political status of the 
area, turned into bilingual writers. As such, when they translate from western languages (e.g., 
                                                 
29 This distinction seems to be similar to Venuti’s more debated concepts of foreignising and 
domesticating strategies (Baker 2001, p. 174). 
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English), most of the time they use those three languages as intermediate languages. In addition, 
the translators’ ideology or the lack of translating resources in Kurdish, such as a reliable 
English-Kurdish Dictionary might be another reason for following such a way of translation. 
Kurdish translators often consult an English-Arabic dictionary in order to know what an English 
word means. However, this study includes a bilingual mono-directional parallel corpus, namely, 
English-Kurdish. Therefore, it does not consider this type of norm in terms of involving 
intermediate languages for the whole text because English is the dominant language for the 
whole text. Yet, the decisions in relation to lexical choices in the translated texts might reflect, 
to some extent, this type of norm.  
Operational norms are considered to direct the translators’ choices during the process of 
translation, with matricial norms governing the macrostructure of the text and textual linguistic 
norms affecting microstructures (Toury 1995, p. 58-59). In this study, they can be employed to 
reflect cases of borrowings, omissions, additions, changes of location and manipulations of 
segmentations in the translated texts to help in the process of identifying translation strategies. 
Although Toury’s three-dimensional model of norms is partially applicable to the process of 
norm analysis of this study, the extent to which translators’ agency can operate against the 
institutional constraints needs further investigation in the context of media translation in 
Kurdistan.  
Hermans did not establish a model to compare translation norms as Toury did. 
Nevertheless, his approach to explore norms is better established socially in the sense that the 
relation between norms and social values is more coherent and practical for the translation 
studies of media texts. Considering the concepts of values and manipulations in translation, 
Hermans (1999b, p. 59) suggests three normative levels which indicate that translation can 
never be value-free. The first level refers to general cultural and ideological norms functioning 
throughout a community at the macro-level. The second levels relates to translational norms 
emerging from general notions of translatability and linguistic illustrations between STs and 
TTs, and the third level is about the textual and other pertinence norms prevailing in a particular 
client system or an institution at the micro-level.  
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Hermans’ discussion calls for an integrative study of discourse analysis with various 
fields. His concept of power has maintained the postulation mentioned above and provided more 
justifications to combine translation studies and CDA. His tripartite classification of translation 
norms seems to be consistent with Fairclough’s (1995b) three-dimensional model of critical 
discourse analysis. Both deal with the general socio-cultural factors and specific textual profile 
at the top and bottom level, and position a comparable intermediate level involving discursive 
linguistic representations. Nevertheless, despite awareness of the significance of Hermans’ 
figuration of norms at the macro level, a structurally developed model of translation norms is 
equally important for the theoretical direction of this study at the micro level. This study, thus, 
refers to Chesterman’s model of translation norms. 
Based on Toury and Hermans’ studies on norms, thus, Chesterman (1997, p. 175-186) 
proposes a set of norms, which can be considered as a refinement of Toury’s, initial and 
operational norms, and a more practical model for the analysis of norms in this study. This 
approach is similar to Toury’s in being a descriptive approach “in that he considers the way in 
which norms and even normative laws appear to operate in the world of translation, without 
necessarily wishing to recommend or impose them” (Hermans 1999a, p. 77). However, there 
are some differences in the way Toury and Chesterman view descriptive translation studies 
(DTS) as an approach. For Chesterman, it is impossible to know the quality of translation, if 
DTS refuses to include the evaluative elements. He argues that what we need to know is what 
will be accepted as an appropriate or legitimate, or better translation by a particular community 
and thus outline the perimeter of the concept of translation for that community. 
He introduces the term “meme” into the study of translation norms, which have been 
broadly discussed as a meme of translation. Meme is socio-biological word corresponding to 
gene in the depiction of the development of cultural phenomena. Under Darwinian laws of 
natural selection, genes are transmitted from body to body. Likewise, memes are transferred as 
similar copies from one brain into another and defined as “a unit of cultural transmission, or a 
unit of imitation” (Dawkins 1976, p. 206, cited in Chesterman 1997, p. 5). Based on the 
rudimentary assumptions of memes, Chesterman (1997) gradually reaches to a point where 
memes can be linked to translation:  
 64 
Human beings are also survival machines for memes, but they are not the 
only ones. […] Meme transmission within a culture takes place through imitation 
and of course also through language. But for a meme to be transmitted verbally 
across cultures, it needs a translation. Indeed, the need for translation is a neat 
criterion for the existence of a cultural boundary (Pym 1992: 26). This gives us a 
fundamental definition of a translation: translations are survival machines for 
memes. (Chesterman 1997, p. 7) 
Chesterman, thus, implies that memes require human brains as concrete transporters or 
“survival machines” to function as “a unit of cultural transmission”. This is indicative that the 
notion meme is closely related to cognition. Consistent with the socio-cognitive aspect of van 
Dijk’s CDA (see section 2.2), knowledge is, therefore, a vital device of discourse production 
within context and can be interpreted as operating interactively at the personal and collective 
levels. Nevertheless, transmitting knowledge appropriately from the group to the personal 
domain or the other way around needs a unit of transmission holding this knowledge and its 
function. Integrated with the concept of memes, knowledge becomes a more understandable 
and accessible cognitive notion in the construction and comprehension of discourse. The 
compatibility of memes and its possibility to integrate with CDA is considered significant for 
the course of textual analysis of this study and motivates the study to continue with the review 
of Chesterman’s model of translation norms. 
Chesterman argues that norms only exist in the form of social recognition although 
individuals have individual knowledge of norms (1997: 54). According to him, they affect social 
consciousness and they have potentiality to access the individual consciousness. From the socio-
cognitive perception, this observation appears to entail that norms exist partially in the form of 
the social and cultural knowledge because personal knowledge is adapted and integrated into a 
set of descriptive norms, which broadly covers social, ethical and technical aspects and allows 
‘evaluative judgments’. These are products or “expectancy norms” and process or “professional 
norms”. 
Expectancy norms are partly dominated and influenced by the predominant translation 
tradition and scenes in the target language and culture, “economic or ideological factors, power 
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relations within and between cultures and the like” (p. 67). They are established in the social 
values of the target community. Consistent with the socio-cognitive perception, values can be 
comprehended as the multidimensional social knowledge common within a culture. 
Chesterman’s formulation of expectancy norms, however, has not so far investigated the 
significant relationship between expectancy norms and the context that surfaces them. The term 
expectancy carries a deep-seated sense of social cognition that reflects in the mental 
representations of the target expectations proposed by translators on behalf of the cross-cultural 
and socio-political knowledge of their institutions. In addition, knowledge is the carrier of 
memes that are transferred between source and target cultures judged according to an agenda 
mediated by power relations. Expectancy norms, thus, seem to offer significant potential for the 
macro- level analysis of socio-political constraints in Kurdish media translation, in that they 
facilitate the investigation of the selected translated journalistic texts and the exploration of the 
way these texts conform to the media news agencies’ and the target readership’s expectations 
as appropriate or acceptable.  
Below the level of expectancy norms, professional norms are reflected in the work of 
translators who are “largely responsible for the original establishment of the expectancy norms’ 
and whose work naturally become the yardsticks by which subsequent translations are assessed 
by the receiving society” (p. 67). This type of norm establishes the relationship between the two 
kinds of norms, with professional norms being subordinate to and governed by the expectancy 
norms. Thus, since the expectancy norms specify what the end translation products are like and 
professional norms regulate the translation process, the process norms are identified by product 
norms as to where the end product would be led to. Brownlie (1999) criticises the vagueness of 
Chesterman’s professional norms in terms of textual evidence or consultation of the people 
concerned. Likewise, the expression “competent professional translators” gives a sense of 
ambiguity and doubt as to in what way professional translators can be regarded as competent. 
This apprehension accordingly requires a detailed investigation of textual data to allow evidence 
to materialise from empirical studies indicating how translation norms are retained and 
negotiated inside the institutional context in the diachronic investigation of the shifts that occur 
in translation. In order to present the process norms in a more accessible manner, Chesterman 
groups them into three different types of norms with each group covering a specific aspect. They 
are the accountability norm, the communication norm and the relation norm. 
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The accountability norm can be defined as an ethical norm with regard to professional 
standards of integrity and thoroughness that make the translator responsible for his decisions 
(1997, p. 68). In the absence of one responsible official association for introducing the basic 
features of the accountability norms of Kurdish media30, this type of norm can only be 
investigated with regard to the translated products along with the policy of each of the selected 
media agencies in the corpus of this study. It, thus, postulates that translators owe loyalty to a 
number of parties comprising the original writer, the commissioner of the translation task, the 
potential audience and even the translators themselves. With regard to “loyalty”, it is important 
to reference Nord’s (1997) understanding of this concept. Loyalty differs from the traditional 
terms of “faithfulness” and “fidelity” in that it is outlined to regulate the trustworthy 
reproduction of formal ST features into the TT. It supports the accountability translators have 
towards the participants in translational communication. This type of norm can be 
comprehended as an interpersonal category of a social relationship between people (p.125). In 
this way, Nord has helped to make the concept of loyalty more obvious in terms of the nature 
of the ethical accountability that loyalty denotes.  
The accountability norm, as one aspect of process norms, presumes that translators take 
into account multiple factors such as the publisher, the ST producer and the TT addressees rather 
than just the expectations arising from the target culture. This, in turn, deteriorates the 
prescriptive pressure of the product norms. Consistent with Chesterman (1997: 68) and Nord 
(1997: 126), therefore, loyalty requires the need for a negotiation of the translation task between 
translators and other involved parties, and that might necessitate harmonising between different 
primacies. This theoretical discussion of the accountability norm above, to some extent, offers 
an analytical base for decoding the power-mediated ideological behaviours in the scrutiny of 
the textual products alongside the source and target contexts in this study. In addition, the 
pertinent ethical features brought by the accountability norm might also provide practical 
direction for the institutional operation of media translation in Kurdistan. This will be discussed 
further in the following chapters. 
                                                 
30 There are some principled agencies In Iraqi Kurdistan. However, they are considered more as the 
individual’s effort. Similar to language policy (Sheyholislami 2012, p. 117), they are not officially recognised.  
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The second group of process norms is the communication norm. It is social in nature 
and “specifies the translator’s role as a communication expert, both as a mediator of the 
intentions of others and as a communicator in his/her own right” (1997, p. 69). This attaches a 
social dimension to the translators’ decision making process at the macro-level. However, it is 
obvious that the attempt to optimise communication needs to be based on the balanced needs of 
different parties as governed by the accountability norm. Therefore, the product of the decision-
making process may be identified by the dominant group as knowledge or the prevailing 
ideology within the institution. This type of norm reflects the extent to which media translators 
played the role of ideological mediators and what impact they have on the translations they 
performed in the corpus of this study. Along with the third type of norm, explained below, it 
can be further distinguished along the CNA approach which provides the study with significant 
tools to investigate the way ideological and evaluative elements in media translation are 
rendered. 
The third group in the category of process norms is the relation norm. It was developed 
to govern the technical aspects in the translation process. This norm can be best explored 
through deviations and similarities, especially through lexico-grammatical deviations. It is 
employed to indicate that the linguistic relation between the ST and the TT should be established 
in favour of the text type, the intentions of the commissioner, the ST producer and the assumed 
needs of the prospective audience (p. 69). Text type is, thus, considered the significant criterion 
to decide the degree of ‘similarity’ and the whole translation profile. Chesterman explains the 
significance of text-type by illustrating that legal contracts or political documents might require 
the translations to give priority to a “close formal similarity to the original” (p. 69) and this may 
be demonstrated by sentence-to-sentence correspondence. Likewise, the translations of media 
journalistic texts might also require such primacy in the same manner, since their text-type has 
an informative purpose for the transference of opinions and assessments of facts. Given that the 
STs and TTs are geopolitical commentary articles, the majority of their lexico-grammatical 
choices function as keywords in terms of retaining the authors and/ or translators’ opinions' and 
assessments of the geopolitical facts and their impacts on the overall textual meaning (see 
chapter 3 for more details). Thus, text type is considered a socially projected concept for 
communicative objectives. It is developed as established textual patterns serving diverse 
circumstances and takes a significant part in producing mental patterns of identifiable structural 
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and rhetorical elements in the course of communication. The textual representations help 
manipulating the text receivers’ ways of acquiring the knowledge. In this regard, the relation 
norm, devising text type as the leading factor in the translation process, can therefore be 
construed from a profound socio-cognitive perception as keen to this translational study of 
geopolitical media discourse. 
Like Toury, Chesterman discards the narrow concept of equivalence. However, while 
Toury employed “relational variable”, Chesterman proposes “relevant similarity” to describe 
the complex relation between STs and TTs. This possible relation calls in variation and 
variation, in turn, covers some parameters, such as the degree of target-culture adaptation 
considered appropriate, addition or omission of information in relation to accompanying 
channels and so forth (p. 69). Chesterman refers to these parameters as strategies (see sub-
section 2.4.3). He rightly moves from the theoretical formation of translation norms to the 
practical level concerning the detailed study of translation strategies. Translational strategies 
are employed in the sense that they are observable from translation products in the form of 
‘explicitly textual manipulation’ (p. 89). They are actually a kind of process of ‘doing things’ 
(p. 88) in order to arrive at the best version of translation or ‘relevant similarity’ along with the 
dominant norms.  
To sum up, the overview above has provided the main aspects of norms theory applied 
in translation studies, establishing that norms are social perceptions and their establishment and 
evolution are subject to social habituation. Based on Toury’s and Herman’s analysis of norms, 
Chesterman’s model of translation norms along with van Dijk’s socio-cognitive aspect of 
discourse analysis offers a methodologically and structurally comprehensive approach for the 
analysis of norms in this study. Chesterman’s model encompasses the relation between the 
social-cognitive dimension of norm construction and the multi-level operation to facilitate its 
application. van Dijk’s socio-cognitive vision of discourse analysis is also a consistent source 
of motivation for the cognitive interpretation of Chesterman’s model of norms. The initiation 
of the socio-biological notion ‘memes’ introduces a pioneering direction to relate the socially-
formed norms to the cognitively-constructed models of human communication. This, in turn, 
allows the socio-cognitive perspective to re-interpret the manifestations and effects of norms. 
The socio-cognitive comprehension leads the traditional concept of translation norms to be 
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resuscitated along with human communication and can be more thoroughly rationalised in the 
social contexts by incorporating the external social conditions with internal cognitive 
influences. In addition, having discussed translational reframing strategies (see also section 2.4) 
and its relation to Chesterman’s norms, it is necessary to consider the strategies that achieve 
ideological deviations and ultimately led to norms in the corpus of this study. 
 
2.5.2 Ideology and Search for Laws of Translational Behaviour 
The exploration in the section above has provided a critical overview of the concept of 
norms and considered Chesterman’s model relevant to the description of ideological shifts in 
this study for its compatibility with the socio-cognitive aspect of CDA and Baker’s reframing 
strategies. Regardless of ideology, however, the instances of shifts resulting from recurrent 
translation strategies might be due to various other tendencies in translations. They are either 
socio-political norms dictated and/or are due to some other preferences. These probabilistic 
explanations are generally explored for so-called translation universals (Toury 2004: 15). In this 
study, translational universals can be explained by reference to Toury’s general laws and 
regularities of translational behaviour along with Pym’s (2008) propositions since they might 
be used to further explain why manipulative shifts occur in Kurdish media translation.  
Toury has used the notion of “law” for observed regularities and considered them 
conditioned and probabilistic in translation (Laviosa 2011, p. 306). Toury suggested two 
representative laws for the way translators produce translations, “the law of growing 
standardisation” and “the law of interference” from the source text (1995, p. 275). However, 
several successive studies have proposed the elimination of the notion of laws in favour of 
translation universals (e.g. Baker 1993, 1995, 1996; Chesterman 2004; Laviosa 1998). This 
issue remains highly controversial in DTS since the very idea of universals or laws in translation 
is impossible to validate empirically, as it is impossible to capture translations from all times 
and languages. In this study, however, translation laws are set out by considering the issue of 
sociocultural constraints along with translator’s mediation in translation. They are investigated 
through the conditioning factors that reflect the position of the TTs as opposed to the STs as 
well as within the receiving culture. Thus, one of the points of departure from translation 
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universals might be Baker’s conception of such a term. She defines universal features of 
translation as the elements that typically arise in the translated texts rather than the source texts 
and that “are not the result of interference from specific linguistic system” (1993, p. 243). The 
aspect in her definition that has begun to raise questions, especially when it comes to an 
empirical work as well as that of the role of ideological constraints, is the status of Toury’s Law 
of Interference. Baker’s account appears to ignore the law of interference. Nevertheless, if we 
turn to an earlier classification of translation universals by Toury, we see that he (1995), in fact, 
postulates “the law of interference” as an essential law of translation. 
Toury describes the law of interference as the phenomena pertaining to the make-up of 
the source text that tend to be transferred to the target text (1995, pp. 275-276). Pym relates the 
occurrence of this type of law to the socio-cultural constraints and the social conditions of the 
two languages that are entangled in the translation process. One of those factors is the situation 
of the target language as opposed to the source language. In other words, the more prestigious 
the source culture from the perspectives of the target culture, the higher the chance of 
interferences, and the other way around. In this study, therefore, the law of interference might 
be due to the power relations and the mutual prestige of the cultures and languages in question. 
Interference is thus either seen as contradicting universality, as in Baker’s definition, or 
alternatively a fundamental demonstration of universality, as in Toury’s. On the other hand, 
Toury’s second law of growing standardisation has received a lot of attention under different 
appearances in the literature of translation studies. This might be due to Baker’s configuration 
of translational universals which has left the law of interference in the shadows.  
Pym (2008, p. 311) reviews Toury’s laws of standardisation and interference and 
critically questions Baker’s later effort to form what she calls translational universals. Despite 
the complexity and indirectness of Toury’s concept of the law of standardisation, Pym considers 
each of Baker’s four universals, explicitation, simplification, nominalisation and levelling out, 
as repetitive amplifications of this type of Toury’s original law while she made no reference to 
the law of interference at all. According to Baker, simplification brings in features of the 
sentences shortening, and this contradicts explicitations since it causes the sentence to be longer, 
or normalisation that involves incomplete sentences (c.f. Pym 2008, p. 319). 
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Both Baker’s four universals and Toury’s law of growing standardisation reflect the 
position of the translated texts within the receiving culture. However, the law of growing 
standardisation is more inclusive in considering what happens in translation. For Pym (2008, p. 
320), the law of growing standardisation occurs when the translation product occupies a 
peripheral position within the target language and culture. However, the target texts selected for 
the analysis of this study are newspaper commentary articles written by various political 
analysts and translated for the Kurdish readership. They are therefore considered to occupy an 
important position within the target language and culture for conveying geopolitical knowledge 
about the Middle East in general and Kurdistan in particular. Yet, the extent to which they adapt 
themselves to the “established models and repertoires” (Toury 2012, p. 307) of Kurdish requires 
knowing where the law of standardisation is effective in them. 
Consistent with Pym’s debate, this study thus argues that the dichotomy of Toury’s 
proposition offers a wider view on causal explanations for translational behaviour than Baker’s. 
According to Pym (2008), the explanations cannot be considered completely universal for their 
reliance on sociocultural variables. He, thus, looks for other alternative explanations with regard 
to Toury’s two translational phenomena and offers the translator’s tendency to risk avoidance. 
In the translation process, translators frequently encounter choices that, in turn, indicate doubt. 
For Pym (2008), since time is the key constraint and participants’ expectations are all part of 
the equation in practical translation, translators will play it safe and avoid risk through following 
two general ways of dealing with doubt: 
either say what seems normal or safe (standardization) or say what 
someone else can be responsible for (interference). Both sets of strategies are 
ways in which translators reduce their personal risk burden. In accordance with 
both laws, at the same time, many translators do not tend to take on 
communicative risk in their own name. (2008, p. 324) 
Pym develops this assumption further to state that a different system of reward structures 
might have an impact on how translators respond while confronting a risk. He argues: 
If translators are going to be rewarded (financially, symbolically or 
socially) for taking risks, then they are likely to take risks, rather than transfer 
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them. Translators may then have an interest in breaking all the maxims, norms, 
laws or universals that theorists throw at them. (2008, p. 325) 
He perceives that the existing reward structure for the translator’s performance 
motivates translators to be risk averse; a tendency that once initiated will reproduce itself. It is 
here, then, that Pym considers the explanation of certain patterns in translational behaviour, 
observing beyond the purely linguistic level to include sociocultural variables such as prestige, 
reward, position, stance and so forth. This is consistent with what Lefevere’s interrelating 
components of patronage, which are the ideological, the economic and status component (see 
sub-section 2.4.1 for more details). According to Pym, these risk dynamics are a key link in 
establishing a law which has “a more human causation”, that is, “translators will tend to avoid 
risk by standardising language and/or channelling interference, if and when there are no rewards 
for them to do otherwise” (2008, p. 326). It might be noted here that this theory of risk avoidance 
could depict the strategies and practices adopted in Kurdish media translation. The status of 
translators within the social, linguistic, and cultural system of the media agencies in Kurdistan 
should be taken into account. 
To sum up, this chapter has presented the theoretical models selected for the course of 
analysis of this study. The aim was to balance the focus of the study in relation to the general 
categorisation with existing theoretical concepts of norms, CDA and Narrative Theory which 
the study draws on within the framework of modern DTS in order to explain the behaviour of 
translators. This study adapts Toury’s (1995) proposal of the three-phase analytical model as 
one of the aims of the research is to describe norms currently operating in English-Kurdish 
media translations. Toury’s norm theory, thus, supports the analysis of this study in terms of 
identifying and describing the periodic, abstract, systematic behaviour that privileges strong 
patterns of socialisation into that behaviour. However, it overlooks many individual and group 
attempts at subverting prevailing patterns of dominant political and social tenet. As a theory, 
Toury’s norms pays very little attention to the involved patterns of interaction between frequent 
established patterns of behaviour and the constant attempts at undermining that behaviour, i.e., 
the interaction between dominance and resistance. Such patterns of dominance and resistance 
are considered to be an outcome of the political and social situations, which is the aspect of the 
translator’s behaviour this study aims at. This study, therefore, employed Chesterman’s two 
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types of norms, which are the product and the process norms, due to their coverage of the socio-
cultural and political aspects of the context they arise from. The aim is to distinguish and 
describe the types of norms currently operational in Kurdish media. In addition, Chesterman’s 
notion of norms helps in bringing several other approaches closer together, such as CDA and 
Narrative Theory which, in turn, increases our understanding of the way translation operates in 
the socio-cultural and political contexts in this study. This study, thus, adapts the two discourse-
analytic approaches of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and Narrative Theory for their 
ability to inform one another and as a means to seek a more complete textual analysis. In other 
words, while CDA focuses on power and language, Narrative Theory is concerned with how 
translators make sense of their decisions in society through language. 
The combination of Fairclough’s socio-functional and van Dijk’s socio-cognitive CDA 
model is borrowed as a micro- and macro-analytical framework in this study (see 3.1.2 for more 
details). As a functional-cognitive model of discourse analysis, it is able to position the relevant 
textual components into basic contextual models shaped by shared group knowledge or 
attitudes. This integrated method is formulated to analyse power-mediated discourse. Likewise, 
the socio-cognitively adapted model of translation norms is designed to account for translation 
as a social action and can be better understood alongside the contexts which accommodate the 
development of the functional-cognitive model for discourse analysis. In this way, the model of 
CDA is consistent with that of translation norms in the sense that they are both dealing with 
socio-cultural events and rely on the indexes of text to deliver socially-encoded messages to the 
respective recipients (see section 2.5). The chapter has also revealed that both models of CDA 
and norm analysis are based on cognitively-composed contextual models and help mediate 
between textual and social dimensions. It thus depends on discourse analysts or investigators to 
unveil the underlying objectives in texts. Nevertheless, according to Souto-Manning (2014, p. 
164) a discourse is only influential when it is resumed in every day told narratives. This line of 
thought calls for a combined and balanced approach of CDA and Narrative Theory, focusing on 
social issues as well as linguistic analysis, considering all the ways in which language and social 
realm are interweaved. Baker’s Narrative Theory describes a model for the analysis of the 
strategies that are employed to frame various and competitive narratives. It used to describe and 
interpret discourse as a social practice and analyses media texts in relation to lexico-
grammatical choices for their ideological implication. Therefore, her model of framing 
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strategies provides this study with mature understandings of the discursive effects of various 
strategies that are used in media translation. It explores the way in which translation functions 
and translators mediate in the context of ideological conflicts. Accordingly, with the 
establishment of the relationship between translation norms theory, CDA and Narrative Theory, 
a critical narrative approach within a descriptive methodology will be formulated in the 






Methodology and Corpus Design 
3.0 Introduction 
The previous chapters have provided an extensive literature review of relevant research 
and theories which will prove instrumental for an analysis of the translation of media texts in 
the Kurdish context. They also indicated that Kurdish media translation, in general, and 
geopolitical translation, in particular, has been overlooked in the field of translation studies. 
This chapter includes a review of the research method and design appropriateness for the 
discussion of the role of ideology in the following chapters. It illustrates the relationships 
between the selected theoretical models and the methods used to collect and interpret the data 
in this study. A combination of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and narrative approach (NA) 
is adapted, as practical analytical tools, to the framework of descriptive translation studies 
(DTS). The aim is to explore the normative effects of the ideological positioning of the translator 
and address the role of the socio-political context in Kurdish media translation. The formulation 
of a critical narrative analysis (CNA) framework for the study of translation phenomena enables 
the examination of the connections between the macro-level ideological power and micro-level 
interactional positioning in the study corpus of this study. It does so through the analysis of the 
way lexico-grammatical choices are manipulated to facilitate mediation and/or express 
ideology.  
This study will focus on investigating the state of Kurdish media translation through a 
special focus on geopolitical commentary articles as a branch of translation for the general 
public. Scrutinising the translation of media texts requires taking into account the role of media 
agencies and the translators who work for them, and as such, this study aims to investigate the 
role of both in relation to Kurdish media translation, focussing on geopolitical texts in particular. 
The main objectives of the research are: 1) investigating the role of ideology in Kurdish media 
translation, driving the decisions of both agencies and translators in order to disclose the 
regularities of translation behaviour; 2) revealing to what extent the choices reflect the author’s 
and translator’s agency or the SL’s and TL’s system and culture. These aims will be explored 
by analysing the data set. This study creates a parallel corpus of English texts and their Kurdish 
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translations to explore the questions raised in the course of the study. Detailed description about 
the corpus design is given in section (3.2). 
  
 
3.1 Methodology: the Integration of the Theoretical Models 
This section reveals the overall approach to the research process and the set of methods 
and principles that are pursued to examine the available data. It also presents the rationale, the 
contribution and the limitations of using this approach before introducing the functional models 
selected as an integrated methodological framework for the analysis of ideological manipulation 
in the context of Kurdish media translation. The aim is to validate and explain the 
proportionality of the type of research design that will enable it to fulfil the objective of this 
study. The study also argues that such framework can be replicated to study translation 
manipulation and ideology in the other contexts. 
Translation is no longer considered as the replacement of an utterance in one language 
by another without distortion. In this study, these distortions are an outcome of diverse 
interventions that have directly and indirectly operated in media translation practice. The 
interventions are considered as motivations for ideologically interfering with the original, on 
the grounds that new information is added to the work. They lead to the fact that shifts in 
translation are in many cases inevitable and at times even required. This, in turn, suggests that 
translation is a mediated practice involving ideological interventions (mediations) rather than 
an unproblematic substitution of code units motivated by dissimilarity of culture.  
Therefore, discussions of the theory and practice of translation in this study have sought 
to highlight the frameworks that take into account sociocultural and ideological contexts 
(Lefevere 1992, p.4; Hermans1985, 1996, 2010; Chesterman 1997; Baker 2006, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the difficulty in moving from a linguistic approach to sociocultural and 
ideological approaches has resulted in methodological crises in an attempt to develop a unified 
methodology in the field of translation studies. There is no single linguistic or sociocultural 
approach when it comes to understanding and translating media texts, in particular, geopolitical 
texts. As a written language form, media text represents one of the four tools of communication. 
Along with images, audio and video, it provides the means of various transmission forms and 
defines the common ground of a variety of literary and non-literary works. As a term, media 
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text thus can be used to refer to how reality is represented in broadcast, online and print media 
from television to newspaper, magazine and social media. Therefore, the concept of media 
translation might be applied to different forms of media translation and raise questions about 
the role of translation in today’s global and digitalised world of communication. However, the 
data for this study is collected from online media in the form of newspaper commentary articles; 
the study investigates the reframing of geopolitical knowledge post-Saddam Hussein’s regime 
in 2003 in Iraqi Kurdistan (see section 3.2). 
In Kurdish media translation, socio-cultural and ideological contexts are considered to 
occupy a central position within current understandings of how translation operates to adjust to 
the dominant relations within the target cultural and communication systems. In the context of 
this study, media texts are considered to reflect different socio-cultural and ideological contexts 
that might privilege certain sets of ideas and neglect or undermine others. They, therefore, 
require a multidisciplinary approach in order to describe the choices made by the translators in 
their translations along with their implications. This study thus adapts the tripartite models of 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Narrative Theory, and Norm theory as a single framework 
for the investigation of such aspects in the following chapters31. The focus is on the types of 
translational shifts along with their implications, resulting from the strategies of deleting, 
adding, substituting and borrowing the lexico-grammatical choices in the translation of 
geopolitical commentary articles from English into Kurdish. This, in turn, may result in the 
revelation of the type and effect of norms currently operating in English-Kurdish translations. 
The integration of these analytical approaches to data analysis helps in the exploration 
of the connection between the macro-level power of institutional and socio-cultural biases and 
the micro-level positioning of translator’s choices in the corpus of this study. The study 
proposes that CNA unifies CDA and narrative analysis within the framework of descriptive 
translation studies of normative effects in a mutually beneficial partnership that addresses both 
theoretical and methodological challenges in translation studies. It also suggests that this 
framework can be replicated for the study of translation behaviour within other contexts where 
                                                 
31 The selected approaches are discussed in detail in chapter two of this study and their functional aspects 
are explored in the following two subsections of this chapter. 
 78 
socio-political factors play a dominant role. As explained in the introductory chapter of this 
study, the purpose of adapting and integrating these three models is to develop the classification 
of forms of discourse representation for the study of translation and create a set of categories 
that enable the study of the mediation of translated discourse by means of a description of 
textual-linguistic features pertinent for the analysis of translated media texts. By employing not 
only Norm theory, but also Narrative Theory and CDA, this research thus has followed a 
linguistic and socio-cultural track in DTS. The suggested classification makes it possible to 
identify a qualitative and quantitative profile for any narrative media texts and their translations 
in terms of discourse representation, as well as to perform a comparison of similar profiles. In 
this way, the three models allow the investigations of this study to move beyond the frequency 
of patterns of behaviour to identify the types of shifts and implications resulting from these 
patterns and their relations to social and political dogma. Therefore, they are adapted in this 
study to work as a single framework that recognises and describes the varied, shifting and 
continuously negotiable positioning of translators in relation to their texts, authors, societies and 
prevailing ideologies.  
The most obvious limitation of this methodology is that it only observes and describes 
the translator’s ideological choices and/or shifts. The focus of interest of this study is translators’ 
behaviour within the framework of their socio-political and historical context. Thus, the analysis 
will be descriptive and explanatory. Prescriptive or evaluative judgement regarding translator’s 
linguistic competency and translation quality are outside the study’s scope and interest. Special 
emphasis shall be placed on the translator’s stance towards the language used and the way it is 
reflected in the TT, as the issue of language has been a deeply ideological one in Kurdistan 
historically. Issues concerning the theatrical aspects of the text are beyond the scope of this 
study. The top-down and bottom-up investigating strategies are involved in this study. The 
direction and the analysis of the impact of socio-contextual factors on the translation choices in 
this study are top-down. In essence, top-down analysis, which is also known as macro-analysis, 
means breaking down the main system to comprehend its compositional sub-systems. It starts 
with an initial framework of socio-political context and breaks down from there into smaller 
units. The focus is more on the interplay between the translator’s behaviour and the function of 
the socio-contextual factors rather than the form of the text. However the textual analysis and 
the analysis of the formulation of the unit of translation in the SL and their counterparts in the 
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TL are bottom up, i.e., it analyses in detail any level of subsystem to determine the unit of 
translations in SL and their counterparts in TL. Therefore, the bottom-up analysis takes place 
once the textual information is extracted from the corpus and analysed according to the 
framework that includes categories, even the culture-specific ones (see subsection 3.1.2). This 
will gradually expand to the semantic relationships among them and lead to the scrutiny of any 
socio-cultural and linguistic differences which, as a result, reflects the type of norms that may 
exist within the domains. As part of the textual analysis, consequently, six procedures needs to 
be carried out in this study which are comparison, identification, classification, distinction, 
quantification and interpretation. The study, therefore, draws on interdisciplinary and 
complementary models and tools in order to adapt into a single framework for the investigation 
of the patterns of the translators’ behaviour in the following chapters (see the following 
subsection 3.1.1).  
 
3.1.1 The Possible Integration of the Complementary Models 
The presentation above has provided the significance of the overall approach to the 
research process in this study and in the field of translation studies. This subsection shows the 
interaction among the three key-selected models of DTS, including Toury’s (1995) three-phase 
methodology and Chestermans’ (1997) two types of norms, Fairclough’s and van Dijk’s Critical 
discourse analysis (CDA), and Baker’s (2006, 2007) three types of framing strategies developed 
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Figure 3.1 shows that Toury’s Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS) Model is borrowed 
and adapted as a common-ground analytical framework to show the interconnection between 
all the selected models operating at different stages in this study. The three-phase methodology 
of systematic DTS encompasses both CNA and Chesterman’s model of norms from its second 
stage of analysis onwards. The second stage of the methodology is the textual analysis, which 
involves CNA approach, to identify how socio-political factors manipulate and affect 
translators’ lexico-grammatical choices in relation to the shifts resulting from the translation 
strategies of deletion, addition and borrowing. This, in turn, facilitates the description of the 
types of norms in relation to Chesterman’s key model of norms in the final stage of Toury’s 
Methodology. 
According to Toury (1995, 2012) this study should follow four procedures which are 
comparison, identification, description, and quantification. However, the target-orientedness 
approach of this research goes beyond an exclusive focus on the target texts only to cover the 
constraint factors of patronage and political conflicts in Kurdish media contexts. The study 
encompasses source text analysis, transfer operations and constraints, transfer features, 
translation relationships, and target text analysis. It is a target-oriented study “because this is 
where its observations start” and “would be exhausted” (Toury, 1995, p. 36). DTS is, therefore, 
appropriate not only in drawing attention to how media texts are translated, but also in 
examining what media agencies and translators do in the information transmission (Weissbrod 
2008, p. 53) which are, in turns, the objectives of this study. In order to achieve these objectives, 
this research, therefore, will adapt the three-phase methodology of systematic DTS proposed by 
Toury (2012, pp. 94-95) as explained below:  
The first stage of the analysis in this study focuses on the study of the translated texts 
individually in terms of acceptability and accessibility on all relevant levels not only as target 
language texts, but also as translations into it. The corpus, which is outlined in detail in the next 
section (3.2), consists of geopolitical commentary articles. As defined in the first two chapters, 
geopolitical texts are defined as parts of politics itself and not an unbiased and isolated depiction 
of an obvious detached reality. The texts selected for this study are produced by various news 
agencies and translated by four Kurdish news agencies for the general public. The translated 
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texts are considered prominent Kurdish geopolitical texts since they are accepted as translations 
of the source texts by four influential Kurdish media agencies, which are Sbeiy, Kurdistan-i-
New, Xendan and Rudaw news agencies, as well as the general public in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Furthermore, the way in which texts are selected for translation is considered to be strongly 
informed by the direct or indirect affiliation of the four main Kurdish media agencies to different 
political parties (patrons). 
The next stage encompasses a textual analysis in which the ST segments are mapped 
onto their assumed counterparts in the TL in order to reveal the type of relationships between 
them. These segments or units of comparison require critical narrative analysis (CNA) in order 
to examine the relationships between the ST and the TT and identify and interpret where the 
two texts correspond and differ (see the following subsection 3.1.2). When performing an initial 
textual analysis, it seems that some linguistic features in the TTs are different from those in the 
STs in terms of evaluative meanings and styles on the level of lexico-grammatical choices. 
Therefore, the unit of comparisons that are of interest to this study are lexico-grammatical 
choices, which may not have always one-to-one correspondence in the TT while mapped onto 
their counterparts in the source language. They are, therefore, regarded as shifts of evaluation 
(deviations of evaluation). Thus, the textual analysis of the study focuses on the deviations or 
distortions resulting from both semantic and stylistic differences in graduation between the 
English commentary articles and their translations. The quantitative analysis constitutes part of 
the study that is used as means of providing supporting evidence for a qualitative CNA 
approach. In other words, the semantic and stylistic deviations in the translated texts are caused 
by a number of identified reframing strategies known as borrowing, deletion (omission), 
addition, substitution, and literal translation. The number and percentage of these translation 
strategies help in exploring and grouping dominant shifts along with their implication. This, in 
turn, provides this study with a clear description of the mediation evidenced by the deviations 
in the translated media texts. The ST and the TT are compared and analysed to identify different 
patterns of departures along with their implications in evaluative meaning and style before 
quantifying the type of deviations and establishing dominant deviation patterns (see the 
following subsection for more detail).  
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Following the comparative analysis process, the third stage of this study, adapted from 
Toury’s DTS draws generalisations on the basis of recurrent patterns of behaviour that are 
identified in the two texts. The observations, which are based on data analysis including word 
level and above word level, will indicate if the diffusion of foreign borrowing, addition, 
substitution and deletion are engendered by the existence of an ideology or the non-
standardisation of Kurdish, or if such diffusion is a general norm or tendency (Chesterman 1997; 
Toury 1995/2012; Pym 2008; Baker 1993, 1995, 1996; Lefevere 1992b; Tymoczko 2000, 2010) 
pursued among the selected media agencies and translators. The outcome of the data analysis, 
therefore, is significant since it works as a device to identify ideological shifts in Kurdish media 
translation, which is the central question this study seeks to answer. In other words, with 
reference to the translation of geopolitical texts, especially Kurdistan, this study seeks to find 
out to what extent geopolitical and contextual factors affect Kurdish translators’ textual 
strategies. The recurrent patterns established by the comparative data analysis can be suggestive 
of the translation behaviours of media translators, on the basis of which translation norms that 
operate in the current practice of English-Kurdish media translation can be uncovered. This, 
eventually, leads to achieving the aim of this study which is the identification of the type of 
norms operating in Kurdish media, including the dominant type and the discussion of the factors 
behind their existence (Chesterman 1997). This aim supports the selection of text type and genre 
in this study that is geopolitical commentary articles. 
 
3.1.2 Critical Narrative Analysis (CNA) 
The previous subsection has discussed the appropriateness of the three selected models 
as a means of data collection and data analysis in this study. With the focus on lexico-
grammatical analysis, DTS offers a common-ground model of describing the quantitative 
analysis of the patterns of translation behaviour. The qualitative analysis of this study, however, 
requires critical narrative analysis (CNA) parameters to explore how translation strategies 
inform ideology along with their impact on media translation. This subsection, therefore, 
illustrates how CDA and the narrative model function as useful tools at the second stage of 
Toury’s three-phase methodology. Following CNA approach, the qualitative textual exploration 
of this study is of twofold analysis: 
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 In the first stage, CDA operates to identify stylistic and semantic deviations in the TT 
lexico-grammatical choices while compared to their STs. The lexico-grammatical choices are 
investigated at word level and above word level, including parts of speech, sentences and 
paragraphs. The determinative series of systematic coupled pairs in the mapping process leads 
to the identification of the translation choices in relation to the translation strategies which 
include cases of literal translation, deletions, additions, substitutions and borrowings. At word 
level, this study investigates shifts arising from the translation strategies with regard to 
vocabularies as ST individual lexical units in a given contexts (Halliday, 1978, p. 39). Above 
word level, the lexico-grammatical patterning will be dealt with using translation strategies with 
regard to words combining with other words to form stretches of language (Baker 2011a, p. 51) 
which may include expressions such as collocations, phrases, clauses, sentence and even 
paragraphs. Nevertheless, both individual lexical units and word combinations in the ST may 
not have one-to-one correspondence in the TT. In other words, they may have been expressed 
differently or paraphrased in the respective TT due to their non-lexicalisation and/or because of 
socio-political factors since the STs are commentary articles that represent geopolitical topics. 
The couple-pair establishment at this stage reveals the type of translation strategy used to make 
shifts by translators.  
Fairclough’s socio-functional dimensions provide the analysis mentioned above with a 
mean of revealing the relationship between language in use (lexico-grammatical choices) and 
the socio-relations and processes in which language use is imbricated (1995b, p. 73). The textual 
analysis in this thesis, thus, starts with Fairclough’s (1992; 1993) functional three-dimensional 
model of CDA in which text, discursive practice and social practice function dialectically within 
every discursive event. Any communicative event in this study is, thus, examined on three 










Figure 3.2 shows that the analysis is performed in three procedures which are 
description, interpretation and explanation. Text analysis is conducted with the description of 
linguistic features of the text. This includes the lexico-grammatical choices used for indexing 
social identities, relations between them, and textual organisation indicative of the broader 
discourse structure in the discursive situation. The in-between level of discursive practice 
operates as the bond between text and social practice, interpreting the way a text is produced, 
construed and consumed. According to Fairclough (1992), the analysis at this dimension should 
combine the ‘micro-analysis’ and ‘macro-analysis’ (p. 85). Micro-analysis denotes the detailed 
textual analysis delineated above.  
Macro-analysis refers to the depiction of the “orders of discourse”, which is the relevant 
wider discursive context in which the text is situated. This realises the nature of the resources 
being drawn on for the production of texts. Thus, “orders of discourse” effectively covers the 
notion of intertextuality which represents the links between one text and its preceding texts and 
other categories of text (Fairclough 1997, p. 119). According to Fairclough (ibid, p. 86), it is 
because of the interrelationship between the micro-and macro-analysis that the dimension of 
discursive practice can mediate between text and social practice. Explanation is concerned with 
the stage of exploring socio-cultural and political factors to explicate possible social facets of 
the process of producing and interpreting the text. The third dimension of social practice, thus, 
relates discourse to the notions of ideology and power. According to van Dijk (2006, p. 164), 
however, “contexts are only observable by their consequences on discourse”. Here 






Figure 3. 2: Fairclough’s three dimension analytical model 
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interpretations of communicative situations onto the observable parameters such as discourse 
and text. Thus, van Dijk pays significant attention to the role of text as the basis for discourse 
analysis. In his words, contexts are only interesting for discourse analysts “because they 
involved language use, text, or talk as its constituent or component practical activity” (p. 165). 
The central task of CDA is, thus, postulated as exposing of the embedded ideologies in 
discursive practices at both micro-and macro levels mentioned above.  
In the second stage, narrative model explores the implication of the identified deviated 
choices by examining the sites and strategies of framing used by the translators both around and 
within the translated texts, synchronically and diachronically. According to an initial data 
analysis, which was carried out in order to reveal the type of translation strategies used in the 
translation of geopolitical commentary articles, the most common strategies employed to 
transmit the ST information are: deletion, addition, substitution (deletion and addition), and 
borrowing (Vinay and Darbelnet 1958/2004; Newmark 1988; Chesterman 1997; Baker 2011a; 
van Leven-Zwart 1989; Nida 1964; Baker 2006, 2007). However, in order to find out the 
discursive effect of the strategies that are used in media translation, this study refers to Baker’s 
(2006, 2007) model of framing strategies. The reframing strategies in Baker’s model provide 
the analysis of this study with helpful tools in examining how the ideological and evaluative 
elements in Kurdish media translation are rendered. In other words, it helps to find out if 
translators are manipulating the STs to favour or undermine the dominant narratives in the target 
society and/or reframing the ST to motivate the reader to reconsider his/her position regarding 
these dominant narratives. This, in turn, explores the extent to which translation agencies and 
newspapers allowing ideology to inform their news output and translation policies. 
The preliminary data analysis also revealed other types of translational shift in the TTs 
which are the cases of mistranslations as a result of literal translation strategy. These cases are 
important as they show where the translator fails to achieve the function of meaning rendition 
since, regardless of their inconsistency with the STs, the TT correspondences do not make sense 
to the TT recipient due to the co-text and/or neglect of context. This function element is 
considered significant to this study’s investigation and also the text type and genre of our study 
corpus. This is due to the fact that the text-type of both STs and TTs in this kind of genre and 
text type is information transfer of opinion and/or attitudes. In other words, they have 
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informative purpose since they transfer opinions and assessments of facts. Bearing in mind that 
the STs and TTs are geopolitical commentary articles, the majority of their lexical choices 
function as keywords in terms of maintaining the authors and/ or translators’ opinions' and 
assessments of the geopolitical facts and their impacts on the overall textual meaning. Based on 
the outcomes of the initial data analysis, the reasons behind those translational shifts which are 
not mistranslations refer to ideology. This can help us test the first assumption to see if ideology 
plays a great role in the occurrence of both lexical and stylistic shifts in Kurdish media 
translation. Besides, the aforementioned translation strategies are all the focus of thorough 
investigation in the comparative data analysis in order to attain a deeper knowledge of 
translation behaviours practised by translators in the Kurdish media. This leads to an exploration 
of the preferred strategies which lead to lexical shift and stylistic shift in Kurdish media 
translation, respectively. This, in turn, can help us to achieve the third stage of Toury’s analysis 
and find out any correlation between the abovementioned strategies and the lack of standardised 
Kurdish, ideology or other possible tendencies. 
The qualitative analysis in this study thus required examining both the ST and TT texts 
in terms of deviations and their implications on account of the fact that they provide evidence 
of processes such as the construction and reconstruction of knowledge and identities and the 
redefinition of social relationships. Critical narrative theory (CNA), which combines CDA and 
Narrative Theory, offers a significant mode of analysis by considering the language power 
differences of institution and society, dissimilarities which have largely been overlooked in the 
analysis of media narrative. The translated media commentary narratives as a genre offer 
institutional discourses an effective way to assert themselves as power discourses. CNA thus 
allows this study to explore how translators make their choices in constant social interactions at 
both personal and institutional levels, and how institutional discourses affect and are affected 
by everyday narratives. This is significant because the translator’s narratives 
(strategies/choices) are created and positioned in social and institutional contexts, yet and by 
large, they are investigated apart from issues of power and/or institution. CNA suggests that 
when translators make sense of their choices through narratives, they bring together the micro 
(personal) and macro (social or institutional) contexts in place. Following Toury’s comparative 
analysis and considering translators’ choices as strategies to reframe ST narratives, CDA offers 
the opportunity to investigate the constructions and reconstruction of these narratives in both 
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the STs and the TT to identify deviations. This is explored in detail in the following chapters 
where many case studies reveal how textual strategies reframed narratives. 
 
3.2 Corpus Design 
This section provides a detailed description of the corpus utilised in this study in terms 
of its selection criteria. These include mode, genre, domain, text type, medium, language, 
authorship, time and the publication status of texts. 
Corpus-based approaches have been an object of study for some decades and the field 
of translation studies has seen an increased interest in their use and construction. Being rather 
new in Kurdish, translational corpus compilations have received little attention compared with 
those in other languages such as English. However, translation researchers do not have a great 
deal of choice in terms of already existing resources since translational corpus compilation 
reflects the goals of the study and its context of production, a reason that leads the researchers 
to build their own corpora (Zanettin 2012, p. 8). This is consistent with the creation of an 
English-Kurdish media corpus in this study since building such a type of corpus needs to meet 
the requirements of the respective study. In other words, since this study looks into the 
translation strategies used by media translators to convey geopolitical information written in 
English, in particular borrowings, additions and deletions, it requires a corpus rich with 
geopolitical information and reflecting different views. The translated texts that meet this 
criterion in Kurdish are geopolitical commentary articles produced by Kurdish media agencies. 
They are available in the public domain and produced by four known Kurdish media agencies, 
which are Sbeiy, Xendan, Kurdistan-i-Nwe, and Rudaw media agencies. They are readily 
available in the public domain and the target audience have access to them both as STs and 
TTs32. This leads to a subject of reflexive discourse about what appears in the Kurdish media 
generally and the four Kurdish media agencies in particular. This study includes a bilingual 
mono-directional parallel corpus. It comprises a collection of parallel texts of original and 
                                                 
32 In many of the online Kurdish newspapers, comments and suggestions at the bottom of the page show 
that some of the target readers made close readings of both the translated texts and the source texts, in particular in 
terms of lexical choices. 
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translated texts that provide an empirical study of the product and process of translation. The 
original texts are written in English and translated into Kurdish by different translators who are 
native speakers of the target language. The STs of this corpus are written in English by various 
authors or commentators who are usually editors or columnists with special expertise on topics 
judged to be of broad significance to the readership, both STs and TTs. The TTs are translated 
by Kurdish translators into Kurdish Soraní for four recognised media agencies. The texts, 
therefore, offer suitable text type and genre for analysis in this study considering the above-
mentioned substantial features. 
 
3.2.1 Selection Criteria 
The corpus is employed on the premise that it can be used as a representative sample to 
answer those questions raised in the course of this study. The question of representativeness is 
somewhat problematic in corpus-based translation studies as outlined by Saldanha and O’Brien 
(2013). They suggest obtaining representative corpus is most challenging when dealing with 
translation because “translation flows from and into any two languages tend to be unequal, 
representativeness and comparability are often conflicting goals” (p. 72). Media is a broad area 
encompassing many different people, topics and organisations which provide information and 
news for the general public. It comprises the printed and electronic media such as newspaper, 
magazine, film, radio broadcasting, TV broadcasting, music records and so forth. Each 
comprises various types of texts in terms of their function and place in society. They may be 
used to accomplish different purposes, e.g., providing information, entertainment, political and 
publicity campaign and so forth. Nevertheless, the corpus of this study includes geopolitical 
commentary articles and their translated correspondence as a significant representative sample 
of a language register used among Kurdish media. They are considered to be significant 
translations performed by different Kurdish media agencies and their translators from English 
into Kurdish. They are, therefore, a significant sample that can represent the (written) language 
register of Kurdish used among Kurdish media translators.  
It is important to bear in mind that as an Iraqi Kurdish Scholar, I have tried to be 
objective in my positioning as a researcher. The selection of the study’s articles, however, in 
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relation to the geopolitical situation in Iraqi Kurdistan may subconsciously have its own impact 
on the judgements of the representative case and reflect elements of subjectivity. As a 
researcher, I have attempted to include the texts which are authentic and represent Kurdish 
media translation in terms of the lexico-grammatical choices. To try to counteract that fact that 
I’m ideologically positioned as a researcher, I have developed a methodology that is heavily 
based on objective criteria like deletions, additions and borrowings. The focus of the study is 
on the period after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, in particular from 2011 to the 
end of 2014, during which time Iraqi Kurdistan experienced a remarkable upsurge of public 
interest in media translation. Since March 2011, Syria and Iraqi’s civil wars have created new 
opportunities for the long repressed Syrian Kurds and semi-independent Iraqi Kurds to create 
new forms of Kurdish governance in Syria and Iraq, respectively (King 2014, p. 211-212). This 
has attracted the world media’s attention and headlines which has had, in turn, a significant 
impact on Kurdish media translation. The language used reflects the linguistic, social, cultural, 
and political status of Kurdish translation of the time. 
In this research, the focus is on the strategies used by the Kurdish translators in electronic 
commentary articles which reflect online translation. The ST producers are journalists with 
wide-ranging areas of expertise as well as professional background in Middle East studies, in 
particular the Kurdish geopolitical question. The significance of this element in relation to our 
investigation is that it indicates the authors’ opinions and assessments of the Middle East facts 
are of high interest to the target readership since they are considered experts in the field of this 
type. For instance, the translated articles by the American journalist Thomas Loren Friedman, 
columnist and author, who writes a twice-weekly column for The New York Times and has 
written extensively on foreign affairs including the Middle East and the Kurdish issue, and has 
won the Pulitzer Prize three times, are of great interest to the Kurdish readers who gladly 
received him when he visited Iraqi Kurdistan. With regard to the translated texts in the corpus, 
they are translated by various Kurdish translators who translate for different Kurdish media 
agencies. It follows that the policy of the agencies and the translators’ ideology and expertise 
as well apply to the TT’s in terms of text-selection policy for translation and lexical choices in 




Since the size of corpus design related to its representation and features this study wants 
to focus on, it is a significant criteria to achieve such representativeness (Saldanha and O’Brien 
2013, p. 73). The corpus of this study includes 60 English commentary articles (STs) which are 
published by different news agencies plus 60 of their Kurdish translation (TTs) which are 
published by four Kurdish media agencies. Four important factors contribute to the compilation 
of the corpus of this study: 
The investigation requirements are closely related to the aim and questions of the 
research (see section 3.0 of this chapter and section 1.2 of chapter one), the features this study 
focuses on (see section 3.2) as well as the corpus representation tendency (Saldanha and 
O’Brien 2013, p. 73). In other words, the corpus is employed to answer those research questions 
raised in the course of this study. The corpus data are described and analysed through various 
methods and techniques that allow end users to make sense of practical examples and case 
studies. The hypotheses are tested using a parallel corpus of English texts and their Kurdish 
translation from one type of genre, commentary articles. The initial criteria for selecting a 
parallel corpus are peripheral, provisional, and based on the target language system. Each 
English text is parallel to its Kurdish full translation in terms of its function, topic, and genre. 
However, they are by multiple authors as well as multiple translators to ensure including 
diversity of geopolitical topics as well as translation strategies, respectively. In addition, the STs 
may not necessary have one-to-one correspondence in the TL, therefore, they might be rendered 
by various strategies such as borrowing, deletion, addition and so forth. The aim, thus, is to 
uncover TTs that show a variety of translation strategies for the analysis based on their ST 
correspondence. This leads to the maximisation of the corpus representativeness and uncovering 
dominant translation strategies. 
Time and data availability play a significant role in the compilation of corpus of this 
study (Hunston 2002, p. 27). The availability of the corpus used in this study is on a limited 
scale, since it consists only of those published commentary articles that are translated by four 
Kurdish media agencies. Another issue that delimits the corpus is selecting suitable articles that 
would meet the study’s requirements in terms of topic and recent publication dates. It contains 
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only those texts which include geopolitical information about the Middle East in general and 
Kurds in particular. Setting also plays a great role in the process of analysis in general and in 
the target texts in particular since it contributes to investigating the current trends in English-
Kurdish media translation. Setting refers to a time and place when and where the events 
happened. The time means the date of the publication of the texts. In regard to this, both of the 
English and Kurdish corpora are roughly published within the same period. The STs and TTs 
dated from 2011-2014, during which time Iraqi Kurdistan witnessed a remarkable flow of public 
interest in media translation as a result of political changes in the Middle East. The language 
used reflects the linguistic, social, cultural, and political status of Kurdish translation of the 
time.  
Time availability for conducting this research is another factor behind the size selection 
of this corpus since it is limited (Saldanha and O’Brien 2013, p. 73). Apart from theoretical 
consideration, building a corpus is a time-consuming process in translation studies because they 
do not already exist as a ready-made corpus. Although the corpus of this study relies on 
electronic commentary articles, its construction is extremely time-consuming, partly because of 
the huge number of the texts available (especially English sources) that makes the search 
difficult. In order to be able to fully analyse and interpret the data within the three years of the 
study, only a specific period of time can be given to the construction of the corpus. Furthermore, 
distinguishing between translated and non-translated texts is another factor, since some of the 
translated texts do not mention the source which they translated from. Attempts were made to 
collect larger translated geopolitical articles and even other types of genres that include 
geopolitical topics such as books. Nevertheless, the attempts were not successful due to the 
restricted time of the research has and the period on which it focuses on, i.e., 2011-2014. 
Besides, the corpus includes translated geopolitical commentary articles from only four specific 
Kurdish media agencies and this limits the text availability of such type during the time 2011-
2014. As this research centres on the question of the extent to which ideology shapes translation, 
the most fruitful strategy proved to be the cross-comparison of newspaper articles translated by 
agencies and newspapers with avowedly different ideologies. 
The length of the texts likewise contributes as another factor behind the selected-size of 
the corpus (Saldanha and O’Brien 2013, p. 73; Olohan 2004, p. 92). Although, source texts and 
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translations can, in theory, be aligned text by text, paragraph by paragraph, sentence by 
sentence, clause by clause or even word by word, it is obviously exceedingly difficult to achieve 
word alignment inasmuch as languages are not translated word for word. Therefore, this study 
considers the whole text and focuses on the relevant sections where the strategies including 
borrowing, addition and omission occur. The text extracts are taken from the beginning, middle 
and end of the texts, where the strategies appear (Bowker and Pearson 2002, p.49). The source 
texts (STs) are fully translated into Kurdish. The ST segments are compared to their 
corresponding units in the translation. They are presented within aligning paragraphs and 
paragraph structure is preserved from entire source text to translation. Since the texts used in 
this corpus are commentary articles, the length of each is typically between 500 -1500 words. 
Nevertheless, this denotes that the text selection is also based on some other criteria which are 
genre, text type, medium, and place. 
 
Genre 
Genre refers to a certain type of written or spoken text which has a particular set of 
characteristics that all examples of this type share. According to Biber (1998, pp. 170), “genre 
categories are determined on the basis of external criteria relating to the speaker's purpose and 
topic; they are assigned on the basis of use rather than on the basis of form”. As such, external 
criteria refer to the intended audience, purpose, and activity type. In other words, genre based 
on non-linguistic criteria refer to a conventional, culturally established groupings of texts and 
the subject to change when challenged over time. The genre of the texts used in this study covers 
online commentary articles. The commentaries usually include both editorials and op-ed 
articles. The former are written by or on behalf of an editor while the latter is printed on the 
page opposite the editorial page in newspaper. However, both have similar functions in that they 
offer an opinion on a topic regarding what is going on in the Middle East in general and 
Kurdistan in particular. As geopolitical journalistic texts, therefore, they play a definitive role 
in the formation and altering of public opinion. 
The initial corpus was to include translated texts of two different genres: commentary 
articles and books. The study, however, excludes books. Although preliminary analysis of the 
data revealed that both commentary articles and books include geopolitical topics, nevertheless, 
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they are of different page length and size. The article’s typical length ranges from 500 to 2000 
words, but very rarely more than 2 pages, while the three books consist of very long chapters. 
It also indicated that while the translated commentary articles are performed by four selected 
Kurdish media agencies between 2011 and 2014, the translated books are translated by different 
publishing houses in 2003, 2004 and 2007. The selected commentary articles have more to do 
with the current geopolitical situation of the Middle East and key questions of ideology that this 
study focuses on while the selected books are more historical. Moreover, the initial data analysis 
shows while the translated articles are performed by more than 27 translators33 with different 
ideologies, while the books are translated by three translators. These differences indicate that 
these two different text genres may not give us logical outcomes if compared due to different 
features of each. On the bases of the outcomes of the preliminary data analysis, the study’s aims 
and questions were revised and the study corpus includes only newspaper commentary articles. 
 
Place 
Place refers to the place where the publications issued. The publications do not belong 
to one specific agency and furthermore their translated versions are not from one single 
publication agency as well. The articles form an independent part of publications, i.e., daily 
newspapers. This study uses 120 articles (60 pairs) published in different news agencies by 
different authors and translators. The published articles from English news agencies are used as 
source texts and compared to their counterparts published by Kurdish news agencies. The place 
of publication is of great importance and value as it has an effect on the TT readers. ST sources 
are considered worldwide electronic newspapers. The source texts published online have been 
sourced from 27 sources that allow various opinions and assessments of the geopolitical facts 
by different writers. Since most of the writers of these articles are academic experts in Middle 
East Politics in general and the Kurdish question in particular, their views and assessments are 
of great importance to the Kurdish readers.  The source texts are from: 
The New York Times, The Washington Post, Time, The Independent, Reuters, The 
                                                 
33 15 texts are translated and published by Rudaw media agency without referring to the translators’ name. 
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Commenter, USA Today, CNN World, New Republic, Forbs, The Daily Star, The Metro Daily 
Star, The Monitor, The Spectator, Rudaw, Bloomberg, Israel Hayom, OpedNews, 
Foreignpolicy.com, Asia Times, Houstonchronicle.com, WSWS.org, Hurriyet daily News, 
Netease International News, The National, Socialist International, and Today Zaman.  
The target texts have been published under the “opinion” section in four popular 
electronic Kurdish newspapers which are Xendan, Sbeiy, Kurdistan-i-New, and Rudaw media 
agencies. These newspapers, which are investigated and described in the next chapter in detail 
(4.2), are directly or indirectly affiliated to the Kurdish political parties. They have their own 
policy in terms of text-selection for translation and lexical choices, a reason that leads to the use 
of various translation strategies, therefore comprising an important element of this study.  
 
Medium 
Another criterion relates to the medium which refers to the communicative format of the 
source text and target text (Bowker and Pearson 2002, p. 49). This study utilises Excel which 
allows broad applicability to data set management manually and systematically computer-
based. This corpus only contains electronic versions of published written texts. Being published, 
the texts are suitable as standards of language production. Although both the STs and TTs are 
in electronic format, part of the analysis requires a manually created data. The available corpus 
analysis software tools do not meet the requirements of this study’s investigation, especially in 
terms of the role of ideology and the occurrence of translation strategies. However, Excel is 
helpful for creating tables and charts to display qualitative and quantitative data in a graphical 
format in this study. The advanced features such as power pivot tables and pivot charts, total 
grand, analysis toolkit, and many templates make it easy to accomplish a wide range of tasks. 
 
3.2.2 Data Compartmentalisation 
The manual investigation is carried out on this corpus in order to classify the selected 
connective devices according to meaning and function. This is then extended to an analogical 
comparison that allows the further extraction of material which was then analysed 
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automatically. The ST-TT segments in the corpus are manually encoded in two stages. In the 
first stage, each ST is compared to its correspondence in the TL in order to determine where the 
two texts differ semantically and/ or syntactically. When the ST-TT segments are identified, 
they are inserted into the Excel spreadsheet manually. Since there is no one-to-one 
correspondence usually, translators adopt strategies such as borrowing, deletion, addition, literal 
translation. These strategies may, in turn, may lead to translational shifts, syntactically and 
semantically. In the second stage, thus, the ST-TT segments are classified in terms of the 
translation strategies used and the types of shift they caused. The aim is to establish significant 
trends and patterns. At this stage, the data categorisation needs also to include the strategy level 
in terms of word level and above word level. This allows the addition of another column 
considering the data in terms of nouns, verbs, expressions, and so forth. After the manual data 
insertion, including segmentation and categorisation, into Excel is completed, the Excel 
spreadsheet is manipulated for the data arrangement in rows and columns of a grid and used in 
calculation.  
The manual and systematically computer-based data categorisation is based on the aims 
and the questions this study seeks to answer. Since this study aims to identify which patterns 
and trends develop from the corpus analysis, the data analysed needs to be described in 
accordance with certain criteria. The selected corpus is dependent on wide ranging external and 
internal scrutiny (Saldanha and O’Brien 2013, p. 71; Zanettin 2012, p. 152). The selection 
criteria result from the investigation of the communicative function of the texts and are external 
criteria, while those which reflect details of the language of the texts are internal criteria. Quite 
regardless of what the textual content of the articles is, the external criteria reveal the sort of 
articles that people are writing and reading. In other words, it encompasses the corpus size, ST 
and TT publishers with the date of their publications, genre of publication, ST-TT authors and 
translators respectively and so forth. Based on external criteria, internal criteria reveals the 
contents of the corpus of this study with regard to the utilised language in terms of topic 
manifestation that is certainly found in the used vocabularies. In other words, it refers to ST-TT 
segments, back translations (BT), mistranslations, translation strategies, and translational shifts. 
As the corpus takes shape on the basis of internal and external criteria, it maintains comparison 
between the actual dimensions of the material and the original plan leads to retrieve evidence 
in support of achieving and answering the aims and questions of this study, respectively. 
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This chapter has illustrated the overall approach to the research process and the detailed 
description about the corpus design of the available data in this study. It also shed light on the 
fact that subjectivity cannot be entirely avoided despite the developed methodology which is 
based on the objective criteria of deletion, addition and borrowing strategies used by the 
translators. A triangulation of methods is adapted in order to provide an intelligible scrutiny of 
mediation at diverse levels: lexico-grammatical, textual, and contextual. Toury’s Descriptive 
Translation Studies (DTS) model is borrowed and adapted as a common-ground analytical 
framework to show the interconnection between all the selected models operating at different 
stages in this study. Along with Chesterman’s concept of norms, they function as 
complementary models in order to describe the type of norms operating within the context of 
Kurdish media translation. The socio-cognitive and functional parameters parallel to van Dijk’s 
and Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis of textual analysis serve as a micro- and macro-
level device for the close examination of texts in their socio-political contexts. At the macro-
level, Baker’s model of Narrative Theory accounts for the impact of the correlation between 
power enactment and discourse production in a more profound manner.  
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Chapter Four 
Translation in Practice I: 
Text-Selection Policies and Stylistic Framing in Kurdish Media 
Translation 
4.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter addressed the corpus in terms of its structure as a representative 
entity by both qualitative and quantitative means with the methodology on which the research 
of this study is based. This chapter investigates and compares the corpus components drawing 
on methodology in order to address the aims and answer the questions of the study. It explores 
the interplay between stylistic shifts and socio-political ideology by examining the way that the 
strategies of borrowing can be manipulated at lexical level to distort translations, and is 
informed by (and actively informs) the ideologies of both the translators and major newspaper 
agencies.  
The chapter starts with an overview of the four selected Kurdish media agencies, their 
text-selection policy for translation, and the hierarchy of the translational strategies used in the 
translation of English geopolitical commentary texts into Kurdish. The focus will be on the 
functional translation strategy that led to stylistic shifts in the corpus of this study and it 
discusses the lexical choices with regard to borrowing strategy in the media from two 
perspectives, at word level and above word level. The choices include parts of speech, 
acronyms, expressions and names. In addition, the chapter investigates the role of the four 
Kurdish media agencies, translators, and socio-political factors in the occurrence of such lexical 
choices when translated from English into Kurdish. Based on the results of the aggregated data 
of the comparative study, this chapter endeavours to answer the questions raised in the course 
of this study. It argues that lexical borrowing is the prevalent translation strategy that leads to 
stylistic shifts. The chapter questions the possible underlying motivations behind the outcomes 
of the choices on the part of the translators in Kurdish media translation. The aim is to find out 
if they are driven by ideology and to show the prevailing tendencies that lead to the 
identification of the current translational norms in the study corpus. 
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4.1 Text-Selection Policy in Kurdish Media 
This section presents a comprehensive overview of the four selected Kurdish media 
agencies in the corpus of this study along with their relationship to the text-selection policy for 
translation and the political parties to which they are directly or indirectly related. It investigates 
the role of socio-political factors in the translation of media texts into Kurdish and the extent to 
which translation agencies and newspapers are allowing ideology to apprise their news output 
and translation policies.  
Marsden and Savigny (2009, p. 98) argue that ideology in general and political ideology 
in particular plays a significant role in the selection of texts for publication in Kurdish media. 
The same holds true in their translation selection policy. Following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime in 2003, the geopolitical situation transcended domestic issues to become a conflict zone 
for the Middle East and indeed the whole world (Watts 2010, p. x; Anderson 2004, p. 172). The 
discussion of the Kurdish geopolitical issue is a significant focus for the world media pages. 
Being a stateless nation, the Kurds are interested in the discussions that produce, reproduce and 
disseminate discursive constructions about their identities. Kurdish media agencies play a 
substantial role in the reproduction and dissemination of what is being written and considered 
relevant to Kurdish issues in the world media pages. This may be due to a belief among them 
that what is written and reported from outside would have greater authority and impact than 
homegrown produce. Within the significant amount of translated texts available, the selection 
and dissemination policy of these texts reflects the geopolitical rivalries between the political 
parties in Kurdistan. Birot (2012) argues that, “the role of ideology in translation starts even 
before the process of translation, i.e. when the translator or the agency chooses to translate a 
text and not another”. However, his findings are based on anecdotal evidence rather than 
extensive research. Likewise, similar cases can be observed in the four selected news agencies 
in this study, which are Sbeiy, Xendan, Rudaw and Kurdistan-i-New (see sub-sections 4.1.1 and 
4.1.2). Nevertheless, while different perspectives can be articulated and perhaps be heard and 
made visible, it is still necessary to inspect and question the motives behind any strategies, if 
any, of those who translate the messages. Meanwhile, before investigating the translators’ 
choices in relation to the use of translational strategies in the study corpus, it is important to 
give an overview of the four selected Kurdish media agencies in terms of their associations with 
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Kurdish parties in the region. In this way, this study provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
translated texts in relation to the ideology of both the translators and their patrons in the context 
of Kurdish media translation. 
 
4.1.1 Party Media and Text-Selection Policy 
This sub-section investigates the text-selection policy of the two Kurdish media agencies 
that are directly associated with political parties in Kurdistan. The study will establish a 
comparative study of the texts selected for translation by the media agencies holding different 
viewpoints on political and ideological issues with the aim of revealing the relationship between 
the policy of the agencies and the translated texts. Sbeiy media agency and Kurdistan-i-New 
media agency are directly affiliated to the Gorran movement and the Patriotic Union Party, 
respectively. Both Gorran and PUK are considered left wing political parties supporting social 
equality, but PUK is more centre-left. 
Sbeiy news agency constitutes an integral part of Kurdish News Network (KNN), which 
was “founded in 2008 as a subsidiary of the Wusha Corporation”. It launched as an online daily 
newspaper in 2008 in the city of Sulaymaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan, as noted on its website 
(http://sbeiy.com/ ). They all belong to the opposition party,the Gorran Movement in Iraqi 
Kurdistan which won 25 seats, an unexpectedly high number (out of 111 seats) in the Kurdish 
national assembly in the KRG elections held on July 25, 2009(IBP 2012, p. 159). According to 
the party’s official website, the Change Movement or Gorran was officially publicised as a 
political organisation on 31 May 2010 after receiving permission from the Interior Ministry of 
the Kurdistan region34 . Sbeiy news agency and KNN were known for their strongly critical 
stance against the main ruling parties and government in Iraqi Kurdistan. Although they 
describe themselves as an “an independent Kurdish media group” (KNN)35, their philosophy is 
based on the ideology of the Change Movement (Gorran). One of the distinguishing ideological 
factors is hiding behind the blue colour which represents the Change movement (Gorran), led 






by Nawshirwan Mustafa (Figure 1, 2, and 3). Likewise, a similar ideological alignment can be 
seen in the text-selection policy for translation when it comes to geopolitical texts. For instance, 
when Today’s Zaman newspaper published two commentary articles arguing how successful 
the Gorran party was in the elections and what impact it would have on the future of Iraqi 
Kurdistan, they were translated from English by the Sbeiy news agency (Appendix A.1). In a 
similar manner, several similar articles are translated from English as well as Arabic (Appendix 
A. 2 and 3). Meanwhile, when Derstandard newspaper criticizes Massud Barzani, the president 
of the KRG and leader of the PDK, for not being ready to abandon power, and when Bultann 
News describes how Jalal Talabani's party, the PUK, was defeated in parliamentary elections in 
Iraqi Kurdistan, they are translated from German and Persian languages into Kurdish by the 
same agency, respectively (Appendix A.4 and 5). In addition, a similar article can be seen in 
the appendix (AE.7) where Asia Times criticizes the rule of PDK in English and it was translated 
into Kurdish (AKS.7) by Sbeiy media agency. Although some of the articles used here are not 
translated from English, they are included since they constitute a significant part of the agency’s 
text-selection policy. They are, therefore, used as examples as they refer to the agencies’ 
philosophy in relation to geopolitical ideology.  
 
 
Figure 4. 1: Sbeiy News Agency 
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Figure 4. 2 : Kurdish News Network 
 
Figure 4. 3: Official Website of the Change Movement (Gorran) 
 
Kurdistan-i-Nwe is the PUK’s Kurdish Newspaper available as an online version of a 
printed periodical at http://www.knwe.org/Default.aspx . It was launched in 2000 and, therefore, 
is considered to be the first Kurdish newspaper to publish a digital version online. It constitutes 
part of the PUK’s group of publications, which includes the Arabic daily al-Ittihad, the Kurdish 
PUKonline.net, and PUKmedia which publishes in Kurdish, Arabic, Turkish, Russian and 
English. Since they all belong to the PUK, they are represented via similar logos and colours 
(Figure 4). Therefore, this study utilises all the translated texts (15 texts) published by the PUK’s 
group of publications and presents them under the name of Kurdistan-i-New. 
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Figure 4. 4: Official PUK Websites 
Being a partisan media, the translated texts are usually in favour of this party. For 
instance, when Thomas L. Friedman wrote the editorial article “5 Principles for Iraq” (AE.18), 
he talked about Najimaldin Omar Karim, who is a political figure in the PUK, in the principle 
before the final one in a positive way. The article is translated into Kurdish and published twice 
under two different titles. While PUKmedia translated the same title into Kurdish (A.6), 
PUKonline changes the title into “ میرەک نیەدمجەن.د ﻭ قاریع یەرﺎﺑەل ﯽچ نﺎمدیرف سﺎمۆﺗ-تێڵەد ەﻭە ” (AKK.18), 
(BT: What Thomas L. Friedman says about Iraq and Dr Najimaldin Karim)(see chapter 6 for 
details). The overview above has illustrated the direct relationship between the selected Kurdish 
media agencies of Sbeiy and Kurdistan-i-Nwe and the two Kurdish political parties of Gorran 
and PUK, respectively. It has also shown that the text selection policies for translation reflect, 
to an extent, the ideology of the two Kurdish political parties to which the two media agencies 
are directly aligned. Such a policy was more prominent in the selection of the articles for 
translation with headlines including geopolitical narratives that praise the two parties or 
criticises their rivals. This is similar to Lefevere’s idea of patronage (1992b). The selection of 
particular texts for translation and the substitution of the headline narratives with specific 
information that supports the party to which the media agency is directly aligned reflect the 
institutional power relation. The policy can be interpreted in relation to the ideological 
component of patronage rather than its poetics. This might be due to the media’s (patron’s) 
attempt to regulate the relationship between the text selection for translation and the system 
policy of the political party to which it is directly affiliated. 
 
4.1.2 Shadow Media and Text-Selection Policy 
The previous sub-section has shown that political ideology plays a significant role in the 
text selection policy for translation and reflects the ideology of the political parties to which the 
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two media agencies are directly aligned. This next sub-section investigates the motivations and 
ideology behind the text selection policy of the two selected Kurdish media agencies in the 
corpus of this study which position themselves so as to be free from political bias. They are the 
media agencies Xendan and Rudaw. 
They are considered to be affiliated indirectly to the two Kurdish ruling parties. Sabir 
(2013) described both Xendan and Rudaw news agencies as shadow media for claiming 
independence while they are subservient to the two political parties PUK and PDK, respectively. 
The PDK has historically maintained a broad base of political allegiances, acting as a big-tent 
party ranging from tribal conservatives to socialists. Today this party is regarded as populist 
and nationalist. According to Reporters without Borders (2010, p.8), the term ‘shadow’ is 
“created to fill the gap existing between the partisan media and the independent media”. In this 
sense, the two agencies are referred to as semi-independent media which denotes that they are 
indirectly affiliated to the two political parties (p.9).  
Xendan newspaper is an electronic newspaper which publishes in the two languages of 
Kurdish and Arabic. It is one of the projects of Xendan Foundation for broadcasting and 
publishing which was founded in the city of Sulaymaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2004. It 
launched as an online daily newspaper in 2010 and is available at: http://www.xendan.org/, 
describing itself as free from party political bias and proprietorial influence. However, it is 
regarded as PUK-affiliated media and it is widely believed to be supported by the former prime 
minister of KRG, Dr. Barham Salih who is also a member of the PUK (BBC)36 . For instance, 
once SkyNews and the BBC held interviews with Dr Barham Salih regarding what was/is going 
on in Kobane, a Kurdish city, Xendan uploaded the videos of the two interviews with a 
translation summary of what he said. Likewise, when Adil Abdul-Mahdi al-Muntafiki, an Iraqi 
Shi'a politician, wrote an article in Arabic entitled, Talabani Resisted His Illness, as He Resisted 
His Enemies (Back Translation), it was not only republished in the Arabic section of Xendan, 
but also translated and published in Kurdish (A.7).  




Rudaw is an online newspaper in Soraní. It is one of the projects of the Rudaw Media 
Company in Hawler (Erbil) which encompasses a website in four languages, Kurdish (Soraní 
and Kurmanci), Arabic, Turkish, and English and a satellite TV station (Available at: 
http://rudaw.net/sorani). It is regarded as PDK-affiliated media and is widely believed to be 
supported by the current prime minister of the KRG, Nechirvan Idris Barzani who is an active 
member of the PDK. It is different from the other three agencies in terms of text selection-policy 
for translation, in particular commentary articles. Since it also publishes in English, few 
commentary articles are translated from outside sources as the text-selection for translation 
mainly depends on the English source from the same agency. Most of the commentary articles 
chosen for translation are written by David Romano, an associate professor of politics at 
Missouri State University and Wladimir van Wilgenburg, a political analyst. Their articles often 
present positive views on issues related to the current Kurdish government, such as, Looking at 
South Kurdistan More Honestly37 and Media and the Kurds in Iraq38. When Wladimir van 
Wilgenburg wrote a number of articles in favour of the PDK criticizing Gorran and the PUK 
for standing against the PDK in English, it was translated into Kurdish by Rudaw newspaper39. 
Even when he published an article in Al-Monitor, it was translated into Kurdish and published 
by Rudaw. The article, which is entitled Syria war brings al-Qaeda threat to Iraqi Kurdistan 
(AE. 46), starts with “Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani has asked the Kurdish government to 
form a committee to investigate Kurdish jihadists going to Syria for jihad”. Meanwhile, the 
article argues that most of these jihadists “came from Islamist strongholds inside the province 
of Sulaimaniyah, close to the Iranian border”. However, the translated version altered the second 
part against the PUK “ سیئ رۆز ەچوﺎن ﯽکڵەخ ەناوەئ یەﺑرۆز ننﺎتسدروک ﯽنﺎمتشین ﯽتێکەي ﯽﺗڵاەسەد رێژ ﯽنﺎکەییملا
نەکەد ڵۆرتنۆک ەنﺎچوﺎن وەئ ﯽتێکەي ﯽنﺎکەیینمەئ ەزێه و.’’ (BT: most of those are from the more Islamic 
areas under PUK control and PUK security forces are in control in those areas/ are controlling 
those areas) (AKR. 46) (See chapter 6).  










The analysis in this sub-section has shown the relationship between the selected Kurdish 
media agencies of Xendan and Rudaw and the two ruling political parties of the PUK and the 
PDK, respectively. The two agencies are described as shadow media for their indirect affiliation 
to the two political parties. Similar to the partisan media, the analysis above has shown that the 
text selection policies for translation of the shadow media is informed by the ideology of the 
two Kurdish political parties to which the two media agencies are indirectly associated. It is also 
worth mentioning that while the Kurdish parties, including their affiliated media agencies, are 
in conflict with each other from the inside, when it comes to the outside relations they are all 
united in their attempts to develop the Kurdish issue (Watts 2010, p. x). In the field of 
translation, this reflects the selection of those texts that enable the Kurdish reader to gain 
knowledge about how neighbouring countries view them and their relationship to the Kurdish 
question in the area in general and in Iraqi Kurdistan in particular.  
Similar to the analysis of the previous sub-section, the examples above are consistent 
with Birot’s (2012) argument that the text-selection policy for translation and publication 
depends on the existing agencies and their views in the Kurdish media. Likewise, they are 
regarded more as anecdotal rather than a detailed investigation to indicate that the policy of text-
selection in Kurdish media is, to a great extent, governed by ideologically driven norms in the 
target culture. In order to identify which translational norms operate in Kurdish media, 
therefore, this study needs to investigate the text-selection in relation to the translators’ 
decisions on reframing the ST narratives in the TTs at text level as well. As Lefevere stated, 
(1992b, p.13), as kinds of ideological entrepreneurs still working within traditional patronage 
relations of production, media translators had to keep favour with these patrons. The translated 
texts reflect the translators’ decisions in terms of choosing between alternatives in particular in 
relation to lexical choices within these texts. Therefore, while it is clear, to some extent, why 
some texts are translated into Kurdish by different agencies, the way they are translated raises 
questions in relation to the translators’ voice and stance regarding the choices and reframing 
strategies. Finding answers requires an investigation of the way in which the translator’s voice 
and stance insinuate themselves into the discourse by alterations to the narratives that the 
translation brings about. This, in turn, may explain the translation’s associated tendencies in 
relation to mistranslations, explicitations, or manipulations of the ST messages for socio-
political ideological purposes.  
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4.2 Text-Selection Strategies in Kurdish Media Translation 
The analysis of the previous section has conducted an overview of the role of socio-
political factors in the selection and translation of the type of geopolitical commentary articles 
into Kurdish. It revealed that there is an interplay between the policy of text-selection for 
translation of each of the four selected Kurdish media agencies with the corpus of this study and 
the ideology of the political parties to which the respective agencies are directly or indirectly 
aligned. This section further investigates the role of socio-political factors in relation to the 
translators’ voice and stance along with the policy of the selected media agencies in 
disseminating or opposing the narratives expounded in the STs, an aspect of translators 
behaviour this study is keen to highlight. To do this, it scrutinises the translation strategies 
adopted by translators in the translation of English media articles into Kurdish in the corpus of 
this study at micro-level with the aim of identifying which of them seems to be more prevalent 
and what the implications are of this for Kurdish media at macro-level. This study focuses on 
the role of ideology in media translation in relation to the findings and observations of the 
comparative data-analysis on the level of lexical choices. It argues that the translation strategies 
in Kurdish geopolitical journalistic texts tend toward the manipulations of the ST messages for 
ideological purposes rather than mistranslations, explicitations, non-lexicalisation, or the non-
standardisation of Kurdish. 
The corpus was analysed on the level of lexical choices to identify the most prevalent 
translation strategies used for the translation of media commentary articles. The ST segments 
were mapped onto their respective TT correspondences. This led to the identification of 
translation strategies in the corpus of this study. 1086 instances of translational strategies are 
mapped in the study. The strategies used by translators in the study are borrowing, deletion, 
addition, and literal translation. 
Translation Strategies Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
Borrowing 532 49% 




Addition 103 9% 
Full Translation 19 2% 
Literal Translation 8 1% 
Grand Total 1086 100% 




Chart 4. 1: Frequency and percentage of translation strategies in the TTs. 
 
Table 4.1 and chart 4.1 above show the frequency and percentage of the translation 
strategies of the study corpus. In terms of  the frequency of their occurrences in the TT, the 
study reveals that of the strategies used in translating media commentary articles, there are 532 
cases of borrowing, 223 cases of deletion, 201 cases of deletion and addition (substitutions), 
103 cases of addition, 19 cases of full translation and 8 cases of literal translation. Nevertheless, 
exploring the extent to which these strategies are informed by the ideologies of both translators 
and the selected media agencies requires an extensive scrutiny of each of these strategies in 
terms of the type and impact of the shifts to the narratives elaborated in the TTs while compared 
to the STs.  
Due to the inclusive analysis of each of the translation strategies involved in this study, 
they cannot be framed within a single chapter. This study, therefore, follows a hierarchical 
technique in order to present the analysis that has been triggered by the high frequency of the 
strategy used in the corpus of this study. It is clear from the table and the chart above that 
borrowing is the most frequent of these strategies, while literal translation is the least frequent 
of them. This next chapter is, therefore, devoted to the discussion of borrowing, arguing that 




















Kurdish media translation (see chapter one and three). The aim is to find out the extent to which 
ideology, non-lexicalisation and lack of standardised Kurdish play a role in Kurdish translators’ 
choices. This, in turn, ascertains which translation behaviour prevails in English-Kurdish media 
translations, and which translational norms function in that practice.  
 
4.2.1 Historical Context and Borrowing Strategies 
The analysis above shows that borrowing has the highest frequency among the strategies 
used in the translation of commentary articles, accounting for 49% of the cases of translation 
strategies in the corpus of this study (Table 4.1 and the chart 4.1). This sub-section investigates 
the respective proportion in terms of its relation to the historical and political context of 
Kurdistan with the aim of identifying an interpretation of this occurrence when compared to the 
current political status of Kurdistan (see sub-section 4.2.2). The findings and observations of 
the comparative analysis will indicate why a particular strategy was preferred to other 
alternatives by the translators and/or publishers in the translation process over time. This, in 
turn, uncovers the extent to which these manipulations are driven by the status of Soraní 
Kurdish, the translator’s ideology, or the historical and current political status of Kurdistan.  
 
Borrowed Cases Frequency of Borrowed 
Cases 
Percentage of Borrowed 
Cases 
Borrowing from English 304 57% 
Borrowing from Arabic 164 31% 
Borrowing from French 49 9% 
Borrowing from Turkish 15 3% 
Grand Total 532 100% 
 
Table 4. 2 : Frequency and percentage of borrowed cases in the TTs 
Table 4.2 above shows that the total of 532 cases of borrowing are not solely from 
English, but also from Arabic, French and Turkish. Of the total 100% of the borrowing cases, 
57% borrowed from English, 31% borrowed from Arabic, 9 % borrowed from French and 3% 
borrowed from Turkish. The geopolitical area of Kurdistan plays a significant role in the 
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occurrence of such strategy, which suggests it is driven by ideology. Since Kurdistan is not a 
country, and instead is divided into five parts and annexed to the neighbouring countries (see 
chapter one), the predominance of borrowing, therefore, does not always reflect the use of one-
to-one transcription correspondence from only English into Kurdish. 31%, 9%, and 3% of the 
cases of borrowing in this study are from Arabic, French, and Turkish, respectively. In addition, 
they embody various types of borrowing such as transliteration, transcription, and double 
borrowing from the respective languages due to the same reason.  
 
Borrowing Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
























Grand Total 532 100% 
 
Table 4. 3: Frequency and percentage of transcription and transliteration cases in the TTs 
 
Table 4.3 shows that 25% of the total of 532 of cases of borrowing in the corpus of this 
study represent cases of transliteration from English while 30% represents transcription from 
English. 11% of the cases of borrowing show transliteration from Arabic while 20 % of the 
cases of borrowing shows transcription from Arabic. However, the remaining cases represent 
1% of transcribed loanwords and 8% transliterated loanwords from French. In addition, 3% of 
the cases shows transcription from Turkish.  
The cases of transliteration differ from transcription in that the loanword is used with a 
slight change in pronunciation. In transcriptional cases, the loanword maps the sounds of the 
language into its writing system. However, there are cases which are partly transliterated and 
partly transcribed in this study. For instance, the expression democratic reform package is partly 
transliterated as ﯽﺗارکﻭمید (BT: democratic) and partly translated into Kurdish as یزﺎسکﺎچ (BT: 
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reform), but package is transcribed. The transliteration of the word democratic or democracy is 
not new in Kurdish. It dates back even prior to the establishment of the Democratic Party of 
Kurdistan-Iraq in 1946. According to Hasanpoor (1999, p.146), the emergence of nationalist 
and communist movements and the formation of contemporary political parties in the 20th 
century led to abundant loanwords, democracy being  a prominent example. He (1999, p. 30 
and 102) explains further that the Kurdish term ﯽﺗارکﻭمید (BT: democratic) or ﯽسارکﻭمید (BT: 
democracy) borrowed indirectly from European languages. In other words, it is borrowed from 
European languages through Arabic and it is phonologically modified. This might be due to the 
geopolitical situation of Soraní Kurdish and its perpetual contact with Arabic. Hasanpoor (1999, 
p. 18), attributes this type of borrowing to the impact of Arabic as an official and prestigious 
language of the Islamic world in the mid-twentieth century and modern Iraq after WWI. The 
same reason led to Soraní Kurdish borrowing less from Turkish and Persian compared to 
Arabic. For example, the word ﺎسﺎی (BT: Law) is borrowed from Turkish and  نﺎهیج (BT: world) 
from Persian that are already established and widely used in Kurdish. Based on Hasanpoor’s 
study (1999, p. 91-143), 28 cases of the total of 532 cases of borrowing in the corpus of this 
study represent well-established cases of transliteration from European languages through 
Arabic, Persian and Turkish.  They are: 
  ﺎمارد  (BT: drama), نارﺎﺑمۆﺑ (BT: bombardment), ﺎیفارگﻭج (BT: geography),  ﯽسارکۆمید
(BT: democracy),  ﯽﺗارکۆمید (BT: democratic),  رۆﺗکد (BT: doctor),   رۆﺗﺎﺗکید  (BT: dictatorship), 
 ەیسۆد(BT: dossier),  رەسفەئ (BT: officer),  مزیشﺎف (BT: fascism),  ەفەسلەف (BT: philosophy),  رۆلکلۆف ( 
BT: folklore),    رۆﺗارپمیئ (BT: empire) , پمیئ مزیلﺎیر  (BT: imperialism),  ڵارەنەژ (BT: general),  
ترﺎک(BT: card), تسیلﺎمەک  (BT: Kemalist)40, نۆێلم (BT: million), ﺎقیسۆم (BT: music), رۆسیفۆرپ (BT: 
professor), راداڕ (BT: radar),  ۆیداڕ (BT: radio),  رۆﺗﺎنیس (BT: senator),  رێﺗرکس (BT: 
secretary), ﯽيژیﺗارتس (strategy),  کیتکﺎﺗ (tactics),  کینکەﺗ (technique),  ﺎيژۆلەنکەﺗ (technology). 
Being largely motivated by the nationalist aspiration, Kurdish purists have attempted to 
regulate and construct a Kurdish national language in Iraqi Kurdistan. In a diachronic and 
                                                 
40 Kemalist is an expression developed in the republican Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Ata Turk  to refer 
to those who support Kemalism (Umut Uzer 2011, p. 34). 
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synchronic study, Abdulla (1980, p. 203-206) shows how Kurdish purists tried to purge the 
Arabic from Kurdish in Iraq between 1924 and1973, which, in effect, brought about European 
loanwords directly. Besides, the emergence of Kurdish nationalism from 1974 onwards as an 
outcome of the repression and arabisation in Iraqi Kurdistan led Kurdish purists to avoid 
borrowing from Arabic language. They preferred borrowing from European languages 
indirectly through Persian and Turkish (and even directly from these two languages) languages 
rather than Arabic. According to Hasanpoor (1999), 14 cases of the transliterations identified in 
this study represent borrowing indirectly from European languages through Persian and Turkish 
language. They are: 
  ەرگنۆک  (BT: congress/ formal meeting), مارگۆرپ (BT: program),  سیلۆپ (BT: police),  
نۆیسمۆک(BT: commission),   ەتیمۆک (BT: committee), ەدنەگﺎپورپ (BT: propaganda),  ترۆپار (BT: 
report),  مێژڕ (BT: regime),  مۆدنارفيڕ (BT: referendum),  تسیلﺎيڕ (BT: realist),  ڵۆڕ (BT: role),  
رۆسنﺎس(BT: censor), مزیلﺎیسۆس (BT: socialism),  تسینیڤۆش  (BT: chauvinist).  
After the attempt to expel Arabic and Persian loanwords in Turkish, French and English 
were the second richest sources of loanwords due to their economic, modernization and 
westernization privileges (Underhill 1986, p. 9; Copper 1989, p. 155). For a long time, French 
was a more prestigious language than English in Turkey. The significant effect of English on 
the Turkish language started as the USA became the superpower of the world in 20th century 
and most of the political, scientific, technological developments were pioneered by the USA. 
Borrowing from English, therefore, could not be avoided in Turkish. Likewise, French was the 
prevailing foreign language in Iran up to World War II. After the War, English gained more 
ground and was taught in secondary schools, and the impact of this language on Persian became 
remarkably resilient (Sadeghi 2003, p. 51). Thus, Soraní Kurdish in Iraq borrowed indirectly 
from French and English through Turkish and Persian up to the Gulf War in 1991. However, 
this equation has perceptibly changed after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. An educated 
generation has emerged with English rather than Arabic as its world language. Soraní Kurdish 
has become the second official language of Iraq after Arabic (see chapter one). However, Kurds 
learn English, not Arabic, as their second language in Kurdistan. Neither Arabic nor Persian or 
Turkish is regarded as a prestigious language. The intensive contact between Kurdish and 
dominant English has, therefore, produced abundant borrowing on all levels of language use 
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and structure. However, this does not necessarily mean that there are no Arabic loanwords in 
Kurdish today. In other words, while only 31% of the cases of borrowing are from Arabic, 
English loanwords represent the majority in the corpus of this study, comprising 57% of all 
cases of borrowing (Table 4.2). This might be due to the fact that some of Arabic, Turkish and 
Persian loanwords are phonetically modified and widely used in Soraní Kurdish. This enabled 
them to be fully established through time. They are therefore, not recognisable as foreign words. 
Hasanpoor (1999, p. 24) refers to this process as “Kurdification”. Further, he (1999, p. 153) 
describes another type of borrowing that is used to Kurdify loanwords in Soraní Kurdish. This 
type of borrowing is consistent with what this study calls transcription. In transcription cases, 
the loanword is used according to the rules of Sorani grammar. In other words, the loanword 
takes the Kurdish affixes such as indefinite article کێ (BT: a), definite article ە ەک  (BT: the), 
plural ending نا (BT: s), etc. For instance, کێنﺎیک (BT: an entity) is transcribed from Arabic and 
received the Kurdish indefinite article کێ (BT: a) as a TT correspondence to the ST an entity. 
Likewise, ەسیفۆئەك  (the office) is transcribed from English and received the Kurdish definite 
article ەک ە  (BT: the). However, the sound of the loanwords in the TL maps the sounds of the 
writing system of both Arabic and English, respectively. Since the sound system of Soraní 
Kurdish is different from that of English, Arabic, Turkish and French, slight changes usually 
happen to most of the loanwords in Kurdish which sometimes make the distinction between 
transcription and transliteration blurry. For instance, the letter r is pronounced as it is in Soraní 
Kurdish, while in most of the cases it is not in English. This can be seen the cases of borrowing 
words like مرۆفیڕ (BT: reform)  تسیمرۆفیڕ  (BT: reformist), and تنێمﻭیگرﺎئ  (BT: argument). In British, 
the three words are pronounced as /rɪfɔːm/, / rɪfɔːməst/, and /ɑːɡjəmənt/, respectively, while they 
are pronounced as /rɪfɔːrm/, /rɪfɔːməst/, and /ɑːrɡjəmənt/ in American English. In Kurdish, they 
are borrowed and pronounced as /rɪfɔːrm/, /rɪfɔːməst/, and /ɑːrɡjəmənt/, respectively. Thus, they 
can be referred to as transliteration cases if they are compared to their British counterparts and 
transcription cases if they are compared to their American ones. However, this study categorises 
them as transliteration cases since the letter r in /rɪfɔːrm/, /rɪfɔːməst/, and /ɑːrɡjəmənt/ as loan 
words in Kurdish is pronounced more heavily while compared to the American English reading.  
The analysis above has shown that borrowings represent an ideological strategy in the 
case of Kurdish context and that the geopolitical milieu of Kurdistan played a significant role 
in the use of this strategy which took different forms due to the way it was practised. The direct 
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and indirect way of borrowing from the European languages led to the two different types of 
borrowing which are transliteration and transcription. According to Hasanpoor (1999), these 
two types of translational strategies enriched Soraní Kurdish with the adoption of new concepts, 
loans, and neologismsm (p. 62). However, they are contentious in the role they play in the 
standardisation and modernisation of this language, since they are neither standardised in their 
spelling nor registered in Kurdish official dictionaries. Although today Kurdish has an 
abundance of monolingual and bilingual dictionaries, they are the products of individual efforts. 
Therefore, they do not exist as an officially recognised monolingual or bilingual dictionary. 
This study will now turn to the level of the occurrence of the strategy of borrowing in the corpus 
of this study in order to investigate the implication of this strategy linguistically as well as 
socially and politically in relation to the status of Kurdish Language (e.g., its non-
standardization). 
 
Borrowing Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
At word level 509 96% 
Above word level 23 4% 
Grand Total 532 100% 
 
Table 4. 4: Frequency and percentage of levels of occurrence of the cases of borrowing at word level and above 
word level in the TTs 
 
Borrowing Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
Nouns 387 73% 
Adjectives 58 11% 
Acronyms 39 7% 
Expressions and Names 23 4% 
Verbs 13 2% 
Adverbs 12 2% 
Grand Total 532 100% 
 
Table 4. 5: Frequency and percentage of parts of speech of the cases of borrowing at word level and above word 
level in the TTs 
Table 4.4 and 4.5 show that the total cases of borrowing are not exclusively individual 
vocabularies, for they cover the act of borrowing expressions and names as well. Of the total of 
532 cases of borrowing, 96% represents borrowing, including nouns, adjectives, acronyms, 
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verbs and adverbs, as a translational strategy at word level. The remaining cases constitute only 
4% and represent the strategy of borrowing above word level, i.e., expressions and names. At 
word level, table 4.5 shows that noun borrowing has the highest frequency among the parts of 
speech, comprising 73% of all cases of borrowing.  
 
Noun Borrowing Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
Ambiguity 258 67% 
Non-lexicalisation 103 27% 
Non-standardisation 26 7% 
Grand Total 387 100% 
 
Table 4. 6: Frequency and percentage of cases of noun borrowing in the TTs 
 
Table 4.6 above shows that only 27% of the total 387 cases of the noun loanwords are 
borrowed due to the ST’s non-lexicalisation in the TL, while 67% of the cases of the noun 
borrowing show that borrowing occurred while there are correspondences for the STs in the TL. 
This raises questions in relation to the current and historical context of the Kurdish language, 
the Kurdish translators’ agency and the policies of the selected media agencies in the corpus of 
this study (see section 4.2.2).  
 
Noun Borrowing Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
Ambiguity 258 67% 
Non-lexicalisation 103 27% 
Proper nouns 26 7% 
Grand Total 387 100% 
 
Table 4. 7: Frequency and percentage of cases of proper nouns borrowed in the TTs 
 
Table 4.7 shows that 7 % of the cases of noun borrowing are proper nouns. Such 
borrowed nouns caused randomness among the translators in relation to their STs. Their 
occurrence might be interpreted in terms of either translator’s confusion due to the non-
standardisation of Kurdish or his/her voice insinuating into the narratives resulting from 
translation. For instance, the proper noun Ankara is borrowed 13 times from Arabic and 5 times 
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from English. Likewise, Mexico and Chechnya are transcribed from Arabic and English as 
کیسکەم and ۆکیسکەم (BT: Mexico) and  نﺎیشیش and ﺎینچێچ (BT: Chechnya), respectively. In 
standardised languages, proper nouns that refer to places are usually fixed in terms of their form 
as they have lists of the standardised and official terms of countries and towns (Schäffner and 
Wiesemann 2001, p. 34). The non-standardisation of Soraní Kurdish, therefore, might be one 
of the reasons behind the dual form of the same proper noun in the respective language. This, 
in turns, may confuse Kurdish translators’ decisions in relation to the translation of proper 
nouns, names and even common nouns sometimes. In the cases of common nouns, their 
occurrence might be interpreted in terms of either their non-lexicalisations in the TL or his/her 
voice insinuating into the narratives resulting from translation. For example, secular, party, and 
moral which are common nouns, are transcribed from both Arabic and English. While the act 
of borrowing secular and party can be interpreted in terms of their non-lexicalisation in the TL, 
borrowing the common noun moral from both Arabic and English might refer to the translator’s 
voice since it is lexicalised in the TL. In the corpus of this study, this duality extends to the 
transliteration of adjectives and adverbs as well. As adjectives and adverbs, formal/ formally 
and official/officially are transliterated 5 times from Arabic as  ﯽمسەڕ  ()ەﺑ  (BT: official (-ly)/ 
formal (-ly)) and 7 times as ﯽمرەف )ەﺑ( (BT: formal/formally) from English.  
Above word level, this duality causes confusion in terms of translating names and 
expressions into Kurdish or borrowing them from the external sources. For instance, Arab 
League and Muslim Brotherhood are English names for the two known Arabic organisations 
ةیﺑرعلا ةعمﺎجلا and نیملسملا ناﻭخلأا, respectively. The study corpus includes the Kurdish translation of 
Arab league as ەمۆكەڵەع ﯽنﺎﺗڵاﻭ یهرﯽﺑ  and its transliteration from Arabic that is ەعیمﺎجەع یهرﯽﺑ  as 
well. Likewise, Muslim Brotherhood is translated into نﺎمڵﻭسم ﯽنﺎیارﺑ and also transcribed from 
Arabic as نیملسﻭم ناﻭخیئ.. The available cases in the study corpus show that transliterating and 
transcribing the name of the abovementioned organizations from their source culture are more 
frequent rather than their Kurdish translation. Since these two examples have more to do with 
culture-specific words, the preferred approach is usually foreignisation. Likewise, few other 
cases show that even when some of the STs are translated into their Kurdish correspondences, 
they are placed next to their ST forms that are borrowed directly from the SL in the TL. These 
cases are referred to as double presentation and represent 3% cases of borrowing in the corpus 
of this study (Table 4.3). This type of foreignisation may occur when new words are introduced 
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to the TT readerships. For example, the word urbicide is placed between brackets next to its 
Kurdish counterpart’s ژﻭکرﺎش and presented as ژﻭکرﺎش  (urbicide). According to Pym (2004, p. 
93), this type of borrowing raises uncertainties about the probability of absolute equivalence. 
For him, if there is no doubt about the certainty of what is available as TT correspondence for 
the ST, there would be no reason behind placing STs next to their TTs in the TL.  
 
Borrowing 526 Cases 48% of the total 
Nouns 387 36% 
Adjectives 58 5% 
Acronyms 39 3% 
names 23 2% 
Adverbs 12 1% 
Verbs 13 1% 
Grand Total 532 48% 
 
Table 4. 8: Frequency and percentage of parts of speech of borrowing cases as part of overall cases of the corpus 
 
The analysis above has shown the role of the status of Soraní Kurdish and the 
geopolitical factors in the use of borrowing strategy at both word level and above word level. 
The study will now turn into investigate the practise of the respective strategy in relation to 
acronyms. Acronyms represent 6 % of the overall 1086 cases and 7% of the 532 cases of 
borrowing in the corpus of this study. However, table 4.8 shows that borrowing cases of 
acronyms constitute only 3% of the overall cases of acronym in this study. They are either 
transcribed or transliterated from English. The remaining cases show the translation of the full 
names of the acronyms existing in the STs. Their full translation, which constitutes 1% of the 
cases of in the corpus of this study, might indicate unfamiliarity of the acronyms to the TL 
readers (Table and chart 4.1). However, their borrowing from English of which they constitute 
the majority (3%) if compared to their translation (1%) might be interpreted due to the belief 
that English is the language of globalisation. This is indicative that the simple way out is for the 
translator to render acronyms as loanwords. 
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The data analysis, in this section, has investigated the strategies of borrowing in the 
corpus of this study in relation to the source of their borrowing and the level of their occurrence. 
The study revealed that borrowing from English and Arabic along with the noun borrowings 
have the highest frequencies among loanword cases in Soraní Kurdish (Table 4.2 and 4.8). 
Similar results were also revealed in a study conducted at the University of Sulaimany in terms 
of the percentage of noun borrowings in the Kurdish political programmes in visual media by 
Sabir (2013a, p.333-352). The percentages in the corpus of this study might have several 
interpretations. The reasons might refer to the target readers’ familiarity with the two languages 
due to the prior and the current geopolitical situation of Iraqi Kurdistan, or to the avoidance of 
misinterpretations in the TL due to the absence of standardised Kurdish correspondents, or to 
the translators’ own sociocultural background and/or voice. The constant geopolitical changes 
of Kurdistan after the Gulf war in 1991in general and the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003 in 
particular affect the dynamic language contact and borrowing in Kurdish by extra-linguistic 
factors. On the one hand, learning English is considered indispensable for social, intercultural 
and international communication, educational advancement, professional success and progress 
in life and media. On the other hand, various ideologies have emerged in the Kurdish media and 
have played a major role in the field of media translation and translators’ choices. Therefore, 
borrowing and purism needs to be further investigated linguistically as well as socially and 
politically and are closely tied to current Kurdish political identities and to the ideology of the 
Kurdish translators in Kurdistan. Details are given in the following sub-section. 
 
4.2.2 Kurdish Media Agencies and Borrowing Strategies 
The previous sub-section has revealed the significant relationship between the historical 
and political setting of Kurdistan and the way borrowing is manipulated in the translation of 
geopolitical commentary articles from English into Kurdish at different levels. This sub-section 
establishes a comparative analysis to investigate the existing relationships between the Kurdish 
media agencies, the translators’ voice and the strategy of borrowing. The outcomes and 
observations of the comparative analysis will designate the way of preferring particular types 
of lexical borrowings to alternatives by the translators and/or the media agencies with which 
they aligned. The TTs used in the corpus of this study are translated by various Kurdish 
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translators and published by four Kurdish media agencies between 2011 and 2014. The media 
agencies directly affiliated to parties Sbeiy and Kurdistan-i-Nwe, belonging to Change 
Movement (Gorran party) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) respectively(see section 
4.1.1), and the shadow media agencies indirectly linked to the parties Xendan and Rudaw media 
agencies, affiliated to the PUK and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), respectively (see 
section 4.1.2). Since the selected media agencies in this study directly or indirectly belong to 
the current major political parties in Kurdistan, the strategy of borrowing needs to be 
investigated in relation to the ideology of the respective media and their translators 
quantitatively and qualitatively as well. Based on Lefevere’s (1992b) patronage analysis, 
translators can choose to adapt to the policy system of these media agencies in a way, “to stay 
within the parameters delimited by its constraints […], or they may choose to oppose the 
system” (p.13). Table 4.7 shows that only 27% of the total of 532 cases in this study represent 
borrowing due to the ST’s non-lexicalisation in the TL. The remaining cases, regardless of the 
impact of the prior geopolitical situation of Kurdistan (see section 4.2.1), raise questions in 
relation to the ideology of Kurdish translators and the current agencies they translate for. 
Therefore, it is important to further investigate the strategy of borrowing in relation to the four 









Partisan Media 266 50% 
Shadow Media 266 50% 
Grand Total 532 100% 
 




Chart 4. 2: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Kurdish media TTs 
 
Table 4.9 and chart 4.2 show the convergence of percentages in the use of the strategies 
of borrowing by the media agencies that are directly or indirectly affiliated to the political parties 
in Kurdistan. Of the total of 532 cases of borrowing in this study, 50 % of the cases represent 
partisan media agencies and 50 % belongs to shadow media agencies. Given that the TL is a 
non-standardised language, the occurrence of the borrowing cases might be interpreted in that 
regard or in terms of the non-lexicalisation of the STs in the TL. Nevertheless, the translator’s 
agency and the ideology of the media agencies play a considerable role in the use of the 
respective strategy. In order to know the implications of the use of such a strategy, it is important 
to investigate the respective percentages in relation to each of the four selected Kurdish media 
agencies in the corpus of this study, translators’ agency and the historical and current political 
situation of Kurdistan. 
 
4.2.2.1 Partisan Media and the Strategy of Borrowing 
This sub-section investigates the occurrence level of the percentages of borrowing cases 
in relation to the translator’s agency and the two selected Kurdish media agencies that are 
directly affiliated to political parties in Kurdistan. The aim is to identify why a particular choice 
was preferred to other alternatives by the translators and/or publishers in the translation process. 










Partisan Media Shadow Media
Borrowing
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Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
Kurdistan-i-Nwe 141 27% 
Sbeiy 125 23% 
Grand Total 266 50% 
 
Table 4. 10: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Partisan Kurdish media TTs 
 
Table 4.10 shows that of the total of 50% of cases of borrowing in partisan media, 23% 
of the cases by Sbeiy media agency, while 27% of the cases belong to Kurdistan-i-Nwe. The 
percentages show that the cases of borrowing by Kurdistani-i-Nwe is higher than those by Sbeiy. 
This might be indicative that there is no endeavour to reduce the use of the strategy or to have 
an directive policy regarding the use of Kurdish by Kurdistan-i-Nwe which can be considered 
the first news agency to be established after the Gulf war in 1991 or by Sbeiy, the latest directly 
affiliated partisan media. In order to find out the possible motivation behind the use of this 
strategy by the media affiliated parties and their translators, the study will now turn to 
investigate the percentage of borrowing strategies by each of the two media agencies along with 
their implications. 
 
Sbeiy Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
Ambiguity 92 17% 
Non-lexicalisation 26 5% 
Non-standardisation 7 1% 
Grand Total 125 23% 
 
Table 4. 11: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Sbeiy media TTs 
 
Table 4.11 shows that the representing corpus of Sbeiy media agency, which consists of 
15 translated commentary articles, shows only 5% and 1% out of 23% of the cases of borrowing 
are due to the ST’s non-lexicalisation and non-standardisation in Soraní Kurdish, respectively. 
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The remaining cases of borrowing in the translated commentary articles by Sbeiy media agency 
constitute 17%. They are borrowed from English, Arabic and French, while there are Kurdish 
correspondents for them in the TL. 
 
Kurdistan-i-New Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
Ambiguity 105 20% 
Non-lexicalisation 31 6% 
Non-standardisation 5 1% 
Grand Total 141 27% 
 
Table 4. 12: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Kurdistan-i-Nwe media TTs 
 
Likewise, table 4.12 shows that of the total of 15 translated commentary articles by 
Kurdistan-i-New media agency, only 6% and 1% out of 27% of the cases of borrowing are due 
to the ST’s non-lexicalisation and non-standardisation in Soraní Kurdish, respectively. The 
remaining cases of borrowing in the translated commentary articles by Kurdistan-i-New media 
agency constitute 20%. They are borrowed from English, Arabic and French, while there are 
Kurdish correspondents for them in the TL. Thus, the analysis above shows that 17% and 20 % 
of the total of 23% and 27% of the cases of borrowing from Sbeiy and Kurdistan-i-Nwe, raise 





Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 











Non-lexicalisation and Culture Specific 
26 5% 
26 5% 
Non-standardisation 7 1% 
Grand Total 125 23% 
 
Table 4. 13: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing representation in Sbeiy media TTs 
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Table 4.13 shows that of the total of 17% of the cases of borrowing by Sbeiy media, the 
highest frequency among the possibilities behind the use of the borrowing strategy is the 
translator’s voice, while historical and political factors constitute 5% of the cases. The socio-
political situation of Kurdistan before the Gulf-war in 1991 had led to abundant loanwords in 
Soraní Kurdish. Most of them are that well-established today are not even recognisable as 
loanwords. After the Gulf-war, in general, and the US-invasion in 2003, in particular, the semi-
autonomous and new socio-political situation of Kurdistan has also instigated another cycle of 
borrowing from the other languages. The semi-autonomous region gave the right to writers and 
translators to practice acts of writing and translating more freely than before. Furthermore, the 
socio-political situation and the rise of some current political movements led to the choice of 
loanwords being more ideological. For example, the rise of the Change movement to which 
Sbeiy media agency belonged in 31th March 201041 has introduced many loanwords into Soraní 
Kurdish. For example, words such as نۆیسزۆپۆئ (BT: opposition), مرۆفیڕ (BT: reform), and دیدنﺎک 
(BT: candidate) emerged with the Gorran Movement’s election campaign before 2010. Despite 
the availability of their TT correspondents in Soraní Kurdish, they have become familiar to the 
TT reader through media publications such as television and print and online publications. They, 
therefore, constitute part of the borrowing cases that represent the historical and political 
environment of Kurdistan after 2003 (Table 4.13). However, words such as نشیم (BT: mission), 
رۆﺗﺎﺗنێمۆک (BT: commentator), ﯽﺗسنمەئ (BT: amnesty) and  ڤیﺗﺎنرەﺗڵەئ (BT: alternative) are transcribed 
and transliterated directly from English, while there are established and familiar TT 
correspondents for them in Soraní Kurdish. The TT reader knows that they are loanwords in the 
TL. However, they might cause ambiguity in terms of comprehension since they are not familiar 
to most of the Kurdish readers, in particular to those who have little knowledge of English. 
Therefore, they represent new loanwords in Soraní Kurdish. This strategy might be used by 
some translators to give voice to their own constituencies since these new loanwords cannot be 
considered as outcomes of the historical and political context of Kurdistan before 2000s.  
In addition, table 4.13 shows that non-lexicalisation and culture-specific word represents 
5% of loanword cases in Soraní Kurdish. For example, the word دﺎهیج (BT: jihad) is transcribed 




directly from Arabic as the English text did as well. The word jihad is considered to be an 
Arabic culture-specific and an idiomatic word. It might refer to “a religious struggle (= fight) 
against evil in yourself or in society [or] a holy war fought by Muslims against people who are 
a threat to Islam” (Cambridge Dictionary Online)42. Furthermore, it may be used in the 
contemporary sense of terror or terrorism when it is used to refer to the military aggressions and 
radical groups such as al Qaeda (Wright-Neville 2010, p. 122) or ISIS since they use it to refer 
to their deeds. Therefore, the reason behind borrowing such a term might refer to its multiple 
meaning due to the political and religious situation of the Middle East. On the one hand, as an 
Islamic term it appears frequently in the Quran and refers to a religious duty of Muslims. On 
the other hand, it is used in its sense of terror related to radical groups. Non-standardisation 
constitutes 1% of the total of 23% of the cases of borrowing in the TTs by Sbeiy media agency. 
The cases include the transcription of the same proper noun sometimes from Arabic and 
sometimes from English. For example, the proper noun Ankara is transcribed from Arabic once 
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Ambiguity 










Non-standardisation 5 1% 
Grand Total 141 27% 
 
Table 4. 14: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing representation in Kurdistan-i-New media TTs 
 
As for the translated texts by Kurdistan-i-New agency, table 4.14 shows that of the total 
of 20%, the historical and political situation of Kurdistan has the highest impact among the 
possibilities behind the loanwords in Soraní Kurdish, while the translator’s voice constitutes 6% 




of the cases. The majority of the borrowed words and/or expressions reflects the overall socio-
political context after the US invasion to Iraq in 2003, such as: نۆێسمۆک (BT: commission), ەسۆڕپ 
(BT: process), ڵۆرﺗنۆک (BT: control), and ادنێجەئ(BT: agenda). Other cases like ەﺗیمۆک (BT: 
committee), and مزیلﺎنۆیسﺎن (BT: nationalism) are more like the PUK ideology like. Despite the 
availability of their correspondents in the TL, they are transcribed and transliterated from 
English and French, respectively, i.e., in the same way they are used in PUK’s publications and 
figures. 9% of the cases of borrowing represent translators’ voice. Despite the availability of 
familiar and established Kurdish correspondents for STs in the TL, Kurdish translators preferred 
to borrow from the other languages. The table also shows that 6% of the cases of borrowing are 
due to non-lexicalisation and culture-specific words/ expressions. For instance, ﯽنﺎملەع the word 
(BT: secular) is transcribed from Arabic for not being lexicalized in Kurdish, while ڵاڕەنەژ(BT: 
general) is transliterated from English since it is a culture-specific word and does not have one-
to-one correspondence in the respective language. Similar to Sbeiy media texts, 1% of the cases 
of borrowing shows that non-standardisation affects translators’ choices in relation to source of 
their borrowing, e.g., borrowing the pronoun Ankara.   
The analysis in this sub-section has revealed that despite the fact that the percentages 
show that the cases of borrowing by Kurdistani-i-New is higher than those by Sbeiy, the 
translator’s voice is considered to be more prominent in the texts translated and published by 
Sbeiy rather than Kurdistani-i-New. The majority of the cases of borrowing by Kurdistan-i-New 
is due to the historical and political situation of Kurdistan. This is considered to be of lesser 
motivation behind the cases attributed to the Sbeiy agency. Non-lexicalisation and non-
standardisation played a significant role in the occurrence of this strategy by the two agencies 
as well. Nevertheless, they are considered to be of lesser motivation behind the occurrence of 
the respective strategy if compared to the motivations behind the rest of the cases by the two 
agencies. 
 
4.2.2.2 Shadow Media and the Strategy of Borrowing 
The previous sub-section has established a comparison to show the extent to which the 
partisan media agencies are allowing translators’ voices to inform their news outputs. This sub-
section investigates the occurrence level of the percentages of borrowing cases in relation to the 
 125 
translator’s agency and the two selected Kurdish media agencies that are indirectly affiliated to 
the political parties in Kurdistan. The aim is to ascertain why a particular choice was made 
instead of others by the translators and/or publishers through a comparative analysis.  Similar 
to the analysis of the previous sub-section, the investigation in this section reveals the extent to 
which these handlings are motivated by ideology, non-lexicalisation or non-standardisation. 
 
Shadow Media Agencies Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
Xendan 153 29% 
Rudaw 113 21% 
Grand Total 266 50% 
 
Table 4. 15: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Shadow media TTs 
Table 4.15 reveals that 50 % of the cases belong to shadow media agencies. Of the total 
of 50% of shadow media representing cases of borrowing, 29% of the cases represent Xendan 
media agency, while 21% of the cases belong to Rudaw media agency. The percentages show 
that the cases of borrowing by Xendan is higher than those by Rudaw. Similar to the cases of 
borrowing in the texts translated by partisan media agencies, a high percentage of the cases of 
borrowing from the two shadow media agencies might be interpreted in relation to the ideology 
of the translators and the agencies they work for. 
 
Xendan Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
Ambiguity 100 19% 
Non-lexicalisation 35 7% 
Non-standardisation 17 3% 
Grand Total 153 29% 
 
Table 4. 16: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Xendan media TTs 
Table 4.16 shows that the data emerging from the study of Xendan media agency, which 
consists of 15 translated commentary articles, shows only 7% and 3% out of 29% of the cases 
of borrowing are due to the ST’s non-lexicalisation and non-standardisation in Soraní Kurdish, 
respectively. The remaining cases of borrowing in the translated commentary articles by Xendan 
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media agency constitute 19%. They are borrowed from English, Arabic and French, while there 
are Kurdish correspondents for them in the TL. 
 
Rudaw Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
Ambiguity 66 12% 
Non-lexicalisation 34 6% 
Non-standardisation 13 2% 
Grand Total 113 21% 
 
Table 4. 17: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing in Rudaw media TTs 
 
Likewise, table 4.17 shows that of the total of 15 translated commentary articles by 
Rudaw media agency, only 6% and 2% out of 21% of the cases of borrowing are due to the ST’s 
non-lexicalisation and non-standardisation in Soraní Kurdish, respectively. The remaining cases 
of borrowing in the translated commentary articles by Rudaw media agency constitute 12%. 
They are borrowed from English, Arabic and French, while there are Kurdish correspondent for 
them in the TL. 
Similar to the cases of borrowing in the texts translated by partisan media agencies, 19% 
and 12 % of the cases of borrowing from Xendan and Rudaw, respectively, raise questions in 
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Strategies 









Non-lexicalisation and Culture Specific 
35 7% 
35 7% 
Non-standardisation 17 3% 
Grand Total 153 29% 
 
Table 4. 18: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing representation in Xendan media TTs 
 
Table 4.18 shows that of the total of 19% of the cases of borrowing, 10% of the cases 
represent translator’s voice, while 9% of the cases show the impact of the historical and political 
 127 
context of Kurdistan on the respective cases. Non-lexicalisation and culture specific words 
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Non-lexicalisation and Culture Specific 
34 6% 
34 6% 
Non-standardisation 13 2% 
Grand Total 113 21% 
 
Table 4. 19: Frequency and percentage of the cases of borrowing representation in Rudaw media TTs 
 
Likewise, table 4.19 shows that of the total of 12% of the cases of borrowing, 8% of the 
cases represent translator’s voice, while 5% of the cases shows the impact of the historical and 
political context of Kurdistan on the respective cases. Non-lexicalisation and culture specific 
constitute 6% of the cases, while non-standardisation represents 2% of the cases.  
Accordingly, the investigation in the two sub-sections above has illustrated that 
translators’ voices represent the highest frequency in the borrowings cases of the three media 
agencies Sbeiy, Xendan and Rudaw. However, 10% of the cases show the highest frequency in 
the borrowing cases of Kurdistan-i-New media agency and it represents the impact of the 
historical and political situation of Kurdistan on the respective cases. The findings largely 
indicate that both partisan and shadow media are informed by the translator’s ideology and the 
ideology of the political parties to which the media agencies are aligned plays a significant role 
in their choices. The remaining cases of borrowings represent convergent rates in relation to 
non-lexicalisation and non-standardisation. Nevertheless, exploring the extent to which these 
percentages are associated with geopolitical events after the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003, 
and how they affect the TT narratives requires an analysis of the dynamics resulted from the 
use of this strategy over the four years (see the following section).  
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4.3 Chronological Distribution of the Borrowing Strategies 
The outcome of the aggregated data of the comparative study in the section above has 
revealed the way the borrowing strategy is implicated in divergent ideologies through 
investigating the relationships between the occurrence percentage of the respective strategy, the 
policy of the publication agencies and the political group to which they directly or indirectly 
belong. This section investigates the dynamics resulted from the use of this strategy throughout 
the four years in which the selected commentary articles of the corpus of this study were written. 
The comparative chronology of the occurrence of the strategy of borrowing from 2011 to 2014 
reveals the regular pattern of a temporal model of the four years. 
 
Percentage of Translation Strategies 
Borrowing 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
14% 24% 26% 36% 
Grand Total 100% 
 
Table 4. 20: Distribution of borrowing strategies according to publication date 
 
 
Chart 4. 3:  Distribution of borrowing strategies according to publication date 
Table 4.20 and chart 3 reveal how borrowing strategies are distributed in each particular 
year. It shows that the use of the respective strategy represents the lowest frequency in 2011, 
and then escalation with a convergent rate in 2012 and 2013, comprising 14%, 24% and 26% 
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2014 when borrowing rises to 36%. This indicates that the tendency of using such strategy may 
increase through time if compared to its use in the previous years.  
 




2011 77 14% 
Historical + Political 
Translator's voice 










2012 128 24% 
Historical + Political 
Translator's voice 










2013 136 26% 
Translator's voice 
Non-lexicalisation and Culture Specific 










2014 191 36% 
Translator's voice 
Non-lexicalisation and Culture Specific 










Grand Total 532 100% 
 
Table 4. 21: Distribution of borrowing strategies according to publication date 
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Table 4.21 and chart 4.4 reveal that the geopolitical environment of Kurdistan played a 
significant role in the first two years accounting for 7% and 9% of the cases of borrowing in 
2011 and 2012, respectively. Nevertheless, this equation changed in the following next two 
years when the translator’s agency became more prominent compared to the previous years. 
The translator’s voice constitutes 11% to 14% of the cases of borrowing in 2013 and 2014, 
respectively. These percentages represent the highest motivations behind the use of the 
respective strategy throughout the four years. This might be indicative that the tendency to use 
such a strategy might be more relative to the translator’s voice through time if compared to its 
use in 2011, and 2012.  This study will now turn to investigate the occurrence percentage in 
relation to the types of media agencies throughout time in order to interpret them on that in this 
regard as well. 
 
































Grand Total 532 100% 
 




Chart 4. 5: Distribution of borrowing strategies according to publication date by media agencies 
 
Table 4.22 and chart 4.5 show the relationship between the percentage of the occurrence 
of borrowing cases and the media agencies within the four years. They show that in 2012 and 
2013, a high frequency of the borrowing strategy was used by partisan media agencies while 
shadow media constituted the lowest frequency. Nevertheless, the use of the respective strategy 
by shadow media agencies represent high rates in 2011 and 2014.  
 
4.4 Translational Norms and Stylistic Reframing in Media Translation  
The previous sections explored the use of the translational strategy that has the highest 
frequency among the reframing strategies used in the translation of media texts into Kurdish. 
The outcomes also are interpreted along those lines. This section discusses what translation 
behaviours the findings and observations of the above contrastive data analysis on the stylistic 
and lexical levels indicate. Thereafter, it turns to the theoretical approaches to norms proposed 
by Toury (1995/2012) and Chesterman (1997/2000) and translational stylistic shifts proposed 
by van Leuven-Zwart’ approach (1989, 1990a), expounded in chapter two, in order to discuss 
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In line with these approaches and with the help of CNA, the existing relationship 
between the STs and the TTs on the stylistic level is defined along with the impact and 
motivations behind the way the STs are reframed within the target socio-political context. The 
study observed the translator’s voice (agency) and answered the key questions raised in this 
study on the translator’s adoption of borrowing strategy during the process of translation. As 
established textual patterns, the outcomes have shown that the cases of borrowing in this study 
served diverse positions and played a significant role in producing patterns of structural and 
rhetorical features in the course of ideological communication and manipulation. Based on the 
socio-cognitive observation, patterns of lexical borrowing are described in terms of 
Chesterman’s relation norms. They defined the translator’s role more as an ideological 
mediator, and less as a communicator, for optimising the communication needs of the various 
socio-political contexts and parties involved at a macro-level (see subsections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). 
Power relations, however, constitute a significant device in the description of the 
expectancy norms in this study. The high frequencies of the historical and political conditioning 
factors as well as the translator’s agency largely indicate the translator’s tendency towards “risk 
avoidance” (Pym 2008). To a certain extent, the Kurdish translators played it safe and avoided 
risk by presenting what media agencies can be responsible for. As exemplified in the subsection 
4.2.2, the majority of the cases that represent the translator’s voice is associated with the policy 
of the political party to which the media agencies are aligned. In this way, the translators did 
not tend to take on ideological and communicative risk only in their own name. Although a 
number of cases indicated the efforts of the translators to give voice to their own constituencies, 
the product of the translator’s decision-making process is, however, largely identified by the 
dominant ideologies within the four media institutions (4.2.2).  
Along with Toury’s (1995/2012) law of interference and Pym’s (2008) propositions, 
these patterns can further be interpreted as manipulative stylistic shifts resulting from the 
geographical and socio-political status of Kurdistan. They reveal the conditioning factors that 
reflect the position of the TTs as opposed to the STs as well as within the receiving culture. On 
the one hand, they indicate the phenomena pertaining to the make-up of the source text reframed 
in the target text and show the involvement of the socio-cultural and political constraints and 
the social conditions of the two languages in the translation process. On the other hand, this 
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outcome shows contradicts Baker’s complete universality with its reliance on sociocultural and 
political variables. One of those factors is the situation of the target language as opposed to the 
source language. While only a few cases are due to non-lexicalisation and non-standardised 
language (tables 4.7 and 4.21), the socio-political factors diachronically affected the translator’s 
lexical choices in relation to the majority of the borrowing strategies. In addition, the majority 
of the cases of borrowings are from English (table 4.2), which is considered a more prestigious 
culture than Arabic, Turkish and Persian due to the geopolitical milieu of Kurdistan (see 
subsection 1.1.1 and 4.2.1 for more details).  
This, therefore, reveals that the tendency in relation to the law of interference in this 
study is partly due to the power relations and the prestige of the cultures and languages in 
question. CNA has identified that borrowing strategies are partly dominated and influenced by 
the predominant traditions in the target language and culture, socio-political and ideological 
factors, power relations within and between cultures. The outcomes are explored in relation to 
the type of ambiguity and two prevailing types of ideological factors were distinguished. The 
corpus analysis in this study shows that 69% of the cases of borrowing between the years 2011 
and 2014 are either due to the historical and political factors or the translator’s agency 
(translator’s voice) (see section 4.2.1). In terms of directness of translation, the analysis shows 
that 31% cases of borrowing are directly borrowed from Arabic, while 57% of the cases are 
directly or indirectly borrowed from English.  The indirect borrowing of English loanwords 
through Arabic, Persian and Turkish made these languages to be intermediates between English 
and Kurdish. This might be due to the historical and current geopolitical situation of Kurdistan, 
respectively. The analysis has revealed that the geographical and political situation of Kurdistan 
has its own impact in relation to the use of this strategy. The high-frequency borrowed forms 
produced by the translator’s agency in this study, however,  indicates that Kurdish translators’ 
decisions are established via the social and ideological values of the target community in favour 
of the current political parties with which the media agencies are aligned.  
As for preliminary norms, section 4.1 shows that the factors that determine the selection 
of texts to be translated in Kurdish media in general and in Kurdish newspapers in particular is 
not a random procedure. The publication agencies select particular types of texts to be translated 
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purposefully and they are translated to serve a certain goal. This will be further investigated in 
the chapter five and six. 
As textual-linguistic norms, thus, the high-frequency borrowed forms are of nouns and 
they led to stylistic shifts in the translation of media texts into Kurdish. The borrowing strategy, 
therefore, is the preferred strategy which leads to stylistic shifts in Kurdish media translation 
since it entails direct and/or indirect transference of a given SL lexical item into the TL. The 
analysis has shown that there is an interplay between the practices of borrowing in Kurdish and 
the geopolitical environment of Kurdistan. While the percentages show that non-lexicalisation 
is not the high-frequency factor behind the use of such strategy, translators’ agency plays a 
significant role in this respective. This indicates that translators manipulate their power to use 





Translation in Practice II: 
Reframing Strategies and Lexical Shifts in Kurdish Media 
Translation  
5.0 Introduction 
The analysis presented in the previous chapter has shown that the ideology of the 
translators and major newspapers agencies plays a significant role in the stylistic shifts on the 
lexical level in Kurdish media translation. These next two chapters continue to investigate the 
way in which similar ideologies shapes Kurdish translation processes, through the analysis of 
the shifts on the level of meaning in the corpus of collected translations. This chapter discusses 
the translators’ lexical choices with regard to the reframing strategies of deletion and addition 
in the translation of English commentary articles into Kurdish from two perspectives, at word 
level and above word level. The choices include: parts of speech, names, acronyms and 
abbreviations, expressions, sentences and paragraphs. In doing so, it explores the extent to 
which shifts on the level of meaning are driven by ideology in Kurdish geopolitical journalistic 
texts. The study argues that the reframing strategies of deletion and addition leading to semantic 
shifts tend toward the manipulation of ST messages for ideological purposes rather than 
mistranslations, simplification, explicitations, non-lexicalisation, or the non-standardisation of 
Kurdish.  
The investigation of the two reframing strategies of deletion and addition has a two-
pronged approach in this chapter. In the first stage, this study examines those cases in which 
each of the deletion strategies and addition strategies has been used alone. The second part of 
the analysis includes those cases in which the two strategies are used as one combined reframing 
strategy, i.e., substitution. In other words, it examines the action of replacing the STs with TTs 
of different values and meaning. The chapter, therefore, compares and investigates the ST and 
TT segments in order to reveal what type of deviation occurred in the use of these two strategies, 
as one combined strategy and as two different strategies. The effect of the use of these reframing 
strategies in the TTs is considerable for the target readership. Given that the articles are available 
online, on the one hand those who know English can refer to the original texts if they are 
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suspicious about the content of the translated TTs. On the other hand, for those who do not read 
English, their comprehension of the translated articles would be different from that of readers 
of the original written by the author. 
Based on the outcomes of the collected data of the comparative study, this chapter thus 
aims at the identifying the reframing strategies of deletion and addition as the prevalent 
translation strategies that lead to ideological shifts on the semantic level in Kurdish media 
translation. This, in turn, will reveal the role of translators in assenting or dissenting to the 
narratives elaborated in the STs and the extent to which they make modifications to the STs so 
as to undermine the narratives dominating and/or disapproving the target society. The chapter 
also focuses on the role of the four Kurdish media agencies, translators, and socio-political 
factors in the occurrence of such lexical choices when translated from English into Kurdish. 
However, the outcomes of the cases in relation to the text-selection policy of the Kurdish media 
agencies will be explored in the following chapter 6. 
 
5.1 Deletion Strategy in Kurdish Media Translation 
This section addresses the way ideology leads translation in relation to the cases of 
omission and their impact on the meaning transference between English and Kurdish in the 
translation of geopolitical commentary articles. This study argues for the employment of this 
strategy against the so-called universal features of translation including non-lexicalisation and 
simplifications43. To do so, it investigates the types of shifts that resulted from the use of the 
translational strategy that involves the deletion of the ST features in the TTs, both at word level 
and above word level.  
The corpus was analysed on the level of lexical choice to categorise the most prevailing 
translation strategies used in the translation of the English commentary articles into Kurdish. In 
the previous chapter, table 4.1 and chart 4.1 show that the use of deletion strategies is the second 
highest frequency after the use of the strategies of borrowing. Deletion or omission strategies 
represent 21% of the overall 1087 cases in the corpus of this study. This strategy occurs when 
                                                 
43 See subsection 2.5.2 
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features take place in the ST and are simply not presented in the TT. Generally, it might be used 
for words or expressions which are not lexicalised in the target language, or cases which their 
deletions do ‘not harm’ in some contexts (Baker 2011a, p.42), i.e., they will be redundant in the 
TTs if translated. However, table 5.1 below shows that 98% of the cases of deletion occurred in 
the corpus of this study while there are TT counterparts for them in the TL.  
 
Deletion Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
Lexicalised 219 98% 
Not-lexicalised 4 2% 
Grand Total 223 100% 
 
Table 5. 1: Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion in the TTs 
 
The non-lexicalised cases constitute 2%, which consist of only four cases. Interestingly 
enough, according to Hasanpoor (1999), two of the identified cases of non-lexicalisation in the 
corpus of this study are those that are normally compensated for by well-established loanwords 
in Kurdish. They are democratic and strategic (see section 4.2.1). The remaining cases of non-
lexicalisation are acronyms, comprising two cases. They were placed next to their ST full forms 
in the source texts. However, the acronyms were not presented in the TTs while their full forms 
were translated into their counterparts in the TL. This result can have different interpretations 
in relation to its significance in terms of the impact it can have in the TL. According to Lewis 
(1985/2004, p. 265), the reason behind the use of this kind of strategy, here, might be “to reduce 
the attention to translation that is sustained in the original”. On the one hand, this motive seems 
to be relevant because acronyms are often borrowed and written in English letters in the target 
language. The Kurdish translators, thus, might intend not to borrow from the STs to reduce 
foreignisation44 in the TTs. On the other hand, as this study has shown that the frequency of 
using borrowing strategies is higher than the use of deletion strategies in the corpus of this study; 
this reason seems unlikely (See table 4.1 of the previous chapter). The third interpretation, thus, 
might be the agency of the translators who considered the deletion of the acronyms did not 
affect the meaning transference since the full forms of the two acronyms were translated into 
their counterparts in the TL. 
                                                 
44 strangeness 
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Deletion Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
Lexical Shift 209 94% 
No Shift 14 6% 
Grand Total 223 100% 
 
Table 5. 2 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion in the TTs 
 
 
Chart 5. 1: Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion in the TTs 
 
Table 5.2 and chart 5.1 show that only 6% of the cases did ‘not harm’ when omitted in 
some contexts, while the majority of the cases affected meaning transfer from the STs to the 
TTs, comprising 94% of all cases of deletion in the corpus of this study. These deleted items 
that affected meaning in the corpus of this study are referred to as lexical shifts. They constitute 
a significant percentage in relation to the text-type of the articles used in the corpus of this study. 
Since the articles include information transfer of opinion on the geopolitical facts, the majority 
of the ST choices function as keywords in terms of sustaining these views and assessments and 
affecting the overall textual meaning. On the semantic level, thus, the majority of the shifts 
resulted from the use of this strategy, both at word level and above word level, can have 
ideological interpretations shaping the manipulation of the translator and the impact they can 
have in the TL. Their occurrence in the translated texts affects specifying and/or generalising 
information and reflects the translator’s resistance and acceptance toward the narratives 










Lexical Shift No Shift
Deletion
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In this way, the deletion of the expression those who confront death45, which was placed 
next to the word peshmerga in the ST, might not affect the meaning transfer from the ST into 
TT. This is because the word peshmerga is a Kurdish culture specific word and does not need 
explanation in the respective language. Beside, both those who confront death and peshmerga 
have similar meaning, i.e., it would be unnecessary information in the TT if it was translated. 
This kind of reframing thus can be interpreted as a translator’s tendency toward simplification 
within the TT by shortening the target sentence and transferring only the relevant and familiar 
concept. Nevertheless, the deletion of the word acting- in the below given example affected the 
meaning transfer from the ST into the TT since it altered the meaning from acting-minister to 
minister.  
 
ST: Besides being prime minister, he made himself acting minister of defense, minister of 
the interior and national security adviser. 
TT:           ﻭكەﻭ ﯽنﺎكەﺗڵاەﺗسەد ﯽنﺎنێهرﺎكەﺑ ﻭەرەﺑ یدرﺑ ناریزەﻭ كۆرەس ﻭكەﻭ ﯽنﻭﻭﺑ ادشەﻭەئ ڵەگەل
 یریزەورەبیرگ  ﯽیﺎهەڕ ەﺑ ﯽمﻭەﻗ ﯽنمەئ یرﺎكژێﻭاڕ ﻭ ۆخﻭﺎن ﻭ  
BT: Besides, being a prime minister made him to use his authorities as minister of defense, 
minister of the interior and the considerable national security adviser. 
 
While the position of Minister of Defense, which was approved on 21 December 201046, 
was left vacant in the Iraqi cabinet, the former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki served as the 
acting defense minister and not minister then. The ST was written and translated into Kurdish 
in 2014. Although the ST presented a negative view by using the expression he made himself 
(and not he was elected) to narrate the way he ruled while he was in power, the deletion in the 
TT provided a stronger interpretive frame. Reframing acting-minister as minister promoted 
competing narratives in relation to legitimacy of the government in terms of holding several 
governmental posts at the same time by the one who had the absolute power. This might be 
interpreted as the translator’s attempt to provoke the target readers to reconsider their decisions 
regarding the narratives that are presented in the target society then. Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite 
political figure, had participated in the 2014 parliamentary election despite accusations that he 
has used the judiciary to silence and imprison political rivals and had “suffered shrinking 
                                                 
45 See AE. 45 and AKX.45 of the corpus of this study. 
46 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nouri_al-Maliki 
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support from Sunnis and Kurds”47. Likewise, when the word Kurdish was used to modify the 
word jihadist in the ST and the word outlawed was used to describe the status of the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) as a political organization in Turkey in the ST, they were simply not 
presented in the TTs. These alterations have a significant impact on the meaning transference 
between the STs and the TTs. They might be interpreted in relation to the translators’ role in 






Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
Above word level 134 60% 
At word level 75 34% 
Grand Total 209 94% 
 
Table 5. 3: Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion in the TTs 
 
Table 5.3 shows that the cases of deleted items resulted in shifts on the semantic level 
occurred at both word level and above word level in the corpus of this study. They have a 
significant implication in shaping the ideology of the translator in terms of sustaining or 
challenging the narratives elaborated in the STs.  
 
Lexical Shift 
At Word Level 
Frequency of 
Translation Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
Nouns 32 14% 
Adjectives 30 13% 
Adverbs 7 3% 
Acronyms and Abbreviations  3 1% 
Verbs 2 1% 
Pluralisation S 1 0% 
Total 75 34% 
of Grand Total 209 94% 
 
Table 5. 4: Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion at word level in the TTs 
 
At word level, table 5.4 shows that nouns and adjectives represent the first and second 
highest frequencies of the total 34% of the cases of lexical shifts. They account for 14% and 
13%, of the cases, respectively. These parts of speech functioned as key material in relation to 
                                                 
47 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11733715 
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the type of information presented by the ST author in the original text. Their omissions resulted 
in transferring less specific information than the ST did, as we see in the following example.  
 
ST: When the air campaign began last spring, he was on the verge of massacring the 
opposition in the rebel stronghold of Benghazi.  
TT:   ەﺑ كێﺗﺎكەشرێه ﻭدرﺑار یرﺎههد نﺎكەﻗ ،دركێپ نﺎیﺗسەل ﯽفازەپﻭەئ یرهر ﯽنادمﺎجنەشەییژﻭك ادك
ەل نۆیسزۆپۆئ یژد ﻭﺑ .یزﺎغنﺑ یرﺎش  
BT: When last spring the campaigns began, Gaddafi was at the extreme of his massacring 
operation against opposition in the city of Benghazi. 
 
The omission of noun air, which functioned as a modifier within the noun phrase the air 
campaign, provided general information and did not specify the type of the campaign that took 
place then. Likewise, the deletion of the noun rebel, which also functioned as a modifier within 
the adverbial phrase in the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, provided a general information and 
did not specify the kind of the city that was about to be massacred. Meanwhile, it specifies the 
political allegiance of those in the city, and so positions them differently. According to Klaudy 
and Károly (2005, p. 15), these kinds of transference result in implicitations in the translated 
products as “meaningful lexical elements of the SL text are dropped in the TL text”. This 
becomes more apparent in the omission cases of adjectives and adverbs since the authors used 
them to describe and specify the type of information they wanted to transfer. In the example 
below, the deletions of the adjectives moral and strategic in the ST’s article headline raised 
ambiguity in the TT in terms of the kind of failure since it is not specified. 
 
ST: Obama’s Moral and Strategic Failure on ISIS 
TT: شعاد رەﺑمارەﺑ ﺎمﺎﺑۆئ ﯽﺗسكش 
BT: Obama’s Failure on ISIS 
 
Headlines represent a unique text-type. While they appear on the front page, they 
condense the stories in a minimum number of words that attract the reader to the stories the 
writers want to accentuate in the texts (Reah, 1998, p. 13). Thus, the deletion of the two 
adjectives in the TT affected the meaning transference in a particularly significant way because 
they function as key words in specifying the topic of the whole text. There is the possibility of 
the omission of unknown or not widely known words in the TL since the TT readers may reject 
and not read the articles with “mysterious” headlines. Therefore, it is undeniable that there is 
the tendency to simplify the wording of headlines in the TTs, when there are unfamiliar words 
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and expressions. However, the TT correspondents of the two adjectives moral and strategy are 
known and widely used in the TL. As such, their omissions might be interpreted in relation to 
the translator’s agency and the way the translation agencies and newspapers allow ideology to 
inform their news output and translation policies. 
Table 5.4 shows that adverbs are the third highest frequency after nouns and adjectives, 
constituting 3% of the total 33% of deletion cases at word level. Similar to adjectives, adverbs 
play a significant role in relation to the author’s decision in presenting the ST information. 
However, while adjectives specified the information, adverbs specified the way they were 
presented by the author in the ST. Therefore, their omissions affects the reframing of the STs in 
the TTs, as we see in the following example. 
 
ST: But what if Islamists just use religion cynically to gain political support? 
TT: نﺎكەییملاسیئ رەگەئ ﯽچ یەئ مڵاەﺑ ؟ﯽسﺎیس ﯽﺗشپڵﺎپ ﯽنﺎنێهﺗسەدەﺑ ۆﺑ ننێهﺑرﺎكەﺑ نیﺎئ  
BT: But what if Islamists use religion to gain political support? 
 
The adverbs just and cynically are used in the ST to question the way religion will be 
used to gain political support. Their deletions in the TT altered the way the question was 
presented in the ST and resulted in presenting a more general question and less critical in the 
TT. 
Acronyms and abbreviations represent only 1% of the 33% of the cases of deletion at 
word level. Nevertheless, they affect meaning transfer from the STs into the TTs and result in 
presenting more general information in the TTs if compared to their STs. For instance, the 
deletion of the acronym HE, which stands for His Excellency, in “HE Massoud Barzani” 
affected the way the author presented Massoud Barzani who holds a high position in the 
Kurdistan regional government in the TT. The deletion here might be interpreted in terms of the 
translator’s mediation and the news agency’s policy (See section 6.4.1 of the next chapter). The 
remaining cases that affected meaning transfer from the STs to the TTs include only one case 
of omission from each of the verbs, and pluralisation form -s. As percentage rates, they do not 
constitute significant percentages in relation to the total. However, they had a significant 
impacts on the meaning transfer from the ST into the TT since they functioned as key elements 
in the STs in terms of presenting the interpretation of the ST authors.  
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ST: So what can Ankara do? Invade?  
TT:  ەیۆﺑ ەئەكنهر هد؟تﺎكﺑ ﯽچ تێناﻭﺗ . 
BT: So what can Ankara do?  
 
The example above shows that  when the ST author questioned the options Turkey had 
and what can Ankara do in relation to what was happening in western/Syrian Kurdistan in the 
below given example, he used the verb invade to specify the possibility he wanted to focus on 
in his article. The omission of such verb in the TT altered the question to have a more general 
implication. 
Lexical Shift 





Expression and Names 73 33% 
Sentences 46 21% 
Paragraphs 15 7% 
Total 134 60% 
of Grand Total 209 94% 
 
Table 5. 5 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of deletion above word level in the TTs 
 
This inference is more prominent above word level since the omission extends not only 
to expressions but to sentences and paragraphs as well. Being a set of words that is complete in 
itself, both sentences and paragraphs fulfil a narrative function in the ST. Their omissions, 
usually, might be due to the length of the texts or the modification to the ST meaning transfer 
in favour of the policy of the media agencies. As strategies, they are, however, more 
interpretable from an ideological view in the corpus of this study due to their effect in translation 
distortion rather than the length of the texts. Their omissions thus might have a significant 
impact on the meaning transference between the STs and the TTs, not only in terms of altering 
the ST messages, but also in relation to the focus of the ST themes. Since they includ a group 
of key words, their omissions had a greater effect in the TTs as a whole representation of the 
ST information. According to Iser (1972, p. 282), sentences do not only include solely a 
statement “but aims at something beyond what is actually says”. This is consistent with the texts 
used in this study since sentences within commentary articles usually contain assessments of 
the facts that authors wants to present. Table 5.5 shows that while expressions constitute 33% 
of the cases of deletion, sentence and paragraph deletions account for 21% and 7% of the total 
60% respectively. The analysis, therefore, shows that the omissions of sentences and paragraphs 
in the TL texts constitute the second and third highest frequencies, respectively, after the 
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omissions of expressions above word level. The omission of the sentence and [the Iraqi 
government] is now calling on Assad to step down in the example below affected the complete 
meaning the author wanted to deliver.  
 
ST: The Iraqi government recently reversed its support for Syrian President Bashar Assad 
amid the ongoing unrest in Syria, and is now calling on Assad to step down. 
TT:      ەمﻭكحەل تﺎكﻭﺎه قارێع ﯽﺗەگەپ ڵەیﻭێشەﺑ ﺎیرﻭس ﯽنﺎكەنﺎییاﻭد م ەﺑ ۆﺑ یۆخ ﯽناﻭیﺗشپش رﺎ
ەئەسەس یدهﻭ ﺎیرﻭس ﯽكۆرهﻭدنﺎﺗس  
BT: The Iraqi government, amid the ongoing unrest in Syria, recently has stopped its 
support for Syrian President Bashar Assad.  
 
The TT indicates that the Iraqi government has only cancelled his support without 
mentioning other verbal or non-verbal activity. This caused implicitation in terms of the kind 
of support the Syrian President Bashar Assad received from the Iraqi government. Likewise, 
two whole sentences of the paragraph below are not presented in the TT.  
ST: The supporters of the new Kurdish strategy are of the opinion that the Oslo negotiations 
conducted between MİT and PKK representatives in Europe were mismanaged and failed. It is also 
true that the PKK spoiled the Oslo talks and thwarted the government’s peaceful approach by 
waging violent attacks last July in the midst of negotiations. 
TT: N/A 
The paragraph contains the reference and more detailed information about the topic 
already introduced in the title of the article. It was written in the penultimate paragraph of the 
commentary article entitled, New Kurdish strategy reveals divisions within government. 
Therefore, one cannot argue that the translator failed to recognise the significance of this 
paragraph. However, it is rather interpretable from the translator’s ideology in terms of 
disseminating or dissenting the narratives detailed in the STs in proportion to the narrative they 
accept or oppose. According to Falkenhayner (2014, p. 75), “commentary articles do not present 
issues in isolation, but in their structure, they judge and position them in connection with other 
issues of importance, or ones receiving coverage, at the same time”. This is occasionally 
consistent with the articles used in the corpus of this study. Therefore, the use of each of the 
words, expressions, sentences and paragraphs constitute significant vehicles in presenting such 
issues in the STs, their omissions affect the textual meaning of the translated commentary 
articles.  
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The deleted expressions affected the meaning transference of the ST messages in the 
TTs. They include various phrases such as verb phrases, noun phrases, adjective phrases and 
adverb phrases, as we see in the following examples.  
 
ST: Mr Erdogan appears to have abandoned, for the moment, his declared long-term 
intention to visit Gaza 
TT: ەئەل نﺎگۆدرەل یزاﻭ ادﺎﺗسێئ ەس یرﺎیڕﺑەغ ﯽنادرهز هﻭﺎنێه ەك هﻭﺎمەیەك هدەیتﺎكیﺑ تێﻭ  
BT: Erdogan, for the moment, has abandoned his decision to visit Gaza, which recently he 
wants to do it. 
 
The omission of the phrasal verb appears to in the TT affected the meaning transfer 
from ST to the TT in relation to the ST author’s certainty about Mr Erdogan’s cancellation to 
visit Gaza. The TT narrated the act of cancellation explicitly while the ST did not specified or 
confirmed the message. The inference of the TT, therefore, is different from that of the ST. As 
a shift, it can be discussed in relation to stylistic shifts, nevertheless the geopolitical status of 
Kurdistan and its relation to Turkey, in particular the policy of current Turkish government 
might indicate other interpretations. This text is translated by the Sbeiy news agency to which 
it is directly aligned to the Gorran party, known as the opposition party in Kurdistan. The 
translator’s policy seems to reflect the same policy of the agency in disapproving of Turkish 
political policy. The deletions of the title Mr and the phrasal verb appears to indicate the 
translator’s attitude toward the Turkish policy by accentuating the conflict between Turkey and 
the Palestinian authority through the Turkish president’s decision48. The example below shows 
that the omission of adverb phrases created a similar impact on reframing the ST narratives in 
the TTs. 
 
ST: ISTANBUL — If it weren’t for Tuesday’s helicopter crash on Mount Sinjar, what 
would I have written about the plight of the Yazidis? 
TT:   ڵﻭﺑنەﺗسەئ-  یەرﺎﺑرەد ﺎیﺎیسﻭنﺑ میچ ﻭﺑەد ۆخﺎئ ،ﺎیادەن یﻭر ەرەﺗپۆکیلەه ﻭەئ ﯽﺗﺎسەرﺎک رەگەئ
؟نﺎکەیدیزێئ ﯽخۆدﻭرﺎﺑ 
BT: ISTANBUL — If it weren’t for the helicopter crash, what would I have written about 
the condition of the Yazidis? 
 
                                                 
48 The relation between the translator’s lexical choices and the policy of the Kurdish media news agencies 
will further be investigated in the following chapter (chapter 6). 
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The non-presentation of the ST expressions Tuesday’s and on Mount Sinjar in the TT 
resulted in a shift from presenting specific information to a rather general one in terms of time 
and place of the event. Again this might be interpreted in relation to stylistic norms or 
simplification, however, the possibility of the translator’s ideological attempt towards 
accentuating the condition of the Yazidis is more prominent. This is due to the fact that the 
translator not only deleted these two adverbial features, which describe the specific accident 
which happened to the author while visiting this mountain, but also all the other features relating 
to the same accident with the aim of accentuating the whole Yazidis trauma while attacked by 
ISIS. Likewise, the omission of the prepositional phrase for America also modified the 
presentation of the ST’s information in the TT in the example below. 
 
ST: Iraq was such a bitter experience for America that we prefer never to speak of it again. 
TT: ەئ قارێعهدنیه ﯽكێنﻭمز ەڵﺎﺗ ەﺑاﻭهد شﺎﺑەك مناز ەسﻗ رﺗ ﯽكیرﺎجەل یهرﺎﺑەیهﻭ ەنەكنی   
BT:  Iraq was such a bitter experience that I prefer never to speak of it again 
 
However, the use of this strategy here with the substitution of the pronoun we with I led 
to the personalisation of the ST information. Thus, the translational strategies used specified the 
information by the shift in register, i.e., the bitter experience is made to refer only to the narrator 
who is from America and not to America as a country.  
The analysis of the use of the reframing strategy of deletion, in this section, has shown 
that a high percentage of the cases led to semantic shifts in the TTs, with only a small percentage 
of the use of this strategy did not affect meaning transfer between the STs and TTs. The low 
percentage of the cases of deletion in this study, in essence, is consistent with what Baker refers 
to as the cases that do ‘no harm’ and what Nida calls redundant features if translated. According 
to Baker (2011a, p. 42), since they are “not vital enough to the development of the [texts]49 to 
justify distracting the reader with lengthy explanations, translators can and often do simply omit 
translating the word or expression in question”. Likewise, Nida (1964) considers that the use of 
this strategy sometimes does not have an impact on meaning transference between the STs and 
the TTs due to their relation to the language preferences. However, the analysis in this study 
also revealed that the high percentage of the choice of deletion strategy resulted in shifts on the 
                                                 
49 The pluralisation –s is added 
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semantic level. The impact of the use of this strategy on the meaning transference from the STs 
to the TTs, both at word level and above word level, resulted in both the specification and 
generalization of the ST and TT messages and changed the ideological drive of the texts. In this 
sense, the omission strategy provided a mechanism through which translators became 
ideologically participants in the reframing process of the STs in the TTs.  
 
5.2 Substitution Strategy in Kurdish Media 
The previous section has shown that strategies of deletion can enable the translator to 
alter the key messages of the texts and provide a different reading of the STs in the TTs, both 
at word level and above. This section will develop the question of the translator’s agency further 
by considering the impact of the use of substitution in translation. The study addresses this 
question because of the frequency of substitution (see table 5.6) and because of its potential 
impact in informing the translation. It argues that the use of this reframing strategy resulted 
from ideological manipulation rather than mistranslation or non-lexicalisation in the TTs. 
Substitution occurs when the translation combines omission and addition strategies. In 
other words, the ST elements are deleted in the TTs and other non-ST elements are added 
instead. In terms of the frequency of their occurrences in the TTs, this study reveals that of the 
strategies used in translating media commentary articles, there are 201 cases of substitution 
which constitute 18% of the total of 1087 cases in the corpus of this study (Table and chart 4.1 
in the previous chapter).  
 
Deletion + Addition 
(Substitution) 




Lexical Shift 175 87% 
Stylistic Shift 26 13% 
Grand Total 201 100% 
 
Table 5. 6 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of substitution in the TTs 
 
Table 5.6 shows the type of shifts this strategy engendered in the target texts. 87% of 
the cases represent lexical shifts, with only 13% causing no shift on the semantic level of the 
TT. The occurrence of 13% of the cases of substitutions might be interpreted in terms of either 
domestication or explicitations (explanation). The translators’ decision are more interpretable 
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as attempts to acculturate the STs and decode them more intelligible to the target reader, as we 
see in the following examples. 
 
ST: Though spectacular attacks still win headlines, fewer people have died violently this 
year in Iraq than in Mexico — or Syria. 
TT:          ەهەچرهدن ەشرێه ﺎﺗشێه ەلهﻭﺎكﺎنەس نﺎكەه یرێدرەڵاﻭ نﺎینﺎكهودرك ریگادەخ ،ەك ﯽكێنﺎكڵ رﺗم
ەﺑهﻭێشەی ﯽكەل ژیﺗﻭدنﻭﺗ ەل ادﻗارێعەﺑ نﻭچﻭﺎن ەﺑەل درﻭارەگەم ڵﺎیرﻭس نﺎی ۆكیسك . 
BT: Though spectacular attacks still occupy headlines, fewer people have died violently 
in Iraq than in Mexico or Syria. 
 
The substitution of the word win with occupy did not affect the meaning of the TT 
sentence if compared to their respective STs. This might be due to the fact that while the word 
win collocates with headlines in English, the word occupy collocates with the word headlines 
to transfer the same meaning in Kurdish. Thus, the word win substituted with the one known to 
the TT readership, i.e., domesticated. Likewise, the substitution of the word one with 
constitution in the TT transferred a similar meaning of ST in the TT in the example below. 
 
ST: As Turkey moves to replace its army-drafted Constitution with one that is fully 
democratic. 
TT:    ەل ەﺑ ﺎیكرﻭﺗ ادكێﺗﺎكهرەنﺗرگێج ﻭهﻭهد یهد ﯽیﺎپﻭس یﻭارژێڕاد یرﻭﺗسەﺑ تاﻭڕ هدیكێروتس 
ەﺗەییساركﻭمید ﻭاﻭهﻭ  
 BT: As Turkey moves towards replacing its armed-drafted constitution with a fully 
democratic constitution. 
 
The replacement of the word one by the word constitution might be due to explicitation 
of the word that the translator considered it might not be clear in the TT if translated as it was. 
The cases of such word choice in the TTs affected, to some extent, the stylistic features if they 
are compared to their STs. This might be due to the fact that the form of the SL could not be 
preserved in translation since each of English and Kurdish has different word and syntactic 
structures to convey the semantic meaning. In other words this is an obligatory shift. The form, 
therefore, cannot be maintained in translation due to the fact that each language has its own 
forms, having secondary and figurative meaning. Then it could be argued that as a consequence, 
there could be meaning change. For instance, the translator’s substitution of the ST putting 
“American boots” on the ground by the TTیەكەﺗڵاﻭ یﺎپﻭس ﯽنﺎكەزێه یەﻭەناڕەگ ، (BT: returning his 
country's army) might be due to the ST’s unfamiliarity to the TT reader if translated literally.  
 
ST: Secretary of State John Kerry ruled out putting “American boots” on the ground 
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TT:  ﺎكیرمەئ یەﻭەرەد یریزەﻭ ،یریك نۆج یەكەتڵاو یاپوس یناكەزێه یەوەناڕەگ ،ﯽنازرﻭﻭدەﺑ  
BT: John Kerry, Secretary of State of America, ruled out [the possibility of] returning his 
country's army 
 
However, this might not be a very productive motivation since the expression 
“American boots” is presented between two quotation marks in the ST. This indicates that the 
author presented John Kerry’s quote directly. Direct quotes are usually used to focus precisely 
on the point one wants to make. Since it was substituted with the expression his country's army, 




Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
At word level 13 6% 
Above word level 13 6% 
Grand Total 26 13% 
 
Table 5. 7 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of substitution in the TTs 
 
Thus, there are cases of substitution that represent stylistic shifts both at word level and 
above word level (Table 5.7). Comprising 13% of the cases, they do not constitute a significant 
percentage in relation to the total percentage of the cases of substitution. However, this result 
can have its significance in terms of the impact it can have in the TTs, in particular in terms of 
domestication, as it is shown in the following example.  
 
ST: America was on the ground with tens of thousands of troops to act as that well-armed 
midwife. 
TT:             ەئەئۆرمەل ﺎكیرمەمەنادیەكەی هد ﻭەه نﺎیەس رازەل زﺎﺑر هرۆگەنﺎپەكهدﺎمﺎئ ادەئ ۆﺑ نهﻭ یەك 
ەكب قارێع یرێدواچ و یناویتشپن  
BT: Today, America is on the ground with tens of thousands of troops to support and 
monitor/watch Iraq 
 
Domestication, here, can be defined as the strategy of minimising the foreignness of the 
ST in the language being translated to and providing a more intelligible rendition to the TT 
readers. For instance, the ST expression well-armed midwife was substituted with the TT 
expression  قارێع یرێدﻭﺎچ ﻭ ﯽناﻭیﺗشپ (BT: support and monitor Iraq). The reason might be due to 
the minimisation of the strangeness of the foreign text for the target language readers, since the 
word midwife has different connotation in the TT. Although it carries similar meaning in terms 
of preparing women for the delivery of new life, Kurdish midwives are not educated and trained 
 150 
and their job, thus, is not part of a successfully completed midwifery education programme that 
is recognised in the country. Therefore, it would not have the same impact on the TT reader if 




Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
At word level 108 54% 
Above word level 67 33% 
Total 175 87% 
Grand Total 201 100% 
 
Table 5. 8 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of substitution in the TTs 
 
The majority of substitutions, which constitutes 87% of the cases, led to lexical shifts in 
the corpus of this study (Table 5.6). While 54% of the cases of substitution represent lexical 
shifts at word level, 33% of the cases of lexical shifts occurred above word level (Table 5.8). 









Nouns 59 29% 
Verbs 21 10% 
Adjectives 14 7% 
Adverbs 4 2% 
conjunctions 3 1% 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 3 1% 
Prepositions 2 1% 
Possessive S 1 0% 
Pronouns 1 0% 
Total 108 54% 
Grand Total 175 87% 
 
Table 5. 9 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of substitution at word level in the TTs 
 
At word level, table 5.9 shows that nouns represent the highest frequency among the 
elements affecting meaning transfer from the STs to the TTs. In the example below, the 
translator might substitute the noun Hawks with ەئسیرگنۆك ﯽنﺎمادن  (BT: Members of Congress or 
congressmen) in the TT to transfer a close meaning of ST.  
 
ST: Hawks are right that Iraq could be a catastrophe. 
TT: ەئ سیرگنۆك ینامادنهدﺗساڕەكەك ن ەه یۆﺑەی ەﺗێﺑﺑ هرﺎكتﺎس  
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BT: Members of Congress are right that it could be a catastrophe. 
 
This might be due to the fact that the word Hawks is not lexicalised in the TL and not 
familiar to the TT readers if it was transcribed. The words congress and congressman are 
familiar to the Kurdish readership as culture-specific loanwords. However, they have not the 
same meaning of Hawks. While Hawk is used to describe a politician who believes in using 
military force, i.e., it is opposite to Dove, the expression Member of Congress or the word 
congressman refers to a member to the US House of Representatives in general. Thus, the ST 
word is used to describe a specific member of congressmen and not the whole membership. The 
use of substitution affected the meaning transfer from specific to general one. Such general 
reframing of the ST narrative in the TT might imply the translator’s agreement with the Hawks’ 
agenda since s/he translated it in that way more than once.  Likewise, the ST noun government 
was substituted with the TT noun مێژر (BT: regime) in the example below, while there is a TT 
correspondence for it in the TL. The substitution between them affected meaning transfer from 
the ST to the TT. 
 
ST: the Iranian government 
TT:  یمێژر نارێئ  
BT: the Iranian regime 
 
This shift might be interpreted from the translator’s ideology since it indicated 
disapproval of the Iranian state because the use of substitution, here, resulted in specifying what 
type of government Iran has. i.e., a regime. This is due to the fact that the word government 
refers usually to a group of people who elected to govern a country or a state whereas regime is 
used to a government that was not elected fairly or that is disapproved for some other reason.  
Verbs represent the second highest frequency among the elements affecting meaning 
transfer from the STs to the TTs at word level. They constitute 10% of the cases of substitution 
in the corpus of this study (Table 5.9). Similar to the strategy of noun substitution, their 
occurrence affected meaning transfer from general to specific and the other way around as well.  
 
ST: Turkey downgraded relations after Israel rejected a sound, American-mediated deal to 
close the book on Israel’s ill-fated assault on a Gaza aid flotilla that killed eight Turks and one 
Turkish-American. 
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TT:  ەپ ﺎیكرﻭﺗهﻭیەییدن ﯽنﺎكدناڕچپ ەئ یاﻭدهﻭهﻭ چیه لیئارسیئ یەن ﯽكێمڵا ﯽناﻭیژﺑﻭﺎن ﯽڵۆر ،ﻭﺑ
ەئەمهدێﺑ ۆﺑ ﺎكیرەل نﻭﺑگن ەس ۆﺑ لیئارسیئ ﯽشرێهەك رەییﺗشەمرﺎی ﯽكەغ ۆﺑ ﯽﺗهزز ەك ەه ادیێﺗ ﯽﺗڵاﻭﺎه تش
ەك ،ﯽكرﻭﺗ ەیەئ( نﺎیكێكەمیرﯽك-نارژﻭك ﻭﺑ )ﯽكرﻭﺗ . 
BT: Turkey ended/ broke off relations after Israel rejected a sound, American-mediated 
deal to be silent on Israel’s assault on a Gaza aid flotilla that killed eight Turks and one Turkish-
American. 
 
The substitution of the ST verb downgraded with the TT verb دناڕچپ (BT: ended/ broke 
off) resulted in specifying the type of relationship more between the two countries in the TT. 
The use of downgraded in the ST shows Turkey reduced its relations with Israel to a lower 
grade, rank, or level of importance. The ST message, therefore, did not clearly address that the 
relations between Turkey and Israel ended, while the TT conveyed the opposite. The 
substitution affected the meaning transfer from giving specific information to a more specific 
one and gave rise to a different reframing that might be interpreted through the translator’s 
agency. In a similar manner, the ST verb plundered was substituted by the TT ڵۆرﺗنۆك درك  (BT: 
controlled) in the example given below. 
 
ST: Kurds plundered bases deserted by the Iraqi army in Kirkuk, 
TT: هدرﻭك تﺎكﻭﺎهەئ نﺎكەكنﺑ ﻭ ەسەنﺎییزﺎﺑری یﺎپﻭس نﺎیﻗاریع ڵۆرتنۆك  دركەك ەل یرﺎش ەك كﻭكر
ناركڵۆچ 
BT: Meanwhile the Kurds controlled those Iraqi army bases that were deserted in the 
Kirkuk city… 
 
Nevertheless, since the verb plunder refers to the act of taking goods typically by using 
force in a time of war or civil disorder, it is different from the verb control that carries a more 
general, and legitimate meaning. The substitution, therefore, affects the meaning transfer from 
giving specific information to general information. This, in turn, presented a positive 
implication in the TT and enabled the translator to present responses to the Kurdish actions in 
a more positive light. 
Table 5.9 shows that 7% of the cases of the cases of substitution in the corpus of this 
study are adjectives. They also play a significant role in terms of giving specific and general 
information in the STs and the TTs. For instance, the substitution of the ST adjective unexpected 
in the noun phrase an unexpected development with the TT adjective ەﺑ ەگەشەس ﯽکێندنەمرادیسرﺗ  (a 
frightening/ alarming development) affected the meaning transfer in terms of specifying the 
type of development Kurds made in the Kurdish region of Syria. 
 153 
ST: The Turkish side sees this as an 'unexpected development' and has started taking steps 
to stop this becoming a deepening problem for Turkey," Zeyrek said. 
TT:  ەﺑەسﻗ ﯽێپەمﺎنژۆر ﯽنﺎکكرﻭﺗ ﯽكێسﻭﻭن […] ەئ ﺎیکرﻭﺗەخۆدﻭرﺎﺑ م ەﺑ ەگەشەس ﯽکێندنەمرادیسرت 
هدێﺗەچ ﻭ تﺎگەه دنهﻭﺎن ﯽکێﻭﺎگن ەئ ۆﺑهﻭەئ یەخۆدﻭرﺎﺑ ﻭ یﺎﺗسێئ یناتسدروک یاوائژۆر ەنەﺗێﺑ  یۆه
ەنووبڵوقهوەشێک یرتایز یدروک ی ەل ﺎیکرﻭﺗ . 
BT: According to a Turkish journalist [...] Turkey considers this situation as a frightening/ 
alarming development and has started taking some steps in order not to let the current situation in 
western Kurdistan deepens the problem of Kurds more in Turkey 
 
Interestingly enough, the example above shows that the ST adjective deepening in the 
noun phrase a deepening problem was turned into a TT verb ەنﻭﻭﺑڵﻭﻗهﻭ  (BT: deepen), while the 
TT phrase درﻭک ی (BT: of Kurd) substituted its place in the TT phrase ەشێکدرﻭک ی  (BT: problem 
of Kurd). As explained earlier in this section, the change of form features in terms of parts of 
speech between the two languages is not inexplicable since each of English and Kurdish has 
different word and syntactic structure to convey the semantic meaning. Nevertheless, since the 
TT expression problem of Kurds replaced the ST phrase a deepening problem, it alters ST 
meaning to a point of particularism. 
Adverbs constitute 2% of the cases of substitution in the corpus of this study. Since they 
specified the way information was presented by the author in the ST, their replacement with the 
TT adverbs with different meanings resulted in lexical shifts in the TTs.  
 
ST: In the past year, the reformist edge of the AKP has dramatically waned. 
  ﻭﻭدرﺑار ﯽڵﺎس AKP ەلەچ  ﯽیزﺎسكﺎچ ﯽكمەبەتییواو ەشاپەشكدركی                       TT: 
BT: In the past year, AKP has completely withdrawn from the idea of reformation. 
 
The replacement of the ST adverb dramatically with the TT adverb ەﺑەﺗﯽیﻭاﻭ  (BT: 
completely) modified the ST message in the below given example. This had a major impact on 
the message transfer as the adverb was added to the meaning of the ST verb waned. Since the 
verb was also replaced by the TT ەشﺎپەشكدركی  (BT: withdrawn), it, in turn, modified the message 
transference as well. The TT message, in essence, spelled out the role of the AKP more clearly 
than the ST message. Likewise, the substitution of the ST adverb However with the TT adverb 
ەﺑەخادهﻭ  (BT: unfortunately) in the below given modified the ST message transfer in a way that 
it seemed the ST author expressed his sentiment regarding what happened. 
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ST: However, Kurdish journalists Soran Mama Hama and Sardasht Osman were not so 
lucky; they were gunned down for writing about corruption by the political class and local 
governments 
 
TT:              ەبەخادهو ەمﺎنژۆرەمﺎم ﯽنارۆس نﺎسﻭنەحەم ەس ﻭهدرەئ نﺎمسﻭع تشەﺑ ﻭەﺗخەن نﺎی ﻭ ﻭﺑ
ەلەسهد نیسﻭن رهرﺎﺑرەگ یهدنەل ﯽڵەیلاهد نەسەمﻭكح ﻭ تڵاەیدرﻭك ﯽﺗهﻭەﺑ ، ەلﻭگ نارژﻭك.  
BT: Unfortunately, journalists Soran Mama Hama and Sardasht Osman were not that 
lucky; for writing about corruption by Kurdish governments and authority they were gunned down 
 
Table 5.9 shows that each of conjunctions, acronyms and abbreviations, and 
prepositions constitute 1% of the cases of substitution in the corpus of this study. Since 
conjunctions and prepositions function as key words in connecting words or group of words and 
showing the relationship between ideas, they play a significant role in the sematic transference 
between the STs and TTs, as we see in the following examples. For example, while the ST 
conjunction as was replaced with the TT conjunction ﻭ (BT: and) and determiner رەه(BT: any) 
in the example given below, the focus on one country turned into more than a country.  
 
ST: At least 50 percent of the people in some way trusted this government, for various 
reasons. One of the most important was religion. When they realize that this government isn't so 
different from the old regimes, they will lose their faith in religious people, civilian politics and 
Turkey as a country. 
TT: ەﺑەیلاەک ﯽنەمهﻭ ەلەسەپ ادەﺑ نﺎیﺗڵاﻭﺎه یﺎجنەههﻭێش رەیەﺑ تێﺑ ک زاﻭﺎیج زاﻭﺎیج یرﺎکۆه         
ەنﺎمﺗمەﺑ یەمﻭکح مەﺗ ەههﻭﺑەی .ەل کێک ەههر ەگیرﺎکەئ نیرﺗرەنارﺎکۆه ﻭ هﻭﺑ نیﺎئهد نﻭر نﺎیۆﺑ کێﺗﺎک .ەﺗێﺑهﻭ ەک 
ەئەمﻭکح مەﺗاﻭﺎیج رۆز شەیین رﺗز ەل ەمێژر ەنۆکەکەئ ،ەل نﺎیۆخ یاﻭڕﺑ اﻭهدهد تسهدەﺑ نەﺑمارەﺑ ر ەک ﯽنﺎس
ەسﺎیس ،ﯽنیﺎئەم ﯽﺗهدەنﺎین  شﺎیکرﻭﺗ ﻭو ..کێﺗڵاﻭ رەه  
BT: At least 50 percent of the people in some way trusted this government, for various 
reasons. One of the most important was religion. When they realize that this government isn't so 
different from the old regimes, they will lose their faith in religious people, civilian politics and 
Turkey and any country. 
 
The TT message, thus, differs from the ST in the way it generalized how people will 
lose their faith in not only Turkey as a country, but also any other country in which its rule based 
on religion. In the same way, the replacement of the ST preposition to with the TT preposition 
ەل ەیلان  (BT: by), shown below, modified the ST message which did not specify the performer 
of the game-changing power in the ST. However, the use of the preposition by in the TT 




ST: However, such reasoning imputes too much game-changing power to the American 
military and belittles the importance of local Iraqi actors and factors. 
TT:    ەهەچرهدنەئ ،هرۆج م ەهەسڵەندنﺎگن هژﺎمﺎئ ەﺑ ەییرﺎی یرۆز ﯽكێناڕۆگەك ەل ەیلان  یﺎپﻭس
ەئمەهﻭﺎكیر ەك ﻭەنﻭﺑمهﻭەئ ﯽگنرگ یەﺗكەﺗكﺎف ﻭرهر ەییۆخﻭﺎنهد قارێع ﯽنﺎك.تﺎك   
BT: However, such evaluation signifies to a great/ major change of the game by the 
American military and belittles the importance of local Iraqi actors and factors. 
 
The above analysis has shown that strategies of substitution impact meaning 
transference between the STs and TTs at word level. A high frequency of substitution resulted 
in alteration on semantic level and brought about both specialization and generalization of the 
ST and TT key messages on the part of the translators. The study is now turning to the remaining 
cases of substitution at word level, those of acronyms and abbreviations, pronouns and 
possessive –s, and investigating the way that substitution at this level informs the message that 
is being transmitted. Although they do not constitute a significant percentage in terms of their 
occurrence, they can be regarded as important features since they have their own impact on the 
meaning transfer from the STs to the TTs. They represent a convergent rate in relation to their 
occurrence in the corpus of this study, each comprising 1% of the cases of substitution. 
 
Substitution 
Lexical Shift above Word 
Level 
Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
Expressions 50 25% 
Sentences 11 5% 
Headlines 4 2% 
Paragraphs 2 1% 
Total 67 33% 
Grand Total 175 87% 
 
Table 5. 10 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of substitution above word level in the TTs 
 
Similar to the cases of the deletion strategy, the impact of the cases of substitution is 
more perceptible above word level as there is a greater expectation of their ability to affect the 
overall transfer between the STs and the TTs. Expressions represent the majority in the corpus 
of this study, comprising 25% of all cases of the substitutions above word level (Table 5.10). In 
the example below, the TT expression اﻭﺎئژۆڕ یدرﻭک ﯽکێﺗرﺎپ (BT: a western Kurdish party) 
replaced the ST in northern Syria of a Kurdish group. Similarly, the ST expression Kurdish 
separatists was substituted by the Kurdish party’s name  نﺎﺗسدرﻭك نارﺎكێرك ﯽﺗرﺎپ  (BT: the 
Kurdistan worker’s party) in the TT.  
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ST: Concerns are surfacing in Turkey about the growing influence in northern Syria of a 
Kurdish group linked to Kurdish separatists fighting Ankara 
TT:   ەگینەیینارهرﺎید ارکشﺎئ ﯽک ەﺑ ەسﺎیسەمﻭکح ﯽﺗەئ ﯽﺗەقنهرهﻭ هدهرﺎﺑرەگیرﺎک ﯽنﻭﻭﺑدﺎیز ی ﯽیر
ەک اﻭﺎئژۆڕ یدرﻭک ﯽکێﺗرﺎپ ەپهﻭیەه یدنەی ەﺑ ەک نﺎﺗسدرﻭك ﯽنارﺎكێرك ﯽﺗرﺎپ ەلگەەئ ڵەقنهرەل اد ەشنادڕ  
BT: Obvious Concerns are surfacing in Ankara government’s policy about the growing 
influence of a western Kurdish party which has a link with the Kurdistan worker’s party that is in 
war with Ankara. 
 
In both of the cases, the TTs gave information that is more specific than the ST’s. This 
result can have two interpretations in relation to the impact it can have in the TTs. On the one 
hand, this denotes that the two cases of substitution might have occurred due to the translator’s 
and TT reader’s knowledge and familiarity regarding the Kurdish parties in the region. On the 
other hand, the effect of the two cases of substitution is substantial since it did not leave any 
room for speculation regarding the Kurdish groups, which is opposite to what the ST author did 
in the ST. According to table 5.10, substitution is also used in the cases of handling sentences, 
headlines and paragraphs. The substitution of sentences constitutes the second highest 
frequency after expressions, while headlines and paragraphs represent 2% and 1% of the cases 
of substitution, respectively. Interestingly enough, these types of substitution affected meaning 
transfer between the STs and the TTs in relation to the transference of the general and specific 
information as well. For example, the ST headline Iraq’s Factional Chaos Threatens to Disrupt 
a Kurdish Haven was substituted with the Kurdish headline ەﺑ رۆﺗكدەهرەه :حڵﺎس مهد كێدرﻭك ﻭﻭمەڵﻭ ﯽﺗ
ەسەﺑرهد یۆختێﻭ  (BT: Dr Barham Salih: Every Kurd yearns for an independent homeland). The 
TT headline started with a quote by a Kurdish political figure who is a member of the one of 
the political parties. The quote is mentioned in the middle of the ST article and is turned into a 
headline of the TT. The headline substitution, here, might be due to the impact of the quote on 
the TT readers as headlines are considered a significant element to attract readers. Nevertheless, 
since the quote is uttered by a member of one of the political parties, it raises questions regarding 
the ideology of the Kurdish publication agency and its translators (See chapter 6). 
The choice of substitution strategy, in this section, shows the types of shifts which 
occurred in the TTs, which are semantic and stylistic shifts. However, the analysis showed that 
the highest percentage of the use of this strategy led to lexical shifts rather than stylistic. The 
use of this strategy impacted the meaning transference from the STs to the TTs, both at word 
level and above word level and resulted in both the specification and generalization of the ST 
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and TT messages. This, in turn, revealed the way translators dissociated themselves from the 
immediate narratives elaborated by the author through altering and/or opposing aspects of the 
immediate narratives they translate. This will further be explained in chapter 6. 
 
5.3 Addition Strategy in Kurdish Media Translation 
The previous section has shown that strategies of substitution can function as a 
significant mechanism through which translators became potential participants in reframing the 
key messages of the texts and providing a different reading of the STs in the TTs. This section 
will develop the question of translator’s agency further by considering the impact of the use of 
the strategy of addition in translation. It investigates the cases of addition in relation to their 
impact on the meaning transference between the STs and TTs. Table 4.1 and chart 4.1 of the 
previous chapter reveal that addition has the fourth highest frequency among the strategies used 
in the TTs, comprising only 9% of the 1087 cases of translational strategies. This result has a 
significant impact on the meaning transfer between the STs and TTs, although it might not 
constitute a significant percentage in relation to the total percentage of the translational 
strategies in the corpus of this study.  
Addition Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
No shift 54 52% 
Lexical Shift 49 48% 
Grand Total 103 100% 
 
Table 5. 11 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of addition in the TTs 
 
Addition 





At word level 37 36% 
Above word level 17 17% 
Total 54 52% 
Grand Total 103 100% 
 
Table 5. 12 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of addition in the TTs 
 
Table 5.11 shows that 52% of the 103 cases of addition did not result in shifts on the 
semantic levels between the STs and TTs. They occurred both at word level and above word 
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level. The majority of the cases of addition occurred at word level accounting for 36% of the 
52% of the cases of addition (Table 5.12). Nida (1964, p. 227) has argued that the use of addition 
can be a technique of adjustment in the process of translating to produce good counterparts due 
to the ST implicitation, the grammatical restructuring in the TT, and the TT categories which 
do not exist in the SL. Thus, their addition in the corpus of this study might be due to the 
syntactic and structural differences between English and Kurdish and/ or the unfamiliarity of 
the ST messages if translated literally. For instance, the addition of ەمﺎنژۆڕ (BT: newspaper) 
next to the names نﺎیدرﺎگ (The Guardian) and ڵﺎنرۆژ تیرﺗس ڵۆ (BT: The Wall Street Journal) in 
the TL can be classified as involving the use of explicitation strategy. Table 5.12 shows that 
17% of the cases of addition can have similar impact above word level, as we see in the 
following example. 
 
ST: Ukraine remains a mess, with few people sure of what to do or when to do it. 
BT:  نەكﺑ ﯽچ یەﻭەل نﺎینڵد مەك ﯽكێسەك دنەچ یەﻭەئ ڵەگەل ،ەﻭەﺗەﻭﺎم یﻭاﻭێش ەﺑ ﺎیناركۆئ رەسەل
ەیەشێك مەئنەكیﺑ یەك ﻭ.  
TT: Ukraine remains a mess, with few people sure of what to do about this problem or 
when to do it. 
 
The addition of ەیەشێك مەئ رەسەل (BT: about this problem/ issue) in the TT might be due 
to the transference of the ST message as clear as possible. In other words, the literal translation 
of the ST sentence might lead the ST message to be incomplete in the TT due to the missing 
features in the TT structure.  
 
 




Of the total of the cases of addition, table 5.11 shows that 48% of the cases resulted in 
shifts on semantic level. Although this percentage does not constitute a significant percentage 
in relation to the overall translational strategies identified in the corpus of this study, it does in 
Addition 





At word level 27 26% 
Above word level 22 21% 
Total 49 48% 
Grand Total 103 100% 
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terms of its impact on the meaning transfer between the STs and TTs. They also occurred both 
at word level and above word level. Table 5.13 above shows that the majority of the cases of 
addition occurred at word level accounting for 26% of the 48% of the cases of addition. 
 
Lexical Shift 
At word level 
Frequency of Translation 
Strategies 
Percentage of Translation 
Strategies 
Nouns 15 15% 
Adjectives 4 4% 
Adverbs 2 2% 
Conjunctions 2 2% 
Verbs 2 2% 
Article 1 1% 
Pluralisation S 1 1% 
Total 27 26% 
Grand Total 49 48% 
 
Table 5. 14 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of addition at word level in the TTs 
 
At word level, table 5.14 shows that nouns constitute the majority of the cases of 
addition that affected meaning transfer between the STs and TTs, comprising 15% of the 26% 
of the cases of addition. For instance, the addition of the noun مێژر (BT: regime) next to the 
names Saddam Hussein, Qaddafi, and Assad in the TTs while they were not referred to as such 
in the STs affected the meaning transfer between the STs and TTs. Despite the fact that the STs 
used these names to refer to the time and the governing body of the nations they ruled, they used 
neither government nor regime to describe them. Nevertheless, the addition of the noun مێژڕ 
(BT: regime) in the TTs next to these names specified the type of governments they rule (d) 
since regime usually used to describe a government that is an authoritarian and not fairly elected 
by people. This, in turn, shows the position of the translator towards the respective names. 
While adjectives have the second highest frequency accounting for 4% of the cases, each 
of adverbs, conjunctions and verbs constitutes only 2% out of the 26% of the total cases at word 
level. The addition cases had significant impacts in relation to the positions of the translators 
and the semantic changes occurred in the TTs, as we see in the following examples. 
 
ST: Aleppo, in Syria, with its treasures of civilization and beauty buried by the explosives 
dropped from Bashar al-Assad’s planes. 
TT:         ﯽنﺎﺗسرﺎش ﻭرەهﻭەگ ﻭﻭمەه ەﺑ ەک ﺎیرﻭس ەل بەلەحملﺎپﺎن یەگێڕەل ﯽنﺎکەییناﻭج ﻭ ﻭ
 ەﺑ دەسەئ رﺎشەﺑ ﯽنﺎکەکۆڕف ﯽنﺎکەﺑمۆﺑییودنیز ارژێن  
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BT: Aleppo, in Syria, with its treasures of civilization and beauty buried alive by the 
napalm and bombs of Bashar al-Assad’s planes 
 
The addition of  ەﺑﯽیﻭدنیز  (BT: alive) to describe how the city was destroyed by Bashar 
al-Assad’s planes in the TT affected the meaning. The reason might be due to the powerful 
meaning of expression buried alive since it is classified as a very cruel method of execution. 
 
ST: Then the “process” started to slow down. 
TT:  ﯽكەییﺗسس ەكەسۆرپ رﺗاﻭدیواچرەب ﯽنیﺑ ەﻭۆخەﺑ  
BT: Then the process started to slow down exceedingly. 
 
Likewise, the addition of the adverb ﻭﺎچرەﺑ (BT: exceedingly) in the TT described how 
the “peace process” between Erdoğan, president of Turkey, and Kurdistan Worker’s Party 
(PKK) started to slow down, while it was not specified in the ST. The impact of such an addition 
will be revealed if the immediate narrative (the texts above) is encoded within the larger 
narrative. The ST immediate narrative followed by a paragraph describing how Ocalan’s50 letter 
created hopes for peace process and PKK forced the Turkish government to rush a legal package 
through the parliament, while the Turkish government started to accuse the PKK of just 
pretending to withdraw militants from Turkish territory. The addition of the adverb ﻭﺎچرەﺑ (BT: 
exceedingly), thus, indicates the positive accentuation of the role of PKK in the peace process 
and this, in turn, indicates the translator’s mediation. 
Similarly, the addition of the conjunction ﻭ (BT: and) in the TT expression ەع ﯽنﺎهیجهرب ﻭ
ملاسیئ (BT: the Arab and Muslim world) affected the meaning transfer between the ST and the 
TT. The ST noun phrase the Arab-Muslim world used to refer to the world of Arab Muslim 
nation while the TT expression the Arab and Muslim world might refer to the Arab nation world 
and other Muslim nation worlds such as Turkish, Persian, and so forth. Since the verb is a key 
member of a class of words that function as the main elements of predicates, that typically 
express an action or a relation between two things, its addition or deletion has a significant 
impact on meaning transference between the STs and TTs. For example, the addition of the verb 
سﺎﺑ (BT: talk about) in the TT alters the ST message in the example below. While the ST pointed 
                                                 
50 The PKK’s founding leader who is imprisoned for life on an island south of Istanbul. 
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out that Obama sent more U.S. advisers to Iraq, the TT showed that he talks about sending more 
U.S. advisers which indicates that it is not certain yet: 
 
ST: As President Obama dispatches more U.S. advisers to help Iraqis defeat the Islamic 
State, or ISIS, … 
TT:  رەس نۆچ کەﻭرەه شعاد ﯽندنﺎشکێﺗ ۆﺑ ﺎمﺎﺑۆئ کۆساب یندرانەل  ۆﺑ تﺎکەد ﯽکیرەمەئ یرۆپسپ
،قارێع. 
BT: As President Obama talks about dispatching more U.S. advisers to defeat ISIS,    
 
While table 5.14 shows that each of definite article and pluralisation –s constitute the 
least frequency at word level, table 5.15 shows that sentences and clauses present similar 
frequency above word level. They all affected the meaning transfer from the STs to the TTs. 
For example, pluralising the noun opposition in the TT while it was used to describe only one 
oppositional political party in the ST alters the ST message since there is more than one 
oppositional political party in Kurdistan. The ST narrates the tolerance of the two major rival 
Kurdish parties, i.e., PDK and PUK, towards the fast-rising opposition party, i.e., the Gorran 
movement, in the elections of Kurdistan. According to Baker (2006, p. 107), different ways of 
framing the same narrative support competing narratives with significant inferences for 
different parties to the conflict. This is consistent with the translator’s reframing of the ST noun 
opposition in the TT by the addition of pluralisation –s because it created a different implication 
for the readers and political parties.  
 
Lexical Shift 
Above word level 




Expressions 16 16% 
Sentences and clauses 6 6% 
Total 22 21% 
Grand Total 49 48% 
 
Table 5. 15 : Frequency and percentage of the cases of addition above word level in the TTs 
 
Above word level, table 5.15 shows that expressions constitute 16% of the cases of 
addition. They were added both in the TTs and some of the headlines and engendered shifts on 
the semantic level. The implication of the use of this strategy above word level, thus, enables 
us to draw a clearer picture of the positioning of translators and might embed them in concrete 
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ideology. For example, adding the expression PKK یﻭﺎن ﯽنﺎنێهەنرەد ﻭ (BT: and excluding PKK’s 
name) next to the translation of the headline The Politics of Terrorism Lists in the TT impacted 
the meaning transference between the ST and the TT. The TT headline PKK  ﯽﺗسیل ﯽنﺎكەﺗەسﺎیس
ﻭﺎن ﯽنﺎنێهەنرەد ﻭ رۆریﺗی  (BT: The Politics of Terrorism Lists and excluding PKK's Name) is more 
indicative of the nature of the article. Besides, since it reveals information on issues related to a 
Kurdish political party, it might have a significant impact on the TT readers. Table 5.15 shows 
that the addition of sentences and clauses in the TT affect meaning transference between the 
STs and TTs as well. They constitute 6% of the cases of addition at word level. The added TT 
clause is not a complete sentence in the text given below, however, it widely affected the ST 
message since it indicated that the Kurdish issue has been emerged by the complex situations of 
the Middle East. Therefore, the TT transferred another message with the ST ones. 
 
ST: The Kurdish problem is one of the complex ethnic problems in the Middle East. 
TT: ەی درﻭك ﯽسرپەكێك ەلەشێك ﻭ ەنەﺗهﻭەنﺎییەك ی ەﺑەهرۆخ یزۆڵﺎئ ﯽخۆد یۆههﻭﺎن ﯽﺗڵاەﺗساڕهﻭ 
ەسەهیرهﻭادڵ  
BT: Kurdish issue/question is one of the nationalist problems which has been emerged by 
the complex situations of the Middle East 
 
This section has demonstrated the interplay between the translators’ ideology and the 
use of the strategy of addition in reframing the ST narratives in the TTs. The analysis of the use 
of the addition strategy, in this section, reveals that while 52% of the cases did not affect 
meaning transfer between the STs and TTs, 42% of the cases led to semantic shifts in the TTs, 
which is a significant percentage. 52% of the cases showed that an addition strategy was used 
as a technique to make the TT message explicit and spell out information that might be implicit 
in the TTs. This, in effect, is consistent with Chesterman’s compensation strategy and Nida’s 
explicitation strategy. According to Chesterman, “addition can be a sufficient justification for a 
compensation strategy”, which may, in turn, function retrospectively. In other words, the 
translators’ choice to offset meanings lost or changed at earlier points in their translation results 
in “a compensatory change” here (Chesterman 1997, pp. 115-116). Likewise, Nida (1964, 
p.227) considers explicitation as a form of addition that exists in the translation product. 
However, the addition strategy did not always involve explicitation in the corpus of this study. 
The analysis evidently revealed that the choice of an addition strategy resulted in shifts on the 
semantic level as well. Although the analysis showed that the highest percentage of the use of 
this strategy caused no harm on semantic level, 48% of the cases led to lexical shifts both at 
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word level and above word level. This percentage cannot be regarded as mistranslation or 
incorrect translation since they were not outcomes of co-textual neglect and their addition makes 
sense in the TTs 
They resulted in both the specification and generalization reframing of the ST key-
messages in the TTs. Such reframing reflects and questions the narratives the translators met 
and shapes their behaviour in relation to the choices they made in terms of distributing or 
opposing the narratives elaborated in the STs. 
 
5.4 Translational Reframing Strategies between Mistranslations and Ideological Choices 
The three previous sections have shown the hierarchy of functional translation strategies 
along with their impact on reframing the ST key-messages in the TTs in the translation of 
geopolitical commentary articles into Kurdish. The analysis has begun from the high frequency 
strategy of deletion, substitution, and addition, respectively. This section seeks to further 
investigate the way the translational choices identified in the corpus define the translators’ 
positioning in terms of their linguistic challenges and contributions to the immediate narratives 
that shape our world.  
Table 5.16 and chart 5.3 below show that the proportion of the use of cases of omission, 
addition and the majority cases of substitution led to lexical shifts in the corpus of this study 
and are not outcomes of co-textual neglect and their addition makes sense in the TTs.  
 



















Grand Total 527 100% 
 




Chart 5. 2: Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in the TTs 
 
Table 5.16 and chart 5.2 show that only few cases of substitution do not make sense in 
the TTs, comprising 2% of the cases. This percentage does not constitute a significant 
percentage in relation to the 37% of the cases of substitution and the overall 527 cases of 
deletion, addition and substitution in the corpus of this study. For instance, the substitution of 
the ST noun carnage with the TT noun ەﻗەفز  (BT: cage) affected meaning transfer between the 
ST and the TT in the following example.  
 
ST: The carnage might be seen as regrettable but acceptable if the bad guys were losing.  
TT:         ەئ ﻭەقەفهز ەلەناﻭەی ەپەل ﯽنﺎمیشەﺑ ،تێﺑ اﻭدەندركڵﻭﺑﻗ یﺎگێج مڵا ەئ كێﺗﺎكەنارۆﺗﺎﺗكید ﻭ 
هدنێڕۆد   
BT: This cage might be followed by regret but it is acceptable when those dictators were 
 
The TT message ەئەﻗ ﻭەفهز ەلەناﻭەی ەپەل ﯽنﺎمیشتێﺑ اﻭد  (BT: This cage might be followed by 
regret) appeared awkward if compared to the ST message The carnage might be seen as 
regrettable. However, it works and makes sense at textual level in the TT due to its coherent 
relation to the rest of the text in the TT. The TT message was preceded by a narrative describing 
Hosni Mubarak as a dictator in his courtroom cage and followed by another narrative indicating 
that this courtroom cage did not work for Gaddafi. It therefore, cannot be referred to as 
mistranslation since the TT makes sense. Nevertheless, the substitution of ST gunfire with the 
expression ەـللﻭگﻭدنیز ی  (BT: live bullet/ an animate bullet) in the TT might be considered as 













mistranslation since the TT expression does not have any sematic connotation in the target 
culture. In a similar manner, table and chart 4.1 of the previous chapter shows that the cases of 
literal translation, which constitute only 1% of the overall of 1087 cases in the corpus of this 
study, might also result in mistranslation due to their inability to decipher the TT elements into 
meaningful messages, as we can see in the following example.  
 
ST: Turkish foreign policy used to be a lot more low-key than this 
TT:  ﺎیكرﻭﺗ یەﻭەرەد ﯽﺗەسﺎیس نارﺎجیكێلیلك  ەمەل رۆزرتمزن ،ﻭﻭﺑ  
BT: Before, Turkish foreign policy was a lot lower key than this 
 
The ST adjective low-key translated word for word in the TT as an adjective رﺗمزن (BT: 
lower) and a noun لیلک  (BT: Key) without conveying the sense of the original whole. The ST 
adjective low-key has a figurative meaning. However, the TT did not only fail in conveying such 
meaning but also in decoding the TT features into a meaningful message. According to the 
meaning-oriented assessment criteria proposed in chapter two, the percentage of the cases of 
literal translation and 2% of the cases of substitution are identified as mistranslated cases 
(Halliday 1978, Reiss and Vermeer 1984; Nord 1997). Consistent with Halliday’s SFL, the 
translator failed in recognizing how the ST language worked and what social purpose it served. 
Thus, this led to the literal translation without transferring the sense the ST wanted to convey. 
In addition, according to Reiss and Vermeer’ Skopos theory, the translation solutions are 
interpreted as mistranslation since the achievability of the brief is based on the target culture 
and ST is only part of the brief. In other words, regardless of the TT’s inconsistency with the 
ST message, since the TT messages are not meaningful in the target-culture receivers, they are 
regarded as mistranslation, i.e., errors. However, the incidence of mistranslated cases is not a 
statistically significant percentage in relation to the overall of 1087 cases in the corpus of this 
study. This is indicative that the majority of the cases involve issues other than the translators’ 
failure to achieve the function of meaning rendition, i.e., ideology.  
 
The analysis in this chapter has illustrated the role of ideology in shaping Kurdish 
translation and translators’ decisions on the level of lexical choices. Following CNA approach, 
the findings revealed that there is interplay between translator’s selective appropriation and 
ideology. Translators’ choices affected the immediate narratives elaborated in the texts being 
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translated on the semantic levels. The study investigated the translator’s lexico-grammatical 
choices in relation to the use of the reframing strategies of omission and addition, as one 
combined strategy and as two different strategies. The analysis has shown that the strategies of 
omission were the highest frequency, while the strategies of addition constituted the least 
frequency in terms of both occurrence and meaning alteration between the STs and TTs. 
However, both had the second highest frequency in terms of both occurrence and meaning 
alteration when the translation combined them, i.e. substitution. All three strategies occurred 
both at word level and above word level. They had different impacts on the meaning 
transference from the STs to the TTs, both at word level and above word level. They resulted 
in both the specification and generalization of the key-messages while reframing the STs in the 
TTs. This, in turn, revealed the way translators distance themselves from the narrative position 
of the author by shifting and/or opposing aspects of the narratives they translate. The alterations 
illustrated the interaction between ascendancy and opposition, which is an aspect of translators’ 
behaviour this study is keen to accentuate. Nevertheless, since this study considers the role of 
ideology in the translation of geopolitical commentary articles, these strategies need to be 
investigated further in relation to the way they change the ideological drive of the texts and the 
contributions they make to the purpose of the TT. The majority of the illustrative cases of 
translational strategies in the corpus of this study can be interpreted in relation to the translator’s 
agency since s/he is the performer of the act of translation in the first place. However, it is 
significant to view the use of strategies of omission, substitution, and addition in terms of the 
policy of the four selected agencies in this study. They could have been explicated in relation 
to the policy of the publishers and their direct and indirect affiliation to the political Kurdish 
parties. This, in turn, may demonstrate the way translators associated with the meta narratives 
in the society through patterns of ideologically motivated shifts.  This question will be the focus 
of the following chapter.  
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Chapter Six 
Translation in Practice III: 
Reframing Strategies and Political Stance in Kurdish Media 
Translation 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter builds on the categorised analysis of the functional translation strategies 
identified in the previous chapter which demonstrated that the ideology of the translator plays a 
significant role in the interplay between ascendancy and resistance in reframing the ST 
immediate narratives in the TTs, both at word level and above word level. This chapter further 
scrutinises the way that translations identified in the corpus are framed by the ideology and 
power relations of the political parties to which the newspapers agencies are aligned. The aim 
is to explore the way these newspaper agencies, acting as forms of patronage in Lefevere’s 
sense, try to regulate the relationship between the narrative system and other systems, which 
together build up a society. These patrons count on their translators to bring media translated 
texts and the required narrative systems in line with their ideology. The study thus investigates 
this through a comparative analysis of the use of strategies of deletion, substitution and addition 
by the four-selected media agencies in the corpus of this study.  
The analysis will open by examining the percentages of alterations occasioned by these 
strategies, before exploring the implications of them, and whether they are linked to the political 
parties to which the newspaper agencies are allied. In doing so, it will reveal the extent to which 
translation strategies and newspapers are allowing and/or motivating ideology to inform their 
news outputs and translation policies in terms of reframing the ST key-messages in the TTs in 
the translation of geopolitical commentary articles into Kurdish. The inference is considered 
significant since the source texts transmit their writers’ opinions and assessments of the 
geopolitical facts related to the Middle East, in general, and the Kurdish political context, in 
particular. These findings, in turn, will show stances in terms of the contributions these 
strategies make to the intents of the TTs and the way they adjust the ideological drive of the 
meta narratives. Based on the outcomes of the collected data of the comparative study, this 
chapter thus attempts to find answers to the questions raised in the corpus of this study regarding 
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the role of ideology, arguing that political ideology plays a significant role in the occurrence of 
lexical shifts in Kurdish media translation.  
 
6.1 Kurdish Media Agencies and Translation Reframing Strategies 
This section investigates the existing correlations between the ideology of the Kurdish 
media agencies and the translators’ ideological decisions in relation to the reframing strategies 
of deletion, substitution and addition in the corpus of this study. The investigation of the 
percentages of the occurrence of the strategies along with their impact is of twofold significance. 
The study establishes a comparative study of the use of the strategies by different media 
agencies holding different perspectives on political and ideological issues.  
As explained in chapter three and four, the TTs used in the corpus of this study were 
translated by various Kurdish translators and published by four Kurdish media agencies between 
2011 and 2014. The media agencies are Sbeiy, Kurdistan-i-Nwe, Xendan, and Rudaw. They are 
regarded as media affiliated parties in Kurdistan. Sbeiy and Kurdistan-i-New media agencies 
belong directly to the Change Movement (Gorran party) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK), respectively. Therefore, this study describes them as partisan media agencies (See 
section 4.1.1 of chapter 4). Meanwhile, Xendan and Rudaw media agencies belong indirectly to 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and. Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). They are thus 
referred to as shadow media in this study (See section 4.1.2 of chapter 4). Since the selected 
media agencies in this study directly or indirectly belong to the current major political parties 
in Kurdistan, these strategies need to be investigated in relation to the ideology of the respective 
media and their translators in both quantitative and qualitative terms. 
Table 5.16 and chart 5.3 of the previous chapter show that only 2% of the total of 
527cases in this study represent substitution due the translators’ failure to achieve the function 
of meaning rendition in the TTs regardless of their inconsistency with the ST messages. The 
remaining cases, irrespective of the impact of the prior geopolitical situation of Kurdistan (see 
section 4.2.1), raise questions in relation to the current ideology of the Kurdish translators and 
the media agencies they translate for. Therefore, it is important to further investigate the 
reframing strategies of deletion, substitution and addition in relation to the four selected Kurdish 
media agencies in terms of quantity, quality and chronology. The study argues that there is a 
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strong relationship between the translator’s decision and the policy of the political parties to 
which the four media agencies are associated, in particular in the translation of the ST author’s 
opinion and assessment of the geopolitical facts related to the Kurdish political context. 
 
Types of Kurdish Media 
Agencies 




Partisan Media 279 53% 
Shadow Media 248 47% 
Grand Total 527 100% 
 





Chart 6. 1 : Frequency and percentage of the total three translation strategies in Kurdish media TTs 
 
Of the 527 cases of the translation strategies identified in the corpus of this study, table 
and chart 6.1 show that 53 % of the cases represent partisan media agencies while 47 % belongs 
to shadow media agencies. These percentages are significant in relation to the ideological 
manipulation of the translation of the geopolitical texts in the current socio-political contexts. 
With only 6% of differences, they indicate that both partisan and shadow media agencies 
include a high rate of reframing strategies that tend towards meaning alteration in particular 
directions.  In other words, this suggests that both partisan and shadow media reframe news for 
ideological purposes. Nevertheless, revealing such indications requires an extensive qualitative 
scrutiny of the percentages of each of the three reframing strategies of deletion, substitution and 
addition in relation to the two types of publication agencies, which are partisan and shadow 











Partisan Media Shadow Media
 170 
agencies selected in the corpus of this study. The following sub-sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2, 
therefore, develop this analysis in detail. They provide opportunities to investigate relevant 
manipulated linguistic methods for the exploration of particular aspects such as stance and 
power relations in the translation of the texts by the four different media agencies. In particular, 
the quantitative analysis allows for a more comprehensive account of the variations in 
translation choices due to ideology than a case study approach, focussed on a small sample of 
representative translators, would have offered. The findings, in turn, reveal a more nuanced 
understanding of the translator’s role as an ideological mediator in translating media discourse 
between different ideologies and the policies of media agencies. The strategies they used show 
the contributions made to the ideological drive in the TTs and the political parties to which the 
news agencies are affiliated. 
 
6.1.1 Partisan Media and Translational Reframing Strategies 
The analysis above explained the relationship between the selected Kurdish media 
agencies and the aggregate percentage of translation reframing strategies and how these affected 
meaning transference in the corpus of this study. This sub-section builds on the analysis of the 
way ideology and power relation can be used to twist translations in favour of the dominant 
powers to which the media agencies are directly affiliated. It investigates the different extents 
to which the translations produced by the key newspapers impact meaning transfer and reflect 
their domestic policies and agendas. This, in turn, reveals where the translator’s interventional 
subjectivity potentially is most telling.  
 




Kurdistan-i-Nwe 151 29% 
Sbeiy 128 24% 
Grand Total 279 53% 
 
Table 6. 2 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in partisan media TTs 
 
Of the total of 53% of partisan representing cases of translation strategies, table 6.2 
shows that 24% of the cases represent Sbeiy media agency, while 29% of the cases belong to 
Kurdistan-i-Nwe media agency. 
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Total 128 24% 
Grand Total 279 53% 
 
Table 6. 3 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Sbeiy media TTs 
 
The corpus drawn from Sbeiy media agency consists of 15 translated commentary 
articles. Out of 24% of the cases of translation strategies in the respective corpus, table 6.3 
shows that 11%, 9%, and 4% represent deletion, substitution and addition, respectively. The 
results reveal that the use of both deletion and substitution strategies resulted in high frequencies 
of shifts on semantic level, while the use of addition strategies did not constitute a significant 
percentage in relation to the total cases. Given that Sbeiy media agency belongs to the political 
Gorran movement, a large number of translation strategies used in the published translated texts 
by such agency reflect the policy of the same party as well. As a political movement, Gorran 
started as a sustainable opposition in the Kurdish parliament in order to deal with issues which 
are more related to domestic affairs in the Kurdish region. For instance, since this movement is 
often in competition with KDP and PUK (the two major ruling parties), the translation strategies 
used in the corpus of this study played a significant role in in the meaning transference between 
the STs and the TTs in relation to the issues related to these Kurdish parties. It is, therefore, 
important to examine the cases in relation to the ideology of the agency prior to the employment 
of the translators who work for such agency. This, in turn, might reveal the translator’s 
interventional subjectivity in opposing the narratives elaborated in the STs and supporting the 
policy of the party to which the media agency aligned, as we see in the following examples. 
 
ST: Officially, they were both living on modest government salaries 
TT: ەﺑ ەفمرﯽ ەهكﻭدرنﺎی ەچﻭمخیرۆ ەمﻭكحنﺗ  
BT: Officially, both are government’s employees  
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The shift highlighted in the back translation above rejected the existing ideology 
encoded in the narrative elaborated in the ST. Since the ST adjective modest in the expression 
modest government salaries was used to describe the amount of the salary drawn by Barzani’s 
sons, the leader of the PDK, its non-presentation in the TT affected the reframing of the ST 
narrative in the TT. The ST raises questions regarding the source of the huge amount of money 
they spent while they were both living on modest government salaries. However, the TT 
indicated clearly that they were spending huge amounts of money, which were all from the 
government’s money. It is important to bear in mind that this translated message constitutes part 
of the translated commentary article about PDK’s rule in Kurdistan. This includes a number of 
similar reframing strategies with comparable impact. These textual changes affect the meta 
narratives of the TT in terms of presenting more criticism towards the reign of the PDK. The 
article was written and translated in June 2013, i.e., three months prior to the Kurdistan 
parliamentary election in September 2013. As stated by Baker (2007, p. 156), the reframing 
strategies that alter the immediate narrative and affect the larger narratives “allow us to see [the] 
translational choices not merely as linguistic challenges but as contributing directly to the 
narratives that shape our social world” (p.156). The TT, therefore, might be interpreted in 
relation to a promotion of a particular political point of view of corruption. In other words, the 
activity of accentuating corruption supports or provides active encouragement for the 
propaganda purposes in favour of the party to which Sbeiy media agency is affiliated. Likewise, 
the PUK was described as one of the two major Kurdish political movements in an article 
published in 2014. However, such information is rejected and omitted in the TT. The reason 
might refer to the results of the parliamentary election in 2013 in Iraq's semi-autonomous 
Kurdistan Region. Since the Gorran movement came in the second position after PDK and 
pushed PUK into the third position in the election, the ST message was opposed in the TT. This 
opposition could, therefore, be an outcome of the policy of the party to which the media agency 
is directly aligned. While these kinds of omission might be interpreted in terms of the familiarity 
of the information for Kurdish readers, the cases of substitution and addition may offer 
themselves to a different interpretation. In the cases of substitution, the translator not only 
deleted the ST items, but also added different features in the TTs that affected the message 
transference between the STs and TTs. Besides, the cases of addition introduced features in the 
TTs that were not present in the STs, as we see in the following examples.  
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ST: The KDP and its historical rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK),  
TT:  ﺗرﺎپﯽ  ﻭەنمژود مەیﻭژێەكی ەك ەیەییﺗێك،  
BT: The KDP and its historical enemy that is the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK),  
 
The substitution of the ST noun rival with the TT noun نمژﻭد (BT: enemy) affected 
meaning transfer since rival and enemy are not synonymous. Rival was used in the sense of 
competitors here as it was used to describe the two Kurdish political parties. In addition, it has 
its counterparts in Kurdish on the semantic level. Both rival and competitor can be used for a 
party that tries to lead the other one without causing harm or producing hostility. They are 
usually used in media campaigns and even smear campaigns at times among the parties. 
However, in the case of enemy, the opponents do not hesitate in causing harm to each other, 
such as armed campaigns. Besides, rivals or competitors are usually used to refer to people or 
groups that belong to the same business, sport activity or nature of job. However, in being 
enemies, this condition is not necessary. This substitution thus altered the ST message regarding 
the two Kurdish political parties from being competitors to enemies. Similarly, the addition of 
the TT adjective ﯽیرﺎﺗیلﺎﺗۆﺗ (BT: totalitarian) to the translation of ST noun regime in the TT 
affected meaning transference from the ST to the TT. The ST noun regime was used to compare 
Massoud Barzani’s ruling to that of the Arab spring in the ST. However, the TT هدەسﯽﺗڵا ﺗیرﺎﺗیلﺎﺗۆ  
(BT: totalitarian regime/ authority) might convey a stronger criticism than the ST did, as 
totalitarian relates usually to a system of government that is centralized and dictatorial and 
requires complete subservience to the state. Interestingly enough, the ST author described 
Massoud Barzani as an authoritarian ruler beforehand. However, the translator preferred not to 
borrow the same adjective from English and add in the new sentence. There is a difference 
between the two adjectives. Authoritarianism differs from totalitarianism in that social and 
economic institutions exist that are not under the government's control, and totalitarian implies 
a stronger critique. 
The analysis above has shown that the different reframing of the ST narratives in the 
TTs had different implications on the respective parties and the Kurdish target readership. The 
attitudes of ST authors, who represented western and international views, of both the PDK and 
PUK before and after the Kurdistan parliamentary election in 2013 and the existent relationships 
between the two parties were altered while reframed in the TTs. These alterations, in turn, might 
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Total 151 29% 
Grand Total 279 53% 
 
Table 6. 4 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Kurdistan-i-New media TTs 
 
Table 6.4 shows that the corpus drawn from the Kurdistan-i-New media agency, which 
consists of 15 translated commentary articles, reveals 13%, 11%, and 5% out of 29% of the 
cases of translation strategies representing deletion, substitution and addition, respectively. 
Similar to the Sbeiy agency, cases of deletion and substitution that resulted in lexical shifts 
constitute high frequencies while addition represents the least frequency. Nevertheless, the three 
strategies have significant implications in terms of highlighting issues related to the competing 
parties in the texts translated by this news agency. For instance, the deletion of the word HE, 
which stands for His Excellency, in the TT might be interpreted in terms of the agency’s policy 
since it is used in the ST to define Massoud Barzani who holds a high position in the Kurdistan 
regional government and a leader of PUK’s historical rival, PDK. In a similar manner, the 
following example shows that the strategies of substitution used in the respective corpus can 
reflect a similar policy. 
 
ST: Iraq’s Factional Chaos Threatens to Disrupt a Kurdish Haven 
TT:  ﺗكدرۆ ەﺑەهرﺎس محڵەه :درﻭك ﻭﻭمكێ هدﻭەڵﯽﺗ ەسەﺑرخیۆ هدﻭتێ  
BT: Dr Barham Salih: Every Kurd yearns for an independent homeland, 
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The substitution of the ST headline with Barham Salih’s quotation might accentuate the 
ideology of such agency. Barham Salih is a known PUK political figure who served as the prime 
minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government while Massoud Barzani, the PDK leader, was 
a president from 2009-2012. They were both interviewed in 2012 by the New York Times 
editorial author who used their quotes in the middle of his article. However, the translator 
preferred the substitution of the ST headline with the prime minister’s quotation rather than the 
president’s. Since the TT is translated and published by the Kurdistan-i-Nwe media agency that 
is a PUK affiliated media, the act of substitution might be interpreted as an attempt to accentuate 
the role of the prime minster who is a PUK political figure. Although the use of an addition 
strategy by the Kurdistan-i-Nwe agency constitutes the least frequency in the corpus of this 
study, its impact on a semantic level is significant in relation to the geopolitical narratives 
elaborated in the STs, as we see in the following example.  
 
ST: The two major rival parties in Kurdistan not only buried the hatchet between them but 
paved the way for democratic elections that recently brought a fast-rising opposition party, that ran 
on an anti-corruption platform, into government for the first time. 
TT: ه ﻭﻭدەزێ سەییكەرە یەكەرەﺑﺎكڕ ن نﺎﺗسدرﻭككە ﺗﺎهنە كﺎنەیكۆﯽنﺎك ننﺎیناﻭێ ﻭﺎنلاە ﺑﻭكڵە 
نﻭﻭﺑرەكشۆخﺎگێڕ ﺑۆ هﯽكێندراژﺑڵە دەنﺎیساركﻭمی كە لمە اﻭﻭدادەنﺎیی تراپە ئیناكەنۆیسزۆپۆ ﺑﻭەرە هﯽكێنﺎشكڵە 
خارێ اﻭ ﻭ درﺑدركی كە لاەنەی ئشیناكەنۆیسزۆپۆ كە لرەسە نﺑیﺎمە ژدە گﯽڵەدنە كنﺎیرﺎ ددركە ﺑۆ مەكەی  رﺎج
ﺑنﻭﻭﺑرادشە لە مﻭكحادﺗە . 
BT: The two major rival parties in Kurdistan not only buried the hatchet between them but 
paved the way for democratic elections that recently led the fast-rising opposition parties, and let 
the opposition parties that ran on an anti-corruption platform, into government for the first time. 
 
The addition of the TT suffix -نا (BT: -s) and the definite article -ەکە  (BT: the) to the TT 
noun ئنۆیسزۆپۆ  (BT: opposition) affected the meaning transfer from the ST to the TT. The use 
of the ST as a singular and indefinite form stemmed from the simple fact that "already shaken 
the political landscape in Kurdish areas" (BBC)51 in March 2010, i.e., Gorran opposition party. 
However, the use of plural and definite form of the word in the TT referred to all the opposition 
parties in the Kurdish region. The addition, therefore, might be due to the agency’s attempt to 
                                                 
51 New Kurdish party to challenge polls BBCNews Retrieved Feb 01 2011. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/8553321.stm 
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downplay the senior opposition party affair or show the high degree of political maturity and 
tolerance of the two ruling parties in the area. 
The analysis illustrated in this sub-section has shown that translation can be considered 
in its own right to frame political stances for domestic purposes by the translators who argue in 
favour of the media agencies that are directly affiliated to a specific political party. The most 
frequent strategies used by the partisan media agencies are deletion and substitution, while 
addition constituted the least. Nevertheless, the three strategies played significant role in relation 
to the policy of the agencies. They can effectively be exploited by the translators in reframing 
the narratives elaborated in the STs which could remain concealed from direct observation by 
the majority of the readers. In this way, target readers who can read both the STs and the TTs 
might consider translators’ choices as a thorny issue surrounding the question of his/her 
ideology while rendering particular geopolitical knowledge via these publication agencies.  
 
6.1.2 Shadow Media and Translational Reframing Strategies 
Building on this previous section’s analysis of the partisan media’s use of deletion and 
substitution to reframe translations, this section will analyse the strategies most frequently used 
by the shadow media agencies. This will enable a comparative analysis of the extent to which 
the different agencies allow political ideology to inform their media output. This next sub-
section analyses the strategies most frequently used by the shadow media agencies, arguing that 
they are not to be ideologically positions as partisan media. The aim is to reveal to what extent 
these agencies allow political ideology to inform their media output and translation policies 
while compared to the partisan media agencies.  
 




Xendan 152 29% 
Rudaw 96 18% 
Total 248 47% 
Grand Total 527 100% 
 
Table 6. 5 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Shadow media TTs 
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Of the total of 47% of cases of translation strategies used by the shadow media agencies, 
table 6.5 shows that 18% of the cases represent Rudaw media agency, while 29% of the cases 
belong to Xendan media agency.  
 






















Total 96 18% 
Grand Total 248 47% 
 
Table 6. 6 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Rudaw media TTs 
 
Table 6.6 shows that the corpus drawn from Rudaw media agency, which consists of 15 
translated commentary articles, shows 9%, 7%, and 2% out of 18% of the cases of translation 
strategies represent deletion, substitution and addition, respectively. Similar to the partisan 
media agencies, high frequencies of deletion and substitution resulted in shifts on semantic 
level, while addition constituted the least frequency. Although Rudaw is indirectly affiliated to 
the PDK, the majority of the translational strategies used in the translated texts led to the 
semantic shifts in the geopolitical texts in favour of the respective party. The ST narratives 
regarding KDP and its members are reframed in the TTs positively. For instance, the omission 
of the ST expression or the KDP in the below example conveyed a different message in the TT. 
 
ST: KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani has also suggested that the only 
door of hope for Iraqi Kurds – or the KDP -- is Turkey. 
TT: هرە ﺑەشەیۆ سﯽكۆرە مﻭكحﯽﺗە هﯽمێرە ﺑ نﺎﺗسدرﻭكمە اﻭدەنﺎیی ﺗﻭگﯽ ﺑۆ نادرﻭكﯽ عقارێ هچی 
دﯽكەیﺎگرە مﻭئدێ نەیی كرﻭﺗﺎی نتێﺑە . 
BT: Thus, The president of the government of Kurdistan region has lately 
said that for Iraqi Kurds the only door of hope is Turkey. 
 
The omission, which resulted in the alteration highlighted in the back translation, might 
be interpreted in terms of the rejection of the existing ideology of the narrative elaborated in the 
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ST. The ST indicated that the prime minister of KRG has suggested that the only chance for 
Kurdish interest or the KDP is Turkey. Nevertheless, the expression or the KDP was not 
presented in the TT. The occurrence of this omission might be due to the prime ministers’ 
affiliation to the PDK; he is an active PDK political figure. Thus, the TT message reflected the 
neutrality of the prime minister who only works in the favour of Kurdish interest and not the 
party he belongs to. The cases of substitution used reflect the same policy as well. For instance, 
the substitution of the ST expression with the TT in the below given example altered the ST 
message and resulted a different one in the TT.  
 
ST: Most of the Kurdish Islamist fighters came from Islamist strongholds inside the 
province of Sulaimaniyah, close to the Iranian border. 
 
TT:       زیەﺑرۆ ئەناﻭە خﯽکڵە چﻭﺎنە زرۆ ئﯽنﺎکەییملاسی ژرێ دیتڵاەسە یتێکەی نینامتشی 
ه و نناتسدروکەزێ ئیناکەیینمە یتێکەی ئوە ناچوانە کڵۆرتنۆ دنەکە  
BT: Most of those are from the more Islamic areas under the PUK control and PUK 
security forces are in control in those areas/ are controlling those areas. 
 
The TT message conveyed a more specific message in relation to the location and those 
who are in control of it. This substitution might be interpreted in terms of the ideology of the 
party’s affiliated agency. Since the article presented geopolitical information about the threat of 
al-Qaeda and its affiliated Islamic parties to Iraqi Kurdistan, the TT message might be 
expounded as an attempt to accentuate the incapability of PUK, the PDK’s rival, in controlling 
Islamist strongholds in Kurdistan. The strategy of addition also played a significant role in such 
ideological reflections. Similar to the substitution case above, the addition of the TT expression 
ﻭ ناڕۆگ (BT: Gorran and) in the following headline affected the ST message in the TT. 
 
ST: Trying to Overturn the Game Board in Kurdistan 
TT:  گناڕۆ و هیەﻭەناڕێگڵە ﺗیەﺗخە ەكەییرﺎی لە نﺎﺗسدرﻭك  
BT: Gorran and Trying to Overturn the Game Board in Kurdistan 
 
The examples illustrates above are headlines of an English commentary article that was 
published and translated into Kurdish in 2011 by the Rudaw media agency. After winning the 
parliamentary election in 2009 and 2010, the Gorran movement called for the resignation of the 
Cabinet and the suspension of the Kurdistan Regional Government during the protests in 
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Kurdistan in 201152. The term game is considered one of the key concepts of criticism in media 
coverage of politics. The addition of the name of Gorran next to such term, therefore, may boost 
public interest in the content of the article. This type of reframing in the TT headline condensed 
the negative role of the respective party in the events occurring in 2011 in a minimum number 
of words. According to Aalberg et al. (2012, p. 165-166), to impact readers can be via framing 
politics as strategic “games”, based on the assumption that such framing may have negative 
consequences for democracy. The examples above have shown that the use of the three 
translational strategies led to different reframings of the ST narratives in the TTs. The semantic 






























Total 152 29% 
Grand Total 248 47% 
 
Table 6. 7 : Frequency and percentage of the translation strategies in Xendan media TTs 
 
Table 6.7 shows the translation strategies used in the 15 texts from the corpus which 
come from Xendan, the final media agency. Out of 18% of the cases of translation strategies, 
the table reveals that 10%, 11%, and 9% represent deletion, substitution and addition, 
respectively. The cases of substitution and deletion that resulted in semantic shifts show a 
similarly high frequency (9%), while the cases of addition constitute the least frequency (4%) 
in the respective types of shifts. The results constitute a significant percentage in relation to the 




rest of the strategies used by the other three selected media agencies in the corpus of this study. 
Similar to the Rudaw media agency, Xendan is a media which is indirectly affiliated. Ii is 
indirectly affiliated to the PUK and the majority of the translational strategies used in the 
translated texts in order to reframe the ST geopolitical issues in favour of the respective party. 
For instance, the non-presentation of the ST noun figurehead in the TT adopted a more 
generalised translation in the example given below. 
 
ST: Kurds have served since Saddam's fall as Iraq's figurehead president and as foreign 
minister,  
TT:               ەلاﻭدی نﺎخﻭﻭرﯽ ەسسح مادەنێهﻭ، هدرﻭكپ نﺎكﯽﺗسۆ ەسركۆ كرامۆ هﻭ ﻭزیری 
هدهرهﻭی عنﺎیﻗاری ەﺑهﻭێڕهﻭﻭدرﺑ  
BT: After the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the Kurds have run the posts of Iraq's 
president and foreign minister, 
 
The ST figurehead is used as a modifier to describe the Kurdish figure who served as an 
Iraqi president after the fall of Saddam Hussein, i.e., Jalal Talabani, the PUK leading Kurdish 
politician and the then president of Iraq. Since the noun figurehead indicates a nominal leader 
or head without real power, its omission in the TT might have ideological interpretation. Since 
Xendan news agency is considered to be an indirectly PUK affiliated media, it discards the 
messages which downplay the respective party and its members. Interestingly enough, the 
opposite can be true when the political members belong to the party’s rivals, i.e., PDK or Gorran 
movement. For instance, the example below is the translation of the ST expression one option 
into the TT ەکﺎﺗ ەگێڕهرﺎچ  (BT: the only option).  
 
ST: He said one option was to get Masoud Barzani, president of Iraq's Kurdistan region, to 
exert more influence over these groups or for Ankara 
TT:             هدتێڵ :ەکات ەگێڕهراچ ەﺑهدکرﻭﺗ تسهﻭﺎی ەئهﻭەی ەک اﻭادی رﺎکﻭﺎهﯽی ەل ەمنازرﺎﺑ دﻭعسﯽ 
ەسرﯽکۆ ەهرﯽمێ تﺎکﺑ نﺎﺗسدرﻭک  
BT: [He] said the only option/ solution in the hand of Turkey is to ask help from the 
president of Kurdistan region, Masoud Barzani, 
 
It can be argued that given that the Kurdish president is a PDK leader and Xendan is 
indirectly affiliated to PUK, the agency might attempt to downplay the role of the Kurdish 
president by showing that his assistance is the only available one and might not be an important 
one among alternatives. Similar to the other selected three agencies in the corpus of this study, 
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the strategies used by the Xendan media agency, consequently, gave comparable results in terms 




Chart 6. 2 : Frequency and percentage of the three translation strategies in Kurdish media TTs 
 
The analysis illustrated in this section has shown that the choice of general and specific 
rendering of meaning in Kurdish media translations resulted from the use of three translation 
strategies, which are deletion, substitution, and addition. The choices are non-obligatory 
because the ST features and messages have their TT counterparts in the TL. The rendition, 
therefore, engendered different reframings of the ST narratives in the TTs and might reflect the 
ideology of both the translators and the agencies they work for. Chart 6.2 shows that the 
percentages indicate that deletion and substitution constitute high frequencies in both partisan 
and shadow media, while addition represents the least frequency. Meanwhile, it also reveals 
that the aggregate percentages of the three reframing strategies used by the partisan media are 
higher than those by the shadow media. Such percentages constitute significant patterns with 
regard to the ideological manipulation of the translation of geopolitical texts by the current 
socio-political framework. It is indicative that the geopolitical narratives can be framed in 
different ways by different news agencies to promote competing narratives, with important 
inferences for different political parties in the conflict. The power relations in Kurdistan bring 
their political ideology into play by different means such as partisan and shadow media to 
reinforce their position. The media agencies are, therefore, considered biased devices for 
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translators play the role of mediators and negotiators in translating media discourse between 
different ideologies and policies of media agencies.  
 
6.2 Chronological Distribution of the Translational Strategies 
The previous section investigated the percentage of functional translational strategies in 
relation to the policy of the publication agencies and the political blocs to which they directly 
or indirectly belong. This section investigates the dynamic shifts resulting from these 
translational strategies through time alongside their relationship to the geopolitical events which 
occurred in the area. The comparative chronology of the occurrence of the strategies determines 
when reframing the narratives elaborated in the STs resulted in alterations on a semantic level. 
This, in turn, reveals the regular pattern of a temporal model over four years. The corpus 
employed in this study contains geopolitical commentary articles from 2011 to 2014. The 
number of STs and TTs included in the corpus are not regularly circulated according to their 
publication date. The selection of the texts and their translation are not consistent among the 
four years. The choice, however, is not casual, nor premeditated. On the one hand, it is related 
to the availability of the STs and their TTs from 2011 to 2014 (see chapter three). On the other 
hand, the significant geopolitical issues in the Middle East throughout these years became more 
prominent. The region has experienced both periods of relative peace and tolerance and periods 
of conflict related to different countries’ domestic and foreign affairs. At the end of 2010 and 
the beginning of 2011, a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests, riots, and civil wars 
began and spread throughout the Middle Eastern countries and had ended by mid-2012. 
Following the US withdrawal from Iraq, tensions between Iraqi Kurdistan and the central Iraqi 
government escalated through 2011-2012 on the issues of power sharing, oil production and 
territorial control. The outcomes of the parliamentary election in 2013 in Iraq's semi-
autonomous Kurdistan Region led to the Gorran movement emerging as a more powerful 
political opposition party, winning the second position after the PDK and pushing the PUK into 
the third position in the election. With ISIS capturing the Northern Iraqi cities and carrying out 
raids on the Kurdish region in 2014, the US launched a humanitarian mission. This led to the 
publication of a large number of articles. The perceptions of these biases, possibly exacerbated 
by different media effect, have generated more coverage of reporting than any other news topic, 
and have led to a proliferation of media commentary articles. However, the availability of the 
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Kurdish translation of such commentary articles depends on the policy of the selected media 
agency in the corpus of this study. This is the main reason behind the inconsistency between the 
published STs and TTs in this corpus. Nevertheless, this inconsistency should not be a problem 
in observing the distribution of translation strategies used over the period of four years. To deal 
with the issue, the grand total percentage of each translation strategy used in the four years is 
identified and analysed comparatively with the aim to reveal the development of interesting 




2011 2012 2013 2014 Grand 
Total 
Deletion 14% 31% 22% 32% 100% 
Deletion 
+Addition Substitution 
17% 26% 24% 33% 100% 
Addition  12% 22% 12% 54% 100% 
Literal Translation 38% 25% 13% 25% 100% 
 
Table 6. 8 : Distribution of translation strategies according to publication date 
 
Table 6.8 reveals how the translation strategies are disseminated in each particular year. 
It shows that the use of a deletion strategy represents a convergent rate in 2012 and 2014, 
comprising 31% and 32% of the cases of deletion, respectively. The use of deletion from 2011 
to 2012 shows a huge increase from 14% to 31% and begins to decline in 2013 to 22%. 
However, the percentage becomes very interesting in 2014 when deletion rises to 32%. One 
might think that the tendency to use such a strategy was significant in these two years if 
compared to its use in 2011 and 2013. This might be due to the media coverage of penetrating 
Kurdish related issues during these two years. Likewise, substitution is shown to have been a 
common practice in 2014, while its practice was the least frequent in 2011. The use of 
substitution strategies from 2011 to 2012 shows an increase from 17% to 26% and begins to 
decline in 2013 to 24%. Addition, like deletion and substitution, shows the highest frequency 
in 2014 and lowest frequency in 2011. The use of an addition strategy from 2011 to 2012 shows 
an upsurge from 12% to 22% and begins to decline again in 2013 to 12%. Literal translation is 
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the least frequently used translation strategy that led to shifts on a semantic level, and has the 
highest frequency in 2011, convergent rate in 2012 and 2014, and least frequency in 2013. 
The observations reveal several interesting patterns throughout the four years. On the 
one hand, the percentages of the three strategies of deletion, substitution and addition indicate 
that they all have the highest frequency in 2014. The three strategies show consistency in 
relation to rises and falls over the years. Regardless of their varying degree of percentages, they 
are all shown to have been common practices in 2014, 2012, 2013 and then 2011, respectively. 
On the other hand, the decline of use of literal translation that resulted in mistranslation in 2014 
into 25% while it was 38% in 2011 indicates that the shifts proliferation might have occurred 
due to ideological attempts rather than translators’ failure in the transference of the ST 
messages. In addition, this might be interpreted in terms of the inevitability of the use of the 
three strategies, which are deletion, substitution and addition, in the translation of geopolitical 
commentary articles. Translating geopolitical topics in general and Kurdish topics in particular 
might not be possible without the use of these three strategies, on a limited basis, due to the 
nature of the article’s text type, target readership, and the Kurdish media agencies in question. 
As illustrated earlier, commentary articles have an informative purpose since they transfer 
opinions and assessments of facts. They, therefore, contain features that function as key 
elements in the transference of such options and assessments. Since the possibility of their 
omissions and substitutions cannot be interpreted in terms of mistranslation or translation error, 
they reveal significant tendencies towards ideology. The target readership plays a significant 
role and might influence the choices of that the translators make. Since the selected Kurdish 
media agencies in this study reflect different ideology, so do their readerships. Therefore, these 




2011 2012 2013 2014 Grand 
Total 
Partisan Media 9% 17% 10% 17% 53% 
Shadow Media 6% 10% 11% 20% 17% 
Grand Total 15% 27% 21% 37% 100% 
 





Chart 6. 3 : The use of translation strategies according to publication date by media agencies 
 
Table 6.9 and chart 6.3 show the percentage of translation strategies by the agencies 
within the four years. They show that in 2011 and 2012, a high frequency of translation 
strategies was used by partisan media agencies while shadow media constitute the lowest 
frequency. Nevertheless, the use of translation strategies by both partisan and shadow media 
agencies represent a convergent rate in 2013. In 2014, although the use of these translation 
strategies was increased by both of the agencies, the table shows the highest percentage of the 
use of such strategies refers to the shadow media agencies in the respective year. Interestingly 
as exemplified in the previous sections, these percentages can be interpreted in terms of 
handling the events that occurred throughout the Middle East, in general, and domestic affairs 
related to the political parties in Kurdistan between 2011 and 2012, in particular. In other words, 
the narratives reframed in the TTs about the post third parliamentary events53, i.e., the wave of 
demonstration in Kurdistan against the Kurdish government and the tension between the Iraqi 
central government and Kurdistan. In 2013, the majority of the functional translational strategies 
                                                 
53 http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?l=12&p=229 
“To date there have been four region-wide parliaments, following elections in 1992, 2005, 2009, and 





















might reflect, to a greater or lesser extent, reframing the narratives of the pre- and post-fourth 
parliamentary election elaborated in the STs. However, the mainstream of the translated texts 
in 2014 demonstrated geopolitical conflict after the ISIS attack to the area. Thus, the majority 
of the strategies used for reframing and accentuating the narratives expatiated in the STs in 
favour of the Kurdish issues rather than the political parties in the area in 2014, as we see in the 
following example. 
 
ST: The Kurdish problem is one of the complex ethnic problems in the Middle East, which 
produces even nearly half a century earlier than the Palestinian issue. The so-called Kurdish question 
is Kurdish demands host government recognize their minority status, expanding its national rights, 
allowing its autonomy or independence. 
 
TT: سرپﯽ  درﻭكەیەكێك ەلك ﻭەشێ ەنەﺗهﻭەنﺎییی ەك ەﺑهیۆ دﯽخۆ ﺎئیزۆڵ خەهرۆﯽﺗڵا هﻭﺎنەﺗساڕهﻭ 
ەسرەهیهﻭادڵ، ەئك مەشێەی زنەكیی نﻭی ەسهد ەل كەشێی ەفەلك نﺗسهرﺗنۆ پ ﻭﯽێ هدرﺗﻭتێ ەمەسەلی ەئ ،درﻭكهﻭ ش
خیۆ ەلهﻭهد ادﺑەﺗێنیهﻭ ەك ل اﻭاد درﻭكە ەمﻭكحەﺗنﺎكﯽ هد ناد تﺎكەب ەمانسانەكادنای نبنێ ﺎﺗنﺎپ ﻭﯽی ەفﺎم 
ەنەﺗهﻭەیینﺎینﺎك زدﺎی ەكﺑر ﻭ نەگێی ئﯽمۆنۆﺗۆ نﺎی ەسەﺑرخنﺎییۆ پێ هدﺑن .. 
 
BT: Kurdish problem/issue is one of the national problems that have emerged from 
complex situation of the Middle East. This problem is nearly half a century earlier than the 
Palestinian issue and it is known as Kurdish question/issue. This reflects in the way Kurdish demands 
host government to recognize their identity, expanding its national rights, allowing its autonomy or 
independence. 
 
The substitution of the expression their minority status with ەمﺎنسﺎنەكادنﺎی  (BT: their 
identity) deviated from the ST frame space. Such deviation can be expounded in relation to the 
translator’s opposition to the narratives elaborated in the ST. The author of the ST used the noun 
minority to describe the Kurdish population which is estimated to be around “40 million” 
(Murinson 2010, p. 100). The translator rejected using the term that is usually used to describe 
a number that considered less than half the whole number. As a stateless nation, the Kurdish 
population is considered the majority if compared to the Palestinian population which is 
estimated at no more than 11 million54. 
                                                 
54 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_people 
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The analysis in this section has revealed dynamic shifts resulted from the translational 
strategies alongside their relationships to the geopolitical events and the media agencies through 
time. As individual strategies, deletion, substitution and addition have the highest frequency in 
2014 and the lowest frequency in 2011 while literal translation constitutes the highest frequency 
in 2011 and second lowest frequency in 2014 after 2013. This indicates the escalation in 
ideological motivation behind the use of the respective translational strategies. Both the topics 
of the articles and the type of agencies played a significant role in the rises and falls of the 
percentages of these strategies throughout the four years. The high percentages of the 
translational strategies in 2011, 2012, and 2013 played a significant role in favour of the political 
parties directly and indirectly. However, the majority of the translational strategies used to 
handle the geopolitical events related to the Kurdish question by accentuating or opposing the 
narratives elaborated in the STs in that regard. 
 
6.3 Translational Norms and Semantic Shifts in Media Translation 
The previous sections described certain translational strategies that have high 
frequencies in relation to the ideological shifts which occurred on the semantic level among the 
strategies used in the translation of media texts into Kurdish from 2011-2014. The outcomes are 
interpreted in that regard as well. This section discusses which translation behaviours the 
findings and observations of the above contrastive data analysis on the lexical levels indicate. 
As chapter two discussed the concept of translation norms and ideological shifts along with 
CNA approach (Toury 1995/2012; Chesterman 1997/2000; Baker 2006, 2007; van Dijk 1998a; 
2006 Fairclough 1992, 1993, 1995), this section deliberates the manifestation of those norms 
and their implications in the translation of English-Kurdish media translation on the basis of the 
observations of the lexical choices. 
Consistent with these approaches, this study observes and describes the translator’s 
decisions within the geopolitical contexts in relation to their adoption of the reframing strategies 
of deletion, substitution and addition during the process of translation. The aim is to answer the 
questions raised in the course of this study related to the role of ideology in the translation of 
geopolitical texts. This study argued that the preferred reframing strategies of deletion and 
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addition are ideologically driven to produce semantic shifts in Kurdish media translation in 
favour of the current Kurdish political parties. 
As established in chapter three, the TTs of this corpus are accepted translations in 
Kurdish culture and published by four different Kurdish media agencies. This indicates that the 
TTs are accepted according to the norms of Kurdish culture and the expectancies of these 
Kurdish media agencies and their TT readership. The outcomes reveal that the Kurdish media 
agencies in question play a significant role as the ultimate “norm authority” (Chesterman 2000, 
p. 67). They have the authority to select and accept certain translated articles and/or certain parts 
of the texts and reject others. However, it is both the translators and the agencies that illustrate 
and finalise acceptable translations. From the perspective of Chesterman’s process norms, the 
translators involved in the negotiation of socio-political representations operate as ideological 
mediators. Their decisions reflected the textual changes in the TTs that are informed by the 
ideology and power relation of .the political parties to which the selected media agencies are 
allied. This leads to what is called expectancy norms by Chesterman. The high frequency of the 
use of these strategies by the Kurdish publications’ and translators’ agency in this study indicate 
that Kurdish translators’ decisions led to a preference for adapting the ST knowledge in support 
of certain political powers in Kurdistan. Consistent with Chesterman’s expectancy norms, the 
three identified strategies, similar to a borrowing strategy, in this study are partly dominated 
and influenced by the predominant tradition and scenes in the target language and culture, 
ideological factors, power relations within and between cultures. Thus, the corpus analysis in 
this study shows that the majority of the cases of deletion, addition and substitution did not led 
to mistranslation, explicitations or simplification in the TTs, but rather semantic shifts that 
might be interpreted from an ideological perspective, current political factors and/or the 
translator’s ideology. 
As for preliminary norms, section 5.4 of the previous chapter shows that the factors that 
might determine the use of these three translation strategies in Kurdish newspapers are not a 
random practice. The publication agencies select particular types of texts to be translated 
purposefully and these strategies are used to serve a certain goal. As textual-linguistic norms, 
the high-frequency use of the three strategies led to lexical shifts in the translation of media 
texts into Kurdish. This type of norm constitutes part of operational norms and process norms. 
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Deletion and substitution strategies, therefore, are the preferred strategies that lead to lexical 
shifts in Kurdish media translation. However, since the percentages and analysis show that 
translators’ failure is not the high-frequency factor behind the use of such strategies, the 
ideology of Kurdish media translators’ agency plays a significant role in this respective. This 
indicates translation might be manipulated by the use of these strategies in order to reflect 
different voices. 
 
6.4 Translation Behaviour, Patrons and Reframing Political Conflict  
 
The analysis above has explored the outcomes and observations of contrastive data 
analysis on the lexical levels. This section draws conclusions in relation to Lefevere’s patronage 
(1992b) and Baker’s (2006, 2007) narrative theory with the aim of further describing the 
ideological leanings of the media agencies. 
When publishers employed translators, they expected them to render according to their 
collective agreement (Lefevere 1992b). They may not official state that this has to be done, but 
there is an informal collective agreement (Pym, p. 70). As also stated by Baker (2007, 2010), in 
any positioning discourse, the translator adopts a certain position using certain linguistic 
operations. Such positioning defines his/her socio-political role. Like her examples, the TT 
lexico-grammatical choices in the corpus of this study revealed various ways in which translates 
highlight, undermine or adjust disputed aspects of the narratives encoded in the source texts. 
The translated texts in this study can be seen as apparatuses used to frame political issues in 
favour of the current Kurdish political parties (patrons). After the fall of Saddam’s regime, 
political parties manipulate media news agencies in Iraqi Kurdistan to reflect the domestic 
political conflict. Thus, the mode of translation in these Kurdish newspaper agencies involves 
a transmission of instances of political alignments into the discussion of such political dispute. 
As patronages, they allowed the extra-linguistic constraints to inform their outlets. The 
ideological affiliations of these media agencies (patrons) affected the choice of the texts and 
their narratives and brought them with line with their own ideologies.  
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The textual indicators that led to the semantic changes in the immediate narratives by 
patterns of the reframing strategies in the given socio-political context altered the meta-narrative 
drive of the whole text as well. For instance in the appendix AKR.46, the translator positioned 
him/herself55 in the context of the domestic political conflict by the employment of a range of 
reframing strategies that express their stances towards the narratives elaborated in the STs . The 
article is about al-Qaeda threat to Iraqi Kurdistan. It is translated and published by the Rudaw 
news agencies which is considered an indirectly KDP affiliated media. The textual indicators 
that led to the semantic changes in the immediate narratives by the reframing strategies of 
substitution on regular basis in the given socio-political context altered the meta-narrative drive 
of the whole text against the KDP’s rival, i.e., PUK. The shifts in the immediate TT narratives 
highlighted al-Qaeda threat at some provinces and pointed to them as places under the control 
of the PUK. In the ST, the location was implicit, even ambiguous. Thus, one possible 
explanation for this modification in the meta-narrative is that these shifts were more common 
in discourses related to the target society and the parties to which the media agencies are aligned. 
Hence, the translation of geopolitical discourse plays a major role in the reproduction of 
ideologies and contributes to certain discourses as promoted by different social groups. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to the issues relation to the neighbouring countries of 
Kurdistan, this transmission is always accompanied by the work of support or resisting ideas 
elaborated in the STs of the historical context of the alignment. For instance in the appendices 
AKS.6, AKR.48 and AKK.23, the translators placed themselves in the Kurdish context. The 
appendix (AKS.1) is a commentary article about Turkey’s role of Leadership in the Middle East 
after the Arab spring. The textual indexes, which led to the semantic changes in the immediate 
narratives related to the Kurdish issues in Turkey by patterns of the strategies of substitution 
and addition, altered the meta-narrative drive of the whole text. The TT seems positively 
addressing the Kurdish related topics, such as translating Kurdish guerrilla attacks into  ﯽكلاﺎچ
ەگ ﯽیلایر (BT: guerrilla activity). Meanwhile, it negatively refers to the authority of the countries 
to which Kurdistan is part of today, such as translating the Iranian government into نارێئ ﯽمێژر 
                                                 
55 The translated text is published under anonymous name. 
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(BT: the Iranian regime), and the rule of Saddam Hussein as مكوحﯽ رژﯽمێ ەسمادد  (BT: the rule of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime). 
This ultimately leads to the fact that media translation in Kurdistan is an institutional 
operation and mutual process of norm organisation practice in geopolitical contexts. The media 
agencies and newspapers in Iraqi Kurdistan allow ideology to inform their news output and 
translation policies. Translators manipulate the STs to favour or undermine the dominant 
narratives in the target society and/or reframing the ST to motivate the reader to reconsider 
his/her position regarding these dominant narratives. When the institutions employ translators, 
they anticipate that they follow their collective policy, even if they do not officially stating that 
this behaviour has to be performed. Cutting across the analysis, what will emerge from the 
discussion is that translators, like all social actors, engage with the narrative world in which 
they are embedded in a variety of ways. Kurdish political power relations, to which the media 
agencies are aligned, repeatedly invoked media narratives to portray and promote particular 







In the contemporary globalised society, translations inevitably involve cultural, 
ideological and political manipulations and question the motivations on the part of the translator 
(Lefevere, 1992; Baker 2006; Sieoni 1998; Yannakopoulou 2008). Today, translation in general 
and political translation in particular has received worldwide attention and its theoretical 
knowledge has profoundly improved. In line with the growing attention to ideology and the 
advance of media translation, political discourse has also received great attention within the 
field of translation studies and thus it has been extensively researched. Nevertheless, there is a 
scarcity of research on online media translation (Schäffner and Bassnett 2010), in particular the 
role and impact of socio-political mediation on textual and extra-textual levels in journalistic 
texts. Media journalistic translation has vastly contributed to the diffusion of ideological and 
geopolitical knowledge in the world. It is not only a worldwide practice that society has 
undertaken, but also it is a form of effective power relations exploited by particular powers and 
institutions. Today, journalistic translators resort to various strategies to reinforce or 
compromise particular aspects of the narratives they mediate, explicitly or implicitly. These 
reframing strategies allow them to dissociate themselves from the narrative position of the 
author or alternatively, to be responsive to it. From this consideration, this study primarily set 
out to investigate translation mediation by groups of translators who belong to different Kurdish 
publication agencies and perform translation for the general public from English into Kurdish. 
In doing so, the study uncovered the potential of geopolitical ideology to reposition translation 
between modernity and identity as the twentieth century times out.  
The thesis outlines the strategies used in the translation of geopolitical journalistic texts 
in Kurdistan by adopting the concepts and theories of CNA and Chesterman’s norms (1997) 
within the framework of descriptive translation studies. At a macro-level, the process of media 
translation is manifested as an institutionalised norm-governed social practice with various 
mediators and performers involved in socio-political representations. At a micro-level, the 
combination of comparative parallel textual methods is adapted and employed to explore the 
textual deviations informed by the macro-level contextual constructions with an insight into the 
role of translation in discursive structure. Upon preliminary investigation, it is been realised that 
media translation in Kurdistan is published by media agencies who are directly or indirectly 
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aligned to the current political parties in Kurdistan. Therefore, the corpus of this study included 
translated texts from both types of the media at a convergence rate, including 30 translated texts 
alongside their 30 source texts from each (see section 3.2 and 4.1). As a result of this finding 
during the course of this exploration, the focus of the study has shifted onto investigating not 
only the impact of the socio-ideological norms but also the political power relations determining 
translators performing geopolitical journalistic translation into Kurdish and the role of their 
stance and voice in the translations they produce. 
Translation manipulations occur in the process of text production, and translators are 
considered as active agents in shaping ideology in the TTs (Schäffner, 2003). The product is, 
therefore, considered a significant device for providing an insight into norm governing 
translation processes and translators’ choices. The notion of Chesterman’s norms (1997) helped 
in explaining the reason behind the occurrence of the wide range of manipulations in this study. 
Through this prism, the investigation in this study explored ideological mediation and 
manipulation in Kurdish media translation by investigating a corpus of translated geopolitical 
commentary articles at the level of lexico-grammatical choices, both semantically and 
stylistically. These aspects are considered significant criteria for revealing different patterns of 
behaviour on the part of the translators. As part of this process, quantitative analysis is used as 
a means to provide supporting evidence for qualitative analytical approach. The qualitative 
analysis of the choices made by the translators showed that most of the manipulations were 
made due to the socio-political and geographical status of Kurdistan and the political ideology 
of the Kurdish media agencies rather than linguistic and cultural differences between the two 
languages. However, a few manipulations did not show a specific reason to be applied and 
therefore they are regarded as mistranslation. These outcomes accordingly offer new insight 
into translational behaviour in a non-western context where geopolitical translation has become 
a significant zone for an academic activity to reflect on and engage in domestic politics as well 
as to inform contemporary translation studies. In order to provide a clear line of perspective on 
how the present study develops an understanding of translation studies and its related fields, the 
following paragraphs are devoted to further highlighting the major original contributions of the 
present study. 
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Based on the theory of Chesterman’s norms (1997) and a CNA approach, the data 
analysis has provided patterns of textual markers and references to the relationship between the 
English texts and their Kurdish translations in the corpus of this study. It revealed that a number 
of lexico-grammatical elements in the Kurdish texts are different from those in the English texts 
semantically and stylistically. They are, thus, referred to as shifts. These translational shifts 
show the specific roles that translation tends to play in mediating between the ST narratives and 
target group communities. From a CNA perspective, these roles manifest themselves as power-
mediated knowledge transfer between the STs and the target group communities depending on 
which group holds more discursive power in specific contextual models. On the one hand, the 
translations appear to be based on the ST form and content by maintaining an original sense of 
the ST representations, semantically and stylistically, as a demonstration of the professional 
norms. In other words, the translators take the source-oriented side to disseminate the dominant 
knowledge to the target community. On the other hand, the translations also seem to manifest 
empathy with the target community. They are motivated by the need to form target-compatible 
context models by adapting the source text knowledge into the target-group knowledge 
structure. The expectancy norms, here, predominate due to the macro-level power relations. 
Both forms of norm-regulated knowledge transference are highly reinforced in translational 
behaviour by the power relations and ideological factors involved at the front of geopolitical 
and intercultural communication.  
In this way, the non-concrete concepts of power relations and ideology involved in the 
CNA approach become apparent and aptly operative when situated in the framework of the 
model of Chesterman’s (1997) translation norms mediated by knowledge transfer from the 
socio-cognitive and narrative perspectives. The critical narrative approach to media translation 
thus serves particularly well in revealing and explaining the conditional features that help to 
maintain and reconstruct the existing translation norms. In order to explain this further, it is 
significant to this study to look into norm reconstruction from a bottom-up approach where the 
autonomy that translators are gaining has more potential to recontextualise the original 
discourse within the institutional contexts. Moreover, the (re)construction of translation norms 
through translators’ lexico-grammatical choices leads to the idea that norms can be not only 
internalised into translators’ intellectual constructs but also externalised as a socially-adaptive 
entity open to change ( see sub-section 6.2). In order to present a broadened and balanced view 
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of geopolitical translation in Kurdish media, a range of the metanarratives has been analysed to 
reveal the building of Kurdish political representations over the different eras in the post 
autonomous region in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1992. Emphasis is placed on the cognitive and socio-
cultural dimensions that the geopolitical metanarratives have in facilitating the formation of 
Kurdish socio-political representations. 
On the stylistic level, the patterns of the reframing strategy of borrowing constitute a 
significant parameter for the exploration of the way the historical and current socio-political 
ideology has driven media translation in Kurdistan as explored in chapter 4. The study 
concluded that the translator used many loanwords that significantly manipulated the text more 
than all other strategies in the corpus of this study. They are regarded as stylistic re-writings that 
involve a re-version of the original in the field of media translation. Nevertheless, the study 
challenges Lefevere's view to assign these shifts to only his atheistic manipulations (poetic) of 
the translation due to the significant role of socio-political translational norms in their existence. 
Indubitably, the status of Sorani Kurdish in some cases in the present study could be revealed 
as the motive behind such manipulation. The very low percentage of non-lexicalisation in and 
non-standardisation of Soraní Kurdish showed the translators’ recreation of the form of the STs 
(see subsection 4.2.1). Nevertheless, the majority of the cases are driven by the historical and 
current socio-political status of Kurdistan and the Kurdish media agencies (see chapter 1). Like 
nineteenth century translations of Irish literature that, for example, helped build a sense of Irish 
nationhood in resistance to British colonial domination (Tymoczko 2000), manipulative stylistic 
translation in Kurdistan engages with discourses of nationalism, preceding the era of the 
autonomous region in Iraqi Kurdistan. Despite the geographical area of Kurdistan and its direct 
contact with four countries of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria, the investigation in this study has 
shown that a large range of the cases of borrowing is from English. From the geopolitical 
perspective, this might be due to the division of this area among the four countries mentioned 
above that led to build a sense of Kurdish nationalism in the past. It does so by considering 
English culture as more prestigious than Arabic, Turkish and Persian cultures pre-and post the 
autonomous region. Being a local language of the northern part of the modern Iraq after WWI, 
Soraní Kurdish is also affected by the impact of Arabic as an official and prestigious cultural 
language of the Islamic world. The same reason led to borrowing from Arabic being the second 
highest percentage after English in the corpus of this study. However, being largely driven by 
 196 
nationalist aspirations, borrowing from English and the European languages directly was more 
motivational than Arabic (Abdulla 1980) (see subsection 4.2.1). Moreover, the Kurdish media 
in the post-autonomous region in Kurdistan also had an immense role in the translator’s reusing, 
producing and borrowing words that reflect the ideological policy of the media agencies, which 
are run by the political parties directly or indirectly. The ideology of the translator (translator's 
own voice) in some cases of the present study could be revealed. However, the very high 
percentage of the cases showed that they mostly tried to recreate the forms of the STs that go 
with the policy of the Kurdish media agencies (see subsection 4.2.2). 
On the semantic level, likewise, this study explored translations of the selected 
geopolitical journalistic texts in the corpus that are shaped by the ideology of the current 
political powers to which the news agencies and newspapers are aligned. The presence of 
manipulation at such a level and the high percentage of omission and addition in the present 
study suggested that these two strategies are among the basic manipulation strategies. The 
reframing strategies of deletion and addition, as one combined strategy (substitution) and as two 
independent strategies, constitute significant parameters for the exploration of the semantic 
shifts elaborated in the TT narratives while compared to their STs by presenting a wide range 
of examples. They revealed the significant interplay between the texts translated by the four 
selected Kurdish media agencies in the corpus of this study, their relation to the selection-policy 
of translating certain geopolitical articles and the political parties to which the news agencies 
are directly or indirectly related to.  
The research illustrated in this study has shown that translation can be considered in its 
own right to frame political stances for domestic purposes by the translators who argue in favour 
of the views of the media agencies that are directly affiliated to a specific political party. The 
outcomes revealed that the most frequent strategies used by both the partisan and shadow media 
are deletion and substitution, while addition constituted the lowest number. However, they are 
all perceived to have socio-political and ideological implication in favour of the political parties 
in conflict. The study also exposed that these strategies can meritoriously be manipulated to 
reframe the narratives elaborated in the STs by the translators who could remain obscure from 
direct observation by the majority of the readers. The translation choices, in general, might 
contain a combination of respect for target readers’ expectations and the adoption of the habitual 
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repertoire of translation. From the readership perspective56, however, this may lead to suspicion 
and uncertainty regarding the question of the translator’s neutrality rendering a particular 
geopolitical field of knowledge. 
The findings and observations of the comparative analysis also investigated the ways 
that all the strategies occurred both at word level and above word level with different impacts 
on the style and meaning transference from the STs to the TTs. The majority of the shifts 
occasioned include nouns and then adjectives which had significant impact on the transference 
of the key messages into the TTs. Stylistically, on the one hand, this study explored the way 
that a large number of the cases of borrowings are more politically motivated by the current 
political status of Kurdistan rather than depending on a rational ideology. This study therefore 
argues against Hasanpoor’s (1999, p. 40) declaration that translations might enrich the language 
with the adoption of new loans for today’s translation, especially in the absence of Kurdish 
language policy and standardisation57. On the semantic level, on the other hand, shifts in the 
key patterns of nouns and adjectives resulted in both the specification and generalization of the 
ST key-messages while reframed in the TTs and they altered the ideological drive of the texts 
at a macro-level. This, in turn, revealed the way translators distance themselves from the meta 
narrative position of the author by shifting and/or opposing aspects of the immediate narratives 
they translate. The alterations illustrate the interaction between ascendancy and opposition that 
accentuate the non-neutrality of both the translators’ and the agencies’ policy of translation in 
relation to the contributions they made to the purpose in the TT. Finally, in terms of the 
relationship between subject and setting, selection decisions and the manipulation of source and 
target text may reveal media translation actors’ ideology and identity: what they believe in, or 
who they feel they are (in terms of voice and stance). Or they may deliberately debate or contest 
issues of ideology and identity. 
Following mostly theoretical aspects of manipulation, now some applied works are 
compared to the findings of the present study.  This study is consistent with Lefevere’s (1992) 
                                                 
56 Especially those readers who read both the STs and the TTs 
57 “ The authorities, especially the Kurdish Academy, have decided not to have any specific language 
policy in Iraqi Kurdistan with respect to declaring an official language for the region or granting linguistic rights 
to Kurdish varieties with fewer speakers” (Sheyholislami 2012, p. 117). 
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and Herman’s (1985) opinion in that translated geopolitical texts in Kurdistan are a “re-written” 
version altered for particular ideologies. Re-writing a text, culturally, politically or ideologically 
in the Kurdish media inevitably involve a process of alteration known as “manipulation” in 
translation studies. This manipulation can be seen from a socio-political perspective. Ideology 
in embedded within translation, because ideology is often coded in the linguistic expression and 
active process of transferring ideas across cultures (Toury, 2012). The factors accounting for 
this are the control, supervision and manipulation operating at the level of the translation 
process. Linguistically, the translator's decision-making about addition, omission selection, and 
the placement of words is a process composed of historical determinations and the socio-
political milieu surrounding him or her (Álvarez & Vidal, 1996; Munday, 2012). Ultimately this 
study helps to provide an answer as to how politics and geography draw themselves at the centre 
to undermine linguistic and cultural identity at the periphery by creating artificial realms with 
boundaries fixed regardless of the indigenous language and cultures (cf Bamgbose 1991; 
Phillipson 1992; Ngugiwa 1993; de Beaugrande 2005). 
Ultimately, some major conclusions around the data set and modelling aspect of this 
study can be drawn. The initial assumption was that there would be greater differentiation 
between the partisan and shadow media agencies in relation to ideological choices, but the 
evidence points to a rather convergence of practice. Interestingly enough, although the data 
analysis revealed that the reframing strategies are not equally used by the four selected media 
agencies, nevertheless, the differences did not show a huge difference. The study showed that 
the partisan media included more manipulative strategies than the shadow media. This, 
however, constitutes a normal indication since these media agencies in Kurdistan have 
publically announced themselves as partisan newspaper agencies. Nevertheless, the low rate of 
differences between the partisan and shadow media regarding the manipulation of the strategies 
might amount to an unusual outcome. As explained in chapter six, the frequency of each of the 
reframing strategies used by the shadow media are a few percentage points lower than that of 
the partisan media (chart 6.2). Having claiming to be independent from political bias, the 
percentages of reframing strategies of deletion, substitution and addition by the shadow media 
lead to have different interpretations of their autonomy. In this way, the conclusion around the 
data set indicates that there is not as much of a differentiation between partisan and shadow 
media in terms of ideological manipulation that one might have expected in the case of Iraqi 
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Kurdistan’s media context. This suggests that there is mileage in further study of the role the 
(mass) media plays in disseminating socio-political ideology to the public. As highlighted by 
Schäffner (2012, p. 103) “the mass media play a significant role in communicating politics to 
the general public’, and that “media produce texts within their own media institutions”. Thus it 
would add an important dimension to the study of political translation by investigating whether 
there is any media mediation involved in the presentation of the final version of political/ and 
or geopolitical translation, and to what extent this might have an influence on the practice of 
ideology in media translation in the Kurdish and/or other contexts. 
Other outcome of this research which can enable further studies is the triangulating 
methodological approach of this study. The current study gives an inclusive picture of the 
products of geopolitical translation in Kurdistan. However, much of the assumptions in relation 
to the decision making process of Kurdish geopolitical translation can be further reinforced by 
the empirical data stemming from larger corpora on the actual operation of translation practice. 
The same methodology used in this study, moreover, can be applied to other genres and periods 
with different or similar samples for future related studies. Based on the discussion and 
limitations of the present thesis future research can be proposed. The model of triangulating the 
approaches can be applied to other data sets and scholars can use it to further other projects, in 
particular in relation to lesser-spoken languages. Some other conclusions can be offered on the 
theoretical side, once it is granted that shifts are indeed unlimited in linguistic and ideological 
aspects, translation theory can use big data sets to determine how richly ideology is limited and 
unlimited in social and cultural aspects. On the practical side, the training of novel translators 
could be improved by drawing their attention to selective bilingual large-corpus data. 
In sum, today, the state authorities and associations are, directly or indirectly, the new 
patrons of media outlets and they are very important in the construction of (geo) political 
ideologies. The efforts of translation to enlarge and enrich a media system makes it an influential 
tool for the introduction of new aesthetics and trends as well as the ideology implied in them. 
The triangulating method employed in this study could therefore be used as a way in which 
translation studies can explore ideological manipulations of different types of patronage-
affiliated institutions. Its new form of line with the comments allows us to analyse the extent to 
which these ideological mediations are taken critically in the opining up by combining the 
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micro-textual analysis and the macro-contextual analysis. The economic and ideological 
processes related to translation phenomena are fundamental for the understanding of the media 
translation system. Since media translators are usually employed by the patronage-affiliated 
institutions, they follow the same policy. Their textual choices thus revealed the extent to which 
media translation were affected by extra textual factors. From this prism, media translated texts 
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Unless something occurs that fundamentally changes the political landscape of Iraqi Kurdistan, all current 
indications point to Gorran (the Movement for Change) becoming a dominant force in the politics of the area 
for decades to come. 
It appears that Turkey has not fully realized this fact, and the country needs to give the matter its due 
significance. We will address the historical roots of Gorran, its current policy on the deadlock in attempts to 
form a government after September elections in the Kurdistan region, and reflect on Turkish policy regarding 
the regional Kurdish government in Iraq. 
Historical roots 
In June 1975 in Damascus, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) was formed as a party out of three small 
leftist groups: The Marxist-Leninist Komelah, the Pro-Talabani General Line and the Kurdistan Socialist 
Movement. In its first communiqué, the PUK ascribed the collapse of the Kurdish revolt in 1975 to the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Mullah Mustafa Barzani's incompetence and feudalist leadership. 
Despite its many ups and downs, the PUK dominated the Kurdish resistance and provided dynamic leadership 
for Iraqi Kurds during the last four decades. Jalal Talabani, the ailing Iraqi president and the founder of PUK, 
was the party's main asset. 
The recent PUK debacle 
After the demise of the Eastern bloc, PUK turned itself into a social democratic party. In practice, however, 
it remains to large extent an authoritarian party. Besides, the party's senior leaders' sons grew from children 
to adults, and the leadership began to focus on empowering and enriching their family members. By doing 
so, the PUK failed to differentiate itself from its more established competitor (the KDP) and lost much of its 
reason for being. 
Talabani's crippling stroke several months ago further deepened the PUK crisis. After Talabani's stroke, 
senior leaders spent more time promoting themselves in Tehran, Washington and Baghdad than they 
spent on laying out a platform to better the lives of their own constituents. Like Mao Zedong's widow, 
Iraq's first lady Hero Ibrahim has developed a craving for power and is using every means possible to 
raise herself and her two sons to positions of power in the PUK. 
The emergence of Gorran 
In 2009, Nawshirwan Mustafa, a veteran politician who was a co-founder of PUK and a close aide of 
Talabani, felt that the aging Iraqi president was leading PUK to its demise by pursuing a policy 
subservient to Massoud Barzani's KDP and realized that reform within PUK was not attainable. Being a 
veteran fighter, and intellectual with leftist tendencies whose image remains untainted by corruption, 
Mustafa managed to take a big chunk of the PUK's fighters and leaders with him when he split from the 
party and formed the Gorran movement. According to many specialists, the formation of Gorran in 2009 
"has already shaken the political landscape in Kurdish areas" (The BBC, Mar. 6, 2010). 
The movement, which is popular among KRG youth, attracts support by OFFERING a new option in 
Kurdistan, and uprooting rampant corruption is one of Gorran's main objectives, according to a report 
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from Al Arabiya News. Besides, Gorran supporters told the Economist in February 2011 that “the KDP 
and PUK have done a poor job of promoting the Kurds' interests at the federal parliament in Baghdad.” 
In 2011 the Gorran movement called for the resignation of the Cabinet and the start of a “Kurdish spring” 
to challenge the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). During the protests, which started on Feb. 17 
of that year and lasted for three months in Kurdistan, dozens were killed or wounded. The KDP and 
Barzani were the main targets of the mass protests. There was a split within the Kurdish leadership about 
how to deal with the demonstrations. Eventually, external pressure, especially from the US and Iran, 
forced PUK to end the protests. For numerous reasons, the uprising failed to SPREAD to KDP-
dominated regions and, consequently, the Gorran movement had to temporarily abandon its plan for a 
general uprising. 
Gorran: Either I play or I spoil the game 
Local analysts have come up with a variety of scenarios as the KRG tries to form a government. The 
first involves a very broad coalition, in which all political parties PARTICIPATE. Other scenarios 
envision the KDP forming a government with one of the two runners-up in the elections -- either PUK 
or the Gorran movement. In another scenario, the KDP could form a coalition that involves both the 
PUK and one or two of the Islamic groups. 
The last two scenarios seem the most probable. Should Nechirvan Barzani fail to form a government or 
exclude Gorran, there is a strong likelihood that the region will relapse into the civil war of the 1990s. 
Although the KDP was able TO WIN most of the seats in the Kurdistan Parliament, it is facing a serious 
problem in forming a government. The KDP has made encouraging statements about a broad-based 
coalition. Its spokesperson, Jafar Eminki, has announced that his party supports that plan. But at the 
same time he said the KDP wouldn't let any conditions be forced upon it. 
An article published on niqash.org on Oct. 24, 2013, quoted Borhan Yassin, a senior lecturer at Lund 
University, as saying, “Winning seats in an election is vastly different from capacity to work and 
negotiate within a political environment.” The article continued: “Official results confirm the KDP won 
38 seats and the Change movement, also known as Gorran, won 24. The PUK's SHARE of seats in the 
local 111-seat parliament fell to 18, while the two main Islamic parties, which have also been in 
opposition, won 16 together." 
Gorran's leaders have issued several serious warnings that if they are excluded, they will resort to any 
means necessary, including taking to the streets to start protests throughout Kurdistan. The KDP takes 
this seriously, but will have difficulty meeting Gorran's conditions. 
Conscious of its newly gained power as the second party in the region, Gorran's top leaders have put 
many conditions on their PARTICIPATION in the next government. These include actively participating 
in drawing up the government agenda, transparency (especially with regard to oil revenue, which so far 
has been a thorny issue in the region) and ending corruption. Having won the most votes in 
Sulaymaniyah and a majority on the provincial council, Gorran wants to replace the current pro-PUK 
mayor, who has been illegally maintained in power for a decade. The election results have already 
plunged Sulaymaniyah into a series of assassinations that pose a serious security challenge for Kurdish 
officials. 
Gorran leaders have made it very clear that unless their demands are met, they are willing and able to 
wreck the whole political process in the region, even possibly breaking Sulaymaniyah province off from 
the KRG. Corruption, however, is too deeply entrenched, and there are powerful lobbies within the KDP 
and PUK that will work to prevent any serious reform. 
For these reasons, the Kurdish administration in Northern Iraq faces a serious challenge in DEALING 
with Gorran's either-I-play-or-I-spoil-the-game tactic. 
Turkey's foreign policy can help 
Turkey has a lot of economic and security stakes in the Kurdistan region and can't afford to see it 
destabilized. Civil war or chaotic conditions in the region would put another burden on Turkey's relations 
with its neighbors, already complicated by the Syria crisis. In addition to the loss of huge business 
INVESTMENTS and a multibillion dollar market, instability here would create a political vacuum that 
could be exploited by the PKK, and could lead to massacres of Turkmens. It was good to see Barzani in 
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 evah ot retteb neeb evah dluow ti tub ,retsinim emirp hsikruT eht htiw edis yb edis gnidnats rikabrayiD
 tahT .gniteem cirotsih dna cilobmys taht ot gnola redael hsidruK rehto eht gnirb ot inazraB decnivnoc
 a sa inazraB gnisu si nağodrE piyyaT peceR retsiniM emirP taht noitasucca eht detpmeerp evah dluow
 .ecneulfni s'nalacÖ retnuoc ot nwap
 ,tsomerof dna tsriF .stneve fo noitcerid eht ecneulfni ot lasopsid sti ta secruoser fo tol a sah yekruT
 .PDK eht :noiger eht ni reyalp evitca tsom eht htiw ecnailla cigetarts a etavitluc ot deganam sah yekruT
 ni gnimochtrof erom eb ot PDK eht edausrep ot dezilitu ylevitceffe eb ot sdeen ecnailla sihT
 lliw taht tnemnrevog noitilaoc eniuneg a fo noitamrof eht rof dnamed s'noitisoppo eht gnitadommocca
 airyS dna ,yekruT rof doog on si robhgien elbatsnu nA .s'yekruT gnidulcni ,stseretni s'ydobyreve evres
 .tniop ni esac a si
 sah dna enecs hsidruK eht ni rewop gnigreme na si narroG taht tcaf eht htiw nokcer ot sdeen osla yekruT
 os evah PDK eht htiw seit esolc s'yekruT .stseretni s'yekruT dna PDK eht no covah kaerw ot snaem eht
 htiw segdirb dliub ot evah srekamycilop hsikruT ,eroferehT .troppus rof narI ot kool ot narroG decrof raf
 ot sedaced emos rof dnuora eb ll'yeht ekil kool hcihw ,narroG yllaicepse ,spuorg noitisoppo hsidruK
 ni ytilaitrapmi gniwohs dna narroG htiw sklat tcerid gnidulcni ,syaw ynam ni enod eb dluoc sihT .emoc
 eht lennahc ot snoitazinagro latnemnrevognon esu ot deen osla yam yekruT .scitilop hsidruK lanretni
 .sisirc a treva dna tnemnrevog noitilaoc a mrof ot spuorg hsidruK eht elbane ot esitrepxe dedeen




 ێراقع یباکور له نگژهته ڵدانیرهه: سهێراقع یکوردستان یو داهاتو ۆڕانگ یوهبزوتنه
 
 ەلﯽد.عوسمﺎن ع
 ێنحس ەﺑﺎح: سینگلیزيیەوەئ لە
 ۆﺑ ێمﺎه ێستﺎدائکﺎن لەمو ئﺎمﺎژهوا هەﺑکﺎت، ئە ێراﻗداع ﯽکوردستﺎن یﺎسﯽس یخشەنە لە یروهەجە ۆڕانێکﯽگ روﺑدات کە ێکشت رگەئە
 .داهﺎﺗو یيەده ينندچە ۆدا ﺑکەنﺎوچە ﺗﯽیﺎسەس لە ستڵادهﺑﺎ ێزێکﯽه ێتەﺑب ن کەکەئە ۆڕانگ یوهزوﺗنەﺑ
 
 ئﺎمﺎژه داێرهل ێمەات. ئﺑد ﺗەم ﺑﺎﺑەﺑە يﺎﺗرز کﯽییەگرنگ یﺎﺗورک ێويستەپ ،ییەن ییەم راستئە یئﺎگﺎدار یواوﺗەﺑە یﺎﺗورک کە ێتوکەردهده وا
پﺎش  ت لەومەحک ێکهێنﺎنﯽپ ۆﺑ کﺎنڵەوهە یستوﻗبەچە ۆخﯽد لە ێستﺎیئ ﺗﯽیﺎسەس ين،کەده ۆڕانگ یوهﺑزوﺗنە ێژويﯽم یڕيشەگوهر ﺑە




 یڵەۆمەزرا: کدامە یزﺑێکک حوه وهپەچە ﯽﺑچوک ﯽگروپ ێس کوردستﺎن لە یشتمﺎنﯽن کێتﯽيە شق،يمەد لە 5791 ﯽوﺗحە ﯽمﺎنگ لە
 ۆینسک کێتﯽيە يدا،ۆخ یننﺎمەيﺎﺑە مکەيە کوردستﺎن. لە ۆسیﺎلیستﯽس یوهﺑزوﺗنە و ﺑﺎنﯽڵەﺗﺎ نگرانﯽيەلا ﯽگشت ﯽﺗخە ینینﯽ،__لﯽمﺎرکس
 ڕایرهکﺎن. سەگەﺑەرهده ۆزهه ۆکرفﺎ و سەلا مستەمە ێتوانﺎيﯽکوردستﺎن و ﺑ يموکراﺗﯽد ﯽپﺎرﺗ ڵپﺎ يەدا 5791 ڵﯽسﺎ لە یکورد ﯽشۆڕش
چﺎلاک  کﯽيەرکردهسە ﺗﯽیويەﺗوان يدا،کورد یرگرﺑە ێزیه ﺑو لە ستڵادهﺑﺎ کێتﯽيە، هﺎﺗوه ﯽﺗوش کە یوﺗنﺎنەرکەو شکست و سەمو ئەهە
 ێراق،ع وﺗویۆشکەخنە ۆکﯽرو سە کێتﯽيە ریێنەزردامە ﺑﺎنﯽ،ڵەلال ﺗﺎراﺑردودا. جە یيەچوار ده لە ێراقع ﯽکوردان ۆﺑ ێنێتمبهرهەﺑە
 .يداکەیزﺑەح لە ﺑوه ﯽکرهسە ێزیه یرچﺎوهسە یشەمهە
 
 :کێتﯽيە یيیەم دوائە یکشەپﺎشە
ﺗﺎ  زدایپراکت شدا لەوهئە ڵگەلە يموکرات،د ۆسیﺎلس یزﺑێکﯽح ۆﺑ ۆڕیگ ۆیخ یرنﺎمەﺑە کێتﯽيە ڵات،ۆژهەر ۆکﯽﺑل ﯽروخﺎن ﺎشپ
کﺎن رکردهەس ﺑون، ورهگە ێستﺎئ کێتﯽيە ڵاکﺎنﯽﺑﺎ رکردهسە ڕیش، کووهلە يﺎد، زوهﺗەر مﺎوهرکوﺗکەسە یزﺑێکﯽک حوه ۆرز کﯽيەراده
 لە نﺎوهێه ﯽشکست کێتﯽيە م کﺎرهئە ﯽکردن . ﺑەکﺎنیﺎنێزانەخ ﯽندامﺎنئە ﺑە ڵاتسەت و سﺎمﺎن و دهروهسە ێدانﯽپ ﺑە ﺎنکردوهیستده
 .ۆیخ یوهمﺎنە ۆﺑ ستداوهدهلە کﺎنﯽۆکﺎرهه یۆرﺑەو ز ییەپﺎرﺗ کە يداکەرخەهﺎوچە رهو رکﺎﺑە ۆیخ ێواننلە یﺎوازيکردنج
 
 رکردهسە ﺑﺎنﯽ،ڵەﺎﺗ یکەۆشیەخ. پﺎش نەوهکرده ڵترﻗو کێتﯽيە کﺎنﯽێشەﺑو ک ﯽﺗوش ﺑﺎنﯽڵەﺗﺎ ێشترپ ێکند مﺎنگچە کە یمﺎغەده یڵدهجە وئە
 رسەﺗەيﺎنەردوﺑ کە یوکﺎﺗەلە يﺎدغدا زﺗﺎران، واشنتن و ﺑە لە يﺎنوهێشەپ ۆﺑردنەخ ر لەسە ﺗەﺑردوه ۆرﺗريﺎنز ێکﯽکﺎﺗ کەیزﺑەح ڵاکﺎنﯽﺑﺎ
 ێرۆ"ه یشێراﻗع مﯽکەيە ﯽخﺎنم ۆنگ،ﺗ ﯽمﺎو ﺗس یکەک ژنەروه. هەکﺎنیﺎننگرهيەلا يﺎنﯽژ یﺑﺎشترکرد ۆﺑ ۆڕمێکپلاﺗف ڕویخستنە لە
و  ۆیخ یهورزکردنەﺑە ۆگونجﺎو ﺑ ۆکﺎرێکﯽمو ههە ێنﺎنﯽکﺎرهو ﺑە ڵاتسەده ﯽستدهگرﺗنە ۆﺑ رخستوهده ۆیخ یزو" ئﺎرهیبراهیمئ
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 .کێتﯽيەنﺎو  ڵاکﺎنﯽﺑﺎ ۆستەپ ۆﺑ کﺎنﯽڕهکو
 
 :ۆرانگ یوهﺑزوﺗنە وﺗنﯽرکەده
 یﺑو، وا ﺑﺎنﯽڵەﺗﺎ يکﯽنز ێکﯽو هﺎوکﺎر کێتﯽيە ﯽشهﺎوﺑە ریێنەزرو دامە يەزاشﺎره کﯽیﺎسیەس فﺎ، کەمستە یروانوش، نە9002 ڵﯽسﺎ لە
 ﯽيموکراﺗد ﯽپﺎرﺗ ﺗﯽیﺎسەس ۆیپﺎشک ﺑە ﯽکردن ﺑﺎت ﺑەمﺎن دهو نەرهﺑە کێتﯽەي ێراق،ع یکەنەمەﺗەﺑە ۆکەرسە کرد کەست ئەهە
 ێرينﯽد ۆڕشگێڕێکﯽک ش. وهدیێنرێتەنﺎه کێتیدايە ۆینﺎوخلە ێفۆرمر ﯽنجﺎمدانئە کە وهرون ﺑوه ۆیو ﺑ ﯽسعود ﺑﺎرزانمە وردستﺎنﯽک
 ۆریز ﯽێکشﺑە ﯽﺗوان یروانوشنە ،وهڵییەندهگە ﺑە کراوهدار نەکەلە یێنەنﺎو و و ێشتﺎه کە ێژينەملە ﯽپچە ۆشنبیرێکﯽو ر ێهﺎﺗول
 ۆرز ێکﯽشەﺑ ۆچونﯽﺑ یێرهگوزراند. ﺑەدامە ۆڕانﯽگ یوهﺑزوﺗنە کە ێکﺑبﺎت کﺎﺗ ۆیخ ڵگەلە کێتﯽيە ﯽکﺎنرکردهکﺎن و سەرگەشمەێپ
 CBB(، "ينرزلە ﺗەێنﺎوهکوردستﺎندا ه ێمﯽرهە لە یﺎسﯽس یخشەنە ختێشوهدا، "پ9002 ڵﯽسﺎ لە ۆڕانگ ﯽزراندندامە ۆڕان،پسپ لە
 )0102/3/6
 ﺑە تێشێکراده ۆيداخ یلاﺑە يﺎﺗرز نگریيەلا ﯽرنجوام سەرده، ﺑەنﺎوﺑﺎنگەکوردستﺎندا ﺑە ێمﯽرهە ﯽنجﺎنگە ێونلە کە کەوهﺑزوﺗنە
 مەئە ڕان،ۆگ کﺎنﯽیەکرهسە ئﺎمﺎنجە لە کێکەيە ڵﯽندهگە ڕکردنﯽﺑﺑنە ﯽندنسەنەشەکوردستﺎندا، ﺗە لە ێنو یﺑژاره شکردنﯽێشکەپ
 يﺎن "tsimonoce" دا ﺑە1102 ی2 ﯽمﺎنگ لە ۆڕانگ نگرانﯽيەش، لامەئە ڕایره. سەیةالعرﺑ ڵﯽواهە ڵﯽنﺎکە ۆرﺗێکﯽراپ یێرهگوﺑە
 ."یدڕاڵف ێراﻗﯽع رانﯽێنەنو ﯽننجومەئە کورد لە کﺎنﯽيیەندوهرژهﺑە ۆﺑ یﺎنکردوهمکە یکﺎر کێتﯽيەو  ﯽ"پﺎرﺗ کە يﺎندوهراگە
دان ﺗﺎنە ۆکرد ﺑ يﺎن"یکورد یهﺎر"ﺑە ڵدانﯽرهەت و سەحکومە یوهێشﺎنەکﺎرکست لەده یوازﺑﺎنگە ۆڕانگ یوهدا ﺑزوﺗنە1102 ڵﯽسﺎ لە
مﺎنگ  ێس یمﺎوه ۆﺑ ێکردوپ ﯽستده ڵدامﺎن سﺎهە ﯽشوﺑﺎﺗ ی71 لە کە کﺎندا،نەۆپیشﺎنداخ یندروﺑەسەکوردستﺎن. لە ێمﯽرهە ﯽﺗحکومە لە
ﺑو،  رانۆپیشندهخ یۆرﺑەز ﯽکرهسە ﯽئﺎمﺎنج ﯽو ﺑﺎرزان ﯽپﺎرﺗ يندارکران،س کوژران و ﺑرکە ينندکوردستﺎندا، چە ﺑو لەهە وامﯽردهﺑە
 ا، گوشﺎرهﺎيیدۆﺗک . لەرانداۆپیشﺎندهخ ڵگەلە کردنڵەمﺎمە ﺗﯽۆنیەچت ﺑەﺑﺎرهدا سەکور ﯽکﺎنرپرسەﺑە ێواننﺑو لەهە کۆکییەدا نﺎکوکﺎﺗەلە
 ينندچە ۆیه. ﺑەتێنێﺑه کﺎنۆپیشﺎندانەخ ﺑە ۆﺗﺎيﯽک کە ێنﺎه کێتﯽيە ۆﺑ ۆريﺎنز ،وهێرانەو ئ ەريکﺎمئە نيەلالە ﺗﯽيبەﺗﺎﺑە کﺎن،ییەکرهده
 ۆﺑو ﺑ يستێوپ ۆڕانگ یوهوﺗنەﺑز ۆﺗﺎيیدا،ک. لەﯽپﺎرﺗ ڵاﺗﯽسەده ێرژ ﯽکﺎننﺎوچە ﺑگﺎﺗە یوهﺑو لەوﺗو نەرکەسە کەڕينەراپە ،وهۆکﺎرهه
 .یررﺗﺎسەسە ڕينێکﯽراپە ۆﺑ ێتﺑب یکەپلانە یردارستبەده ﯽکﺎﺗ کﯽيەمﺎوه
 
 مدهێکدهﺗ کەيﺎريیە يﺎنم کەئە يﺎری يﺎن: گۆڕان
ت، حکومە ﺎنﯽێکهێنپ ۆر ﺑﺑە يگرێتەکوردستﺎن ده ێمﯽرهە ﯽﺗحکومە ن کەکەده یﺎوازج ینﺎريۆیس ينندچە ﺑﺎس لە ۆنﺎوخ کﺎنﯽکﺎرهشرۆڤە
 ێشبینﯽﺗر پ کﺎنﯽینﺎريۆ. سیﺎيداشدارﺑن ﺗﺑە کﺎنیﺎسیەس یزﺑەمو حهە کيەێوهشﺑە کﺎن،نەيەلا ﯽفراوان ێکردنﯽپ یشدارﺑە مکەيە ینﺎريۆیس
 کێتﯽيە يﺎن ۆڕانگ یوهﺑزوﺗنە کﺎنڵبژاردنەهە مﯽێیەم و سدوه یﺑراوه لە کێکيە ڵگەکوردستﺎن لە يموکراﺗﯽد ﯽرﺗپﺎ ن کەکەئە وهئە
و  کێتﯽيە ڵگەلە ێکبهێنێتپ کﺗییەيمﺎنیەهﺎوپە ێتﺗوانده ﯽپﺎرﺗ ،يەوهﺗر ئە کﯽینﺎريۆيە. سێکبهێنێتت پکوردستﺎن حکومە یشتمﺎنﯽن
 .کﺎنیسلامییەئ زﺑەیدو ح لە کێکيە
 ۆڕانگ يﺎخودﺗدا ومەحک ێکهێنﺎنﯽپ لە ێنێتشکستبه ﯽﺑﺎرزان ڤﺎنێجیرهن ێويستەپ يﺎرودانن. ئﺎ یلﯽﻗﺎﺑ يﺎﺗرز ۆﺗﺎيﯽک یینﺎريۆکەس دو
 .کﺎندهوهنە ڵانﯽسﺎ ۆینﺎوخ ڕیشە ۆخﯽد ۆﺑ وهڕێتەﺑگە کەێمەرهە نگەره کە يەهە ێزهﺑە کﯽيەيمﺎنە، گروهدورﺑخﺎﺗە
 کﯽيەێشەک ویڕروﺑە ڵامﺑە ێنێت،ستبهدهکوردستﺎن ﺑە ﯽمﺎنرلەپە کﺎنﯽییەکورس یۆرﺑەز ﯽکوردستﺎن ﺗوان يموکراﺗﯽد ﯽپﺎرﺗ ندهرچەهە
 ێژیﺑ. وﺗەانوفراﺑنکە يمﺎنﯽهﺎوپە یرﺑﺎرهده وهﺗەڵاوکردوهﺑ یرانەهﺎنده یيﺎننﺎمەﺑە ينندچە ﯽﺗدا. پﺎرﺗحکومە ێکهێنﺎنﯽپ لە وهﺗەﺑوه یجد
 ێکرجمە یچه ﯽپﺎرﺗ ﯽ؛مﺎنکﺎﺗدا وﺗهەلە ڵامکﺎت، ﺑەده و پلانەئە یوانﯽپشت یکەیزﺑەح کە يﺎندوهراگە یوهئە یمینکﯽ،ر ئعفەجە ﯽ،پﺎرﺗ
 .يدارسەﺑە ێنرێتپﺑسە ۆرزنﺎکﺎت ﺑە ڵﻗبو
 ۆیزانک لە ڵايەﺑﺎپلە ێژیﺑوانە کە يﺎسین،ﺑورهﺎن  لە يﺎنوﺗە کە وهﺗەڵاوکراوهﺑ ێکﺗﺑﺎﺑە 3102/01/42 لە gro.hsaqin ڕیڵپەمﺎ لە
دا"،  یﺎسﯽس کﯽيەينگەژ لە ۆکردنکﺎرکردن و گفتوگ یﺗوانﺎ لە یﺎوازهج ۆرز ڵبژاردنێکداهە لە ﯽکورس ێنﺎنﯽستهده"ﺑە ڵێ؛ک دهلوند، وه
 111 لە کێتﯽيە ﯽپشک ﯽ،کورس 42 ۆڕانگ ﯽ،کورس 83 ﯽپﺎرﺗ کە وهنەکەده ﯽدوپﺎﺗ کﺎنەیسمره نجﺎمە، "ئەدا هﺎﺗوهکەﺗەﺑﺎﺑە یێژهدر لە
 ٦1ﺑون،  یۆنداسۆپۆزئ لە کە ،کەیەکرهسە یسلامییەئ یزﺑەدو ح ێکداکﺎﺗ لە ﯽ،کورس 81 ۆﺑ يوهزداﺑە ۆنﺎوخ ﯽمﺎنرلەپە یکەیەکورس
 .ێنﺎوهستهدهﺑە یﺎنکورس
 کێگﺎيەر رر هەەﺑنەﺑەنﺎ دهوا پەئە کرێت،ێنەپ يیﺎنشدارو ﺑە ێتر ﺑگەئە کە وهڵاوکردهﺑ يﺎنﺗوند يﯽئﺎگﺎدار ينندچە نۆڕاگ کﺎنﯽرکردهسە
 ڵامﺑە ،رﺗوهرگهو یجد ﺑە یمەئە ﯽکوردستﺎندا. پﺎرﺗ لە یررﺗﺎسەسە ۆپیشﺎندانﯽخ ۆکﺎن ﺑﻗﺎمەر شەسە ش چونەوانەﺑکﺎت، لە ێويستپ کە
 .ێتﺑده ۆڕانﯽگ ﯽکﺎنرجەمە یوهڕوﺑونەروﺑە یێشەک
 ۆﺎ ﺑدان یﺎنرجمە ينندچە ۆڕانگ ﯽکﺎنرکردهسە دا،کەێمەرهە م لەدوه یزﺑﯽک حوه یێیەنو ێزهو هئە ێنﺎنﯽستهدهﺑە لە یوهئﺎگﺎهﺎﺗنەﺑە
 یوهئە ﺗﯽبەﺗﺎي(ﺑە تیەفﺎفﺗدا، شەحکومە ێندایجئە ڕشتنﯽدا لە يﺎنچﺎلاکﺎنە يﯽشدارش ﺑەوانەداهﺎﺗودا. لە ﯽﺗحکومە لە يکردنیﺎنشدارﺑە
 ێنﺎنﯽستهدهﺑە . ﺑەڵﯽندهگە ڕکردیﺑهﺎ ﺑنەروه) هەداکەێمەرهە لە خشەئﺎزارﺑە ێکﯽپرس ێستﺎشﺗﺎ ئهە کە ،يەهە وهوﺗەنە ﯽداهﺎﺗ ﺑە ندیيوهپە
 ێتداﺑن ێستﺎئ ێزگﺎریپﺎر ۆﺑ کيەوهێگرهج وێيەده ۆڕانگ شدا،ێزگﺎکەپﺎر ﯽننجومەئە لە شينەۆرز ﯽو ﺑون ێمﺎنﯽسل ﯽکﺎننگەده یۆرينەز
 خستە مﺎنییﺎنێرزو سلهە ڵبژاردنهە ﯽکﺎننجﺎمە. ئەيداکەۆستەپ لە وامەردهﺑە ڵەسﺎ ينندچە يﺎسﺎيﯽنﺎ کﯽيەێوهشو ﺑە کێتییەيە ر ﺑەسە کە
 .کﺎن دروستکردوهکورده رپرسەﺑە ۆﺑ ﯽﺗرسنﺎک ﯽمنئە کﯽيەداحەﺗە کە وهيیەکوژشەره کيەیرهنﺎو زنج
شتوانن ەو ئ وێتيﺎنەئە ێت،کرنە جێێبەج کﺎنیﺎنيیەو داواکﺎر ێتر ﺑگەئە کە ڕوﺗەئﺎشکرا خستوه ﺑە يﺎنوهئە ۆڕانگ کﺎنﯽرکردهسە
 ﯽﺗحکومە ەل ڕنداﺑب ێمﺎنﯽسل ێزگﺎیﺗوانن پﺎرگونجﺎو ده کﯽيەێوهشت ﺑەنﺎنەن، ﺗەﺑده ێکوپێکﺗ ێمرهە یﺎسﯽس یۆسەپر یرﺑەرلەسە
و  کێتﯽەينﺎو لە يەهە ێزهﺑە ێکﯽکردن ۆﺑﯽو ل کرێتێدهل یرگرﺑە ڵﯽﻗوﺑە ۆرز ێت،ﺑ کيەێوهرشهەﺑە ڵﯽ،ندهکوردستﺎن. گە رێمﯽهە
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 .یجد يفۆرمێکﯽر رهە ﯽنرودا لە ێگريکردنر ۆﺑ یداپﺎرﺗ
 ڵەگلە کردنﯽڵەمﺎمە ﺗﯽۆنیەچ لە وهﺗەﺗرسنﺎک ﺑوه کﯽيەداحەﺗە یروروﺑە ێراقع یﺑﺎکور لە یکورد ییدارهئ ،ۆکﺎرانەم هئە رﺑەلە
 .ۆڕانگ یم)دهده ێکﯽﺗ يﺎنم کەئە يﺎری يﺎن( یکﯽﺗﺎکت
 ێتهﺎوکﺎر ﺑ ێتﺗوانده یﺎﺗورک یوهرهده ﺗﯽسیﺎسە
 ڕی. شەوێێبکەﺗ ێویپش ینێﺑب ێنﺎﺗوان ۆيەکوردستﺎن دا ﺑ ێمﯽرهە لە يەهە ﯽمنو ئە یئﺎﺑور یوپتە یيەپﺎ ۆرز کﯽيەژمﺎره ﺗورکیﺎ
خت هێشوپ ەک ێکﺎنیدا،دراوس ڵگەلە یﺎﺗورک کﺎنﯽنديەيوهپە ﯽر شﺎنسە خﺎﺗەﺗر ئە ﯽگران ێکﯽﺑﺎر داکەێمەرهە لە یووزهفە ۆخﯽو د ۆنﺎوخ
 ۆخﯽد ،ڕﺑﺎزا ۆلارید هﺎێنەو ﺑلووره گە ﯽﺑﺎزرگﺎن ێنﺎنﯽرهﺑەوه ﯽستداندهلە یرﺑﺎر. سەوﺗوهێکەﺗ ڵۆزیئﺎ يﺎوهسور نﯽکﺎێشەک ۆیهﺑە
 ۆﺑ ێشێترﺑکهﺎ سەروههە ێنێت،ﺑه یکﺎرﺑە ۆیخ ﯽﻗﺎزانج ﺑە ێﺗوانئە KKP کﺎت کەهﺎ دروست ئەوه یﺎسﯽس کﯽۆشﺎيیەﺑ ێرهئ ﯽنﺎئﺎرام
 ڵامستﺎ ﺑو، ﺑەوه ﺎیﺗورک يرانﯽزوه ۆکرسە ﯽشﺎنشﺎنبە کە کريﺎرﺑەد ﺑو لە ۆرﺑﺎشز ێکﯽشت ﯽﺑﺎرزان ینینﯽکﺎن. ﺑنەﺗورکمﺎ یکوشتﺎرگە
. مێژويیەو  ولﯽیمبس وهۆﺑونەو کئە ۆﺑ ۆيداخ ڵگەلە يەﺑبردا يشﯽﺗر ﯽکﺎنکورده رکردهسە يەﺑکرا يلﻗﺎ ﯽر ﺑﺎرزانگەﺑو ئەﺑﺎشتر ده مەئە
 کﺎنﯽڵاﺗەسەده دژ ﺑە ێنێتهکﺎردهﺑە ێکک داشوه ﯽﺑﺎرزان ۆگﺎنردئە يبب ﺗەجەره يرانزوه ۆکرسە کە وهڕيەسئە یﺗﺎنەۆمەو ﺗئە مەئە
 .لانۆجەئ
ر ەو ﺑ مکەيەن، کﺎروداوه ویێڕهر رسەلە ريدانﺎنيگەکﺎر ۆﺑ ڵاﺗیدايەسەده ێرژلە کە يەهە ﯽداهﺎﺗ یرچﺎوهسە ۆرز کﯽيەژمﺎره ﺗورکیﺎ
. ییەپﺎرﺗ کە دا،کەنﺎوچە ریيﺎريکە ينچﺎلاکتر رههە ڵگەلە یجﯽستراﺗ کﯽﺗیەيمﺎنیەهﺎوپە ﺑدات ﺑەشەگە ﺗﯽیويەﺗوان یﺎﺗورک ێک،ر شتهەلە
 يﯽهﺎوکﺎر ﺎﺗريداهﺎﺗودا ز لە ەک ﯽپﺎرﺗ يکردنﯽراز ۆﺑ ێببینرێتل یسود ريگەکﺎر کﯽيەێوهشﺑە يەوهﺑە ێويستﯽپ ﺗیەيمﺎنیەم هﺎوپەئە
 کدايەمو لاهە ﯽﺗخزمە لە کە کيەێوهشﺑە ینەﻗراستە کگرﺗویيە ێکﯽﺗحکومە ێکهێنﺎنﯽپ ت ﺑەﺑﺎرهسە ێتﺑ ۆپۆزسیۆنئ کﺎنﯽيەداواکﺎر
 .کردنە ۆﺑ ژهئﺎمﺎ یێگەج يسێکەکە يﺎسور یﺎ،ﺗورک ۆﺑ ییەﺑﺎش ن یرﻗﺎمگنﺎسە کﯽێیە. دراوسوهیﺎشەﺗورک ﺑە ێت،ﺑ
 يەەه ۆکﺎريشﯽه کورددا و ﯽکﺎنروداوه یدشهەمە لە رچﺎوهﺑە ێزێکﯽه ۆڕانگ ﺑکﺎت کە ییەو راستئە یچﺎوره ێويستەپ یﺎﺗورک هﺎروههە
 یپرد ندينچە ێويستەپ یﺎورکﺗ ﺗﯽیﺎسەس رانﯽڕێژه، داواﺗە... کەیﺎو ﺗورک ﯽپﺎرﺗ کﺎنﯽيەندوهرژهﺑە لە رێرانکەو کﯽيەوهندنەسەۆڵەﺗ ۆﺑ
 داهﺎﺗو لە یيەده ينندچە ۆﺑ چێتێدهپ کە ۆڕان،گ یوهﺑزوﺗنە ﺗﯽيبەﺗﺎﺑە کﺎندا،يەکورد ۆپۆزسیۆنەئ یزﺑەح ڵگەلە ێنﺑن یﺎتﺑن ندیيوهپە
 ۆوهوخراستە ۆیگفتوگ یﺎێگر ش لەوانەلە ێت،نجﺎم ﺑدرئە ێگﺎوهر ينندچە لە ێتکرده شنديەيوهم پە. ئەێتﺑهە یﺎندا ﺑونکەنﺎوچە
 ۆﺑ ێتﺑهە کﺎنەینﺎحوکم ێکخراوهر ێنﺎنﯽکﺎرهﺑە ﺑە ێويستﯽپ یﺎﺗورک نگەکوردا. ره ۆینﺎوخ ﺗﯽیﺎسیەس لە نﯽێلايەﺑ یشﺎندانﯽهﺎ پروههە
 .کﺎنێشەک ﯽنﺎنهلاوو ﺑە کگرﺗويە ێکﯽﺗحکومە ێکهێنﺎنﯽپ ۆﺑ کﺎنيەکورد یزﺑەح ﺑە پێدانێگەر ۆﺑ ێويستپ يﯽکﺎرامە کردنﯽڕاستەئﺎ
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matured as an intellectual movement, finally becoming a party supported by Iraqi and Kurdish diaspora 
intellectuals. It sends messages of democratization, budget transparency, administrative reforms, dealing with 
corruption and enhancement of civil society to the Kurdish people. It rejected the idea of basing its political 
action on tribal identity. Members even rejected signaling their tribal affiliation in their names. Furthermore, 
Gorran created a research center affiliated with the party organization. Nearly 90 percent of working people 
receive salaries from the state in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan (PUK) have enterprises and factories. They are able to distribute MONEY to the voters. In such 
an environment, Gorran did not want to be part of the establishment in Erbil or Baghdad. They did not go 
after a huge number of votes despite their strong voter base. 
In 2009, little was known about Gorran. There was no solid information except from some prominent figures 
who parted ways with the PUK. The Noşirvan Mustafa-led Gorran movement, based in Sulaymaniyya, 
contributed to a decline in support for the Masoud Barzani - Jalal Talabani alliance from 90 percent to 53 
percent. In the parliamentary and presidential elections held on July 25, 2009 in Iraqi Kurdistan, the party 
came second after the KDP-PUK alliance. They caused a big surprise by receiving 23.62 percent of the vote. 
Currently, Gorran has eight of a total 325 seats in the Iraqi parliament and 25 of a total 100 in the Iraqi 
Kurdistan parliament. 
In Iraqi Kurdistan, a constitution was adopted by the parliament in 2009, however, a referendum should also 
be held for its entrance into effect. Gorran asks for a referendum after additional amendments to the 
constitution and pays special attention to relations with Turkey, which they do not see as an alien country. 
They say that the Turkmen population should have a position of deputy presidency in Iraqi Kurdistan. To this 
end, they strongly support the settlement process in Turkey. If Ankara successfully completes the settlement 
process, they believe that peace will be rebuilt with Turkey's assistance. Iraq is in a state of chaos. In July 
alone, 3,000 were killed in terror attacks. Iraqi Kurdistan is an OASIS of stability and security in Iraq. For 
this reason, Gorran believes that Iraqi Kurdistan is on the edge of instability. They believe that only Turkey 
could protect them from any potential collapse and turmoil. Gorran's Iraqi Parliament Deputy and Group 
Chair Dr. Latif Muhammad said: “We have had so many bad days in Iraq that we have barely saved our spirit, 
let alone our culture.” Turkey continues to make peace with itself. If Mevlana Jelaluddin Rumi's “Mesnevi” 
is being translated into the Kurdish language in a conservative city such as Konya, where Kurdish people do 
not even constitute 10 percent of the population, this means that bold and irreversible steps have been taken. 
Politics sometimes works against the interests of the people. Without political interference, peoples, religions 
and sects may exist together. For this reason, we need to build confidence in the Middle East first. An unsaid 
or unexpressed view cannot be tested. We need to investigate what lies behind opinions. New dynamics that 





ەوەیيزیلگنیئەلﺑ :ناوشی ەجللا 
سهنادره گنرگه میهکهییوژێ گناڕۆ بۆ هئهقنهر 
 
ەهودر ەكﺗرﯽ ﺎﺗەبيت تشگ وﯽی ەل زنەكيهو رﺎهیرﺎكي حﯽﺑزی هدەستڵا ەئ وەناوی ەلەناوهو زننكي هدەكن.  
 
تﺎكوﺎه ﺑۆ ەئهوی ەﺑهر رەنخەنادرﺎك وهوی حﯽﺑزی هدەستڵا ەنەكخ ،نونﺎيۆ ەل ئنۆیسزۆپۆ هرود ەپرزێ هدەس .نرگەتنرﯽكێ 
لەنیڵۆكێهوﯽي هوەس( كەتنری لەنیڵۆكێهوی ﺗارتسﯽجی خەهرۆﯽﺗڵا هوﺎنتساڕەك ) ەﺑ (ORSAM) هوارسﺎنسرپ ،ﯽكێ ەلج وهرۆ 
ﺎخﺎنەﺗ،وڕ ەﺑﺑێ ەئهوی ەﺑرﺎكدروارەيك ەل تﺎكﺑ نناوێ حﯽﺑزی هدەسڵات ئ وادنۆیسزۆپۆەئ .ەس مەتنهرك ،ەنوﺑۆهوی ەلەگڵ ەهودرلاەين 
هودركﺑ تﺎكوﺎه ووری ﺑﯽنوچۆ ەهلاودری تسخەﺗۆوڕەل .ەس مەﺑ ورهدنەنﺗوزﺑ ادهوی گناڕۆ ەك ﺗرﺎپﯽ ەسهركﯽ ئنۆیسزۆپۆە ەل 
نﺎتسدروكﯽ ع،قارێ ەل 13 ﺑۆ 16 ی ەئەگنﺎم مەس ادنادرﯽ ەئەقنهری ەل .دركوێ وﺎهێڕ ەلەگڵ ەسەتنری (ORSAM)  ادكرۆ 
شنﺎیكێپۆ ەل دركزﺎسژرێ نوﺎنﯽنﺎشی ەگ"ەشی سﯽسﺎی ەل موكحﯽناڕ نﺎتسدروكﯽ عقارێ وﺗﺎهاد وی ەپهويیدن نناوێ كروﺗوﺎی نادروكﯽ 
قارێع". 
ەنﺗوزﺑیەو گناڕۆ ەك ەل ﺎسﯽڵ 2009 ههو ەمادهوارزهر ،هەدنﯽكێ ونﯽێ ەتسخ نوێ ﺎكەيی ژﯽنﺎي سﯽسﺎی نﺎتسدروكﯽ عەﻗارێهو تﺎكوﺎه .
ەئەنﺗوزﺑ مهوەي هوەنﺗوزﺑ كهوەيﯽك ركفشي هدەكرهوﺗوەﺑ ،پوەیێی ەئ رﺎجاودەنﺗوزﺑ وهوەي ەللاەين زكێرۆ ەل ریدنەوە عﯽﻗارێ  و
دروكەيهو ﺎپﯽتشپڵ لهدێتێركەئ .ەنﺗوزﺑ ووهەي كەمۆكێڵ ەپﯽمﺎي دهزیﺗاركوميﯽندرك ەﺑ وﺎهﯽنﺎیﺗڵا ەگ دروكهودنﺎي، ەلەناو شەفﺎفەیت ەل 
  622
 وهكﺎﺗەﺗدهره يديﺎيەو ئﺎئە يەيەوهو ﺑزوﺗنە. ئەهوییەندهمە ڵگﺎیۆمەك ﯽندنسەشەو گە ڵﯽندهگە ﺑە نديدايوهپە لە یداريﯽ،ئ ی، چﺎكسﺎزﺑودجە
 ینﺎو ۆیپﺎشك كە وهنەكەﺗدهش رهوهت ئەنﺎنەﺗە یزﺑەو حئە ﯽندامﺎن. ئەێنێتزرداﺑمە ۆیخ یﺎسﯽس ﯽشونﺎس كﯽێڵەخ یمﺎر ﺑنەسەلە كە
 .ێكهێنﺎوهپ وهيەكەیزﺑەح ێكخستنﯽر ﺑە نديدايوهپە لە یوهێژينەﺗو رێكﯽەنتسە ۆڕانش گمەلە يﺎد. زێتﺑهە وهیﺎنەكﺎننﺎوه ﺑە كﯽێڵەخ
كوردستﺎن و  يموكراﺗﯽد ﯽگرن. پﺎرﺗردهكوردستﺎن وه ێمﯽرهە ﯽﺗحكومەلە ن موچەكەكﺎرده یڵكﺎنەو خەئە ی 09دا سەلە ینزيكە
 يويستوهان نەڕۆدا گشنەو چەلە كﯽۆخێد ران. لەنگدهدهخشن ﺑەﺑبە ﺗوانن پﺎرهكﺎنن. دهكﺎرگە وۆژهپر ﯽنكوردستﺎن خﺎوه یشتیمﺎنﯽن كێتﯽيە
 ﯽنو خﺎوه ێنﺎﺑوه ﯽنگده ۆرز كﯽيەژمﺎره كە یوهئە ڕایرهسە مەئە يش،غدام ﺑەو هە لێرەوه م لەهە ڵاتسەده لە ێكشﺑە ﺑە ێتﺑب
 .ێزﺑوهﺑە يﯽرمﺎوهجە كﯽيەێگەپ
نﺎو ەل يﺎرد ێكﯽسند كەچە كە ێتﺑنە وهنهﺎ ئەﺑو ﺗەستدا نەردهﺑەلە يﺎرد كﯽیﺎريەانرا. زانزده ۆڕانگ یرﺑﺎرهم شت دهدا، كە9002 ڵﯽسﺎ لە
 یوهئە ۆیه ا، ﺑوهزردامە ﯽﺎنێمسل یشﺎر فﺎ لەمستە یروانوشنە ﺗﯽرايەڕاﺑەﺑە كە يەوهم ﺑزوﺗنە. ئەیﺎﺑبۆوهكوردستﺎن ج یشتیمﺎنﯽن كێتﯽيە
 ﺗﯽۆكﺎيەرسە ڵبژاردنەهە . لە%35 ۆﺑ ێتزداﺑبە وهه %09 ﺑﺎنﯽڵەلال ﺗﺎو جە ﯽسعود ﺑﺎرزانمە ێوانن يمﺎنیﯽهﺎوپە لە ڵپشتیﯽپﺎ یێژهر كە
 یم ﺑراوهدوه ﺑوه وهكێتیەيەو  ﯽپﺎرﺗ يمﺎنیﯽهﺎوپە ایدولە يەوهم ﺑزوﺗنەئە ێراﻗدا،ع ﯽكوردستﺎن ی 9002 ی 7 ی52 یكەیەمﺎنرلەو پە
 ﯽشت كورسهە ﯽنخﺎوه ﯽكورس 523 ۆیكلە ۆڕانگ ێستﺎدائ . لەێنﺎستهدهﺑە ﯽراننگدهده ی %26.32 یێژهو ر كﺎنڵبژاردنەهە
 .ێراﻗداع ﯽكوردستﺎن مﺎنﯽلەرپە لە ﯽكورس 001 ۆیكلە یەكورس 52 ﯽنو، هﺎوكﺎت خﺎوه ێراﻗەع ﯽمﺎنرلەپە
 ۆڕانگ ڵام. ﺑەوهيفراندۆمەر ێتەﺑخر كە كراوهستور ئﺎمﺎدهده كﯽيەۆژهپر وهمﺎنەرلەپە نيەلادا لە 9002 ڵﯽسﺎ لە اﻗدا،ێرع ﯽكوردستﺎن لە
 وێتيەده ۆڕانگ ێیداﺗ ە. كوهيفراندۆمەر ێتەﺑخر ینجﺎئ وهێتەموار ﺑكرمﺎن هەرلەپە لە ستورهو دهئە دوﺑﺎره كﺎت كەده وهئە یداوا
 ەرێمه یﺗر ﺎنﯽەﺗەوەکن ەﺑ ێتﺑدر ەهەرێمل ڵاﺑﺎ ۆستﯽپ كە وێتيﺎنەوان ده. ئەیﺎداﺗورك ڵگەلە كﺎننديەيوهپە ﺑە ێتﺑدر تيبەﺗﺎ كﯽیەگرنگ
ر گە یﺎنوايەێوان پ. ئەایﺎدﺗورك ڵگەلە ﺎتكده یﺎسﯽس یريﯽﻗﺎمگسە ێزیهﺑە كﯽڵپشتیەدا پﺎندهروﺑەم سەﺗوركمﺎن. لە یوهﺗەنە ەنﺎويﺎندال
 لە ڕپ ڵاﺗێكەو ێراق. عوهنرێتەیﺎﺗدهﺑن داڵاﺗەو ولە ید ێكﯽجﺎر ۆﺑ یﯽوا ئﺎشترﺑخﺎت، ئەسە يەۆسەو پروﺗو ئەركەسە كﯽيەێوهش ﺑە رهنقەئە
 اێراﻗدع لە ێنەشو ﺗﺎكە ێراقع ﯽژراون. كوردستﺎنكو وهكﺎنەیرۆرستیەﺗ ێرشەه ۆیهس ﺑەكە 0003موزدا، ﺗە ﯽمﺎنگ نهﺎ لەﺗە. ﺑەيرانﻗە
 ۆرز گﺎریۆژر ەعێراﻗدال ێمە"ئ ﯽوﺗ ۆڕانگ یستﯽر لسەلە ێراقع ﯽمﺎنرلەپە ﯽندامئە یف،ﺗلە ۆر. دكتێترارﺑرﻗەﺑە ێیداﺗ يشئﺎسﺎ كە
 ."ەلتورک یچ جﺎ ێزينﺑپﺎر یﺎنمﺎنﺑو گ ەحمەتز ۆرز ەک ەسەرﺑرد،ﺑ ۆشمﺎننﺎخ
 نگەره اکﺎنينزو ئﺎ كﺎنينەو ئﺎ ڵكﺎنخە ﺗیش،یﺎسەس ەستێوەردانﯽد ێﺑكﺎت. ﺑەکﺎرده وهڵكەخە ﯽخواست یوانەێچەپ ﺑە تیﺎسەس ندێكجﺎرهە
 یستراوﺑنە و كراونە ی. وﺗەێینﺑن یﺎتﺑن ڕاستدانﺎوه ۆژهەڵاﺗﯽرلە شت متمﺎنە مینكەيە ێوستەپ ێمەئ ۆکﺎرەه ەمئ ەﺑەر. لنڵبكەهە وهێكەپ
 ینﺎکردنﯽﺑ ەﺑ ەداتد ﯽگرنگ ەک ێنو ينەمیکﯽ. دایروڕاكﺎنەوەيەپشت ﺑ لە ێکچ شت ەينﺑک وهێكۆڵینەل ێويستە. پوهیبكرێتەﺗﺎﻗ ێتنﺎﺗوانر
 .كﺎنێیەنو میكیەينەدا ينگرنگتر ەل كێكەيە ۆڕانگ ەرکەوﺗون،د ەڕاستدانﺎو ۆژهەڵاﺗﯽر ەل ەمتمﺎن
 





 neheg thcin lliw inazraB dussaM
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 iewz run thcerlhaW ehcsikari sad lhowbo ,netertuzkcüruz hcis tregiew tnedisärplanoigeR ehcsidruk reD
 tznergeb nedoirepstmA nessed dnu tsi githcäm uz thcin sad ,tpuahrebostaatS niE theisrov nedoirepstmA
 ,nehcam eitarkomeD ruz geW ned fua hcis eid ,nrednäL nov lettezmmargorP med fua thets saD :dnis
 edeR eid nned ,"rednälsednuB" llaF meresnu ni redo – rednäL tbig sE .owsredna redo netsO nehaN mi
 neuen menie uz noitisnarT eid negitläweb eid ,– karidroN mi teibegeimonotuA nehcsidruk mov tsi
 geW meblah fua ssad ,thetstne kcurdniE red nnew ,se tsi regiruart osmU .eredna sla resseb metsyS
 :tgaseg zruK .se negnalrev ednätsmU eiD :ehcielg eid remmi tsi gnudnürgeB eiD .driw thcameg trhek
 hcan thcin hcod lliw dnu tgelrebü sredna hcis se tah inazraB dussaM tnedisärplanoigeR ehcsidruk reD
 mov 9002 eiD .theisrov thcerlhaW egitiezred sad se eiw ,netertba 3102 tsuguA mi nedoirepstmA iewz
 merhi ba mhi edrüw gnussafrevlanoigeR ehcsidruk etreizifitar ein sgnidrella ,etedeihcsbarev tnemalraP
 retiew gnussafreV red na ssad ,fuarad siewniH med tiM .nettatseg lhawredeiW enie hcon neterttfarknI
 edoireprutalsigeL enegie enies librE ni tnemalraplanoigeR ehcsidruk sad tah ,ssum nedrew tetiebraeg
 ,ßiew rew dnU .5102 tsuguA .91 sib hcielg sgnidrella inazraB nov eid ,tregnälrev etanoM raap nie mu
 driw inazraB .driw nehesrov nnad gnussafreV eid netnedisärP ned rüf nedoirepstmA eretiew eleiv eiw
 eid red ni ,gnuztisstnemalraP eiD .sua sawte hcon nohcs hcis theg ad ,tla erhaJ 76 tsuguA mi
 nerelttim renie ni etedne dnu ttats inuJ .03 ma nohcs dnaf ,nedruw nessolhcseb negnubeihcsreV
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Prügelei, Fäuste und Wasserflaschen flogen. Die Oppositionsparteien, die ja im Prinzip auch wollen, 
dass das Wahlrecht noch einmal überholt wird, fühlten sich vom nicht mehr so mächtigen wie früher, 
aber immer noch übermächtigen Block der zwei traditionellen Kurdenparteien KDP (Kurdische 
Demokratische Partei) und PUK (Patriotische Union Kurdistans) überrollt, die alles, was sie wollen, mit 
ihrer Mehrheit durchboxen. Genereller Ärger besteht auch bei der parlamentarischen Opposition, weil 
Barzani die Frage, ob er seine eigene Amtsverlängerung unterschreiben würde, mit Kleingruppen und 
Kräften außerhalb des Parlaments zu diskutieren gedachte, um besser auf die „öffentliche Meinung“ 
eingehen zu können: Bei dem klientelistischen Netzwerk der KDP und der Barzanis läuft das nur auf 
eine Machtkonsolidierung hinaus, außerhalb des Parlaments, das an Bedeutung verliert. Es hat 2005 
den Präsidenten noch gewählt, 2009 gab es bereits eine Volkswahl. Eine der Fragen, die die Juristen 
beschäftigt, ist deshalb, ob das Parlament überhaupt das Recht hat, die Amtszeit des Präsidenten zu 
verlängern. Auf Meta-Ebene ist das Argument für solche Manöver natürlich immer die Stabilität, die 
Oppositionsparteien verweisen jedoch auf Korruption und Nepotismus in Kurdistan, die die zarten 
demokratischen Strukturen in ihren Anfängen erstickt. Der Protest dagegen hat ja auch die stärkste 
Oppositionspartei, die PUK-Abspaltung Gorran (Wechsel), hervorgebracht. Die anderen kurdischen 
Parteien im Parlament sind – bis auf die der ethnischen und religiösen Minderheiten – meist islamistisch 
(und haben auch lautstark den Sturz des Muslimbruders Mohammed Morsi in Ägypten beklagt). Die 
PUK ist durch den Ausfall ihres Führers – des irakischen Staatspräsidenten Jalal Talabani, der seit 
Dezember 2012 nach einem schweren Schlaganfall in Deutschland in einem Krankenhaus liegt – 
geschwächt, sie hat den KDP-Wünschen nichts entgegenzusetzen. Die Zukunftsfähigkeit der PUK, die 
ja eine KDP-Abspaltung ist, wird von manchen Beobachtern angezweifelt. Der starke Mann der PUK ist 
momentan eine Frau: Talabanis Gattin Hero Ibrahim Ahmed. Auch Talabanis Sohn Qubad wurde aus 
Washington zurückgerufen. Gegen diese Übermacht der Familie in der PUK wendet sich der frühere 
kurdische Premier der kurdischen Regionalregierung, Barham Salih, der international gut vernetzt ist. 
Barzani – der auch unter den syrischen Kurden vermittelt und die nordirakischen Beziehungen zu 
Ankara gut managt – absolvierte soeben einen Europa-Trip. Vorher war er jedoch zum ersten Mal seit 
drei Jahren in Bagdad, ein Versuch, das zuletzt dramatisch schlechte Verhältnis zur Regierung in 
Bagdad, namentlich zum irakischen Premier Nuri al-Maliki, zu reparieren (der seinerseits vorher nach 
Erbil kam). Einmal mehr wurde beschlossen, die großen kurdisch-arabischen Fragen bald anzugehen: 
das Management der Ölressourcen in der Kurdenregion, wobei die Kurden volle Autonomie 
beanspruchen. Neuer Ärger könnte durch die neue Pipeline der Kurden an die türkische Grenze 
entstehen, wenn sich Erbil und Bagdad nicht bald einigen. Der größte Brocken bleibt die Zukunft der 
Stadt Kirkuk und der zwischen Kurden und Arabern umstrittenen Gebiete, für die die irakische 
Verfassung von 2005 ein Referendum vorsah, das nie stattfand. Maliki ist nicht weniger als Barzani ein 
Machtmensch: Vonseiten der Kurden musste er sich seit 2010 immer wieder Vergleiche mit Saddam 
Hussein gefallen lassen. Er selbst muss sich übrigens mit keinem irakischen Präsidenten 
herumschlagen: erstens ist das Amt verfassungsmäßig eher schwach, zweitens ist, wie bereits gesagt, 
Talabani ausgefallen. Der sunnitische Vizepräsident Tarik al-Hashimi ist wegen Terrorismusbeihilfe zum 
Tod verurteilt und lebt in der Türkei, bleibt ein schiitischer Vizepräsident, Khodair al-Khozaie, von dem 
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تی مانهوەی لهپۆستی سهرۆکهیهتیدا لهو وڵاتانهدا بهئاراستهی دیموکراسی بهڕێوەن سهرۆک ههمو دەسهڵاتێکی نییهو مۆڵه
دیاریکراوە. دیارە ئهمه لهرۆژههڵاتی ناوەراستیش دا پهیڕەو دەکرێ. بهڵام جاروبار وڵاتێک، یاخود ههرێمێک ههیه بهرەو دواوە 
وکراسی مههنگاو دەنێ. وەک لهبابهتی ئهم باسهدا ئاماژەی پێدەکهین ههرێمی ئۆتۆنۆمی کوردەکان لهباکوری عێراق دا پاشهکشهی دی
دەبینین. مایهی نیگهرانیه ئهو ههرێمه لهنیوەی رێگای بهرەو دیموکراسیبون دا بوەستێ و بۆ دواوە بگهڕێتهوە، بیانوی دەسهڵات 
 . و سستهمهکهیش بۆ هێشتنهوەی سهرۆک وەکو ههمو جارێک بریتیه لهم رستهیه: بارودۆخهکهوا دەخوازێ
 
ستانی عێراق دوای دو خول سهرۆکبون نایهوێت دەستبهرداری دەسهڵات بێت و بهکورتی مهسعود بارزانی سهرۆکی ههرێمی کورد
 . واز بهێنێت  دا 3102له ئابی 
 
دا لهلایهن پهرلهمانهوە پهسهند کراوە و دەستورێک بۆ ههرێم  9002وەک یاسای ههڵبژاردنی ههرێم لهئێستادا دیارە، ئهو یاسایه له 
وەو کاری تێدا بکرێت، بهڵگهیان بۆ خۆ کاندیدکردنهوەی بارزانی ئهوەیه ئهو دەستورە دانراوە، دەستورێک دەبوایه ههموار بکرێته
تاکو ئێستا هیچ کارێکی تێدا نهکراوە. پهرلهمانی ههولێر لهپێناو کارکردن لهو رەشنوسی دەستورەدا ههم خولی یاسادانانی خۆی بۆ 
 .ێژ کردەوەدر 5102ی ئابی  91چهند مانگێک و ههم سهرۆکبونی بارزانی تاوەکو 
 
دەستکاریکردنی دەستور تا چ ساڵێک ئهو بهسهرۆک دەهێڵێتهوە!   کێ دەزانێ بارزانی چهندین خولی دیکهیش ههر سهرۆک دەبێ و
 . ساڵان و جارێ بهبهریهوە ماوە گهلێک ساڵانی تریش ههر سهرۆک بێت 76بارزانی لهمانگی ئابدا تهمهنی دەگاته 
 
هرلهمان دا و ئهوساتهی تیایدا دەسهڵاتی پهرلهمان و سهرۆکی ههرێم تیایدا درێژکرانهوە ی پ -ی حوزەیران  03لهکۆبونهوەی 
پێکدادان و شهڕەبۆکس رویاندا و بوتڵهئاو وەک فڕفڕۆکه بهئاسمانهوەبون. پارتهکانی ئۆپۆزیسیۆن ئهگهرچی ئهوانیش دەیانهوێت 
ویست بهئامادەبونی خۆیان یاسای لهوجۆرە لهلایهن ههرێم دەستورێکی ههبێ و ههڵبژاردن بهیاسا بێت، ئۆپۆزیسیۆن نهیدە
فراکسۆنی ههردو حیزبی پارتی و یهکێتییهوە تێپهڕێنرێن. ئهگهرچی پارتی دیموکراتی کوردستان و یهکێتیی نیشتیمانی کوردستان 
 . مان دا تێپهڕێننلاوازبون و ئهو هێزەی جارانی پهرلهمانیان نییه. بهڵام هێشتا هێزی ئهوەیان ههبو ئهو یاسایانه لهپهرله
 
لایهنهکانی ئۆپۆزیسۆن ئاماژەبهبونی گهندەڵی و دەسهڵاتی تاکه بنهماڵه لهکوردستان دا دەکهن و نایانهوێت بهو هۆیانهوە دیموکراسیه 
ساواکهی ههرێم بخنکێت. ناڕەزایی دەربڕین دژی گهندەڵی و دەسهڵاتی یهک خێزان لهکوردستانی عێراق دا بوبه هۆی بههێزبونی 
لهو ههرێمهدا. گۆڕان بهتوندی دژی ئهو سستهمهی ههرێمهو بههێزترین فراکسیۆنی ئۆپۆزیسیۆنه  -زوتنهوەی گۆڕان ب -
لهپهرلهمان دا. گۆڕان رێکخراوێکه کهسانێک دایانمهزراندوە پێشتر یهکێتیی نیشتیمانی کوردستان بون. گروپه ئهتنیکی و 
انی کوردستان دا بونهته ئۆپۆزیسیۆن و ههندیکیان پهرۆشی روخانی حکومهتی ئیسلامیهکانی دیکهبریتین لهو لایهنانهی لهپهرلهم
 .ن لهمیسر -محهمهد مورسی 
 
یهکێتیی (پی یو کهی) دوای دیارنهمانی جهلال تاڵهبانی سهرکۆماری عێراق بههۆی نهخۆشی زەبری مێشک لهکانونی یهکهمی 
مل بۆ ههمو خواستێکی پارتی دەدات و هیچ   از بوەودا و ناچاربونی چونه نهخۆشخانهیهک لهئهڵمانیا دا لاو 2102
 !بهرههڵستکارییهک نیشان نادات. توانای یهکێتیی لهداهاتودا جێگهی پرسیارە
 
کهسی یهکهم و بههێزی یهکێتیی دوای جهلال تاڵهبانی لهئێستادا بریتیه لههێرۆ ئیبراهیم ئهحمهدی هاوسهری تاڵهبانی قوبادی کوڕی 
نهوە گهڕێنراوەتهوە وڵات . لهبهرانبهر ئهم باڵادەستیهی خێزانی تاڵهبانی لهناو یهکێتیی دا دکتۆر بهرههم تاڵهبانیش لهواشینگتۆ
 .ی سهرەک وەزیرانی پێشوی حکومهتی ههرێم ههیه، ساڵح خاوەنی تۆڕێکی بههێزی پهیوەندیه نێودەوڵهتیهکانه -ساڵح 
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هزار رای قرار دارد که بنا دارد این بار در حکمرانی کردستان عراق نقش داشته  005در رده دوم جنبش اعتراضی تغییر با بیش از 
نی اختصاص داشت اما به نظر می رسد با باشد. رده دومی که تا قبل از این به اتحادیه میهنی کردستان عراق به رهبری جلال طالبا
 .شروع بیماری طالبانی دوران افول سیاسی اتحادیه میهنی کردستان عراق نیز شروع شده است
 
برگزار روز شنبه چهارمین دوره انتخابات پارلمانی کردستان عراق در سه استانی شمالی عراق  - گروه بین الملل
شد . اگرچه کمیسیون برگزاری انتخابات اعلام کرده است که تا چند روز دیگر نتایج را بطور رسمی اعلام خواهد 
هزار  008کرد اما نتایج غیر رسمی حاکی است که حزب دمکرات کردستان عراق توانسته است با بدست اوردن 
است که اکثریت اراء را بدست بیاورد. در انتخابات این رای برنده بیشترین رای باشد اگرچه این حزب نیز نتوانسته 
 . هزار رای دهنده واجد شرایط رای دادن بودند 008میلیون و  2دوره 
بار در هزار رای قرار دارد که بنا دارد این  005، در رده دوم جنبش اعتراضی تغییر با بیش از بولتن نیوزبه گزارش 
حکمرانی کردستان عراق نقش داشته باشد. رده دومی که تا قبل از این به اتحادیه میهنی کردستان عراق به 
رهبری جلال طالبانی اختصاص داشت اما به نظر می رسد با شروع بیماری طالبانی دوران افول سیاسی اتحادیه 
 میهنی کردستان عراق نیز شروع شده است.
ه سران این حزب بیشتر از اینکه درصدد بازیابی حزب باشند مشغول اختلافات داخلی بودند در طول چند ماه گذشت
و اخبار غیر رسمی از درون این حزب حاکی است که یکی از سران این حزب بنام دکتر برهم صالح درصدد تاسیس 
اق در سی سال حزب مستقلی است که اگر این اتفاق روی دهد یکی از بزرگترین احزاب سیاسی کردستان عر
گذشته در استانه تجزیه کامل قرار خواهد گرفت.سخنان دکتر برهم صالح در خصوص سخت بودن باقی ماندن با 
 سایر هم حزبی هایش این شک و گمان را تشدید کرده است.
علیرغم افول سیاسی اتحادیه میهنی کردستان عراق جنبش تغییر نشان داد که در چهار سال گذشته توانسته 
در استان سلیمانیه گوی سبقت را کاملا از اتحادیه میهنی و حزب دمکرات کردستان برباید و در استان اربیل  است
هزار رای به آرای خود اضافه کرده است.بدین ترتیب می توان انتظار داشت که دوران جدید این  03نیز نزدیک به 
شروع شده است و آنها با هجمه گسترده خود  حزب که چندان سر سازگاری با حزب دمکرات کردستان عراق ندارد
سال گذشته در خصوص فساد در حکومت اقلیم،اکنون مسئول ریشه کن کردن این فساد خواهند بود اما ایا  4در 
می توانند در مسند حاکمیت محبوب باقی بمانند؟ ایا این تغییر بالانس سیاسی در کردستان عراق حکومت اقلیم 
 یت پذیرتر خواهد کرد؟کردستان عراق را مسئول
یکی دیگر از نکات این انتخابات پیروزی حزب دمکرات کردستان عراق می باشد که براساس اراء کنونی که اگر تایید 
کرسی پارلمان را بدست خواهد آورد وبدین ترتیب مامور تشکیل کابینه جدید خواهد شد .اما علیرغم این  04شود 
یز بعنوان یکی از ریشه دارترین احزاب سیاسی کردستان عراق که عقبه ملا پیروزی حزب دمکرات کردستان عراق ن
مصطف ی بارزانی را بر مسند خود می بیند دیگر حزب اکثریت نیست و در هیچ شرایطی نمی تواند به تنهایی 
 کابینه را تشکیل بدهد و هم پیمان استراتژیکش نیز دیگر از قدرت سابق برخوردار نیست.
پیش بینی کرده بود این بار در کردستان عراق تقسیم قدرت در نتیجه انتخابات اتفاق افتاد  بولتن نیوزهمانگونه که 
و قدرت در این منطقه می رود در بین تمام احزاب منطقه ساری و جاری شود که بخش اعظمی از این قدرت به 
ردد و این نشان از پایان حاکمیت مطلق احزاب کلاسیک کردی بر کردستان عراق احزاب جدید التاسیس بر می گ
 می باشد.
با تقسیم قدرت در کردستان عراق عملا تشکیل کابینه نیز براحتی عملی نخواهد شد حزب دمکرات کردستان عراق 
رفتن این حزب را هدف مجبور از هم پیمانی با اپوزیسیون خواهد شد اپوزیسیونی که در چهار سال گذشته قدرت گ
 گرفته بود.
بهر روی این انتخابات نیز تمام شد و احزاب سیاسی کردستان عراق هرکدام جایگاه خود را در میان مردم به روشنی 
دریافتند.در کنار این پایان یکی از عمده نگرانی های قبل از انتخابات عدم تسلیم قدرت به شیوه مسالمت آمیز در 
کم بود که با توجه به قبول شکست از سوی اتحادیه میهنی کردستان عراق می توان صورت شکست احزاب حا
گفت کردستان عراق یک گام دیگر نیز رو به جلو برداشت و خاطرات جنگ های داخلی فرسنگ ها از خاطره و ذهن 
 مردم منطقه دورتر شد.
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 ن یوز ب ول تن
ئ ه ع ێراق ب اك وری یپ ارێ زگ اكه  سێ ل ه ع ێراق ك ورد س تان ی مان یرل هپ ه ڵ بژاردن ی ه خول ی م ینچواره
ن جامهئ ه دی كه رۆژێ كی ن دچه ت ا كه ی ان دوهرای گه ك انڵ بژاردن ه ه ب اڵا ی ك ۆم س یۆن ی رچیگ هئ ه .ن جامدرا
 پ ارت ی كه نخهری دهده ك انرم ی یهن اف ه ن جامهرهده ڵا مب ه ن ێتی هگ هرائ ه رمیف ه ك یی ه ش ێوه ب ه ك ان
 ه ێ ش تا رچیگ هئ ه  س ت به ێ ن ێتدهب ه ن گده زۆرت ری ن ت یت وان یوی ه ع ێراق ك ورد س تان ی دی موك رات ی
ه 008 و م ل یۆن 2 خول ه مئ ه ك ان یڵ بژاردن ه ه ل ه .ب ه ێ ن ێت  ستدهب ه ك انن گهده یزۆری نه ی توان یوهن ه
 .ب وه ه ن گدان یانده ماف ی رن گدهده زار
  س ت به ێ ن ێتدهب ه ن گده زار ه 005ن زی کهی ت یت وان یوی ه كه دێ ت گ ۆڕان یوهب زوت نه مدوه یپ له ب ه
ی ه ب ه ب و تت ای به پ ێ ش تر ی هپ له مئ ه .دا حوك مڕان یل ه ب كات  شداریب ه ب ڕی اری داوه جاره مئ ه كه
 .ب ان یت اڵ ه لا لجه ت یرۆك ای ه سهب ه ك ورد س تان ن ی ش ت یمان ی ك ێ تی
 یوهگ ێڕان ه رق اڵ ی سه یوهئ ه ب ریل ه پ ارت ه مئ ه  سهرک ردەک ان ی راب وردودا، مان گی ن دچه یماوهل ه
ئ ه وهئ ه ب ۆ ئ اماژه ك ان یشرم ی یهن اف ه واڵ ه ه و ب ون ن اوخۆ ن اك ۆك ی رق اڵ ی سه ب ن، پ ارت ه مئ ه یپ ێ گه
 درو س ت كردن ی وڵ ی ه ل ه  ساڵ ح مر هب ه ن اوی ب ه پ ارت ه مئ ه ك ان یدی اره رك رده سه ل ه ك ێكی ه كه نك ه
 پ ارت ه ت ری ن ورهگ ه ل ه ك ێكی ه ب گرێ ت ر سه وڵ ه ه مئ ه رگ هئ ه كه خۆدای هرب ه سه پ ارت ێ كی
ه ت یواوهت ه  ش بون یداب ه ورهب ه راب وردودا  ساڵ ی  سی یماوه ل ه ع ێراق ك ورد س تان ی ك ان یی یه س یاس
  .ن ێتئ ه ن گاو
 كه ری خ ستده گ ۆڕان یوهب زوت نه ك ورد س تان، ن ی ش ت یمان ی ك ێ تیی ه  س یا سی ئ اواب ون ی رب اری سه
 ن ی ش ت یمان ی ك ێ تیی ه پ ێش ل ێمان یس پ ارێ زگ ای ل ه ت یت وان یوی ه راب وردودا  ساڵ ی چوار یماوه ل ه
ه 03 ل ه زی ادت ر ول ێری ش ه پ ارێ زگ ای ل ه و وێ تب كه ك ورد س تان دی موك رات ی پ ارت ی و ك ورد س تان
 میرده سه كه ب كرێ ت ڕوانچاوه وا ت وان رێ تئ ه ی ه ش ێوه مب ه .خۆی ك ان ین گهده ر سه ب خات ه ن گده زار
 پ ارت ی ڵگ هل ه ن ی یه  سازگ ار زۆر ك ه تت ای به ب ه ك ردب ێتپ ێ  س تیده ی هوهب زوت نه مئ ه ن وێ ی
 ل ێ گرت وە رەخ نهی رب ڵاوت ری نب ه راب وردودا  ساڵ ی چوار یماوه ل ه و ع ێراق ك ورد س تان ی دی موك رات ی
 ل ه ب ێتده رپ رسب ه كه ی هوهب زوت نه وئ ه وهئ ه ئ ێ س تا ڵا مب ه ،وهڵ ی یهن دهگ ه ل ه گ لان یت ێوه هۆیب ه
ماوهجه یپ ێ گه ت وان ێتئ ه دا ڵا ت سهده ل ه ی هوهب زوت نه مئ ه ئ ای ا ڵا مب ه ،ڵ ین دهگ ه  ش كردن یك ێری شه
 رێ می ه ت یح كومه ع ێراق، ك ورد س تان ی ل ه  س یا سی ب اڵان سی گ ۆڕان ی ئ ای ا ب پارێ زێ ت؟ خۆی ری
 ك ات؟ئ ه رپ ر س یارت رب ه ك ورد س تان
 ب ه كه ب و ع ێراق ك ورد س تان ی دی موك رات ی پ ارت ی وت نیركه سه ك انڵ بژاردن ه ه یدی كه خاڵ ێ كی
ب ه ی ه ش ێوه مب ه و ب ه ێ ن ێت  ستدهب ه ك ور سی چل ب ه ن زی ك ت یت وان یوی ه ئ ێ س تا ك ان ین گهده پ ێی
 مئ ه ه ێ ش تا شوت نهركه سه مئ ه رب اری سه ڵا مب ه .ن وێ یك اب ی نه درو س ت كردن ی ل ه ب ێتده رپ رس
 و ب ه ێ ن ێت پ ێك تح كومه ن های یت ه ب ه ن ات وان ێت دا رج ێكل ومه ه ه یچل ه و ن یه زۆری نه پ ارت ی پ ارت ه
 .ماوهن ه جاران ی یت وان ای ه وئ ه  شیكه س ترات یج ی یه ی مان ههاوپ ه ئ یدی
 ن ێوان ل ه ئ اراوه هات ه ڵا ت سهده  ش بون یداب ه ڵ بژاردن ه ن جامیرهده ل ه ع ێراق، ك ورد س تان ی ل ه جاره مئ ه
 ب ۆ ك هی هئ اماژه شمهئ ه و ن وێ كان پ ارت ه ی ش تهگ ه ڵات ه سهده وئ ه یزۆری نه و كهوچهن ا ك ان یپ ارت ه
  .ك ورد س تان دا رێ می ه ل ه ك انك وردی ه ك لا س ی ك ی یه پ ارت ه هایره حوك مڕان ی ك ۆت ای ی
 واب هر ه ن وێ ت یح كومه یك اب ی نه درو س ت كردن ی ك ورد س تان، رێ می ه ل ه ڵا ت سهده  ش بون یداب ه ب ه
گ هل ه ك ردن ی مان یهاوپ ه ب ه ب ێتئ ه ن اچار ع ێراق ك ورد س تان ی دی موك رات ی پ ارت ی و ن اب ێت ئ ا سان ی
 رەخ نهی زۆرت ری ن راب وردودا  ساڵ ی چوار یماوه ل ه ك ه یئ ۆپ ۆز س یۆن ه وئ ه دا، ئ ۆپ ۆز س یۆن ڵ
 .ل ێ گرت وە
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پ ێ گه ك ورد س تان رێ می ه ك ان ی س یا س یه پ ارت هل ه كری ه ه و هات ك ۆت ای ی شڵ بژاردن ه ه مئ ه رحاڵ هب ه
 ت ری نورهگ ه ك ان،ڵ بژاردن ه ه ك ۆت ای یهات نی ڵگ هل ه .وترك هده ب ۆ دا ڵ كخه ن اول ه خۆی ان یج ێ گه و
 ك انڵات داره سهده پ ارت ه  ش ك س تی ك ات ی ل ه ك ه ب و وهئ ه ك انڵ بژاردن ه ه ن جامدان یئ ه ل ه رب ه ران ین ی گه
 ق بوڵ كردن ی ب ه ڵا مب ه ،ئ ا ش ت یان ه ك یی ه ش ێوه ب ه ڵا ت سهده  س ت كردن ی س تاودهده ب ه ب نن ه ئ اماده دا
ه ك ورد س تان رێ می ه كه ب ڵ ێ ین ت وان ینئ ه وهك ورد س تان ه ن ی ش ت یمان ی ك ێ تیی ه نلای ه ل ه  ش ك ست
دوركه ی ادت رز و زی ادت ر ن اوخۆ ن گیجه ك ان یری یهوهی اده و وهپ ێ شه ورهب ه ن اوه یدی كه ن گاوێ كی
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ڕۆژهەڵاﺗﯽ نﺎوەڕاستدا كە ڕوداوێكﯽ زۆر مەزنە و ئێمەش وەك ويلايەﺗە پەرﺗبوونﯽ عێراق و سوريﺎ ئەوەی ﺑە كۆﺗﺎ گەيﺎند كە سەپێندراﺑوو ﺑەسەر 
 يەكگرﺗووەكﺎن دەﺑێ چۆن وەڵامﯽ ئەمە ﺑدەينەوە.
 
"دوژمنﯽ نزيكەی دوو هەفتە دەﺑێت لە عێراق گەڕاومەﺗەوە، پێنج ﺑنەمﺎ مێشكمیﺎن سەرﻗﺎڵ كردووە. يەكەمیﺎن ﺑۆ ئەوەيە كە لە عێراﻗدا ئەگوزەرێ كە 
نمە" نەك دۆست. جگە لە كورد كەسﯽ ديكە دۆستمﺎن نین لەو نﺎوچەيەدا، نە سەركردە سوننەكﺎن و نە شیعەكﺎنیش لەگەڵ خواست و دوژمنەكەم دوژم
وصڵ ﺑەهﺎكﺎنﯽ ئێمەدا نین. گروپە جیهﺎديیە سوننﯽ و ﺑەعسﯽ و هۆزە چەكدارەكﺎن كە پﺎڵپشتﯽ سەندنەوەی دەسەڵات دەكەن لە حكومەﺗﯽ عێراﻗﯽ لە م
اﻗێكﯽ ديموكراسﯽ فرەيﯽ نﺎكەن، عێراﻗێك كە هیچﯽ ﺑۆمﺎن نەهێشتووەﺗەوە ﺗﺎوەكو يﺎرمەﺗﯽ پێشكەش ﺑكەين. هەروەهﺎ سەرۆك وەزيرانﯽ پشتگیری لە عێر
امەزراندنﯽ شیعەی عێراق (نوری مﺎلیكﯽ) خۆشﯽ ﺗﺎ ئێستﺎ نەيسەلمﺎندووە كە پشتیوانﯽ عێراﻗێكﯽ فرەيﯽ ﺑێ. لە يەكەم ڕۆژی دەستبەكﺎرﺑوونیەوە كﺎر ﺑۆ د
ﺑڵێین مﺎلیكﯽ ەكﺎن دەكﺎت لە پۆستە ئەمنییە هەستیﺎرەكﺎن و وەلانﺎنﯽ سیﺎسﯽ و خەڵكﯽ سوننە و پشتگیری دارايﯽ ﺑۆ دامەزراوە شیعیەكﺎن. ﺑۆيە ئەﺗوانین شیع
ی و نﺎوخۆ و ﺑە مﺎنﺎی وشە گەمژە ﺑووە. لەگەڵ ئەوەشدا ﺑوونﯽ وەكو سەرۆك وەزيران ﺑردی ﺑەرەو ﺑەكﺎرهێنﺎنﯽ دەستەڵاﺗەكﺎنﯽ وەكو وەزيری ﺑەرگر
 ڕاوێژكﺎری ئەمنﯽ ﻗەومﯽ ﺑە ڕەهﺎيﯽ و هﺎوڕێكﺎنیشﯽ دەستیﺎن گرﺗووە ﺑەسەر ﺑﺎنكﯽ نﺎوەند و وەزيری دارايیدا. 
 
ەڵبژارد و مﺎلیكﯽ ئەﺑوايە يەكیﺎن هەڵبژێرێت، يﺎن ئەوەﺗﺎ دەسەڵاﺗێكﯽ ﺗﺎيەفەگەری جێبەجێبكﺎت يﺎن ئەوەﺗﺎ فرەيﯽ ﻗبوڵبكﺎت، سەرەنجﺎم ﺗﺎيەفەگەری ه
  هیچﯽ پێشكەشﯽ ئێمە نەكردووە ﺗﺎ پﺎداشتﯽ ﺑدەينەوە. لەمەشدا 
 
وانەن كە دووەم ﺑنەمﺎ: پرسیﺎرێكﯽ گرنكم لەلا دروست ﺑووە كە ئەﺑێ لەﺑەر ڕۆشنﺎيﯽ ﺑەهﺎری عەرەﺑﯽ وەڵامەكەی ﺑدەينەوە. ﺑۆچﯽ ﺑﺎشترين نﺎوچەكﺎن ئە
 ئەمريكﺎ كەمترين دەستﯽ ﺗێوەرداون، وەك ﺗونس و كوردستﺎن؟
 
ی يﺎن نﺎ ئەمە هیچ پەيوەندی ﺑەوەوە نییە كە ئێمە چﯽ ﺑكەين و هەڵبژاردنﯽ ئێمە چییە. عەرەب و كورد ﺑريكﺎری خۆيﺎن هەيە، وە وەڵام: ﺑﺎوەڕ ئەكە
هۆكﺎری ئەوەی ﺑۆچﯽ ﺗونس و كوردستﺎن دورگەيەكﯽ ﺑەرﻗەرار و شیﺎويﺎن ﺑەدەستهێنﺎوە كەچﯽ دڵنیﺎيﯽ ﺗەواوی نییە، ئەوەيە كە هێزە سیﺎسییە 
  ﺎن لەكۆﺗﺎيیدا هەوڵﯽ جێبەجێكردنﯽ ﺑنەمﺎی (كەس ﺑراوە و كەس دۆڕاوە نییە)يﺎن داوە.دەسەڵاﺗدارەكﺎنی
 
كە لەم  دوو هێزە سەرەكییە ڕكﺎﺑەرەكەی كوردستﺎن نەك ﺗەنهﺎ نﺎكۆكیەكﺎنﯽ نێوانیﺎن وەلانﺎ ﺑەڵكو ڕێگﺎخۆشكەرﺑوون ﺑۆ هەڵبژاردنێكﯽ ديموكراسیﺎنە
ﺎنێكﯽ خێرا ﺑرد و وايكرد كە لايەنە ئۆپۆزسیۆنەكﺎنیش كە لەسەر ﺑنەمﺎی دژە گەندەڵﯽ كﺎريﺎن دەكرد ﺑۆ دووايیﺎنەدا پﺎرﺗە ئۆپۆزسیۆنەكﺎنﯽ ﺑەرەو هەڵكش
ان يەكەم جﺎر ﺑەشدارﺑوون لە حكومەﺗدا. وە ﺗونسیش دوای كێشمەكێشێكﯽ نﺎوخۆيﯽ و خوێنڕژانێكﯽ زۆر ڕێگەچﺎرەيەكیﺎن دۆزيەوە ﺗﺎ هﺎوسەنگﯽ نێو
و هﺎوڕاﺑن لەسەر پێشكەﺗنخوازﺗرين دەستوور لە مێژوی جیهﺎنﯽ عەرەﺑیدا و ﺗﺎ ئێستﺎش كﺎری پێدەكرێ. لەﺑەرئەوە ﺗﺎيەفییەكﺎن و ئیسلامییەكﺎن ڕاﺑگرن 
ێكەوە ئﺎشت پێموايە كە ڕۆژهەڵاﺗﯽ نﺎوەڕاست ﺗەنهﺎ ئەوكﺎﺗە خەندە دەخﺎﺗە سەر لێوت كە ئەم خەندەيە سەرەﺗﺎ لە خۆيﺎنەوە دەست پێبكﺎت، ئەمەش ئەﺑێ پ
ات. سوننە و شیعەكﺎن چەكیﺎن لە ئێمە نﺎوێت ﺑەڵكو ڕاستییﺎن لێمﺎن ئەوێت، ئێستﺎ سەدەی ﺑیستويەكە و زۆرێكیﺎن هێشتﺎ شەڕی ئەوە ﺑبنەوە ئینجﺎ ڕووئەد
 كﺎنیﺎن ﺗﺎوەكوئەكەن كە كێ جێنشینﯽ ڕاستەﻗینەی پێغەمبەر محمدە كە لە سەدەی حەوﺗدا ژيﺎوە. ئەمە ئەﺑێت كۆﺗﺎيﯽ پێ ﺑهێنرێت لەﺑەخﺎﺗری خۆيﺎن و منداڵە
 داهﺎﺗوويەكیﺎن هەﺑێت. 
 
شیعییە سێهەم ﺑنەمﺎ: لەوانەيە ئێران و فەرمﺎندەی سوپﺎ ﺑەهێزەكەی ﻗودس (ﻗﺎسم سولەيمﺎن) زۆر زيرەك نەﺑن، چونكە ئەوە ئێران ﺑوو كە عێراﻗییە 
دارﺑوون. خواستﯽ ئێران ﺑوو كە ئێمە لە هﺎوپەيمﺎنەكﺎنﯽ پڕچەك ئەكرد ﺑە ﺑۆمبﯽ ﺗﺎيبەت كە ﺑەهۆيەوە زۆرێك سەرﺑﺎزی ئەمريكﯽ گیﺎنیﺎن لەدەستدا و ﺑرين
لە عێراق عێراق ﺑڕۆين، ئەوە ئێران ﺑوو كە مﺎلیكﯽ دڵنیﺎكردەوە ﺑەوەی ﺑەهیچ جۆرێك پەيمﺎن لەگەڵ هێزەكﺎنﯽ ئەمريكﺎ مۆرنەكﺎت ﺗﺎوەكو هێزەكﺎنمﺎن 
سولەيمﺎن، ئەم دەستە گوڵە ﺑﺎ هەر ﺑۆ ئێوە ﺑێ، ئێستﺎ  ﺑەشێوەيەكﯽ يﺎسﺎيﯽ ﺑمێننەوە، ئێران ويستﯽ كە هەژموونﯽ خۆی لە نﺎوچەكەدا دەرﺑخﺎت. زۆرچﺎكە
 هێزەكﺎنتﺎن ﺑەرفراوانتركردووە لە سوريﺎ و لوﺑنﺎن و عێراق وە هێزەكﺎنﯽ ئێمەش گەڕانەوە مﺎڵەوە، كەواﺗە ڕۆژێكﯽ خۆش ﺑۆ ئێوە.
 
هێنﺎنﯽ چەكﯽ ئەﺗۆمﯽ، كەواﺗە ئەﺑێ زۆر ئﺎگﺎدارﺑین لەوەی ﺑەڵام هێشتﺎ لەسەرمﺎنە كە پﺎڵپشتﯽ ئەو پەيمﺎننﺎمەيە ﺑین كە ڕێگری لە ئێران دەكﺎت لە ﺑەدەست
و لوﺑنﺎن و  چەندێك يﺎرمەﺗﯽ دوژمنە سوننەكﺎنﯽ ئێران ئەدەين. ﺑەڵام ﺑەهۆی ئەو ئﺎﺑڵوﻗﺎنەی لەسەر ئێرانە و هێزەكﺎنﯽ و هەروەهﺎ حیزﺑوڵڵاش لە سوريﺎ
 عێراق لە شەڕدان، كەواﺗە ﺑﺎشترە ﺑڵێین ﻗﺎزانجﯽ ئەمريكﺎيە. 
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  كێشەی سەركردايەﺗیكردن.چوارەم: 
 
ر كە لە عێراق سەردانﯽ كەركوكم كرد، ئەو شﺎرەی كە ﺑۆ مﺎوەيەكﯽ دورودرێژە كورد و عەرەب و ﺗوركمﺎنەكﺎن كێشەيﺎنە لەسەری. پێنج سﺎڵ لەمەوﺑە 
ﺑووريیەكﯽ گەشەسەندوم ﺑینﯽ، كە ﺗیﺎيدا لەوێ ﺑووم كە كەركوك پیسترين مەيدانﯽ شەڕ ﺑوو، ﺑەڵام ئەمجﺎرەيﺎن ڕێگەوﺑﺎنﯽ ﺗﺎزەی ﻗیرﺗﺎو و پﺎركﯽ نوێ و ئﺎ
زيﺎﺗريشﯽ  پﺎرێزگﺎرێكﯽ كورد (نەجمەدين عومەر كەريم) جﺎرێكﯽ ديكە و لە مﺎنگﯽ نیسﺎندا و لە هەڵبژاردنێكﯽ دادپەروەرانەدا هڵبژێردرايەوە و كورسﯽ
  یﺎن پێدا. دەنگ  ﺑەدەست هێنﺎ ﺑەهۆی ئەوەی كە جگە لە كورد كەمە نەﺗەوەكﺎنﯽ وەك عەرەب و ﺗوركمﺎنەكﺎن
 
دا، وﺗﯽ "جەختمﺎن لە ٩٠٠٢سﺎڵ لە ئەمريكﺎ كﺎری كردووە پێش گەڕانەوەی ﺑۆ عێراق لە  ٣٣دكتۆر نەجمەدين كە پزيشكﯽ نەشتەرگەری مێشكە و مﺎوەی 
كﺎﺗژمێر.  ٤٢نزيكەی  كﺎﺗژمێر لە ڕۆژێكدا ﺑۆ ٤ﺑﺎشتركردنﯽ ڕێگەوﺑﺎن و هﺎﺗوچۆ و نەخۆشخﺎنە و خوێندنگەكﺎن كردووەﺗەوە"، وە زيﺎدكردنﯽ كﺎرەﺑﺎ لە 
متمﺎنە  هەروەهﺎ پێﯽ وﺗم "خەڵكﯽ كەركوك ﺑێزارﺑوون لە سیﺎسەت و ﺑەگشتﯽ كردنﯽ گرفتەكﺎن و شۆڕنەﺑونەوە ﺑۆ وردەكﺎری داواكﺎريیەكﺎنﯽ خەڵك. ئێمە
ﺎری نﺎكەين و ئەمە ﺑۆ يەكەم جﺎرە و ﺑڕوای عەرەب و ﺗوركمﺎنەكﺎنمﺎن ﺑەدەستهێنﺎوە ﺗﺎوەكو كوردێك پﺎرێزگﺎريﺎن ﺑێ، ئەوان هەست ئەكەن كە ئێمە جیﺎك
 كە لەم هەڵبژاردنەدا ﺗوركمﺎن و عەرەب دەنگیﺎن ﺑە كورددا".
 
ەڕێوەﺑبردايە لەم كێشمەكێشەی دوايیدا كورد كۆنتڕۆڵﯽ سەرﺑﺎزی ﺗەواوی كەركوكﯽ كرد، ﺑەڵام ئەﺗوانم پێتﺎن ﺑڵێم كە ئەگەر مﺎلیكﯽ عێراﻗﯽ ﺑەو شێوەيە ﺑ
وە هەرگیز ئەو ﺑێسەروﺑەريەی ئێستﺎ دروست نەدەﺑوو، كەواﺗە گەر سەركردەيەكﯽ ﺑﺎش و شیﺎو هەﺑێ ئەوە خەڵكﯽ كە دكتۆر نەجمەدين كردويەﺗﯽ ئە
 ئەﺗوانن پێكەوە ﺑژين.
 
كﺎنﯽ ەيە ﺑۆ ﺑەهﺎكۆﺗﺎ ﺑنەمﺎ ئەوەيە كە لە كﺎﺗێكدا هیچ كﺎم لە كﺎرەكتەرە سەرەكییەكﺎنﯽ عێراق جگە لە كورد كەس ڕێزی ﺑەهﺎكﺎنﯽ ئێمە نﺎگرێت. ئﺎيﺎ كەس ه
  رمەﺗﯽ ﺑدەين؟ئێمە ﺑجەنگێ ﺗﺎوەكو عێراﻗێكﯽ سەﻗﺎمگیر هەﺑێ كە هەڕەشە نەﺑێت ﺑۆسەرمﺎن؟ وە ئەگەر واﻗیعﺎنە ﺗەمﺎشﺎ ﺑكەين، ئەوە كێیە كە ئەﺑێ ئێمە يﺎ
 
  وەڵامەكە هێشتﺎ ﺑۆم ڕوون نییە و ﺗﺎوەكو ﺑۆم ڕوندەﺑێتەوە نیگەرانییەكﺎنم ﺑەردەوام ئەﺑن لەسەر هەر دەستێوەردانێك. 
 
  
 سەرچﺎوە/ نیويۆرك ﺗﺎيمز
 
 نوسینﯽ/ ﺗۆمﺎس فرێدمﺎن
 





   
 عﺎدل عبد المهدي: طﺎلبﺎني ﻗﺎوم مرضە، كمﺎ ﻗﺎوم اعداءه
 خ ندان 4102/70/91:43:11:MP
 
الرئیس جلال طﺎلبﺎني،" من كبﺎر القﺎدة  اكد القیﺎدي في المجلس الاعلى الاسلامي الدكتور عﺎدل عبد المهدي، ان –خندان 
والزعمﺎء، واكثرهم خبرة ومعروفیة داخلیﺎ ًوخﺎرجیﺎ،ً شﺎمٌخ مقﺎوٌم للاستبداد والظلم، متفﺎئٌل صلٌب في اوﻗﺎت الشدة، لا 




وﻗﺎل عبد المهدي في مقﺎل لە ﺑعنوان (طﺎلبﺎني ﻗﺎوم مرضە، كمﺎ ﻗﺎوم اعداءه) ان الرئیس طﺎلبﺎني، لا يكل ولا يتعب، 
مؤسسة ومشروع كﺎمل ﺑذاﺗە.. يجید الكردية والعرﺑیة والفﺎرسیة والانكلیزية وﺑعض التركیة والفرنسیة.. اديب، حﺎفظ لكثیر 
شعر (خصوصﺎ ًالجواهري) والروايﺎت والنوادر والنكﺎت، وﻗﺎرىء ممتﺎز، ويحتفظ اينمﺎ كﺎن ﺑمكتبة زاخرة.. من القرآن وال
 كريم نفس وﺑﺎسط يد، لا يرد طلبﺎ،ً متسﺎمٌح عند الحﺎجة وحﺎزٌم عند الضرورة".
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 ﺎء والمختلفین، لیخرجواواشﺎر عبد المهدي الى ان الرئیس طﺎلبﺎني " يدير الاجتمﺎعﺎت والمؤﺗمرات ﺑبراعة، يجمع الفرﻗ
موحدي الكلمة والصف، دوره مركزي في ﺗطور القضیة الكردية والعراﻗیة على حد سواء.. وان اختیﺎره لرئﺎسة 
الجمهورية، وﺗمتعە ﺑمحبوﺑیة الشعب لیست امرا ًمستغرﺑﺎ ًلرجل مثلە، يمتلك هذه المواصفﺎت والامكﺎنیﺎت.. فوصفتە 
 ".المرجعیة العلیﺎ ﺑـ(صمﺎم الامﺎن)
 





  وهبوه یكاندوژمنه ینگاررهبه ۆنك چ، وهوهبوه یكهۆشیهخنه ینگاررهبه بانیڵهتا
 
  یهدبدول مهعادل عه
 
 هدیﺑدولمەعەعﺎدل 
ی وهكردم، پﺎش ئە ندی پێوهيوهرۆك پەسە كﯽ ئێوارهخولە 03:7داو نزيكﯽ كﺎﺗژمێر 2102مﯽ سﺎڵﯽ كەی كﺎنوونﯽ يە71 لە
وێت ﺑۆ ﺗﺎووﺗوێكردنﯽ ﺑﺎسێكﯽ گرنگ. پﺎشﺎن ڕۆژی دواﺗر چﺎوم پێﯽ ﺑكە نوری مﺎلیكﯽ، داوای لێكردم كە وت ﺑەچﺎوی كە
و  ی مێشك ﺑووهڵتەرۆك ﺗووشﯽ جەسە يﺎندم كەفۆنﯽ ﺑۆ كردم و پێﯽ ڕاگەلەيﺎنﯽ زوو ﺗەم ﺑەرهەەڕۆژی دواﺗر دكتۆر ﺑ
مێك ﺗیمێكﯽ پزيشكﯽ . پﺎش كەكۆمﺎدايە واوی لەﺗەرۆك ﺑەسە وێ و ﺑینیم كە. چووم ﺑۆ ئەخۆشخﺎنەﺑۆ نە وهﺗەگوازراوه
 مﺎن مﺎنگدا ﺑڕيﺎردرا كەی هە02 ﺗیمﯽ پزيشكﯽ ﺑنێرن. لە داوايﺎنكرد كە ڵمﺎنﯽ هﺎﺗن، دواﺗريش وڵاﺗﺎنﯽ ديكەئێرانﯽ و ئە
وێ ريش لەی پێشتوپێیەﺑە وهودا ﺑخشێنرێتەفﺎيلﯽ پزيشكﯽ ئە كو چﺎو ﺑەڵمﺎنیﺎ ﺑكرێت، ﺗﺎوهی ئەوانەﺑﺎنﯽ ڕهرۆك ﺗﺎڵەسە
 نجﺎمدراﺑووری ﺑۆ ئەسەچﺎره
ی ﻗورئﺎنﯽ ﺗەم ئﺎيەخوێندنﯽ ئە ستیكرد ﺑەو ده وهريەلای سە ری ﺑردهد، سەرۆكﯽ كرردانﯽ سەكیم سەمﺎر حەكﺎﺗێك عە
پیرۆز "واژا مرچت فهو يشفین.. والژی يمیتنﯽ پم يحیین.. والژی اگمع ان يغفر لﯽ خگیئتﯽ يوم الدين ". كﺎﺗێكیش چﺎوم 
لال نﺎدات". مﺎم جە وهستەدهﺎسﺎنﯽ خۆی ﺑەئو ﺑە هێزهﺑن، ﺑﺎوكم ﺑەران مەﻗوﺑﺎدی كوڕی، پێﯽ ووﺗین "نیگە وت ﺑەكە
ی ﺑكﺎت، لای يەندهم ﺑەحم ﺑەڕه ورهخودای گە ، هیوام وايەوهﺗەستﺎوهمووان وهو هﺎوشﺎنﯽ هە ﺑووه خشندهﺑە میشەهە
 ی ﺑوونورهێكﯽ گەويستﺎنﯽ پﺎڵپشتی و خۆشەكەوادهخێزان و خﺎنە م كﺎری خۆی كرد، وهردهﺑواری پزيشكﯽ سە وهخۆيە
سﺎغ و  ی ﺑەو كﺎﺗەدا، ﺗﺎ ئەنە وهستەدهو خۆی ﺑە وهی ﺑوويەكەخۆشیەنگﺎری نەرهرۆكیش ﺑەك سەروهدا، هەيەو مﺎوهلە
 ی.كەسوكﺎر و نیشتیمﺎنەلای كە وهڕايەﺗﯽ گەلامەسە
  
كﺎنﯽ وهو كرده ی ووﺗەوهرئەﺑەڵێن "مﺎم" لەپێﯽ ده تپێكرد، ﺑۆيەسده وهنێكﯽ زوهمەﺗە ی لەكەلال ﺗێكۆشﺎن و شۆڕشەمﺎم جە
و  هونﺎوهلە زموونتر و نﺎسراوﺗرهئە موانیش ﺑەهە واكﺎن. لەو پێشەركردهسە ورهگە لە كێكەﺑﺎنﯽ يەنرخن. ﺗﺎڵەو ﺑە ورهگە
ندا، كﺎدژواره كﺎﺗە شبین ﺑوو لەسێكﯽ گەم و داپڵۆسیندا. كەم ستەهردﺑەك واﺑوو لەڵايەك ﻗەوه م پیﺎوهی وڵاﺗدا. ئەوهرهده
ﺑری زهكوردستﺎن و عێراﻗیشدا، ﺑە ی لەكەوهﺗەمﺎفﯽ نە ﺗوانﺎﺑوو لەرگريكﺎرێكﯽ ﺑە، ﺑەزانیوهدانﯽ نەرگیز مﺎنﺎی كۆڵنەهە
و  خۆيدا پرۆژهﺎدات و هیلاك نﺎﺑێت، خۆی لەرگیز چۆك نی. هەكەهێزهﺑە كﺎنﯽ و ڕێكخستنەو ووﺗﺎره ك و نﺎمەچە
زانێت، نسیش دهرهمێك ﺗوركﯽ و فەﺑﯽ و فﺎرسﯽ و ئینگلیزی و كەرهكﺎنﯽ كوردی و عە..زمﺎنەواوهكﯽ ﺗەيەزراوهدامە
 زی ﺑەك حەروهواهیری)، هەی جەوانەت ئەﺗﺎيبە(ﺑە رهﺑەﻗورئﺎنﯽ پیرۆز و شیعری لە ، زۆرێك لەسێكﯽ ڕۆشنبیرهكە
ت رگیز داوا ڕه، هەست و دڵ ﺑﺎشەيﯽ و دهزهﺑەسێكﯽ ﺑە. كەرێكﯽ زۆر ﺑﺎشیشە، خوێنەيەرهﺎت هەسەو چیرۆك و ﺑە نوكتە
جودا و ﺎت، ﺑده ڕﺑَوهكﺎن ﺑەوهو كۆﺑوونە كۆنگره . زۆر لێهﺎﺗووانەدا جدديەنگﺎنەﺗە و لە يەكﺎﺗﯽ پێويستدا لێبورده، لەوهنﺎكﺎﺗە
ﯽ وﺗنﯽ ﺑﺎسپێشكە لە ﺑووهكﯽ هەرهكڕيز. ڕۆڵێكﯽ سەنگ و يەهﺎوڕا و هﺎوده كو ﺑیﺎنكﺎﺗە، ﺗﺎوهوهكﺎﺗەكﺎن كۆدهلێكجیﺎﺑوه
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موو ، هەر نییەرسوڕهێنەی ﺑۆی شتێكﯽ سەكەلەويستﯽ گەرۆك كۆمﺎر و خۆشەك سەڵبژاردنیشﯽ وهكوردی و عێراﻗیدا. هە
 .ی ﺗێدايەوانﺎيﺎنەت و ﺗسڵەم خەئە
  
كوردستﺎن و  ی لەكەوادهخﺎنە . پیرۆزﺑﺎيﯽ لەوهرۆك كۆمﺎرهی سەوهڕانەی گەﺑۆنەم ﺑەكەلﯽ عێراق دهگە پیرۆزﺑﺎيﯽ لە
 ُر الگغﺎه"ﺑﺎٍق واعمﺎ واهیريدا هﺎﺗووهی جەكەشیعره لە كە وهڵێمەده و ووشﺎنەئە م. وهكەكێتﯽ نیشتیمﺎنﯽ دهﺑرايﺎنﯽ يە
 "كﺎنیش كورﺗەنﯽ ديكتﺎﺗۆرهمە: "مﺎويت و ﺗەﻗصﺎُر" ، واﺗە
 
 نوسینﯽ: عﺎدل عبدالمهدی
 حمودوا مەرگێڕانﯽ: ڕهوه
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The Arab Spring tour taken this month by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey demonstrated the 
good and the bad of his increasingly confident leadership. 
The Muslim world needs democratic role models. On his visits to Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, the Turkish 
leader, who leads the Islam-rooted Justice and Development Party, made a strong and very welcome 
case that Islam and democracy are compatible. “Turkey is 99 percent Muslim, yet it is a democratic 
secular state where all religions are equal,” he said in Tunisia where voters next month will elect their 
first constituent assembly since the ouster of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. 
 
But Mr. Erdogan’s increasingly shrill denunciations of Israel are a danger to the region as well as to 
Turkey. During his visit to Egypt — where anti-Israeli protests have become violent — he called Israel 
“the West’s spoiled child.” He needs to stop playing for the applause lines and weigh the full 
consequences of his words. 
 
There is a lot about Turkey that deserves to be emulated. Over the last nine years, Mr. Erdogan’s party 
has unleashed the energies of Turkey’s entrepreneurs, asserted civilian control of the once-dominant 
army and enacted human rights reforms. He also has a worrying authoritarian side and important choices 
to make as Turkey moves to replace its army-drafted Constitution with one that is fully democratic. 
 
Mr. Erdogan is playing a particularly dangerous game with Israel. There is no question that dealing with 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel can be frustrating. Turkey downgraded relations after 
Israel rejected a sound, American-mediated deal to close the book on Israel’s ill-fated assault on a Gaza 
aid flotilla that killed eight Turks and one Turkish-American. 
 
But Mr. Erdogan has dangerously upped the ante — and put the United States, a NATO ally, in a 
particularly difficult spot — with his threat to send warships into the Mediterranean Sea to escort Turkish 
shipping. If both sides aren’t careful, things could spiral out of control. At a minimum, Mr. Erdogan is 
risking his country’s substantial trade with Israel. 
 
President Obama has worked hard to cultivate Mr. Erdogan but hasn’t spared the tough talk in private, 
including about the Turkish leader’s previous efforts to cozy up to Iran. And Mr. Erdogan has recently 
agreed to station radar in Turkey as part of NATO’s American-designed missile defense system to 
protect the region from Iran. Mr. Obama also privately urged him to cut ties with President Bashar al-
Assad of Syria. Mr. Erdogan has said he no longer believes in Mr. Assad. He now needs to use Turkey’s 
economic leverage and impose sanctions on Mr. Assad and his cronies. 
As the chief of a major Muslim democracy, Mr. Erdogan can legitimately claim a leadership role. He 
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Is Iraq the model for the Mideast after all? 
 
In Syria, elite army units are bloodily assaulting a now-armed resistance. Supporters of dictator Bashar 
al-Assad are being picked off in targeted assassinations while opposition activists are tortured to death. 
Western countries stand fecklessly by as Russia and China veto action by the U.N. Security Council. At 
least 2,900 dead have been counted — and the carnage may be just getting started. 
I could write a column about all of this. But I’d like to propose, instead, that we think again about the 
war in Iraq. 
With U.S. troops less than three months away from withdrawal, that mission is now generally regarded 
in Washington as, at best, a waste of American lives and resources, and at worst a monumental folly — 
and that’s among the Republican presidential candidates. But the misnamed Arab Spring, which has 
turned from a euphoric winter in Tunisia and Egypt to a savage summer in Libya, Yemen and Syria, casts 
Iraq in a different light. 
It turns out that the end of autocracy in the Arab Middle East, unlike in Central Europe or Asia, will 
not happen peacefully. People power isn’t working. Dictators such as Assad, Moammar Gaddafi and 
Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh, backed by mountains of weapons and armies bound to them by tribe or 
sect, prefer to fight to the death rather than quietly yield. Despite seeing Hosni Mubarak in his courtroom 
cage — or maybe because of it — they don’t shrink from crimes against humanity. 
The carnage might be seen as regrettable but acceptable if the bad guys were losing. But with the notable 
exception of Gaddafi, they are not. Assad has been written off by most of the West’s intelligence services, 
but his tanks and artillery are proving more than a match for the ragtag groups of army defectors in towns 
such as Homs and Rastan. Saleh was nearly killed by a bomb, but on his return after three months in a 
Saudi hospital, forces commanded by his son still held the presidential palace in Sanaa. 
Gaddafi, of course, is losing, though still at large — thanks to the military intervention by NATO. When 
the air campaign began last spring, he was on the verge of massacring the opposition in the rebel 
stronghold of Benghazi. Western planes and drones proved just enough to tip the balance against him. 
But Libya was the limit for the Obama administration, Britain and France: There will be no such 
operation in Syria or Yemen, goes the constant refrain. 
This means that the bloodshed in those countries could drag on indefinitely, and grow steadily worse. 
Tribal war, and the anarchy of nearby Somalia, beckons for Yemen. In Syria we could see, at worst, a 
repeat of the history of Lebanon: sectarian war, interspersed with interventions by neighbors and 
transnational operations by terrorists. 
This brings us back to Iraq. As former Bush administration strategist Meghan O’Sullivan recently 
wrote in The Post, Iraq has fallen well short of both American and Iraqi expectations. The pain and cost 
of that war are some of the reasons the United States and its allies have sworn off intervention in Syria 
and why the Obama administration made a half-hearted effort in Libya. 
Iraq, however, looks a lot like what Syria, and much of the rest of the Arab Middle East, might hope to 
be. Its vicious dictator and his family are gone, as is the rule by a sectarian minority that required 
perpetual repression. The quasi-civil war that raged five years ago is dormant, and Iraq’s multiple sects 
manage their differences through democratic votes and sometimes excruciating but workable 
negotiations. Though spectacular attacks still win headlines, fewer people have died violently this year 
in Iraq than in Mexico — or Syria. 
Just as significantly, Iraq remains an ally of the United States, an enemy of al-Qaeda and a force for 
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relative good in the Middle East. It is buying $12 billion in U.S. weapons and has requested that an 
American training force remain in the country next year. It recently helped get two U.S. citizens out of 
prison in Iran. 
All of this happened because the United States invaded the country. Saddam Hussein demonstrated how 
he could handle a homegrown, Arab Spring-style rebellion when he used helicopter gunships to slaughter 
masses of Shiites in 1991. Even had his regime somehow crumbled, without the presence of U.S. troops 
nothing would have stopped Iraq from spiralling into the bottomless sectarian conflict that now threatens 
Syria. 
The Arab Spring, in short, is making the invasion of Iraq look more worthy — and necessary — than it 
did a year ago. Before another year has passed, Syrians may well find themselves wishing that it had 
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Averting a civil war in Syria 
 
FOR MONTHS the United States and its allies have grappled with how to respond to a mass movement 
of peaceful protests in Syria and the government’s despicably violent response to them. Too slowly, the 
Obama administration has moved from urging dictator Bashar al-Assad to implement reforms to 
imposing sanctions and calling for him to step down, while seemingly embracing a strategy of “leading 
from behind.” Now it appears the administration and other outside powers could soon be faced with a 
very different situation: war between Mr. Assad’s dwindling forces and a rebel army made up of military 
defectors and volunteers. That would require a stronger, quicker and more forward-leading U.S. 
response. 
A number of news reports in the past week have cited diplomats and Syrian sources as saying that armed 
resistance to Mr. Assad’s assaults on the population has begun to appear — including in the central towns 
of Homs and Rastan (where heavy fighting was reported Tuesday) and near the Turkish and Iraqi borders. 
The New York Times quoted an unnamed U.S. official as estimating there had been 10,000 defections 
from the Army and security forces, and that several hundred of these had joined one of two rival 
movements — the Free Syrian Army and Free Officers Movement. 
The appearance of such forces is not to be welcomed, even by those hoping for an end to the Assad 
regime. Violence will push extremists to the forefront, justify even more brutal repression by the 
government and possibly transform what has been a broad pro-democracy movement into a sectarian 
war. Fighting could spread to Syria’s neighbors, including Lebanon and Iraq, and invite intervention — 
covert or otherwise — by outside powers, beginning with Iran. But as a State Department spokesman 
pointed out Monday, the incipient rebel movements are an inevitable “act of self-preservation” against 
“a regime that continue[s] to use violence against innocent, peaceful demonstrators.” 
The administration is right to hold Mr. Assad responsible for provoking civil war, but the question is 
what can be done about it. There are some obvious first steps, including urging the organized Syrian 
opposition, which recently formed a national council, to reject violence at an upcoming meeting in 
Istanbul. Syria’s neighbors should seek to choke off arms supplies to the regime — as Turkey is doing. 
Some fighting might be averted if safe zones for Syrians fleeing government persecution were 
established along the borders, either with Turkey or Iraq. 
 238 
In the end, the only way to avert a Syrian civil war may be for Mr. Assad’s regime to collapse. Having 
ruled out armed intervention of its own, the outside world can’t force this outcome; but the United States 
could drop its back-seat approach and lead a more aggressive effort to raise the pressure on Mr. Assad. 
The administration can press Russia, China and the Arab League to endorse tougher sanctions, and urge 
Turkey to break with the regime and provide protection for refugees. It would be far easier for the United 
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As they have almost every Friday since March, following weekly prayers, Syrians poured out of their 
mosques and into the streets, calling for a litany of reforms in their repressive government. 
Just as predictably, Syrian security forces went after the demonstrators with clubs, tear gas and gunfire. 
It is estimated that over 700 civilians have been killed in so-far-futile efforts to end the protests, with the 
crowds' specific grievances becoming crystallized into just one: Syrian President Bashar Assad has to 
go. 
His brutal tactics against his own people, despite protests from his neighbors and the Arab League, have 
basically forfeited his claim to rule. He may quell this protest, as the family during 40 years of rule has 
suppressed other protests, but there will be another and another until he finally goes. It would be better 
for the country and save much bloodshed if he left now. 
Conspicuously absent from the calls for Assad's departure is the Obama administration. The White 
House, probably goaded by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, edges ever closer to it, but in 
such a nuanced way that it could lead the Syrian government to believe that President Barack Obama is 
not serious about Assad stepping down. 
At the end of the week, the White House came the closest yet, with spokesman Jay Carney saying what 
has been self-evident for the past five months, that Syria "would be a much better place without him." 
Carney told reporters on Air Force One: "We believe that President Assad's opportunity to lead the 
transition has passed." Assad, aside from empty promises about reform that he has made before and then 
quickly abandoned once the crisis has passed, has made it clear that there is not going to be a transition. 
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The Iraqi government recently reversed its support for Syrian President Bashar Assad amid the ongoing unrest 
in Syria, and is now calling on Assad to step down. However, it is true that many Iraqi Shiites deeply fear 
the possible consequences of an overthrow of the Alawite-dominated regime in Damascus. 
Specifically, the Shiites’ concern is that hard-line Sunnis might come to power next door and embolden Iraqi 
Sunnis, reigniting sectarian violence and civil war in Iraq. As one anonymous, senior Iraqi Shiite politician 
put it to Reuters: “Change in Syria will cause major problems for Iraq. They [Sunnis] will incite the western 
[Sunni] part of Iraq.” However, are these anxieties justified? 
In a word: No. To understand why, it is necessary to examine the question of what was primarily responsible 
for the dramatic drop in violence in Iraq from 2007 onward. 
The prevailing orthodoxy affirms that the increase in the number of U.S. troops and the introduction of a 
counter-insurgency strategy as part of the “surge” were the key factors behind the weakening of Al-Qaeda 
and the Sunni turn against the militant group. However, such reasoning imputes too much game-changing 
power to the American military and belittles the importance of local Iraqi actors and factors. In fact, Sunni 
insurgents began to turn against hard-line militants because by late 2006 they had realized that they were 
losing the sectarian civil war in and around Baghdad against Shiite militias. At the time these were protected 
by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. 
It is a truism that a key reason for the swelling of the ranks of the Sunni insurgency after 2003 was the de 
facto transformation of the de-Baathification process into a “de-Sunnification” process. This was most 
flagrant in the disbanding of the old, Sunni-dominated Iraqi military by L. Paul Bremer, the head of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority. In hindsight, it is easy to point the finger solely at Bremer for this grave 
mistake. Yet as The Independent journalist Patrick Cockburn has noted, Bremer was backed and 
encouraged in his decision by Shiite and Kurdish politicians who were eager to fill the ranks of the new 
Iraqi security forces with their own militiamen. 
Nevertheless, de-Sunnification alone cannot account for the manner in which the Sunni insurgency gained 
recruits and strength. In any war, no side commences hostilities if it does not feel that there is a good chance 
of defeating the enemy. In this case, a key premise behind the insurgency was that the Sunnis were in the 
majority and could thus either subdue or wipe out Shiites in a sectarian civil war. 
The “Sunni-majority” delusion was well illustrated prior to the invasion, when Sunni Arabs frequently 
accused outside demographers of under-representing their numbers. Those accusations were not mere 
rhetoric. The propagation of this false perception among Sunnis was partly the result of propaganda put out 
by Saddam Hussein’s regime, and partly the consequence of a sense of disconnect from the majority Shiite 
population, created by 70 years of Sunni minority rule. 
Having launched repeated attacks on the Shiites, causing large numbers of casualties, the Sunni 
insurgency was able to provoke the Shiite militias into retaliation. This gave rise to a full-blown sectarian 
civil war in 2006 centered on Baghdad. The main aim of both sides was to seize control of the mixed Sunni-
Shiite neighborhoods in the capital and cleanse them of the rival sect. 
Owing to numerical advantage and backing from the central government, the Shiite militias largely 
succeeded in clearing the mixed neighborhoods of Sunnis. This forced the Sunni insurgents to retreat into the 
few remaining Sunni-majority strongholds of the city, such as Yarmuk, or flee the country to Jordan and Syria. 
In the latter two countries, Nir Rosen, an investigative journalist and reporter, interviewed numerous Sunni 
insurgent leaders who admitted that they had lost the battle against the Shiite militias in Baghdad. 
Hence, the sectarian civil war subsided throughout 2007 and 2008 for the same reason wars generally end: 
namely, one side had mostly lost its will to fight. Fearing further losses at the hands of the Shiite militias and 
the central government, large numbers of Sunnis realized, at around the time the surge began, that the only 
feasible option was to cooperate with coalition troops and Iraqi security forces against the likes of Al-Qaeda. 
This led to the rapid strengthening of the Anbar Awakening and the birth of the Sons of Iraq movement. 
Maliki would go on to reel in the Shiite militias, such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. The prime minister 
realized that the remaining Sunni insurgency posed no existential threat to his government, opening the way 
for him to consolidate his power base by cracking down on Shiite militants based in the south and around 
Baghdad. 
The risk of another sectarian civil war in Iraq on account of turmoil in Syria is very low indeed. Having 
witnessed the disastrous outcome for Sunnis of the sectarian civil war in 2006, the Sunni Arabs of Iraq 
generally appreciate that they cannot afford to take on Shiites in another conflict. For most of those in the 
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community, the concern is not to return to minority rule. It is to survive and adapt to the reality that Iraq’s 
Shiite majority is leading the country’s political process. 
Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and an intern at the Middle 
East Forum. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR. A version of this article appeared in the print 
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Turkish PM sets out on mission to become leader of Arab world 
Erdogan tours revolutionary countries as he looks to build power 
 
BY PATRICK COCKBURN   TUESDAY 13 SEPTEMBER 2011 
The Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan, arrived in Egypt yesterday at the start of a three-nation tour as 
Turkey toughens its stance towards Israel and seeks to become the predominant power among Muslim states 
in the Middle East and North Africa. 
After Egypt, Mr Erdogan will visit Tunisia and Libya to show Turkey's support for both countries after the 
overthrow of long-standing police states in the Arab Spring. Turkey's strong, democratic and mildly Islamic 
regime makes it a model for new governments in all three countries. 
Mr Erdogan's assertive and critical attitude towards Israel, until recently a close ally of Turkey, makes him 
attractive to the Arab world. In Cairo, the burning down of the Israeli embassy last weekend was the latest 
incident marking the hostility at street level between post-Mubarak Egyptians and Israel. 
At the same time, the perception among Arab states that President Barack Obama has failed to help the 
Palestinians, while lending Israel his total support, has diminished US popularity and influence in the region. 
Mr Erdogan said in an interview before leaving for Cairo that he had seen "grounds for war" against Israel 
last year after nine Turks had been killed by Israeli commandos on the Turkish aid ship Mavi Marmara bound 
for Gaza, but had "decided to act with patience". He hinted that in future the Turkish navy would protect any 
Turkish aid flotilla going to Gaza. 
"Turkey will get most of what it wants if it does not overplay its hand," said one commentator. Turkey has 
already imposed sanctions on Israel in retaliation for the aid-boat raid, but according to his aides Mr Erdogan 
appears to have abandoned, for the moment, his declared long-term intention to visit Gaza. 
Turkey has benefited from the Arab Spring because it is likely to be in tune with new democratic governments, 
even when it had good relations with their predecessors. 
The country can also move to fill a vacuum since most of the more powerful Arab states, such as Egypt and 
Syria, are weaker than they were before their governments were overthrown. Iraq has never recovered from 
the rule of Saddam Hussein and the violence that followed. 
 
In sharp contrast to Iran, Turkey has few serious enemies. It has sought to mediate over Iran's nuclear 
programme between the Iranian government, which it regards with suspicion, and the US and Europeans. 
The two countries also have a common foe in the shape of festering Kurdish insurgencies which engage in 
persistent guerrilla attacks. An attack by Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) guerrillas in Hakkani Province in 
eastern Turkey overnight killed five people, including two security men. 
The PKK has killed about 50 Turkish security personnel in recent weeks since it ended its ceasefire earlier in 
the year. Although Mr Erdogan has brought the Turkish army under civilian control, his government does not 
want to look weak in any confrontation with the PKK. 
It is putting pressure on the Iraqi Kurdish President, Massoud Barzani, to isolate the PKK from its mountain 
strongholds inside Iraq. Mr Barzani, who would like Turkey as a counter-balance to Baghdad, has demanded 
in recent days that the PKK and the Kurdish guerrilla movement in Iran give up armed resistance. 
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Turkey has been playing an increasingly influential role in Iraqi politics because it is able to mediate between 
different parties, sects and ethnic groups. It also plays a growing commercial role: Turkish companies have 
even won contracts to collect the rubbish in Baghdad and Basra. 
In Syria, Mr Erdogan has criticised President Bashar al-Assad's repression of protests, probably calculating 
that his regime is not going to survive, at least in its present form. Similarly in Libya, Turkey was at first slow 
to break with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, but when it did so, it advanced $300m to the rebels at a time when 
they were short of money. Turkey was heavily involved in construction in Libya. 
Overall, the isolation of Israel, the democratic uprisings in the Arab world, the weakness of the Arab states, 
and the diminished strength of the US in the region have all worked to Turkey's advantage. 
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Family rule taints Kurdistan's rise 
 
A haze hangs low over the city of Erbil. Automotive exhaust and dry sand envelop the area, forming an opaque 
mixture that sunshine struggles to penetrate. The capital of northern Iraq's Kurdistan Autonomous Region, 
Erbil operates as a de facto independent state, with its own legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Its 
soldiers wear their uniforms with pride, sporting a tricolor symbol of their country sewn on to them. 
Meanwhile, Erbil has total control of its external and internal regional borders, just as any sovereign state 
would. 
 
As a result, Erbil is separate from Iraq, and from that country's contentious and often deadly politics in 
Baghdad. "Separation is a necessary step, as our representatives have only 90 seats in 
Iraq's parliament [out of 700 plus]. Thus we have absolutely no voice in what is going on," said Abdullah, 
who owns a travel agency in downtown Erbil. "They often say we will give you money for this and this, but 
we want you to do this and that," he added. "We, the Kurds, find this unacceptable, as so many people have 
died so things will not be the same as before anymore." 
 
The sentiment Abdullah expresses prevails among Kurds who are now, for the first time in history, living in 
a state they can call their own. As the newest petro-state, Kurdistan has enjoyed an unprecedented level of 
political and economic stability since the end of the first Gulf War in 1991. And for the first time, the Iraqi 
Kurds' economic fortunes are on an upward trend, especially in comparison with their co-patriots in 
neighboring countries, as a sea of oil revenue has lifted most economic boats. 
 
Yet not all is well in Kurdistan, due in part to the dominant presence of one ruling family. Descended from a 
political dynasty that has built a power base over centuries of fighting, regional president Massoud Barzani 
has blossomed into an authoritarian ruler not unlike many whose regimes are now crumbling from the internal 
pressures of the Arab Spring. 
 
Organized corruption 
Throughout Erbil, portraits of Barzani adorn the walls of offices and shops. That is not to say that Barzani's 
cult of personality is as force-fed as Saddam Hussein's often was in Iraq. The Barzani clan has tremendous 
popularity in the area of its political base in northern Iraq, and people feel a genuine reverence for Massoud, 
whose father led uprisings against Hussein in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
However, the cracks in the family's image are accentuated by political dissent, and the official story of the 
ruling Kurdish Democratic Party's (KDP) road to power has often been challenged. "The people were the 
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ones who first fought in the city and defeated Hussein's troops in 1991's revolution," said Adar, who runs a 
small hotel downtown. "The Peshmerga [militia] came down two days later from the mountains after it was 
all over and claimed the power. This is the truth that many people in Erbil are afraid to speak of," he said. 
 
The fear to speak out is real, as KDP has both limited tolerance for criticism and a long memory. In December 
2005, Kamal Qadir, an Austrian scholar, was arrested and sentenced to 30 years in prison for a series of 
articles criticizing the Barzanis' hold on the economy and power. He was released a year later after prolonged 
action to free him by Amnesty International and the Austrian government. 
 
However, Kurdish journalists Soran Mama Hama and Sardasht Osman were not so lucky; they were gunned 
down for writing about corruption by the political class and local governments. Demands for thorough and 
transparent investigations were met by Kurdish authorities maneuvering to blame others for the deaths; to 
this day both cases remain unsolved. Even a brief expression of criticism toward the Barzanis, such as one 
anonymous caller's comments on a television call-in program, resulted in a bombing of the studio the very 
next day. As usual, the perpetrators were never found. 
 
One of the most sensitive subjects is the Barzanis' involvement in the economy of the newly rich oil state. 
While Massoud Barzani's personal wealth is estimated to be in the range of US$2 billion, the exact amount 
of the family's involvement is unknown due to Kurdistan's murky legal environment and a web of offshore 
cross-ownership entities. While the Barzanis often repudiate any reporting that follows the trail of money, 
such as a 2010 exposure by the newspaper Rozhnama that accused them of benefiting from illegal oil 
smuggling, the personal behavior of some family members leads to more questions than answers. 
 
For example, in 2012, Mansur Barzani, the son of Massoud, lost over $3.2 million in a Dubai casino during 
the elder Barzani's official state visit. Meanwhile the other son, Masrour, purchased a $10 million home in 
the US state of Virginia. Officially, they were both living on modest government salaries - with Masrour 
heading the security and intelligence services, which are not shy to use deadly force to squash protests they 
find intolerable, as was demonstrated in 2011 in Erbil, Halabja, and Sulaymaniyah. 
 
The family's influence permeates the ruling class through a steady supply of official perks and status symbols. 
The symbol of the KDP elite has become a fleet of white sport utility vehicles that ply the pot-holed streets 
of Erbil at high speeds, unconcerned about pedestrians or other vehicles. Official and unofficial oil revenues 
streaming into governmental and party coffers compound a growing resentment over widespread corruption 
and mismanagement. 
 
Signs of extreme poverty compete with these images of imported luxury goods. The contrast is easily visible 
at the grand bazaar in front of Erbil's famous citadel. Women carrying small children sell chewing gum to 
passersby in order to retain what remains of their dignity. "Life is very hard here," said a woman holding a 
toddler. She declined to give her name as she approached me. "You wouldn't know it because you are not 
from here. But believe me, every day of my life is bitter." 
 
The KDP and its historical rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have created interlocking 
mechanisms of power distribution and execution that put both of them in the driver's seat at the same time. 
The balance is often altered slightly in favor of one or the other party, depending on the individual at the 
helm. In the Barzani clan's case, the money trail reinforces ancient tribal allegiances and connections, making 
a de-facto "democratic" Barzani dynasty possible. 
 
The dysfunction of organized corruption is most visible in economic sphere. "The Barzanis and [current 
Iraqi President Jalal] Talabani's PUK own most of the lucrative businesses in Kurdistan. Mobile phones, 
big shopping malls, non-transparent oil deals. No one exactly knows where the oil income goes," said Ari, 
editor of Austria-based publication Ekurd.net. The degree of rapacity at the expense of the public interest is 
often taken to grotesque proportions. In one example, a party-dominated cell phone company made huge 
profits by charging enormous sums for SIM cards, even when cell phone reception didn't work. 
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A state of schizophrenia 
Large amounts of petro-dollars coming into the economy are increasingly resulting not only in a growing 
divide between rich and poor, but also a national state of schizophrenia with curious contradictions. "Having 
a look at the hospitals and their services, which are very poor, one cannot help but say 'where does the oil 
income go?'" said Ari. "Despite exporting over 150,000 barrels per day, Kurdistan is still importing over 80% 
of the fuel it needs from Iraq, Iran, and Turkey." 
 
The Barzanis tout break-neck land development and new construction as a monument to Kurdish 
independence, with new malls, shops, public buildings, and homes popping up everywhere. The mass 
construction along the "100-Meter" ring road in Erbil is creating a Nevada-like environment of gated hamlets 
for educated elites and expatriate foreigners. It is widely understood that any major building project has to 
have some type of business connection with the Barzanis, who are pivotal to the permitting process. Their 
involvement decides whether the construction will be a commercial success or an utter failure. 
 
The rapid construction of this new Kurdistan results in architectural curiosities. The micro-climate of the West 
is often replicated in mass real estate offerings that have nothing to do with social and economic realities on 
the ground. Colonies like Royal City, English Village, American Village, and others, along with the wholesale 
import of fast-food restaurants, have absolutely nothing to do with local culture or people. This disconnect 
also extends to parts of government. For example, the foreign affairs office is conveniently located next to a 
foreign settlement called Italian City, thus making the trip downtown to witness the uncomfortable truth 
unnecessary. 
 
According to the 2012 report on Erbil from Associates for International Research, Inc, "The distance from 
the center to the outermost ring [100m Street] is approximately 2.5 miles [four kilometers]. However, there 
is little need for expatriates to venture into the center of town, since most expatriate shopping outlets and 
housing compounds are located along or near 100m Street, or the outer ring. The Ainkawa neighborhood, or 
Christian quarter, is located in the north of the city." 
 
As one Western NGO worker who preferred to remain anonymous commented, "This is the effect of 
globalization, parachuted by nuts and bolts into Iraq, and is as magical as Walt Disney's or Universal Studios' 
version of life in that part of the world. All that is missing is Ali Baba and The 40 Thieves, but even this can 
arranged." 
 
Many Kurds sigh in resignation that this is a symbol of the Barzanis' rule and expect it to continue without 
interruption. This is one possibility, but others are harder to predict. 
 
A member of parliament in Iraq's ruling party recently accused the Kurds of seeking to partition Iraq along 
ethnic lines and warned that the government in Baghdad would not tolerate it. Many Kurds are increasingly 
seeing themselves as caught between a rock (their government) and a hard place (Baghdad). "Prime Minister 
[Nuri al-] Maliki is a little Saddam. He will not stop in getting all of Iraq's lands together as before. He will 
also come here, but he knows that Kurds will fight hard. We have no other choice," said Adar, who works at 
the grand bazaar in the center of Erbil. 
 
It would be a stretch to think that Western governments remain unaware of Kurdistan's power dynamics. 
Many of them have consulates in Erbil, where developments are constantly being monitored and reported on. 
Yet the race to profit from oil and tap a growing consumer market pushes other considerations - such as 
human rights and the application of democratic principles - into not even the backseat, but as far back as the 
trunk of a speeding car with Kurdish license plates. The ultimate tolls on this highway to prosperity will be 
paid not by the driver but by its passengers, the Kurds, with growing evidence that the final destination is 
different from what had been advertised. 
 
Derek Monroe is a contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus. 
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A decade ago the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government came to power largely because people 
were fed up with the corruption in the country. 
In fact, back in 2002 the AKP officials promised people that they would fight against three things: corruption, 
restrictions on freedom, and poverty (yolsuzluk, yasaklar, yoksulluk). People largely voted for the AKP 
because they thought that the party would root out corruption.  
For the first few years, the AKP government took effective measures to end corruption in low-level state 
offices. Ten years ago it was a very common for traffic police to be heavily involved in corruption. Many 
low-ranking officers were taking bribes, etc. 
What the AKP government achieved was ending the visible corruption among the lower ranking officers. 
Because of this success, many people thought that the AKP government was successfully fighting against 
corruption. 
However, those who deal with government officials in higher-ranking positions knew that corruption was still 
continuing and even worsened. 
 
The police operation against the relatives of some ministers and high-ranking public officials proved that the 
AKP government did not keep its promise to fight corruption. 
 
One could posit three major impacts of the operation. 
 
First, it will be a big blow for the AKP government in the eyes of its constituencies. It has tarnished the 
positive image of the AKP ministers and the government. From now on, no conservative will be able to defend 
their party by arguing that this government ended corruption in the country. 
Given that these officials are known for their piety, conservatives won't easily forgive such behavior. Thus, 
one could imagine that the AKP government will lose some votes in the upcoming election. 
Internationally, the operation revealed that Turkey has become one of Iran's money-laundering stations. As 
the West was trying to tighten international sanctions against Iran, a state-owned bank was used to get around 
the sanctions. It has been claimed that a hundred billion dollars of Iranian money was laundered in Turkey 
and pumped into the world market, which if true would be a big blow for Turkey's international image.  
Economically, the operation will harm the construction sector, a leading sector of the Turkish economy. If in 
fact it is proven that well-known businessman are part of the circle of corruption, the construction companies 
will take a severe hit. That would seriously harm the government, too. 
The deepest impact of this operation is the social impact. At least 50 percent of the people in some way 
trusted this government, for various reasons. One of the most important was religion. When they realize that 
this government isn't so different from the old regimes, they will lose their faith in religious people, civilian 
politics and Turkey as a country. 
It has been claimed that there is a video footage of a minister taking a bribe of $1.5 million. Once it is proved 
that a minister, a so-called respectable man, took a bribe, this country will be pulled down to the level Third 
World countries in Latin America and Africa. Will the government easily overcome this shock? 
No, not very easily. By firing five police captains conducting the operation, the government tried to bury this 
case as quickly as possible and make the public forget about it. The information that has been shared with the 
public is so dramatic, however, that it won't be put out of their minds so easily. 
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Iraqi oil dispute reveals KRG vulnerability 
 
The ongoing tit for tat between Baghdad and Erbil over oil-export rights and revenues has escalated over 
the past two weeks, leading to the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) most serious banking crisis 
since 1991. In the absence of an agreement, Baghdad has withheld part of the KRG’s revenues, resulting 
in non-payment of some civil servant salaries for two to three months, including the Peshmerga forces 
and the Oil Protection Force that guards international oil company (IOC) installations. KRG President 
Massoud Barzani has responded harshly by equating Baghdad’s actions to a “declaration of war on the 
people of Kurdistan” while claiming the ability to pay salaries from KRG funds 
Despite employing nationalist rhetoric, staging anti-Maliki protests, blaming the United States for a lack 
of support and pressing IOCs for payments, the KRG’s efforts to leverage Baghdad and independently 
export oil remain ineffective. Alongside ongoing legal, political and technical obstacles, the KRG’s key 
ally and energy partner, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is facing his own domestic crisis 
and an uncertain political future. In the absence of a legal transit route or viable alternative revenue 
source, and with mounting criticism by local populations and investor confidence to sustain, Erbil will 
be hard-pressed to compromise with Baghdad. If not, the landlocked region risks undermining the 
economic and political gains it has made thus far while leaving its population and key institutions 
vulnerable to social, political and financial instability. 
Until now, few believed that Baghdad would go so far as to withhold the KRG budget as a retaliatory 
measure. Although the Iraqi government and KRG have been disputing payments since 2005, the KRG 
has continued to receive its expanding annual budget from Baghdad. In 2013, the region was allocated 
about $13 billion to administer three provinces, relatively more than other oil-producing provinces in 
Iraq. Nor did Baghdad effectively thwart the KRG’s energy sector development. Its “blacklist” against 
IOCs working in the Kurdistan Region has hardly deterred oil majors from signing contracts with the 
KRG and exploiting hydrocarbons. 
It was only when the KRG crossed Baghdad’s red line by attempting to circumvent state sovereignty 
and export oil unofficially to Turkey that Iraqi officials fully utilized their revenue card. The current 
crisis also imploded in response to Baghdad’s 2014 draft budget, competing claims by other oil-
producing provinces for greater decentralization and revenues and the KRG’s opaque financial demands. 
It has now become part of campaign politics as both Barzani and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 
use the oil and budget issues to affirm their authority and nationalist credentials and cut the best deal 
possible before the April elections. 
Indeed, the crisis has heightened criticism by Kurds of the Iraqi government. Many blame Maliki for 
withholding revenues, arguing that the Kurds are victims of Baghdad once again. Yet local populations 
also argue that the crisis is due to in part to the KRG’s mismanagement of funds and lack of transparency 
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in financial affairs. One parliamentarian from the Gorran movement stated that as the KRG has been 
selling oil for years, it should be able to pay six months of salaries based on its oil revenues. Similarly, 
the head of the Kurdistan Central Bank, Edehem Karim Derwish, stated that the crisis is not simply an 
issue of Baghdad refusing to send money to the KRG. Rather, Baghdad is withholding cash flows to 
Erbil because the KRG is withholding clear information regarding its oil shipments and revenues. Worse 
still, the KRG has made no plans for financial emergencies. While Baghdad has $80 million in reserves 
in its state banks, the public banks in the Kurdistan Region have nothing. 
The crisis has also spilled over into the KRG’s energy sector, particularly as it relates to security 
operations and the Oil Protection Force. The KRG’s Ministry of Natural Resources has indicated that 
KRG security forces remain proactive in defending the region and there is no discussion of the protection 
force leaving its posts; however, it has warned IOCs to remain vigilant at rig sites. The ministry has also 
given IOCs the option of (re-) hiring their own private security guards — a retrenchment from a 2011 
edict demanding all IOCs release most of their international security personnel and employ only the 
KRG’s Oil Protection Force. 
Securing revenues also has created tensions between the Ministry of Natural Resources and some IOCs. 
According to a local Western oil company representative, the ministry is pressing IOCs to pay their 
outstanding Oil Protection Force bills by March 1, 2014. In a recent meeting with IOCs to discuss the 
financial crisis, Minister of Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami criticized those IOCs — including key oil 
majors — for not paying their protection force bills and indicated that nonpayment would not be 
tolerated. Thus far, only about 5-10% of IOCs have currently paid, and the total payments could be about 
$150 million. 
Some KRG officials and individuals have stated their intentions to use additional cards to pressure the 
Iraqi government. They initially threatened to obstruct parliamentary politics in Baghdad, decrease water 
supplies to Arab farmers from KRG dams, block Kirkuk oil from being transported to Turkey and declare 
independence. Baghdad immediately responded by threatening to close the airspace in the Kurdistan 
Region, blocking all flights to and from Erbil and Sulaimaniyah. 
Despite these tactics and threats, it seems likely — or imperative — that both sides will negotiate an 
agreement before the election — although it would be a short-term deal at best. Even then, the crisis has 
reinforced the vulnerability of the KRG and its dependence on Baghdad. With over 60% of the 
population dependent on the KRG for salaries and even more on social welfare benefits, and a 
government still unformed nearly six months after regional elections, the KRG may have to rethink its 
energy, political and financial strategies moving forward. One essential step is to create transparent 
institutions to manage the region’s energy wealth, particularly a sovereign wealth fund for future 
generations. Failure to do so will have greater repercussions on local populations, economic and energy 
sector development and domestic stability. 
Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/baghdad-erbil-crisis-krg-financial-
oil.html##ixzz3H51YsBsT 
 Al-Monitor. She is also a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, 
National Defense University, where she specializes in Iraq, regional energy issues and the Kurdish 
problem. The views expressed are her own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the 
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ISIS recruits Kurdish youths, creating a potential new risk in a peaceful part of Iraq 
HALABJA, Iraq — This town near the Iranian border has long been a symbol of Kurdish resistance, and 
it is best known as the site of a gruesome chemical-weapons attack by Saddam Hussein in 1988. 
These days, residents say, it is increasingly known for something else — although few want to talk about  
Kurdish authorities say a small contingent of Kurdish youths — around 150 in all, about a third of whom 
are from Halabja — has in recent months joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which has 
seized a vast swath of Iraqi territory. 
The young men’s allegiance to the extremist militant group represents a potential danger for the Kurds, 
who share the jihadists’ resentment of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Shiite-dominated 
government but are wary of the extremists now massed on the edge of their territory. The Kurds 
have hoped to keep their largely autonomous region in northern Iraq from being entangled in the 
country’s increasingly bloody conflict. 
Some Kurdish intelligence officials fear that with ISIS’s gains, more local youths will join the jihadists 
and that the radical ideology could creep beyond Arab Iraq and into Iraqi Kurdistan, which has so far 
remained an oasis of calm and order. 
The presence of Kurdish fighters in the extremist militant group highlights how effectively ISIS’s 
recruitment efforts are reaching disenfranchised youths across Iraq’s ethnic divide. Most Kurds are 
Sunni Muslims, like the insurgents, but have their own language and culture. 
A top local intelligence official in Halabja, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was 
not authorized to speak to the news media, said ISIS is already operating “cells” inside the town, 
appealing to bored and underemployed young people to join their fight. 
Most of the 52 local men and boys who have left Halabja in the past year and a half to fight in Syria 
have been recruited by ISIS, he said. 
One local man, Mariwan Hallabji, has become an ISIS commander and currently serves on a front line 
against Kurdish pesh merga security forces outside the city of Kirkuk, the official said. 
“How do we guarantee that when they’re done fighting the Shiites, they don’t start waging a war against 
the Kurds?” the intelligence official said. 
A little over a decade ago, Islamist radicals allegedly tied to al-Qaeda had a base here and fought against 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), one of the two major Kurdish political movements, before 
U.S. forces bombed the Islamists’ bases during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
Halabja, although relatively far from the front line between Iraqi Kurdistan and ISIS-held territory, is 
particularly vulnerable to losing its sons to the radical group, local officials and residents said. 
 248 
The town lacks jobs and educational opportunities and has a history of militant resistance to the Arab 
government in Baghdad, residents said. Almost every family has a “martyr,” either from the Kurds’ 
struggle for independence or from the chemical weapons attack in 1988 that killed thousands. Hussein’s 
forces attacked the town because of its sympathy for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. 
The situation has deteriorated since Maliki’s government, in a dispute with the Kurdistan Regional 
Government, slashed the Kurds’ budget six months ago, halting the payment of salaries to many workers. 
“People here are graduating from high school, and they think they have no future,” the intelligence 
official said. In the Western world, depressed teenagers commit suicide, he added. “People here join 
ISIS — which is also basically suicide.” 
The path to radicalism 
“Z,” whose name is being withheld at the request of his family, would seem an unlikely recruit for ISIS, 
which has enforced a brutal interpretation of Islamic law, executing hundreds of Shiites and others in its 
bid to establish anIslamic caliphate that spans Iraq and Syria. 
“He had a motorbike. He had a girlfriend. He had lots of friends,” Z’s brother-in-law said with a bitter 
laugh one recent night, as the family sat on the hard, thinly carpeted floor of their modest living 
room. 
But Z’s family think he was enticed by the extremists’ slick social media campaign and by local 
recruiters. 
Photos on Z’s sister’s cellphone show a grinning 16-year-old boy with a fluffy black “faux-hawk,” the 
latest hairstyle craze. 
His family said Z was not especially religious and was never particularly interested in going to the 
mosque. But in mid-May, he suddenly left Halabja with his best friend to join ISIS in Syria, his relatives 
said. “In one week, he changed completely,” his brother-in-law said. 
After last week’s rapid ISIS advance into Iraq, Z is now with fellow militants in the northern Iraqi city 
of Mosul, the family said. In a few phone calls, he has told his family that he was “following the teachings 
of the Koran,” they said. 
Two intelligence officials, as well as residents of Halabja, said Kurdish authorities have allowed young 
people such as Z to leave the region, in part because they think it is safer without them. 
“They want them out of here. They don’t want the bomb to explode in their hands,” said a second 
intelligence official, who also spoke on the condition of anonymity. 
In one recent instance, the bomb nearly did go off. 
In late May, a young Kurdish man from Halabja who had recently returned from fighting with ISIS in 
Syria was apprehended by local security forces as he tried to enter a Shiite shrine in the Kurdish city of 
Sulaymaniyah, carrying a backpack containing explosives, officials said. 
 
A salvage mission 
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Friends and relatives of a few other young men who have returned say the authorities have sought to put 
them through a lengthy reverse-conditioning process to persuade them to abandon their radical beliefs. 
Then the men are heavily monitored. 
“Those who come back are taken through a very intense process to ensure that they have left those 
thoughts behind,” said Fazil Basharati, a Halabja local and former member of parliament from the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party. 
Relatives of young men who are either fighting with ISIS or have left the group and returned said that 
Kurdish security forces have ordered them not to speak about their family members’ ties to the group 
because it draws attention to the issue. 
“They don’t let them talk about it,” said a 24-year-old man in Halabja who grew up with the Kurdish 
member of ISIS who tried to blow up the shrine in Sulaymaniyah. The 24-year-old man, who did not 
want to give his name, said two of his other neighbors had joined the extremist group in Syria, only to 
be captured and returned by Turkish Kurds who are fighting with Syrian insurgents opposed to ISIS. 
The man said one of his cousins was killed fighting in Syria four months ago. 
Z’s brother-in-law recently implored the 16-year-old over the phone to return to his mother and sister. 
“I said, ‘What if someone tries to harass them?’ He told me: ‘We have plenty of ISIS people in Halabja 
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Turkish Support for ISIS 
N.B. Washington Times title: "Turkey's support for ISIS Islamist terrorists. Aiding jihadists could put 
Ankara at odds with Iran" 
The battle in Iraq consists of "Turkish-backed Sunni jihadis rebelling against an Iranian-backed Shi'ite-
oriented central government," I wrote in a recent article. 
Some readers question that the Republic of Turkey has supported the "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria," 
the main Sunni group fighting in Iraq. They point to ISIS attacks on Turkish interests, within Turkey, 
along its border with Syria, and in Mosul and a successful recent meeting of the Turkish and Iranian 
presidents. Good points, but they can be explained. 
First, ISIS is willing to accept Turkish support even while seeing the Islamist prime minister and his 
countrymen as kafirs (infidels) who need to be shown true Islam. 
Second, the presidential visit took place on one level while the fighting in Syria and Iraq took place on 
quite another; the two can occur simultaneously. Turkish-Iranian rivalry is on the rise and, as the 
distinguished Turkish journalist Burak Bekdil notes in the current issue of the Middle East Quarterly: 
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Recent years have often seen official language from the two countries about prospering bilateral trade 
and common anti-Israeli ideological solidarity. But mostly out of sight have been indications of rivalry, 
distrust, and mutual sectarian suspicion between the two Muslim countries. 
Ankara may deny helping ISIS, but the evidence for this is overwhelming. "As we have the longest 
border with Syria," writes Orhan Kemal Cengiz, a Turkish newspaper columnist, "Turkey's support was 
vital for the jihadists in getting in and out of the country." Indeed, the ISIS strongholds not coincidentally 
cluster close to Turkey's frontiers. 
Kurds, academic experts and the Syrian opposition agree that Syrians, Turks (estimated to number 
3,000), and foreign fighters (especially Saudis but also a fair number of Westerners) have crossed the 
Turkish-Syrian border at will, often to join ISIS. What Turkish journalist Kadri Gursel calls a "two-way 
jihadist highway," has no bothersome border checks and sometimes involves the active assistance of 
Turkish intelligence services. CNN even broadcast a video on "The secret jihadi smuggling route through 
Turkey." 
Actually, the Turks offered far more than an easy border crossing: they provided the bulk of ISIS' funds, 
logistics, training and arms. Turkish residents near the Syrian border tell of Turkish ambulances going 
to Kurdish-ISIS battle zones and then evacuating ISIS casualties to Turkish hospitals. Indeed, a 
sensational photograph has surfaced showing ISIS commander Abu Muhammad in a hospital bed 
receiving treatment for battle wounds in Hatay State Hospital in April 2014. 
One Turkish opposition politician estimates that Turkey has paid $800 million to ISIS for oil shipments. 
Another politician released information about active duty Turkish soldiers training ISIS members. 
Critics note that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has met three times with someone, 
Yasin al-Qadi, who has close ties to ISIS and has funded it. 
Why the Turkish support for wild-eyed extremists? Because Ankara wants to eliminate two Syrian 
polities, the Assad regime in Damascus and Rojava (the emerging Kurdish state) in the northeast. 
Regarding the Assad regime: "Thinking that jihadists would ensure a quick fall for the Assad regime in 
Syria, Turkey, no matter how vehemently officials deny it, supported the jihadists," writes Cengiz, "at 
first along with Western and some Arab countries and later in spite of their warnings." 
Regarding Rojava: Rojava's leadership being aligned with the PKK, the (formerly) terrorist 
Kurdish group based in Turkey, the authoritative Turkish journalist Amberin Zaman has little 
doubt "that until recently, Turkey was allowing jihadist fighters to move unhindered across its 
borders" to fight the Kurds. 
More broadly, as the Turkish analyst Mustafa Akyol notes, Ankara thought "anybody who fought al-
Assad was a good guy and also harbored an "ideological uneasiness with accepting that Islamists can do 
terrible things." This has led, he acknowledges, to "some blindness" toward violent jihadists. Indeed, 
ISIS is so popular in Turkey that others publicly copy its logo. 
In the face of this support, the online newspaper Al-Monitor calls on Turkey to close its border to 
ISIS while Rojava threatened Ankara with "dire consequences" unless Turkish aid ceases. 
In conclusion, Turkish leaders are finding Syria a double quagmire, what with Assad still in power and 
the Kurdish entity growing stronger. In reaction, they have cooperated with even the most extreme, 
retrograde and vicious elements, such as ISIS. But this support opened a second front in Iraq which, in 
turn, brings the clash of the Middle East's two titans, Turkey and Iran, closer to realization. 
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Kurds deserve independence: Column 
Our allies are culturally and economically ready for their own country. 
Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga fighters hold their position Tuesday east of Mosul in their ongoing battles 
with ISIS terrorists.(Photo: JM Lopez, AFP/Getty Images) 
Our slow march to an ISIS strategy ends, for now, with President Obama's speech tonight. But as the 
details of his plans trickle out, there is still room for some new thinking. Holding Iraq together with 
training, foreign aid and diplomatic pressure has been tried and failed. Perhaps it is time to turn 
elsewhere. Our last and best hope of turning the tide against the Islamist thugs could be the powerful 
and motivated Kurdish people, especially their valiant army, the peshmerga. 
Forget having to train or advise these Kurdish warriors. All the peshmerga really needs to turn into the 
true steel tip of the sword are the right hardware and some assurance that the endgame will involve an 
independent Kurdistan. If we lose sight of this reality, the United States and the West have lost before 
the battle is joined. You can bet that the pathetic Iraqi army, backed by a new but shaky government, 
will make zero headway against the Islamic State. We'll be in for years of violence and turmoil spreading 
across the region and, all too quickly, to our shores. 
Wrong reasons  
Officially, Obama sent U.S. warplanes into action to drive ISIS forces from the Mosul dam while 
protecting Iraqi religious minorities and protecting the Kurdish capital of Irbil. All good reasons for 
intervention. 
The right reason would have been to help the Kurds achieve independence. That we took any initiative 
on behalf of the Kurds was because it furthered our own misguided goal. For years and at a cost of 
thousands of lives, we have sought to hold together a dysfunctional Iraqi nation to which few Kurds 
have any real loyalty and for which they would hardly lay down their lives. 
They would lay down their lives, however, for a free Kurdistan, something that was snatched from their 
grasp nearly a century ago by the Treaty of Versailles ending World War I. Redrawing the map of the 
Ottoman Empire, the peacemakers created Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and an opening for Israel, but 
left out Kurdistan. Instead, they scattered 30 million to 40 million ethnically, religiously and culturally 
homogeneous people across a handful of countries. 
Today, the Kurds understand what it takes to build a viable nation and have the gumption and will to 
defend it. Given the means and authority, the Kurds have every right to become the Israel of the Muslim 
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Middle East. And they won't even ask for a handout. Plenty of oil and a vibrant commercial class assure 
them of a solid economic foundation. 
Real Islamic democracy 
Imagine helping a true Islamic democracy emerge in the heart of the Middle East, something we tried 
desperately to do in Iraq at the cost of so many American lives. And yet it is now right in front of us, 
ripe for the taking, if only we abandon the fiction of a united, democratic Iraq. Coupled with an Israeli-
style "right of return," the Kurds could become a free and vibrant nation, without taking a sliver of 
territory from the countries where millions of their brethren live today. 
Moreover, they have their forces where they are needed, in the vast stretches of northern Syria and Iraq 
where ISIS is so firmly planted. Given the right incentive, we might also find that the Kurds of Syria are 
worthy and vital opponents both of the Assad regime and of ISIS terrorists. The Kurds of Turkey are 
equally appropriate allies, if we can persuade our NATO ally, Turkey, to part with them. And why not? 
They are only a distraction in that nation. There's also no love lost between the Kurds of Iran and the 
mullahs of Tehran, yet both seem prepared to face down the Sunnis of ISIS at any cost. 
America, with all its diplomatic and military muscle, should do no less — help the Kurds finally reach 
the goal they have earned, many of them with their lives. Perhaps we can right a century-old wrong 
while giving Obama's ISIS strategy a real chance to succeed. 
David A. Andelman, editor in chief of World Policy Journal, is a member of the Board of Contributors 
of USA TODAY and author ofA Shattered Peace: Versailles 1919 and the Price We Pay Today. 
In addition to its own editorials, USA TODAY publishes diverse opinions from outside writers, including 
our Board of Contributors. To read more columns like this, go to the opinion front page or follow us on 
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Kurds Welcome U.S. Help in Iraq, But Remember History of Betrayal 
A brief history of the Kurdish/U.S. relationship shows why 
For a few hours, the city of Erbil was in a state of panic. Word came that Gwar, just 30 minutes from the 
Kurdish capital, had been taken by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Kurds and ex-pats 
alike were packing up, trying to book airline tickets or, in a worse case scenario, preparing to drive to 
Turkey. But then American war planes swooped in and began bombing and President Obama pledged 
to defend Erbil. 
Kurds breathed a sigh of relief. “The most important development was the decision by the United States 
to save lives,” says Hoshyar Zebari, a former Iraqi foreign minister and a prominent Kurd. “U.S. help is 
deeply appreciated.” Dr. Fuad Hussein, chief of staff to Kurdish President Masoud Barzani, welcomed 
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the UN resolution condemning ISIS, and praised coalition forces for their technical and humanitarian 
assistance. He noted that the U.S. had co-ordinated tactical efforts with Peshmerga forces, allowing the 
Kurdish fighters to prepare to go on the offensive. “We used to say Kurds don’t have any friends but 
the mountains. But that doesn’t ring true anymore,” he said. 
That said, many Kurds still carry lingering worries that the U.S. will betray them once again. “There’s 
a history of contact and betrayal with the U.S. and the Kurds where the U.S. made contact and helped 
but never jumped in with both feet,” says Quil Lawrence, author of The Invisible Nation: How the Kurds’ 
Quest for Statehood Is Shaping Iraq and the Middle East, and a correspondent with NPR. “The Kurds 
have been very frustrated with a lot of the stages long the way,” he says. “But certainly these airstrikes 
would restore some of that trust. I feel like I’ve had many Kurds quote Churchill to me in the past 
week: ‘Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing… after they have exhausted all 
other possibilities.’” 
Finally, it seems, the U.S. has exhausted all other possibilities in Iraq and all that’s left is to rely upon 
the Kurds. It’s only taken a century. 
Nearly a hundred years ago, the Kurdish rebel leader Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji carried around in his 
pocket a copy of Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points, so inspired was he by American self-determination. And 
yet it would be the Americans who would help deny the Kurds the same right at nearly every turn. Two 
years after Wilson delivered that speech, the Allies agreed to an independent Kurdistan in the 1920 
Treaty of Sevres. But by 1923, in the Treaty of Lausanne that recognized Kemal Attaturk’s Turkey, the 
international community abandoned the Kurds and the referendum promised in the Treaty of Sevres was 
never realized. Thus began the Kurdish struggle for independence. 
After several thwarted attempts to break away from Iraq, the Kurds finally got their first indirect aid 
from the U.S. in the early 1970s, more thanks to the Shah of Iran than anything else. In 1972, Iraq aligned 
with the Soviet Union and the Shah pushed the U.S. to arm the Kurds by selling them Soviet weapons 
seized in Egypt. By 1974, the Kurds were in open rebellion led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, of the same 
tribe Barzanji was from. But by 1975, Iran and Iraq made peace under the Algiers Accords. Iranian 
support for the Kurdish uprising abruptly came to a halt and the rebellion collapsed. 
Barzani fled to Iran and then America, where he died in 1979, the same year of the Iranian Revolution, 
where yet again U.S. allegiances shifted. And, yet, again, the Kurds were the unwitting victim. 
Towards the end of the First Gulf War, the Kurds saw a window for independence. Encouraged by the 
Americans, they rose up against Hussein for the third time. Hussein sent in the army and rolled over the 
Kurds, slaughtering thousands of villagers as they passed through. More than 1.5 million Kurds fled 
through the mountains to Turkey. American troops and arms never materialized, though they eventually 
sent in air support, which helped the Kurds push Hussein back to Kirkuk. In order to protect the Kurds, 
a no-fly zone was formed that lasted nearly a decade, until the Second Gulf War. 
By the time the Turks refused America passage for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Kurds were in a position 
to offer themselves as a viable alternative. Fighting side-by-side with American special forces, the Kurds 
believed that their day had finally come: independence couldn’t be far away. But in the aftermath of the 
invasion, the Kurds were taken aback when the U.S. tried to disarm them and insisted they join the new 
government. Warily, the did so, but Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has not been the partner they’d 
hoped for. 
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Maliki warned repeatedly that the Kurds did not have the authority to drill and export their own oil, and 
that empowering them would lead to the end of Iraq. By late 2011 some 60,000 Kurdish peshmerga and 
Iraqi forces were at a stand off near Kirkuk over the oil dispute. But, then, in 2013, Fallujah fell to Sunni 
extremists and then in the summer of 2014, Mosul and Tikrit fell to ISIS. The Iraqi Army retreated back 
to Baghdad. The Kurds took full control of Kirkuk and its refinery. 
But U.S. refusal to equip the Kurds, and Baghdad’s refusal to share U.S. arms with the peshmerga, left 
Kurdish forces weakened, low on ammunition and unable to defend a 600-mile border border. ISIS 
advanced within 30 minutes of the Kurdish capital of Erbil as panicked Kurds and foreign workers began 
packing and fleeing to the airport or north towards Turkey. Last week, the U.S. stepped in and bombed 
ISIS and President Obama pledged to defend Erbil. For the first time ever, the U.S. said it would directly 





The New York Times 
On a Helicopter, Going Down: Inside a Lethal Crash in Iraq 
By ALISSA J. RUBINAUG. 16, 2014 
Alissa J. Rubin, a veteran Times foreign correspondent, was injured on Tuesday in a helicopter crash in 
Kurdistan and dictated the following article from her hospital bed in Istanbul, where she was evacuated 
from Iraq. She suffered broken bones and a fractured skull but was in stable condition, and was 
scheduled to be taken by air to the United States on Sunday.  
ISTANBUL — If it weren’t for Tuesday’s helicopter crash on Mount Sinjar, what would I have written 
about the plight of the Yazidis? 
I would have started, I guess, with this mountain that everybody is talking about, to which the Yazidis 
have fled. It’s hard to overstate the size of this mountain, which is such a sacred place to the Yazidis, 
and the place they went to escape the terror that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria has been inflicting 
on them. It’s really more of a range than an individual mountain — 60 miles long, 5,000 feet high — 
and it is no wonder the relief operation, which riveted much of the world, posed such challenges. 
Then I would have written about our pilot, Maj. Gen. Majid Ahmed Saadi, a veteran Iraqi Arab officer 
helping the Kurds rescue the Yazidis. Adam Ferguson, our photographer, and I were waiting all day at 
the Kurdish military base in Fishkhabour, Iraq, for a helicopter to take us to Mount Sinjar. General Majid 
came in from his first run up the mountain with a full load of Yazidi refugees, and a British television 
journalist said to him, “Why are you taking such risks overloading your helicopter like that?” 
He just said, “I checked my numbers, I checked the weight, and it was possible to do it.” 
Also waiting with us was a Yazidi member of Parliament, Vian Dakhil, whose heart-rending speech in 
the Iraqi Parliament on Aug. 5 really touched people. She seemed very together, very organized 
(although she was inexplicably wearing high heels), and, of course, passionate about her people’s 
plight. 
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When we finally got in the helicopter, it was 3:45 p.m., not a lot of daylight left. I had a seat on a load 
of bread, behind one of the door gunners. Otherwise, there were no seats, no seatbelts; it was the kind of 
flight the United States military would never have allowed. 
The helicopter was full of bread, and probably bullets, too: bread for the Yazidis and bullets for the base 
of Kurdish pesh merga fighters on top of the mountain. 
The pilot really made a big impression. You know, the Yazidis feel so betrayed by the Arab neighbors 
they had lived among for so many years; they all turned on the Yazidis when ISIS came. Many of the 
atrocities were carried out not by the militants but by their own neighbors. 
Yet here was General Majid, an Iraqi Arab himself, who was taking off from his own job — he was in 
charge of training for the Iraqi air force — to help these people. 
He told me it was the most important thing he had done in his life, the most significant thing he had 
done in his 35 years of flying. 
It was as if it gave his whole life meaning; he was especially moved by all the Yazidi children. 
The top priority was to get food up there. There were many places where there had been no airdrops of 
food at all, so these drops by the Kurdish authorities were really important. 
When we were nearing the top of the mountain, people were gathered already. I remember one mother 
holding her son by the hand on one side, her daughter on the other, and they were trying to stay upright 
in the downdraft from the rotors so they could push forward to climb aboard. And they did make it on. 
One older woman’s face sticks in my mind; it was very rough and tremendously sad. 
We were on the ground only about 10 minutes. The Yazidis were battered. Some older people were 
barefoot, legs swollen from walking; others were just totally dehydrated; and children sunburned. The 
kids — a lot of them — were crying, afraid and confused, and others were silent, just frightened. 
When we landed, it was almost scary, with people thronging to get to us. All these people just wanting 
to get onto the helicopter and off this mountain. And I’m sure most of them had never seen a helicopter 
up close. One woman’s legs were so swollen she had to be carried in a sling by several men. 
So many climbed into the helicopter, coming up the rear loading ramp, the crew couldn’t get the ramp 
closed. So they had to reopen it and make people get off. 
When they tried to take off, they couldn’t and had to set the helicopter back down. 
Then there was this sad moment: They pulled this woman and her two children off the helicopter. They 
were crying. The mother was quite thin. 
The pilot was just so moved by all this. He wanted to help all these people, especially the children. 
Then General Majid took off. But you could see he was going to use the downward slope of the mountain 
to aid in the takeoff, until he could build up enough lift. The nose of the helicopter was pointing downhill 
as the flight started. 
I felt the helicopter hit something; later, someone said it was a rock. I thought the pilot would right it, 
but then I saw the ground come up. I didn’t know what would happen, but I knew it was bad. 
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Later, someone told me the co-pilot shut off the fuel when they lost control, which made us stall. 
Otherwise, it might have caught fire and exploded. 
When we went down, I thought, all right, we’re on a mountain, it’ll slide a long way before it stops. Stuff 
fell on me; I didn’t know if they were people or things. Then Ms. Dakhil landed on top of me. 
Everyone was groaning. There were no screams, but everyone was groaning. Adam was great. He 
dragged me out of the helicopter, as I couldn’t possibly walk. Adam wrapped his scarf around my head 
to stop the bleeding. 
A pesh merga soldier took off his kaffiyeh and wrapped my arms together so that they wouldn’t flap 
around. I thought it was really sweet at the time, but then I realized how sensible it was: He was 
immobilizing my arms because both my wrists were broken. 
Just before dark, a rescue helicopter came. 
Several people picked me up and carried me aboard in a very inexpert fashion; that really hurt, 
unfortunately. I heard myself groan like everybody else. At that moment, it just hurt so much. But then 
I thought, that’s good. At least I’m alive. 
I bet a lot of them are not. 
How is the pilot? Did he make it? He just wanted to help. 
About 25 Yazidis, as well as five crew members, five Kurdish politicians and four Western journalists, 
were aboard the Mi-17, a Russian-made transport helicopter. Nearly all were wounded, although none 
as seriously as Ms. Rubin. Ms. Dakhil was also evacuated to Istanbul, with both legs and several ribs 
broken. 
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Freud and the Middle East 
NOV. 11, 2014 
Thomas L. Friedman 
 
ABU DHABI, United Arab Emirates — When trying to make sense of the Middle East, one of the most 
important rules to keep in mind is this: What politicians here tell you in private is usually irrelevant. 
What matters most, and what explains their behavior more times than not, is what they say in public in 
their own language to their own people. As President Obama dispatches more U.S. advisers to help 
Iraqis defeat the Islamic State, or ISIS, it is vital that we listen carefully to what the key players are 
saying in public in their own language about each other and their own aspirations. 
For instance, the Middle East Media Research Institute, or Memri, recently posted an excerpt from an 
interview given by Mohammad Sadeq al-Hosseini, a former adviser to Iranian President Mohammad 
Khatami, which aired on Mayadeen TV on Sept. 24, in which he pointed out that Shiite Iran, through its 
surrogates, has taken de facto control over four Arab capitals: Beirut, through the Shiite militia 
Hezbollah; Damascus, through the Shiite/Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad; Baghdad, through the 
Shiite-led government there; and — while few in the West were paying attention — Sana, where the pro-
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Iranian-Yemeni-Shiite offshoot sect, the Houthi, recently swept into the capital of Yemen and are now 
dominating the Sunnis. 
 
As Hosseini said of Iran and its allies: “We in the axis of resistance are the new sultans of the 
Mediterranean and the Gulf. We in Tehran, Damascus, [Hezbollah’s] southern suburb of Beirut, 
Baghdad and Sana will shape the map of the region. We are the new sultans of the Red Sea as well.” 
And he also said, for good measure, that Saudi Arabia was “a tribe on the verge of extinction.” 
We might not hear this stuff, but Sunni Arabs do, especially now when the United States and Iran might 
end their 35-year-old cold war and reach a deal that would allow Iran a “peaceful” nuclear energy 
program. It helps explain something else you might have missed: Sunni militants burst into a Saudi Shiite 
village, al-Dalwah, on Nov. 3 and gunned down five Saudi Shiites at a religious event. 
 
Well, at least Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is in the modern world. No, wait, what is the 
name that Erdogan insists be put on the newest bridge he’s building across the Bosporus? Answer: the 
Yavuz Sultan Selim bridge. Selim I was the Sunni Turkish sultan who, in 1514, beat back the Persian 
Shiite empire of his day, called the Safavids. Turkey’s Alevi minority, a Shiite offshoot sect whose 
ancestors faced Selim’s wrath, have protested the name of the bridge.  
 
They know it didn’t come out of a hat. According to Britannica, Selim I was the Ottoman sultan (1512-
20) who extended the empire to Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, “and raised the Ottomans to leadership 
of the Muslim world.” He then turned eastward and took on the Safavid Shiite dynasty in Iran, which 
posed a “political and ideological threat” to the hegemony of Ottoman Sunni Islam. Selim was the first 
Turkish leader to claim to be both sultan of the Ottoman Empire and caliph of all Muslims. 
Vice President Joe Biden did not misspeak when he accused Turkey of facilitating the entry of ISIS 
fighters into Syria. Just as there is a little bit of West Bank “Jewish settler” in almost every Israeli, there 
is a little bit of the caliphate dream in almost every Sunni. Some Turkish analysts suspect Erdogan does 
not dream of building pluralistic democracy in Iraq and Syria, but rather a modern Sunni caliphate — 
not led by ISIS but by himself. Until then, he clearly prefers ISIS on his border than an independent 
Kurdistan. 
As Shadi Hamid, a fellow at the Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, put it in an Atlantic article 
entitled “The Roots of the Islamic State’s Appeal”: “ISIS draws on, and draws strength from, ideas that 
have broad resonance among Muslim-majority populations. They may not agree with ISIS’s 
interpretation of the caliphate, but the notion of a caliphate — the historical political entity governed by 
Islamic law and tradition — is a powerful one.” 
In fact, though, notes the Middle East scholar Joseph Braude, most Arab Sunnis in Egypt, the Levant 
and the Arabian Peninsula in the late 19th century “were quite opposed to the [Turkish-run] caliphate 
they had experienced, which they saw as a kind of occupying force.” It was the 20th century Sunni 
Islamist groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, that revived the idea, idealizing the caliphate as 
a response to their region’s weakness and decline “and inserting it into mainstream religious discourse.” 
 
In sum, there are so many conflicting dreams and nightmares playing out among our Middle East allies 
in the war on ISIS that Freud would not have been able to keep them straight. If you listen closely, of 
those dreams, ours — “pluralistic democracy” — is not high on the list. We need to protect the islands 
of decency out here — Jordan, Kurdistan, Lebanon, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Oman — from ISIS, in hopes 
that their best examples might one day spread. But I am skeptical that our fractious allies, with all their 
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There Be Dragons 
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN 
Published: February 28, 2012 200 Comments 
 
In medieval times, areas known to be dangerous or uncharted were often labeled on maps with the 
warning: “Beware, here be dragons.” That is surely how mapmakers would be labeling the whole Middle 
East today. 
After the onset of the Arab awakenings, it was reasonable to be, at worst, agnostic and, at best, hopeful 
about the prospect of these countries making the difficult transition from autocracy to democracy. But 
recently, looking honestly at the region, one has to conclude that the prospects for stable transitions to 
democracy anytime soon are dimming. It is too early to give up hope, but it is not too early to start 
worrying. 
Lord knows it is not because of the bravery of the Arab youth, and many ordinary citizens, who set off 
these awakenings, in search of dignity, justice and freedom. No, it is because the staying power and 
mendacity of the entrenched old guards and old ideas in these countries is much deeper than most people 
realize and the frailty or absence of democratic institutions, traditions and examples much greater. 
“There is a saying that inside every fat man is a thin man dying to get out,” notes Michael Mandelbaum, 
the foreign policy expert at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. “We also tend 
to believe that inside every autocracy is a democracy dying to get out, but that might not be true in the 
Middle East.” 
It was true in Eastern Europe in 1989, added Mandelbaum, but there are two big differences between 
Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Many Eastern European countries had a recent liberal past to fall 
back on — after the artificially imposed Soviet communism was removed. And Eastern Europe also had 
a compelling model and magnet for free-market democracy right next door: the European Union. Most 
of the Arab-Muslim world has neither, so when the iron lid of autocracy comes off they fall back, not 
on liberalism, but Islamism, sectarianism, tribalism or military rule. 
To be sure, we have to remember how long it took America to build its own liberal political order and 
what freaks that has made us today. Almost four years ago, we elected a black man, whose name was 
Barack, whose grandfather was a Muslim, to lead us out of our worst economic crisis in a century. We’re 
now considering replacing him with a Mormon, and it all seems totally normal. But that normality took 
more than 200 years and a civil war to develop. 
The Arabs and Afghans are in their first decade. You see in Syria how quickly the regime turned the 
democracy push there into a sectarian war. Remember, the opposition in Syria began as a largely 
peaceful, grass-roots, pan-Syrian movement for democratic change. But it was deliberately met by 
President Bashar al-Assad with murder and sectarian venom. He wanted to make the conflict about his 
Alawite minority versus the country’s Sunni Muslim majority as a way of discrediting the opposition 
and holding his base. 
As Peter Harling and Sarah Birke, experts on the Middle East who have been in Syria, wrote in a recent 
essay: “Rather than reform, the regime’s default setting has been to push society to the brink. As soon as 
protests started ... state media showed staged footage of arms being found in a mosque in Dara’a, the 
southern city where protests first broke out, and warned that a sit-in in Homs ... was an attempt to erect 
a mini-caliphate. This manipulation of Syrians meant the regime was confident that the threat of civil 
war would force citizens and outside players alike to agree on preserving the existing power structure as 
the only bulwark against collapse.” 
You see the same kind of manipulation of emotions in Afghanistan. U.S. troops accidentally burned some 
Korans, and President Obama apologized. Afghans nevertheless went on a weeklong rampage, killing 
innocent Americans in response — and no Afghan leader, even our allies, dared to stand up and say: 
“Wait, this is wrong. Every week in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq, Muslim suicide bombers kill other 
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Muslims — holy people created in the image of God — and there’s barely a peep. Yet the accidental 
burning of holy books by Americans sparks outbursts and killings. What does our reaction say about 
us?” They need to have that conversation. 
In Egypt, every day it becomes clearer that the Army has used the Tahrir uprising to get rid of its main 
long-term rival for succession — President Hosni Mubarak’s more reform-minded son, Gamal. Now, 
having gotten rid of both father and son, the Army is showing its real hand by prosecuting American, 
European and Egyptian democracy workers for allegedly working with “foreign agents” — the C.I.A., 
Israel and the Jewish lobby — to destabilize Egypt. This is a patently fraudulent charge, but one meant 
to undermine the democrats demanding that the Army step aside. 
The Arab/Muslim awakening phase is over. Now we are deep into the counter-revolutionary phase, as 
the dead hands of the past try to strangle the future. I am ready to consider any ideas of how we in the 
West can help the forces of democracy and decency win. But, ultimately, this is their fight. They have to 
own it, and I just hope it doesn’t end — as it often does in the land of dragons — with extremists going 
all the way and the moderates just going away. 
 
A version of this op-ed appeared in print on February 29, 2012, on page A27 of the New York edition 
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From a liberal perspective, the past Turkish decade has largely been a pleasant one. The Turkish military, 
which has ousted four elected governments since 1960, has been gradually pushed to where it should be 
in any democracy. 
Systemic human rights abuses, such as torture and summary executions, have disappeared. Reforms 
encouraged by the European Union have expanded the rights of Kurds, Christians, women and basically 
all minority groups. Meanwhile, the Turkish economy has boomed, creating more jobs and more 
prosperity. 
The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has been in power since 2002, deserves a lot of credit 
for this transformation. No wonder Turkey’s liberal intellectuals, who had long been calling for 
democratic reforms, have by and large supported the AKP. That is also why the Kemalists, the sworn 
enemies of the AKP, have labeled the liberals as “traitors” who “sold” themselves to the AKP. (In Turkey, 
liberalism and Kemalism have always been conflicting political lines; Kemalism venerates the 
authoritarian state, liberalism criticizes it.) 
However, in the past year, the reformist edge of the AKP has dramatically waned. The “Kurdish 
opening,” which promised a liberal and peaceful solution to the country’s decades-old conflict with 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), was replaced by a more hawkish policy of “counter-terrorism.” 
Various journalists were arrested for “propaganda on behalf of terrorism,” with indictments that would 
not be considered serious in most democratic countries. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s intolerance to 
criticism continued, with “insult” cases opened against even friendly journalists. 
Therefore, the current widespread opinion among many Turkish liberals, and even some conservatives, 
is that the AKP is not a promising party anymore. Rather, the governing party is criticized for its 
increasingly authoritarian style, and even for creating its own authoritarian establishment. 
I agree with most of these liberal criticisms against the AKP. I, too, feel less enthusiastic about “New 
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Turkey” and its potential to becoming a truly liberal democracy.  
However, there is a crucial point to note: Almost none of the problems that we see today in the AKP 
stem from its “Islamism,” as Kemalists and some Westerners think. In fact, the AKP’s transformation to 
post-Islamism remains genuine, as the party promotes nothing more “Islamic” than a secular state that 
has respect to religion. Moreover, in its approach to Turkey’s non-Muslims, the AKP is still more liberal 
than the Kemalist nationalists. 
The real problem lies in not the “Islamism” of the AKP, but its “Turkishness” – i.e., the problems that it 
inherited from Turkey’s political culture: an over-powerful leader, a love affair with conspiracy theories, 
an obsession with “honor” that limits freedom of speech and a concept of “terrorism” that criminalizes 
even ideas. These are the standard troubles that Turkish governments, let them be Kemalist or center-
right, have displayed for many decades. The AKP is only proving that it too is not free from these 
negative Ankara traditions. 
That is why some of the Islamic critics of the AKP are blaming the party these days for being “Ankara-
icized.” One of them is Faruk Ünsal, the head of Mazlumder, an Islamic Human Rights Organization, 
who gave a long interview to daily Taraf two weeks ago. “The AKP transformed the bureaucracy to 
some extent,” he said, “but the bureaucracy transformed them, too, and they met at a midpoint.” He 
went on to criticize all the illiberal tendencies of the AKP from a Muslim point of view. 
The next big question is whether the AKP will be stuck in this new equilibrium, or whether it will have 
the wisdom to shake and renew itself, curb its own temptation to unlimited power and revive its reformist 
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THE disintegration of Iraq and Syria is upending an order that has defined the Middle East for a century. 
It is a huge event, and we as a country need to think very carefully about how to respond. Having just 
returned from Iraq two weeks ago, my own thinking is guided by five principles, and the first is that, in 
Iraq today, my enemy’s enemy is my enemy. Other than the Kurds, we have no friends in this fight. 
Neither Sunni nor Shiite leaders spearheading the war in Iraq today share our values. 
The Sunni jihadists, Baathists and tribal militiamen who have led the takeover of Mosul from the Iraqi 
government are not supporters of a democratic, pluralistic Iraq, the only Iraq we have any interest in 
abetting. And Iraq’s Shiite prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, has proved himself not to be a friend 
of a democratic, pluralistic Iraq either. From Day 1, he has used his office to install Shiites in key security 
posts, drive out Sunni politicians and generals and direct money to Shiite communities. In a word, Maliki 
has been a total jerk. Besides being prime minister, he made himself acting minister of defense, minister 
of the interior and national security adviser, and his cronies also control the Central Bank and the 
Finance Ministry. 
Maliki had a choice — to rule in a sectarian way or in an inclusive way — and he chose sectarianism. 
We owe him nothing. 
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The second principle for me derives from the most important question we need to answer from the Arab 
Spring. Why is it that the two states doing the best are those that America has had the least to do 
with: Tunisia and the semiautonomous Kurdistan region of Iraq? 
Answer: Believe it or not, it’s not all about what we do and the choices we make. Arabs and Kurds have 
agency, too. And the reason that both Tunisia and Kurdistan have built islands of decency, still frail to 
be sure, is because the major contending political forces in each place eventually opted for the principle 
of “no victor, no vanquished.” 
The two major rival parties in Kurdistan not only buried the hatchet between them but paved the way 
for democratic elections that recently brought a fast-rising opposition party, that ran on an anti-
corruption platform, into government for the first time. And Tunisia, after much internal struggle and 
bloodshed, found a way to balance the aspirations of secularists and Islamists and agree on the most 
progressive Constitution in the history of the Arab world. 
Hence my rule: The Middle East only puts a smile on your face when it starts with them — when they 
take ownership of reconciliation. Please spare me another dose of: It is all about whom we train and arm. 
Sunnis and Shiites don’t need guns from us. They need the truth. It is the early 21st century, and too 
many of them are still fighting over who is the rightful heir to the Prophet Muhammad from the 7th 
century. It has to stop — for them, and for their kids, to have any future. 
Principle No. 3: Maybe Iran, and its wily Revolutionary Guards Quds Force commander, Gen. Qassem 
Suleimani, aren’t so smart after all. It was Iran that armed its Iraqi Shiite allies with the specially shaped 
bombs that killed and wounded many American soldiers. Iran wanted us out. It was Iran that pressured 
Maliki into not signing an agreement with the U.S. to give our troops legal cover to stay in Iraq. Iran 
wanted to be the regional hegemon. Well, Suleimani: “This Bud’s for you.” Now your forces are 
overextended in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, and ours are back home. Have a nice day. 
We still want to forge a nuclear deal that prevents Iran from developing a bomb, so we have to be careful 
about how much we aid Iran’s Sunni foes. But with Iran still under sanctions and its forces and 
Hezbollah’s now fighting in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, well, let’s just say: advantage America. 
Fourth: Leadership matters. While in Iraq, I visited Kirkuk, a city that has long been hotly contested 
between Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen. When I was there five years ago, it was a hellish war zone. This 
time I found new paved roads, parks and a flourishing economy and a Kurdish governor, Najimaldin 
Omar Karim, who was just re-elected in April in a fair election and won more seats thanks to votes from 
the minority Arabs and Turkmen. 
“We focused on [improving] roads, terrible traffic, hospitals, dirty schools,” and increasing electricity 
from four hours a day to nearly 24 hours, said Dr. Karim, a neurosurgeon who had worked in America 
for 33 years before returning to Iraq in 2009. “People were tired of politics and maximalism. We [earned] 
the confidence and good feelings of Arabs and Turkmen toward a Kurdish governor. They feel like we 
don’t discriminate. This election was the first time Turkmen and Arabs voted for a Kurd.” 
In the recent chaos, the Kurds have now taken full military control of Kirkuk, but I can tell you this: Had 
Maliki governed Iraq like Karim governed Kirkuk, we would not have this mess today. With the right 
leadership, people there can live together. 
Finally, while none of the main actors in Iraq, other than Kurds, are fighting for our values, is anyone 
there even fighting for our interests: a minimally stable Iraq that doesn’t threaten us? And whom we can 
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Friedman: Iraq's best hope may be in young Kurds 
Thomas Friedman says that in the long run our values as taught at the American University of Iraq 
could triumph where our power failed. 
By Thomas L. FriedmanJune 3, 2014 Updated: June 3, 2014 10:01pm 
 
SULAIMANI, Iraq - I am a sucker for commencements, but this one filled me with many different 
emotions. 
As Dina Dara took the stage - the student speaker and valedictorian of the 2014 graduating class of the 
American University of Iraq, Sulaimani, in Kurdistan - the sun was just setting, turning Azmar Mountain 
in the background into a reddish-brown curtain. The class was about 70 percent Kurds, with the rest 
coming from every corner, religion and tribe of Iraq. Parents bursting with pride had driven up from 
Basra and Baghdad, dressed in their finest to see their kids get their American-style college degrees. 
Three Kurdish TV stations carried the ceremony live. 
"It has been quite a journey," Dara, who's going on to graduate school at Tufts, told her classmates. 
(Since the university opened in 2007, all the valedictorians have been Iraqi women.) "We went through 
a whole different experience living in the dorms. This evening .. we are armed with two things: first, the 
highly valued American education that makes us as competent and qualified as the rest of the students 
in the world. And, second, the empowerment of a liberal arts education." As we "exercise critical 
thinking techniques that have been the core of our education here, and as we try to move beyond the 
traditional conventions, beyond what others suggest, we may struggle. But isn't this how nations are 
built?" 
Sitting near Dara (I was the commencement speaker), I thought: This is how the Iraq story was supposed 
to end but hasn't, not yet. Kurdistan remains the unsung success story of the Iraq War, one thing that 
U.S. veterans can take pride in having helped to create - first by protecting the Kurds from Saddam 
Hussein with a no-fly zone and second by toppling Saddam, who had tried to wipe out the Kurds with 
poison gas in 1988. 
But it was the Kurds who used the window of freedom we opened for them to overcome internal 
divisions, start to reform their once Sopranos-like politics and create a vibrant economy that is now 
throwing up skyscrapers and colleges in major towns of Erbil and Sulaimani. Everywhere I've gone here, 
I've met "reverse immigrants," Kurds who've come back to their homeland in northeastern Iraq because 
of all the opportunities. 
Kurdistan represents everything that has not happened in Shiite-dominated Baghdad and the Sunni 
regions of Iraq, where Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has behaved like a visionless, pro-Shiite sectarian 
chief and violence remains rife. Maliki was "our guy." So you could say that we left two big "gifts" 
behind in Iraq: an American-installed autocrat and an American university that is teaching the values of 
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inclusiveness that Maliki doesn't practice. In the long run, after Maliki is gone, we can still hope - as 
partially happened in Vietnam - that our values will triumph where our power failed. It's still a long shot, 
but that's clearly what the American University students are hoping. 
Bery Hoshiar, 20, a female engineering student, told me: "People graduating here feel they can make a 
change. They come here as people bounded by social conventions, and they leave as individuals with 
values that they implement in their lives. We all believe that we can be future leaders. (Iraq) is not over. 
We are just getting started. We are building from scratch. It is going to take time." 
Karwan Gaznay, 24, a Kurd, told me he grew up on books about Saddam: "Now we have this American 
education. I did not know who Thomas Jefferson was. I did not know who James Madison was. So when 
the government is doing something wrong, now we can say: 'This is wrong. I have been educated.' ... I 
ran for student president, and Arab guys voted for me. We are living as a family in the university. I am 
not pessimistic about Iraq. We can work together if we want to." 
As student president, Gaznay persuaded the Kurdish government to create a special ID card for Sunni 
and Shiite AUIS students to use to easily pass through checkpoints that protect this region from the rest 
of Iraq. Isa Mohamed, 22, a Shiite from Baghdad, told me this was why he supported Gaznay: "Any 
Arab (AUIS) student can now go through all the checkpoints and airports" in Kurdistan without 
difficulties. 
Mewan Nahro, 23, put it all in perspective: "My dad was in the mountains as a Pesh Merga (Kurdish 
guerrilla) fighter in the '80s and '90s, and now (our family) has gone from him in the mountains to me 
here at an American University and getting to say what I want." 
Yes, this is an elite school, and Kurdistan is an island of decency in a still-roiling sea. But the power of 
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In every civil war there is a moment before all hell breaks loose when there is still a chance to prevent a 
total descent into the abyss. Egypt is at that moment. 
he Muslim holy month of Ramadan starts this week, and it can’t come too soon. One can only hope that 
the traditional time for getting family and friends together will provide a moment for all the actors in 
Egypt to reflect on how badly they’ve behaved — all sides — and opt for the only sensible pathway 
forward: national reconciliation. I was a student at the American University in Cairo in the early 1970s 
and have been a regular visitor since. I’ve never witnessed the depth of hatred that has infected Egypt in 
recent months: Muslim Brotherhood activists throwing a young opponent off a roof; anti-Islamist 
activists on Twitter praising the Egyptian army for mercilessly gunning down supporters of the 
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Brotherhood in prayer. In the wake of all this violent turmoil, it is no longer who rules Egypt that it is at 
stake. It is Egypt that is at stake. This is an existential crisis. 
Can Egypt hold together and move forward as a unified country or will it be torn asunder by its own 
people, like Syria? Nothing is more important in the Middle East today, because when the stability of 
modern Egypt is at stake — sitting as it does astride the Suez Canal, the linchpin of any Arab peace 
with Israel and knitting together North Africa, Africa and the Middle East — the stability of the whole 
region is at stake. 
I appreciate the anger of non-Islamist, secular and liberal Egyptians with President Mohamed Morsi. He 
never would have become president without their votes, but, once in office, instead of being inclusive, 
at every turn he grabbed for more power. With Egypt’s economy in a tailspin, I also appreciate the 
impatience of many Egyptians with Morsi’s rule. But in the Arab world’s long transition to democracy, 
something valuable was lost when the military ousted Morsi’s government and did not wait for the 
Egyptian people to do it in October’s parliamentary elections or the presidential elections three years 
down the road. It gives the Muslim Brothers a perfect excuse not to reflect on their mistakes and change, 
which is an essential ingredient for Egypt to build a stable political center. 
But Egypt’s non-Islamists, secular and liberal groups need to get their act together, too. The Egyptian 
opposition has been great at mobilizing protests but incapable of coalescing around a single leader’s 
agenda, while the Brotherhood has been great at winning elections but incapable of governing. 
So now there is only one way for Egypt to avoid the abyss: the military, the only authority in Egypt 
today, has to make clear that it ousted the Muslim Brotherhood for the purpose of a “reset,” not for the 
purposes of “revenge” — for the purpose of starting over and getting the transition to democracy right 
this time, not for the purpose of eliminating the Brotherhood from politics. (It is not clear that the 
“interim constitution” issued Tuesday by Egypt’s transitional government will give the Brotherhood a 
fair shot at contesting power. It bans parties based on religion, but that ban was in place under Hosni 
Mubarak, and the Brotherhood got around it by running as independents.) Egypt will not be stable if the 
Brotherhood is excluded. 
Dalia Mogahed, the C.E.O. of Mogahed Consulting and a longtime pollster in the Middle East, 
remarked to me that the original 2011 revolution that overthrew Mubarak was mounted by “young 
people, leftists, liberals, Islamists, united for a better future. The division was between those 
revolutionaries and the status quo. The revolution wasn’t owned by the secularists or the liberals or the 
Islamists. That’s why it worked.” Democracy in Egypt “only has a chance when revolutionaries again 
see the status quo as their enemy, not each other.”  
She is right: Muslim Brothers can kill more secularists; the military can kill more Muslim Brothers; but 
another decade of the status quo in Egypt will kill them all. The country will be a human development 
disaster. With the absence of a true party of reform — that blends respect for religion with a strategy of 
modernization as the great 19th-century Egyptian reformers did — Egyptians today are being forced to 
choose not a better way, but between bad ideas. 
The Brotherhood posits that “Islam is the answer.” The military favors a return to the deep state of old. 
But more religion alone is not the answer for Egypt today and while the military-dominated deep state 
may provide law and order and keep Islamists down, it can’t provide the kind of fresh thinking and 
educational, entrepreneurial, social and legal reforms needed to empower and unleash Egypt’s 
considerable human talent and brainpower. In truth, the 2002 U.N. Arab Human Development Report is 
the answer, which, by the way, was mostly written by Egyptian scholars. It called on Egyptians to focus 
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on building a politics that can overcome their debilitating deficits of freedom, education and women’s 
empowerment. That is the pathway Egypt needs to pursue — not Mubarakism, Morsi-ism or military 
rule — and the job of Egypt’s friends now is not to cut off aid and censure, but to help it gradually but 
steadily find that moderate path. 
A version of this op-ed appears in print on July 10, 2013, on page A23 of the New York edition with the 
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Syria Is Iraq 
Lord knows I am rooting for the opposition forces in Syria to quickly prevail on their own and turn out 
to be as democratically inclined as we hope. But the chances of this best-of-all-possible outcomes is 
low. That’s because Syria is a lot like Iraq. Indeed, Syria is Iraq’s twin — a multisectarian, minority-
ruled dictatorship that was held together by an iron fist under Baathist ideology. And, for me, the lesson 
of Iraq is quite simple: You can’t go from Saddam to Switzerland without getting stuck in Hobbes — a 
war of all against all — unless you have a well-armed external midwife, whom everyone on the ground 
both fears and trusts to manage the transition. In Iraq, that was America. The kind of low-cost, remote-
control, U.S./NATO midwifery that ousted Qaddafi and gave birth to a new Libya is not likely to be 
repeated in Syria. Syria is harder. Syria is Iraq. 
And Iraq was such a bitter experience for America that we prefer never to speak of it again. But 
Iraq is relevant here. The only reason Iraq has any chance for a decent outcome today is because America 
was on the ground with tens of thousands of troops to act as that well-armed midwife, reasonably trusted 
and certainly feared by all sides, to manage Iraq’s transition to more consensual politics. My gut tells 
me that Syria will require the same to have the same chance. 
But because I absolutely would not advocate U.S. intervention on the ground in Syria or anywhere in 
the Arab world again — and the U.S. public would not support it — I find myself hoping my analysis is 
wrong and that Syrians will surprise us by finding their own way, with just arms and diplomatic 
assistance, to a better political future. I know columnists are supposed to pound the table and declaim 
what is necessary. But when you believe that what is necessary, an outside midwife for Syria, is 
impossible, you need to say so. I think those who have been advocating a more activist U.S. intervention 
in Syria — and excoriating President Obama for not leading that — are not being realistic about what it 
would take to create a decent outcome. 
Why? In the Middle East, the alternative to bad is not always good. It can be worse. I am awed at 
the bravery of those Syrian rebels who started this uprising, peacefully, without any arms, against 
a regime that plays by what I call Hama Rules, which are no rules at all. The Assad regime 
deliberately killed demonstrators to turn this conflict into a sectarian struggle between the ruling 
minority Alawite sect, led by the Assad clan, and the country’s majority of Sunni Muslims. That’s 
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why the opposite of the Assad dictatorship could be the breakup of Syria — as the Alawites retreat 
to their coastal redoubt — and a permanent civil war. 
There are two things that could divert us from that outcome. One is the Iraq alternative, where 
America went in and decapitated the Saddam regime, occupied the country and forcibly changed 
it from a minority Sunni-led dictatorship to a majority Shiite-led democracy. Because of both U.S. 
incompetence and the nature of Iraq, this U.S. intervention triggered a civil war in which all the 
parties in Iraq — Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds — tested the new balance of power, inflicting 
enormous casualties on each other and leading, tragically, to ethnic cleansing that rearranged the 
country into more homogeneous blocks of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. 
 
But the U.S. presence in Iraq contained that civil war and ethnic cleansing from spreading to 
neighboring states. And once that civil war burned itself out — and all sides were exhausted and 
more separated — the U.S. successfully brokered a new constitution and power-sharing deal in 
Iraq, with the Shiites enjoying majority rule, the Sunnis out of power but not powerless, and the 
Kurds securing semi-autonomy. The cost of this transition in lives and money was huge, and even 
today Iraq is not a stable or healthy democracy. But it has a chance, and it’s now up to Iraqis. 
Since it is highly unlikely that an armed, feared and trusted midwife will dare enter the fray in 
Syria, the rebels on the ground there will have to do it themselves. Given Syria’s fractured society, 
that will not be easy — unless there is a surprise. A surprise would be the disparate Syrian 
opposition groups congealing into a united political front — maybe with the help of U.S., Turkish 
and Saudi intelligence officers on the ground — and this new front reaching out to moderate 
Alawites and Christians who supported the Assads out of fear and agreeing to build a new order 
together that protects majority and minority rights. It would be wonderful to see the tyrannical 
Assad- Russia-Iran-Hezbollah axis replaced by a democratizing Syria, not a chaotic Syria. 
But color me dubious. The 20 percent of Syrians who are pro-Assad Alawites or Christians will be 
terrified of the new Sunni Muslim majority, with its Muslim Brotherhood component, and this 
Sunni Muslim majority has suffered such brutality from this regime that reconciliation will be 
difficult, especially with each passing day of bloodshed. Without an external midwife or a Syrian 
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New wars possible, new borders too 
Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan warned about a sectarian and ethnic-based civil war in Iraq on 
Nov. 22 and pointed to energy wars as the main motivation behind it. The next day, Iraq’s Shiite-origin 
Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, sent a strong “Not if you trigger it” reply to Erdoğan, only to be snubbed 
as “delusional” by the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Almost simultaneously, al-Maliki released a photo 
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showing the deployment of Iraqi troops to Tuzhurmatu in order to face Kurds piling up along the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) borders, despite still being part of Iraq on paper. 
It is surely about energy resources. There are still untapped oil and natural gas beds in the KRG territory, 
for which the energy giants of the world - from Exxon and Chevron of the United States to Total of 
France and Gazprom of Russia (Turkish companies too) - have sealed deals with the KRG President 
Massoud Barzani in Arbil. Despite the strong protests of al-Maliki in Baghdad and disapproving lip 
service from Washington, D.C., they are not taking any steps back. Al-Maliki knows that if Kurds 
manage to sell their oil and gas via NATO member Turkey without interference from Arabs, Russians 
and Iranians, that would mean a de-facto change in Iraqi borders and sovereignty, if not de jure. 
But has there been any conflict in Iraq or generally in the greater Middle East in the last hundred years 
which was not related to energy interests? 
Iraq itself, as a country, is one of the end results of the First World War, an outcome of sharing the oil 
fields of Mesopotamia and the Basra basin as carved out of the dismantling of the Turkish Empire, thanks 
to the British Empire. That was the first generation of energy wars in the region. 
The second generation was during the 1950-60s. Because of the Balance of Terror between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union - the Cold War - it was not in the form of wars between the countries. One exception 
is Arab countries’ attempts to finish off Israel, which ended with a wider and stronger Israel each 
time. The rest were in the form of regime changes, civil wars and coup d’etats in countries like Iran, 
Iraq, Syria and Egypt. That wave came to an end with the big oil crisis of 1973. 
The third generation started with the Iran-Iraq war, right after the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and came 
to an end in 2003 with the fall of Saddam Hussein, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq with the help of the 
Kurds. 
Now there are the pains of a fourth generation dictated by the needs of energy giants to get the marginal 
benefit of old-world resources before the end of the oil era, which is estimated to come within a few 
decades. 
What is happening in Iraq, Syria, Iran and Israel could be part of that, a hundred years after the start of 
it. Whenever there have been energy fights, there has been either regime or border changes, or both, in 






The Hurriyet daily News 
September/17/2013- MURAT YETKİN 
Öcalan raises the bar in Turkey’s Kurdish bid 
The third round of dialogue between the Turkish government and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK) started less than a year ago when Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan decided to send Hakan 
Fidan, the head of the Turkish intelligence service (MİT), to the PKK’s founding leader, who is 
imprisoned for life on İmralı island south of Istanbul.  
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In the following months, not only Fidan but MPs from the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which 
share the same grassroots as the PKK, paid 10 visits (the latest one on Sept. 15) to Öcalan in prison – 
all of them since January this year. 
Öcalan’s letter hinting at an end to the PKK’s 30-year armed campaign, Erdoğan’s calling the dialogue 
a “peace process” and the beginning of the withdrawal of militants from Turkish territory created hopes 
for a political solution to Turkey’s chronic Kurdish problem. 
Then the “process” started to slow down. The PKK started to force the government to rush a legal 
package through Parliament before the summer recess in July, and the government started to accuse the 
PKK of just pretending to withdraw militants while actually going after new recruits. The tone escalated 
mutually as the PKK, especially at the headquarters in the Kandil mountains of the Kurdish autonomous 
region in Iraq, began threatening the government with a restart of actions before eventually announcing 
the halt of their withdrawal earlier this month. 
Erdoğan announced last week that he was to announce a “democratization package” this week, while the 
Prime Minister’s Office denied media reports saying that the draft of the package was first shown to 
Öcalan before being made public. 
The last BDP visit to Öcalan took place under such circumstances. The outcome is a statement by Öcalan 
asking to see more people in prison, not just the BDP, but civil society representatives and journalists. 
And it was impossible not to observe that he insistently used the word “negotiations” instead of 
“dialogue” and said his demands had to be met for the continuation of the process. 
What had changed in less than a year to cause Öcalan, in his prison cell, to raise the bar in his dealings 
with the government? 
There are a few reasons. The first is the Syria factor. The PKK’s Syria wing, the PYD, has successfully 
distanced itself both from the forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad and from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) 
fighting against them. It carried out its own program to take Kurdish-populated Syrian towns along the 
border under its control and for that, mainly fought against al-Nusra, the Syria branch of al-Qaeda.  
Taking advantage of an end to security operations, thanks to the “process,” the PKK endorsed its 
presence in Turkey, especially in the Kurdish-populated southeast, as Turkey approaches critical local 
elections in March 2014. Knowing that Erdoğan doesn’t want any bloodshed before the elections, Öcalan 
might have thought that he has an upper hand and that it is time to raise the bar. 
Now the content of the Turkish government’s “democratization package” is more important than, say 
three months before. Will it suggest the lowering of the 10 percent election threshold, enable obligatory 
education in Kurdish or merely give what Öcalan wants so that he can have better communications and 
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ERBIL, Iraq — For the Kurds here in this ancient city, the rewards of war are numerous and obvious. 
Construction cranes rise from the cityscape. Highway medians are green with shrubbery. A glittering 
shopping mall with an indoor ice skating rink stands as a totem of American-style consumerism. The 
only blast walls in sight are those that protect the regional parliament, decorated by sunflowers painted 
in muted shades of yellow. 
Among Iraqis, the Kurds benefited the most from the war, and now may have the most to lose if the 
political chaos that followed the departure of American forces metastasizes into civil war. 
“Are we worried? Yes, we are worried,” said Barham A. Salih, the prime minister of the Kurdish regional 
government. “Our national interest as Kurds lies in a democratic, federal, peaceful Iraq. We still have a 
long way to go before we get there.” 
The end of the American military role here is an anxious turning point for the Kurds, who were protected 
by the United States for 20 years, beginning after the Persian Gulf war of 1991, with a humanitarian 
operation and no-fly zone that halted Saddam Hussein’s killing machine. Now, the consolidation of 
power by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki evokes painful memories of Kurdish suffering at the 
hands of a powerful central government in Baghdad. It also places the Kurds in the delicate position of 
acting as peacemakers between warring Shiite and Sunni Arab factions, a battle in which their own future 
is at stake. 
“Every Kurd yearns for an independent homeland, no doubt,” Mr. Salih said. “But we have also accepted 
living as part of a democratic, peaceful, federal Iraq. If this hope vanishes, I don’t think the Kurds will 
be willing to risk what we have.” 
The current crisis, which politicians say has brought the country to the brink of civil war, erupted almost 
two weeks ago, just as the last American troops were leaving. Mr. Maliki’s government issued an arrest 
warrant for Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, the top Sunni politician, accusing him of running an 
assassination squad. Mr. Hashimi fled north, to the semiautonomous Kurdish region, to escape arrest. 
Mr. Maliki, a Shiite, warned the Kurds that there would be “problems” if they did not turn over Mr. 
Hashimi. 
The Kurds, who have no intention of complying with Mr. Maliki’s demand, were not happy about being 
dragged into the dispute between Sunnis and Shiites. “We are not part of the problem,” insisted Massoud 
Barzani, president of the Kurdish regional government. 
But with the future of postwar Iraq hanging in the balance, they cannot avoid being part of the solution. 
American diplomats, whose influence is vastly diminished here since the American military withdrawal, 
have called on a Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, who is president of Iraq, to convene a meeting of Iraq’s 
leadership. 
But so far there is no agreement even on where the meeting should be held: the Kurds say it should be 
in the north while Mr. Maliki is pushing for Baghdad. 
A unity government formed last year at the initiative of the Kurds, which included meaningful roles for 
all three of Iraq’s main factions, is now teetering. Mr. Maliki has threatened to form a new government 
controlled by the Shiite majority that would effectively marginalize the Sunnis. To do so, he would need 
the support of the Kurds in Parliament, an unlikely prospect. 
“This would be the most dangerous step,” Mr. Barzani said in an interview at his sprawling palace 
outside Erbil, surrounded by snow-tipped mountains that have served as the terrain for generations 
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of guerrilla fighters. “It has to be a partnership between the Shias, the Sunnis and the Kurds. Anything 
contrary to that would be disastrous.” 
Mr. Salih, the prime minister, said a Shiite-Kurdish alliance that shut out the Sunnis would mean “the 
end of Iraq as we know it.” 
Depriving the Sunnis, who dominated under Mr. Hussein’s government, of a political voice would be 
likely to revitalize the Sunni insurgency, which is already showing new signs of life. Four days after the 
American withdrawal, coordinated bombings in Baghdad killed at least 63 people, the deadliest attack 
there in more than a year. 
The Kurds have no great love for the Sunnis. Even though the Kurds are mostly Sunni Muslims 
themselves, it was the Sunni-Arab government of Mr. Hussein that was accused of committing genocide 
against the Kurds. But they would rather have the Sunni Arabs safely ensconced in a power-sharing 
government rather than risk renewed violence and instability. 
Kurdistan, long a bastion of tolerance and a haven for the aggrieved and oppressed of all stripes, has 
lately become a sanctuary for Sunnis. Mr. Hashimi remains encamped at Mr. Talabani’s guesthouse in 
the hills outside Sulaimaniya, where he said he alternated wearing the two suits he packed for a trip he 
thought would last two days. 
Sunni leaders from Diyala Province, a mixed region that has sought greater autonomy from the central 
government, have also fled to Kurdistan after a crackdown by state security forces. 
The Kurds have deep emotional ties to the United States, and in many ways they subscribe to the vision 
of the pluralistic society the Americans tried to construct here. 
Mr. Salih lived in Washington for years; his daughter attended Princeton and his son Columbia. He 
was close to the writer Christopher Hitchens, who wrote a book on the Kurdish cause. Explaining the 
view of the Sunni elite that leadership is their birthright, Mr. Salih likens them to “the WASPs of the 
United States.” 
Objects that in Baghdad would offend the religious and invite terrorists are abundant here. Christmas 
trees were on display at the mall and elsewhere. An American school openly flies an American flag, and 
not behind blast walls and checkpoints and razor wire. Not a single American soldier died in this region. 
“If you ask most Kurds, they will say that America’s military left Iraq too soon,” Mr. Salih said. 
Kurdish leaders believe in federalism and support the efforts of other provinces, like Diyala and Anbar, 
both with Sunni majorities, to gain autonomy, a status Mr. Maliki opposes as a threat to Shiite 
dominance. While most Kurds ultimately wish for their own state, a move toward independence carries 
the risk of provoking a regional war with Iran, Turkey and Syria, countries with their own substantial 
Kurdish minorities. These countries would be likely to view an assertion of statehood by Iraqi Kurds as 
a provocation. 
For now at least, the Kurds see their best hope in maintaining their autonomy within a united Iraq. 
“If Iraq ends up being broken apart, it’s not because the Kurds wanted it,” said Dr. Najmaldin Karim, an 
American citizen from Silver Spring, Md., who is now the governor of Kirkuk, a city divided by Kurds, 






THE KURDISH PEOPLE 
SI Committee on Kurdish People in Sulaimaniya 
12 APRIL 2013 
 
The SI Committee on the Kurdish People, established by the Council following a decision by the 
Congress, held its first meeting in Sulaimaniya, on Friday 12 April 2013. It was hosted by the SI member 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, PUK, and brought together participants from more than twenty Kurdish 
political parties and organisations from Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. (List of Participants)  
 
At the opening of the meeting, the SI Secretary General Luis Ayala paid tribute to HE Jalal Talabani, 
President of Iraq, PUK leader and an SI Vice-President, with whom he had discussed the holding of this 
meeting. Talabani’s absence was strongly felt and during the discussions participants joined Ayala in 
wishing President Talabani a speedy recovery. 
 
Luis Ayala went on to express satisfaction that this Committee was now a reality. The politics and 
agendas of the various Kurdish parties throughout the region were varied, he said, but the cause was the 
same: rights, freedoms, democracy, and solidarity. Human rights could not be trampled on and they 
needed to be for all, not just for some. He underlined the firm commitment of the Socialist International 
in this regard. Commenting on the wave of change underway in the Middle East, he said this was the 
time for politics and dialogue. Kurds in Iraq had come a long way in gaining rights and freedoms for 
their people since the fall of Saddam Hussein ten years before, but important issues remained. 
Intimidation by Baghdad over Kirkuk was unacceptable, Article 140 of the constitution needed to be 
implemented and democracy needed to be respected. He referred to the grave situation in Syria and 
looked forward to hearing first hand from our Kurdish friends there on recent developments, and from 
our members from the BDP on the latest initiatives in Turkey, an issue at the center of concerns of 
Kurdish people everywhere. The situation in Iran regarding the Kurdish population could not be more 
urgent today than it has been for years and he hoped that headway could be made there soon. He 
reiterated that they could count on the solidarity of the Socialist International and its members 
worldwide. 
 
Mala Bakhtiar, Head of the Political Bureau of the PUK, warmly welcomed all participants on behalf of 
his party. He hailed this initiative of the Socialist International and expressed thanks to the Secretary 
General. Until now, he said, Kurds in the Middle East have been voiceless, divided and friendless. With 
this new Committee he hoped it would bring people together and provide a sanctuary for their cause. 
After a long struggle the PUK had gained full membership in the SI and he wished the same for other 
Kurdish parties. There were many changes in the Middle East, Bakhtiar said, and many people struggling 
for a better life. The time was over for governments to dictate to the people and democracy was now 
moving forward in the region. Resolving the cause of the Kurdish people in all four parts of Kurdistan 
was key to achieving peace and democracy in the Middle East, he said, and the role of the Socialist 
International would be crucial in bringing a greater understanding of this issue to all corners of the world. 
He was pleased that with this new Committee there was a platform for setting a strategy among the 
Kurdish political parties. He hoped in the future other parties of Kurdistan will also convene in peace 
and freedom. 
 
In open and frank discussions, all the parties present took part in the debates, describing their respective 
positions and viewpoints. All participants enthusiastically welcomed the convening of this meeting, 
calling it a historic moment. There were strong expressions of recognition and gratitude to the SI for its 
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long record in supporting the Kurdish cause and for this re-launching of its commitment to achieving 
justice for the Kurdish people and moving forward their agenda for rights and freedoms. The Committee 
should be an open forum, bringing together Kurdish parties committed to the achievement of those goals 
in a democratic framework. It was stressed that all Kurdish parties needed to be supportive of each other 
and should meet more often. The changing environment in the Middle East and the many crises in 
existence required that the Kurds be united and have a common strategy. This committee was seen a 
welcome first step in that direction. 
 
In regard to Iraq, on the 10th anniversary of the liberation of the Kurdish people from Saddam Hussein’s 
dictatorial regime, it was noted that although there was democracy, peace and stability in the Kurdish 
region, problems with the national government remained. There was the status of the province of Kirkuk, 
which was administratively under the control of Baghdad, there was the outstanding problem of the lack 
of implementation of Article 140 of the constitution which affected Kirkuk and was a violation of the 
rights of the Kurdish people; there were matters relating to the national budget, issues with the parliament 
in Baghdad, and the increasing danger of sectarianism and terrorism. The situation of Kirkuk was of 
particular concern, where Baghdad's build-up of military presence on the borders was seen as attempts 
at intimidation and increasing control. It was pointed out that the Governing Council of Kirkuk was the 
same as it had been since 2005, as Baghdad has consistently refused to allow new elections. The SI 
Secretary General, in a statement to the press after the meeting, underlined that nothing less than the 
withdrawal of troops, the proper implementation of Article 140 of the constitution and the holding of 
free and fair elections was acceptable. 
 
Participants from the Kurdish parties from Iran reported that the repression and suffering of the Kurdish 
population in that country continues. The obligation of the international community to keep up the 
pressure for recognising their rights without delay was underlined and it was hoped that through this SI 
Committee, international public awareness could be focused on their plight. The parties there were 
encouraged to intensify their cooperation with each other and work together in unity, and in this sense 
there was a particular appeal to the PDKI and the KDP who participate in the work of the SI. 
 
The Committee heard from the BDP of Turkey that the new process underway with the Turkish 
government was seen as a chance for finding a peaceful solution. It was still in its early stages, but there 
was cause for optimism and they were looking forward to drawing up a new legal framework for the 
Kurds. They wanted democratic autonomy, maintaining good relations with other parts of Kurdistan. 
The importance of support from the international community for the success of these talks was 
underlined, as they were seen as crucial for the whole region. A signal from the international community 
to the Turkish government in support of the peace process was considered useful. 
 
The situation of the Kurds in Syria had reached a unique phase and they were today fighting alongside 
the rebels, against the Assad regime. The Kurdish participants from Syria reported that they were 
working together, and for the first time they have areas secured under their control. They were seeking 
a federal system within Syria and asked for backing and help in this endeavour. There was concern 
expressed about what type of regime would replace that of Assad, particularly if it would be a 
fundamentalist one. The US and Europe were perceived as not acting decisively enough in helping the 
opposition to bring an end to the Assad regime for the same reason. They appealed to the SI for global 
support in keeping up international pressure on the opposition to recognise now the rights of the Kurds 
in Syria. It was considered important not to let happen in Syria what had happened in Iraq, in that 
everyone let the regime fall first and left the Kurdish issue to be sorted out later. 
 
With the changes sweeping across the Middle East in the ‘Arab Spring’, the Kurdish populations were 
also mobilised to gain their rights and freedoms. Rather than armed conflict, theirs should be a civil 
struggle, and dialogue for peace should never cease. Another area of importance that was included in the 
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discussions was the role of women. Political parties and institutions of the Kurdish people should 
increase their representation of women, as our political family was committed to gender equality and the 
empowerment of women. 
 
Following the decision by the SI Council that committees would elect their own chairs and vice-chairs, 
and after consultations among the Kurdish member parties of the SI, a proposal was put forward. Mala 
Bakhtiar from the PUK was elected as Chair of the Committee, with Nazmi Gur from the BDP Turkey 
and Loghman Ahmedi from the PDKI Iran as Vice-chairs, understanding that a process is open between 
the PDKI and the KDP of Iran for increased cooperation and unity.  
 
It was confirmed that the SI Committee on the Kurdish People should constitute a platform for the 
Kurdish members of the SI along with other invited parties, like on this occasion, which included guest 
parties represented in the Kurdistan Parliament-Iraq and other parties following consultations, and in 
agreement with the hosts. The Committee will meet periodically and report regularly to the Council of 
the SI, working within the structures of the Socialist International and in accordance with its policies. 
 
The meeting also agreed that the Socialist International would organise an international conference on 
the Kurdish people late in the year, at the headquarters of one of the international institutions with which 
the SI cooperates and has a recognised status. 
 
In the days immediately prior to these discussions in Sulaimaniya, the SI Secretary General held a series 
of meetings. These included with the Head of the Political Bureau of the SI member PUK, Mala Bakhtiar; 
the President of the Iraqi Kurdish Parliament, Arsalan Baiz; the Governor of Kirkuk, Najmadin Karim; 
and the General Secretary of the Ministry of Peshmerga and Spokesman for the General Command of 
the KRG, Jabar Yawar Manda. The SI Secretary General also held a special meeting with HE Massoud 
Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Regional Government and leader of the KDP Iraq, on the current 






Iraq election sets stage for protracted civil strife 
By Jean Shaoul  
5 May 2014 
Iraqis went to the polls on Wednesday to elect a new parliament and government under conditions of a 
virtual civil war, terrorist bombings and sectarian tensions stoked by all the political factions and their 
external backers, who are fighting for control over Iraq’s vast energy resources. 
Iraq has the fifth largest oil reserves in the world and is the second largest producer among the OPEC 
nations, having just passed Iran and trailing only Saudi Arabia. 
The government deployed troops and security forces, with Peshmerga forces patrolling the Kurdish 
autonomous zone in the north of the country, and enforced a curfew and ban on traffic in the capital 
Baghdad, in an effort to prevent car bombs and suicide attacks from deterring voters from going to the 
polling stations. 
In the run up to the elections, there have been at least 40 attacks, with bombs targeting electoral rallies 
in Baghdad, Khanaqin and Diyala. On April 28, the day when Iraq’s security forces voted, seven polling 
stations were attacked in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Anbar province, Salahuddin province, and Mosul, with a loss 
of more than 50 lives. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), an al-Qaeda affiliate, has claimed 
responsibility for many of the attacks. 
Only 70 percent of polling stations in insecure areas of Anbar Province, parts of which are controlled by 
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Sunni Islamist, tribal and al-Qaeda militias, were open, while other polling stations in the insecure areas 
of Baghdad, Mosul and Diyala were closed. 
This is the first general election since the US and its allies withdrew from Iraq at the end of 2011 after 
failing to secure a guarantee of legal immunity for the remaining US troops. The Iraqi people were left 
to deal with the bitter legacy of a criminal war to topple the Saddam Hussein regime and a nearly nine-
year military occupation that destroyed Iraq’s basic infrastructure. 
The result is soaring unrest over unemployment, poverty, lack of basic services such as electricity, clean 
water and freedom from flooding, corruption, and a rising tide of violence that has claimed more than 
2,000 lives in the first three months of this year, and 750 lives in April alone. 
Far from anticipating any improvement in their conditions, both voters and commentators believe that 
the elections are unlikely to resolve the severe political and social crisis that is the legacy of 35 years of 
war and imperialist intervention. On the contrary, there is open speculation that these elections might 
be the last under a nominally unified state. 
Iraq’s complicated proportional representation system means that the official results are not expected till 
mid-May. With more than 9,000 candidates from numerous electoral alliances on the ballot for 328 
parliamentary seats, no one party is expected to win an outright majority. While Prime Minister Nouri 
al-Maliki continues to dominate his Shi’ite-based State of Law coalition, the remaining Shi’ite, Sunni 
and Kurdish parties and alliances have splintered and formed new alliances and blocs. 
There have been numerous allegations of foul play in the electoral process. According to Ayad Allawi, 
a former prime minister and leader of the Iraqiya List, which won the most seats in parliament in 2010, 
38 candidates from his political bloc were barred from running in the elections. The Electoral 
Commission claimed that it had disqualified 34 candidates from all parties. 
All the political factions and cliques have played the sectarian card. Not one of them has addressed the 
dreadful economic and social conditions facing the vast majority of the population, even as oil 
production and revenues increase. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, the draft Iraqi budget 
for 2014 “anticipates average exports of 3.4m barrels/day (b/d), up 1m b/d from the previous year." 
The mounting poverty is the direct result of al-Maliki’s government, installed under the US occupation, 
which has promoted free market policies and introduced legislation outlawing the organisation of 
workers and unions to fight for higher wages and better conditions. 
While al-Maliki’s bloc is expected to win the highest number of votes, he will need to form some kind 
of coalition to gain an overall majority in parliament and a third term in office. This will entail a process 
of political horse-trading that could take months. But even this is not assured, as the bloc which won the 
highest vote total in the 2010 elections, Allawi’s Iraqiya List, was unable to form a government, giving 
way after seven months to a coalition led by al-Maliki. 
Al-Maliki has played the role of the strongman, claiming that he is the only one capable of uniting Iraq. 
The very opposite is the case. Taking his lead from the US occupation, his government has stoked the 
sectarian tensions between the majority Shi’ites and minority Sunnis, who live predominantly in the west 
of the country, to rally Shi’ite support in advance of the elections. He has purged leading Sunni 
politicians, cracked down on the population, branding all protests the work of al-Qaeda, and accused 
Saudi Arabia of funding the militias. 
Following the arrest of a prominent Sunni politician, the killing of his brother and five bodyguards, and 
the breakup of a year-long protest camp, civil war has been raging in Anbar Province for four months 
between government forces and tribal, local and Sunni Islamist militias who oppose both the government 
and each other. 
According to the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), this new 
“Iraqi insurgency” comprises at least 12 major organizations and possibly up to 40 distinct groups. It 
estimates that less than 10 percent are non-Iraqi foreign insurgents, a fact that both Baghdad and 
Washington downplay. 
But as a result of the fighting, more than 400,000 Iraqis have been forced to flee their homes, while the 
Anbar capital, Ramadi, remains contested and Fallujah is under the control of insurgents. 
The supposed threat from al-Qaeda, however, is very much the product of Washington and its regional 
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allies’ sponsorship of Sunni Islamist militias in neighboring Syria, including ISIS and al-Nusra, to 
topple the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, as part of its wider project of isolating Iran and curtailing 
the influence of Russia and China in the Middle East. 
The Obama administration, with supreme cynicism, is using the threat of al-Qaeda and its affiliates in 
Iraq as a pretext to arm the al-Maliki government and thus control Iraq and its resources. At the same 
time, it is boosting its teams of specialists working under contract to the Iraqi government to provide 
security, military training, and intelligence analysis, as well as commercial, energy and construction 
projects. While Secretary of State John Kerry ruled out putting “American boots” on the ground, he has 
delegated the task to the Pentagon’s sub-contractors, which, according to figures cited by the Wall Street 
Journal, numbered more than 12,500 in January 2013. 
Tensions have also risen between the al-Maliki regime and the Kurdistan Regional Government, which 
has sought to export oil directly, cutting Baghdad out of any share of the proceeds, prompting fears of 
outright secession. Such is the bitter factional rivalry that conflicts over borders and rights to oil and gas 
wealth threaten to break out into civil war there too. 
Al-Maliki has consolidated power into his own hands, holding four positions simultaneously—prime 
minister, defence minister, interior minister and head of national security—putting 930,000 security 
personnel at his disposal. This was ostensibly because he could not get parliamentary approval for 
appointees to those cabinet positions. He also has the judiciary under his thumb. As a result, he was able 
to use the courts to overturn a law introduced by parliament that would have prevented him for running 
for a third term. 
Eleven years after the US invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraq has a tyrannical government 
with the third highest execution rate in the world. Human Rights Watch in its 2013 Report Iraq: a Broken 
Justice System, described the al-Maliki government as using “draconian measures against opposition 
politicians, detainees, demonstrators and journalists, effectively squeezing the space for independent 
civil society and political freedoms … the Iraqi people today face a government that is slipping further 
into authoritarianism and doing little to make them safer.” 
Weeks before the elections, the cabinet endorsed a “National Safety” bill, which defines a “state of 
emergency” and gives near-absolute powers to the Prime Minister to determine what constitutes an 
emergency, prompting widespread fears that the government could use the law to eliminate its 
opponents. 
The conflicts instigated in Iraq by Washington, Britain, France and their regional allies are creating the 
conditions for the break-up of the country and a far wider conflagration that will embroil not just Iraq, 






Turkey eyes Syrian crisis through lens of Kurdish stability 
 
Maria Fantappie 
March 23, 2012 
Read more: http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/turkey-eyes-syrian-crisis-
through-lens-of-kurdish-stability#ixzz3K4hicHVP 
Follow us: @TheNationalUAE on Twitter | thenational.ae on Facebook 
Turkey appears to be keeping all options open for intervening in Syria - even arming the opposition. But 
Ankara's failure to monitor the development of the Kurdish issue in Syria, and Bashar Al Assad's 
struggle for power, have left room for others to instil their agendas there. 
In Syria's Kurdish-populated areas, the Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party, the PKK, is expanding its 
military front against Turkey. Leaders in Iraqi Kurdistan are stretching their political influence and 
campaigning for the establishment of a Kurdish region in Syria. 
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The PKK and Iraqi Kurdish agendas in Syria could open a Pandora's box of the Kurdish issue in Turkey, 
furthering Kurdish demands for autonomy and bolstering armed struggle. Turkey is in a state of alarm. 
It is using all means to influence the situation in Syria to avoid a domestic crisis of its own. 
Turkey sees the Kurdish question as the most important threat to its stability. Kurds account for nearly 
20 per cent of the Turkish population, and their demands range from the recognition of Kurdish cultural 
rights to the secession of the Kurdish-populated areas from the Turkish state. Since 2007, Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan sought to mitigate this question by granting Kurds some cultural rights, yet still 
preventing them from attaining significant autonomy and combating separatism. 
Turkey saw the fall of the Assad regime as an opportunity to influence Syria's Kurds. Turkey had hoped 
to oversee negotiations on the Kurdish issue by hosting the Syrian National Council on its soil. Ideally, 
after Mr Al Assad fell, Kurdish rights would be recognised within "the unity of the Syrian state". Thus, 
Syria's Kurds would be prevented from gaining any form of autonomy, the PKK's branch in Syria - the 
Democratic Union Party (PYD) - would be undermined, and Turkey's own Kurdish separatist movement 
would not be further inflamed. Turkey was relying on the Iraqi Kurds to leverage the Syrian Kurdish 
parties to accept negotiations. 
But Turkey's strategy backfired. Mr Al Assad has not fallen as Turkey wished. The Iraqi Kurds are 
pushing for their own agenda and Mr Al Assad is fighting back by allowing the PKK free rein in Syria. 
The Syrian National Council failed to attract and retain Kurdish members. In January, Kurdish parties 
withdrew their membership from the Syrian opposition, and 11 of them eventually gathered in the 
Kurdish National Council under the Iraqi Kurdish umbrella. The Syrian National Council was left 
with only a few Kurdish members and without legitimacy to form the basis of negotiations. 
Under the auspices of the Kurdish National Council, the Iraqi Kurds have expanded their political grip 
over the Syrian Kurdish parties. Although Kurdish demands in Syria were previously limited to 
decentralisation, the Kurdish National Council's executive body is calling for a higher degree of 
autonomy - applying the Iraqi vision of a Kurdish region to Syria. 
As the Syrian crisis drags on, the Iraqi Kurds are empowering the Kurdish National Council as the sole 
representative of Kurdish demands. The Iraqi Kurds are aware that any political entity aspiring to govern 
Syria in the near future would need the Kurds in order to establish itself as a legitimate power. The 
council may raise the stakes and deal only with a counterpart that will accept its demands for a large 
degree of autonomy. 
The PKK is also furthering its agenda and has found in Mr Al Assad a willing ally to consolidate and 
expand its military front across the Syrian frontier. In the past few months, the party has had carte blanche 
to conduct its activities in the northwest Syrian district of Afrin, in Aleppo. From Afrin, the PYD is 
expanding east and opening new offices in the Syrian-Turkish border cities of Ras Al Ayn and Ayn Al 
Arab. The PKK may now use the expansion of its Syrian branch to establish a military front that stretches 
from western Syria to eastern Iraq. 
The escalation of the Syrian crisis into a long-term civil conflict provides the best opportunity for the 
PKK in particular to consolidate its influence and proliferate within Syria. As the Assad regime persists 
in its struggle to hold onto power, it could grant even more leeway to the PYD as its anchor for 
maintaining control of the northern Syrian Kurdish areas. If the armed conflict engulfs the Kurdish areas, 
it could help the PYD grow roots in the region. Being the only Syrian Kurdish party to bear weapons, 
the PYD could try to gain legitimacy as the protector of Kurdish civilians. 
Turkey has tried to step into the Syrian crisis under the guise of an international front. But so far support 
for intervention, both military and humanitarian, has been met with resistance. 
Therefore, a newly empowered Syrian National Council could be Turkey's best route to penetrate Syria 
and reinstate some degree of control over the Kurdish issue. 
The Syrian National Council is now opening a military bureau, which should be in charge of organising 
the Free Syrian Army against the regime. Through this body, Turkey could attempt to channel the support 
of the Free Syrian Army, secure its loyalty in keeping the northern Syrian provinces under control, and 
halt the military advancement of the PKK. 
Turkey might also hope to recast the Syrian National Council as the sole legitimate opposition body in 
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Syria, in order to bring the Kurdish members back into its fold, and regain oversight of negotiations on 
the Kurdish issue in Syria. 
Channelling armed support through the Syrian National Council might serve Turkey's interest in 
stemming the PKK and Iraqi Kurdish agendas. But instead of helping the Syrian revolution to achieve 
the regime's downfall, Turkey risks plunging Syria into an extended domestic conflict. 





America needs a Kurdish policy 
BY John Hannah  
MARCH 22, 2012 - 11:30 AM 
 
Among the Iraq-related anniversaries to consider, here's one more:  Twenty-one years ago this week, 
millions of Iraqi Kurds set flight for the desolate, snow-capped mountains bordering Turkey and Iran, 
frantically seeking to escape the advancing armies of Saddam Hussein. Fresh off his humiliating defeat 
in the first Gulf War, Saddam had quickly trained his guns on wiping out all internal opposition to his 
tyrannical rule. 
Where the Kurds were concerned, his purpose seemed clear. Saddam aimed to eliminate once and for all 
the persistent challenge this proud, irrepressible minority had long posed to his dictatorship. Genocide 
was on tap, the completion of a job begun in 1988, when Iraqi forces razed thousands of Kurdish villages, 
murdered their inhabitants, and rained chemical weapons down on the innocent men, women and 
children of a town called Halabja. 
Now, with their backs literally to the wall, freezing to death on a barren mountainside, facing Saddam's 
full vengeance, the Kurds' destruction seemed nigh. 
Until, that is: America. Said. No. Working with a small group of allies, the United States, quite simply, 
saved the Kurds. Saddam's army was ordered to stand down or face renewed hostilities. U.S. ground 
forces deployed to northern Iraq and organized one of history's greatest humanitarian rescues, Operation 
Provide Comfort. A no-fly zone was established over Kurdistan, which U.S. aircraft patrolled until 2003, 
when America finally settled its score with Saddam for good, liberating almost 30 million people from 
his republic of fear, including the long-suffering Kurds. 
 
It's a story of deliverance and American leadership well worth recalling, especially this year. For the 
first time in a generation, Iraq's Kurds find themselves without direct American protection. President 
Obama's decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq has once again left the Kurds largely alone. While 
no longer confronting Saddam's terror, the long shadow of their anguished history remains, as do 
unresolved tensions not only with Iraq's majority Arabs, but with powerful neighbors in Iran, Syria and 
Turkey struggling with disadvantaged Kurdish minorities of their own. 
It's a mix of fear, loathing and foreign meddling that, left untended, could easily lead to conflict and even 
war -- both inside Iraq and, perhaps, regionally. That, indeed, would be tragic -- for the often-betrayed 
Kurds, to be sure, but also for the prestige and long-term interests of their main benefactor, the United 
States. 
Say what you will about the American project in Iraq, its application in Kurdistan was well down the 
path toward success. As happened in Germany, Japan and South Korea after World War II, a few decades 
of intense American engagement had begun working wonders for the Kurds. Excellent security -- indeed, 
not a single U.S. combat death in areas under Kurdish control. A booming economy with growing levels 
of foreign investment. And an emerging democracy that, while far from perfect, has seen real opposition 
parties emerge, as well as a burgeoning civil society and media. Yes, corruption, lack of accountability, 
and uneven development remain serious problems. But certainly no worse than, say, South Korea circa 
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the 1970s, at a similar point in that country's experience under America's wing. 
Properly nourished, Iraqi Kurdistan has all the makings of a U.S. strategic asset. Iraq's Arabs may have 
been profoundly ambivalent about a continued role for American troops. But not the Kurds, whose 
leaders loudly proclaimed their desire for a permanent U.S. presence, and whose population of some 5 
million is overwhelmingly pro-American. Sharing borders with Iran and Syria, Kurdistan could play a 
vital role in U.S. strategy to combat the serious threats now emanating from those anti-American 
regimes. Kurdish security and intelligence forces are competent and battle-hardened, and after years of 
cooperation have built up excellent working relations with their U.S. counterparts, including in fighting 
Al Qaeda. And sitting atop 40-50 billion barrels of oil, Kurdistan is poised to become one of the world's 
largest petroleum producers, a major contributor to global energy security. 
Confident in its U.S. backing, Kurdistan could serve as both engine and anchor for the rest of Iraq's 
democratic development. But America's precipitous retreat has left behind a dangerous vacuum, a 
potential breeding ground for destructive acts of self-help that could easily spiral out of control That 
vacuum urgently needs to be filled by a concerted American strategy to define a new, "special" 
relationship with Iraq's Kurds. Making clear that Kurdistan's well-being within a truly federal Iraq is a 
high U.S. priority could serve both to deter potential aggressors while encouraging Kurdish restraint, 
patience and cooperation in dealing with the turmoil of Baghdad's day-to-day politics. 
When Kurdish President Masoud Barzani visits Washington next month, the Obama administration 
would be well advised to use the opportunity to establish a new Joint Commission on U.S.-Kurdish 
relations to oversee the bilateral relationship, composed of high-level officials from both sides. America's 
consulate in Kurdistan should be led by a senior foreign service officer of ambassadorial rank, perhaps 
seconded by a retired general. Under the rubric of U.S. security assistance for Iraq, programs for 
equipping and training Kurdish security and intelligence services should be established, including robust 
channels for information sharing and other cooperative efforts. A joint initiative to expand dramatically 
American investment in Kurdistan needs to be launched, with a focus on expediting the region's 
emergence as a reliable energy exporter to Western markets. Technical assistance should be provided to 
support Kurdish efforts to battle corruption, strengthen the rule of law, and ensure human rights. 
More than two decades after saving Iraq's Kurds from annihilation, it's time for America to 
institutionalize a long-term strategic relationship with them -- one that understands that a secure and 
prosperous Kurdistan, confident in its ties to the world's sole superpower, can be a boon to U.S. interests, 






The political geography of the Kurds 
GÖKHAN BACIK 
April 22, 2012, Sunday 
 
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has changed Turkey's position vis-à-vis the Kurds dramatically. 
Maliki's grand ambition is to geopolitically realign Iraq with its historical Shiite ideology, alongside Iran. 
Such a strategy, although criticized by some countries such as Turkey, is not totally baseless. The Shiites 
have a clear majority in Iraq. More, the US-led Western intervention destroyed the Iraqi state and nation 
and opened the way to the present-day sectarianism. 
Even though Maliki's strategy is fraught with danger in the long term with regards to Iraqi unity, it forces 
Turkey towards a more realistic approach to the Kurdish problem. For example, Turkey has now realized 
that its prime interests in the region require strong cooperation with the Kurds in Iraq. Although Turkey 
will not take any action that would further disrupt Iraqi unity, it will not hesitate to deepen its 
engagement with the Kurdish region despite the resistance from Baghdad. Ankara's cooperation with 
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Massoud Barzani, the leader of the Iraqi Kurdish Autonomous Region, will indeed reduce regional 
pressures on Turkey. But is that enough to overcome the Kurdish problem itself? 
Before venturing to answer, one should analyze the political geography of the Kurds. Today, Kurds live 
in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. None of these countries has developed an efficient strategy to incorporate 
them as equal citizens. Thus, with regard to the Kurdish issue, all these states have failed. However, 
more critical is the political stratification of the Kurds. In general, Kurds have long been categorized as 
either traditional or modern. For instance, the Naqshbandi, an Islamic religious order, was very 
influential among Turkey's Kurds but was almost devastated by the Kemalist regime, particularly after 
the 1960 coup. If Kemalism had an ounce of sociological wisdom, it would not have brought its struggle 
with Islam to the Kurdish regions of Turkey. 
The differentiation that produced the labels “traditional” and “modern” was more sociological in kind, 
linked to Islam and urbanization, respectively. As expected, the traditional Kurdish base, strongly linked 
to Islam, was characteristically silent on political issues. So it was from the modern group, the urban 
Kurds of Turkey, that the first generation of Kurdish nationalists emerged. These urban Kurds, no longer 
part of their traditional setting, took to nationalism instantly. Paradoxically, this recourse voiced itself 
in leftist and secular jargon, that being its only option thanks to the political poverty in Turkey on the 
Kurdish issue of conservative and right-wing politicians alike. Unlike in Turkey, Kurdish nationalism 
in Iraq was championed by Barzani-like traditional religious groups. Therefore, the Kurdish political 
geography has two major models: Kurdish nationalism through the traditional elites (the Barzani model) 
and Kurdish nationalism through the secular elites (the Öcalan model). 
The foregoing tableau presents a serious question to Turkey: Who will persuade the Kurds in Turkey to 
move away from the Öcalan model? So far, the struggle in this matter has been in the domain of the 
Turkish security apparatus. Additionally, the Turkish state includes no Kurdish organization, nor does it 
offer any Kurdish alternative. Governors, military officers and other public figures have limited roles in 
such issues. Like many others, the Turkish state, as a Weberian machine, stops at 4 p.m., but life in all 
its complexity goes on. In other words, Turkey has failed to generate an alternative model to 
counterbalance the Öcalan model. Thus, despite its inner problems (such as authoritarianism, corruption 
and even terrorism), the Öcalan model has a virtual monopoly of influence on the Kurds of Turkey. There 
is no other model. 
That is why it is not surprising to observe that in today's Qamishli, a northern Kurdish city in Syria, 
Kurds are not divided over being pro- or anti-Assad. They are divided over being pro- or anti-Kurdistan 
Workers' Party (PKK). 
So what is the answer? The answer is “no.” Turkey, including the conservatives and the Kemalists, has 
no political or social capacity to solve the Kurdish problem and will not have it unless it does something 







New Kurdish strategy reveals divisions within government 
LALE KEMAL 
April 02, 2012, Monday 
Confusing remarks being made lately by senior government officials over a much-debated controversial 
strategy, presented as Turkey’s new Kurdish and terrorism plan, have shown that a divergence of 
opinion exists among government members over the country’s future Kurdish policy. 
Hüseyin Çelik, spokesperson for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and one of the 
deputy heads of the party, ruled out the existence of a new plan during an interview with a TV channel. 
He, at the same time, confirmed that some elements of the plan have already been in force and that it 
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was not new. 
Some Turkish journalists -- including me -- ran a story on March 22, quoting an unnamed senior 
bureaucrat who disclosed a package of new measures in Turkey’s strategy in the fight against 
terrorism while addressing the Kurdish question. This senior bureaucrat said the new strategy is 
being adopted now by the government. 
In short, the new strategy excludes the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) from any future 
talks that will be held to find a peaceful solution to end terrorism. It, instead, envisages the pro-
Kurdish and democratically elected Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) acting as a legitimate 
interlocutor of the state in any negotiations aimed at solving the Kurdish and PKK problem 
peacefully. Hence, the new plan abandons any possible repetition of the famous Oslo peace talks 
that took place between PKK representatives and senior officials of the National Intelligence 
Organization (MİT). 
Only Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has confirmed the plan, two days after it was 
published in the dailies, when he stated, “The fight against the PKK will continue while negotiations 
to solve the Kurdish question will be held with its [the PKK’s] political extension [the BDP] in 
Parliament.” However, he urged the BDP to end its ties with the PKK. 
Except for Erdoğan, nobody from within the government made any comments on the press reports of a 
new Kurdish strategy until March 29. That day -- six days after we, some journalists, ran the strategy -- 
Çelik told Habertürk TV channel that there was no new strategy. 
He said: “I asked all of the related ministers -- i.e., Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay, in charge of 
the Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security (KDGM), tasked to gather intelligence information 
on PKK activities and contribute to an effective fight against the terrorist organization, as well as 
Interior Minister İdris Naim Şahin -- about the new plan. They all denied its existence. I am the 
spokesperson of the party, and I do not know about the new plan either.” 
Çelik, instead, blamed the journalists who covered the story quoting their source for making up a story 
on what he called an alleged new strategy. He, however, contradicted himself when he stated that 
Turkey has already been implementing a plan that includes some elements of the new strategy. This 
includes a resumption of the fight against the PKK, mainly in the Kurdish-dominated southeastern parts 
of Turkey, where the organization’s bases are continuing to be destroyed through operations since 
summer of last year. 
Turkey has, since then, come under criticism for returning to its security-first policies after the collapse 
of the Kurdish opening processinitiated in 2009 by the government and which was aimed at finding a 
peaceful settlement to the terrorism problem. 
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s confirmation of the new strategy, which the dailies ran recently, and Çelik’s 
remarks that none of the related ministers were aware of it have, in the meantime, revealed a 
divergence of opinion within the government over the new Kurdish strategy. 
I had found out that a small team within the government, which included Erdoğan, finalized a road map 
to tackle the Kurdish and PKK problems. Among this small team was the senior bureaucrat who talked 
to us, as well as AK Party Deputy Yalçın Akdoğan, who was a former advisor to Erdoğan, as well as 
Interior Minister Şahin. Although Çelik denied that Şahin knew about the plan, it was his ministry that 
was already enforcing the new strategy, which is based on fighting the PKK while implementing 
democratic reforms in a wider sense. But the plan neglects to address specific Kurdish demands, such 
as gaining the right to learn Kurdish as a second language in schools. 
Another group within the government is led by Deputy Prime Minister Atalay, who initiated the 2009 
Kurdish opening process when he was interior minister but which is dead now, and this group has 
reportedly been opposing the new Kurdish strategy because it puts too much emphasis on security 
policies. Hakan Fidan, undersecretary of MİT, is included in the Atalay team. 
The supporters of the new Kurdish strategy are of the opinion that the Oslo negotiations conducted 
between MİT and PKK representatives in Europe were mismanaged and failed. It is also true that the 
PKK spoiled the Oslo talks and thwarted the government’s peaceful approach by waging violent 
attacks last July in the midst of negotiations. 
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The team led by Erdoğan, not Atalay, is now understood to have put their stamp on the new Kurdish 
strategy that is underway. This is because the government has given priority to the security policies 







Kurds May Lead the Way for the Arab Spring:  
 
By Meghan L. O’Sullivan  Jun 16, 2011 5:01 AM GMT 
 
As change sweeps the Middle East, euphoria has slowly given way to anxiety that the tumult will benefit 
extremist religious groups with anti-Western or anti- modernization agendas. 
Optimists rightly point to several dynamics that may curb the influence of such groups, such as the 
secular nature of many of the forces that have dislodged old regimes and the relative lack of public 
support that extremists have thus far garnered. 
Yet few have focused on another development that could help promote moderation in the region: the 
tentative, but growing, role of the region’s Kurdish population. 
Policy makers in the U.S. and Europe need to set aside their traditional way of viewing the world 
exclusively as a collection of nation-states; recognize the possibilities and risks behind Kurdish 
empowerment; and craft a strategy to encourage this pro-Western population to gain more influence in 
the region without provoking a backlash. 
The history of the Kurds in the Middle East is a seemingly endless tale of oppression, thwarted ambitions 
and tragedy. Totaling more than 30 million, the Kurds of the Middle East -- who are overwhelmingly 
Muslim and ethnically distinct from Arabs, Persians and Turks -- have long fought for autonomy from 
hostile governments or even outright independence. 
The hardships of the Kurds of Iraq are perhaps the most infamous, involving genocidal chemical attacks 
by Saddam Hussein in the 1980s. Next door in Syria, about 2 million Kurds have struggled to preserve 
their ethnic identity against laws banning their language, and other government acts to force 
assimilation. (Many had long been denied Syrian citizenship, effectively rendering them stateless, until 
early April when President Bashar al-Assad granted nationality to 300,000 in an effort to shore up his 
teetering government.) 
 
Across the Region 
 
Turkey’s approximately 15 million Kurds, a small minority of which have waged a terrorist campaign 
against the government, claim a history of rebellion, open war and forced relocation by the Turkish 
military. Iran’s more than 5 million Kurds enjoy more linguistic rights than in other countries, but also 
have clashed violently with the state. 
For all their historic suffering, a series of developments may now be changing the fortune of the Kurds 
in fundamental ways. The Kurds in Iraq, who gained effective autonomy after the 1991 gulf war, have 
reaped tremendous benefits from Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003 and the subsequent efforts to build a 
new political system. Kurdish parties now wield significant power in Baghdad, having been a key 




The Kurds maintain a high degree of political and cultural autonomy under the Kurdistan Regional 
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Government in the north of Iraq. Although they must address issues of governance and participatory 
politics to maintain their momentum, their economy is booming, and any visitor to the Kurdish region 
of Iraq will be impressed by the public investment, infrastructure projects and new businesses visible at 
every turn. 
Other Kurdish gains across the region are more tentative, but have the potential to be equally significant. 
In Turkey, Kurds may be on the cusp of the most promising moment in decades to address their 
grievances. This week’s election brought a solid victory for the ruling pro-Islamist Justice and 
Development Party, or AKP. Even so, the AKP will need to find parliamentary partners in order to reach 
a two-thirds majority necessary to enact the sort of constitutional reforms it seeks. 
Turkey’s main Kurdish party, the BDP, and Kurdish independents are most likely to serve this role, 
giving the country’s Kurds the opportunity and the leverage to resolve many of the outstanding issues 
related to their place in society. They have already made clear their desire for the end of military 
operations in the Kurdish areas of the southeast and for more political autonomy. 
Depending on what happens in Syria, new opportunities may also arise for the Kurds there. Should the 
Assad regime fall, a political arrangement based on power-sharing among Syria’s ethnic and religious 
communities -- much like that in post- Saddam Iraq -- would give the Kurds a real place at the table. 
 
Potential for Conflict 
 
Admittedly, rising Kurdish influence also brings the possibility of further complications and even 
conflict. Kurds of the Middle East may decide to take advantage of the changes in the region to push for 
a separate state, the Kurdistan that has long been the focal point of so much Kurdish song and poetry. A 
push in this direction wouldn’t be surprising, given the hardships endured by the Kurds and their desire 
to be free of the vagaries of Baghdad, Damascus and Ankara. 
Alternatively, political sophistication may come with this new power, as has been the case among Iraq’s 
Kurds. Many of them appreciate the gains that can be realized in the context of a democratic Iraq and 
have weighed them favorably against the potential costs of provoking regional powers that will oppose 
a separate Kurdish state. 
 
A Globalization Strategy 
 
Rather than feeding new clamoring for a Kurdish state, an increase in influence may lead the region’s 
Kurds to adopt a “globalization” strategy. This approach would acknowledge the waning importance of 
state borders around the globe and focus on building strong cultural and economic links -- and maybe 
ultimately institutions -- that span political boundaries. Working toward a “virtual” Kurdistan, the Kurds 
of a transformed Middle East might realize many of their aspirations without incurring the ire of the 
region’s larger powers. 
The U.S. and its allies should favor this outcome, not simply because it would be good for the Kurds, 
but because it would be good for their own interests. Kurds, perhaps because of their dark history at the 
hands of extremists, tend to be moderates. While many are devout Muslims, they are more likely to favor 
secular government. 
They are among the most pro-American populations in the Middle East, having either watched or 
benefited from the American-led no-fly zone over northern Iraq for more than a decade. And, if the Kurds 
of Iraq are any indication, they are also entrepreneurial and welcoming of U.S. and Western investment. 
 
Allies for U.S. 
 
A region where the Kurds play a role in the national politics of Iraq, Syria and Turkey and possibly 
carry significant economic weight as a collective group will almost certainly be more moderate and 
conducive to American interests than the Middle East that many see on the horizon. And if the 
gains of Kurds in Iraq, Turkey and Syria were to encourage Iran’s Kurds to agitate against the regime in 
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Tehran, all the better. 
All this argues for Barack Obama’s administration to incorporate a Kurdish angle into its new Middle 
East strategy. First, the U.S. should continue to encourage the resolution of outstanding issues between 
Baghdad and the Kurds of Iraq. In particular, a formalized law on sharing oil revenue will help cement 
the Kurds in the framework of Iraq by ensuring them of a portion of the country’s vast resources. 
 
The Next Syria 
 
Second, the U.S. can be an advocate for a post-Assad political arrangement in Syria that gives some 
political power to each of the country’s many communities; this will be good for all Syrians, not only 
the Kurdish ones. While Assad might prove capable of staying in power for weeks or even months, he 
is likely to be added to the list of leaders unseated by the Arab Spring. 
When this day comes, Syria and the region will greatly benefit from any efforts made today to map out 
a transitional political order. Unlike in Yemen, where the U.S. had a long relationship with a president, 
America isn’t the likely broker in Syria. But its close ally, Turkey, is -- and should be encouraged to 
work in this direction. 
Third, the U.S. should quietly encourage the new government in Turkey to treat its Kurdish minority 
generously, making such treatment a focal point in the rich and complex bilateral relationship. Turkish 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has in the past recognized the need to address the Kurdish 
“problem.” The U.S. should support rejuvenated efforts to find an acceptable solution on an amnesty for 
Kurdish militants, to establish the right of Kurds to be educated in their own language, and to provide 
greater autonomy for the Kurdish region of Turkey. 
 
New Regional Dyamics 
 
Finally, the U.S. can use its good relationships with the Kurds in Iraq to counsel pragmatism as they 
assess the new regional dynamics. Because of their advanced development, the Kurds of Iraq will 
play a leadership role for the community at large. The U.S. should continue to dissuade them from 
over- reaching and claiming a Kurdish state. 
Difficulties in forging a new strategy for the fast- changing Middle East are compounded by the tendency 
of analysts to look at the world exclusively in terms of nation-states, rather than considering subnational 
and transnational forces. But if policy makers take a less traditional view, they might see an opportunity 
to empower one of the region’s more moderate, pro-American populations in a way that helps the Kurds, 
Western interests and freedom and prosperity in the Middle East. 
 
(Meghan L. O’Sullivan, a professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, is a Bloomberg View 
columnist. The opinions expressed are her own.) 
 
Read more Bloomberg View columns. 
 









Kurdistan can be a model for democracy in a troubled region 
Were it not for the first Gulf War, Saddam would have wiped the Kurds off the map. Why doesn't the UN 
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recognise his violence as genocide? 
 
Robert Halfon MP 
On 1 October 2011 13:05 
 
After the Iraq war, it was often argued that the Middle East wasn’t “ready for democracy”. The Guardian 
for example implied this about Iraq in 2003. But this is a nonsensical argument, as it seems to suggest 
that some people because of their background are not entitled to democracy, and the example of 
Kurdistan shows all too clearly how wrong this is. 
The removal of Saddam Hussein not only saved the Kurds from being destroyed by genocide, but also 
brought about an independent, democratic and free nation in the shape of Kurdistan. 
As Vice-Chair of the All-Party Group for Kurdistan, I have visited twice, and have seen firsthand the 
evidence of genocide. Despite regional instability, autonomous Kurdistan was established in 2003. The 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) makes its own laws, controls its own army, and decides its own 
pace of economic development.  In contrast to most other parts of Iraq, KRG is relatively terrorist-free. 
Ultimately, a democracy can be judged by its respect for property rights, religious tolerance, the rule of 
law, equality towards women, equal access to education, a free press, and a vigorous political opposition. 
It’s worth looking at how far Kurdistan fulfills some of these criteria: 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The draft Kurdistan constitution (it's still a draft) includes several articles concerning the protection of 
minority, political and property rights. In Ankawa, the main Christian town in Erbil governorate, there 
is even special heritage protection for the property owned by the local community. 
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE 
The Kurdish regional parliament has now officially recognised the rights of other minorities 
such Turkmen, and Assyrians, and these are reflected in the electoral system. In fact, Kurdistan is one 
of the only safe-havens for Christians and Jews in the region. 
Whilst Christians are being murdered and persecuted across Iraq and Iran, in Kurdistan they are 
welcomed.  The Kurdish President has even invited Christian refugees to take up safe haven in his 
region. 
 
THE RULE OF LAW 
Crime is very low compared to neighbouring Iraq, and the UK has helped the Kurdish Police authorities 
to build forensic skills, rather than relying the traditional “confession-based” policing. The 
Kurdish judiciary are independent, and have defended the right of free assembly during the Arab Spring. 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
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On women’s rights, the Kurdistan Parliament has recently passed tough laws against domestic 
violence. This made female genital mutilation, forced marriage, and child labour all 
criminal offences for the first time. 
FREE ACCESS TO EDUCATION 
As the Kurdish economy is booming, universities too are flourishing, and despite some set-backs there 
is a real focus on improving education. Illiteracy has fallen from thirty-seven to  to just sixteen 
percent since 2003, and is now at about the same level as London in 2011. 
Kurdistan is a country that has learnt from the past, rather than living in it. Had Saddam stayed in power, 
it is likely that at some point, the rest of Kurdistan would have been covered with nerve gas - were it not 
for the first Iraq war and the creation of the Kurdish Safe Havens in 1991-2. (Saddam’s henchmen 
pledged to “bury them with bulldozers”.) 
Some perpetrators of the genocide are even thought to be living in Europe, possibly even in 
England, having claimed asylum. Inexplicably, the genocide of the Kurds is not recognised as a 
genocide by the International Community, most notably the United Nations. 
For justice to be done, the UN must fully recognise the murder of the Kurds for the genocide that it was. 
The Arab Spring shows that the Middle East is ready for democracy. Of course, it doesn’t mean that it 
will happen all at once, and there will be many upsets along the way. But the people of the Middle East 
are no different to anyone else. They want bread, but they want freedom also. 
I will be making this case at Party Conference, alongside Nicholas Soames MP, Nadhim Zahawi MP, 
David Gardner, and Ms Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, the Kurdish High Representative to the UK. We 
will be at the Derby Suite of the Midland Hotel, Monday 2nd October, at 1pm. I very much hope to see 
you there. 
Robert Halfon is the Member of Parliament for the UK Constituency of Harlow. He blogs 






The Strange Power of Qatar Hugh Eakin 
Here comes Qatar 
Suddenly, the tiny Gulf emirate is the Middle East’s superpower 
Hugh Eakin 17 December 2011 
 
Suddenly, the tiny Gulf emirate is the Middle East’s superpower 
In late October, Syrian state television aired a 17-minute documentary unmasking what it said was the 
real force behind the country’s seven-month-old revolt: the tiny Persian Gulf emirate of Qatar. ‘The 
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name of Qatar surfaces once a disaster or conflict breaks out in the Arab and Muslim world,’ the 
programme begins. ‘Qatar intervenes in major and minor issues, seeking to wield influence by backing 
rebel and extremist movements as well as armed Islamic groups.’ Along with sowing ‘sedition’ 
everywhere from Egypt and Tunisia to Sudan and Yemen, Qatar had been ‘financing and arming the 
rebel movements in eastern Libya.’ Now the super-rich Gulf nation was ‘defaming’ Syria, as part of 
an aggressive scheme to create a ‘new Middle East’. 
Such extravagant claims might be written off as the ravings of an increasingly desperate leadership in 
Damascus. After all, this is a regime that has accused Al Jazeera, Qatar’s government-backed news 
network, of fabricating the Syrian uprising by building vast ‘cinematic replicas’ of Syrian cities in the 
Qatari desert. And there is little about Qatar — a hereditary monarchy jutting off from Saudi Arabia in 
the most conservative corner of the Middle East — that would seem to make it a likely instigator of 
popular revolution or Islamist rebellion. 
But with the Arab League’s recent announcement of sanctions against Syria — a remarkable step 
orchestrated in no small part by Qatar, which now chairs the League — it is hard not to see a glimpse of 
reality in the Syrian movie. Indeed, the emirate has been far from a mere bystander in the Arab upheavals 
of 2011. While Al Jazeera has bombarded Middle Eastern homes with pictures of the revolts in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, an influential Qatar-based Egyptian cleric, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 
has stirred up support for the Islamist parties that — as elections in Tunisia and Egypt now dramatically 
affirm — stand to gain most from their outcome. At the same time, Qatar has breathed new political life 
into regional bodies like the Saudi-dominated Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League, while 
engaging in background diplomacy for groups like Hamas and the Taleban. (Both have reportedly been 
considering setting up permanent bases in Qatar in recent months — something particularly irksome to 
the Syrian government, whose ties to Hamas’s Damascus-based leadership have meanwhile unravelled.) 
Nor has the Qatari government shied from robust military intervention: it fought alongside Nato in 
Libya’s rebellion, while simultaneously (and much less publicly) joining the Saudi-led forces that helped 
crush Bahrain’s. The Libyan effort has been particularly eye-catching. From the outset, Qatar was the 
most prominent Arab supporter of the Nato mission, sending fighter planes as well as its own special 
forces to train the rag-tag Libyan militias. But it also flouted the UN arms embargo, providing, as 
the Wall Street Journal recently reported, some 20,000 tons of weapons through at least 18 separate arms 
shipments to specific rebel leaders. It is hard to overestimate the effect of these shipments, which some 
Nato powers were squeamish about and which may well have been decisive in the more important 
ground war against the Gaddafi regime.   
 
For a country less than half the size of Belgium and whose own armed forces, by one count, are the 
second smallest in the Middle East, such entanglements have at times left even Gulf specialists 
scratching their heads. All the more so given that Qatar is blessed with a rare combination of attributes 
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that seem to have immunised it from political upheaval. It doesn’t have any aggrieved job-seekers to 
speak of (though most of its population consists of migrant workers with few rights); with huge gas 
reserves and a dominant position in the world LNG market, it can offer virtually guaranteed employment 
to its 225,000 citizens and the highest living standard (measured by share of GDP) in the world. It also 
lacks a sizable population of Shia that might expose it to the sectarian tensions inflaming neighbours 
like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia — it is overwhelmingly Sunni. 
Doha, Qatar’s shopping-mall-and-hotel-strewn capital, is hardly the kind of place you might expect 
grand political ideas to ferment. Civil organisations are almost nonexistent, and according to recent 
polling data, Qatari youth have the least interest in democracy of any of their Arab cohort. Aside from 
the hugely successful Al Jazeera network, Doha’s distinguishing features include camel racing and some 
large US military bases discreetly tucked away in the desert; its reputation for bland affluence and 
western-friendly stability (it has been run by the same family since the 19th century) have made it the 
kind of place where the World Trade Organisation likes to have meetings and Fifa has decided (in 2022) 
to hold a World Cup. 
But Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, its emir, has a habit of defying expectations. Almost from the 
moment he took power in 1995 (not coincidentally, by deposing his father), Sheikh Hamad has engaged 
in an astute game of pro-action in a neighbourhood where stasis had become something of a chronic 
ailment. Thus he established low-level relations with Israel, built a billion-dollar air base for the US, and 
— without any pressure from below — announced a raft of political reforms, including new rights for 
women, the writing of a new constitution and plans for an elected legislature (now promised for 2013). 
All of which has sat extremely well with Washington and Europe, while leaving largely intact the 
country’s deeper grounding in the emirati system, sharia law and Wahhabi Islam. 
Meanwhile, with the launch of Al Jazeera — an Arab network unafraid to criticise Arab governments — 
the emir got instant street cred across the Middle East along with a potent form of soft power for Qatar 
itself. (A glance at WikiLeaks cables from almost any Arab country will suffice to show this.) Equally 
important, the network solidified Qatar’s ties to more radical groups, providing air time to Islamic 
militants and other political actors in conflicts ranging from Afghanistan to Lebanon, and turning Sheikh 
Qaradawi, the exiled cleric, into one of the most-watched television personalities in the Middle East. 
With such pro-western and pro-Islamic credentials, the emir was laying the ground for a high-velocity 
plunge into regional diplomacy, where Qatar has quickly gained status as the country that talks to the 
US and Iran, Israeli opposition leader Tzipi Livni and Hamas leader Khaled Mishal. And since there is 
plenty of gas revenue pouring in, there is always the option of ‘throwing money at the problem — all 
sides of it’ as one Gulf analyst puts it. When the Qataris persuaded Hezbollah to end an 18-month stand-
off with pro-western Lebanese factions in 2008, they could leverage hundreds of millions of dollars in 
aid to South Lebanon. 
From the Qatari perspective, then, the 2011 uprisings have been rife with opportunity: a chance to show 
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off Qatar’s democratic and diplomatic bona-fides to the international community while at the same time 
ensuring that its own interests are looked after. Nowhere has this been more evident than in Libya, where 
a great deal of Qatar’s far-reaching support for the rebels has not gone to the National Transition Council 
itself but directly to Libyan Islamists with ties to Doha. But it has also been apparent in Egypt, where, 
days after the fall of Mubarak, Qaradawi addressed hundreds of thousands in Tahrir Square; and in 
Qatar’s energetic efforts this autumn to buttress Arab backing for Hamas. 
Clearly Qatar understands that the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots may emerge as the next big 
political force in the region; if Assad falls, religious parties linked to Syria’s Sunni majority may 
take over in Damascus as well. It is also true that these movements have long been backed by the Gulf 
states and are most likely to adopt policies that are congenial to Qatar and its immediate neighbours. It 
is worth noting, for example, that shortly after Gulf forces crossed into Bahrain to prop up the Sunni 
regime there, Sheikh Qaradawi declared the uprising ‘sectarian’ rather than popular, thus giving religious 
backing to the brutal government crackdown on protestors. 
Of course the intervention in Bahrain shows the pitfalls of Qatar’s high-profile embrace of Arab 
revolutionaries. But even there, criticism has been muted by the bold coverage of Al Jazeera English, 
the Qatari network’s English language offshoot, which caters mostly to an elite international audience 
and, unlike the Arabic channel, has largely avoided the charge of selective reporting. If Qatar can 
continue to play this double part with such panache, it may well position the anti-democratic Gulf region 
as one of the key beneficiaries of the popular revolutions that have swept the Arab world.  







Syrian Kurdish moves ring alarm bells in Turkey 
Recommend 
47 people recommend this 
By Daren Butler 
ISTANBUL | Tue Jul 24, 2012 11:58am EDT 
 
(Reuters) - Concerns are surfacing in Turkey about the growing influence in northern Syria of a Kurdish 
group linked to Kurdish separatists fighting Ankara, something Turkey fears may further complicate 
efforts to solve its intractable Kurdish problem. 
 
Syria's Kurdish areas have been largely spared the worst of the violence in the 16-month-old revolt 
against President Bashar al-Assad, and Syrian Kurds see a chance to attain the freedoms enjoyed by their 
ethnic kin in neighboring northern Iraq. 
 
Pictures of Kurdish flags flying over buildings and being waved by Kurds in northern Syria have 
attracted wide coverage in Turkish media and prompted commentators to mull the possibility that Kurds 
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could carve out an independent state there. 
 
Kurdish opposition figures say Assad's forces pulled out of areas of Hassaka and Aleppo provinces, 
leaving control of them to the Democratic Union Party (PYD) - linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party 
(PKK) which has fought a 28-year separatist conflict in Turkey in which more than 40,000 people have 
died. 
 
"In some places, the Syrian regime handed over power to the PYD (Democratic Union Party) and 
withdrew," Abdelbasset Seida, head of the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC), said after meeting 
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu on Monday. 
 
The Syrian towns of Amuda, Derik, Kobani and Afrin have been reported to be under PYD control. The 
reports could not be confirmed due to Syrian restrictions on media access. 
 
The assertion of control by the PYD, which denies any association with the PKK, has led to squabbles 
and even armed clashes with the other main Kurdish political group, the Kurdish National Council, and 
other Syrian rebel factions. 
 
Syrian opposition figures have accused the PYD of acting as enforcers for Assad, putting down 
demonstrations in Kurdish areas and assassinating anti-Assad activists, most notably Mashaal Tammo, 
a charismatic Kurdish leader. He was killed last year as he organized an anti-Assad political coalition. 
 
Assad's father, the late Hafez al-Assad, for years sheltered PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan before the threat 
of a Turkish invasion in 1998 forced him to send Ocalan abroad, where Turkish agents eventually 
captured him and brought him back to Turkey. 
 
As Turkish-Syrian relations improved, Bashar al-Assad cooperated with Ankara by cracking down on 
PKK elements hunkered down in Syria, but those ties disintegrated last year after Assad deployed 
military forces to crush popular unrest. 
 
'SYRIAN NATIONAL FABRIC' 
 
Turkish officials have not expressed concerns publicly about the PYD's influence. A foreign ministry 
official said Davutoglu warned the SNC about risks of sectarian conflict or civil war. 
 
Deputy Prime Minister Besir Atalay played down the Syrian Kurdish issue when asked by reporters on 
Tuesday whether he was concerned by the raising of Kurdish flags and if he was concerned that a Kurdish 
state could be established. 
 
"We do not have such a concern," he said, rejecting the idea that Kurds were now in control. "In some 
small places there have been flag incidents, but there is no such thing (as the Kurds being in control)." 
 
Seida, a Kurd, emphasized the national unity of Syria, where Kurds make up around one million of the 
21 million population. 
 
"We have given the necessary orders so that no flag is raised apart from the flag of Syrian independence. 
The Kurds are a part of the Syrian national fabric," he said. 
 
But Ankara had been unpleasantly surprised by Syrian Kurdish support for the PKK-linked PYD, 
according to Deniz Zeyrek of the Turkish liberal daily Radikal. 
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"The Turkish side sees this as an 'unexpected development' and has started taking steps to stop this 
becoming a deepening problem for Turkey," Zeyrek said. 
 
He said one option was to get Masoud Barzani, president of Iraq's Kurdistan region, to exert more 
influence over these groups or for Ankara, now among the states calling for Assad's removal, to cultivate 
ties with Syrian Kurdish leaders. 
 
Turkey has recently established closer relations with Barzani and the Kurdish regional government as it 
looks to build on growing business and energy stakes in northern Iraq. 
 
More than 7,000 Syrians have fled growing economic hardship and instability for Iraq's Kurdistan, which 
has been autonomous since 1991 with its own provincial government and armed forces, but relies on the 
Baghdad central government for its budget. 
 
Meanwhile, the Turkish opposition is playing on fears of Kurdish independence in Syria. 
 
"Now a new Kurdistan is coming. Syrian Kurdistan is on the doorstep," Muharrem Ince, a leading 
member of the main opposition Republican People's Party, told reporters. 
 
During his 10 years in power, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has thrust through reforms, mainly to 
increase the scope for Kurdish broadcasting and teaching, designed to address the grievances of a 
minority of some 12 million people. 
 
However, inspired by the example of northern Iraq, many Turkish Kurdish politicians are pushing for 
political autonomy. 
 
Turkish academic Ihsan Dagi said Turkey needed to clarify its position on the Kurdish problem, having 
sent "mixed signals" by holding talks with the PKK while enforcing security policies. 
 
"Are you ready for a Kurdish state?" he wrote in the Turkish daily Zaman, saying an autonomous Kurdish 
administration would take shape in Syria if Assad fell and that even an independent "Western Kurdistan" 
was possible. 
 
"Kurdish geopolitics are being reshaped in the region. A 'Greater Kurdistan" is no longer just a dream 
for many Kurds. You may look and find the 'first independent Kurdish state' emerging in an unexpected 
place - Syria," Dagi said. 
 
(Additional reporting by Erika Solomon in Beirut and Tulay Karadeniz in Ankara; Editing by Mark 
Heinrich) 
 







From Inner Circle of Iran, a Pragmatic Victor 
 
Hassan Rowhani’s political life has been spent at the center of Iran’s conservative establishment. 
By THOMAS ERDBRINKPublished: June 16, 2013 
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TEHRAN — As Iranians responded to the victory of the cleric Hassan Rowhani in the country’s 
presidential race over the weekend by erupting into street parties not seen in many years, it almost 
seemed as if some sort of reformist revolution could be under way. 
Across the country, drivers honked horns, men danced to pop music and women clapped, celebrating 
Mr. Rowhani’s campaign pledges to bring more freedom and better relations with the outside world.  
But Mr. Rowhani, 64, is no renegade reformist, voted in while Iran’s leaders were not paying attention. 
Instead, his political life has been spent at the center of Iran’s conservative establishment, from well 
before Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led the Islamic Revolution in the 1970s. And analysts say that Mr. 
Rowhani’s first priority will be mediating the disturbed relationship between that leadership and Iran’s 
citizens, not carrying out major change.  
Even his nickname — “the diplomat sheik” — is testament to his role as a pragmatist seeking 
conciliation for the Islamic leadership. Whether in dealing with protesting students, the aftermath of 
devastating earthquakes or, in his stint as nuclear negotiator, working to ease international pressure as 
Iran moved forward with its nuclear program, Mr. Rowhani has worked to find practical ways to help 
advance the leadership’s goals.  
Though he is widely seen as a cautious realist, his first leap into Iran’s inner circle as a young man was 
rooted in risk. In one of his memoirs, Mr. Rowhani describes a perilous journey he took as an 18-year-
old seminary student, sneaking across the border into Iraq to meet Ayatollah Khomeini in exile.  
At one point, he recounts, a smuggler told him to immediately take off his turban, in order to be less 
visible inside their car. More dogmatic Shiite Muslim clerics would have ignored such a request, but the 
young Mr. Rowhani did not hesitate and quickly removed his white turban.  
“We arrived safely, and that is what mattered,” Mr. Rowhani wrote.  
In the memoir, he argues that ideology must never stand in the way of advancement. In 1979, during the 
last months of Ayatollah Khomeini’s exile, Mr. Rowhani was part of his entourage in France. “There 
some people spread leaflets saying Iran must stop buying weapons from the United States, in order not 
to support their weapons industry,” he wrote. “But I argued that we must not deprive ourselves of modern 
weapon technology just because it is American.”  
While the Iranian leadership considers Islam the basis for all policy, Mr. Rowhani comes from a wing of 
the clerical establishment that finds Islam to be a more dynamic than rigid code. The thesis he wrote to 
obtain his doctorate in constitutional law in 1997 from Glasgow Caledonian University in Scotland, 
according to his personal Web site, was on “the flexibility of Shariah; Islamic law.”  
His own pragmatic flexibility in the face of ideology was on display in 2003, when Mr. Rowhani visited 
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the earthquake struck-region of Bam while serving as secretary of the Supreme National Security 
Council. Despite the tensions with the United States, Iran had allowed Americans to set up an emergency 
hospital, and Mr. Rowhani made it a point to visit it and take photographs with American doctors.  
His memoirs and several other books describe a life as an integral part of the fabric of Iran’s political 
establishment, forming friendships at an early age with other clerics bound for positions of power and 
influence within the Islamic republic.  
Mr. Rowhani has described a train journey in 1967 that only in hindsight would seem momentous. Along 
that trip, he befriended a fellow Shiite cleric who is now the influential head of the office of the supreme 
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Also on that train was a cleric who would turn out to become the national 
prosecutor. Another influential friend from the pre-revolution years was Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, 
a former president whose endorsement helped ease Mr. Rowhani’s road to the presidency.  
It is a snapshot in the life of a man set to become an insider in Iran’s small circle of power.  
Because of his dedication to political Islam and influential connections, Mr. Rowhani’s star rose quickly. 
He was the deputy leader of the Iran-Iraq war effort in the 1980s, served in Iran’s Parliament for 20 
years, and for 16 years was in charge of the daily management of the security council, one of the 
country’s most influential agencies. He is currently the head of the Center for Strategic Research in 
Tehran, which advises both Mr. Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Khamenei.  
“His lifelong career shows he has been at the heart of Iranian politics and his goal is to serve the Islamic 
republic of Iran,” said Ali Shakouri-Rad, a reformist politician. “The very fact he is elected shows that 
he is very much accepted by our establishment.”  
On Sunday, in Mr. Rowhani’s first major speech since becoming president-elect, that focus was already 
on display. He warned that the country’s many problems would not be solved overnight, and said he 
would enter talks with the governing establishment of clerics and commanders for advice.  
“He is the right man for the job,” said Soroush Farhadian, 31, a political editor at the reformist newspaper 
Bahar. “He is a modern cleric, and a diplomat, which is useful in foreign and domestic politics.”  
The diplomat sheik played a key role in Iran’s voluntary suspension of uranium enrichment in 2004, 
which Western powers responded to by asking for more concessions from Iran.  
In Iran, the move is now regarded as a failure, and in the years since, the Iranian leadership has taken a 
much harder negotiating line.  
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In his book “National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy,” on his position as the chief nuclear negotiator 
from 2003 until 2005, Mr. Rowhani defended himself, arguing that all critical advances in the nuclear 
program were made during the suspension. “We dealt both with increasing outside pressures and the 
need to make consensus within the country,” he wrote.  
During the recent election, Mr. Rowhani argued that it was again time to change tactics in the nuclear 
program and reduce international pressure on Iran.  
The nuclear case, he wrote in his book, has turned into the most complicated negotiations Iran has 
ever held.  
“It is good for centrifuges to operate,” he said in a campaign video, “but it is also important that the 
country operates as well, and that the wheels of industry are turning.”  
On Sunday, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman told reporters that there would be no change in nuclear 
policy. But reformists led by former President Mohammad Khatami, who backed Mr. Rowhani in the 
election, say it is time for a new approach.  
“The election result shows that people want a change in the nuclear policy,” Mr. Shakouri-Rad said. 
“Now we will wait and see what Mr. Rowhani will do.”  
A version of this article appears in print on June 17, 2013, on page A1 of the New York edition with the 






Newsletter Monday September 5, 2011 
Eli Avidar 
  
Turkey doesn't deserve an apology 
 
Long before the Palmer report was released, initial leaks made it clear why Turkey was demanding an 
apology from Israel and trying to forestall the report's publication. Even then, everyone understood that 
the Palmer report's committee had unequivocally accepted Israel's position that the naval blockade of 
Gaza is legal. The report even established that Turkey had done too little to stop extremists aboard the 
Mavi Marmara from setting sail in the first place. Turkey understood that once the report was published 
they would have no chance of squeezing an apology out of Israel, so instead they launched a diplomatic 
offensive. Israel commendably withstood the pressure. There was nothing to apologize for. 
Turkey should be satisfied with the fact that the U.N. Palmer Commission gave their country a pass by 
disregarding its government's relationship with the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, as well as 
that organization's role in the election of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Still, the bottom 
line is obvious. Despite some criticism of IDF conduct, the report takes Israel's side. It's difficult to 
describe how humiliating this is for Ankara. For the past few months, Turkey has been proclaiming in 
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every international forum that Israel violated international law. In light of this comeuppance, it is no 
surprise that Erdogan chose to declare our ambassador in Ankara a persona non grata. 
Some have proposed that despite the fact that Israel's position was justified, it would have been better 
to end the crisis with an apology, if only for the sake of broader geopolitical considerations. This would 
have constituted a grave mistake. No apology would have ended the crisis. Turkey demanded that we 
lift our blockade on Gaza, a step that would have earned Erdogan the status of Leader of the Arab World. 
This would have come at the expense of Israel's citizens, who would have then found themselves under 
an even greater threat of missile and terror attacks. The analysts who continually harped about Israel's 
need to ingratiate itself with Turkey are the very same people who helped Turkey paint itself into a 
corner. 
The best way to improve relations with Turkey, using language that Middle Easterners understand, is to 
exact a heavy diplomatic price. Israel must attack the portion of the Palmer report that downplays 
Turkey's responsibility in the flotilla crisis, as well as make it clear to the world that Erdogan's 
government has a negative influence on the Middle East. We must make it clear that Turkey is not a 
stabilizing force in the region or part of the solution. Rather, it is a provocateur that undermines stability. 
Expelling the Israeli ambassador from Ankara is a move that will likely hurt Turkey in the end. Erdogan 
could learn a lesson from Oman and Morocco, both nations that hosted international conferences and 
leaders from all over the world in the 1990's, but disappeared from the diplomatic map after severing 
ties with Israel in 2000. Likewise, Turkey is a former key player that has been taken over by radical, 
irresponsible ideology. Not only has Turkey failed in its efforts to join the European Union, but its latest 
steps are pushing it further away from moderate Muslim states and closer to extremists like Iran, Syria, 
Hezbollah and Hamas. The deterioration of its relations with Israel is tantamount to a public confession 
that this is, in fact, the case. 
In Ankara's view, no counterweight currently exists in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and certainly not in the 
Gulf states. The rejuvenated Arab world views Erdogan as an impulsive leader in the cast of Moammar 
Gadhafi. The loss of its alliance with Syria and the latter's weakening are liable to cause the long-
forgotten Kurds to rise up and force Turkey to deal with its internal problems before it can continue to 
sow chaos internationally. 
Israel must shift from a policy of absorbing blows to taking the diplomatic offensive. While the most 
natural thing for Israelis to do is wait out the storm, in the Middle East, diplomacy doesn't work that 
way. Relations with Turkey will improve only once Israel realizes that the current crisis is exacting too 
high an international price and condemning it to isolation and irrelevance in the region. 
The Palmer report has shed light on the extremism and isolation Erdogan has brought to Turkey. Only 
continued diplomatic pressure will propel Ankara to change direction and, in the long run, restore its 
former friendly relations with Israel.  
Eli Avidar is currently the managing director of the Israel Diamond Institute Group and a former official 






Could a state for Greater Kurdistan be on the horizon? 
By Pepe Escobar (about the author) 
Cross-posted from Al Jazeera 
As the Middle East is being remapped, this may be the Kurds' last shot at having their own state.   
The current remapping of the Middle East could possibly see the creation of a Greater Kurdistan state 
[AFP] 
Millions of Kurds, observing the meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Tehran last week, 
must have thought: "What about us? What about our non-aligned nation to be? We should be there. 
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Maybe next time..." 
It may be just possible that Kurds -- which themselves admit their notoriety for internal squabble -- are 
finally getting their act together; after all, history may be dictating, roughly a century after World War I 
and its aftermath, which dealt a big blow to Kurds. This is the last chance for the emergence of a Greater 
Kurdistan.   
After the two Syrian Kurdish parties made a deal -- sealed by Iraqi Kurdistan President Masoud Barzani 
-- to jointly run northeast Syria, Kurdish parties in Iran are also coming together. 
Meanwhile, Ankara behaves like a bunch of headless chickens.  
Kurds are carefully paying attention to how Ankara decided to boycott NAM -- even though Turkish 
President Abdullah Gul was personally invited by Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Egypt's 
President Mohammed Morsi proposed a Syria contact group -- Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran -- 
to try to solve the Syrian tragedy. 
This means that Egypt -- under a Muslim Brotherhood president -- privileges mediation for a civil war 
inside a fellow Arab country, while Turkey sticks to a color-blind regime change strategy, which would 
only be possible with a NATO no-fly zone (it won't happen). 
So the pressing question for the Kurds becomes how to profit from Ankara's each and every move.   
 
And the winner is... Israel 
Not even Turkish public opinion knows what exactly are the contours of Ankara's policy for Syria -- 
apart from regime change. President Gul claims that Damascus weaponizes PKK guerrillas (there's 
absolutely no evidence), and that would be a casus belli. 
 
Damascus for its part does not want a war with Turkey. 
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu -- he of the defunct "zero problems with our neighbors" 
doctrine -- is still toeing the line that the country could not accept more than 100,000 Syrian refugees 
(there are already 70,000 and counting); in this case, some fuzzy "safe haven" would have to be installed 
in Syrian territory. This Thursday, Ankara will press the complexities of the refugee crisis at a ministerial-
level meeting at the UN.   
Ankara has insistently accused both Damascus and Tehran of supporting PKK guerrillas active in 
Anatolia and the porous border areas. Yet at the same time, Ankara has developed a quite secretive 
narrative; Turkey, once again, is aligned with Israel's strategy (the Mavi Marmara incident is now water 
under the bridge). 
Tel Aviv avidly bets on Ankara becoming the hegemonic regional power in the -- still hazy -- event of a 
post-Assad Syria. As Israel has been deeply infiltrated in Iraqi Kurdistan for years, with very good 
connections -- the Mossad uses it as an operational base against Syria and Iran -- this will be 
manipulated as a bargaining chip to seduce Ankara. 
Meanwhile, in Syria, the red, green and yellow Kurdish flag is now flying in places like Girke Lege -- 
only 35 kilometres from the Iraqi border and only 15 kilometres from the Turkish border. Over 3 million 
Syrian Kurds now see an ideal opening to revert the official Ba'ath Party Arabisation policy. 
The Kurdish PYD (Democratic Union Party) President Salah Muslim vehemently denies that there was 
a tacit agreement with the Bashar al-Assad government. But in fact there was; as long as Syrian Kurds 
don't attack Damascus forces, they can do whatever they want in Western/Syrian Kurdistan, which by 
now is assuming the contours of a an autonomous region. 
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, by the way, has already delivered the message to Ankara; even in 
a post-Assad Syria, this should be seen as a fact on the ground. And it happens to dovetail with  Israel's 
charm offensive among Kurds -- emphasising what would be their common agenda. 
 
So what can Ankara do? Invade? Kurdish blowback is bound to be devastating. 
Despite official rumblings, Turkish options for invading Western/Syrian Kurdistan are not exactly 
stellar. The Turkish army's morale is low -- after the purge of several ranking Kemalists. Over 60 
generals are in jail, accused of plotting a coup -- and lower-ranking officials may even try it again. Alevis 
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and Kurdish conscripts will refuse to fight an AKP-incited war. And the Turkish economy -- not to 
mention tourism -- will inevitably go down the drain. 
 
Is there a leader in the house? 
One can imagine whether Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Barzani's political 
scheming will be enough for him to embrace the Angel of History, and rise to the occasion. 
He certainly sees a Greater Kurdistan independent from Arabs, Persians and Turks. But for that to happen 
in a grand scale he would have to conduct himself as a unifier -- not only sharing power inside Iraqi 
Kurdistan but also managing conflicting Kurdish aspirations in Syria, Iran and Turkey. This implies a 
visionary streak plus tremendous diplomatic skills. 
What's certain is that Washington and Tel Aviv are on board; this implies that Brussels sooner or later 
will follow. BRICS members Russia and China are not exactly against it. There are two possibilities 
here. A Greater Kurdistan forged as a model for the Middle East -- in terms of a secular, dynamic, 
progressive entity respectful of religious minorities. Or yet another Western stooge. 
A major geopolitical volcano is erupting. Ankara certainly has not analyzed the blowback of 
weaponising Syrian Sunnis just for the weapons to find their way back into Turkey to be used by the 
PKK against Ankara itself. 
This anti-imperialist analysis may be very useful to understand the Kurdish dynamic. But there's still 
much more to it. 
Jeremy Salt, professor of History and Politics of the Middle East at Bilkent University, Ankara, and 
author of The Unmaking of the Middle East, in a conversation with La Stampa's world news editor 
Claudio Gallo, neatly summarised it: 
"In 1918 the imperial powers divided the Middle East in a certain way that suited their interests at the 
time. They are now remapping it again -- and again to suit their interests. It is not coincidental that this 
programme dovetails with Israel's own long-term strategic planning. Russia and China are fully aware 
of what is going on, which is why the present situation can be seen as a 21st century extension of the 
'Eastern question' or of the 'Great Game' between Russia and Britain." 
Make no mistake; each day makes it more likely that an unintended -- or rather intended -- consequence 
of this Great Game remix will be the emergence of Greater Kurdistan. 
 
  
Pepe Escobar is the roving correspondent for Asia Times. His regular column, "The Roving Eye," 
is widely read. He is an analyst for the online news channel Real News. He argues that the world 
has become fragmented into "stans" -- we are now living (more...) 
The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily 





SundayReview | Op-Ed Columnist  
The New York Times   JUNE 13, 2014 
Nicholas Kristof 
 
Obama, McCain and Maliki 
The Blame for Iraq Is Shared 
THE debacle in Iraq isn’t President Obama’s fault. It’s not the Republicans’ fault. Both bear some 
responsibility, but, overwhelmingly, it’s the fault of the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. 
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Some on the left suggest that President George W. Bush is at fault because he invaded Iraq in the first 
place. Senator John McCain argues that the White House bears such responsibility that President Obama 
should replace his national security team. 
Let’s remember that Iraq isn’t a political prop. It’s a country whose 33 million people are on the edge of 
a precipice. Iraq is driven primarily by its own dynamic, and unfortunately, there are more problems in 
international relations than there are solutions. 
The debate about who lost Iraq is an echo of the equally foolish debate in the mid-20th century about 
“who lost China.” China wasn’t ours to lose then, and Iraq isn’t ours to lose today. 
The Democratic narrative is that President Bush started the cascade of dominoes. The problem with that 
logic is that Obama administration officials were boasting just a couple of years ago about how peaceful 
and successful Iraq had become because of their fine work. At a minimum, they catastrophically 
misjudged the trend. 
The Republican line is that by pulling out the last American troops in December 2011, President Obama 
allowed gains to evaporate and a hopeful story to unravel. Well, that’s conceivable, but unlikely. And 
Prime Minister Maliki seemed uncomfortable with the kind of reasonable status of forces agreement 
that would have enabled American troops to remain. 
Where Obama does bear some responsibility is in Syria, the staging area for the current mayhem in Iraq. 
In retrospect, Obama erred when he vetoed the proposal by then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham 
Clinton and Gen. David Petraeus to arm moderates in Syria. 
No one can know if that would have succeeded. But it is clear that Obama’s policy, to the extent there 
was one, failed. Activists say that 160,000 have died in Syria, and President Bashar al-Assad has 
recovered momentum. In the absence of foreign support, some frustrated Syrian rebels quit units led by 
moderate commanders and joined the extremists, simply because then they would be better paid and 
better armed. 
The upshot was that extremist forces, particularly ISIS, for the Islamic State for Iraq and Syria, gained 
strength and established safe havens in northern Syria. ISIS used these bases to assault northern Iraq in 
the last few days. 
What happened next was stunning: ISIS, with some 4,000 fighters, routed an Iraq Army that has more 
than 200,000 active-duty soldiers. Several divisions disintegrated. 
That’s where Prime Minister Maliki comes in, for this is a political, not military, story. For several years, 
Maliki has systematically marginalized Sunnis, weakened Sunni Awakening militias that had been a 
bulwark against extremists, and undermined the professionalism of the armed forces. Some Sunnis so 
feared their own government that they accepted ISIS as the lesser of two evils. 
So Maliki created his own nemesis and ignored danger signs, blindly proceeding without wanting to 
hear the truth. In all this, he echoes Saddam Hussein. 
In 2002, in the Saddam era, I published a searing anti-Saddam column while I was in Iraq. A senior 
government official summoned me to his office in Baghdad, as a portrait of Saddam stared down at us, 
and began a threatening tirade. It became apparent that this official hadn’t actually read the full column, 
so I nervously asked my Iraqi interpreter to read it to him in Arabic. 
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I was paying my interpreter a hefty daily rate, and, for financial reasons, he didn’t want to see me 
expelled or jailed. So, in rendering my column into Arabic, he skipped whole paragraphs and turned it 
into mush. Deflated, the government official let me off with a stern warning, and I was reminded of how 
megalomaniac regimes mislead themselves. In the same way, Maliki probably had no idea that his Army 
was crumbling. 
As the United States debates what to do, let’s remember Maliki’s central role in all this. Hawks are right 
that Iraq could be a catastrophe. We could see the establishment of a terrorist caliphate, untold deaths, 
soaring oil prices, more global terrorism. 
In that context, hawks favor American airstrikes. But such strikes also create risks, especially if our 
intelligence there is rusty. And while airstrikes might be necessary to slow ISIS, they’re not sufficient. 
The crucial step, and the one we should apply diplomatic pressure to try to achieve, is for Maliki to step 
back and share power with Sunnis while accepting decentralization of government. 
If Maliki does all that, it may still be possible to save Iraq. Without that, airstrikes would be a further 
waste in a land in which we’ve already squandered far, far too much. 
I invite you to comment on this column on my blog, On the Ground. Please also join me on Facebook 
and Google+, watch my YouTube videos and follow me on Twitter. 
A version of this op-ed appears in print on June 15, 2014, on page SR11 of the New York edition with 





Why did ISIL agree to give up the hostages?  
 EMRE USLU September 21, 2014, Sunday  
The “hostage crisis” between Turkey and the Islamic State in Iraq and »» 
The “hostage crisis” between Turkey and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is one of the 
most mysterious and bizarre “crises” that any nation could face. When the Turkish Consulate General in 
Mosul was seized and 49 people -- including Turkish diplomats and security personal -- were taken by 
ISIL, many people asked why the consulate hadn't been evacuated. 
Conflicting statements were released; after that, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan confidently 
stated that Turkey would take the hostages with ease, as if they were not in the hand of the most brutal 
terrorists. Many people believed that it was a political saga that both the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) government and ISIL had agreed upon rather than a real hostage-taking. 
Although ISIL had the Turkish diplomats in its hands, they were treated as if they were not hostages. 
For instance, the Turkish consul was allowed to use his cellphone during his captivity of more than 100 
days. ISIL is not a stupid organization which does not know that an electronic signal could be used as 
intelligence to reveal where the hostages are. In order for ISIL to allow the Turkish diplomat to use his 
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cellphone, it must have had a guarantee that Turkey would not conduct an operation to rescue the 
hostages. 
Like its beginning, the hostage-taking saga ended in a bizarre way. ISIL released the Turkish hostages, 
but left many unanswered questions behind it. 
A retired American diplomat friend of mine raised the following questions: 
 “It was good news indeed that the Turkish hostages were released, but the circumstances, as reported in 
the Turkish press, do not ring true. No shots were fired, no military pressure was applied, and no ransom 
paid. Why, then, did ISIL agree to give up the hostages? There must have been a quid pro quo. The 
assumption among some of the bloggers here is that Turkey agreed to something that ISIL wanted, like 
a guarantee not to engage in offensive operations against the 'Islamic State'.” 
These are some of the questions that remain unanswered. At this stage no one, except a few people who 
negotiated with ISIL, can answer these questions. 
More importantly, I don't think the Turkish press -- and especially the pro-government media outlets -- 
will give us accurate background information about the negotiation process. 
It is a typical tendency of Turkish media outlets that under such circumstances, they run heroic stories, 
most of them fabricated with barely any truth in them. Thus, I tend to read the Turkish press with 
caution these days. It would take years for the Turkish press to write true stories about events like 
this. 
It is not a new phenomenon to the Turkish media. We know it from the Abdullah Öcalan case. When 
Öcalan was brought to Turkey, we read many heroic stories about how he had been captured. Similarly, 
we read stories how other Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) militants such as Şemdin Sakık were brought 
to Turkey. 
In order to understand what has really happened between Turkey and ISIL, the pro-government Turkish 
media is the least reliable source of information. I prefer to follow the news from opposition media 
outlets and pro-ISIL Internet sites. 
Tevhidhaber.net, a pro-ISIL website that openly and freely publicizes in Turkey -- which is another 
bizarre fact, that the Turkish authorities are shutting down Twitter and YouTube and closing Twitter 
accounts which criticize the government but allow ISIL to freely propagate in and recruit from Turkey 
-- stated that Turkey had guaranteed not to join the international coalition against ISIL. 
As a security expert, I will make some guesses about the possibilities of what Turkey might have 
promised to ISIL to get the hostages back. 
First, as the ISIL website claimed, some form of guarantee to not join the coalition against ISIL. Another 
possibility is to give ISIL a promise to delay possible international operations inside Syria to allow it to 
gain some time and more territory. If these are not possible, Turkey may even offer to play an 
intermediary role between the West and ISIL to end the violence. 
Second, Turkey may provide strategic information to ISIL to defeat its enemies in Syria and Iraq. In fact, 
when ISIL was pushed back in Iraq, it launched offensives against the PKK/Democratic Union Party 
(PYD) stronghold Kobane and seized some strategic locations. Without information such as strategic 
intelligence about the locations of PYD units and powerful weaponry, it would have been difficult for 
ISIL to win against the trained PKK militants. 
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Third, instead of giving direct aid to ISIL, Turkey might have given aid in the form of economic, 





Turkey, October 12, 2014 
Shame on Turkey for Choosing the Islamic State Over the Kurds 
By Bernard-Henri Levy  
  
Kobane will fall.  
In a matter of hours.  
Or perhaps days.  
But the Syrian city will fall, a victim of the cynical reckoning of Turkish President Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, who, by refusing to act and leaving his powerful army stationed along the border with Syria, 
just a few kilometers from the already martyred city, seems to have chosen Daesh, otherwise known as 
the Islamic State, over the Kurds.  
Kobane will be a victim of the double game of Turkey, which, after having let pass every jihadist in the 
region and closing its eyes to the heavy weaponry that Daesh’s forwarders had been sending for weeks 
toward the besieged city and that is now being used to shell it, shuts everything down, blocks everything, 
plays the innocent while immobilizing not only its own troops but also the ten thousand Kurdish 
volunteers who have come forward in Turkey to try to save Kobane.  
The outsize miracle of the resistance of Kobane, which so far has succeeded, without resources and 
against unheard of violence, in delaying the advance of the religious zealots, cannot last much longer 
now. The fall of the city and the hoisting of the black flag of the Caliphate not only in the eastern and 
southern quarters but now over the last heights of a place that henceforth will be powerfully symbolic, 
will be a catastrophe the full extent of which has not yet been appreciated, and certainly not everywhere. 
It will be a catastrophe for the combatants both male and female who for weeks have been struggling 
with unbelievable courage against better-armed units that will make them pay very dearly indeed for 
their audacity.  
It will be a catastrophe for the city itself, where Daesh will not be content, as it has been before, to 
enslave the women, behead the leaders, or forcibly convert the practitioners of minority religions, but 
that will assume its place in the long and terrible list of martyred cities of recent decades: Guernica 
pulverized by the aircraft of the Condor Legion; Coventry razed by the Heinkels of the Luftwaffe; 
Stalingrad and its million dead; Sarajevo, which escaped with its life, but at the price of eleven thousand 
dead during a thousand-day siege; Grozny, in Chechnya, ground into a ghost town by Putin’s rabble; 
Aleppo, in Syria, with its treasures of civilization and beauty buried by the explosives dropped from 
Bashar al-Assad’s planes; and now Kobane, the existence of which was unknown to most of us until 
recently but that it is about to become an urbicide.  
 301 
It will be a catastrophe, beyond Kobane proper, for secular Kurdistan, the incarnation (if one exists) of 
the values of moderation and law that the diplomats state as their wish for the Islamic world, and whose 
Peshmerga, moreover, are the only ones to have taken literally the global order to mobilize against the 
Daesh hordes and to fight, face to face on the front line against a self-proclaimed state that threatens, as 
we have been amply warned, not just Kurdistan, but humanity itself.  
Because Kobane is not only a symbol but a key, its fall will be a catastrophe, finally, for the coalition of 
which it is the forward outpost, a coalition that will now see the barbarians of Daesh carve out a wide 
swath of ground several hundreds of kilometers long adjacent to the Turkish border—a considerable 
tactical and strategic advantage. 
To prevent this disaster we have not only very little time but, above all, paltry means.  
The coalition may decide to intensify its strikes, but how does one strike from the air when the battle is 
being waged hand to hand, street by street, house by house on the outskirts of the city?  
The coalition may choose to deliver arms. Even without Turkish assistance, it has the logistical ability 
to do so. And if it does not do so—if it does not resolve to reestablish a measure of balance between the 
jihadists who have brought in heavy artillery, sophisticated rocket launchers, and tanks taken from the 
arsenals of Mosul and Tabah, while the Kurds are armed only with Kalashnikovs, DFDS machine guns, 
and a few mortars, the citizens of the world still have the freedom to do what we did not so long ago for 
little Bosnia, which, like Kurdish Kobane, was defending us by defending itself—but what we lack is 
time. Time is required to organize an airlift of weapons to a besieged population caught in a vise, and 
time is what we do not have.  
At this late hour, there is only one way to save what remains of Kobane, and that way is Turkey.  
Erdogan, whose judgment has been clouded by his obsessional fear of seeing an embryonic Kurdish 
state created just outside his borders, must be reminded—once again—that Daesh is no less his enemy 
and that it is for Turkey that the bell tolls in Kobane.  
He must be made to understand that if his increasingly authoritarian and benighted regime, one that 
strays ever farther from the secular foundations of Kemalism, is to preserve its chance to forge the 
economic partnerships with Europe (and eventually, the political partnerships) to which Turkey’s elites 
aspire and that the country sorely needs, that chance passes through Kobane and its defense: That chance 
depends on the aid delivered to the heroines and the heroes of the beleaguered city.  
But we have to go even further and tell Erdogan, formally or informally, that the battle against Daesh is 
the moment of truth, the now or never, for the alliances and the system of collective security that was 
established in the region in the aftermath of the second world war, a system in which Turkey is more 
than an ordinary member, having become its eastern pillar when it joined NATO in 1952.  
In 1991, Turkey only reluctantly joined in operations to support the civilian population of northern Iraq.  
On March 1, 2003, Turkey’s Grand National Assembly, in a vote that cast a long shadow over the 
country’s relations with its allies, voted against allowing 62,000 American troops to pass through Turkey 
on their way to Baghdad or to be based in Turkey.  
If Turkey stands down a third time—if Kobane becomes the name of yet another Turkish default, this 
one inexcusable—its future in NATO is in doubt.  
 302 
The emissaries of President Barack Obama who have just arrived in Ankara should make this very clear.  
French President François Hollande, who has given Turkey many signs of friendship, should assume the 
role of spokesman for France’s partners by informing Erdogan that Kobane is a rampart for Europe.  
Here, as at the siege of Madrid, the world must declare, “They shall not pass.”  
Translated from the French by Steven B. Kennedy. 
Bernard-Henri Levy is the author of La Guerre Sans L'Aimer and Left in Dark Times: A Stand Against 
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International NEWS site 
China supports multiple independent Kurdish problem more in the interests of Core Tip : Experts say , 
how to deal with the Kurdish issue , on China’s diplomacy is a new topic. With China in particular, the 
interests of the Iraqi Kurdish region is growing in the Kurdish region , and how we safeguard interests 
overseas and in the country between the central government and Kurdish maintain the delicate balance 
of increasing difficulty . 
 
China must face the Kurdish issue 
Recent times,” Islamic State” massive attack on the Iraqi Kurdish region, the international community 
launched a large rescue this end, lead to the Kurdish people‘s sympathy. But soon came the three Chinese 
engineers were kidnapped in the Kurdish region of southeastern Turkey, news, letting people 
suspiciously: Why PKK targeted the Chinese people? Regardless of the answer, the Kurdish issue 
continues to heat up will be a new challenge for China in the Middle East had to face. 
Kurdish problem is one of the complex ethnic problems in the Middle East, which produces even 
nearly half a century earlier than the Palestinian issue. The so-called Kurdish question is Kurdish 
demands host government recognize their minority status, expanding its national rights, allowing its 
autonomy or independence. Kurds living in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria Shikoku junction of” Kurdistan” 
is the Middle East‘s fourth largest nation, a total of about 30 million . 
Kurdish problems in the First World War, when the Allies had once promised Kurdish independent state, 
after being abandoned oppose Turkey, Kurdistan was divided into four this purpose. For a long time, 
Kurdish ethnic identity is not recognized in some countries, suffer discrimination, economic and social 
development behind. So far failed to effectively solve the Kurdish issue has become a major source of 
instability in the countries and regions. 
Kurds have faced several times in the history of a rare opportunity. A war was their best opportunity to 
seek independent , but was missed. 1991 and 2003 two Americans waged the war in Iraq has become a 
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turning point in the fate of the Iraqi Kurds . In recent years , the Middle East into a big turmoil , 
geopolitical order and national geographic territory facing redistricting , Kurdish ushered in a new 
strategic opportunities. 2011 outbreak of the ” Arab Spring” has actually evolved into a ” Kurdish Spring 
.” 
In Syria, the Kurdish armed disarray establish control of the reservoir area, and the establishment of a ” 
provisional self- government” , like the year of the Iraqi Kurds as to achieve a de facto autonomy. In 
Turkey, the Kurdish issue in this past century taboo has been broken. The first Kurdish political party 
with the name” Kurdistan Democratic Party” get legal approval. Internal conflict in Iraq war intensified, 
in fact, the situation evoked Kurdish separatist centuries of independence ambitions. In recent days the 
first joint United States and Europe and other countries to provide weapons directly to Yikuerde who is 
regarded as an important signal of Western policy might turn. At present, more and more people believe 
in the reality of the current chaos and upheaval regional political order in Iraq , the Kurdish independent 
state may no longer be a dream. 
How to deal with the Kurdish issue , on China’s diplomacy is a new topic. Specific challenges related 
to four aspects : First, the Iraqi Kurds may be an independent nation , will be a direct challenge to the 
relationship between China and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of China and 
relevant countries. Second, with China in particular, the interests of the Iraqi Kurdish region is growing 
in the Kurdish region , and how we safeguard interests overseas and in the country between the central 
government and Kurdish maintain the delicate balance of increasing difficulty . Third, as a permanent 
member of the Security Council and the major developing country , China is not only responsible for 
the international humanitarian, protection of minority rights, while the major security issues involved in 
the Middle East can not stand idly by. Four Middle Eastern countries due to individual western frontier 
problem for me to make irresponsible remarks , many Chinese netizens hope to show government 
support for Kurdish fight back , which also pose some of our diplomatic pressure of public opinion . In 
short , although the Kurdish problem is very difficult, but the issue is related to China’s interests and 
national security , a matter of regional security and stability , a matter of international law and 
international moral norms , the Chinese do not have much room to maneuver, must face to deal with. ( 
The author is a researcher at the Chinese Academy of West Africa ) 
Original link: http://war.163.com/14/0902/08/A54GK9S400014OVF.html 




August 9th, 2014  
11:39 AM ET 
Why U.S. should help the Kurds 
Watch "Fareed Zakaria GPS," this Sunday at 10 a.m. and 1 p.m. ET on CNN 
By Fareed Zakaria 
The situation in Iraq today is perilous, but also chaotic and confusing. Should the United States do more 
to help the communities under threat of destruction? If it does intervene for humanitarian reasons here, 
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then why not in a place like Syria, which has seem many terrible atrocities and massacres as well? How 
should we think through the issue? 
I have been cautious about urging the United States to get back into Iraq, but I believe that in the current 
circumstances, the Obama administration should intervene more forcefully and ambitiously, use air 
power, offer training support and weaponry if needed. 
Why? 
The humanitarian crisis unfolding in Iraq is terrible enough. But sometimes, as in Syria, it is unclear 
whether U.S. military intervention could really help matters, whether there’s a clear plan that would 
work. In Iraq now there is such a path, one that also offers the strategic rationale for U.S. action. 
What is now at stake in Iraq is crucial to U.S. interests – the survival of the Kurdish region in that 
country. 
Since 1991, for 23 years, the United States has protected the Kurds of Iraq from being attacked and 
destroyed as a community. In that period, the Kurds have built up a modern, increasingly liberal, pro-
Western and pro-American oasis in the Middle East. 
The largely autonomous Kurdish region of Iraq has become an open, cosmopolitan, forward-looking 
place with a booming economy – construction cranes, car dealerships and fast food chains sprout up 
every day. 
The American University in Sulaimani is a place marked by a modern educational outlook and open 
dialog. Kurdish leaders have been responsible in their efforts to secure their future – not declaring 
independence, working to end Kurdish terrorism in Turkey, supporting humanitarian efforts for Syrian 
refugees. They have been a force for stability in a region in chaos. 
One of the lessons of American foreign policy over the last six decades has been that interventions work 
when the locals are led by popular, legitimate leaders and they want to fight for their cause. Think of 
South Korea compared with South Vietnam – they don’t work when the locals simply will not fight. 
The Kurds want to fight for their freedom, for their independence. They have a strong, well-trained army. 
Their leaders are popular and legitimate, they have been close allies of the United States. Now they 
urgently need America's help. The Obama administration should answer their call. 
 Post by:CNN's Jason Miks  
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Christopher Helman 
Iraqi Kurdistan Set To Become an Independent World Oil Power 
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Last Thursday, after ISIS forces captured Mosul and Kurdish fighters had moved into Kirkuk, I wrote a 
piece about how the Kurdish Regional Government might end up being the “unlikely losers” in the 
ensuing chaos. Its peshmerga forces were in danger of being stretched thin. Its two renegade tankers 
full of oil had no buyers. Surely, it seemed last Thursday, that President Obama would never dream of 
allowing Baghdad (and especially the Green Zone) to come under ISIS attack. Wouldn’t the U.S. prop 
up Maliki and ensure the survival of Iraqi federalism? 
No. That article was wrong. As numerous readers were all too happy to point out. The Kurd forces appear 
to be comfortably holding their territory. The Baghdad airport is reportedly under attack. ISIS militias 
have brutally machine gunned hundreds of government forces. The U.S. government is evacuating 
diplomats from the Green Zone (a la the fall of Saigon). Iran is said to have sent Revolutionary Guard 
forces to Baghdad. Obama has urged Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to sort it all out diplomatically. 
Iraq was an artificial state to begin with, its borders drawn by British bureaucrats with no regard to 
tribal territories. The consensus now, especially among Kurdish people, is that this “Iraq” will soon cease 
to exist altogether. 
The Kurdish region is blessed with an estimated 45 billion barrels of oil, more than Libya. Exxon, 
Chevron CVX +0.7%, Total and many others have invested billions there to explore and drill virgin 
fields in concessions doled out by the Kurdish Regional Government. The KRG had not had any control 
over the supergiant Kirkuk field, which produced more than 650,000 barrels per day at its peak more 
than a decade ago. Like all mature fields in Iraq, Kirkuk was under the purview of the oil ministry in 
Baghdad, which contracted last year with BP to start rehabbing the field. The Kurds opposed the BP 
deal. With or without Kirkuk, the Kurdish region could readily sustain 400,000 barrels per day of oil 
production. 
Baghdad’s control over Kirkuk may well be history now that Kurd forces are at long last in control of 
Kirkuk and have no intention of leaving. Writing on Twitter TWTR -11.08%, Fanar Haddad, of the 
Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore, wrote: “Is it just me or has Kirkuk, an 
issue of massive complexity & contention & the possible source of a future war, been solved overnight?” 
After the events of the last few days it seems the Kurds can now, at last, make their own rules. So what 
does that mean for those tankers full of Kurdish crude? The ones loaded in Turkey, which have drawn 
condemnation from Baghdad, which called the shipments illegal and threatened legal action against 
anyone who dared to buy them? They are reportedly still floating off the coasts of Malta and Morocco. 
With Kurdish independence appearing to grow closer every day, perhaps this will be the week when the 
world’s oil buyers put aside any concern of being blacklisted by Baghdad, and step up to buy them. 
When it happens it will open the floodgates for Kurdish exports, and initiate a flood of cash to the 
Kurdish Regional Government, which is now moving inexorably closer to becoming an independent 
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War against Isis: US air strategy in tatters as militants march on  
America's plans to fight Islamic State are in ruins as the militant group's fighters come close to 
capturing Kobani and have inflicted a heavy defeat on the Iraqi army west of Baghdad 
The US-led air attacks launched against Islamic State (also known as Isis) on 8 August in Iraq and 23 
September in Syria have not worked. President Obama's plan to "degrade and destroy" Islamic State has 
not even begun to achieve success. In both Syria and Iraq, Isis is expanding its control rather than 
contracting. 
Isis reinforcements have been rushing towards Kobani in the past few days to ensure that they win a 
decisive victory over the Syrian Kurdish town's remaining defenders. The group is willing to take heavy 
casualties in street fighting and from air attacks in order to add to the string of victories it has won in 
the four months since its forces captured Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq, on 10 June. Part of 
the strength of the fundamentalist movement is a sense that there is something inevitable and divinely 
inspired about its victories, whether it is against superior numbers in Mosul or US airpower at Kobani. 
In the face of a likely Isis victory at Kobani, senior US officials have been trying to explain away the 
failure to save the Syrian Kurds in the town, probably Isis's toughest opponents in Syria. "Our focus in 
Syria is in degrading the capacity of [Isis] at its core to project power, to command itself, to sustain 
itself, to resource itself," said US Deputy National Security Adviser Tony Blinken, in a typical piece of 
waffle designed to mask defeat. "The tragic reality is that in the course of doing that there are going to 
be places like Kobani where we may or may not be able to fight effectively." 
Unfortunately for the US, Kobani isn't the only place air strikes are failing to stop Isis. In an offensive 
in Iraq launched on 2 October but little reported in the outside world, Isis has captured almost all the 
cities and towns it did not already hold in Anbar province, a vast area in western Iraq that makes up a 
quarter of the country. It has captured Hit, Kubaisa and Ramadi, the provincial capital, which it had long 
fought for. Other cities, towns and bases on or close to the Euphrates River west of Baghdad fell in a 
few days, often after little resistance by the Iraqi Army which showed itself to be as dysfunctional as in 
the past, even when backed by US air strikes. 
Today, only the city of Haditha and two bases, Al-Assad military base near Hit, and Camp Mazrah 
outside Fallujah, are still in Iraqi government hands. Joel Wing, in his study –"Iraq's Security Forces 
Collapse as The Islamic State Takes Control of Most of Anbar Province" – concludes: "This was a huge 
victory as it gives the insurgents virtual control over Anbar and poses a serious threat to western 
Baghdad". 
The battle for Anbar, which was at the heart of the Sunni rebellion against the US occupation after 2003, 
is almost over and has ended with a decisive victory for Isis. It took large parts of Anbar in January and 
government counter-attacks failed dismally with some 5,000 casualties in the first six months of the year. 
About half the province's 1.5 million population has fled and become refugees. The next Isis target may 
be the Sunni enclaves in western Baghdad, starting with Abu Ghraib on the outskirts but leading right to 
the centre of the capital. 
The Iraqi government and its foreign allies are drawing comfort, there having been some advances 
against Isis in the centre and north of the country. But north and north-east of Baghdad the successes 
have not been won by the Iraqi army but by highly sectarian Shia militias which do not distinguish 
between Isis and the rest of the Sunni population. They speak openly of getting rid of Sunni in mixed 
provinces such as Diyala where they have advanced. The result is that Sunni in Iraq have no alternative 
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but to stick with Isis or flee, if they want to survive. The same is true north-west of Mosul on the border 
with Syria, where Iraqi Kurdish forces, aided by US air attacks, have retaken the important border 
crossing of Rabia, but only one Sunni Arab remained in the town. Ethnic and sectarian cleansing has 
become the norm in the war in both Iraq and Syria 
The US's failure to save Kobani, if it falls, will be a political as well as military disaster. Indeed, the 
circumstances surrounding the loss of the beleaguered town are even more significant than the inability 
so far of air strikes to stop Isis taking 40 per cent of it. At the start of the bombing in Syria, President 
Obama boasted of putting together a coalition of Sunni powers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Jordan, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to oppose Isis, but these all have different agendas to the US 
in which destroying IS is not the first priority. The Sunni Arab monarchies may not like Isis, which 
threatens the political status quo, but, as one Iraqi observer put it, "they like the fact that Isis creates 
more problems for the Shia than it does for them". 
Of the countries supposedly uniting against Isis, by the far most important is Turkey because it shares a 
510-mile border with Syria across which rebels of all sorts, including Isis and Jabhat al-Nusra, have 
previously passed with ease. This year the Turks have tightened border security, but since its successes 
in the summer Isis no longer needs sanctuary, supplies and volunteers from outside to the degree it once 
did. 
In the course of the past week it has become clear that Turkey considers the Syrian Kurd political and 
military organisations, the PYD and YPG, as posing a greater threat to it than the Islamic 
fundamentalists. Moreover, the PYD is the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which 
has been fighting for Kurdish self-rule in Turkey since 1984. 
Ever since Syrian government forces withdrew from the Syrian Kurdish enclaves or cantons on the 
border with Turkey in July 2012, Ankara has feared the impact of self-governing Syrian Kurds on its 
own 15 million-strong Kurdish population. 
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan would prefer Isis to control Kobani, not the PYD. When five PYD 
members, who had been fighting Isis at Kobani, were picked up by the Turkish army as they crossed the 
border last week they were denounced as "separatist terrorists". 
Turkey is demanding a high price from the US for its co-operation in attacking Isis, such as a Turkish-
controlled buffer zone inside Syria where Syrian refugees are to live and anti-Assad rebels are to be 
trained. Mr Erdogan would like a no-fly zone which will also be directed against the government in 
Damascus since Isis has no air force. If implemented the plan would mean Turkey, backed by the US, 
would enter the Syrian civil war on the side of the rebels, though the anti-Assad forces are dominated 
by Isis and Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliate. 
It is worth keeping in mind that Turkey's actions in Syria since 2011 have been a self-defeating blend of 
hubris and miscalculation. At the start of the uprising, it could have held the t between the government 
and its opponents. Instead, it supported the militarisation of the crisis, backed the jihadis and assumed 
Assad would soon be defeated. This did not happen and what had been a popular uprising became 
dominated by sectarian warlords who flourished in conditions created by Turkey. Mr Erdogan is 
assuming he can disregard the rage of the Turkish Kurds at what they see as his complicity with Isis 
against the Syrian Kurds. This fury is already deep, with 33 dead, and is likely to get a great deal worse 
if Kobani falls. 
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Why doesn't Ankara worry more about the collapse of the peace process with the PKK that has 
maintained a ceasefire since 2013? It may believe that the PKK is too heavily involved in fighting Isis 
in Syria that it cannot go back to war with the government in Turkey. On the other hand, if Turkey does 
join the civil war in Syria against Assad, a crucial ally of Iran, then Iranian leaders have said that "Turkey 
will pay a price". This probably means that Iran will covertly support an armed Kurdish insurgency in 
Turkey. Saddam Hussein made a somewhat similar mistake to Mr Erdogan when he invaded Iran in 
1980, thus leading Iran to reignite the Kurdish rebellion that Baghdad had crushed through an agreement 
with the Shah in 1975. Turkish military intervention in Syria might not end the war there, but it may 





Kurds realise dream as Baghdad loses grip on north Iraq 
 
ARBIL, Iraq, June 14 Fri Jun 13, 2014 11:04pm BST 
 
Poets wrote songs about it for generations. Guerrilla fighters holed up in the mountains trained 
for it for decades. But in the end, when a Kurdish army finally took control of Kirkuk, they realised the 
dream of their forefathers within hours, without having to fire a shot. 
The collapse of Baghdad's control of northern Iraq in the face of an onslaught by Sunni insurgents has 
allowed Kurds to take the historic capital they regard as their Jerusalem, and suddenly put them closer 
than ever to their immortal goal: an independent state of their own. After Sunni insurgents from the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant seized Iraq's biggest northern city Mosul and rampaged towards the 
capital Baghdad, Kurdish fighters wasted no time in mobilising. 
They seized full control of Kirkuk - and tracts of land besides. In all, they expanded the territory they 
control by as much as 40 percent, without having to fight a single battle. 
The new territory includes vast oil deposits the Kurdish people regard as their national birthright and 
foundation for the prosperity of a future independent homeland. 
Kurds plundered bases deserted by the Iraqi army in Kirkuk, making off with everything from guns to 
air-conditioning units, armoured vehicles and mattresses in a frenzy reminiscent of the scenes that 
followed the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. 
For now, Kurdish officials are still weighing their options for next steps, but they have made clear that 
the settlement that held Iraq together as a state has been torn up. 
"We have entered a new era in Iraq that is completely different than before Mosul," Fuad Hussein, chief 
of staff to Kurdish regional President Masoud Barzani, told Reuters. "We will see how we are going to 
deal with this new Iraq." 
The 30 million Kurds - the world's largest stateless nation, divided between Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey 
- have sought a state of their own since the mapmakers of the modern Middle East denied them one last 
century. 
Since Saddam's fall, Iraq's 4 million Kurds have come the closest: ruling themselves in a prosperous and 
comparatively peaceful autonomous region of three remote mountainous provinces under a settlement 
that awards them a fixed 17 percent of Iraq's total oil wealth, sent from Baghdad. 
That has provided enough of a windfall to turn the regional capital Arbil into a boomtown, even as 
Baghdad remained an unreconstructed war zone strewn with rubbish, barbed wire and concrete blast 
walls. 
Kurds have served since Saddam's fall as Iraq's figurehead president and as foreign minister, and 
Kurdish political parties have acted as kingmakers in Baghdad, helping to give the Shi'ite-led 
government an appearance of inclusivity. 
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But disputes remained unresolved over the authority to issue oil exploration rights, and over the 
territorial boundaries of the autonomous region - demarcated between government troops and Kurdish 
forces by an often tense "green line". 
Kurds argued that much of the disputed territory, including Kirkuk itself, had been illegally "Arabised" in 
ethnic cleansing campaigns by Saddam, who pushed out Kurds and settled Arabs, to ensure control over 
the land and the oil beneath it. 
Now, the government troops are gone, and the Kurdish forces, known as peshmerga, or "those who 
confront death", have effectively resolved the main disputes in the Kurds' favour. 
 
"All these areas are going to be incorporated into the region," said Jabbar Yawar, Secretary General of 
the Kurdish Ministry of Peshmerga. "Currently our border is with ISIL, it is not with the Iraqi 
government". 
 
NOTHING TO OFFER 
The priority for now, Kurdish officials say, is to insulate the region from the violent fallout in the rest of 
Iraq. 
Officials in Kurdistan say they anticipated this week's assault by ISIL fighters as long as a year ago, and 
warned Baghdad to no avail. 
They built up their own defences by creating a security belt stretching more than 1,000 km (600 miles) 
from the Iranian border all the way to Syria - skirting around Mosul, a city of 2 million people they 
appear to have no intention of fighting for. 
The Kurds "don't particularly care about Mosul," said a former U.S. official in Iraq. "They are going to 
expand further below the green line, and a lot of it is going to be oil-related territory." 
In the days after Mosul fell, some in Baghdad suggested the peshmerga could come to the Iraqi 
government's aid and retake the city, an hour's drive from Arbil, on Baghdad's behalf. 
The Kurds say they received no formal request for help from in Baghdad. But even if Baghdad were to 
ask, it no longer has much to offer the Kurds in return for the favour, since the Kurds have already taken 
prizes like Kirkuk for themselves. 
 
KURD-ARAB WAR? 
Emma Sky, a former political advisor to the U.S. military in Iraq, said some of Iraq's Kurdish leaders 
may have been waiting all along for the governing system in Baghdad to fall apart, helping to keep Prime 
Minister Nuri al-Maliki in power while betting that Iraq would crumble around him. 
"On the Kurd side, some leaders calculated that Kurdish independence would come out of the collapse 
of Iraq - and that Maliki was the person most likely to destroy Iraq. For them, independence is so close," 
she said. 
However, that also creates a risk that the Kurds could find themselves at war with ISIL - dragging them 
into the sort of violence they have so far avoided for more than a decade. 
The disputed areas, including Kirkuk itself, are still home to many Sunni Arabs. Some may accept 
Kurdish rule if it brings piece, but some may look to ISIL for support that the Iraqi army failed to give. 
 
"The risk, of course, is that ISIL presents itself as the defender of the Sunnis in the (disputed areas) - and 
starts a fight with Kurds, marking the start of Arab-Kurd war," said Sky. 
But for Kurdish officials, the risk of a new conflict with the insurgents was clearly worth taking. 
"Everyone is worried, but this is a big chance for us," said a source in the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) on condition of anonymity. "ISIL gave us in two weeks what Maliki has not given 






Syria war brings al-Qaeda threat to Iraqi Kurdistan 
 
WASHINGTON — Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani has 
asked the Kurdish government to form a committee to investigate Kurdish jihadists going to Syria for 
jihad. The KRG is facing the same problem as other European countries: Jihad in Syria has not only 
brought al-Qaeda to Europe’s doorstep but also to that of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, as shown by an 
attack in Erbil on Sept. 26. 
There were reports indicating that several Kurdish Islamist fighters were recruited in mosques in 
the province of Sulaimaniyah. The Kurdish fighters of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) captured 
several Kurds from Iraqi Kurdistan in Syria, and in July Kurdish TV broadcast an interview with three 
captured Kurdish Islamic fighters. Most of the Kurdish Islamist fighters came from Islamist 
strongholds inside the province of Sulaimaniyah, close to the Iranian border.  
The city of Halabja located in Sulaimaniyah province has been the historical stronghold of 
Kurdish Islamists since the 1960s. The first Kurdish Islamic party, the Islamic Movement of 
Kurdistan (IMK), was created in Halabja and declared a holy war against the Iraqi government 
in 1987 in response to the genocidal Anfal campaign. However, the movement splintered as a result 
of the IMK joining the Kurdish government, and several Kurdish jihadist groups emerged that 
controlled parts of Halabja. 
In March 2003, a joint US special force and Kurdish fighters dislodged fighters of the Kurdish 
Islamist group Ansar al-Islam, which fled to Iran and has since been mostly operating outside the 
official Kurdistan Region of Iraq.  
Since then, most Islamic Kurdish parties have operated inside the system and become more moderate, 
trying to achieve their goals through political means. But the war in Syria has provided more 
opportunities for Kurdish youths to refocus on an armed jihad and join groups such as the al-Qaeda-
affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). 
One of the legal Islamic Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG), tried to disassociate 
themselves from jihad, although their members sympathize with jihad in Syria. 
Momen Zellmi, a Kurdish journalist based in Sulaimaniyah, who wrote an article for the Kurdistan 
Tribune about Kurdish jihadists in Syria, told Al-Monitor, “The people of Halabja have struggled against 
injustices, tyrants and despotism from early history.” 
“So, I believe right now, while the people of this city — especially the youths — see the violence by 
[Syrian President Bashar al-] Assad against his people, they want to help the poor Syrian people in Syria 
by jihad against the Assad regime,” he said. 
For the first time on Nov. 18, Kurdish security forces arrested a Kurdish jihadist at the airport of 
Sulaimaniyah returning from Turkey. Sheikh Lahur Jangi, head of the anti-terror force confirmed that 
Kurds have traveled to Syria to fight against the Syrian regime. 
“These young Kurds are trained in advance and some of them are even trained to commit suicide. 
We are doing our best to obtain information about these terrorist groups, not only in Kurdistan 
but also in Syria,” said Lahur Jangi. One of the government's countermeasures is banning the 
funerals of slain Kurdish jihadists who died in Syria and whose families want to bury them in their 
hometowns. Moreover, the KRG Ministry of Endowment in Iraqi Kurdistan has ordered imams 
and preachers in the region to advise young people not to go for jihad.  
Although there are tensions and competition between the Kurdish nationalist political parties over 
power-sharing in the Iraqi Kurdistan government and over control of Kurdish territory in Syria, al-
Qaeda-affiliated groups do not make any distinction between the different Kurdish parties from either 
Iraq, Turkey or Syria and see them as a threat. 
Suicide bombings and attacks targeting Kurds have taken place not only in Iraq but also in Syria. 
Moreover, Kurdish nationalist parties have fought jihadist and Islamist groups in Iraq, Syria and Turkey 
and also fought against the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
In a video statement released by ISIS in Sorani, Kurdish fighter Abu-Haris al-Kurdi said, “With these 
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guns, we will return to [Iraqi] Kurdistan, and we will kill all of the members of the KDP [Kurdistan 
Democratic Party], PUK [Patriotic Union of Kurdistan] and [KRG] security forces [ruling KRG 
parties].” 
Two Kurds, Abu al-Maqdisi al-Kurdi and Shakar Fayeq Hama Ameen, were involved in an ISIS attack 
on Dec 4 against the Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Kirkuk. Moreover, some say Kurds were also 
involved in the attack in Erbil on Sept. 26. 
Zagros Hiwa, a spokesman for the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), the executive political council 
of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), told Al-Monitor that the Kurdish movement in Turkey has a long 
history of struggle against Islamist groups in Turkey. Moreover, he accused the Turkish government of 
supporting jihadist groups against Kurds in Syria. 
Hiwa said that the KRG might have turned a blind eye to the practices of jihadist groups in the Kurdish 
areas of Syria and the recruitment of Kurdish youths in Iraq. “Or it may have miscalculated the danger 
of this trend. But the attacks in Erbil and Kirkuk showed that these groups show no mercy to any people 
or any political group.” 
"Any attack on the Kurdish people in South Kurdistan [Iraqi Kurdistan] by jihadist groups is an attack 
against the KCK, too. KCK strongly condemns any abuse of Islam for political interest and is ready to 
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Photos and video footage from the chemical weapons attack on the southern suburbs of Damascus August 21 
offer the world another heart wrenching glimpse into Syria today.  With some six hundred civilians 
casualties from the chemical attack, this one seems impossible to shrug away. Given President Obama’s 
Syrian “red line” statement of last year, sacred post-World War One international conventions against 
chemical weapons use and the United Nation’s recently adopted (2005) “Responsibility to Protect” 
doctrine, America’s and the international community’s credibility seems to be at stake. 
Feeling like we need to do something and knowing what to do are two very different things, however.  
To begin with, it’s not completely clear who was responsible for the attack – no matter how certain 
American, British and French officials try to appear on television.  Skeptics, along with the Assad 
regime, Russia and Iran, ask why the Assad regime would resort to chemical weapons now, when the 
war has finally begun to go in its favour?  Why risk Western intervention in a war you are winning?  
Why use the weapons when U.N. inspectors are in the country, and why use them near Damascus only 
some 5 kilometers away from where the inspectors are staying? 
If the regime is not responsible for the attack, however, that only leaves one of the many rebel groups 
fighting it (assuming we agree to avoid absurd scenarios, such foreign spy agencies with chemically 
armed mortar teams running around Damascus undetected).  I don’t doubt that some of the Syrian 
opposition groups are ruthless and immoral enough to do such a thing to their own people in a 
sympathetic Damascus suburb under rebel control.  Given their recent losses on the battlefield and 
growing desperation, Syrian rebels clearly have a strong incentive to attract Western intervention one 
way or another.  In May 2013 Carla Del Ponte, a U.N. investigator in Syria, even suggested that Syrian 
rebels may have used limited amounts of Sarin gas in some attacks.   
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For this latest attack, however, opposition fighters would have had to get their hands on much more 
significant amounts of nerve agent gas, and they would have had to launch the operation undetected 
and without any defectors confessing to the whole dastardly enterprise.  This simply sounds too unlikely, 
especially given that there has not been a single report of rebels seizing any significant chemical weapons 
caches from the Assad regime during the course of this war – and a number of intelligence agencies have 
been monitoring the regime’s chemical stockpiles very closely for just such an eventuality.  
All of which takes us back to the Assad regime.  Of course the Assad regime would rather not get 
bombed by the United States and other Western countries, and a chemical weapons attack like this one, 
with large numbers of civilian casualties, almost forces Washington’s hand.  We should not, however, 
equate every incident with perfect intent.  Accidents happen, especially in the fog of war.  A rogue 
chemical weapons unit commander, including Bashar Assad’s younger brother Maher, is one possibility.  
I don’t see it as particularly likely, however, given that Maher should not be considered any less rational 
than his elder brother.  These sorts of units are also tightly controlled by the regime.  Yet at the time of 
this writing, the evidence that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry seems about to present the world 
involves an intercepted phone call from a high Syrian official to a chemical weapons unit in Damascus 
under the control Maher. In the call, the panicked regime official apparently seeks more details about 
the unit’s chemical attack. 
The most likely explanation has the Syrian government mounting a chemical attack that was simply 
much more effective than originally intended.  Since May 2013, in fact, Western intelligence agencies 
publically stated their belief that the Assad regime has been using chemical weapons on a limited scale.  
It was not in the White House’s interest to admit this, since they had no desire to be forced over Mr. 
Obama’s red line into a meaningful Syrian intervention.  The evidence was just too clear to deny, 
however, so the United States fudged its red line by claiming that the chemical weapons had been used 
in such a limited way by the regime that real intervention in the war was not merited.   
It also makes good sense for Damascus to make limited use of chemical weapons, provided Mr. Assad 
thinks he can get away with it.  The weapons terrorize civilian populations supportive of the rebels.  At 
the first mention of a possible chemical attack on civilian areas, rebel fighters have a tendency to abandon 
their posts in order to go check on their families.  The recently attacked suburbs south of Damascus 
endured as a real headache to the Assad regime, which needed to maintain control of the city at all costs.  
Yet assault after assault over the past year had failed to dislodge rebels from these suburbs.  The regime 
also appeared to have gotten away with previous, limited chemical weapons attacks elsewhere in the 
country.  Given the extent to which Mr. Assad’s forces shell rebel-held civilian areas with conventional 
weapons, we should not assume any real moral compunction against weapons of mass destruction.  So 
last week the order was probably given to mount a limited chemical attack, and a local unit commander 
of the Syrian army let fly with a few too many chemically-laden shells, or displayed a bit too much 
accuracy, or both.  Hence the intercepted, panicked phone call from headquarters. 
If my analysis here is correct, however, that still leaves the question of what to do about it.  The U.N. 
Security Council will remain deadlocked on the issue, thanks to a Russian and Chinese veto.  Sending 
in some stealth bombers and a salvo of cruise missiles despite that hardly seems likely to end the Assad 
regime or the misery in Syria, and doing so without a real strategic plan or more clarity about what 
actually happened last week would be rash.  American voters also seem to have little appetite for the 
kind of effort that a more sustained military intervention would require, especially when the Syrian 
opposition includes so many Islamist extremists.  All of which means that Assad may just get away with 
this latest atrocity, again. 
 
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since August 2010. He is the Thomas G. Strong Professor 
of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and author of The Kurdish Nationalist Movement 
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Just a few years ago, Turkey received toasts from all across the Middle East and the West. Foreign 
Minister Davutoglu’s “Zero problems with neighbours” policy looked like a revolutionary sea change in 
Turkey’s position and role in the region. Prime Minister Erdogan basked in accolades in every Arab city 
he visited, from Beirut to Rabaat. As relations with Israel deteriorated, Turkish leaders warned the Jewish 
state that it would find itself more isolated than ever. 
An activist foreign policy carries risks which are all too apparent now, however.  By pronouncing its 
positions clearly and forcefully on every issue, from which Arab Spring dictators should fall and which 
should remain in power to how Israel should deal with the Gaza strip, Ankara seems to have made itself 
enemies even faster than it made friends.  Turkish foreign policy used to be a lot more low key than this, 
filled with the usual cautious diplomatic platitudes and avoiding any entanglements beyond its 
membership in NATO. Now I suspect that career diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cringe 
every time Mr. Erdogan lays his hands on a microphone. 
In a region experiencing such fast paced changes and developments, the wisest players keep their cards 
close to their chests.  Ever since he tamed the Turkish army and deep state, however, Prime Minister 
Erdogan looks more and more like a reckless, overconfident gambler. He threw his cards down and 
bet half the house on Egypt’s Morsi, the Syrian opposition, Palestinian Hamas and Iraqi Sunni parties.  
As his losses accumulate, the Turkish business and diplomatic community begins to wonder if they will 
be forced to cover his bets.   
So far Mr. Erdogan’s only successful wagers appear to be some of those he made on the Kurds.  The 
Kurdistan Regional Government has emerged as one of the few neighbours Turkey has zero problems 
with, at least for the moment.  The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) agreed to a roadmap to peace with 
Ankara, although this may still fall apart if the Turkish government fails to respond to a PKK withdrawal 
with democratic reforms.  Even Syrian Kurds refused to be provoked by Turkish support for radical 
Islamist groups attacking them, insisting that they desired nothing more than cordial relations with their 
northern neighbour. 
What then will Mr. Erdogan and his government do as their foreign policy losses, combined with 
increasing difficulties at home, accumulate?  The prudent thing to do would be to take the gains on their 
Kurdish bets and nurture them carefully. The reckless thing to do would involve gambling ever more 
actively and throwing more good money after bad on the lost bets.  Such a strategy would likely include 
squandering the Kurdish bets, and then blaming the West and Israel when everything at home and abroad 
collapses.  From some of his latest speeches, including one a few days ago in which he blamed Israel for 
the anti-Morsi coup in Egypt, I suspect Mr. Erdogan to be leaning towards the latter strategy.   
For a country once known as a pillar of stability and caution in the region, the change could not be more 
striking. 
 
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since August 2010. He is the Thomas G. Strong Professor 
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An Escape Tunnel from “Democracy” 
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By DAVID ROMANO 26/9/2013 
 
I was going to write this week’s column on the recent election in Iraqi Kurdistan. Like many people, I 
was heartened to see a an election day with few problems, high participation and some surprises.  With 
some political parties still a bit divided in their reaction to the election and official, final results still 
pending, however, I think I will wait a bit longer before commenting more. 
Instead, I would like to talk about a recent event in Turkey, where elections and the rule of law 
supposedly enjoy a much longer history.  Turkish news outlets reported that on September 25th, some 
18 imprisoned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) members “escaped from a prison in the eastern province 
of Bingol via a tunnel.”  Most readers in Turkey probably read with interest about how the prisoners 
apparently spent around a year secretly digging their escape tunnel, which was 80-meters long and ended 
outside the outer walls of the prison in a waste-water canal. Prison authorities were unable to find soil 
left over from digging the tunnel or shovels and other tools needed to dig such a tunnel, and they lost the 
tracks of the prisoners shortly after the tunnel’s exit. The escape seems to include many good elements 
for an action drama, in fact. 
What people should really focus on, however, is Turkish Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin’s statement on 
the matter: “We learned that 18 inmates, 14 of which were arrested and four convicted, have escaped.” 
The Justice Minister seems to be saying that of the 18 inmates, only four were convicted of any crime. 
Ten were arrested at some time in the past, but had yet to be convicted of any crime. The last four, 
apparently, had never been arrested or formally charged with any crime whatsoever.  For at least a year, 
they therefore languished in this prison without any due legal process. 
Perhaps I misunderstand the Justice Minister’s statement. Somehow I don’t think so, however. The 
pattern in Turkey simply remains too common (and according to many accounts, has worsened 
significantly under Prime Minister Erdogan’s tenure).  People imprisoned without charge, or arrested 
and imprisoned for years as they await a trial and the chance to defend themselves. The people in 
question seem to mostly be opponents of Mr. Erdogan’s government, and a disproportionate number of 
them Kurdish.  A government that can do this to some people can do it to anyone.   
Over the years, I met many Turkish officials who appear very fond of repeating that “Turkey is a country 
of the rule of law.” If the law permits this sort of thing, they make a complete mockery of the spirit of 
the rule of law. 
Prime Minister Erdogan promised to present a significant democratic reform package to the public by 
the end of September.  For months now, his people have been mysteriously crafting the package behind 
closed doors, without the input of others.  But time is running out for democratic reform, especially as 
the PKK begins to wonder if the “roadmap to peace” the government offered is really genuine.  Although 
Kurdish leaders publicly focus on their demand for “mother tongue education” and similar minority 
rights in the reform package, I for one will be more interested to see if administrative detention without 
charge and arrest without trial continue to enjoy legal sanction in Turkey’s “rule of law.” 
In the meantime, hopefully the prisoners who never enjoyed the luxury of a trial make good on their 
escape. 
 
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since August 2010. He is the Thomas G. Strong Professor 
of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and author of The Kurdish Nationalist Movement 
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Yesterday I heard America’s National Public Radio quote Tariq Ramadan, an Oxford University 
professor of Islamic studies and grandson of the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  Dr. 
Ramadan lamented the recent events in Egypt, stating something along the lines of “Islamists and 
secularists must learn to live together and accept each other” (I can’t find a transcript of his exact words, 
but this was the gist of it if memory serves me faithfully).  This probably strikes people as a very 
reasonable view, akin to “we must learn to make peace, not war.”  
Secular and Islamist co-existence, however, is a contradiction in terms. Islamists, by definition, engage 
in politics in order to insert religion into the realm of public policy. If this were not their objective, they 
would simply be religiously devout politicians in some other political party. Also by definition, 
secularists believe in not allowing religion to dictate public policy. We might just as well wish for the 
Klu Klux Klan and African Americans to get along. 
 
Some readers may, at this point, exclaim “Wait! There are many different kinds of Islamists, as well as 
different sorts of secularism!” As far as I can tell, however, there are only really two kinds of Islamists–
the patient, “play by the rules” kind, and the impatient, “take power by any means” kind. Of course there 
are many, many different interpretations of Islam and Islamic law and varying levels of enthusiasm for 
imposing religious rules throughout a society. In both kinds of Islamism, however, the same basic logic 
applies: a view that religion enjoins what is right and forbids what is wrong, and that these things should 
be translated into public policy one way or the other.  
 
  Islamists, by definition, engage in politics in order to insert religion into the realm of public policy.  
  
In Islam, alcohol, blasphemy, adultery and usury, among other things, are wrong. Some Islamists may 
therefore enact forthright bans on such practices, as in Iran and Saudi Arabia, while others take a more 
indirect approach, as in Turkey. Since Turkey’s constitution mandates secular politics, the Justice and 
Development Party’s (AKP) approach has been to increasingly curtail alcohol as part of a public health 
campaign, outlaw blasphemy and adultery as part of public morality campaign (they have been stymied 
on the adultery issue to date), and spout conspiracy theories and vague threats against the “interest rate 
lobby”.  Turkey under the AKP thus travels to the same general destination of “life dictated by religion 
and those who interpret it” as Iran and Saudi Arabia, but does so on a slower, more circuitous train. 
The mirror image of such an outlook comes in the form of a French style approach to secularism, or 
“laïcité.” In this understanding, religion is subservient to the state, and politics even dictates and 
constrains religion. Kemalism in Turkey adopted such an approach when it trained and licensed all 
imams in the country according to state-sanctioned doctrine, outlawed the wearing of veils in public 
institutions and forbade public officials from growing beards, for instance. This is the kind of secularism 
that sparked so much resentment amongst Islamists, and which Prime Minister Erdogan referred to when 
he recently proclaimed “They humiliated our values for years. They despised our beliefs, ignored our 
choices, desires, demands and expectations.” Islamism, including Mr. Erdogan’s patient brand of 
Islamism, bears a remarkable similarity to this kind of secularism in that both seek to impose one group’s 
values on the other. They can not coexist.  
What of American-style secularism, however? In the American understanding, secularism means a 
separation of church (or mosque) and state, with neither subservient to the other. Just as the state should 
not mandate or favor certain religions or interpretations of religious doctrine, religion should not serve 
as a determiner of public policy. Although this separation faces constant challenges in the United States, 
the principle seems clear enough: politics dirties religion, and religion wrecks politics. Surely political 
parties of socially conservative Muslims, as opposed to Islamists, could coexist with this kind of 
secularism? When I spoke to AKP deputies about this in 2008 and 2009, they told me that they very 
much support secularism in this American sense of the term. I wish I could believe them. Perhaps if they 
had not organized their political party on the ashes of the banned Islamist Refah party, if they had not 
made its Sunni Islamic nature so central, I could. Millions of protestors in Turkey no longer seem to 
believe them either, just as a good number of the millions who protested in Egypt no longer believe the 
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Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
 But what if Islamists just use religion cynically to gain political support? What if they don't believe 
in a heavenly mandate at all, and are quite ready to compromise on every issue? 
  
Even American-style secularism and moderate Islamism are not equivalent or compatible, unfortunately. 
One promises to leave people alone when it comes to their beliefs and their lifestyles (although even 
these promises sometimes face problems, as the Christian conservative component of the American 
Republican Party attests to). The other believes itself to have a mandate from God. Fulfilling God’s Will 
does not easily lend itself to compromise, sharing political power or staying out of people’s daily lives, 
no matter how “moderate” your tactics are. Who would want to compromise on their vision of the Divine 
Will? That’s one reason the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt sparked so much opposition in such a short 
time, and why Turkey’s AKP looks more and more like the Muslim Brotherhood every year. 
 
But what if Islamists just use religion cynically to gain political support? What if they don't believe in a 
heavenly mandate at all, and are quite ready to compromise on every issue? In this case, they formed a 
religiously-based political party for mainly strategic reasons rather than any deeply held convictions. 
Perhaps there's more hope for coexistence with secularists in such a scenario, although many people 
who vote for such "Islamist" leaders might not accept many compromises before they vote for a different, 
less moderate Islamist pretender. These kinds of Islamist leaders would also have to be cynics and liars 
before they even entered politics, which hardly inspires confidence... 
 
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since August 2010. He is the Thomas G. Strong Professor 
of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and author of The Kurdish Nationalist Movement 





Does the Kurdistan Region Have Alternatives to Turkey? 
By Wladimir van Wilgenburg 10/5/2013 
Column 
 
Could a change in government in neighboring Syria offer Iraq’s autonomous and landlocked Kurdistan 
Region an alternative to dependence on Turkey for oil and gas exports? According to Middle East expert 
Ruba Husari, it can, especially if Syrian Kurds also succeed in gaining autonomy in the future.   
In an article for the Carnegie Middle East Center, she suggested that an alignment of interests between 
the Kurds of Syria and Iraq could offer the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) an alternative to 
dependence on Turkey as an oil-gas corridor. 
 
But this seems unlikely. 
 
Husari suggests that the “degree of autonomy that a new regime emerging in Syria would be able to 
grant Syrian Kurds -- as well as the latter’s ability to carve out an autonomous region within the new 
state -- will determine whether Iraq’s Kurds will be able to free themselves from the pressures of Ankara 
and Baghdad and establish a direct export route for their hydrocarbons via Syrian Kurdish territory.” 
However, Syria’s own Kurdish areas contain oil and gas, but will themselves be dependent for exports 
on either Turkey, Syria’s future government or the KRG -- more specifically on the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP), which controls the border near the Kurdish areas of Syria. 
Some analysts think the Syrian Kurds have this access, but this is not the case. 
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Often analysts forget the fact that Kurds -- including Syrian Kurds -- are landlocked and therefore always 
dependent on others not only for gas and oil exports, but also for imports.  Moreover, the current tensions 
between the KDP and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) could make cooperation between Syrian Kurds 
and Iraqi Kurds difficult in the future. The oil industry knows the PKK-affiliated Democratic Union 
Party (PYD) controls most of Syria’s Kurdish areas. 
At an oil forum in Washington DC last month, KRG energy minister Ashti Hawrami made clear that for 
the Kurdistan Region there is no alternative to Turkey.  He said exports were possible through Iran and 
Syria, “But we infinitely prefer dealing with Turkey, for several advantages: first of all, the infrastructure 
-- more or less ready. The corridor is already being used for oil supply,” he said. 
KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani has also suggested that the only door of hope for Iraqi Kurds – 
or the KDP -- is Turkey. 
The Iraqi Kurds cannot simply fly out oil and gas; they need pipelines. And those pipelines are the 
guarantee of possibly more independence or autonomy in the future. But for this, they need cooperation 





The Politics of Terrorism Lists 
 
18/10/2012 05:35:00By DAVID ROMANO 
 
The U.S. State Department just removed The People’s Mujahideen, or Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), from 
its list of designated terrorist organizations.  The MEK was responsible for thousands, perhaps tens of 
thousands, of attacks on Iranian civilians over the years.  The most infamous attacks occurred on June 
28 and August 30, 1981, when the MEK set off bombs that between them killed some seventy high 
ranking Iranian officials, including Iran’s chief justice, its newly elected Prime Minister, its newly 
elected President, four cabinet members and twenty-seven members of the Majlis (Iranian parliament).  
During the Iran-Iraq war, the MEK invaded Iran along with Saddam Hussein’s army, using weapons and 
hardware supplied by the Ba’athist regime to fight Iranians.  In 1991, the MHK helped Saddam suppress 
the uprisings in Kurdistan and the Shiite south of Iraq. 
Perhaps the MEK has changed since then.  I admit that I haven’t seen much about their activities of late, 
besides rumours of their involvement in various Israeli and American covert operations in Iran and the 
difficulties faced by their cadres in Camp Ashraf in Iraq since 2003.  While in Geneva in 2011 I also 
spoke at length with several MEK members manning a protest tent outside the U.N. headquarters there, 
although that’s hardly the best way to get a good idea about whether or not they should still be considered 
a “terrorist organization.”  
It’s usually frustratingly difficult, in fact, ever to get accurate, up to date facts about insurgent groups’ 
tactics.  Unless the groups in question are vicious and callous enough to freely admit that they 
intentionally target civilians (Al Qaeda, Hamas, Ansar al-Sunnah and similar groups come to mind here), 
academics like myself are left poring over unreliable reports and attacks for which no one claimed 
responsibility.  Even the MEK attacks of 1981 that killed so many Iranian civilian government officials 
were neither claimed nor denied by the MEK (the perpetrators of the June 28 and August 30 attacks 
were both MEK members, however). 
In the end it probably doesn’t matter much whether academics believe a group deserves to be on a terror 
list or not.  I think we all know why the United States removed the MEK from the list: Relations with 
the regime in Iran have hit an all time low, and the Americans no longer seem to hold out much hope for 
U.S.-Iranian negotiations.  This, combined with a robust MEK lobbying campaign of American senators, 
congressmen and government officials, means that the enemy of America’s enemy is now America’s 
friend – no matter how much civilian blood it has on its hands.  The MEK no doubt offered the Americans 
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a lot of help with intelligence gathering and covert activities as well.  The mullahs in Teheran, in turn, 
will see vindications for their conspiracy theories about the Americans’ true intentions.  It’s not a 
conspiracy theory, after all, if they really are out to get you. 
The political nature of terror lists – whether of the United States, the European Union, Canada or other 
countries – cheapens them immensely.  Turkey’s Prime Minister decries the “terrorist PKK” [Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party] just before he heads off to the airport to welcome the latest Hamas visitor for lunch.  
Iranian leaders rail against the evils of the MEK at the same time as they wire money to Islamic Jihad 
in Palestine and a whole bevy of groups in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
If groups could really get off terror lists by turning away from terrorist tactics, the PKK would have been 
removed from Western lists for at least a time after 1999.  PKK leaders even changed its name to 
KADEK and Kongra-Gel in 2002 and 2003, in the vain hope of encouraging others to recognize their 
withdrawal from armed operations, their change in tactics and their call for negotiations.  It probably 
would not have mattered if the PKK even metamorphosed into a bunch of blind boy (and girl) scouts, 
however.  As long as their friends in Ankara insist so much that the PKK remain on the terror list, the 
Americans will keep it there no matter what the organization does or doesn’t do (as for the Iranians, 
what they insist on no longer matters in Washington).  
Armed insurgent groups thus seem to have few incentives to stop engaging in terrorism, since that’s not 
what really gets them onto or off of the terror lists.  Little wonder then that so many fail to reform 
themselves. 
 * David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since August 2010. He is the Thomas G. Strong Professor 
of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and author of The Kurdish Nationalist Movement 




A Shroud Over the Arab Spring 
 
13/10/2011 03:25:00By DAVID ROMANO 
THURSDAY COLUMN 
 
In Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, the overthrow of dictators brought great joy and high expectations.  It also 
brought widespread intolerance out into the open, it seems.  Synagogues in Tunisia were attacked, a 
Libyan Jew returning to the country saw armed men prevent him from cleaning a decrepit synagogue in 
Tripoli, and now Egyptian Copts face increasing violence from both street thugs and the army itself. 
One might feel tempted to blame all this on decades of authoritarian rule.  When a population lives under 
repression and lies for years on end, removing the cauldron’s cover allows some unpleasant, repressed 
and ugly tendencies to boil over at first.  You can’t expect instant liberalism and tolerance the day after 
a dictator’s demise.  The French revolution, after all, saw a reign of terror before the advent of fraternity, 
liberty, and equality. 
If this serves as an adequate rationalization of the past week’s ugly events in Cairo and elsewhere, what 
then of Iraqi Kurds’ emergence from Saddam’s iron fist in 1991?  Even when civil war broke out between 
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in 1994, Christians, 
Yezidis, Kakaiis, Turkmen and Arabs in Kurdistan remained a secure, accepted part of society.  No angry 
mobs threatened their houses of worship, their schools or their homes. 
When the rest of Iraq was freed from Saddam’s rule twelve years later, however, the position of Christians 
and Yezidis came under almost immediate attack.  Rumors rolled through Baghdad’s streets that Iraqi Jews, 
robbed of their possessions and expelled sixty years ago, were now coming back to nefariously buy up 
land. While the Iraqi government and Iraqi society at large failed to protect the Christians in particular, 
radical Islamists killed and bombed them out of neighborhood after neighborhood. 
"A large part of the reason why modern Kurdistan is much more tolerant of its minorities comes from 
the secularism of its leading political parties" 
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When it comes to tolerance and popular acceptance of minorities, political Islamists in particular seem 
to have an increasingly poor record.  Religious minorities didn’t fare so well in Europe either, of course, 
until the separation of Church and state (remember the Inquisition in Spain, for example?).  As the grip 
of religious Jews over politics in Israel strengthens, we also see the emergence of hate crimes against 
non-Jews, such as the arson attack on a mosque in the Galilee region.  The rise of political Hinduism 
brought a similar phenomena to parts of India.  Even in Turkey, the rise of the AKP has seen a concurrent 
increase in attacks on immodestly dressed women, Christians (including a prominent Armenian writer) 
and others deemed “immoral.” 
It seems that religion and politics just don’t mix very well.  A large part of the reason why modern 
Kurdistan is much more tolerant of its minorities comes from the secularism of its leading political 
parties.  While the politicians are often believing, practicing Muslims, they don’t take their religion into 
the political sphere very much or wear it on their sleeve.  This is in contrast to much of the Arab world, 
where the leading opposition groups nowadays tend to be Islamists, and ruling governments compete 
with them by trying to be even more Islamic. 
But why would anyone would want to sully the sacredness of religion by forcing it into the dirtiness of 
politics?  Many theologians also completely reject the notion that Islam is an inherently political 
religion.  For example, if Islam were so necessarily political, why would the most basic political question 
– leadership succession after Mohammad’s death – have been left unanswered?  This most basic of 
political issues created the split between Sunnis and Shiites and a lot of violence over the years. 
Europe only put an end to its bloody wars pitting Catholics against Protestants by pushing religion out 
of the political sphere.  Judging by some of the recent events in Egypt and elsewhere, the example was 
lost on much of the Arab world.  While most of the world fully accepts basic liberal principles of civic 
equality between all religious groups and freedom of religion, we see the oldest and largest Islamist group, 
the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, incapable of simply condemning the recent slaughter of Coptic Christian 
demonstrators. 
 
* David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since early August 2010. He is the Thomas G. Strong Professor 
of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and author of The Kurdish Nationalist Movement (2006, 





Putin Announces His Support for a Unified Kurdish State 
By DAVID ROMANO 20/3/2014 
column 
 
Now that I have readers’ attention, I have to admit that Vladimir Putin did not in fact announce his 
support for a unified Kurdish state. Our world remains too full of double standards for that. What Putin 
actually said was that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, “The Russian nation became one of the 
biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders.” 
With some 27 million Russians living outside of Russia, which includes places as far away as the 
Americas and Western Europe, Putin is right that the Russian nation in 1991 became “one of the biggest 
to be divided by borders.” If we’re talking about the number of people cut off from a state of their own 
by the vicissitudes of borders, however, they’re not the biggest one. With some thirty to forty million 
people and no state of their own anywhere, the Kurds hold that dubious honor. After the Ukraine secured 
its independence in 1991, the Kurds became the world’s largest stateless nation. 
Given the snap referendum in Crimea and this week’s even quicker annexation of Crimea by Russia, Mr. 
Putin appears to be a fervent believer in the right to national self-determination. The majority ethnic 
Russian population of Crimea yearned to become part of a Russian state, you see, and Mr. Putin felt 
obliged to fulfill the Crimeans’ wishes. Attaching Crimea to the Ukraine in 1954 was a historical mistake, 
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according to the Russians, and it seems such mistakes should be rectified.  
I know most Kurds like seeing this kind of thing play out internationally. They reason that the less sacred 
the world’s established borders become, the better. The more people talk about rights of national self-
determination, the greater the chance that the international community will finally recognize as much 
for the Kurds, they believe. The injustice of the post-World War One drawing of political borders can 
also be rectified, they hope. Crimea, South Sudan, East Timor, Kosovo – it’s all music to Kurdish ears. 
There’s a discordant note in the music, however: it’s the cacophony of double standards and hypocrisy 
the world over. When it comes to Syria, for instance, Mr. Putin holds state sovereignty and non-
interference sacred. The Syrian Kurds can hold all the referendums and local elections they like, and not 
one of the world powers – including Russian lovers of self-determination – will so much as recognize 
their efforts. The United States and its Western European allies were all for Kosovars’ self-determination 
and the creation of the Republic of Kosovo, and it couldn’t have mattered less to them that the whole 
enterprise violated Serbian law. They even bombed Serbia while its main patron and ally – Russia – was 
still too weak to do much about it. Now that it’s one of their friends losing territory, however, suddenly 
arguments like “this is totally in violation of Ukrainian law!” are supposed to matter. 
If any part of Kurdistan ever finds itself poised to declare its independence, therefore, they had best not 
rely too much on norms, principles or precedents. Only nations with powerful friends or enough power 
of their own benefit from these hypocrisies.  
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Trying to Overturn the Game Board in Kurdistan 
 




The resort to violence only finds justification when a political system remains closed to any 
other attempts at change.  Even then, non-violent protests and civil disobedience are generally 
preferable to armed resistance.  Few doubt that the Tunisian and Egyptian political systems were 
completely closed in every meaningful sense of the word. This in turn justified the mass protests 
that erupted in both countries, and the international sympathy they garnered.   
The Gorran Party’s recent talk of replicating the Tunisian example in Kurdistan, however, 
amounts to crying wolf.  As my fellow columnists for this newspaper correctly pointed out, 
Gorran participated in the last elections, which were declared free and fair by international 
observers, and accepted the results.  In other words, the political system in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
despite its many shortcomings, still allows room for the legal, institutionalized pursuit of 
change.  If the Tunisians and Egyptians had been so lucky, they wouldn’t have needed to take 
to the streets by the millions. 
To turn suddenly around and demand the dissolution of the Kurdistan Regional Government 
and Parliament strikes most people as petty.  Gorran is acting like a child who overturns the 
game board when he starts to lose.  It complains that Gorran people were not given any posts in 
KRG institutions.  Since the current KRG government is not a minority coalition government, 
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why should they have expected any appointments? After Gorran forsook Kurdish national goals in 
Baghdad by quitting the Kurdistan Alliance (a unified bloc formed to press Kurdistan’s objectives vis-
a-vis political groups in the rest of Iraq), they should count themselves lucky that anyone still 
speaks to them at all. At a time when Iraqi Kurdistan still faces serious threats from outside, it 
also strikes many Kurdistanis as the height of folly to try to bring down the government through 
non-institutionalized means. 
What makes this whole incident all the more depressing is that, lost in Gorran’s overdone 
histrionics, are some very legitimate complaints against the KRG.  Nawshirwan Mustafa is correct 
when he points out that a great many key institutions in the KRG, from the peshmerga and asayish to 
various not-so-non-governmental organizations (also known as ‘fake NGOs’, or GONGOs – government 
organized non-governmental organizations), remain under KDP and PUK party control rather than that 
of the government. Corruption still runs rampant, as does nepotism.  Most, although thankfully not all, 
media outlets are party controlled (of course this includes Wusha Corporation, the Gorran Party’s media 
company).  Services, including education and health care, still need a lot more improvement – the kind 
of advances that are less likely to occur when corruption keeps society from running as efficiently as it 
could. 
Most countries in the world face problems more similar to those of Kurdistan than Egypt or Tunisia – 
partly open, partly liberal political systems where incumbent political parties enjoy all kinds of 
unfair advantages.  Such systems are not the closed, deeply authoritarian political environments 
that spawned protest in Tunisia and Egypt.  The proper response in such a context would be to 
exercise one’s right to free speech (Wusha Corporation and its KNN television channel are very 
useful to Gorran in this case) and work hard to compete in the next elections, rather than demanding 
that the current game be overturned.  We’re all anxiously waiting for Gorran to develop the political 
maturity to realize as much. 
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Ankara’s Glass House and the French Genocide Bill 




Last week (December 22) France’s lower house of parliament overwhelmingly passed a law that would 
make it illegal and punishable to deny publically any genocide recognized as such by French law.  This 
in effect refers to the two genocides currently recognized by French law: the Holocaust that Germany’s 
Third Reich perpetrated against mostly Jews, and the mass killings of mostly Armenians (but also other 
Christians) by the Ottomans in 1915. 
Ankara immediately branded the French bill “an attack on freedom of expression and historical inquiry,” 
and its ruling and opposition parties jointly denounced it as a "grave, unacceptable and historic mistake."  
Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan added that the bill is “politics based on racism, discrimination, 
xenophobia.”  A Turkish protester in Paris expressed the view of many when he told Reuters “I don’t 
understand why France wants to censor my freedom of expression.”  
This is particularly rich coming from Ankara.  According to the International Press Institute, Turkey 
jails more journalists than any other country in the world, including Iran and China.  Laws against 
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“insulting Turkishness,” or “insulting the military”, the Prime Minister, the “organs of the state,” the 
“memory of Ataturk” and any number of other sacred cows, frequently get invoked to prosecute and 
imprison people in Turkey who dare claim an Armenian genocide did occur, or that Kurds were 
massacred on numerous occasions, or that Ataturk was an authoritarian leader.  
Other laws, such as various “anti-terror” statutes, are so broadly worded that Turkish authorities can and 
often do arrest almost anyone they want, any time they want.  The European Commissioner for Human 
Rights recently complained about a great many vague statutes that effectively kill freedom of expression 
in Turkey, including a law that “provides for imprisonment ranging from one to three years for a person 
who makes propaganda in favour of a criminal organisation or its aims” [italics in the original report of 
the Commissioner].  This means that if you want to establish a historic nature and culture site around an 
ancient city like Hasankeyf (instead of a dam to flood the place like the current government is doing), 
and the PKK has this as one of its aims as well, you could technically be arrested for terrorism. 
Just the definition of terrorism in Turkey’s “Anti-Terror” law remains so broad, even after it was 
amended in 2006, that people face prosecution for even saying that a Kurdish minority exists in Turkey.  
The Turkish definition: “Terrorism is any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an 
organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, 
its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with 
its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or 
destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or 
damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by means of 
pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat.” Columnists like myself could face 
problems for just pointing out obvious problems with such a definition of terrorism, should a Turkish 
prosecutor want to argue that our intent was to harm Turkey’s anti-terror struggle.  One can be held responsible 
for such “crimes” even if they were done unintentionally, by word or deed.  Many intellectuals and public 
figures who claim that a Kurdish minority exists in Turkey found themselves in court and in prison. 
Despite all this, the Turks are right to throw rocks at the French genocide law and French glass houses of self-
righteousness.  Remember the Battle of Algiers?  Or shall we recall Vichy France and the eagerness with 
which French officials helped the Nazis round up Jews for extermination? Or perhaps Charles De Gaule’s 
attempt to recast the French experience under German occupation as one of unrelenting partisan resistance 
rather than collaboration?.  That the latest French genocide bill, passed just before new elections, caters to 
France’s sizeable Armenian diaspora is no secret to anyone.  What the French parliament just did will also 
hurt any chances for a sincere, necessary and open discussion of what the Ottomans did to their Christian 
minorities as their empire collapsed. Many liberal Turks (including the most prominent remaining Armenian 
citizens of Turkey) criticized the French law for precisely this reason.  In the process, Turks also have a right 
to talk about the many Muslims massacred by Russian forces and Armenian irregulars in the area at the time.  
Kurds will also be reminded of the prominent role that Kurdish tribes working for the Ottomans played in the 
massacres of eastern Anatolia’s Christians. 
In the process, governments should leave such history to society and the historians and limit themselves to 
condemning, rather than forbidding, points of view they don’t like.  If someone wants to deny the Holocaust, 
to claim the Srebinica massacre in Bosnia never happened, to minimize the Armenian genocide, or to argue 
that rebellious Iraqi Kurds deserved the Anfal ethnic cleansings, I for one would rather hear their point of 
view (and in many cases, know more quickly that they are anti-Semitic, Islamophobic, racist or fascist). 
The Turks should save a few rocks for their own glass house, however, and take a hard look at Turkey’s much 
more severe restrictions on freedom of expression.  At least in France, one can walk around today and 
fearlessly talk about French government misdeeds in Algeria, in Vietnam, in the Pacific or as far back as the 
Vendée massacres of 1794.  When anyone can do the same kind of thing in Turkey without fear, Prime 
Minister Erdogan and his government can legitimately complain about “attacks on freedom of expression and 
historical inquiry.” 
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Turkey can not have its Kurdish cake and eat it too 
By DAVID ROMANO 17/10/2014 
 
Since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Ankara has demanded that the Kurds within the new 
state’s borders remain loyal and obedient. Their identity was of course denied and authorities mounted a 
ceaseless campaign of forced assimilation to their preferred language, customs and history. State ideologues 
maintained that everyone in Turkey was Turkish, insisting that “Turkish” referred to their citizenship and not 
their ethnicity. Nonetheless, the mandated language, history and cultural practices of “Turkish citizens” 
looked very much like that of ethnic Turks. A number of Kurdish revolts were then dismissed as the banditry 
of a people “who just refuses to accept civilization and the benefits the state wants to bring them.” 
 
At the same time, the Turkish public and Turkish state authorities kept the fate of non-citizen fellow Turks, 
whether in Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Germany or elsewhere, close to their hearts. While they appeared 
curiously uncaring about the situation of many of their own “so called citizens” who spoke languages other 
than Turkish at home, leaders in Ankara ceaselessly spoke up for Turkic minorities across the world.  When 
in the 1960s and 70s Greek Cypriot militias and death squads threatened the Turkish minority in Cyprus, the 
Turkish public and state authorities demanded that something be done. In 1974 they finally sent a massive 
invasion force to the aid of the Turkish Cypriots and took over one third of Cyprus, where Turkish troops 
remain to this day. 
The insurgency of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which began in earnest in 1984, eventually forced a 
change in official policy towards the Kurds, however. It grew increasingly difficult to fight the PKK while 
maintaining that Kurds do not exist in Turkey. If Turkey had no Kurds, the word “Kurdistan” in the PKK 
name should not have caused so many conniptions in Ankara. By 1991, Turkey finally admitted that there 
were indeed Kurds in the country (in fact they consist of up to twenty per cent of the population).  
The capture and imprisonment of the PKK’s leader in the late 1990s brought a lull in the PKK insurgency, 
but by 2005 the insurgency resumed. It was thus under the watch of Prime Minister Erdogan and his Sunni 
Muslim Justice and Development Party (AKP) that Ankara looked for additional ways to end the violence. 
Erdogan offered limited Kurdish language rights and some other reforms, including limited Kurdish 
broadcasting and Kurdish language publications. He publically recognized the existence of his “Kurdish 
brothers” and promised to make the Kurds feel like equal citizens. A peace process begun in 2007 held a lot 
of promise, but when the first group of PKK fighters disarmed and arrived at the Turkish-Iraqi border, the 
throng of Kurdish supporters (some of the “so called citizens” of Turkey) waiting to welcome them 
embarrassed the government so much it backed out of the whole process and started arresting the Kurds again.  
A few years later Mr. Erdogan announced another big push for peace, and in March 2013 the PKK agreed to 
stop its insurgency and withdraw its fighters from Turkey to Iraqi Kurdistan. They withdrew in return for 
unspecified government commitments to further the peace process. Unfortunately, Mr. Erdogan’s government 
appeared more interested in achieving a peace process than actually achieving peace. None of the Kurdish 
demands were met. Instead thousands of non-violent Kurdish journalists, civil society activists, student 
leaders and politicians were arrested and imprisoned (where many are still awaiting charges).    
It is at this point in the story that ISIS launched its biggest offensive against the Syrian Kurdish canton of 
Kobane, which sits right on the Turkish border. Kobane is not, however, equivalent for the Kurds to  what 
Northern Cyprus was for Turks. It is instead much more dear, as Kurds never really recognized the imposed 
border that separates Kobane from Kurdish towns like Suruc on the Turkish side of the line – they have close 
kin and friends on both sides.   
Yet somehow the same state that demands Kurdish loyalty and assures Kurds that they are equal citizens 
blockades Kobane even as its residents are attacked. The city’s defenders run short of ammunition for their 
light weapons, their backs pushed right up to the border by the most bloodthirsty, heavily armed band of 
terrorists the world has ever seen. The Kurds do not even ask for Turkish military intervention as occurred in 
Cyprus, but rather only permission to supply and relieve their brethren themselves. Ankara refuses, however, 
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as its Prime Minister claims that the PKK he supposedly entered into a peace process with in 2013 is “the 
same” as ISIS. For good measure Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister  this week ridiculed the month-long heroic 
fight of Kobane’s Kurds against a much better supplied Jihadi force, a force that in a few days in June sent 
half the Iraqi Army scurrying to Baghdad.  
As Kurdish demonstrations now rock cities across Turkey, leaders in Ankara and some of the Turkish public 
appear bewildered, wondering why the Kurds are so angry. They have yet to understand that they can not 
have their cake – in this case loyal Kurdish citizens at peace with Ankara – and simultaneously try to feed it 
to hungry Jihadis. If Mr. Erdogan insists on treating the Kurds as his greatest enemy, even in the midst of his 
vaunted “peace process,” then that is precisely what they will be. 
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A Risk Averse Leader of the Free World 
By DAVID ROMANO 4/9/2014 
 
Although Kurds, Shiites and many others in Iraq never regretted the 2003 American invasion, most Americans 
do. From many Americans’ point of view, the younger President Bush turned out to be reckless, squandering 
vast sums of the country’s blood and treasure on risky, ill-prepared and mendaciously justified undertakings. 
While the toppling of Saddam turned out to be easier than most people expected, the occupation of Iraq cost 
Americans much too much for far too little in return. 
It was thus an America tired of war that elected Mr. Obama in 2008.  It should come as no surprise that Mr. 
Obama was elected on a platform promising to focus on domestic rather than foreign policy problems. The 
slogan “Yes we can!” was certainly not meant to apply to any new ventures abroad. It should also probably 
come as no surprise that in contrast to his predecessor, Mr. Obama also appears exceedingly risk averse in 
foreign policy. Whether the issue is Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Russia’s advances in the Ukraine, Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the civil war in Syria or just about anything else, the new president seems to prefer 
cautious non-committal to decisive engagement or action. 
As I have written in previous columns, the rise and recent advances of the Islamic State (IS) demonstrate this 
tendency in the White House very well. Initially Mr. Obama dismissed the IS as a two-bit junior varsity 
regional problem. When the IS captured Mosul and much of Western Iraq in June the Americans seemed to 
be caught with their pants almost as far down as the Iraqi Army’s.  When the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga faced 
their own surprise humiliation at the hands of IS in early August, again the Americans appeared too hesitant 
and unsure about what course of action they would take. Only when Erbil itself seemed to be under threat 
and tens of thousands of Yezidi civilians had already been on Mount Shangal five days did the American 
President decide to say something and act.  
The action he chose was “limited air strikes to protect American personnel in Iraq and the civilians on Mount 
Shangal.” This was combined with a promise not to send American troops into Iraq. The arming and resupply 
of the Kurds fighting the IS would only occur with Baghdad’s approval and collusion. Throughout August, 
Mr. Obama’s apparent position remained that the IS was the problem of others in the region, stating that 
“We’re not the Iraqi military, we’re not even the Iraqi air force,” and “I am the commander in chief of the 
United States armed forces, and Iraq is gonna have to ultimately provide for its own security.” Most recently, 
the President added that regarding the Islamic State, “I don't want to put the cart before the horse. We don't 
have a strategy yet.” 
In other words, while President Obama reassesses the IS and attempts to devise a strategy, he continues with 
his non-committal cautious policies, adding relatively small tweaks to the status quo foreign policy only when 
forced to do so. The caution instinct seems to run so deep that the President even promised not to send troops 
back to Iraq and admitted to not having a strategy to defeat the Islamic State. 
But why would anyone enter a contest by placing limits on what they can do, and then publically admit that 
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they have no idea what to do? America may not need to send significant numbers of troops into Iraq or Syria, 
but surely there is no need to tell its enemies that it will not do so under any circumstances? Likewise, can 
the public admission of lacking a strategy inspire confidence in American allies battling the IS Jihadis as we 
speak?  What if instead of looking indecisive, Mr. Obama threatened both the IS and others that he will back 
allies like the Kurds one hundred per cent, without limit or conditions?  At the same time, he could privately 
tell the Kurds what they actually have to do in the short term to receive unrestrained American assistance in 
this war. 
Cautious diplomacy and minor tweaks to the status quo foreign policy can not possibly be the right answer 
to every single challenge facing the United States. Leaders that turn out to be too risk averse may endanger 
their country and its interests just as much, or more than, reckless ones. 
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Obama’s Moral and Strategic Failure on ISIS  
By DAVID ROMANO     7/8/2014   
column  
Few conflicts offer the moral and strategic clarity that the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS) now 
provides. Polarized camps can and do endlessly argue in support of Israeli or Palestinian viewpoints, resulting 
in a lot of international chatter but little of substance. Ukraine remains a mess, with few people sure of what 
to do or when to do it.  Syria gave the West the unenviable choice of either the Assad devil or the Jihadi 
demons, with decision makers in  Washington and elsewhere appearing paralyzed by their lack of options. 
Sub-Saharan African conflicts appeared so chaotic and far away they never made it onto the strategic radar 
screen, although the world still feels guilty (when it remembers) for inaction in places like Rwanda, Darfur 
and the Congo. 
In contrast to other international problems, the ISIS villain offers the world, and the United States in particular, 
a refreshingly unambiguous imperative. Thanks to the statements and on-line videos that ISIS terrorists post 
themselves, no one doubts what they are about: Executing captives and unarmed civilians, including children; 
beheading those whose religious beliefs differ from their nihilistic Salafi extremism; raping women taken as 
booty; random drive by shootings of civilians; pedophilia (I am not sure how else to describe the forcible 
marriage of captured underage girls); blowing up the religious shrines and ancient cultural heritage of others; 
suicide bombings targeting random innocents; destabilizing the region and replacing existing states with an 
Islamic Caliphate, starting with Syria and Iraq but now moving onto Lebanon, Jordan and Gaza and soon the 
rest; expanding the “struggle” to encompass as much of the world as possible. 
As if all this were not enough, ISIS butchers now bring the threat of genocide to the devastated cityscapes 
and barren countrysides they stalk. I do not mean this in the tripe way the word has been thrown about so 
often, every time a few hundred innocents of the same group get killed -- but rather in the very real sense of 
the physical extermination of an entire people, with their survivors scattered.  Mosul’s Christian population 
is no more, ethnically cleansed in June from a city they inhabited for almost 2000 years. Since ISIS overran 
the nearby city of Shangal a few days ago, the Yezidi population has been looking at the threat of genocide 
as well. Some half of the world’s 400,000 Yezidis, an old religion that predates Christianity and Islam, are 
now displaced and on the run from ISIS. As I write this, some ten thousand Yezidi civilians are trapped on a 
mountain top in 45 degree heat, with their old and young expiring first as ISIS terrorists surround the base. 
The last big Christian town in Iraq, Qaraqosh, may have just fallen to ISIS as I write this. 
In short, ISIS makes al-Qaeda look like a bunch of boy scouts, which probably explains why al-Qaeda 
disowned them. But whereas al-Qaeda was more of an idea and a loose franchise of like-minded, disparate 
Jihadis, ISIS is much more than that. The militants of the Islamic State (as they now call themselves) are 
organized into an almost regular army, with a state that incorporates a good deal of Syria and Iraq. They are 
 326 
flush with cash and now American weapons captured from the fleeing Iraqi army. The group’s recent and 
lightning-quick series of military conquests is convincing Arab Sunnis with few other options that ISIS is a 
viable, serious player, and no one in this region wants to stand with the wrong team. Analysts who watch 
these things are calling ISIS’ advance “a calamity hitherto unimaginable.” It is likely today’s most serious 
threat to the entire region. 
Despite the rare confluence of moral and strategic imperatives to respond, the United States, Europe and other 
countries appear almost blasé about the whole thing. It does not even make the front page of major 
newspapers. U.S. President Obama last made a public statement about Iraq on June 19th, despite being the 
leader of a state with both a strong interest and moral obligation to respond to ISIS’ actions in Iraq.  
Those analysts, journalists and academics looking at the issue appear to have reached a very rare consensus 
on what needs to be done: Arm and support the secular, pro-Western Kurds currently standing up to ISIS. 
With their budget cut off by Baghdad since January and no military resupply to speak of, the Iraqi Kurds are 
outgunned by the new American hardware and supplies ISIS captured in June. Syrian Kurds have moved to 
help them confront the ISIS advance, but they have received even less support than the Kurds in Iraq (if that 
is possible) and have been fighting ISIS in Syria for two years. 
Yet somehow President Obama cannot be moved to say anything or do anything. His Republican rivals seem 
little better, either not comprehending what is happening or not wishing to remind anyone about their 2003 
invasion. Mr. Obama’s avoidance and neglect of pressing issues in Iraq, a headache he never wanted to deal 
with, has left policy to bureaucratic apparachniks in the State Department. Their priority appears to be 
insisting that they were not wrong for unconditionally backing Nuri al-Maliki all these years. Instead of 
confronting genocide and a mortal threat to just about everyone, they prioritize maintaining the “territorial 
integrity” of a state that now exists in name only. They claim to be “monitoring events closely” and they insist 
that all military and financial aid to the Kurds must go through Baghdad, knowing full well that this really 
means doing nothing. 
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The Truth About Kobane    
By DAVID ROMANO     9/10/2014   
 
Writing in the Guardian this week, columnist David Graeber compares the plight of Syria’s Kurds and the 
besieged town of Kobane to the Spanish Civil War: “Amid the Syrian war zone a democratic experiment is 
being stamped into the ground by ISIS. That the wider world is unaware is a scandal.”   
Just as Spanish revolutionaries empowered women and fielded female combatants, so too do the People’s 
Protection Units (YPG) of the Syrian Kurds. The lightly armed YPG partisans now fight house to house 
against much more heavily armed fascists of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS). They fight to 
protect their land and an attempt at local democratic governance – an attempt that provided refuge to and 
empowered not just Kurds, but Turkmen, Christians, Arabs and others. The main political party directing the 
YPG forces in Syrian Kurdistan is the Democratic Union Party (PYD). Like the Spanish and many other 
revolutionaries, the PYD are of course not angels, and they stand accused of shutting out rival Kurdish parties 
promoted by Turkey, the United States and the Iraqi Kurds. They have strong organic links to the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK).  
 Nonetheless, the Syrian Kurds have not attacked anyone but the Islamists trying to take over their lands. 
They have not even asked for a Kurdish state or secession from Syria. Rather, they proclaimed local self-
government in the three cantons of Kobane, Cizre and Afrin. The three cantons emerged as tolerant, somewhat 
democratic islands amidst the grim maelstrom that is the Syrian civil war.  By the PYD’s own rules, all the 
administrations must have male and female leaders and include all the ethnic and religious groups of the area 
within their decision making structures. 
 327 
 Yet since they established their autonomous cantons in 2012, the United States, Europe and even most 
independent “progressives” of the world seem to have studiously ignored the Syrian Kurds.  Graeber also 
asks, “If there is a parallel today to Franco’s superficially devout, murderous Falangists, who would it be but 
ISIS? If there is a parallel to the Mujeres Libres of Spain, who could it be but the courageous women 
defending the barricades in Kobane? Is the world – and this time most scandalously of all, the international 
left – really going to be complicit in letting history repeat itself?”  
That seems to be the intent of many, judging by the deceptions that government officials in Washington and 
Ankara keep trying to peddle to us. They say they are “arming moderate Syrian rebels,” yet many of the 
“moderates” they are arming appear only a bit less Islamist than ISIS. If the secular Syrian Kurds want arms, 
on the other hand, they are told by Washington and Ankara that they must drop their demands for autonomy, 
local government and Kurdish and other minority rights. No doubt this will make them “moderate” so they 
can join the fight to replace an Allawi Arab dictatorship with a Sunni Arab one. 
 When the United States began its bombing campaign in Syria, it appeared to be targeting ISIS everywhere 
except where they were besieging the Syrian Kurds. ISIS drove its captured Iraqi and Syrian tanks around 
Kobane with impunity, even though armor can be easily targeted by Western aircraft. News reporters just 
across the border in Turkey filmed the whole thing, at least until Turkish soldiers tear gassed them out of the 
area. When finally U.S. aircraft targeted ISIS around Kobane this week, as the city began to fall to the Jihadi 
onslaught, the public was told that Turkey had asked the Americans to do something to help the besieged city.  
 In all likelihood the Americans finally decided to do something contrary to Turkey’s wishes. In Kobane ISIS 
is about to win yet another major victory, and this will not make Mr. Obama’s campaign look good. They 
likely just told the Turks they could pretend they had asked them. If Ankara really wanted ISIS forces around 
Kobane targeted, they could have done so themselves as they watched the Jihadis just a few hundred meters 
away from the border.  A few artillery rounds could have done wonders, or Ankara could have allowed Iraqi 
Kurdish peshmerga to transit through Turkey and reinforce Kobane in much the same way PYD fighters 
helped in Iraq recently. There are much better options to help Kobane, in other words, than an embargo or 
Turkish ground troops setting up a buffer zone. The buffer zone would likely be designed to squash Kurdish 
autonomy in Syria more than anything else. 
 Yet Ankara claims that it opposes ISIS, even as the organization recruits in Turkey, transits through Turkey 
and sells its smuggled oil through Turkey. Every year hundreds of Kurds get imprisoned in Turkey for 
smuggling cigarettes across the mountains on the Iranian and Iraqi borders, yet we do not hear of any ISIS 
smugglers getting caught on the flat terrain of the Syrian-Turkish border. Instead Turkey prevents food and 
water from being sent to Kobane’s defenders, at the same time that it pretends it does not wish to see Kobane 
fall.  
 In March 2013, the PKK also ended its fight with Ankara and entered into peace negotiations with the 
government. Yet last week President Erdogan said that for Turkey, the terrorists of ISIS and the PKK “are the 
same.” If only that were true – Kurdish fighters might be better supplied and not prevented from crossing into 
Syria to defend Kobane.   
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He is the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle 
East Politics at Missouri State University and author of The Kurdish Nationalist Movement (2006, Cambridge 
University Press) and co-editor (with Mehmet Gurses) of Conflict, Democratization and the Kurds in the 
Middle East (2014, Palgrave Macmillan). 
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 ریيدهحە كﺎروان: وهئینگلیزيیە لە
 
 و ﺑﺎش روی دو دامﺎنگە ملە ﺗوركیﺎ زيرانﯽوه رۆكسە ردۆگﺎنﯽئە يبﺗە بجەره نلايە لە برهعە هﺎریﺑە كﺎنﯽردانەسە
 .دا پیشﺎن ﺗیكردنﯽركردايەسە خراپﯽ
 
 ﺗوركیﺎ رۆكﯽەس ﺗونس، و لیبیﺎ و میسر ﺑۆ كﺎنیداردانەسە لە. يەهە كراسﯽديمو مۆدێلێكﯽ رۆڵﯽ ﺑە پێويستﯽ ئیسلامﯽ جیهﺎنﯽ
 ﯽديموكراس و ئیسلام كە یوهﺑە وروژاند هێزیﺑە يسێكﯽكە كﺎت،ده پێدانشەگە و داد ئیسلامﯽ پﺎرﺗﯽ ﺗﯽركردايەسە كە
 ﺑۆ ﺑژێرندهڵهە خۆيﺎن ﺑۆ ستوریده كﯽﺗییەرايەنوێنە انرنگدهده داهﺎﺗو مﺎنگﯽ ﺗێیدا كە ﺗونس، لە. گونجﺎون كتريدايە ڵگەلە
 ديموكراسﯽ ﺗێكﯽوڵەده هێشتﺎ ڵامﺑە ،موسڵمﺎنە ی%99 ﺗوركیﺎ: "وﺗﯽ ردۆگﺎنئە ينلعﺎﺑدين،زه رنﺎنﯽدهوه دوای جﺎر مكەيە
 ".كسﺎننيە كﺎنئﺎيینە موهە ﺗێیدا كە لمﺎنییەعە
 
 يداكەانەردسە كﺎﺗﯽلە. خۆيشﯽ ﺗوركیﺎ و كەنﺎوچە ﺑۆ ﺗرسیدارنمە ئیسرائیل لە ردۆگﺎنئە كﺎنﯽهﺗوند وامەردهﺑە خنەره ڵامﺑە
 منداڵﯽ" ﺑە ئیسرائیلﯽ ردۆگﺎنئە ،كردوه ﺗوندوﺗیژی لە رويﺎن ئیسرائیل دژی كﺎنخۆپیشﺎندانە یشوێنە وئە میسر، ﺑۆ
 .وهﺑكﺎﺗە یخۆ كﺎنﯽﻗسە نجﺎمﯽرهده لە ﺑیر و ستێﺑوه لێدوانﺎنە جۆره ملە ردۆگﺎنئە پێويستە. نﺎوﺑرد" خۆرئﺎوا ﺗێندراویڵەخە
 
 ﯽستده ردۆگﺎنئە راﺑردودا، سﺎڵﯽ نۆ یمﺎوه لە. ﺑكرێت رسەلە یستەڵوههە پێويستە كە ﺗوركیﺎ یرﺑﺎرهده يەهە شت زۆر
 مرۆڤﯽ كﺎنﯽفﺎمە ريفۆرمﯽ و سپﺎندچە سوپﺎسﺎلاری جیﺎﺗﯽلە نﯽدهمە حوكمﯽ ،كردوه ئﺎزاد كﺎنﯽﺗوركییە دارهرمﺎيەسە
 ورهبه توركیا كاتێكدا له ﺑدات نجﺎمﯽئە يەهە گرنگﯽ ڵبژاردنﯽهە و ستﯽﺑﺎڵاَده ﺗرسیداریمە نﯽلايە هﺎروههە. نجﺎمدائە
 .هودیموكراسییه واوته ستورێكیده به ڕواتده سوپایی داڕێژراوی ستوریده یوهجێگرتنه
 
 ﺎﺗﺎنیﺎهۆین ﺑنیﺎمین ڵگەلە كردنڵەمﺎمە كە نییە داوهلە گومﺎن. كﺎتده ئیسرائیلدا ڵگەلە ﺗرسیدارمە كﯽيﺎريیە ردۆگﺎنئە ڕێزﺑە
 ڵامێكﯽوه چهی ئیسرائیل یوهئە دوای پچڕاند كﺎنﯽنديیەيوهپە ﺗوركیﺎ. ﺑێت رﺑێزاركە كرێتده ئیسرائیل زيرانﯽوه رۆكسە
 شتهە ﺗێیدا كە ززهغە ﺑۆ ﺗﯽيﺎرمە كﯽشتییەكە رسە ﺑۆ ئیسرائیل هێرشﯽ لە نگبونﺑێده ﺑۆ ريكﺎمەئە نﺎوﺑژيوانﯽ رۆڵﯽ و،ﺑنە
 .كوژران ﺑو) ﺗوركﯽ-ريكﯽمەئە( كێكیﺎنيە كە ﺗوركﯽ، هﺎوڵاﺗﯽ
 
 ،وهﺗەحمەزه دۆخێكﯽ خستۆﺗە نﺎﺗۆی مﺎنﯽيهﺎوپە ريكﺎیمەئە و وهكﺎيە ﺗەهێنﺎوه ﺗرسیداریمە ﺑﺎرێكﯽ ردۆگﺎنئە ڵامﺑە
 رگەەئ. ﺗوركﯽ لﯽشتیگەگە لە پﺎرێزگﺎری ﺑۆ ڕاستنﺎوه ريﺎیده ﺑۆ رﺑﺎزیسە شتﯽكە نﺎردنﯽ ﺑۆ كﺎنﯽشەڕههە ڕایرهسە
 ڵگەلە یكەورهگە یەﺑﺎزرگﺎنی ردۆگﺎنئە ڕێزﺑە ،وهمەكە لایﺑە. چێتردهده ستدهلە كەﺑﺎره وائە ﺑن،نە وريﺎ ردولاهە
 .وهﺗرسییەمە خﺎﺗەده ئیسرائیلدا
 
 مئە رەسلە ﺗوند ﺗﯽﺗﺎيبە كﯽيەوهكۆﺑونە يشتۆﺗەگەنە ڵامﺑە ردۆگﺎن،ئە یوههێوركردنە ﺑۆ داوه جدی وڵﯽهە ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ رۆكسە
 ﺑوه ازیر وهﺑە ردۆگﺎنئە شدوايیﺎنە مﺑە. ئێران لە وهنزيكبونە ﺑۆ ﺗورك كﺎنﯽركردهسە پێشوی كﺎنﯽوڵەهە هﺎروههە و ﺗەﺑﺎﺑە
 زگﺎریپﺎرێ ستﯽﺑەمە ﺑە نﺎﺗۆ ريكﯽمەئە رگریﺑە كﯽموشە لە شێكﺑە كوه ﺑكرێت جێگیر ﺗوركیﺎ خﺎكﯽ نﺎولە رادارێك كە
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 دیسەئە شﺎرﺑە ڵگەلە كﺎنيونديیەپە نﯽپچڕاند ﺑۆ كرد ردۆگﺎنئە لە داواشﯽ تﺗﺎيبەﺑە ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ. ئێران هێرشێكﯽ رهەلە كەنﺎوچە
 ﺎﺑوریئ هێزی ﺗوركیﺎ ئێستﺎ پێويستە. مﺎوهنە دسەئە ﺑە ڕیﺑﺎوه چیدی كە يﺎندوهراگە یوهئە ردۆگﺎنئە. سوريﺎدا رۆكﯽسە
 .پێنێﺑسە يداكەستەداروده و دسەئە رسەﺑە مﺎرۆگە پﺎندنﯽسە ﺑۆ خۆی
 
 ێويستەپ ڵامﺑە. لمێنێتﺑسە ﺗﯽركردايەسە رۆڵﯽ ﺗوانێتده ردۆگﺎنئە ئیسلامﯽ، ﺗﯽديموكراسیە ديﺎری كﯽيەركردهسە كووه
 .ﺑكﺎت يەڵەمﺎمە وئە رپرسیﺎرانەﺑە كﯽيەشێوهﺑە
 
 ﺗﺎيمز نیۆرك: رچﺎوهسە
 




                                 ﻭهمیدیﺎکﺎنە لە
 ڕاستناوه ڵاتیخۆرهە بۆ مۆدێلێكە عێراق شتێك موهە دوای ئایا
  دیێڵ جﺎكسن
 رییدهحە كﺎرﻭان: ﻭهئینگلیزییە لە
 سنیشﺎنده كﺎنداەكﻭشﺗﺎریی ئﺎمﺎنجە لە دسەئە شﺎرﺑە پشﺗیﻭانﺎنﯽ. درﻭسﺗﺑﻭ ﺗﺎزه سﻭپﺎیﯽ كﯽڵسﺗییەرهەﺑە رسە كﺎﺗەده شهێر تحكﻭمە سﻭپﺎی سﻭریﺎ، لە
 ﺎفﯽم كﺎرهێنﺎنﯽﺑە ئﺎست لە سﺗﺎﻭنﻭه نگﺑێده خۆراﻭا ﻭڵاﺗﺎنﯽ. ﻭهكرێنەده رگمە ڕﻭیرﻭﺑە ئﺎزاردان ﺑە ئۆپۆزسیۆن چﺎلاكﺎنﯽ كﺎﺗێكدا لە كرێنده
 مئە چێتپێده ﻭكﻭژراﻭه هﺎﻭڵاﺗﯽ 0092 ﻭهمەكە لایﺑە. ﻭهچینە رﻭسیﺎﻭ نلایە لە كﺎنكگرﺗﻭهیە ﻭهﺗەنە ئﺎسﺎیشﯽ نﯽنجﻭمەئە یكەﺑڕیﺎره دژی ڤیﺗۆ
 .ﺑێت سﺗپێكردنﯽده ﺗﺎیرهسە كﻭژییە شەره
 .ﻭهینەﺑكە عێراق ڕیشە لە ﺑیر جﺎرێكیﺗر ﻭهئە جیﺎﺗﯽلە مكەزدهحە ڵامﺑە. ﺑنﻭسم ﺗەﺑﺎﺑە مئە رسەلە ﻭاﻭﺗە ﻭﺗﺎرێكﯽ ﺗﻭانمده من
 ژیﺎن فیرۆدانﯽەﺑ ﺑە ریكﺎمەئە لە گشﺗﯽ كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە كەمیشنە ئێسﺗﺎدا لە عێراق، لە ریكﺎمەئە سﻭپﺎی یﻭهكشﺎنە ﺑۆ مﺎﻭه مﺎنگﯽ سێ نهﺎﺗە كﺎﺗێكدا لە
 ﺗﯽرۆكﺎیەسە كﺎنﯽخﻭازه كۆمﺎری كﺎندیده نﺎﻭلە شمەئە ،شێﺗﺎنە یﻭرهگە ﺑڕیﺎرێكﯽ خراپﺗر شﻭهلە م،ڵەﻗە درێﺗەده كﺎنریكییەمەئە یرچﺎﻭهسە ﻭ
 ﻭ نمەەی لیﺑیﺎ، لە ختسە هﺎﻭینێكﯽ ﺑۆ گۆرا میسر ﻭ ﺗﻭنس ریدڵخۆشكە زسﺗﺎنێكﯽ لە كە نﺎﻭﺑراﻭ، ڵەهە ﺑە ﺑﯽرهعە هﺎریﺑە ڵام،ﺑە. كرێتده دیﺑە
 .ﻭهجیﺎﻭازه ﺑﺎرێكﯽ رۆشنﺎیﯽ رێژ خﺎﺗەده عێراق سﻭریﺎ،
 ڵاﺗﯽسەده. ﺑێتنە ئﺎشﺗیﺎنە كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە ئﺎسیﺎ، ﻭرﻭپﺎﻭئە ڕاسﺗﯽنﺎﻭه یﻭانەپێچە ﺑە ڕاسﺗدا،نﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽخۆرهە لە ئۆﺗﻭكراسﯽ ﺑە هێنﺎن كۆﺗﺎیﯽ چێتپێده
 مەﻗﺎی پشﺗیﺎن هێز ﻭ كچە لە شﺎخێك هۆیﺑە كە نمەیە سﺎڵحﯽ ﺑدﻭڵاعە لﯽعە ﻭ زافﯽﻗە رمەەمﻭع د،سەئە كﻭﻭه كﺎنﯽدیكﺗﺎﺗۆره. نﺎكﺎت ئیش ڵكخە
 ڕایرهسە. ڵگرنهە ستده نگﯽده ﺑێﺑە یﻭهئە جیﺎﺗﯽلە نﺑكە رشە مردن كﻭﺗﺎﻭه ﻭێیﺎنەده كرێت،ده داﺑین ﺑۆیﺎن ﻭهكﺎنەﺗەشیرهعە هۆزﻭ نلایە لە كە
 .ﺗﯽمرۆڤﺎیە دژی كﺎنیﺎنﺗﺎﻭانە لە ﻭهنەنﺎكە سڵ ،ﻭهﻭهئە هۆیﺑە یەﻭانەلە یﺎن دادگﺎدا، زیفەﻗە لە كمﻭﺑﺎره حﻭسنﯽ ﺑینینﯽ
 راست شﺗە مەئ زافﯽ،ﻗە ڕﻭانیﺗەده كﺎﺗێك ڵامﺑە. دۆڕێنده دیكﺗﺎﺗۆرانە ﻭئە كﺎﺗێك ﻗﺑﻭڵكردنە جێگﺎی ڵامﺑە ﺑێت، دﻭالە شیمﺎنﯽپە یەﻭانەلە زهفەﻗە ﻭئە
 كﺎنﯽێزهر یمﺎنەكە گرﻭپە ﻭلە هێزﺗرنﺑە كﺎنﯽﺗۆپە ﻭ ﺗﺎنك ڵامﺑە ،ﻭهﺗەسڕاﻭه دسەئە ،خۆرئﺎﻭاﻭه كﺎنﯽﻭاڵگرییەهە زگﺎده یزۆرﺑە نلایە لە. رنﺎچێتده
 ردنﯽﺑسەﺑە دﻭای ،ﻭهﺑﻭیە نزیك رگمە لە ﻭهكەﺑۆمﺑە هۆیﺑە كە سﺎڵحیش ﺑدﻭڵاعە لﯽعە. نسﺗەره ﻭ حﻭمس كﻭﻭه كﺎنﯽشﺎره لە جێهێشﺗﻭه سﻭپﺎیﺎن
 نعﺎسە ەل ﺗﯽرۆكﺎیەسە كۆشكﯽ لە هێشﺗﺎ كرێتده رشﺗﯽرپەسە ﻭهكﺎنیەكﻭڕه نلایەلە كە كﺎنﯽهێزه ،ﻭهڕایەگە سعﻭدیە كﯽیەخۆشخﺎنەنە لە مﺎنگ سێ
 .زاڵن
 سﺗیﺎنده كﺎنهێرشە راﺑردﻭ هﺎریﺑە كﺎﺗێك. نﺎﺗۆﻭه نلایە لە رﺑﺎزیسە ردانﯽسﺗێﻭهده ﺑۆ سﻭپﺎس ﯽ،ﺗدۆڕاندﻭیە گشﺗﯽ كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە زافﯽﻗە ﺑێگﻭمﺎن
 زافﯽەﻗ كﺎنﯽهێرشە ﺑﺎڵانسﯽ خۆرئﺎﻭا كﺎنﯽفرۆكە. ﺑنغﺎزی شﺎری لە ئۆپۆزسیۆن دژی ﺑﻭ كداكﻭژییەشەره نجﺎمدانﯽئە ریﻭپەلە زافﯽﻗە پێكرد،
 .ترﻭنﺎدا نمەیە ﻭ سﻭریﺎ لە جۆره ملە راسیۆنێكﯽئۆپە هیچ نسﺎ،رهفە ریﺗﺎنیﺎﻭﺑە ئۆﺑﺎمﺎﻭ یئیداره ﺑۆ ﺑﻭ ردارسنﻭ لیﺑیﺎ ڵامﺑە. پﺎراسﺗﺑﻭ
 نمەیە یەﻭێن سۆمﺎڵ كﺎنﯽشێﻭیەپە ﻭ رایﯽهۆزگە ریشە. ﺑسێنێت رهپە خراپﺗر كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە كرێتده داﻭڵاﺗﺎنە ﻭلە خﻭێنرشﺗن یەﻭهئە مﺎنﺎی مەئە
 .كﺎنۆرسﺗییەﺗیر ﻭهكرده ﻭ درﻭاسێكﺎن ردانﯽسﺗێﻭهده ڵگەلە هﺎﻭكﺎت فﯽﺗﺎیە ریشە ﺑﺑینین، لﻭﺑنﺎن دﻭﺑﺎری مێژﻭی كرێتده سﻭریﺎش لە. ندهده پیشﺎن
 چﺎﻭیلە عێراق ﺗﯽ،نﻭسیﻭیە پۆست ﻭاشنﺗن لە دﻭاییﺎنە مﺑە ﺑۆش یئیداره كﺎنﯽسﺗراﺗیژییە پێشﻭی رپرسﯽﺑە كﻭرﻭههە. ﻭهمﺎنگێرێﺗەده عێراق ﺑۆ مەئە
 ﺑریﺎریﺎنداﻭه ﺎنﯽكیمﺎنەهﺎﻭپە ریكﺎﻭمەئە كە لێكنهۆكﺎرێگە نگەجە مئە كﺎنﯽﺗێچﻭه ئﺎزارﻭ. هێنﺎﻭه شكسﺗﯽ كﺎنیشداعێراﻗییە ریكﺎﻭمەئە كﺎنﯽپێشﺑینیە
 .ڕگەخسﺗە لیﺑیﺎدا لە ینیﻭهﺑە نیﻭه ﻭلێكﯽهە ئۆﺑﺎمﺎش یكەئیداره ﻭ ندهنە نجﺎمئە سﻭریﺎ لە رﺑﺎزیسە ردانﯽسﺗێﻭهده
 ﻭەكدڕنده دیكﺗﺎﺗۆره. ﺑن یهﺎﻭشێﻭه خﻭازنهیﻭاده ڕاستنﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽخۆرهە كﺎنﯽﺑییەرهعە ﻭڵاﺗە لە زۆرێك سﻭریﺎﻭ كە یەﻭڵاﺗە ﻭئە عێراق ندهرچەهە
 یكەڕهشە نیمچە. داده كﺎنﯽركﻭﺗكﺎرییەسە ﺑە ﻭامﯽردهﺑە ﻭهمینەكە هۆزێكﯽ نلایە لە كە یكەڵاﺗەسەده كﻭرﻭههە ﺑﻭن، ﻭن چﺎﻭ رﺑەلە یكەﻭادهخﺎنە
 ﺎریشج ندێكهە ﻭ دیمﻭكراسﯽ نگدانﯽده یرێگەلە كﺎنیﺎنجیﺎﻭازییە حﻭكمﯽ عێراق كﺎنﯽجیﺎﻭازه ﺗیره ﻭهۆزه ﻭﻭایە نﻭسﺗﻭ كﻭﻭه رﻭﺑەمەلە سﺎڵ پێنج
 كﯽیەﻭهشێﺑە مﺗركە ڵكﺎنێكﯽخە ،كردﻭه داگیر كﺎنیﺎنﻭاڵەهە ردێریسە كﺎننﺎكﺎﻭهلە هێرشە هێشﺗﺎ ندهرچەهە. ﻭهﺗەحمەزه ﻭ سﻗﻭر دانﻭسﺗﺎنﯽ یرێگەلە
 .سﻭریﺎ یﺎن كسیكۆمە ڵگەلە راﻭردﺑە ﺑە نﺎﻭچﻭنلە عێراﻗدا لە ﺗﻭندﻭﺗیژ
 رﻗﺎڵﯽسە ﻭڵاﺗە ﻭئە. ﻭهمێنیﺗەده ڕاستنﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽخۆرهە ﺑۆ ﺑﺎش هێزێكﯽ لقﺎعیدهئە دﻭژمنﯽ ﻭ ریكﺎمەئە یمﺎنﯽهﺎﻭپە ﺑە عێراق كە یەﻭهئە گرنگە یﻭهئە
 یﺎنەدﻭای مﺑە. ﻭهﺑمێنێﺗە عێراﻗدا لە داهﺎﺗﻭ سﺎڵﯽ ریكﺎمەئە پێكردنﯽ شقمە هێزێكﯽ كردﻭه داﻭای ﻭ دۆلاره ملیﺎر 21 ﺑﺎیﯽ كە ریكﺎمەئە لە كەچە كڕینﯽ
 .ئێران یندینخﺎنەﺑە لە ریكیدامەئە هﺎﻭڵاﺗﯽ دﻭ ئﺎزادكردنﯽ ﺗﯽیﺎرمە عێراق
 ت،رێﺑە ڕێﻭهﺑە یكەمﺎڵە ﺗﻭانﯽ چۆن نیشﺎدا یﻭهئە حسین دامسە. ریكﺎﻭهمەئە نلایە لە رﻭیدا ﻭهكەﻭڵاﺗە داگیركردنﯽ نجﺎمﯽئە لە شﺗﺎنە ﻭئە مﻭهە
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 مﻭهە ڵگەلە. 1991 سﺎڵﯽ لە شیعە هﺎﻭڵاﺗیﺎنﯽ ركﻭﺗكردنﯽسە ﺑۆ كﺎنﯽكەپڕچە رههێلیكۆﺗە كﺎﺗێك ﺑﯽرهعە هﺎریﺑە كﺎنﯽڵدانەرهەسە یشێﻭهلە
 ﺑكﺎت، گﺎررز ﺑﯽزهەمە ﻭ فﯽﺗﺎیە ﻗﻭڵﯽ ریشە لە عێراق ﺗﻭانﯽیدهنە شﺗێك هیچ ریكﺎمەئە كﺎنﯽهێزه ﺑﻭنﯽ ﺑێﺑە هێنﺎ، شكسیت یكەرژێمە شدامﺎنەئە
 .كﺎتده سﻭریﺎ لە شرههە ئێسﺗﺎ یﻭهئە كﻭه
 ﺗر ێكﯽسﺎل یﻭهئە پێش. رﻭﺑەمەلە سﺎلێك ڵگەلە راﻭردﺑە ﺑە ڕﻭخﺎﺗەده عێراق داگیركردنﯽ پێﻭیسﺗﯽ ﻭ ﻭاهﯽگە زیﺎﺗر ﺑﯽرهعە هﺎریﺑە كﻭرﺗﯽ،ﺑە
 .هﺎﺗﺑﺎ ﻭانیشئە رسەﺑە یەهە عێراﻗدا لە یﻭهئە كە نكەده ﻭهﺑە ستهە كﺎنسﻭریە رێت،ﺗێپە
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 سﻭریﺎ لە نﺎﻭخۆ ڕیشە لە رگرﺗنﺑە
 پۆست ﻭاشنﺗن
 رییدهحە كﺎرﻭان: ﻭهگلیزییەئین ه
 كﺎنﯽﺎنەئﺎشییی رییەمﺎﻭهجە خۆپیشﺎندانە ڵامﯽﻭه ﺑﺗﻭانن چۆن كە ﺑﻭن، ململانێدا لە كﺎنﯽیمﺎنەهﺎﻭپە ﻭ كﺎنكگرﺗﻭهیە ﺗەﻭلایە مﺎنگێك ندچە یمﺎﻭه ﺑۆ
 ۆﺑ دسەئە شﺎرﺑە نﺎچﺎركردنﯽ ﺑۆ داﻭه ﻭڵﯽهە رخۆسەلە زۆر كﯽیەهشێﻭﺑە ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ یكەئیداره. ﻭهنەﺑده رژێم كﺎنﯽﺗﻭندﻭﺗیژه رچەرپەﺑە سﻭریﺎﻭ
 لە ﻭیكردنپێشره" ﺗﯽسیﺎسە رﻗﺎڵﯽسە كەئیداره كﺎﺗێكدا لە ڵات،سەده جێهێشﺗنﯽﺑە ﺑۆ لێكردنﯽ داﻭا ﻭ مﺎرۆگە پﺎندنﯽسە ﺑە چﺎكسﺎزی نجﺎمدانﯽئە
 ڕشە ﻭیشئە: ﺑن كﺗییەحمەزه ندچە ﺗﻭشﯽ نزیكدا كﯽیەمﺎﻭه لە ﻭهرهده ﺗری كﺎنﯽڵاﺗدارهسەده هێزه ئۆﺑﺎمﺎﻭ یكەئیداره ئێسﺗﺎ چێتپێده. یە"دﻭاﻭه
 ﺑە ﯽپێﻭیسﺗ مەئە كﺎن،خشەخۆﺑە ﻭ تحكﻭمە سﻭپﺎی كﺎنﯽﻭهجیﺎﺑﻭه لە پێكهﺎﺗﻭن كە كﺎنكدارهچە سﻭپﺎی دﻭسەئە كﺎنﯽكراﻭهكشەپﺎشە هێزه نێﻭانلە
 .یەهە ریكﺎمەئە زیﺎﺗری كﯽرییەسﺗپێشخەده خێراﺗرﻭ هێزﺗر،ﺑە ڵامێكﯽﻭه
 ارانەكدچە ڵسﺗﯽرهەﺑە كە كردﻭه سﻭری كﯽیەرچﺎﻭهسە ﻭ دیﺑلۆمﺎت ندچە لێدﻭانﯽ ﺑە یﺎنئﺎمﺎژه راﺑردﻭ یفﺗەهە كﺎنﯽﻭاڵییەهە راپۆرﺗە لە كیەژمﺎره
 رۆژی لە ﻗﻭرسﯽ ڕێكﯽشە كە( راسﺗﺎن ﻭ مسحە كﺎنﯽشﺎرۆچكە لە كﻭﻭه ﻭێت،كەردهده ریكەخە اندانیشﺗﻭ رسە ﺑۆ دسەئە كﺎنﯽركێشییەسە دژی
 ﻭهەﺑ ئﺎمﺎژه ریكﯽمەئە نﺎسراﻭینە رپرسێكﯽﺑە زاری لە ﺗﺎیمز نیۆرك یرۆژنﺎمە. سﻭریﺎش ﺗﻭركیﺎﻭ سنﻭری نزیك هﺎرﻭههە ﻭ)رﻭدا ﺗێدا ممەسێشە
 دﻭ لە كێكیە رهە ﺑە ندیﺎنیﻭهپە ﻭانەلە سێككە دسە ندچە هﺎرﻭههە ،ﻭهﺗەجﺎﺑﻭنە ئﺎسﺎیش كﺎنﯽهێزه لە رﺑﺎزسە 000,01 ینزیكە ﺗﺎئێسﺗﺎ كە كﺎت،ده
 .كردﻭه ئﺎزاد رانﯽفسەئە یﻭهﺑزﻭﺗنە سﻭریﺎﻭ ئﺎزادی سﻭپﺎی كﺎنﯽكدارییەچە ﻭهﺑزﻭﺗنە
 ﺗﻭندﻭﺗیژی دن،سەئە یكەرژێمە هﺎﺗنﯽ كۆﺗﺎیﯽ هیﻭای ﺑە كە ﻭهشەسﺎنەكە ﻭئە نلایە لە تنﺎنەﺗە ،نییە نلێكرد پێشﻭازی جێگﺎی هێزانە مئە ﻭﺗنﯽركەده
 سﯽدیمﻭكرا-رۆپ كﯽیەﻭهﺑزﻭﺗنە ﺑە یﻭهئە ﻭ خﻭلقێنێتده ﻭهﺗەحكﻭمە نلایە لە زیﺎﺗر یدرندانە ركﻭﺗكﺎریسە ،ﻭهپێشە ریزی هێنێﺗەده ﻭﺗﻭندره سﺎنﯽكە
 ردانﯽﺗێﻭهسده شمەئە عێراق، ﻭ لﻭﺑنﺎن كﻭﻭه دراﻭسێﯽ ﻭڵاﺗﺎنﯽ ﺑۆ ﻭهﺑگﻭازرێﺗە كرێتده سﻭریﺎ، لە رێكشە رهە. ﺗﺎیفﯽ ڕیشە ﺑۆ گۆرێتده نﺎسراﻭه
 پێدا، یئﺎمﺎژه ممەشە دﻭ رۆژی ریكﺎمەئە یﻭهرهده ﺗﯽزارهﻭه راﻭێژكﺎرێكﯽ كﻭه ڵامﺑە ئێران، مﻭشیﺎنهە پێش هێنێت،ده خۆیدا دﻭایﺑە كﯽرهده
 ڵكﯽەخ ررامﺑەﺑە سﻭریﺎ رژێمﯽ كﺎنﯽﻭامەردهﺑە ﺗﻭندﻭﺗیژییە لە خۆپﺎراسﺗن ﺑۆ" كەیەﻭهدانە ڵامﻭه كﻭﻭه كﺎنڵدراﻭهرهەسە ﺗﺎزه كدارییەچە ﻭهﺑزﻭﺗنە
 ."كﺎنئﺎشﺗیخﻭازه خۆپیشﺎندانە ﻭ ﺑێﺗﺎﻭان
 كە یەﻭهەئ كەپرسیﺎره ڵامﺑە م،ڵەﻗە داﺗەده نﺎﻭخۆ ریشە ڵگیرسﺎنﯽهە رپرسﯽﺑە ﺑە دسەئە كﺎﺗێك كﺎتده درﻭست ﻭ راست كﺎرێكﯽ ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ یكەئیداره
 مﺑە كە سﻭریﺎ، ئۆپۆزسیۆنﯽ رسەخسﺗنە فشﺎر كﻭﻭه ن،هە ئﺎشكرا ﺗﺎیﯽرهسە نگﺎﻭێكﯽهە ندچە. هﺎﻭه شﺗێكﯽ ﺑە تﺑﺎرهسە ﺑكرێت چﯽ ﺗﻭانرێتده
 هﺎﻭكﺎری سﻭریﺎ كﺎنﯽدراﻭسێ ﻭڵاﺗە پێﻭیسﺗە. نﺑﻭڵسﺗەئە لە داهﺎﺗﻭ یﻭهكۆﺑﻭنە لە ﺗﻭندﻭﺗیژی یﻭهﺗكردنەره ﺑۆ پێكهێنﺎ، نیشﺗمﺎنﯽ نێكﯽنجﻭمەئە اییﺎنەدﻭ
 ﻭئە ۆﺑ ئﺎرام كﯽیەنﺎﻭچە ندچە رگەئە لێﺑگرێت یﺎنرێگە رانەشە ﻭلە ندێكهە یەﻭانەلە. یكﺎتده ﺗﻭركیﺎ كﻭرﻭههە سﺗێنن،ﺑﻭه رژێم ﺑۆ رﺑﺎزیسە
 .ﺑكرێت داﺑین عیراق یﺎن ﺗﻭركیﺎ كﺎنﯽسنﻭره درێژایﯽﺑە كردﻭه رایﺎن رژێم ﺗرسﯽ لە یسﻭریﺎنە
 جیهﺎنﯽ نلایە لە رﺑﺎزیسە ردانﯽسﺗێﻭهده. دسەئە یكەرژێمە رﻭخﺎنﯽ لە ﺑێت ﺑریﺗﯽ نﺎﻭخۆ ریشە دانﯽرﻭنە ﺑۆ رێگە نهﺎﺗە یەﻭانەلە كۆﺗﺎییدا، لە
 رگەﺑخﺎﺗە ﺗﻭندﺗر ﻭڵێكﯽهە ﻭ لێﺑهێنێت ﻭاز ﻭهپشﺗە لە سﺗپێكردنده ﺗﯽسیﺎسە ﺗﻭانێتده كﺎنكگرﺗﻭهیە ﺗەﻭلایە ڵامﺑە نﺎهێنێت، دیﺑە ئﺎمﺎنجە مئە كﯽرهده
 ﻭركیﺎﺗ هﺎرﻭههە ﻗﻭرس، مﺎرۆیگە پﺎندنﯽسە ﺑۆ ﺑﯽرهعە یەجﺎمیع ﻭ چین رﻭسیﺎ، رسەﺑخﺎﺗە فشﺎر ﺗﻭانێتده كەئیداره. دسەئە رسە فشﺎرخسﺗنە ﺑۆ
 جددیﺑە ﺗﺎئێس كە ریكﺎمەئە ﺑۆ ﺑێتده ئﺎسﺎنﺗر زۆر. ﺑكﺎت داﺑین كﺎنئﺎﻭاره ﺑۆ پﺎرێزگﺎری ﻭ ﺑپچرێنێت داكەرژێمە ڵگەلە ندییﻭهپە ﺑكﺎت نﺎچﺎر
 .كﺎتده درﻭسﺗﯽ ﺗﻭند نﺎﻭخۆی رێكﯽشە كە ﺑكﺎت داەیرانﺎنﻗە ﻭئە ڵگەلە ڵەمﺎمە یﻭهلە ﺑكﺎت خۆی یڵەمﺎمە
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 ﺑكﺎت ﻗسە سﻭریﺎ رسەلە اشكﺎﻭیڕﺑە ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ پێﻭیسﺗە
  نیﻭز یلﯽده ﻭێست میﺗرۆ
 لﯽعە شێخ ﻭالﯽ: ﻭهئینگلیزییە لە
 ﻭهكﺎنەﻭﺗەمزگەلە جﻭمعە نﻭێژی پﺎش سﻭریﺎ هﺎﻭڵاﺗیﺎنﯽ ئﺎزار، مﺎنگﯽ دﻭای كﺎنﯽینییەهە زۆریرههە یزۆرﺑە كﻭه راﺑردﻭش ینﯽهە
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 .كﺎنﻗﺎمەشە رسە رژانە یﺎن،كەرهركﻭﺗكەسە ﺗەحكﻭمەلە ریفۆرم كیەزنجیره داﻭاكﺎری سﺗﯽﺑەمەﺑە
 .ﻭهﺑﻭنە رانخۆپیشﺎنده ڕﻭیرﻭﺑە زیندﻭ یگﻭللـە ﻭ فرمێسكڕێژ گﺎزی ﻭ ككﻭﺗەﺑە سﻭریﺎ كﺎنﯽمنییەئە هێزه كراده ڕﻭانچﺎﻭه كﻭه كﺗﻭمت
 ﻭئە مڵێندرێت،خەده نﯽدهمە سﯽكە 007 لە زیﺎﺗرﺑە كﻭژراﻭن كﺎن،زاییەنﺎڕهﺑە نﺎنكۆﺗﺎییهێ ﺑۆ كﺎنزۆكەنە ﻭڵەهە یمیﺎنەلە یسﺎنەكە ﻭئە یژمﺎره
 ."ﺑڕﻭا پێﻭیسﺗە دسەئە شﺎرﺑە سﻭریﺎ رۆكﯽسە: "یەمەئە ﻭیشئە ﺑﻭه ڵاڵەگە شﺗدا كیەلە نهﺎﺗە كﺎنیﺎنداﻭاكﺎرییە كە یزاییەنﺎڕه پۆلەشە
 ﺎفﯽم ری،ﻭهەجە كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە ﺑﯽ،رهعە ﻭڵاﺗﺎنﯽ یڵەكۆمە ﻭ دراﻭسێ ﻭڵاﺗﺎنﯽ زایﯽنﺎڕه رﺑﺎریسە خۆی یكەلەگە دژیلە دسەئە كﺎنﯽدڕنده ﺗﺎكﺗیكە
 .ﻭهندﻭﺗەسە دسەئە لە ﻭاییكردنﯽرمﺎنڕهفە
 مئە ڵامﺑە ركﻭﺗكردﻭه،سە ﺗری زایﯽنﺎڕه ندینچە ییداﻭارمﺎنڕهفە سﺎڵ 04 یمﺎﻭهلە دسەئە خێزانﯽ ﺑكﺎت، ركﻭتسە زاییەنﺎڕه مئە ﺑﺗﻭانێت نگەره ﻭئە
 ڵاتسەده ەل ﻭاز دسەئە ئێسﺗﺎ رگەئە ﺑۆیە ﺑكﺎت، چۆڵ ڵاتسەده ﺑێتده نﺎچﺎر كۆﺗﺎییدالە ﺗﺎ داتڵدههە رسە ﺗر زایﯽنﺎڕه ﺑكﺎت، ركﻭتسە شزاییەنﺎڕه
 .ﺑێتده ﺑﺎشﺗر خﻭێن، لافﺎﻭی لە رێگرﺗن ﻭ كەﻭڵاﺗە ﺑۆ ﻭائە ﺑهێنێت
 زیﺎﺗر ێككﺎﺗ مﻭهەلە ئێسﺗﺎ چێتپێده هﺎﻭكﺎت كرێت،دیدهﺑە ﺑهێنێت، ڵاتسەدهلە ﻭاز دسەئە یﻭهئە ﺑۆ راشكﺎﻭ داﻭاكﺎری ﺑﻭنﯽنە ئۆﺑﺎمﺎدا یكەئیدارهلە
 ﻭداﻭپێش كﺎنﯽﻭڵﻭێسﺗەهە ڵگەلە ﻭﺗۆیئە كﯽییەجیﺎﻭاز ڵامﺑە هﺎندراﺑێت، دسەئە دژیلە ،ﻭهرهده زیریﻭه كلنﺗۆن هیلاری نلایەلە سپﯽ كۆشكﯽ
 .ﺑهێنێت ڵاتسەده لە ﻭاز دسەئە پێﻭیسﺗە كە یﻭهئە رسەلە نیە جددی ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ كە یﺑڕﻭایە ﻭئە ﺑگﺎﺗە سﻭریﺎ ﺗﯽحكﻭمە نگەره كەیەشێﻭهﺑە
 گﺎرنﯽ یجە یڕێگەلە ﻭیشئە ،یشﺗﻭهگەنە پێﯽ ﺗﺎئێسﺗﺎ كە ﻗۆنﺎغێك ﺗەیشگە سﻭریﺎ دژیلە سپﯽ كۆشكﯽ ڵﻭێسﺗﯽهە راﺑردﻭدا یفﺗەهە كۆﺗﺎیﯽلە
 .راﺑردﻭ مﺎنگﯽ پێنجﺑە تﺑﺎرهسە ﺑﻭ گرنگ ﻭ ﻭیستنەڵگەﺑە لێدﻭانێكﯽ كە ﺑﻭ ﻭهﺑێژییەﻭﺗە
 ."ﺑﻭده ﺑﺎشﺗر زۆر شﻭێنێكﯽ دسەئە ﺑێﺑە: "سﻭریﺎ كە یﺎندرایگە گﺎرنﯽ
 ﺑۆ دەسئە شﺎرﺑە رۆكسە چﺎنسﯽ ﻭایە پێمﺎن ئێمە: "ﻭت یﺎمنێرانﯽپەﺑە ریكﺎﻭهمەئە ﺗﯽرۆكﺎیەسە كﺎنﯽئﺎسمﺎنییە ههێز مﯽكەیە یﺑنكەلە گﺎرنﯽ
 ."رچﻭسەﺑە گۆڕانكﺎری ﺗیكردنﯽركردایەسە
 .ﺎنێتن گۆڕانكﺎری ﻭرهﺑە نگﺎﻭهەكە رایەئﺎشک ﻭ رﻭن كرد،جێنەجێﺑە ﻭانیشﯽئە كە دا ریفۆرمﯽ پﻭچﯽ ڵێنێكﯽﺑە ندچە كە یﻭهئە رﺑﺎریسە دسەئە
 .ﺗﺎراﻭگە كﺎﺗەرﻭﺑ خۆشیدا خﻭدی ﺗﯽلامەسە پێنﺎﻭلە ﻭ ﺑهێنێت ڵاتسەده لە ﻭاز ﺑكﺎت دسەئە لە داﻭا ئﺎشكرا ﻭ رﻭن كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ پێﻭیسﺗە ﻭاﺗەكە
 نیﻭز یلﯽده ﻭێست میﺗرۆ: رچﺎﻭهسە
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 نﺎكﺎت ڕشە ﺗﻭشﯽ عێراق سﻭریﺎ خێر،نە
 میمﯽﺗە ﻭادجە نیمەئە
 رییدهحە كﺎرﻭان: ﻭهئیگلیزییە لە
. دﻭهسﺗﺎنﻭه سﻭریﺎ رۆكﯽسە دیسەئە شﺎرﺑە ﺑۆ خۆی پشﺗیﻭانﯽ دﻭاییﺎنە مﺑە سﻭریﺎ كﺎنﯽشێﻭیەپە ڵگەلە هﺎﻭكﺎت عێراق ﺗﯽحكﻭمە
 شیعە زاڵﺑﻭی رژێمﯽ رﻭخﺎنﯽ كﺎنﯽكراﻭه پێشﺑینﯽ نجﺎمەرهده لە ﺗرسیﺎن ﻗﻭڵ كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە عێراق كﺎنﯽشیعە لە زۆرێك كە راسﺗە ﻭهئە ،ندهرچەهە
 .یەهە شقدیمە لە بزهەمە
 ﻭ ژیﺗﻭندﻭﺗی ﻭ نﺑده هﺎن كﺎنسﻭننە ﻭ ستدهﺑگرنە داﻭڵاﺗە ﻭلە ڵاتسەده یەﻭانەلە كە كﺎنەﻭهﺗﻭندڕه سﻭننە لە شیعە ﺗرسﯽ كﯽ،رهسە كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە
 گۆڕان" :ﻭﺗﯽ رزرۆیﺗە ﺑۆ ﺑكﺎت ئﺎشكرا خۆی نﺎﻭی یستیﻭنە كە كﺎن،شیعە دارهﺗمەسیﺎسە لە كێكیە كﻭرﻭههە. نﺑكە رپﺎﺑە عێراﻗدا لە نﺎﻭخۆ ڕیشە
 گرن؟ڵدههە پﺎسﺎﻭ شﺗﺎنە مئە ئﺎیﺎ ڵامﺑە ،"گرنده ﻭڵاﺗدا خۆراﻭای شﯽﺑە رسەﺑە ستده كﺎنسﻭنە عێراق، ﺑۆ كێشە هۆی ﺑێﺗەده سﻭریﺎ لە
 سﺎڵﯽ ﻭاید كرد ﻭای چﯽكە ﻭهﺑكۆڵینە پرسیﺎره ﻭلە پێﻭیسﺗە ش،مەلە یشﺗنﺗێگە ﺑۆ. خێرنە: ڵێینده ﻭائە ﻭهینەﺑده مەئە ڵامﯽﻭه ﻭشە كیەﺑە رگەئە
 .رﻭﺑدات عێراﻗدا لە ﺗﻭندﻭﺗیژی لە رچﺎﻭﺑە داكشﺎنێكﯽ 7002
 لە شێكﺑە كهﻭ ﺗیرۆر ژهد ﺗﯽسﺗراﺗیژییە سﺗپێكردنﯽده ﺗﺎیرهسە ﻭ ریكﺎمەئە كﺎنﯽهێزه یژمﺎره زیﺎدﺑﻭنﯽ كە كﺎتده ﻭهﺑە ئﺎمﺎژه گشﺗﯽ ﺑیرﻭﺑۆچﻭنﯽ
 ۆرهج مئە ،ندهرچەهە. كەكدارییەچە گرﻭپە دژی كﺎنسﻭننە یﻭهڕانەڵگەهە ﻭلقﺎعیدهئە ﺑێهێزكردنﯽ پشت لە ﺑﻭن كﯽرهسە هۆكﺎری" كەﺗرسییەمە"
 ێراقع كﺎنﯽنﺎﻭخۆییە رهفﺎكﺗە رﻭكﺗەئە گرنگﯽ یﻭهمﺑﻭنەكە ﻭ ریكﺎﻭهمەئە سﻭپﺎی نلایە لە كەیﺎرییە زۆری گۆڕانێكﯽ ﺑە ئﺎمﺎژه نگﺎندنەڵسەهە
 ریشەلە كە كردﺑﻭﻭهﺑە دركیﺎن 6002 كۆﺗﺎیﯽ پێش چﻭنكە رگێرا،ﻭه كﺎنﻭهﺗﻭندڕه ملیشیﺎ دژی خۆیﺎن رﻭی كﺎنسﻭننە كدارهچە راسﺗیدا،لە. كﺎتده
 .كرادهلێ پﺎراسنﺗیﺎن ﻭهزیرانەﻭه رۆكسە مﺎلیكﯽ نﻭری نلایە لە ﻭانئە دا،كﺎﺗە ﻭلە. چﻭنده دۆڕاندن ﻭرهﺑە غداﺑە لە كﺎنشیعە میلشیﺎ دژی فﯽﺗﺎیە
 لە پێشﻭ عسﯽﺑە رژێمﯽ ندامﺎنﯽئە لاﺑردنﯽ یپرۆسە لە ﺑﻭ ﺑریﺗﯽ 3002 دﻭای سﻭننە كﺎنﯽﺗﻭندﻭﺗیژییە ندنﯽسەرهپە لە كﯽرهسە هۆكﺎری ﻭﺗرێتده
 كﺎﺗﯽ ڵاﺗﯽسەده رۆكﯽسە ریﺑریمە پۆڵ ئﺎشكراكﺎنﯽ ﻭڵەهە لە زیﺎﺗر مشئە. ﺗﺎزه ﺗﯽحكﻭمە لە كﺎنسﻭننە لاﺑردنﯽ یپرۆسە ﻭرهﺑە تحكﻭمە
 درێژ رریمەﺑ ﺑۆ مﺎننجەپە ئﺎسﺎنﯽﺑە ﺗﻭانینده ،مەلە ﺗێرﻭانین ﺑە. پێكرا سﺗﯽهە كۆن یسﻭننە عێراﻗﯽ سﻭپﺎی هێشﺗنﯽنە ﺑۆ عێراق لە یمﺎنﺎنهﺎﻭپە
 لە كﺎنیداﺑریﺎره لە رﺑریمە ،كردﻭه ﺗێﺑینﯽ كۆكﺑێرن پﺎﺗریك خۆ،رﺑەسە نﻭسﯽرۆژنﺎمە كﻭرﻭههە ڵام،ﺑە. یەكﻭشنده ڵەهە ﻭئە نجﺎمدانﯽئە ﺑە ینكەﺑ
 .ﻭهنەەﺑك پڕ خۆیﺎن كﺎنﯽرﺑﺎزهسە ﺑە عێراق نﻭێﯽ كﺎنﯽسﻭپﺎییە هێزه یﺎنﻭیستده كە كرالێده پﺎڵپشﺗﯽ كﺎنكﻭرده ﻭشیعە دارهﺗمەسﺎیسە نلایە
 نێكلایە هیچ رێكدا،شە مﻭهە لە. سﻭننە كﺎنﯽﺗرسییەمە ﻭ ﺗﻭندﻭﺗیژی هێزﺑﻭنﯽﺑە لە ﺑﻭنە هۆكﺎرێك نیﺎﺗە ﺑە سﻭننە لادانﯽ یپرۆسە ،ندهرچەهە
 زۆرینە كﺎنسﻭننە ﺑﻭایەده دا،ﺗەحﺎڵە ملە. یكەدﻭژمنە شكﺎندنﯽ ۆﺑ نییە ﺑﺎشﯽ چﺎنسێكﯽ ﺑێتنە دڵنیﺎ رگەئە نﺎدات نجﺎمئە دﻭژمنكﺎرییﺎنە یﻭهكرده
 .نﺎﻭخۆدا فﯽﺗﺎیە رێكﯽشە لە ﺑهێنن كﺎنشیعە ﺑە شكست ﺑﺗﻭانن یﻭهئە ﺑۆ ﺑﻭنﺎیە
 مكە ﺑە یﺎنكﺎنﺑیﺎنیە رهرافەدیمۆگ كﺎنسﻭننە ﺑەرهعە زۆرجﺎر كﺎﺗێك كراﺑﻭ،پێﻭه رۆیﯽزیﺎده عێراق داگیركردنﯽ پێش" سﻭننە یزۆرینە" یﺑیرۆكە
 هۆیﺑە كﯽشێﺑە كﺎنسﻭننە نﺎﻭلە ﺗەﺑﺎﺑە مئە یڵەهە یشﺗنﯽﺗێگە. ﺑﻭننە گرانەخنەره نهﺎﺗە ﺗﺎﻭﺑﺎركردنﺎنە مئە. كردده ﺗﺎﻭانﺑﺎر كﺎنسﻭننە ژمﺎردنﯽهە
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 07 مﯽحﻭك هۆیﺑە ﺑﻭ شیعە یزۆرینە لە جیﺎخﻭازی ﺑە سﺗكردنهە نجﺎمﯽرهده رﺑەلە ﺗریشﯽ شێكﯽﺑە ﺑﻭ، ﻭهحسێنە دامسە رژێمﯽ كﺎنﯽندهپرﻭپﺎگە
 .مینەكە یسﻭننە یسﺎڵە
 یﻭهﻗینەﺗە مەئە. كﺎنشیعە ملیشیﺎ رچﯽرپەﺑە ڵدانﯽرهەسە هۆی ﺑﻭه ،ﻭههۆیە مﺑە زۆر كﯽﻗﻭرﺑیﺎنیە یﻭهﻭﺗنەكە ﻭ كﺎنشیعە رسە ﺑۆ ﻭامردهﺑە هێرشﯽ
 سﻭننە - شیعە نﺎﻭچە راگرﺗنﯽسەسﺗﺑەده لە ﺑﻭ ﺑریﺗﯽ ردﻭكیﺎنهە ئﺎمﺎنجﯽ. غداﺑە شﺎری ڕاسﺗﯽنﺎﻭه لە هێنﺎ خۆیدا دﻭایﺑە دا6002 لە نﺎﻭخۆی ریشە
 .ﺗر یكەنەلایە لە یﺎنﻭهپﺎكردنە ﻭ ختپﺎیﺗە كﺎنﯽڵەﺗێكە
 لە ﻭای مەئە. ﻭهنەﺑكە پﺎك سﻭننە لە كﺎنڵەﺗێكە نﺎﻭچە ﺗﻭانیﺎن كﺎنشیعە یلیشیﺎم ،ﻭهﺗەحكﻭمە نلایە لە پﺎڵپشﺗیكردنیﺎن ﻭ یﺎنژمﺎره زۆری هۆیﺑە
. ردك رایﺎن سﻭریﺎ ﻭ نردهئە ﻭرهﺑە یﺎن رمﻭك،یە كﻭﻭه ،ﻭهنەﺑخە رێك خۆیﺎن كﺎننشینە زۆرینە سﻭننە نﺎﻭچە لە ندێكهە لە كرد كﺎنسﻭننە گرﻭپە
 نجﺎمدائە ﻭﺗنﯽچﺎﻭپێكە سﻭننە كﺎنﯽكدارییەچە ركردهسە لە زۆر كﯽیەژمﺎره ڵگەلە رلێكۆڵە ریریپۆرﺗە ﻭ نﻭسرۆژنﺎمە ن،رۆز نیر دا،ﻭڵاﺗە دﻭ ملە
 .غداﺑە لە دۆڕاندﻭه كﺎنشیعە میلیشیﺎ دژی یﺎنكەڕهشە ﻭانئە نﺎ داﻭهﺑە دانیﺎن كە
: پێهﺎت كۆﺗﺎیﯽ گشﺗﯽ كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە ﻭههۆكﺎره مﺎنهە هۆیﺑە 8002 ﺑۆ 7002 كﺎنﯽسﺎڵە رێژایﯽدﺑە عێراق نﺎﻭخۆی ﺑﯽزهەمە ڕیشە ،ﻭهرئەﺑەلە 
 ندی،نﺎﻭه ﺗﯽحكﻭمە ﻭ كﺎنشیعە سﺗﯽده رسەلە زۆرﺗر ﺗێچﻭنﯽ لە ﺗرسیﺎن هۆیﺑە. سﺗدادهلە ڕكردنشە ﺑۆ كﺎنﯽخﻭاسﺗە نێكلایە رﻭنﺗر، كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە
 دژی عێراق ئﺎسﺎیشﯽ كﺎنﯽهێزه ﻭ یمﺎنﺎنهﺎﻭپە كﺎنﯽهێزه هﺎﻭكﺎریكردنﯽ لە ﺑریﺗییە رێگە نهﺎﺗە كە كردﻭهﺑە دركیﺎن كﺎنسﻭننە لە زۆر شێكﯽﺑە
 .عێراق یﻭهﺑزﻭﺗنە كﺎنﯽرۆڵە درﻭسﺗﺑﻭنﯽ نﺑﺎرﻭئە یحﻭهسە هێزﺑﻭنﯽﺑە هۆی ﺑﻭه مەئە. لقﺎعیدهئە
 ەك كردﻭه ﻭهﺑە سﺗﯽهە زیرانﻭه رۆكسە. درسە دامﻭﻗﺗە ﺑە رسە هدیمە سﻭپﺎی كﻭﻭه كﺎنﯽشیعە ﺎمیلیشی لە پشﺗكردن لە ﺑێتده ﻭامردهﺑە مﺎلكﯽ
 ﯽسﺗﺑەمەﺑە یكەڵاﺗەسەده كﺎرهێنﺎنﯽﺑە ﺑۆ كﺎتده خۆش ﺑۆ رێگﺎی شمەئە ی،كەﺗەحكﻭمە رسەلە نییە شەرههە سﻭننە كﺎنﯽﺗرسییەمە یپﺎشمﺎﻭه
 .غداﺑە ریﻭرﻭﺑەده ﺑﺎشﻭرﻭ كﺎنﯽشیعە لیشیﺎمی شكسﺗپێهێنﺎنﯽ
 سﻭننە ﺑۆ كﺎنرهسﺎﺗﺑﺎكﺎره نجﺎمەرهده لە ﺗێڕﻭانین ﺑە. لاﻭازه رێكﯽگەئە سﻭریﺎ كﺎنﯽشێﻭیەپە رۆشنﺎیﯽ ژێرلە عێراق لە فﯽﺗﺎیە ﺗری ڕێكﯽشە ﺗرسﯽمە
 ۆﺑ. ﺑن زاڵ كﺎنداشیعە رسەﺑە نﺎﻭخۆدا ﺗری ڕێكﯽشەلە نﺎﺗﻭانن یﻭهﺑە گﻭزارنسﻭپﺎس عێراق كﺎنﯽسﻭننە ﺑەرهعە ،6002 كﺎنﯽنﺎﻭخۆییە ڕهشە لە
 یرۆسەپ عێراﻗدا لە زۆرینە یشیعە كە یەﻭاﻗیعە ﻭئە ﻗﺑﻭڵكردنﯽ ﺑۆ شمەئە. مﺎﻭهنە ﺑﻭنﯽ مینەكە حﻭكمﯽ یﻭهڕانەگە یﺑیرۆكە ،ڵگﺎكەكۆمە یزۆرﺑە
 .ﺑﺎتده ڕێﻭهﺑە كەﻭڵاﺗە سیﺎسﯽ
 لﻭﺑنﺎنﯽ سﺗﺎری یلﯽده: رچﺎﻭهسە




 ﺑﯽرهعە جیهﺎنﯽ ﻭایپێشە ﺑە ﺑﺑێت كە دایەﻭهئە ﻭڵﯽهە لە ﺗﻭركیﺎ زیرانﯽﻭه رۆكسە
 كۆكﺑۆرن پﺎﺗریك
 یسﺑە: ﻭهئینگلیزییە لە
 
 داتده وڵهە و درا نجامئە تیا شۆڕشیان كە كاتده وڵاتانە وئە شتیگە ردۆگانئە
 شمەئە ،ﻭهگرێﺗەده ﻭڵات سێ كە ردانێكسە لە میسر ێشﺗەگە ردۆگﺎنئە یبﺗە بجەره ﻭ ﺗﻭركیﺎ زیرانﯽﻭه رۆكسە 1102/9/21 دﻭێنﯽ
 لە كﺎنﺎنەمﻭسڵم ﻭڵاﺗە نﺎﻭ لە كﯽرهسە هێزی ﺑە ﺑﺑێت كە داتده ﻭڵهە ﻭ كﺎتده ﺗﻭندﺗر ئیسرائیل ررامﺑەﺑە خۆی ڵﻭێسﺗﯽهە ﺗﻭركیﺎ كە كﺎﺗێكدایە لە
 .فریقﺎئە ﺑﺎكﻭری ﻭ ڕاستنﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽرۆژهە
 ﺗەكﻭمەح ﺗﻭانیﺎن یﻭهئە دﻭای ﻭڵاﺗﺎنە ﻭئە ﺑۆ ﺗﻭركیﺎ هﺎﻭپشﺗﯽ نیشﺎندانﯽ ﺑۆ كﺎتده لیﺑیﺎ ﻭ سﺗﻭن ﻭڵاﺗﯽ ردﻭهە ردانﯽسە ردۆگﺎنئە میسر، دﻭای
 ﺑۆ ﺑێت یلێكمۆد كرێده ئیسلامﯽ نیمچە ﻭ دیمﻭكراﺗﯽ ﺗﻭركیﺎی ئێسﺗﺎی هێزی ﺑە رژێمﯽ. ﺑیدارهعە هﺎریﺑە لە ﺑڕﻭخێنن كﺎنیﺎننەدرێژخﺎیە پۆلیسیە
 .كەﻭڵاﺗە رسێهە ﺗﯽحكﻭمە
. ﺑﯽرهعە ﺎنﯽجیه لە ﻭهخﺎﺗەده نزیكﯽ ﺑﻭ ﺗﻭركیﺎ نزیكﯽ یمﺎنێكﯽهﺎﻭپە دﻭاییە مئە ﺗﺎهە كە ئیسرائیل ڕمەلە ردۆگﺎنئە ئﺎمێزیخنەره ﻭ ﺗﻭند ڵﻭێسﺗﯽهە
 ئیسرائیل ﻭ كمﻭﺑﺎره پﺎش میسری نێﻭان ﯽﺗدﻭژمنﺎیە ئﺎسﺗﯽ كە ﺑﻭ رﻭداﻭ دﻭا راﺑردﻭ یفﺗەهە كۆﺗﺎیﯽ لە ﻗﺎهیره لە ئیسرائیل یﺑﺎڵﻭێزخﺎنە سﻭﺗﺎندنﯽ
 كﺎﺗێكدا لە داەن كﺎنﯽسﺗینیەلەفە كﯽﺗیەیﺎرمە هیچ ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ رۆكسە كە یەﻭهئە ﺑیدارهعە جیهﺎنﯽ لە ﺑڵاﻭ ﺑیرﻭﺑۆچﻭنﯽ دامەئە ڵگەلە هﺎﻭكﺎت. داتده نیشﺎن
 .كەنﺎﻭچە لە ریكﺎمەئە كگرﺗۆكﺎنﯽیە ﻭڵاﺗە ڵﯽرۆ لاﻭازﺑﻭنﯽ هۆی ﺑﻭه شمەئە كرد، ئیسرائیلﯽ ﻭاﻭیﺗە پشﺗگیری
" ڕهڕمەمە مﺎڤﯽ" شﺗﯽكە رسە لە ﺗﻭركﯽ سﯽكە نۆ كﻭشﺗنﯽ كﺎﺗﯽ لە پﺎرسﺎڵ كە گﻭﺗﯽ ردۆگﺎنئە میسر، ﻭرهﺑە ﻭﺗنﯽڕێكەﺑە پێش ﻭﺗنێكداچﺎﻭپێكە لە
 ئﺎرامﺗر كە اد ﺑڕیﺎری ڵامﺑە ،"ئیسرائیل ڵگەلە نگجە ﺑۆ ﺑێت كمﺎیەﺑنە كراده" لئیسرائی كۆمﺎندۆی سﺗﯽده رسە لە زهغە ﺑۆ كردﺑﻭ ﺑﺎر ﺗﯽیﺎرمە كە
 ﻭرهەﺑ كە كﺎتده ﺗﻭركﯽ یمرۆڤﺎنە ﺗﯽیﺎرمە كﯽشﺗیەكە رهە پﺎرێزگﺎری ﺗﻭركﯽ ریﺎیﯽده هێزی كە كرد ﻭهﺑە یئﺎمﺎژه كﺎﺗدا مﺎنهە لە ﺑكﺎت، فﺗﺎرره
 .داهﺎﺗﻭدا لە ﺑڕﻭات زهغە
". یكەسﺗەده ەﺑ یﺎریكردن لە كﺎتنە ڕۆیﯽزیﺎده رگەئە ﺑهێنێت سﺗﯽده ﺑە ﻭێتیەده كە یﻭهئە یزۆرﺑە كرێتده ﺗﻭركیﺎ" كۆمێنﺗﺎﺗۆرێك یﻗسە پێﯽ ەﺑ
 ئێسﺗﺎدالە ردۆگﺎنئە كﺎنﯽ،هﺎﻭكﺎره یﻗسە ﯽپێﺑە ڵامﺑە ،كەشﺗیەكە رسە هێرشكردنە نجﺎمﯽئە لە ئیسرائیلدا رسە ﺑە پﺎندﻭهسە سزای كەیەمﺎﻭه ﺗﻭركیﺎ
 ﺗەحكﻭمە ڵگەلە یەﻭانەلە چﻭنكە ،كردﻭه ﻗﺎزانجﯽ ﺑﯽرهعە هﺎریﺑە لە ﺗﻭركیﺎ. ﺑیكﺎت ﻭێتیەده كەیەمﺎﻭه كە هێنﺎﻭه زهغە ردانﯽسە ﺑڕیﺎری لە ﻭازی
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 پڕ ﺑۆشﺎییە ﻭئە كرێتده ﺗﻭركیﺎ هﺎرﻭههە .پێشﺗر كﺎنﯽﺗەحكﻭمە ڵگەلە ﺑﻭﺑێتهە ﺑﺎشﯽ یندیﻭهپە رگەئە ﺗﺎهە ﺑێت، گﻭنجﺎﻭ كﺎننﻭێیە دیمﻭكراﺗیە
 حﻭكمﯽ كﺎنﯽنجﺎمەرئەده لە یﺗﻭانیﻭهنە ئێسﺗﺎ ﺗﺎهە عێراﻗیش ﻭ ﺑﻭه درﻭست سﻭریﺎ ﻭ میسر كﻭه هێزی ﺑە ﻭڵاﺗﺎنﯽ ﺑێهێزﺑﻭنﯽ نجﺎمﯽئە لە كە ﻭهﺑكﺎﺗە
 .ﻭهڵﺑسﺗێﺗەهە رﻭیدا رژێمە ﻭئە رﻭخﺎنﯽ پﺎش یﻭندﻭﺗیژییەﺗ ﻭئە ﻭ ددامسە رژێمﯽ
 لە كﺎتﺑ نﺎﻭﺑژی ﻭیسﺗﯽ ﺗﻭركیﺎ ئێران، ﺗۆمیﯽئە یﻭزه پرۆگرامﯽ یكەیرانەﻗە كﺎﺗﯽ لە رﻭهﺎهە من،كە جدی دﻭژمنﯽ ﺗﻭركیﺎ ئێران، یﻭانەپێچەﺑە
 ێكﯽدﻭژمن ئێران ﻭ ﺗﻭركیﺎ ﻭڵاﺗﯽ ردﻭهە. كﺎنﻭرﻭپیەئە ﻭ ریكﺎمەئە كﺎنﯽكگرﺗﻭهیە ﻭیلاﺗە ﻭ ڕﻭانێده لێﯽ ﻭهگﻭمﺎنە ﺑە كە ئێران، رژێمﯽ نێﻭان
 ﯽپﺎرﺗ ریلاكﺎنﯽگە نلایەلە كە هێرشێكدا لە. ندهده نجﺎمئە ریلایﯽگە چﺎلاكﯽ ﻭامﯽردهﺑە ﺑە كە كﺎنەكﻭردیە یﺎخیﺑﻭنە ﻭیشئە ،یەهە شیﺎنهﺎﻭﺑە
 .ﺑﻭن ئﺎسﺎیش كﺎنﯽهێزه لە دﻭانیﺎن كە كﻭژران سكە 5 درا، نجﺎمئە ﺗﻭركیﺎ ڵاﺗﯽرۆژهە لە كﺎریهە ینﺎﻭچە لە KKP كﻭردسﺗﺎن كرێكﺎرانﯽ
 
 ێپ كۆﺗﺎیﯽ سﺗیﺎنئﺎگرﺑە كە یﻭهئە دﻭای كﻭشﺗﻭه ﺗﻭركیﺎ ئﺎسﺎیشﯽ كﺎنﯽهێزه لە سیﺎنكە 05 ینزیكە KKP ریلاكﺎنﯽگە راﺑردﻭدا یفﺗەهە ندچەلە
 لاﻭاز ەﺑ جۆرێك هیچ ﺑە ﻭێتنﺎیە یكەﺗەحكﻭمە ڵامﺑە ﻭهنیەدهمە ڵاﺗﯽسەده كۆنﺗرۆڵﯽ ژێر ﺑخﺎﺗە ﺗﻭركیﺎ سﻭپﺎی ﺗﻭانﯽ ردۆگﺎنئە رچﯽگەئە. هێنﺎ
 یﻭهﺗﺎكخسﺗنە ﺑۆ ﺑﺎرزانﯽ سعﻭدمە عێراق، كﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ رێمﯽهە رۆكﯽسە رسە خﺎﺗەده فشﺎر ڵكﻭﺑە ،KKP ڵگەلە كنگﺎریەرهﺑە رهە لە ﻭێترﺑكەده
 ەل داﻭای راﺑردﻭ یرۆژانە ملە غدادا،ﺑە ررامﺑەﺑە لە كنگیەهﺎﻭسە كﻭه ﻭێتده ﺗﻭركیﺎی كە ﺑﺎرزانﯽ ڕێزﺑە. عێراق كﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ چیﺎكﺎنﯽ لە KKP
 .ﺑهێنن كدارانەچە نگﺎریرهﺑە لە ﻭاز كە كرد پژاك ﻭ كەكەپە
 
 ﺑەزهەمە ﻭ كﺎنجیﺎﻭازه نەلایە نێﻭان لە ﺑكﺎت نﺎﻭﺑژی كرێتده چﻭنكە عێراﻗدا، سیﺎسﯽ پﺎنﯽگۆڕه لە ﺑگێڕێ هێزﺑە رۆڵێكﯽ ﺗﯽﺗﻭانیﻭیە ﺗﻭركیﺎ
 كۆنﺗراكﺗﯽ ﺗﻭركﯽ كﻭمپﺎنیﺎی كە كیەراده ﺑە گێڕێده شﻭرهگە ئﺎﺑﻭری رۆڵیكﯽ رﻭهﺎهە كﺎن،جیﺎﻭازه) ﻭهﺗەنە( ژادییەنە گرﻭپە ﻭ كﺎنجیﺎﻭازه
 .كردﻭه رﺑەسﺗەده شیﺎنسرهﺑە ﻭ غداﺑە زﺑڵﯽ یهﻭكۆكردنە
 
 یكەژێمەر ﻭاﺑێت پێﯽ ردۆگﺎنئە چﯽپێده كە كﺎن،خۆپیشﺎندانە ركﻭﺗكردنﯽسە رسە لە گرت دلئسەئە شﺎرﺑە سﻭریﺎ رۆكﯽسە لە یخنەره ردۆگﺎنئە
 نێلكۆلۆ لە ﻭهخۆجیﺎكردنەلە خۆﺑﻭ رسەلە زۆر ﺗﺎدارهسە لە ﺗﻭركیﺎ لیﺑیﺎ، لە شێﻭه مﺎنهەﺑە. ئێسﺗﺎی شێﻭازی رسە لە مكە لای نﺎﺑێت رزگﺎری
 هپﺎر ﺑە پێﻭیسﺗیﺎن كە داكﺎﺗە ﻭلە كرد كﺎنشۆڕشگێڕه ﺑە شپێشكە دۆلاری ملیۆن 003 ركسەیە ﻭهجیﺎكرده خۆی كە كﺎﺗﯽ ڵامﺑە زافﯽ،ﻗە رمەمﻭعە
 .لیﺑیﺎ لە ﺑینﺎسﺎزی رﺗﯽكە لە ﺑﻭههە یﻭرهگە رۆڵﯽ ﺗﻭركیﺎ. ﺑﻭ
 
 ﺗﻭركیﺎ ندیهﻭرژهﺑە لە مﻭهە كەنﺎﻭچە لە ریكﺎمەئە رۆڵﯽ لاﻭازﺑﻭنﯽ ﻭ ﺑﯽرهعە جیهﺎنﯽ كﺎنﯽدیمﻭكراﺗیە ڕینەراپە ﻭ ئیسرائیل یﻭهﺗﺎكخسﺗنە گشﺗﯽﺑە
 .ﺑێت ستده لە كﺎنﯽرﻭداﻭه نﺗرۆڵﯽكۆ یﻭهلە دﻭره هێشﺗﺎ ڵامﺑە ،زیﺎدﺑﻭندایە لە داكەنﺎﻭچە لە ژمﻭنﯽهە. ﺑﻭن
 ئیندپێندێنت: رچﺎﻭهسە




  باتڵدێردهو ههرهكوردستان به ڵهمابنه یحوكم
 3102/60/81
 ۆنرۆم یریكد
 ەحمەدئ ﯽحﺎج یدی: خﺎلینگلیزيیەوەئ لە
 
 ێمﯽرهە ختﯽيتەپﺎ ێریول. هەێبداتپ ڕید ڵدايەوهە لە كەۆرهخ یشكﯽﺗ كە ۆشیوهداپ یكەوشك نﺎوچە ێكﯽلم ،یوهنﺗە ێریولهە ینزم شﺎر مومژێكﯽﺗە
. ﺗﯽيەۆخ يﺎسﺎيﯽ ﯽو حوكم جێكردنێبەو ج يﺎسﺎدانﺎن ڵاﺗﯽسەده ێرسن هەخﺎوه كﺎت، كەده ڵەمﺎمە ۆخرﺑەسە ﺗێكﯽڵەوك دهوه يﺎﺗرز ێراقع ﯽكوردستﺎن
 كﺎنﯽیەكرهو ده ۆيﯽنﺎوخ سنوره ﯽمرجەسە ێرولهە وهيسﺎنە. دیﺎنداكﺎنرگەجلوﺑە ﺑە يوهدور يﺎنكەڵاﺗەو ڵایئﺎ ﯽنگره ێس وهيەشﺎنﺎزﺑە ﯽكﺎنرﺑﺎزهسە
 .ۆنترۆڵدايەك ێرژلە
 
 ێمەئ كداێكﺎﺗلە ،يیەنﺎچﺎر ێكﯽنگﺎوهە وهیﺎﺑونە. (جدايەيەكﺎ غدا لەﺑە لە یو كوشت و كوشتﺎره تیﺎسەو سو ئە ێراقع لە ۆيەخرﺑەسە ێرولنجﺎم هەرهده 
 لە يەهە ۆیهﺎﺗوچ كﯽۆمپﺎنیﺎيەك كە ڵايەﺑدوعە یوﺗە مەنﺎگﺎت) ئە یچهنگمﺎن ﺑەده ۆيە. ﺑيەغدا هەﺑە مﺎن لەرلەندام پەئە 523 نداممﺎن لەئە 95
و  داتێدهپ یێژهن) درﺑكە ۆمﺎن ﺑوهو ئەمەئە ێتﺑده يشداررانبەﺑە، لەوهو ئە مەئە ۆﺑ ينێدهﺗﺎن ئەپﺎره ڵێنده ێمﺎنپ یشەم. (هەێرداولهە یرگەنﺎوجە
 .)وهێنێتەك راﺑوردو ﺑمكﺎن وهشتە ێتو نﺎكر داوه ۆرمﺎنز كﯽیەﻗورﺑﺎن ێكداكﺎﺗ لە ،ينە ڵﻗبو مەكورد ئە یێمەئ ۆ: ﺑڵێتده
 
 ﯽه ﺗوانن ﺑەده كە ينژده ڵاﺗێكداو لە ێژودام لە مجﺎركەيە ۆﺑ ڕۆمئە كﺎندا، كەكورده لە ۆرێكر زسەﺑە ێشﺎوهك ڵﯽﺑﺎ ڵاﺑدوعە یستەست و نەم هەئە 
. ینیوهﺑ ۆوهخەﺑ یو ئﺎﺑور یﺎسﯽس ﻗﺎمگیریسە لە ﯽﺑﺎش ێكﯽكوردستﺎن ئﺎست وهنداوهكە مﯽكەيە ﯽنگجە لە ﯽوﺗنە ڵاﺗﯽو ينرﺗك ﺗﺎزهﺑزانن. وه ۆيﺎنﯽخ
 ﯽملەﺑە وت،نە یيﺎر. دهێیﺎندراوس ﯽكﺎنكورده راورد ﺑەﺑە ﺑە تيبەﺗﺎﺑە ،يەوهرزﺑونەﺑە رو لە يﺎنكەيەسﺎمﺎن و ئﺎﺑور ێراق،ع ﯽكﺎنكورده مجﺎركەيە ۆﺑ
 .ڵبڕيوههە یئﺎﺑور
 
 ڵاﺗیﺎنەسده كە كﺎنیە. ﺑﺎرزانوهكەيەڵەمﺎنهﺎ ﺑنەﺗە نيەلالە ڵاﺗەسەده ۆرخكﺎریﻗ شﯽكەۆكﺎرهه ،یەكوردستﺎندا پرشنگدار ن لە ێكموشتدا هەوهئە ڵگەلە 
 كﯽيەیﺎوازج ر، كەمگەستە كﯽوايەڕهرمﺎنفە ۆﺗەﺑ ﯽسعود ﺑﺎرزانمە ێمرهە ۆكﯽرسە ێراق،ع ێمﯽرژ دژ ﺑە یكدارچە یوهنگﺎرﺑونەرهﺑە ۆﺑ وهڕێتەگەده
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 .وهۆﺗەﺑ ڕويﺎنروﺑە ﯽﺑرهعە یهﺎرﺑە یۆﺗﺎلیتﺎريﺎنەﺗ ڵاﺗەسەو دهلە یەن
 
 مكراویستەس ﺑە ڵﯽندهگە
 ﺗﯽیرهشعە .ێراﻗداع ﺑو لە ێندام حسسە یێوههﺎوش یشﺑﺎرزان ڵێینﺑ نﺎ كە وهئە ،ۆشیوهاپد ﯽكﺎنو دوكﺎنە رمﺎنگەفە يوارید ﯽﺑﺎرزان یێنەو ێرداولهە لە 
راﺑوردودا  یدهسە فتﺎكﺎنﯽەكﺎن و حستەشە لە ﯽﺑﺎوك گرن كەسعود دهمە لە ێزر ڵكیشخە ێراﻗدا،ع یﺑﺎكور لە يەهە ۆيﺎنخ ێزیر ﯽﺑﺎرزان
 .كردده ێراقع ﺗﯽەڵوده دژ ﺑە ێكۆشﺎنﯽﺗ ﺗﯽيەركرداسە
 
 ﯽستدهرﺗنەگ ێگﺎیر كوردستﺎن لە يموكراﺗﯽد ﯽپﺎرﺗ ییەرمفە یرۆكەو چ. ئەینێتﺑده ۆوهخﺑە يﺎﺗرز یدرز ۆژر ﺑە ۆژر كەێزانەخ یێنەو ێتﺑ رچۆنهە
 مەدا. ئە1991 یكەينەرراپە لە زاندﺑە یﺎندامسە كﺎنﯽهێزو ه ينرراپە ﺑو كە ڵكخە وهﺗﺎ ئەره. (سەێتكرده ستﯽڵەرهەﺑە خشێنێتينەده ڵاﺗداسەده
 كەیەراست مەواو ﺑوﺑو) ئەﺗە ێكمو شتهە كە ينزكﺎن داﺑەشﺎخە دواﺗر لە ۆژدو ر رگەێشمەنﺎوشﺎردا. (پ لە ﺑچوكە ۆﺗێلێكﯽن هخﺎوه كە (ئﺎدار)ه یﻗسە
 .يبڕێترده ێرێتس ﺑوم كەكە ڵامﺑە يزانێت،ده ێكسمو كەهە
 
 ﯽشت شداريەرانبەﺑ و لە ێگرﺗنل خنەره ۆﺑ يەهە ﯽﺑچوك كﯽيەیكڵدانەكوردستﺎن چ يموكراﺗﯽد ﯽ. پﺎرﺗوهۆﺗەگرﺗ ێنﯽشو ۆرز ينرﺑرراده لە ﺗرس
 یرهر زنجسەلە پێندرا،ردا سەسەﺑە يندانﯽز ڵسﺎ 03و  یرامسﺎ، گنە ڵاﺗﯽو لە ۆستﺎﻗﺎدر، مﺎم يدسە ﯽمﺎلدا كە5002 مﯽكەيە ﯽكﺎنون . لەیرنﺎچێتﺑلە
مسﺎدا ەن ﺗﯽڵەوو ده ﯽمنستئە یفشﺎر ێرژلە ڵێكگرﺗبو. دواﺗر پﺎش سﺎ وهیەﺑﺎرزان نيەلالە ڵاتسەو ده یئﺎﺑور ۆرخكردنﯽﻗ لە یخنەره كە ێكوﺗﺎر
 .ئﺎزادكرا
 
و  ڵاتسەده نيەلالە ڵﯽندهگە یرﺑﺎرهده ینر نوسسەﺑو و لەنە يﺎنختەو ﺑەەشت عوسمﺎن ئردهو سە مەحەمﺎمە ۆرانﯽس نوسﺎنۆژنﺎمەر وهداخەﺑە
 كيەخنەت رهنﺎنە. ﺗەزانراوننە كﺎنیەراست ۆشمرو ﺗﺎ ئە ﺗﺎوانبﺎركردوه یﺗر ێكﯽسﺎنكە یكورد ڵاﺗﯽسەكوژران. ده گولە ﺑە ،وهيەكورد ﯽﺗحكومە
ك ن. وههر هﺎوﺑە ێتەﺑدر كەڵەنﺎكە ﯽرﺑﺎنداهﺎﺗو سە ۆژیر یوهۆئەﺑ سەﺑە ﯽﺑﺎرزان دژ ﺑە يۆنیدافزلەﺗە كﯽيەرنﺎمەﺑە لە وهنﺎسراوهنە ێكﯽسكە نيەلالە
 .وهۆزرێتەنﺎد كەﺗﺎوانبﺎره ێكیشمو جﺎرهە
 
 یﺎردمل 2 ێتەيشتبگە ﯽسعود ﺑﺎرزانمە ﯽسﺎمﺎن ێتكرده ندهزهمە دا،ەیوﺗنە ێنو ڵاﺗەم وئە یئﺎﺑور لە ییەﺑﺎرزان یشدارﺑە كﺎنیﺎرهستهە ﺗەﺑﺎﺑە لە كێكيە
 لە ۆنك چوه ێرێتنو دادگﺎ دهرهﺑە ﺗەو ﺑﺎﺑەئە ۆدواداچون ﺑﺑە ێكداكﺎﺗ. لەزانراوهكوردستﺎندا نە یئﺎﺑور لە شكەێزانەخ یشدارو ﺑەپﺎره ڕیو ﺑ ۆلارد
 ﯽﺎنكﺗﺎكە وﺗﯽڵسوكەهە ۆيەوﺗدا. ﺑنە ﯽﻗﺎچﺎخ ﺑردن ﺑە كرد لە ﯽﺑﺎرزان یڵەمﺎﺑنە ﯽﻗﺎزانج لە ﯽﺑﺎس ێكدگﺎ. كﺎﺗدا درا ﺑە ۆژنﺎمەر یۆژنﺎمەدا ر0102
 اێكدكﺎﺗ.......... لە یدوﺑە یشﺎر سعود لەمە ڕیكو ﯽنسور ﺑﺎرزاندا مە2102 لە نمونە ۆﺑن. ﺑوهرهده ڵامﺗﺎ وه ێنێتخولقده یﺎرپرس يﺎﺗرز ێزانەو خئە
سرور ﺗن و مەحكومە ۆریخموچە یﺎنردوكهە ﯽرمفە .......... ﺑە ،یەﺑﺎرزان یورهگە یكور كە يشسرورﺑو. مە یدارمفە ێكﯽشتگە لە ﯽﺑﺎوك ڵگە لە
. ێتنﺎكر یﺎنمولحەەﺗ ێیوايەپ ەك یۆﺗێستﺎنەو پر زايﯽڕهو نﺎئە ﯽركوﺗكردنسە ۆﺑ ێنێتكﺎرﺑهﺑە ێزه يیەئﺎسﺎ یوهلاشﺑە ەك ،یەگشت يشﯽئﺎسﺎ ۆكﯽرسە
 .ینیمﺎندا ﺑ1102 لە ێمﺎنﯽو سل ێرولهە كﺎنﯽۆپیشﺎندانەخ ك لەروههە
 
 یﺎنﯽردوكهە ەك رﺑەۆﺗەگرﺗ وايیﺎنڕهرمﺎنو فە ڵاتسەده ﯽشكردنداﺑە ۆﺑ ێنیﺎنو نه ڵۆزئﺎ یكﺎنیزمێكﯽند مچە ،كێتییەيە كە یكەێژويەم و دوژمنە پﺎرﺗﯽ
 كيەرهە لە ستەدهﺑە ەیکسوكﺎنە یسەوكەر ئەسەۆﺗەوﺗكە كە نگەلاسە كێكیﺎندايە یلاﺑە كەﺑﺎره ێكجﺎرند. هەوهۆڤێرهش ﯽكورس ۆﺗەكﺎﺗدا خست كيە لە
 يداكەڵەمﺎﺑنە ێونلە ﯽ) ﺑﺎرزانﺗﯽوكراﺗیەيم(د ۆيﺎندا،خ نگرانﯽيەندامﺎن و لار ئەسەﺑە ڵاتسەو ده پﺎره ﯽشكردنداﺑە ﯽﺑﺎرزان ی. لادایزﺑەو دو حلە
 .خسﺎندوهره
 
 یچ. (هكﺎنەیوﺗنەمە رهەو ﺑە ورهگەۆڵەو م ۆنفلەك ﺗەوه ،يەوهستەدهﺑە یﺎنكﺎنﻗدارهونەره و ﺑزنسە ﯽﺑﺎزرگﺎن ۆرﺗرينﯽز ﺑﺎنﯽ،ڵەو ﺗﺎ ﯽﺑﺎرزان یمﺎڵەﺑنە
 .مسﺎنە لە ه )ten.druk e(يتﯽسﺎ یررنوسەسە كە يەئﺎر - یوﺗە مە) ئەڕواتده ێوك ۆوت ﺑنە یپﺎره ﯽدروست ﺑە ێتس نﺎزانكە
 
 یزۆفرێنیﺎش لە وڵاﺗێك
ر . (گەكﺎتدروست ده یشتیمﺎنیشن كﯽیزۆفرينیﺎيەش ڵكوكﺎت، ﺑەده يﺎدز ندمەڵەوژار و دههە یﺎوازیك جنە ی،نﺎو ئﺎﺑور ۆوت ﺑنە ۆریز یپﺎره هﺎﺗنﯽ
 یپﺎره كﺎت كەنە یﺎرهپرس وئە ێتس نﺎﺗوانكە لاوازه ۆرز كە ێت،كرده شێشكەپ ێیداﺗ كە يتﺑكە يﺎنەﺗگوزارو خزمەو ئە كﺎنۆشخﺎنەخنە يرێكﯽسە
 يننزﺑە ی%08ردستﺎن كو ێشتﺎه ێنرێتهردهوت دهنە یلرمزار ﺑەهە 051 لە يﺎﺗرز ێكداكﺎﺗ: لەڵێتده یر ئﺎرش هەمە) ئەڕواتده ێكو ۆﺑ كەوﺗەنە
 .كﺎتده هﺎورده یﺎوهو ﺗورك ێرانو ئ ێراقع لە
 
) یڤﺎدای(ن لە ێوازێكش ێرولهە یكەيەﺗرمە 001 ﻗﺎمەشە ێژايﯽدرﺑە تيبەﺗﺎﺑە ﺗۆﻗێن،ڵدههە وهێنەشو ۆرز لە كە رهو خﺎنوﺑە ینﺎو ﺑ ۆڵم دروستكردنﯽ
 یشدارﺑە ﺗﯽۆنیەچ ﺑە ستراوهﺑە سهێنﺎنﯽرههە يﺎنوﺗن ركەسە ﯽرجمە ورهگە كﯽيەۆژهپر س كەكە یلا یەن وهشﺎرا كﺎن،یﺎنیەو ﺑ نوخبە ۆﺑ ۆگرﺗوهخلە
 ﺑە یەن ۆرگﺎنﯽئ كﯽنديەيوهپە یچه يەڕێوهﺑە ێرايﯽخﺑە ۆژئﺎويدار ۆلۆنﯽك ێوازیش لە یێرايەخ ڵتۆﻗینەو هە. ئەداۆژانەو پرلە ﯽﺑﺎرزان ێكﯽسكە ﯽكردن
 ختەەﺑزمﺎر و ن ﺑە كە ۆﺑﺎلیزمەگل مەئە ڵێت؛ده ۆكﺎندانگلە كێكيە لە ۆژئﺎوايﯽر ێكﯽند. كﺎرمەیعداواﻗ یرزئە لە ڵكخە يﺎنﯽران و ژگوزه ۆریﺑﺎرو ج
 كە يەكەهﺑﺎﺑﺎ و چل دز ﯽلعە نوﻗسﺎنە یوه. ئەیﺎدادن یشەم ﺑەلە یحراويە) سيزنﯽد ڵت) و (وايونیڤێرسﺎڵ ۆديۆكﺎنﯽ(ست یێندهو ه ێراقع ﺗەندراوهيەگە
 یﺗر یەكيوهد ڵام. ﺑەێتپچرو نە ێتﺑهە یێژهدر ێتكرو ده یەﺑﺎرزان ﯽوﺗستكەده مەكﺎن ئەكورده لە ێندهە ی. لاێنرێتﺑه ستدهﺑە یشوانئە ێتكرده
 ۆرێكیﺎنز . كەینن یكورد ڵاﺗﯽسەده ﺗﯽينﺎمیكیەد یئﺎگﺎدار ۆژئﺎوار ڵاﺗﺎنﯽو یهولە یە. گومﺎن نێتﺑكر ێشبینﯽو پ ێتر ﺑكرسەلە یﻗسە ﻗورسە
و  اوانینێڕر ﺗسەﺑە ڵﯽوت ﺑﺎنە ﯽﻗﺎزانج ۆﺑ ڵوهە ێشتﺎه ڵامﺑە ێن،كرئﺎگﺎدار ده ﯽكﺎنو روداوه شەگە لە كە يەهە خدايتەپﺎ ێریولهە لە يﺎنڵخﺎنەكونسو
 یژمﺎره نﺎنﯽيهێدﺑە ۆﺑ ينێسبە كە یو نرخە. ئەهدواو ﯽكﺎنكوشنە ێنەﺑخر ێتو نﺎﺑ تيموكراسیەد یﺗر كﺎنﯽڕگەو ﺑ ۆڤمر ﯽمﺎف كە ێشﺎوهرنجداندا كسە












 ێنحس ەﺑﺎح: سوهینگلیزيەئ لە
 .ڵاﺗداو لە ڵﯽندهگە لە ێزارﺑوﺑونﺑ ڵاﺗیﺎنﺑو هﺎو وهرئەﺑەلە ۆریزر حوکم ﺑەسەهﺎﺗە )PKA( ێدانپشەداد و گە ﯽپﺎرﺗ ﯽﺗحکومە ێستﺎئ ێشپ کيەيەده
 
 ﺎنکيەئﺎزاد ۆسنوردانﺎن ﺑ ڵﯽ،ندهشت: گە ێس یدژ ن لەکەده ڕوان شەئە کە ڵاﺗیﺎنهﺎو ﺑە ڵێنیﺎنداﺑە PKA ﯽکﺎنرپرسەدا ﺑە2002 ڵﯽسﺎ لە ستیدا،ڕالە
 .کﺎتده ڕﺑﺑنە ڵﯽندهگە کەپﺎرﺗە واﺑو کە ڕوايﺎنﺑو ﺑ وهر ئەﺑەلە PKA ﺑە یﺎندانگده کە ۆرز ڵکﺎنێکﯽ. خەیژارو هە
 
ر وﺑەەملە ڵسﺎ . دهﺗداڵەوده کﺎنﯽۆفیسەئ ﯽکﺎننزمە ئﺎستە لە ڵﯽندهگە ﯽنﺎوﺑردنلە ۆنﺎ ﺑ ریيگەکﺎر ینگﺎوهە PKA ﯽﺗﺗﺎدا، حکومەرهسە کﺎنﯽڵەسﺎ لە
 یلیﺎنرﺗکﺎن ﺑەنزمە پلە رهفسەئە ەل ۆرێک. زوهڵییەندهگە لە گلێێوهﺗ ردهﺑەڕادهلە کﯽيەێوهش ﺑە کە ۆهﺎﺗوچ ۆلیسێکﯽپ ۆﺑو ﺑ يﯽئﺎسﺎ ۆرز
 .گرت...هتدردهوه
 
، وهوﺗنەرکەەم سئە ۆیهکﺎندا ﺑو. ﺑەنزمە پلە رهفسەئە ێواننلە کە یيەئﺎشکرا ڵیەندهو گەﺑو ﺑە ێنﺎنه ۆﺗﺎيﯽک یهێنﺎستدهﺑە PKA یکەﺗەحکومە یوهئە
 .کﺎتده ڵﯽندهگە یدژلە ڕشە وﺗوانەرکەسە PKA یکەﺗەحکومە کە شتن،ێگەواﺗ ڵاﺗیﺎنهﺎو لە ۆرێکز
 
راپ ت خنﺎنەو ﺗە وامەردهر ﺑەهە ڵﯽندهگە کە ەيﺎنزانﯽد ڵاکﺎنداﺑﺎپلە ﺗدا لەحکومە ﯽکﺎنرپرسەﺑە ڵگەن لەکەده ڵەمﺎمە کە یوانەئە ێت،ﺑ رچۆنێکهە
 .ﺑوه يشﺗر
 
 PKA یکەﺗەحکومە کە یلمﺎندسە ڵاکﺎندانﺑﺎپلە لە کە ینﺎسراوانە رپرسەﺑە يروزو وهلە ێکندهە کﺎنﯽيکەنز سەکە یدژلە ۆلیسپ کﺎنﯽراسیۆنەئۆپە
 .ڵیداندهگە ﺗیکردنﯽيەدژا ر لەسەﺑبﺎﺗە یکەڵێنەﺑە يتوانیوهنە
 
 .ێتکرﺑ يﺎرید وهراسیۆنەۆپەم ئگرنگ لە ریيگەکﺎر ێس ێتﺑتوانر نگەره
 
ت و حکومە یکەﺗیڤەۆزهپ ێنەو کە کيەێوهش. ﺑەوهکﺎنیەنگرهيەلا یرچﺎوﺑە ﺑە PKA یکەﺗەحکومە ۆﺑ ورهگە کﯽڵايەهە ێتەﺑئە مەئە م،کەيە
 ۆﺗﺎيﯽک ﺗەم حکومەوا ئەکە ڵێتکﺎت و ﺑﺑ یکەیزﺑەح لە یرگرﺑە ێتنﺎﺗوان رێکێزگﺎريکەپﺎر یچه ێستﺎدا،ئ . لەدار کردوهکەلە PKAی کﺎنﯽيرهزوه
 .ڵاﺗداو لە ێنﺎوهه ڵﯽندهگە ﺑە
 
 نەکردڵەمﺎمە ۆرهم جنﺎﺗوانن لە ﯽئﺎسﺎنروا ﺑەهە کﺎنیﺎنرهێزگﺎريکەخواﺗرسن، پﺎرلە نﺎسراون کە وهﺑە رپرسﺎنەم ﺑەئە کە ی،وهرئەسەلە راهﺎﺗون
 .داتست دهدهنگ لەده ێکندهە ﺎﺗوداداه کﺎنﯽڵبژاردنەهە لە PKA یکەﺗەحکومە ﺑکﺎت کە وهئە ێشبینﯽپ ێکسکە ێتکر، ئەمەئە یێرهگوﺑبورن. ﺑە
 
 ێکداکﺎﺗ. لەێرانئ ﯽنکﺎدراوه یوهیکردنەسپ کﺎنﯽێزگەو لە کێکيە ﺑە ﺑوه یﺎﺗورک ئﺎشکراکرد کە یوهئە کەراسیۆنەۆپەئ یﺎ،ﺗورک یوهرهده ﺑە نديداريوهپە
. يﺎنەاو سزئە ﯽرﺗکرنپە ۆﺑ کﺎرهێنراوهﺑە یریم ێکﯽﺑﺎنک ﯽچکە ێران،ر ئسەلە کﺎنﺗیەوڵەێودهسزا ن ﯽﺗوندکردن ۆﺑو ﺑ ڵداوهە لە ۆژئﺎوار کە
وا ئە ێتت ﺑش راسمەر ئەگەئە یهﺎن،ج کﺎنﯽڕهزاﺑﺎ ۆﺑ ێردراونو ن وهﺗەیکراونەسپ یﺎﺗورک لە ێرانئ ﯽکﺎنپﺎره لە ۆلارد یۆندان ﺑلسە کە وهﺗەڵاوﺑوهواﺑ
 .داوهرهده یﺎیدون لە یﺎﺗورک یێنەو ۆﺑ ێتﺑده یورهگە يﺎنێکﯽز
 
 وهر ئەگەئە داڕاستی. لەیﺎداﺗورک یئﺎﺑور لە رﺗەکە ينگرنگتر دات، کەده وهدانکردنەئﺎوه ﯽرﺗکە لە يﺎنز کەراسیۆنەۆپەئ ،وهيەئﺎﺑور ﺑە نديداريوهپە
 ێت،وکەردهﺑە ريﺎنۆز يﺎنێکﯽز وهنەدانکردهئﺎوه یﺎکﺎنﯽﺎنۆمپوا کئە ،کەڵیەندهگە یﺑﺎزنە لە ێکینشکﺎن ﺑەنﺎوﺑﺎنگەﺑە ﺑﺎزرگﺎنە یﺎوهپ کە وهێتەسﺎغ ﺑب
 .داتت دهحکومە لە ريشيگەکﺎر ێکﯽررهزه ێوهمﺎن شهەﺑە
 
 ﺑە ێتﺑ کيەێوهر شهەﺑە ڵاﺗیﺎنهﺎو ینجﺎدا پەسەلە وهمەکە نﯽيەلا. ﺑەﺗﯽيەکەﺗیەڵايەۆمەک ريیەيگەکﺎر راسیۆنەۆپەم ئئە ريﯽيگەکﺎر هێزﺗرينﺑە
م ئە ەک وهێتەﺑهرون د ۆيﺎنﺑ ێک. کﺎﺗﺑوه ينئﺎ ۆکﺎرانەو هئە رﺗرينيگەکﺎر رههە لە کێکيە. ﺑوههە ﺗەم حکومەﺑە یمتمﺎنە یﺎوازج یﺎوازج ۆکﺎریه
 و یﺎشکو ﺗور یﺎنەندهمە ﺗﯽیﺎسەس ينﯽ،ئﺎ ﯽسﺎنکە ر ﺑەرامبەن ﺑەدهست دهدهلە ۆيﺎنخ ڕوایوا ﺑئە ،کەۆنەک ێمەرژ لە ییەن یﺎوازﺗرج ۆرش زﺗەحکومە
 .ڵاﺗێکو ەره
 
 کە يرێک،زهو کە ێنرالمسە وهئە ێکرکﺎﺗ. هەێتگرردهوه یلرﺗک ﺑەوه ۆلارد ێکیوو ن یۆنمل يرێکزوه يەهە ڤیديۆيﯽ کﯽيەگرﺗە کە وهﺗەڵاوﺑوهﺑ وا
ت حکومە يﺎ. ئﺎقﺎيفرو ئە ینلاﺗ مەريکﺎیەئ لە مێیەس یﺎیدون ڵاﺗﺎنﯽو ﯽئﺎست ۆﺑ ێتزﺑەداده ڵاﺗەم و، ئەرگرﺗوهوه یلﯽرﺗ، ﺑەنﺎسراوه ڕێزیﺑە یﺎوێکﯽپ
 دا؟ۆکەم شر ئەسەﺑە ێتﺑب ڵزا ﯽئﺎسﺎنﺑە ێتﺗوانده
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 زوﺗره ﯽرچهە ڵیداوت هەحکومە ،کەراسیۆنەۆپەئ ﺑە ێنﺎنه ۆﺗﺎيﯽک ۆﺑ ۆلیسپ ریﺑەڕێوهﺑە 5 ﯽرکﺎر لاﺑردنسەلە . ﺑەێتنﺎﺗوان ﯽئﺎسﺎنﺑە ۆرز خێرنە
 ،یکیەرامﺎﺗد ۆرز کرێتێدهپ ریشداﺑە یداگشت یرا ڵەگلە کە ییﺎريﺎنەو زان. ئەوهێتەﺑچ یريﺎنﺑلە ﯽگشت یرا ون ﺑکﺎت و واﺑکﺎت کە يسەم کەئە
 .ێتنﺎچ یرﺑ لە يﺎنو شتﺎنەئە ﯽئﺎسﺎنروا ﺑەهە ێت،ﺑ ۆنێکرچهە
 
 ێت؟گرردهوه یلرﺗﺑە ﺑە ۆلارد یوێکو ن یۆنمل ﺑکﺎت کە یرﺑلە يرێکزوه یێنەو ێتﺗوانده کێ
 




 کﺎتده ئﺎشکرا کﻭردسﺗﺎن رێمﯽهە ﺗﯽحکﻭمە لاﻭازی عێراق ﻭﺗﯽنە رسەلە نﺎکۆکﯽ: نﺎﺗﺎلﯽ دێنیس
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 ناتالی دێنیس
 سبەی: ئینگلیزییەوە لە
 
 ەک خراپتر، ئﺎستێکﯽ يشتۆﺗەگە راﺑردودا یفتەهە دو لە وتنە داهﺎﺗﯽ و کردنهﺎنﺎرده رسەلە ولێرهە و غداﺑە نێوان مﯽواردهﺑە ینەدولايە ڕیشە
 داهﺎﺗﯽ لە شێکﺑە غداﺑە ﺗنێکدا،رێکەو يﯽنﺎئﺎمﺎده لە. وه1991 سﺎڵﯽ لە کوردستﺎن رێمﯽهە ﺗﯽمەحکو ﺑۆ ﺑﺎنکﯽ يرانﯽﻗە جديترين هۆیﺑە ﺑوه
 ﺎنﯽکهێزه نﺎويشیﺎندا لە دراوه،پێنە يﺎنموچە مﺎنگە سێ ﺑۆ دو یمﺎوه رانرمﺎنبەفە شێکﺑە نجﺎمدائە لە ،راگرﺗوه کوردستﺎنﯽ رێمﯽهە ﺗﯽحکومە
 وهﺗەداوه ڵامﯽوه ﺗوندی ﺑە نکوردستﺎ رێمﯽهە رۆکﯽسە. نکەده کﺎنﺗیەوڵەنێوده وﺗیەنە کۆمپﺎنیﺎ وانﯽپﺎسە کە وتنە پﺎراستنﯽ هێزی و رگەپێشمە
 موچە اننﺗوده کە کرد یوهئە یشەﺑﺎنگە کﺎﺗیشدا مﺎنهە لە کردوە، ﺑەراورد'' کوردستﺎن ڵکﯽخە ﺑە ررامبەﺑە ڕشە يﺎندنﯽراگە'' ﺑە غداﺑە کﺎنﯽنگﺎوههە
 .نﺑده کوردستﺎن رێمﯽهە ﺗﯽحکومە کﺎنﯽداهﺎﺗە لە
 
 پشتیوانﯽ ۆﺑ ئەمەريکﺎ يەکگرﺗوەکﺎنﯽ ولايەﺗە لۆمەکردنﯽ مﺎلیکﯽ، ﺑە دژ خۆپیشﺎندانﯽ رێکخستنﯽ نەﺗەوەيﯽ، دروشمﯽ نﺎنﯽﺑەکﺎرهێ سەرەڕای ئەمە
 و ﺑەغدا ەﺑ ﺑەرامبەر کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ هەوڵەکﺎنﯽ پﺎرە، پێدانﯽ ﺑۆ نێودەوڵەﺗیەکﺎن نەوﺗیە کۆمپﺎنیﺎ خستنەسەر فشﺎر و نەکردنیﺎن
 وزەی سەرەکﯽ هﺎوپەيمﺎنﯽ ﺗەکنیکﯽ، و سیﺎسﯽ و يﺎسﺎيﯽ ﺑەرﺑەستﯽ ﺑونﯽ لەگەڵ. مﺎون نﺎکﺎريگەر هێشتﺎ نەوت يﺎنەیسەرﺑەخۆ هەنﺎردەکردنﯽ
 يﺎرنﺎد سیﺎسﯽ داهﺎﺗويەکﯽ و نﺎوخۆی ﻗەيرانﯽ روﺑەڕوی خۆی ئەردۆگﺎن، ﺗەيب رەجەب ﺗورکیﺎ وەزيرانﯽ سەرۆک کوردستﺎن، هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ
 و ﺎوچەکەن دانیشتیوانﯽ رەخنەی ﺑەرفراوانبونﯽ لەگەڵ و ئەڵتەرنﺎﺗیڤ داهﺎﺗﯽ سەرچﺎوەی يﺎن يﺎسﺎيﯽ تنەوەیگواس رێگﺎی نﺎئﺎمﺎدەيﯽ لە. ﺑوەﺗەوە
 کە ﺎنکوردست هەرێمﯽ ئەگەرنﺎ،. ﺑکﺎت سﺎزش ﺑەغدا ﺑەرامبەر ﺗﺎکو زۆرەوە فشﺎری ژێر دەکەوێتە هەولێر وەﺑەرهێنەر، متمﺎنەی پﺎراستنﯽ هەوڵدان
 دانیشتیوان مهە ﺑەمەش هێنﺎوە، دەستﯽ ﺑە کە سیﺎسیﺎنەی و ئﺎﺑوری دەستکەوﺗە ئەو دەستدانﯽ لە هەڕەشەی رمەﺗرسﯽﺑە دەکەوێتە جوگرافیﺎيە زيندانﯽ
 .دەﺑنەوە دارايﯽ و سیﺎسﯽ و کۆمەڵايەﺗﯽ نﺎسەﻗﺎمگیری روﺑەڕوی دامودەزگﺎکﺎنﯽ هەمیش و
 
. سزادان ﯽئﺎمرازێک وەکو ﺑبڕێت ﺗەواوی ﺑە کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ ﺗﯽحکومە ﺑودجەی کە ﺑڕوات رادەيە ئەو ﺗﺎ ﺑەغدا کە ﺑﺎوەڕەدان لەو کەس کەم ﺗﺎئێستﺎ
 هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ ﺑەﺑەردەوامﯽ وە،٥٠٠٢ سﺎڵﯽ لە ﺑودجە پێدانﯽ لەسەر هەﺑو نﺎکۆکیﺎن کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ و عێراق حکومەﺗﯽ هەرچەند
 ﺑۆ ﺑەرکەوﺗوە دۆلاری ملیﺎر) ٣١( نزيکەی هەرێم اد٣١٠٢ سﺎڵﯽ لە. پێگەيشتوە ﺑەغدادەوە لە خۆی زيﺎدکردوی سﺎڵانەی ﺑوجەی کوردستﺎن
 کە اوەهەوڵینەد کﺎريگەرانە ﺑەغداديش. دەهێنن ﺑەرهەم نەوت کە عێراق ﺗری پﺎرێزگﺎکﺎنﯽ لە زيﺎﺗرە ﺑەڕێژەيەک کە پﺎرێزگﺎ، سێ ﺑەڕێوەﺑردنﯽ
 دەکەن کﺎر تﺎنکوردس هەرێمﯽ لە نێودەوڵەﺗیﺎنەی وﺗیەنە کۆمپﺎنیﺎن ئەو ﺑۆ'' رەش لیستﯽ. ''کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ وزەی کەرﺗﯽ پەرەپێدانﯽ لە رێگرﺑێت
 لە ەرگرﺗنو سود و کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ لەگەڵ گرێبەست کردنﯽ ئیمزا لە نەوت سەرەکیەکﺎنﯽ کۆمپﺎنیﺎ سڵەمینەوەی ﺑۆ نەﺑوە هۆکﺎر هیچ
 .سروشتیەکﺎنﯽ سەرچﺎوە
 
 ردنﯽهەنﺎردەک ﺑە عێراق سەروەری پێشێلکردنﯽ ﺑۆ هەوڵدان ﺑە ﺗێپەڕاند ﺑەغدای سوری هێڵﯽ کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ کە ئەوکﺎﺗەی ﺗەنیﺎ
 ﺑودجەی نوسﯽرەش ئەنجﺎمﯽ لە عێراق ﻗەيرانەی ئەم. ﺑەکﺎرهێنﺎ داهﺎﺗیﺎن کﺎرﺗﯽ ﺗەواوی ﺑە عێراق ﺑەرپرسﺎنﯽ نﺎڕەسمﯽ، ﺑەشێوەيەکﯽ ﺗورکیﺎ ﺑۆ نەوت
 هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ دارايﯽ نﺎڕونﯽ داوکﺎری و زيﺎﺗر داهﺎﺗﯽ و لامەکەزی ﺑۆ ديکەی ﺑەرهەمهێنەراکﺎنﯽ نەوت پﺎرێزگﺎ نﺎکۆکﯽ داواکﺎری ،٤١٠٢
 ﺎلیکﯽم نوری عێراق وەزيرانﯽ سەرۆک هەم و ﺑﺎرزانﯽ هەم چونکە هەڵبژاردن، هەڵمەﺗﯽ لە ﺑەشێک ﺑە ﺑون نﺎکۆکیەکﺎن ئێستﺎ. ﺗەﻗیەوە کوردستﺎن
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 ەڵبژرادنەکﺎنﯽه پێش خۆيﺎن ﺑۆ رێکەوﺗن ﺑﺎشترين ﺑە ﺑگەن ﺗﺎکو ﺑونیﺎن نەﺗەوەيﯽ و دەسەڵاﺗیﺎن چەسپﺎندنﯽ ﺑۆ ﺑەکﺎردەهێنن ﺑودجە و نەوت پرسﯽ
 .نیسﺎن
 
 شڵێندە و داهﺎت راگرﺗنﯽ ﺑۆ دەکەن مﺎلیکﯽ لۆمەی زۆرکەس. عێراق حکومەﺗﯽ لە کوردەکﺎن رەخنەی زيﺎدﺑونﯽ ﺑەهۆی ﺑوە ﻗەيرانەکە راستیدا، لە
 داهﺎت ەکردنﯽئیدار خراپ ئەنجﺎمﯽ لە ﻗەيرانە ﺑەشێکﯽ دەشڵێن نﺎوچەکە دانیشتوانﯽ داهەمﺎنکﺎﺗ لە. ﺑەغدا دەستﯽ ﻗورﺑﺎنﯽ ﺑە ﺑون کوردەکﺎن ديسﺎن کە
 سﺎڵە چەندين ەک رايگەيﺎند گۆڕان ﺑزوﺗنەوەی پەرلەمﺎنتﺎرێکﯽ. کوردستﺎنەوە هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ لەلايەن گشتیدا کﺎورﺑﺎری لە شﺎفﺎفیەﺗە نەﺑونﯽ و
 سەرۆکﯽ شێوە هەمﺎن ﺑە. ﺑدات فەرمﺎنبەران مﺎنگﯽ شەش مودچەی نەوت داهﺎﺗﯽ ﺑە دەﺗوانێت و دەفرۆشێت نەوت کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ
 ﺑۆ ﺎرەپ نﺎردنﯽ ﺑۆ نیە ﺑەغدا رەﺗکردنەوەی ﺑەهۆی سﺎدەيﯽ ﺑە هەروا ﻗەيرانەکە کە رايگەيﺎندوە دەروێش، کەريم ئەدهەم کوردستﺎن، نﺎوەندی ﺑﺎنکﯽ
 ونر زانیﺎری کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ چونکە راگرﺗوە، کوردستﺎنﯽ ەرێمﯽه حکومەﺗﯽ پﺎرەی ﺑەغدا ﺑەڵکو. کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ
 حﺎڵەﺗە ﺑۆ نیە دارايﯽ پلانێکﯽ هیچ کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ خراپتر، لەوەش. داهﺎﺗەکەی و نەوت هەنﺎردەکردنﯽ لەسەر ﺑەغدا ﺑە نﺎدات
 هیچ کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ گشتیەکﺎنﯽ ﺑﺎنکە دەوڵەﺗدا، ﺑﺎنکەکﺎنﯽ لە يەدەگە دۆلاری ملیﺎر) ٠٨( خﺎوەنﯽ ﺑەغدا کﺎﺗێکدا لە. نﺎئﺎسﺎيیەکﺎن
 .نیە پﺎرەيەکیﺎن
 
 هێزی و ئەمنﯽ ئۆپەراسیۆنﯽ ﺑە پەيوەست ﺗﺎيبەت ﺑە کوردستﺎن، هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ وزەی کەرﺗﯽ سەر ﺑۆ هەﺑوە رەنگدانەوەی ﻗەيرانەکە هەروەهﺎ
 کردن یﺑەرگر لە چﺎلاکن ئﺎسﺎيش هێزەکﺎنﯽ کە کردوە ﺑەوە ئﺎمﺎژەی کوردستﺎن ەرێمﯽه حکومەﺗﯽ سروشتیەکﺎنﯽ سﺎمﺎنە وەزيری. نەوت پﺎراستنﯽ
 نەوﺗیە ﺎکۆمپﺎنی ﺑە داوە هۆشداری ئەوەشدا لەگەڵ. نیە ئﺎرادا لە هێزەکﺎنەوە لەلايەن پێگەکەکﺎنیﺎن جێهێشتنﯽ لەسەر گفتوگۆيەک هیچ و هەرێم لە
 کە ﺗیەکﺎننێودەوڵە نەوﺗیە کۆمپﺎنیﺎ ﺑە داوە ﺑژاردەشﯽ ئەو سروشتیەکﺎن سﺎمﺎنە وەزارەﺗﯽ. هێنندەردە نەوت نﺎوچﺎنەی لەو وريﺎﺑن کە نێودەوڵەﺗیەکﺎن
 دەخوازێت نێودەوڵەﺗیەکﺎن نەوﺗیە کۆمپﺎنیﺎ هەمو لە کە ١١٠٢ سﺎڵﯽ داوايەکﯽ لە پﺎشەکشەيە ئەمەش کە ﺑگرنەوە، سەرلەنوێ خۆيﺎن ئەمنﯽ پﺎسەوانﯽ
 .ﺑەکﺎرﺑهێنن کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ نەوﺗﯽ پﺎراستنﯽ هێزی ﺗەنیﺎ و ﺑخەنەوەدور نێودەوڵەﺗیەکﺎنیﺎن کﺎرمەندە زۆرﺑەی
 
 نوێنەری گوێرەی ﺑە. نێودەوڵەﺗیەکﺎن نەوﺗیە کۆمپﺎنیﺎ لە هەندێک و سروشتیەکﺎن سﺎمﺎنە وەزارەﺗﯽ لەنێوان گرژی ﺑەهۆی ﺑو داهﺎت ﺑەدەستهێنﺎنﯽ
 پﺎرەی ﺑڕە ٤١٠٢ مﺎرسﯽ ١ ﺗﺎ کە نێودەوڵەﺗیەکﺎن نەوﺗیە کۆمپﺎنیﺎ ﺑە هێنﺎوە ﺗﺎوی یەکﺎنسروشت سﺎمﺎنە وەزارەﺗﯽ وێستەرن، لۆکﺎڵﯽ نەوﺗﯽ کۆمپﺎنیﺎی
 ﻗەيرانﯽ ەرلەس گفوگۆکردن ﺑۆ نێودەوڵەﺗیەکﺎن نەوﺗیە کۆمپﺎنیﺎ لەگەڵ دوايیەی ئەم کۆﺑونەوەکﺎنﯽ لە. وەزارەت ﺑە ﺑدەن نەوت پﺎراستنﯽ نەدراوی
 پﺎراستنﯽ ﺎرەیپ ﺑڕی کە سەرەکیەکﺎن، کۆمپﺎنیﺎ نﺎويشیﺎندا لە گرﺗوە، کۆمپﺎنیﺎيﺎنە لەو رەخنەی ﺎنسروشتیەک سﺎمﺎنە وەزيری هەورامﯽ ئﺎشتﯽ دارايﯽ،
 ئەو و داوە پﺎرەکﺎنیﺎن نێودەوڵەﺗیەکﺎن نەوﺗیە کۆمپﺎنیﺎ ی%٠١-٥ ﺗەنیﺎ ﺗﺎئێستﺎ. پﺎرەکە نەدانﯽ لە نﺎکرێت چﺎوپۆشﯽ چۆن هەروەک نەدواو نەوﺗیﺎن
 .دۆلارە ملیۆن) ٠٥١( نزيکەی ﺑڕەش
 
 ەرەﺗﺎس لەوانەش. نیشﺎنداوە عێراق حکومەﺗﯽ ﺑە ﺑەرامبەر ديکەيﺎن کﺎرﺗﯽ ﺑەکﺎرهێنﺎنﯽ نیەﺗﯽ کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ حکموەﺗﯽ ﺑەرپرسێکﯽ چەند
 رﺗنرێگەگ و عەرەﺑەکﺎن جوﺗیﺎرە ﺑۆ کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ ﺑەنداوەکﺎنﯽ ئﺎوی کەمکردنەوەی و ﺑەغدا لە پەرلەمﺎنیﺎن وەستﺎندنﯽ هەڕەشەی
 ردستﺎنکو هەرێمﯽ ئﺎسمﺎنﯽ هێڵﯽ داخستنﯽ هەڕەشەی ﺑە ﺑەغدا دەستبەجﯽ. سەرﺑەخۆی راگەيﺎندنﯽ و ﺗورکیﺎ ﺑۆ کەرکوک نەوﺗﯽ ستنەوەیگوا لە
 .هەولێر و سلێمﺎنﯽ ﺑۆ ئﺎسمﺎنیەکﺎن گەشتە هەمو راگرﺗنﯽ ﺑە دايەوە، وەڵامﯽ
 
 لە هەرچەندە رێکەوﺗن، ﺑگەنە هەڵبژاردن پێش هەردولا کە -وازندەخ وا يﺎن -ئﺎراستەيەن ﺑەو ئﺎمﺎژەکﺎن هەڕەشﺎنە، و ﺗﺎکتیک ئەم سەرەڕايﯽ
 ﺑەغدا ەﺑ ﺑەستنﯽ پشت و کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ حکومەﺗﯽ لاوازی ﻗەيرانە حﺎڵەﺗەشدا، لەو ﺗەنﺎنەت. دەﺑێت کﺎﺗﯽ رێکەوﺗنێکﯽ حﺎڵەﺗدا ﺑﺎشترين
 دیسودمەن لەسەر زيﺎﺗريش ژمﺎرەيەکﯽ و کوردستﺎن ەرێمﯽه حکومەﺗﯽ موچەی ﺑە دەﺑەستن پشت کە دانیشتوان %٠٦ نزيکەی لەگەڵ. دەسەلمێنێتەوە
 حکومەﺗﯽ ەک ﺑکﺎت پێويست رەنگە پێکنەهﺎﺗوە، هێشتﺎ کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ هەڵبژاردنەکﺎنﯽ لە مﺎنگ شەش پﺎش کە حکومەﺗێکیش و خۆشگوزەرانﯽ
 دامەزراوەی ﺑنیﺎﺗنﺎنﯽ لە ﺑريتیە ريشەيﯽ ەنگﺎوێکﯽه. ﺑکﺎﺗەوە داهﺎﺗو ﺑۆ خۆی دارايﯽ و سیﺎسﯽ و وزە ستراﺗیژی لە ﺑیر دوﺑﺎرە کوردستﺎن هەرێمﯽ
 کﺎرەدا ەمئ ئەنجﺎمدانﯽ لە شکست. داهﺎﺗو نەوەکﺎنﯽ ﺑۆ سەروەر ﺑودجەی حسﺎﺑێکﯽ ﺑونﯽ ﺗﺎيبەت ﺑە هەرێم، وزەی سﺎمﺎنﯽ ﺑەڕێوەﺑردانﯽ ﺑۆ شەفﺎف






  ..رادەکێشێت کﺎنﯽریزه ﺑۆ کﻭرد نجﯽگە داعش
 4102/60/82
  هﺎﻭسلۆنیر ئەﺑیگەیل
 کﺎتدرﻭسﺗده عێراق ئﺎرامﯽ شێکﯽﺑە رسەلە نﻭێ کﯽﺗرسیەمە
 
 سﺎڵﯽلە ککﺎﺗێ نﺎسراﻭه دنیﺎدالە ﻭ کﻭردی رگریﺑە سیمﺑۆڵﯽ ﺑۆﺗە درێژه کﯽیەمﺎﻭه ئێران سنﻭریلە نزیک شﺎره مئە -عێراق - ﺑجەڵەهە
 .کرد ﺑۆردﻭمﺎنﯽ کیمیﺎﻭی کﯽچە ﺑە دامسە 8891
 
 رسەلە یسەﻗ ﻭێتیﺎنەده دانیشﺗﻭانﺎنﯽ لە مکە کیەدیﺎرده ،ﻭهنﺎسرێﺗەده ﺗر کﯽەیدیﺎرده ﺑە ﺑێت ﺗﺎ ڵێن،ده دانیشﺗﻭانﺎنﯽ کﻭه ،مڕۆژانەئە
 .نﺑکە
 
 کﺎندامﺎنگە دﻭالە ن،ﺑجەڵەهە دانیشﺗﻭی لێیﺎن %03 کە س،کە 051 ینزیکە کﻭرد، نجﯽگە ﺑچﻭکﯽ گرﻭپێکﯽ ڵێتده کﻭردی ڵاﺗﯽسەده
 یلیﺗﺎنﺗەم گرﻭپە کﺎنﯽریزه چنەده ینجﺎنەگە ﻭئە. گرﺗﻭه عێراﻗﯽ خﺎکﯽ شێکﯽﺑە کە ﻭهداعشە کﺎنﯽریزه نﺎﻭ ﺗەچﻭنە
 ﺑﺎکﻭریلە ئۆﺗۆنۆمیﺎن ینﺎﻭچە ﺑﻭن هیﻭادار کﺎنکﻭرده. کﺎنکﻭرده ﺑۆ یەشﺎردراﻭه کﯽﺗرسیەمە ﻭهکﺎنەﻭهﺗﻭندڕه
 .راﺑگرن عێراق خﻭێنﺎﻭی ڕیشەلە رێزپەدﻭره عێراق
 
 لۆژیەئﺎیدۆ ﻭ داتده جیهﺎد ﺑۆ ﺗر نجﯽگە هﺎنﯽ داعش یچﻭنەﻭهپێشە مئە کە رﺑڕیده خۆیﺎن ﺗرسﯽ کﻭردی ﻭاڵگریهە ندێکﯽکﺎرمە ندچە
 ﻭ هێمن کﯽیەﻭاحە شسﺎﺗە مئە ﺗﺎ کیەنﺎﻭچە ن،کەده رگﻭزه عێراق کﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ ﻭرهﺑە یﯽخشکەﺑە کﺎنرادیکﺎڵە
 .ئﺎرامە
 
 عێراﻗێکﯽەل نجگە سﺑکردنﯽکە ﺑۆ داعش کﺎنﯽﻭڵەهە چۆن داتده نیشﺎنﯽ کﺎنداﻭهﺗﻭندڕه میلیﺗﺎنﺗە ەگرﻭپ نﺎﻭلە کﻭرد ریڕکەشە ﺑﻭنﯽ
 .کردﻭه خۆیﺎن ریکﺎریگە شکراﻭداداﺑە
 
 داﻭا ﻭەیەه داکەشﺎره نﺎﻭلە چﺎلاکﯽ"  یشﺎنە" ئێسﺗﺎدالە داعش ﻭﺗﯽ ﺑﺑرێت، نﺎﻭی یﻭیستنە ،ﺑجەڵەهەلە ﻭاڵگریهە ﺑﺎڵای رپرسێکﯽﺑە
 25 ﻭەئ یزۆرﺑە: ﻭﺗﯽ کەرپرسەﺑە کﺎنیداﻗسە یدرێژهلە. نﺑکە ڵگەلە کﺎریﺎن نکەده ﺑێزار ﻭ ﺑێکﺎر نجﺎنﯽگەلە
 ﻭهداعشە نلایەلە سﻭریﺎلە ڕکردنشە ﺑۆ جێهێشﺗﻭهﺑە یﺎنﺑجەڵەهە راﺑﻭردﻭ نیﻭی ﻭ سﺎڵ یمﺎﻭهلە ینجەگە ﻭ پیﺎﻭ
 .کراﺑﻭن سبکە
 
 کﺎنﯽزههێ ﺑە دژ ڕهشە یرهﺑەلە ئێسﺗﺎ ﻭ داعش کﯽکۆمﺎندۆیە ﺑۆﺗە یﯽ،ﺑجەڵەهە ریﻭانمە ،کەنﺎﻭچە کﺎنﯽپیﺎﻭهلە کێکیە: "ﻭﺗﯽ هﺎرﻭههە
 ."رکﻭککە شﺎری یﻭهرهدهلە ئﺎسﺎیش ﻭ رگەپێشمە
 




 کﻭردسﺗﺎنیﺎن ﺗمﺎنﯽنیش کێﺗﯽیە ڕیشە ﻭ ﺑﻭهە کیﺎنیەﺑنکە لێره ﻗﺎعیده ﺑە نداریﻭهپە رادیکﺎڵ ئیسلامﯽ گرﻭپێکﯽ پێشﺗر سﺎڵ ده ینزیکە
 .کرا ﺑۆمﺑﺎران ریکﺎﻭهمەئە کﺎنﯽهێزه نلایەلە 3002 سﺎڵﯽلە یەﺑنکە مئە کرد،ده
 
 کﯽدانیشﺗﻭیە کﻭه ،یەهە غدایﺑە ﺑﯽرهعە ﺗﯽحکﻭمە ڵسﺗیکردنﯽرهەﺑە مێژﻭی ﻭمەکە خﻭێندن ﻭ کﺎرکردن ﺑﻭاری ﺑجەڵەهە شﺎریلە
 ێکهیدشە یﺎخﻭد خۆیﯽرﺑەسە ﺑۆ کﻭرد ﺑﺎﺗﯽخەلە هیدێكشە ،یەهە هیدێکﯽشە مﺎڵێک رهە ینزیکە: "ﻭﺗﯽ کەشﺎره
 ."ﻭهﻭﺗەلێکە ﻗﻭرﺑﺎنﯽ زارانهە کە 8891 لە کیمیﺎﻭی کﯽچەﺑە کەشﺎره لامﺎردانﯽپەەل
 
 نگەمﺎ ششە یمﺎﻭه ﺑۆ کﻭردسﺗﺎن رێمﯽهە ﺗﯽحکﻭمە ڵگەلە نﺎکۆکﯽ ئﺎکﺎمﯽلە مﺎلیکﯽ ﺗﯽحکﻭمە یﻭهﻭکﺎﺗەلە ﺑﻭه ئﺎڵۆزﺗر کەدۆخە
 .راگرﺗﻭه نﯽرارمﺎنﺑەفە یمﻭچە ﻭ ﺑڕیﻭه رێمﯽهە یﺑﻭدجە
 
 کیرگۆشە نجﯽگە خۆرئﺎﻭا دنیﺎیلە نین، شﺑینگە ئﺎینده ﺑۆ ﻭ نکەده ﻭاﻭﺗە ﺑﺎڵا خﻭێندنﯽ لكﯽخە لێره: "ﻭﺗم پێﯽ کەﻭاڵگریەهە ندیکﺎرمە
 ."خۆکﻭشﺗنە ﺗدارهﺑنە لە میشئە ،ﻭهداعشە کﺎنﯽریزه چنەده لێره. کﻭژێتده خۆی
 
 رادیکﺎڵیزم ﻭرهﺑە رێگە
 ۆﺑ ﺗﻭندی یﻭهلێکدانە کە ﻭﺗێکره ،ﻭهداعشە نﺎﻭ ﺑچێﺗە چﻭدهپێنە ﺑﻭ نجێکگە نﺎنﻭسم، یکەنﺎﻭه یکەﻭادهخﺎنە داﻭای رسەلە ،" ز"
 کە مﯽئیسلا ﺗﯽلافەخە زراندنﯽدامە ﺑۆ ﻭڵدانێکهەلە کﻭشﺗﻭه ﺗری ڵکﯽخە ﻭ شیعە دانسە ،یەهە ئیسلام یﺎسﺎکﺎنﯽ
 .ﻭهسﺗێﺗەﺑﺑە ﻭهکەیەﺑە عێراق ﻭ سﻭریﺎ
 
 ."ﺑﻭهە ﺗریشﯽ دۆسﺗﯽ زۆر ﺑﻭ،هە دۆسﺗﯽ کچێکﯽ ﺑﻭ،هە مۆﺗۆرسﺎیکلﯽ: "ﻭﺗﯽ" ز" یزاﻭاکە
 
 رسەلە" ز" یﻭێنە. کردﺑﻭ رسەلە کﺎریﺎن داعش کﺎنﯽلۆکﺎڵیە ندامەئە ﻭ کﺎنﻭهﺗﻭندره میدیﺎی سۆشیﺎڵ مپینﯽکە کە ﻭﺗیﺎن" ز" یﻭادهخﺎنە
 .رسە ﻗژی سﺗﺎیڵﯽ دﻭا ﻭ مۆدێرن پۆشﺎکﯽ ﺑە سﺎڵ 61 نمەﺗە نجێکﯽگە خﺎتریدهده یکەشکەخﻭ مۆﺑﺎیلﯽ
 
 کﺗﻭپر امﺎیسد مﺎنگﯽ راسﺗﯽنﺎﻭهلە. ﺑچێت ﻭتمزگە ﺑۆ ﺑﻭهنە گرنگ لای کﺎت هیچ ﻭ ﺑﻭنە ئﺎینﯽ یﺎنکەکﻭره کە ﻭﺗیﺎن" ز" یﻭادهخﺎنە
 کیەلە: "ﻭﺗﯽ یﺎنزاﻭاکە کﻭه سﻭریﺎ،لە داعش نﺎﻭ ﺑچێﺗە ﺗﺎ شتجێهێﺑە یﺑجەڵەهە دۆسﺗﯽ نزیکﺗرین ڵگەلە
 ."گۆرا ﻭاﻭیﺗەﺑە - ز – دافﺗەهە
 
 پێیﺎن یکەﻭادهخﺎنە ،مﻭسڵە شﺎری لە کﺎنﯽمیلیﺗﺎنﺗە هﺎﻭرێ ڵگەلە ئێسﺗﺎ" ز" ،ﻭهپێشە هﺎﺗە عێراقلە داعش پێشﻭدا یفﺗەهەلە یﻭهپﺎشئە
 .ﻗﻭرعﺎنە فێرﺑﻭنﯽ ریکﯽخە کە ﻭﺗﻭه یکەدهﻭاخﺎنە ﺑە لۆفینیداﺗە کﯽندیەﻭهیپە ندچەلە" ز. "ﻭﺗم
 
 ﺑهێڵن،جێﺑە کەنﺎﻭچە" ز" کﻭه نجﯽگە داﻭه رێگﺎیﺎن کﻭردی ڵاﺗﯽسەده ﻭﺗیﺎن شﺑجەڵەهە دانیشﺗﻭانێکﯽ ندچە ﻭ ﻭاڵگریهە ندیکﺎرمە دﻭ
 .رهئﺎرامﺗ ﻭانﺑێئە کەنﺎﻭچە ﻭاﺑﻭه پێیﺎن چﻭنکە
 
  043
 نجﺎمئە ﻭهەﻗینﺗە لێره ﻭانئە سﺗﯽدهﺑە ﻭیستیﺎندهنە ،مێنننە لێره ﻭانئە ﺑﻭ سﺗﯽﺑەمە ڵاتسەده: "ﻭاڵگریهە ﺗری ندێکﯽکﺎرمە یﻭﺗەﺑە
 ."ﺑدرێت
 
 سﺗگیرهد ئﺎسﺎیش کﺎنﯽهێزه نیەلالە ﻭهڕاﺑﻭهگە سﻭریﺎ لە داعش کﺎنﯽڕهشەلە ﺗﺎزه ﺑجەڵەهە نجﯽگە کﻭردێکﯽ مﺎیس، مﺎنگﯽ کۆﺗﺎیﯽلە
 پێﺑﻭه ﺗﯽپش کﯽجﺎنﺗﺎیە ڵێنده کﺎنندهکﺎرمە کﻭه سلێمﺎنﯽ، شﺎری یکەحﻭسێنیە نﺎﻭ ﺑچێﺗە داﺑﻭ ﻭڵﯽهە کﺎﺗێک کرا
 .ﺑﻭه ﺗێدا جﺎراﺗﯽفەﺗەمﻭ کە
 
 ﯽکیەپرۆسە یرێگەﺑە داﻭه ﻭڵﯽهە ڵاتسەده کە ﻭﺗم پێیﺎن ﻭهﺗەڕاﻭنەگە ﻭسﻭریﺎﻭهلە کە ﺗر نجێکﯽگە ندچە سﻭکﺎریکە ﻭ دۆست
 کﯽچﺎﻭدێریە ژێر ﺗەخراﻭنە ﺑۆیە ﺑهێنن، کﺎنیﺎنرادیکﺎڵیە فکرهلە ﻭاز نﺑکە تنﺎعەﻗە نجﺎنەگە ﻭئە ﻭهرجدارهمە
  .ﻭهﺗﻭنده
 ﻭهڕێنەگەده یسﺎنەکە ﻭئە: "ﻭﺗﯽ ردسﺗﺎنکﻭ دیمﻭکراﺗﯽ پﺎرﺗﯽ لیسﺗﯽ رسەلە کﻭردسﺗﺎن مﺎنﯽرلەپە پێشﻭی ندامﯽئە ﺗﯽ،شﺎرهﺑە فﺎزڵ
 ."ﺑهێنن کﺎنیﺎنﺑۆچﻭنەلە ﻭاز درێتده ڵگە لە ﻭڵیﺎنهە ﻭهچره کﯽیەپرۆسە یرێگەﺑە
 
 ﺎیشئﺎس کﺎنﯽهێزه کە ﻭﺗیﺎن ﻭهﺗەڕاﻭنەگە ﻭ جێهێشﺗﻭه یﺎنکەگرﻭپە یﺎخﻭد نکەده داعش ﺑۆ ڕشە ینجﺎنەگە ﻭئە سﻭکﺎریکە ﻭ خزم
 رنجﯽەس کەﺗەﺑﺎﺑە چﻭنکە نکەنە داعش ڵگەلە کﺎنیﺎنخێزانە ندامﺎنﯽئە کﺎنﯽندیەیﻭهپە ﺑﺎسﯽ پێکردﻭن مریﺎنەئ
 .کێشێتراده ڵکخە
 
 کە ﻭﺗﯽ ﻭهەﺗﻗێنێﺑﺗە سلێمﺎنﯽ یکەحسێنیە ﺗﯽﻭیسﺗﻭیە کە ﺑﻭه ﻭرهگە داعش یندامەئە ﻭئە ڵگەلە کە ﺑجەڵەهەلە سﺎڵ 42 نمەﺗە پیﺎﻭێکﯽ
 نلایەەل دﻭاﺗر سﻭریﺎ،لە داعش کﺎنﯽریزه چﻭﺑﻭنە ﺗری دراﻭسێﯽ دﻭ ﻭﺗیشﯽ ﺑکرێت، ﺑﺎسیﺎن نﺎدات رێگﺎ ڵاتسەده
 پیﺎﻭه مئە .نکەده داعش ڕیشە سﻭریﺎلە ئۆپزسیۆن کﺎنﯽگرﻭپە ڵگەلە کە کراﺑﻭن سﺗگیرده ﺗﻭرکیﺎﻭه کﺎنﯽکﻭرده
 .کﻭژراﻭه سﻭریﺎلە ڕشەلە ﻭپێشمەلە ﺎنگم چﻭار کﯽئﺎمۆزایە کە ﻭﺗﯽ
 
 کێکیە رگەئە ینﺑکە چﯽ پێمﻭت"  ی،کەخﻭشکە ﻭ دایک لای ﺑۆ ﻭهڕێﺗەﺑگە ﻭهﺗەپﺎراﻭه" ز" لە فۆنلەﺗە ﺑە ﻭﺗم پێﯽ" ز" یزاﻭاکە
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 پۆست ﻭاشنﺗۆن: سەرچﺎﻭە
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 muroF tsaE elddiM ehT راستنﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽخۆرهە فۆرمﯽ رۆکﯽسە
 
 پشﺗگیری ئێران کە شیعە ندینﺎﻭه ﺗێکﯽحکﻭمە ﺑە دژ کﺎنەیﺎخیﺑﻭه سﻭننە جیهﺎدیسﺗە ریشە عێراق ڕیشە: نﻭسیﺑﻭم ێشﻭداپ ﻭﺗﺎرێکﯽ لە
 ریڕکەەش هێزی ﺗرینﻭرهگە کە داعش ﺑۆ ﺗﻭرکیﺎ کۆمﺎری پشﺗگیری: کﻭه کردم، لێ پرسیﺎرێکیﺎن ندچە رێکخﻭێنە ندچە کﺎت،ده
 ﯽدرێژایﺑە ﻭ ﺗﻭرکیﺎ نﺎﻭلە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ کﺎنﯽندیەﻭهرژهﺑە رسە ﺑۆ داعش کﺎنﯽلامﺎرهپە ﺑە داﺑﻭ یﺎنئﺎمﺎژه هﺎرﻭههە عێراق، لە یەسﻭننە
 .ﺗﻭرکیﺎ ﻭ ئێران کﺎنﯽکەرۆکەسە نێﻭان یﺗﺎزه ﻭﺗﻭیرکەسە کﯽیەﻭهکۆﺑﻭنە ﻭ مﻭسڵ لە ﻭ سﻭریﺎدا ڵگە لە سنﻭری
 
 .ﺑۆیﺎن یەهە رﻭنکرده ڵامﺑە هێزن،ﺑە خﺎڵﯽ مﻭیﺎنهە مﺎنەئە
 کﺎت،ده رکﺎف کﻭه یکەگرﻭپە ﻭ ﺗﻭرکیﺎ زیرانﯽﻭه رۆکسە یریسە ندهرچەهە کﺎت،ده ﻗﺑﻭڵ ﺗﻭرکیﺎ پشﺗگیری ئێسﺗﺎش داعش: مکەیە
 .ﺑدرێت پیشﺎن یﺎنﻗینەراسﺗە ئیسلامﯽ یەﻭهﺑە پێﻭسﺗییﺎن کە
 
 رێتکده ﻭ رﻭیﺎنداﻭه جیﺎﻭازﺗر زۆر ئﺎسﺗﯽ لە عێراق ﻭ سﻭریﺎ لە ڕشە کﺎﺗێکدا لە رﻭیدا ئﺎسﺗدا کیە لە کﺎنرۆکەسە ردانﯽسە: مدﻭه
 ﺗﻭرکیﺎ، نﺎﻭداری ریگەرۆژنﺎمە کﻭه ،خۆیﺎنە یﻭهڵسﺎنەهە ﻭ هێز رسەلە ئێران ﻭ ﺗﻭرکیﺎ ریرکﺎﺑە. نرﻭﺑده کﺎﺗدا مﺎنهە لە دﻭ رهە
 نلایەلە رمﯽفە زمﺎنﯽ دﻭاییدا یسﺎڵانە ملە: "ﺗﯽنﻭسیﻭیە راسﺗدانﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽخۆرهە ریگﻭڤﺎ رزیﻭه یژمﺎره دﻭالە ، lidkeB karuB
 یﻭهئە مڵاﺑە ،کﺎرهێنراﻭهﺑە ئیسرائیل ﺑە دژ ئﺎیدیۆلۆژی زامﻭنﯽﺗە ﻭ نێﻭانیﺎن ﺑﺎزرگﺎنﯽ پێدانﯽشەگە ﺑە تﺑﺎرهسە ﻭهﻭڵاﺗە دﻭ رهە
  ."کﺗریە لە دﻭلایە رهە ﺑﯽزهەمە گﻭمﺎنﯽ ﻭ یﯽﺑێمﺗمﺎنە ﻭ ریرکﺎﺑە ﻭێتنﺎکە رچﺎﻭﺑە
 
 مﺎلکە ئۆرهﺎن ﺗﻭرکﯽ نﻭسﯽرۆژنﺎمە کﻭه زۆرن، زۆر ﺗیدانیﺎرمە کﺎنﯽئﺎمﺎژه ڵامﺑە ،ﻭهکﺎﺗەﺗدهره داعش ﺗیدانﯽیﺎرمە رهنکەئە
 زۆر کﺎنسﺗەجیهﺎدی هﺎﺗﻭچۆکردنﯽ ﺑۆ ﺗﻭرکیﺎ پشﺗگیری ،یەهە سﻭریﺎ ڵگە لە درێژمﺎن شﯽهﺎﻭﺑە سنﻭرێکﯽ ئێمە: "ﺗﯽنﻭسیﻭیە نگیزجە
 .نیە سﻭدفە کﯽیەلەسەمە مەئە ﻭ نزیکن ﺗﻭرکیﺎﻭه سنﻭری لە سﻭریﺎ لە داعش کﺎنﯽهێزهﺑە ﺑنکە  ﻭاﻗیعدا لە". ﺑﻭ گرنگ
 
 کیەژمﺎره ﻭ سعﻭدی تﺗﺎیﺑە( ﺑیﺎنﯽ ﻭ ﺗﻭرک ریڕکەشە 000.3 ینزیکە کە هﺎﻭڕان پسپۆڕان ﻭ سﻭری ئۆپۆزسیۆنﯽ ﻭ کﺎنکﻭرده
 دریﻗە ﺗﻭرکﯽ، ریگەرۆژنﺎمە کﻭه ،ﻭهداعشە کﺎنﯽریزه نﺎﻭ چﻭنە ﺑۆ سﻭریﺎﻭه نﺎﻭ ﺗەچﻭنە ﺗﻭرکیﺎﻭه سنﻭری یرێگەﺑە) خۆرئﺎﻭایﯽ
 زگﺎیده کە ﺑﻭه جﺎریش ﻭ ﺑﻭه کۆنﺗڕۆلکردن ﺑێ کﺎنجیهﺎدیسﺗە سﺎیدی دﻭ خێرای هێڵﯽ: "کردﻭه سنﻭری یرێگە سفﯽﻭه گﻭرسڵ،
 خشپە کﺎنجیهﺎدیسﺗە ﻗﺎچﺎخﯽ یرێگە رسەلە کﯽڤیدۆیە NNC فزیۆنﯽلەﺗە تنﺎنەﺗە". داﻭن ﺗیﺎنﯽیﺎرمە چﺎلاکﺎنە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ ﻭاڵگریهە
 .کردﻭه
 
 داعش ﯽکرهسە هێزی ﺑە لۆجیسﺗیکﯽ کﺎرئﺎسﺎنﯽ ﻭ شقکردنمە ﻭ پﺎره ﻭ کچە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ ڵکﻭﺑە سنﻭر، یﻭهڕینەپە کنە نزیکﺎنە مﺑە
 ﻭ ﻭﺗنفریﺎکە ﺑۆ زێنێتﺑەده سنﻭر رکﯽﺗﻭ مﺑﻭڵانسﯽئە سنﻭر نزیک لە داترﻭده داعش ﻭ کﺎنکﻭرده نێﻭان ڕشە کﺎﺗێک. داﻭه
 لە محەمەد، ﺑﻭئە داعش، کﯽکۆمﺎندۆیە ریﻭرﻭژێنە کﯽیەﻭێنە. ﺗﻭرکیﺎ کﺎنﯽخۆشخﺎنەنە ﺑۆ داعش کﺎنﯽﺑرینداره یﻭهگﻭاسﺗنە





 4102 نیسﺎنﯽ لە yataH حکﻭمﯽ یخۆشخﺎنەنە لە داعش، کﯽکۆمﺎندۆیە محەمەد، ﺑﻭئە
 
 ﻭﺗﯽنە کردنﯽنﺎردههە ﺑۆ داﻭه داعش ﺑە دۆلاری ملیۆن 008ﺗﻭرکیﺎ ﺗﯽحکﻭمە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ، ئۆپۆزسیۆنﯽ دارێکﯽﺗمەسیﺎسە یندهزهمە ﺑە
 رﺑﺎزهەس نلایەلە داعش پێکردنﯽ شقمە رسەلە ﻭهﺑڵاﻭکردۆﺗە زانیﺎری ﺗﻭرکﯽ ﺗری دارێکﯽﺗمەسیﺎسە. داعش ڵاﺗﯽسەده ژێر سﻭریﺎی
 ﺑینیﻭه لقﺎدیئە یﺎسین جﺎر سێ ردۆگﺎن،ئە یبﺗە بجەره ﺗﻭرکیﺎ، زیرانﯽﻭه رۆکسە کە یﺎندﻭهنگەرایە چﺎﻭدێرێک ندچە. ﻭهکﺎنەﺗﻭرکە
   .داعشە رێکﯽﺗیدهیﺎرمە ﻭ نزیکە زۆر داعش لە کە
 
 دسەئە ژێمﯽر رێت،نﺎﻭﺑەلە سﻭریﺎ لە سیﺎسﯽ نﯽلایە دﻭ یەرهنقەئە ﻭیسﺗﯽ چﻭنکە دات،ده ﻭانەﺗﻭندڕه ﺗیرۆریسﺗە مئە ﺗﯽرمەیﺎ ﺗﻭرکیﺎ
 .سﻭریﺎ ڵاﺗﯽخۆرهە ﺑﺎکﻭری لە) ایەدرﻭسﺗﺑﻭند لە کە کﻭردی ﺗﯽﻭڵەده( رۆژئﺎڤﺎ ﻭ
 
 ندچە ﻭ خۆرئﺎﻭا ﻭڵاﺗﺎنﯽ ڵگە لە ﺗﺎدارهسەلە: "ڵێتده نگیزجە گیررۆژنﺎمە کﻭه ﺑدات، داعش ﺗﯽیﺎرمە ﻭهکﺎﺗەﺗیدهره ﺗﻭرکیﺎ ندهرچەهە
 ."داعش انﯽﺗیدیﺎرمە لە ﻭامەردهﺑە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ یﻭهئﺎگﺎهێنﺎنەﺑە ﻭێرای دﻭاﺗر ﻭ ﺑﯽرهعە ﻭڵاﺗێکﯽ
 لە. ﺑێتده ﺗرهێزﺑە ﻭ کﺎتده شەگە شکەکﻭردیە کیﺎنە ﻭ ڵاﺗدایەسەده لە هێشﺗﺎ دسەئە لکﺎﻭێک،زه ﺑۆﺗە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ کﺎنﯽرکردهسە ﺑۆ سﻭریﺎ
 ریکردنەپشﺗگی مئە. نکەده داعش کﻭه کﺎنﯽگرﻭپە ﺗرینندهدڕه ﻭ رادیکﺎڵﺗرین هﺎریکﺎری ﺗﻭرکیﺎ کﺎنﯽرکردهسە داﻭاﻗیعە مئە ڵامﯽﻭه
 کیﺎﺗﻭر( ﻭهکردۆﺗە نزیک ڕاسﺗﯽنﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽخۆرهە عملاﻗﯽ دﻭ پێکدادانﯽ خۆی ﻭریدهﺑە میشئە کە ﻭهکردۆﺗە عێراق لە مﯽدﻭه یرهﺑە
 .)ئێران ﻭ
 هێنێتکﺎردهﺑە داعش لۆگۆیREDASİH  : نﺑﻭڵسﺗەئە لە خێرخﻭازی رێکخراﻭێکﯽ
 :سەرچﺎﻭە
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  4102/90/71
 ئەم ێدەچێتپ ﺑەڵام. کرد ئﺎشکرا داعش ﺑەرامﺑەر ئێسﺗﺎ ﺑۆ لەسەرخۆکەی سﺗراﺗیجیە پلانە چﻭارچێﻭەی لەگﻭﺗﺎرێکدا ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ، سەرۆک
 ﻭ ردنمەشقک پشﺗیﻭانﯽ ﺑە ﺑەیەکگرﺗﻭیﯽ عێراق مﺎنەﻭەی ﺑۆ هەﻭڵدان. ﺑگرێت لەخۆ دیکە نﻭێﯽ ﺑیرۆکەی ﻭ ﻭردەکﺎری زۆر پلانە
. ەمﺑﺎرەﻭەل هﺎﺗﻭە ﻭەرچەرخﺎنێک کﺎﺗﯽ ﺑۆیە. شکسﺗیهێنﺎﻭە ﺗﺎﻗیکراﻭەﺗەﻭەﻭ لەزﻭەﻭە دیپلۆمﺎسﯽ فشﺎری ﻭ دەرەکﯽ لەپشﺗدانﯽ دەست
 ێزه ﺑﺎشﺗرین چﺎﻭنەﺗرسن،) پێشمەرگە( سﻭپﺎیەکﯽ خﺎﻭەن چﻭنکە دەﻭێ، کﻭردی ﻭەک ئﺎزای ﻭ هێز ﺑە گەلێکﯽ ﻭەرچەرخﺎنەش ئەم
 یە،ن رێنمﺎییکردن ﻭ مەشق ﺑە پێﻭسﺗﯽ پێشمەرگە لەمەش، جگە. ﺗﺎﻭانکﺎرەکﺎن ئیسلامیە ملﯽ ﺗەﻭﻗﯽ ﺗﻭندکردنﯽ ﺑۆ هیﻭان دﻭا ﻭ
 سەرﺑەخۆی کﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ درﻭسﺗﺑﻭنﯽ لەدﻭاڕۆژێک دڵنیﺎﺑﻭنە ﻭ سەرﺑﺎزی کەرەسﺗەی پێﻭیسﺗیەﺗﯽ پێشمەرگە ﺗەنهﺎ ئەﻭەی
 راسﺗە .شەڕە لەم ﺑکەن پێشﻭەخت دۆڕانﯽ چﺎﻭەڕﻭانﯽ دەﺑێ نەگرن، لەﺑەرچﺎﻭ راسﺗیە ئەم رۆژئﺎﻭا ﻭ ئەمەریکﺎ ئەگەر. لێﺑەکەﻭێﺗەﻭە
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 ﺑە دژ یەن پێشڕەﻭی ﺗﻭانﺎی لەرزۆکە، حکﻭمەﺗێکﯽ ئەمە ﺑەڵام دەکﺎت، عێراق مﺎنەیﺑەسﺗەز سﻭپﺎ ئەﻭ پشﺗیﻭانﯽ نﻭێ حکﻭمەﺗێکﯽ
 ﺑڵاﻭ نﺎﻭچەکە لەهەمﻭ ﻭ دەکﺎت درێژخﺎیەن ﺗەنگەشەی ﻭ گێژەنگ ﺗﻭشﯽ زۆر سﺎڵانێکﯽ نﺎﻭچەکە دەﻭڵەﺗێک. ئیسلامﯽ دەﻭڵەﺗﯽ
 .دەریﺎکﺎنمﺎن کەنﺎری دەگﺎﺗە زۆریش خێراییەکﯽ ﺑە پﺎشﺎن دەﺑێﺗەﻭە،
 
  ﻭسﺗەکﺎننﺎدر هۆکﺎرە
 ەمئ کﺎﺗیشدا لەهەمﺎن مﻭسڵ، لەﺑەنداﻭی داعش دﻭرخسﺗنەﻭەی ﺑۆ دەرکرد ئﺎسمﺎنﯽ هێزی دەسﺗﺑەکﺎرﺑﻭنﯽ فەرمﺎنﯽ ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ ﺑەفەرمﯽ
 ﺑۆ ﺑﺎشن زۆر هۆکﺎری ئەمﺎنەش هەمﻭ. ﺑپﺎرێزێت کﻭرد پﺎیﺗەخﺗﯽ هەﻭلێری ﻭ عێراق ئﺎیینیەکﺎنﯽ کەمﺎیەﺗیە ﺗﻭانﯽ هێرشە
 ە،ﺑەشداریکرن نﺎﻭەﻭ چﻭنە ﺑۆ ﺑنەڕەﺗیەکە ﻭ درﻭست هۆکﺎرە دەﺑﻭ لەڕاسﺗیدا ﺑەڵام. ﺑﺎرﻭدۆخەکە نﺎﻭ دەسﺗخسﺗنە ﻭ ﺑەشداریکردن
 ردەﻭەکﻭ ﺑەنﺎﻭی لەمﺑﺎرەﻭە دەسﺗپێشخەریەکیش هەر ﺗر، هۆکﺎری نەک سەرﺑەخۆیﯽ ﺑۆ ﺑێت کﻭرد راشکﺎﻭانەی پشﺗیﻭانیکردنﯽ
 ەزارانه ﺑەیەکگرﺗﻭیﯽ عێراق ﻭەک لەیەکﺗرازاﻭی گەلێکﯽ یمﺎنەﻭە ﺑۆ سﺎڵانێکە. مەسﺗەکﺎنمﺎن ﺑە گەیشﺗن زﻭﺗر هۆی دەﺑﻭە ﺑکرایﺎ
 .ﺑکەن ﺑەخت ﺑۆ خۆیﺎن گیﺎنﯽ زەحمەﺗیشە نیەﻭ ﺑۆ ئینﺗیمﺎی کﻭرد کﻭردێک، لەچەند جگە عێراﻗەی ئەﻭ دراﻭە، ﻗﻭرﺑﺎنﯽ
 
 نگﯽجە ۆﺗﺎیﯽلەک رەخسﺎ ﺑۆیﺎن دەرفەﺗەی ئەﻭ لەمەﻭﺑەر سەدەیەک نزیکەی سەرﺑەخۆیﯽ، ﺑۆ ﺑەخشینە گیﺎن ئﺎمﺎدەی هەمیشە کﻭرد
 ئیمپراﺗۆریەﺗﯽ نەخشەکێشﺎنەﻭەی لەنﻭێ سەر ﻭ هەڵﻭەشﺎندنەﻭە دﻭای: دەرهێندرا لەدەسﺗیﺎن) ١(ڤێرسﺎی لەپەیمﺎنﯽ یەکەم جیهﺎنﯽ
 امۆشکراﻭفەر کﻭردسﺗﺎنیش ئیسرائیل، ﺑۆ کەلێنیک کردنەﻭەی ﻭ ئﻭردن لﻭﺑنﺎن، سﻭریﺎ، عێراق،: ﻭەک ﻭڵاﺗێکﯽ چەند ﺑۆ عﻭسمﺎنﯽ
 ﻭڵاﺗێکدا چەند ﺑەسەر لەیەکچﻭ هﺎﻭشێﻭەﻭ کەلﺗﻭری ﻭ ئﺎیین ﻭ رەگەز یەک خﺎﻭەن کﻭرد، ﻭەک کەسﯽ ۆنملی ٠٤ - ٠٣ گەلێکﯽ
 .داﺑەشکرا
 
 لەڕﻭی. هەﺑێت لەخۆکردنﯽ ﺑەرگری مﺎنەﻭەﻭ ﺗﻭانﺎی کە زیندﻭ، کیﺎنێکﯽ ﺑﻭنیﺎدنﺎنﯽ ﺑۆ پێﻭیسﺗە چﯽ ﺗێدەگﺎ کﻭرد ئەمڕۆ،
 نکەچﻭ. دەرکەﻭێ نﺎﻭەڕاست رۆژهەڵاﺗﯽ مﻭسﻭڵمﺎنﺎنﯽ لەنﺎﻭ ئیسرائیل ﻭشێﻭەیهﺎ هەیە ﺗەﻭاﻭی مﺎفﯽ ﻭ ﺗﻭانﺎ کﻭرد دەسەڵاﺗدارێﺗیەﻭە
 ﺑە ﻭیسﺗﯽپێ کﻭرد ﺑﻭارەدا لەم ﺑۆیە دەکﺎت، پﺗەﻭ ئﺎﺑﻭری ﺑنەمﺎیەکﯽ دەسﺗەﺑەری زیندﻭ ﺑﺎزرگﺎنﯽ چینێکﯽ ﻭ زۆر نەﻭﺗێکﯽ ﺑﻭنﯽ
 .نیە لەکەس دەسﺗپﺎنکردنەﻭە
 
  راسﺗەﻗینە ئیسلامﯽ دیمﻭکراسﯽ
 زۆرێک نﯽژیﺎ ﺑێسﻭد ﻭ دەمﺎنەﻭێ لەعێراق ئێمە دیمﻭکراﺗیەی ئەﻭ هﺎﻭشێﻭەی راسﺗەﻗینە ئیسلامﯽ دیمﻭکراﺗﯽ سیسﺗەمێکﯽ داﺑنێ ﻭا
 نەﻭلەﺑەردەممﺎ رێک ئێسﺗﺎ سیسﺗەمە ئەم ﻭێنﺎی. ﺑﻭنە هﺎﺗنە ﻗﺎﺑیلﯽ نﺎﻭەڕاسﺗدا رۆژهەڵاﺗﯽ لەنﺎﻭجەرگەی دانﺎ، ﺑۆ لەئەمەریکیمﺎن
 مﺎفﯽ" ئیسرائیلﯽ ﺑەسﺗﺎیلﯽ پشﺗﺑەسﺗن لەجێیدا ﺑهێنین، دیمﻭکرات ﻭ ﺗﻭیەکگر عێراﻗﯽ لەخەیﺎڵﯽ ﻭاز مەرجەی ﺑەﻭ گەییﻭە،
 نەهﺎملیۆ کە ﺑﺑەن ﻭڵاﺗﺎنە ئەﻭ لەخﺎکﯽ ﺑچﻭک پﺎرچەیەکﯽ ﺑەﻗەد ئەﻭەی ﺑێ کﻭردەکﺎن ﺑکرێت، داﺑین کﻭردەکﺎن ﺑۆ) ٢"(گەڕانەﻭە
 .ێتدەﺑ ﺑەر دەسﺗە دیمﻭکراﺗیەش ەمەسیسﺗ ئەﻭ پڕجﻭڵە، زیندﻭی ﻭ ئﺎزاد میلەﺗێکﯽ دەﺑنە دەژین، ﺗێیدا ئﺎیینیەکﺎنیﺎن لەﺑرا
 
 ﺎنﯽکﻭردەک. هەیە هێزیﺎن دەکﺎت، پێﻭیست فراﻭانەی نﺎﻭچە لەﻭ لێیەﻭ داعشﯽ شﻭێنﺎنەی لەﻭ لەعێراق سﻭریﺎﻭ لەﺑﺎکﻭری کﻭردەکﺎن
 هەمﺎن ەﺑ ﺗﻭرکیﺎش کﻭردەکﺎنﯽ. دەکەن داعش ﻭ ئەسەد رژێمﯽ ﺑەرﺑەرەکﺎنﯽ کﺎﺗدا لەیەک ﺗێدایە ﺑﺎشیﺎن زیندﻭیەﺗﯽ ﺗﻭانﺎﻭ سﻭریﺎ
 لەنێﻭان .ﻭڵاﺗە لەﻭ ﺑەشێکن ئەﻭان خۆ نەکرێت؟ لەﺑەرچﯽ ﺑێت، هﺎﻭکﺎریﺎن لەنﺎﺗۆ هﺎﻭپەیمﺎنمﺎن ﺗﻭرکیﺎی ئەگەر هﺎﻭپەیمﺎنمﺎنن شێﻭە
 ەداعش لێدانﯽ ﺑۆ ئﺎمﺎدەن ﺑێت نرخێک ﺑەهەر هەردﻭلایﺎن هەیەﻭ لەخۆشەﻭیسﺗﯽ جۆرێک ئێرانیش کﻭردەکﺎنﯽ ﻭ ﺗﺎران مەلاکﺎنﯽ
 .سﻭنەکﺎن
 
 ﻭ شﺎیﺎنیﺎنە ەک ئﺎمﺎنجەی ﺑەﻭ گەیشﺗن ﺑۆ ﺑدات کﻭرد یﺎرمەﺗﯽ دیﺑلۆمﺎسیەﻭە ﻭ سەرﺑﺎزی لەﺑﻭاری ﺗەﻭاﻭی ﺑە پێﻭیسﺗە کﺎئەمەری ﺑۆیە
 .کردﻭە ﺑەخت لەپێنﺎﻭدا گیﺎنیﺎن زۆرێکیﺎن
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 ێکیشدەرفەﺗ هەم ﺑکرێﺗەﻭە، راست راﺑردﻭ سەدەیەکﯽ هەڵەی هەم داعش ﺑە دژ ئۆمﺎﺑﺎﻭە سﺗراﺗیجەی ئەم ﺑەهۆی نﺎزاندرێت دﻭر ﺑە




 دەرﺑﺎرەی)  سیڤەر -٥  ﺗریﺎنۆن -٤ نیﻭلای -٣ - گیرمەین سﺎنت -٢ڤێرسﺎی،-١( پەیمﺎنەی پێنج لەﻭ ﺑﻭ یەک ڤێرسﺎی پەیمﺎنﯽ -١
 ەیمﺎنﯽلەپ ﺑﺎسکراﻭە، کﻭرد پرسﯽ سیڤەردا پەیمﺎنﯽ مﺎدەیەکﯽ لەچەند. هﺎﻭپەیمﺎنﺎن ئەڵمﺎنیﺎﻭ لەنێﻭان ﺑەسﺗرا یەکەم جیهﺎنﯽ شەڕی
 ٤١ پﺎکێجێکﯽ ﻭیلسۆن ﻭیدرۆ ئەمەریکﺎ سەرۆکﯽ ٨١٩١/١/٨  لە. پێشێلکران دراﺑﻭن کﻭرد ﺑە لەسیڤەر ﺑەڵێنﺎنەی ئەﻭ هەمﻭ لۆزان
 سەرﺑەخۆیﯽ مﺎفﯽ لەدیﺎریکردنﯽ ﺑﺎس ٢١ لەخﺎڵﯽ خﻭێندەﻭە، ئەمەریکﯽ لەکۆنگرێسﯽ یەکەم جیهﺎنﯽ ﺑەشەڕی کۆﺗﺎییهێنﺎن ﺑۆ خﺎڵﯽ
 )ﻭەرگێڕ. (نەﺗەﻭانە لەﻭ ﺑﻭ یەکێک کﻭرد ﺗﻭرکدان، کۆنﺗڕۆڵﯽ لەژێر ﻭ نین ﺗﻭرک کە دەکﺎت نەﺗەﻭانە ەﻭئ هەمﻭ
 
 "nruter ot thgir"  گەڕانەﻭە مﺎفﯽ  -٢
 ﺎفەکﺎنﯽم ﺑۆ نێﻭنەﺗەﻭەیﯽ پەیمﺎنﯽ ﻭ مرۆڤ مﺎفەکﺎنﯽ جیهﺎنﯽ جﺎرنﺎمەی لەنێﻭ نێﻭدەﻭڵەﺗﯽ یﺎسﺎی سەرەﺗﺎکﺎنﯽ ﺑۆ ئﺎمﺎژەیە چەمکە ئەم
 .)ﻭەرگێڕ. (دەکﺎت داﺑین دایک ﻭڵاﺗﯽ ﺑۆ هﺎﺗنەﻭە ﻭ گەڕانەﻭە مﺎفﯽ ﺗێیدا سیﺎسﯽ، ﻭ ﯽمەدەن
 
 ﺗﻭدەی ئێس یﻭ: سەرچﺎﻭە
 31.SKA
 06=DIkniL&18443=di?xpsa.liateD/moc.yiebs//:ptth
 ئەمەريکﺎ و کورد
       سمۆڵ نیوﺗۆن جەی
 فرمﺎن مەلا: لەئینگلیزيەوە
  4102/80/42
 یشنﺎپﺎک مێژوی ﺑەڵام دەکەن، ئەمەريکﺎ هﺎوکﺎری  ﺑەخێرهﺎﺗنﯽ لەعێراق کوردەکﺎن ئەوەی لەگەڵ" دەنوسێت نیوﺗۆن جەی
 ."نﺎکەن لەيﺎد
 
  ئەمەريکﺎ/  کورد پەيوەنديەکﺎنﯽ مێژوی لە کورﺗەيەک
 ەولێره شﺎری ﺑڵاوﺑوەوە، داعشەوە لەلايەن شﺎرە ئەم گرﺗنﯽ هەواڵﯽ کﺎﺗێ دورە، کوردانەوە لەپﺎيتەختﯽ سەعﺎت نیو گوێر
 ﺑە يﺎن ﺑێت فڕۆکەوە لەرێگەی چ دەرﺑﺎزﺑونیﺎندا زو هەوڵﯽ خۆپێچﺎنەوەو کەوﺗنە زۆر خەڵکێکﯽ. شڵەژا سەعﺎﺗێک چەند ﺑۆ
 داکۆکیکردن ﺑۆ ۆﺑﺎمﺎئ سەرۆک ﺑەڵێندانﯽ و ئەمەريکﺎ جەنگیەکﺎنﯽ فڕۆکە دەستبەکﺎرﺑونﯽ ﺑەڵام. ﺗورکیﺎ ﺑەرەو ئۆﺗۆمبێل
 .کردەوە هێور ﺑﺎرودۆخەکەی لەهەولێر
 
  543
 ڵێتدە عێراق پێشوی دەرەوەی وەزيری زێبﺎری هۆشیﺎر لەمبﺎرەوە. دايەوە پشودانیﺎن ﻗوڵﯽ هەنﺎسەيەکﯽ کوردەکﺎن ﺑەمەش
 ەرپرسﯽﺑ حوسێن، فواد دکتۆر هەروەهﺎ". دايﺎن ژيﺎن، پﺎراستنﯽ ﺑۆ کە ئەمەريکﺎيە ﺑڕيﺎرەکەی پێشکەوﺗن گرنگترين"
 و مرۆيﯽ هﺎوکﺎريە داعش، دژی يەکگرﺗوەکﺎن نەﺗەوە ﺑڕيﺎرەکﺎنﯽ ئەمەريکﺎ، هﺎوکﺎريەکﺎنﯽ ﺑﺎرزانﯽ، مەسعود مەکتەﺑﯽ
 کورد لەمەودا ەک سەلمﺎند ئەوەی پێشمەرگە ﺑۆ ئەمەريکﺎش سەرﺑﺎزيەکﺎنﯽ پشتیوانیە. نرخﺎند ﺑەرز هﺎوپەيمﺎنﯽ ﺗەکنیکیەکﺎنﯽ
 .نیە نپشتیوانیﺎ و دۆست چیﺎکﺎن ﺗەنهﺎ ﺑە
 
 ﺑکﺎت ەگەڵل نﺎپﺎکیﺎن ئەمەريکﺎ يەکگرﺗوەکﺎنﯽ ويلايەﺗە ﺗر جﺎرێکﯽ هەيە ئەوەيﺎن مەﺗرسﯽ لەکوردەکﺎن زۆرێک دەوﺗرێت،
 عێراق ﺑە داوە کﯽفۆرمێ چ کوردی دەوڵەﺗﯽ پرسﯽ نﺎديدەگیراو، میلەﺗێکﯽ کتێبﯽ نوسەری لۆرانس، ﻗويل.  ﺗێبکﺎت پشتیﺎن و
 ئەمەريکﺎ هەيە، پێکەوە لێکردن پشت و لەپەيوەندی مێژويەکیﺎن ئەمەريکﺎ و ردکو"  دەڵێت نﺎوەڕاست، رۆژهەڵاﺗﯽ و
 ەڵامﺑ".. نەﺑوە راستەﻗینەی دۆستﯽ و نەکردوە ﺗەواوی پشتیوانﯽ پێويست وەک کﺎت هیج ﺑەڵام داوە، کوردانﯽ يﺎرمەﺗﯽ
 .دەگەڕێنێتەوە ئەمەريکﺎ ﺑە کورد متمﺎنەی ﺗﺎڕادەيەک جەنگیەکﺎن فڕۆکە نﺎردنﯽ و ئەمەريکﺎ جﺎرەی ئەم فريﺎکەوﺗنﯽ
 
 ەيشتەگ ﺗﺎﻗیکردەوە، لەعێراق ﺗری ئەگەرەکﺎنﯽ و لايەن هەمو ئەمەريکﺎ ﺗﺎ خﺎيﺎند سەدەيەکﯽ نزيکەی دواجﺎر، و لەکۆﺗﺎيﯽ
 .ﺑکﺎت کورد ﺑە متمﺎنە ﺑڕوايەی ئەو
 
 خﺎڵیەکەی ٤١ پﺎکێچە لە وێنەيەک هەمیشە ﺑەرزنجﯽ محمود شێخ کورد يﺎخیبوی سەرۆکﯽ لەمەوﺑەر سﺎڵ ٠٠١ نزيکەی
 چﺎرەی مﺎفﯽ کەڵکەڵەی نوسراوەوە ئەو ﺑەهۆی ئەمەريکیەکﺎنەوە لەلايەن شێخ ﺑوە، لەگیرفﺎندا) ١(ويلسۆنﯽ وودرۆ
. شتگوێخستوەپ کوردی ئەمەريکﺎ رەخسﺎﺑێت کورد ﺑۆ وا هەلێکﯽ کﺎﺗێ هەر ئێستﺎ ﺗﺎ لەوکﺎﺗەوە کەچﯽ. ﺑوە پەيدا لا خۆنوسینﯽ
 سەرﺑەخۆی دەوڵەﺗﯽ دامەزراندنﯽ لەسەر رەزامەندﺑون سیڤەر لەپەيمﺎنﯽ يمﺎنﺎنهﺎوپە ويلسۆن وﺗﺎرەکەی دوای سﺎڵ دو
 ەکوردل پشتﯽ نێودەوڵەﺗﯽ کۆمەڵگەی نراو ئەﺗﺎﺗورکدا کەمﺎل ﺗورکیﺎی ﺑە دان لۆزاندا لەپەيمﺎنﯽ ٣٢٩١ لە ﺑەڵام. کوردستﺎن
 .ێکردپ دەستﯽ سەرﺑەخۆيﯽ ﺑۆ ردکو خەﺑﺎﺗﯽ لێرەوە. راستﯽ ﺑە نەﺑو داﺑو ﺑەڵێنیﺎن لەسیڤەر ريفراندۆمەی ئەر و کرد
 
 ەميەک حەفتﺎکﺎن سەرەﺗﺎی لە کوردەکﺎن ئێران شﺎی هﺎوکﺎری ﺑە لەعێراق، جیﺎﺑونەوە ﺑۆ ﺑێهودە هەوڵدانﯽ چەندين دوای
 ئێران شﺎی سۆڤیەت، يەکێتﯽ و عێراق هﺎوپەيمﺎنﯽ ﺑەستنﯽ دوای ٢٧٩١ لە. وەرگرت لەئەمەريکﺎ نﺎڕاستەوخۆی هﺎوکﺎری
. گیراﺑو رداﺑەسە دەستﯽ لەمیسر روسیﺎنەی چەکە ئەو فرۆشتنﯽ ﺑە کوردەکﺎن چەکدارکردنﯽ ﺑۆ مەريکﺎئە سەر خستە فشﺎری
 کراوە لەشەڕێکﯽ کورد ٢)ﺑەرزنجﯽ ﺑنەمﺎڵەی سەر دەگەڕێتەوە ﺑﺎرزانﯽ( ﺑﺎرزان مستەفﺎی مەلا سەرکردايەﺗﯽ ﺑە ٤٧٩١ لە
 د،وەستﺎن هﺎوکﺎريەکﯽ هەمو ئێران ئێراق، و ئێران ننێوا جەزائیری رێککەوﺗنﯽ لەئەنجﺎمﯽ ٥٧٩١ لە ﺑەڵام. ﺑو گەورەدا و
 دوايﯽ کۆچﯽ لەوێ هەر ٩٧٩١ لە ئەمەريکﺎو چوە پﺎشﺎن ﺑو، ئێران ئﺎوارەی ﺑﺎرزانیش. هێنﺎ شکستﯽ کورد شۆڕشﯽ ﺑەمەش
 رﺑﺎنﯽﻗو ەﺑ ﺑو کورد جﺎرەش ئەم و، گۆڕا ﺑۆچونەکﺎنﯽ ئەمەريکﺎ ﺗر جﺎرێکﯽ ﺑو، ﺑەرپﺎ ئێرانیش شۆڕشﯽ سﺎڵدا لەهەمﺎن کرد،
 .ﺑێمەﺑەست
 
 سێهەم ﺑۆ ەريکﺎئەم پشتیوانﯽ ﺑە ﺑەديکرد، سەرﺑەخۆيﯽ ﺑۆ ﺗروسکﺎيیەکﯽ کورد يەکەم کەنداوی شەڕی کۆﺗﺎيﯽ لەسەروﺑەندی
 ەل زيﺎﺗر کوشت، گوندنشینﯽ هەزار دەيﺎن و کورد سەر کردە هێرشﯽ حوسێن. راپەڕی) حوسێن سەدام( حوسێن دژی جﺎر
 ﯽسەرﺑﺎزان و سوپﺎ ئﺎسمﺎنﯽ، لەهﺎوکﺎری جگە ئەمەريکﺎ.  ﺗورکیﺎ گەيشتنە کﺎنەوەلەشﺎخە کورد نیو و ملیۆن يەک 5.1
 ﺎراستنﯽپ ﺑۆ. ﺑکشێتەوە ﺑکﺎت نﺎچﺎر کەرکوک ﺗﺎ حوسێن سەدام سوپﺎی ﺗوانﯽ کورد ئﺎسمﺎنیە پشتیوانیە ﺑەو.  نەجوڵاند
 .ﺑو ﺑەردەوام دوەم کەنداوی ەڕیش ﺗﺎ: خﺎيﺎند دەيەی يەک نزيکەی ﺑڕيﺎرە ئەم درا، فڕين دژە نﺎوچەی ﺑڕيﺎری کوردەکﺎن
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 ﺎوکﺎریه ئﺎمﺎدەيﯽ کوردەکﺎن عێراق، سەر ﺑکەنە هێرش لەﺗورکیﺎوە نەدا ئەمەريکﺎ سوپﺎی ﺑە رێگﺎی ﺗورکیﺎ کﺎﺗێ ٣٠٠٢ لە
 ەرﺑەخۆيﯽس رۆژی پێیواﺑو ﺗر جﺎرێکﯽ کورد لێرەوە. جەنگین ئەمەريکﺎ ﺗﺎيبەﺗەکﺎنﯽ هێزە شﺎنبەشﺎنﯽ دەرﺑڕی، ﺗەواويﺎن
 داو دیکور چەکدامﺎڵینﯽ هەوڵﯽ ئەمەريکﺎ کﺎﺗێ ﺑون سەرسوڕمﺎن ﺗوشﯽ کوردەکﺎن پێنەچو، هێندەی ﺑەڵام. وەدەﺑێتە نزيک
 شێوەيەک هیج ﺑە کورد ﺑەڵام کرد، ئەمەيﺎن دڵیەوە دو ﺑە زۆر. ﺑکەن عێراق نوێﯽ لەحکومەﺗﯽ ﺑەشداری لێکردن داوای
 .نەدەکرد مﺎلیکﯽ نوری وەک وەزيرێکﯽ سەرۆک چﺎوەڕوانﯽ
 
 ەوەيﺎندەر نﺎردنە و نەوت ﺑیری هەڵکەندنﯽ خﺎوەندارێتﯽ مﺎفﯽ کورد کە رايگەيﺎندوە يەک لەدوای يەک جﺎرێک چەند مﺎلیکﯽ
 پێشمەرگەی هەزار شەست ٠٦ نزيکەی ١١٠٢ لەکۆﺗﺎيﯽ. دێنن ئێستﺎ عێراﻗەی ﺑەم کۆﺗﺎيﯽ و دەﺑن ﺑەهێز لێرەوە چونکە نیە،
 کەوﺗە فەلوجە ٣١٠٢ لە. ﺑونەوە نزيک يەکتر روﺑەڕوﺑونەوەی لە کەرکوک نەوﺗەکﺎنﯽ ﺑیرە نزيک عێراق سوپﺎی و کورد
 ﺑەغدا و ﺑەرە عێراق سوپﺎی. داعش دەست کەوﺗە ﺗکريتیش و موسڵ ٤١٠٢ لەهﺎوينﯽ پﺎشﺎن و ﺗوندڕەوەکﺎن سونە دەست
 .کرد پﺎڵاوگەکەی و کەرکوک ﺗەوای کۆنتڕۆڵﯽ کوردەکﺎن. کرد پﺎشەکشەی
 
 چەکﯽ داﺑەشکردنﯽ لەسەر عێراق رازينەﺑونﯽ ئەمەريکﺎو، لەلايەن کورد رﺑﺎزیسە هﺎوکﺎری رەدکردنەوەی لەسەرەﺗﺎوە،
. ﺑکﺎت داکۆکﯽ میلیدا ٠٠٦ لەﺑەرەيەکﯽ نەﺗوانێ کە ﺑو پێشمەرگە هێزی لاوازی هۆکﺎری پێشمەرگەدا، ﺑەسەر ئەمەريکﯽ
 لەڕێگەی هەڵاﺗن ﺑۆ ەکردنئﺎمﺎد خۆ و ﺑیﺎنیەکﺎن و کورد شڵەژانﯽ هۆی ﺑوە هەولێرەوە لە خولەک سﯽ ٠٣ ﺑە داعشیش دوری
 .ﺗورکیﺎ ﺑۆ ئۆﺗۆمبێل ﺑە يﺎن ﺑێت فڕۆکەخﺎنەوە
 
 ەکەمي ﺑۆ. دا هەولێری پﺎراستنﯽ ﺑەڵێنﯽ ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ سەرۆک کرد، داعشﯽ ﺑۆردومﺎنﯽ و کﺎر کەوﺗە ئەمەريکﺎ راﺑردو هەفتەی
 وسچﺎرەن ﺑڕيﺎردانﯽ ﯽپشتیوان هەنگﺎوە ئەم راستە. ﺑکﺎت کورد هێزی سەرﺑﺎزی يﺎرمەﺗﯽ راستەوخۆ ئەمەريکﺎ جﺎريشە
 .سەرەﺗﺎيەکە ﺑەڵام - نﺎگەيەنێ
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 يەکەم جیهﺎنﯽ شەڕی ﺑە کۆﺗﺎيهێنﺎن ﺑۆ خﺎڵﯽ ٤١ پﺎکێجێکﯽ ويلسۆنﯽ ودرۆ ئەمەريکﺎ سەرۆکﯽ ٨١٩١/١/٨  لە -١
 ﺗورک کە دەکﺎت نەﺗەوانە ئەو هەمو سەرﺑەخۆی مﺎفﯽ ديﺎريکردنﯽ لە ﺑﺎس ٢١ لەخﺎڵﯽ ێندەوە،خو ئەمەريکﯽ لەکۆنگرێسﯽ
 .)وەرگێڕ( ﺗورکدان کۆنتڕۆڵﯽ لەژێر و نین
 رەﺗیشعەشی لەيەک نیەو نەمردا شێخﯽ و ﺑﺎرزان مستەفﺎی مەلا لەنێوان خزمﺎﺗﯽ پەيوەنديەکﯽ هیچ هەڵەيە، زانیﺎريەکﯽ  -٢





 شەنگﺎل چیﺎی هەلیکۆپﺗەرەکەی
 رﻭﺑن جەی ئەلیسﺎ




 ەنگﺎلش چیﺎی هەلیکۆپﺗەرەی لەﻭ  سێشەمە رۆژی ﺗﺎیمز، نیﻭیۆرک رۆژنﺎمەی دەرەﻭەی دێرینﯽ پەیﺎمنێری رﻭﺑن، جەی ئەلیسﺎ خﺎﺗﻭ
 سەری ەﻭشکﺎﻭ رانﯽ ئەگەرچﯽ. نﻭسیﻭە ﺑﺎﺑەﺗەی ئەم نەخۆشخﺎنە ﺗەخﺗﯽ لەسەر ﻭ ئەسﺗەنﺑﻭڵ ﺑۆ گﻭێزراﻭەﺗەﻭە پﺎشﺎن. ﺑﻭﻭ ﺑریندار
 .ئەمەریکﺎ ﺑۆ گﻭاسﺗنەﻭەی نیﺎزی ﺑە ئێسﺗﺎش. ﺑﺎشە جێگیرەﻭ ﺗەندرﻭسﺗﯽ ڵامﺑە ﺑردﻭە، درزی
 
 ئێزیدیەکﺎن؟ ﺑﺎرﻭدۆخﯽ دەرﺑﺎرەی ﺑنﻭسیﺎیﺎ چیم دەﺑﻭ ئﺎخۆ نەدایﺎ، رﻭی هەلیکۆپﺗەرە ئەﻭ کﺎرەسﺎﺗﯽ ئەگەر - ئەسﺗەنﺑﻭڵ
 
 زۆر ﯽشﻭێنێک مرۆڤەﻭەیە، ﺑﺎسکردنﯽ ﻭانﺎیﺗ لەسەرﻭی چیﺎیەکە دەدﻭێ، دەرﺑﺎرەی کەس هەمﻭ کە پێدەکرد دەسﺗم چیﺎیە ﺑەﻭ پێمﻭایە،
 ئەﻭ ﺎنکردەرﻭی سﻭریﺎ ﻭ لەعێراق ئیسلامﯽ دەﻭڵەﺗﯽ ﺗیرۆری لەچنگﯽ دەرﺑﺎزﺑﻭن ﺑۆ پەنﺎگەیەک ﻭەک ئەمﺎنە. ئێزیدیەکﺎن لای پیرۆزە
 .درێژ میل ٠٦ ﺑەرزﻭ، مەﺗر هەزار پێنج نزیکەی چیﺎیەک. چیﺎیە
 
 کﺎنﯽئێزیدیە کﻭردە دەرﺑﺎزﺑﻭنﯽ هﺎﻭکﺎری ﻭ عەرەﺑە دێرینﯽ فڕۆکەﻭانێکﯽ( سەعدی ئەحمەد مﺎجد جەنەراڵ فڕۆکەﻭان دەرﺑﺎرەی پﺎشﺎن
 .دەمنﻭسﯽ) دەکرد
 
 رۆژە ئەﻭ درێژایﯽ ﺑە دەخیل ڤیﺎن ئێزیدی پەرلەمﺎنﺗﺎری ﻭ فەرگﻭسن ئﺎدەم ﻭێنەگرەکەمﺎن لەگەڵ شەنگﺎل، چیﺎی سەر ﺑچینە ئەﻭەی ﺑۆ
 لەپەرلەمﺎنﯽ ﻗسەکﺎنﯽ ﺑە ٨/٥ لە کە پەرلەمﺎنﺗﺎرەیە ئەﻭ ڤیﺎن دەکرد، کۆپﺗەرمﺎنهەلی چﺎﻭەڕﻭانﯽ لەفیشخﺎﺑﻭر کﻭردەکﺎن سﻭپﺎی لەﺑنکەی
 ﻭﺑ پەرۆش ﺑە ﻭ ﺑەﻭرە زۆر ﻭ گﻭرجﻭگۆڵ زۆر ﺑەڵام ﺑﻭ، لەپێ پﺎژنەﺑەرزی پێڵاﻭی ئەﻭەی لەگەڵ. هەژاند لایەکﯽ هەمﻭ دڵﯽ عێراق
 .میلەﺗەکەی ﺑۆ
 
 پێﯽ ﺗﺎنﯽﺑەری ﺗەلەفزیۆنﯽ رۆژنﺎمەنﻭسێکﯽ. داﺑەزی لەفڕۆکەکەی مﺎجد لجەنەرا ﺑﻭ، ﺗێدا ئێزیدی خۆی لەﺗﻭانﺎی زیﺎد هﺎت، فڕۆکەکە
 "مەﺗرسیەﻭە؟ دەخەیﺗە خۆت لەهەلیکۆپﺗەرەکە زیﺎد ﺑﺎری ﺑﺎرکردنﯽ ﺑە ﺑۆچﯽ" گﻭت
 
 ."دەﺗﻭانێت ﺑﺎرە ئەﻭ کردﻭە، کۆنﺗڕۆڵ کێشم ﻭ نەفەرەکﺎن ژمﺎرەی" گﻭﺗﯽ مﺎجد
 
 نەدەرگﺎﻭا لەپشﺗﯽ کە کﻭرسیە ﺗەنهﺎ ئەﻭ لەسەر ﺑﻭین، هەلیکۆپﺗەرەکە سﻭاری نەمﺎﺑﻭ، رۆژ هێندەی پﺎشنیﻭەڕۆ، ٥٤:٣ لەسەعﺎت
 فڕۆکەکە. ﺎدرێپێن رێگەی ئەمەریکیدا لەسﻭپﺎی هەرگیز فڕینە جۆرە ئەم نەﺑﻭ، سەلامەﺗﯽ پشﺗێنﯽ کﻭرسیەکە دانیشﺗم، ﺑﻭ چەکدارەکە
 .شﺎخ سەر پێشمەرگەکﺎنﯽ ﺑۆ ﺗەﻗەمەنﯽ ﻭ ئﺎﻭارەکﺎن ﺑۆ لەنﺎن ﺑﻭ پڕ
 
 ئەﻭ ﺑەرامﺑەر ەچۆن ئێزیدیەکﺎن هەسﺗﯽ ئێسﺗﺎ ئەزانﯽ، ﺗۆ: فڕۆکەﻭانەکە سەر کردﺑﻭە کﺎریگەریﺎن زۆر ئێزیدیەکﺎن ﺗﯽکﺎرەسﺎ دیﺎرﺑﻭ
 ەﻭئ لەلایەن دڕندانەیە ﻭ ﻗێزەﻭن کردەﻭە لەﻭ زۆر. دراﻭسێیﺎنن سﺎڵە چەندین کە کردﻭن لێیﺎن عەرەﺑﺎنە ئەﻭ نﺎپﺎکیەی ﻭ خیﺎنەت
 .داعشەﻭە ەکﺎنﯽچەکدار لەلایەن نەک کراﻭن عەرەﺑﺎنەﻭە
 
 ئەم یﺎرمەﺗیدانﯽ ﺑۆ لێرەیە -هەیە عێراﻗﯽ ئﺎسمﺎنﯽ هێزی فڕۆکەﻭانﯽ ﺑڕﻭانﺎمەی عێراﻗیە، عەرەﺑﯽ فڕۆکەﻭانێکﯽ مﺎجدیش، جەنەرال
 منﺎڵﯽ دیمەنﯽ دیﺎرﺑﻭ. دەزانم ئەرک پیرۆزﺗرین ﻭ دیﺎرﺗرین ﺑە کﺎرە ئەم فڕۆکەﻭانیمدا سﺎڵەی ٥٣ لەژیﺎنﯽ گﻭﺗم، پێﯽ ئەﻭ... خەڵکە
 .ﺗێکردﺑﻭ کﺎری زۆر یەکﺎنئێزید
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. خﻭارەﻭە انەدەخر لەفڕۆکەﻭە کە پێنەگەیشﺗﺑﻭ خﻭاردنﺎنەی کیسە ئەﻭ شﻭێن زۆر چیﺎ، سەر ﺑگﺎﺗە کەرەسﺗەﺑﻭ ﺗرین پێﻭیست خﻭاردن
 .شﻭێنﺎنە ئەﻭ دەگەیشﺗنە ﻭ ﺑﻭن گرنگ زۆر دەﺑردران کﻭردەکﺎنەﻭە ﺑەرپرسە لەلایەن خﻭاردنﺎنەی ئەﻭ ﺑۆیە
 
 دەسﺗێکﯽ ەرلەس کچەکەی ﻭ دەسﺗێک لەسەر کﻭڕەکەی دایکێک ﺑیرم، دێﺗە. کۆﺑﻭنەﻭە هەمﻭ خەڵکەکە ﻭﺗینەﻭە،کە چیﺎ سەر نزیک کﺎﺗێ
 شێﻭاﻭی ندەهێ پیرەژنێک دەمﻭچﺎﻭی سیمﺎی. فڕۆکەکە نﺎﻭ ﺑگﺎﺗە ﺗﺎ سەرەﻭە، ﺑێﺗە ﻭ ﺑﻭەسﺗێت ﻗیت ﻭ راست ئەدا هەﻭڵﯽ هەڵگرﺗﺑﻭ، ﺗر
 .هەسﺗم سەر ەکرد گەﻭرەی زۆر کﺎریگەری نیشﺗﺑﻭ، لێﯽ خەمﺑﺎری ﻭ
 
 ﺑﻭ، ڵقرچﺎهە دەمﻭچﺎﻭیﺎن هەﺗﺎﻭ گەرمﯽ کﺎریگەری لەﺑەر دەگریﺎن، دەﺗرسﺎ، دەﺑینﯽ، منﺎڵم لەنزیکەﻭە، نیشﺗەﻭە، هەلیکۆپﺗەرەکە کﺎﺗێ
 ﺑەچﻭار ەﺗﺎنیەکﺑ لەنﺎﻭ پیﺎﻭێک چەند ﺑە ئﺎﻭسﺎﺑﻭ ﻭا ﻗﺎچﯽ ژنێک. ئﺎﻭسﺎﺑﻭ ﻗﺎچیﺎن رۆیشﺗن زۆر لەﺑەر ﺑﻭ، پەﺗﯽ پێیﺎن لەپیرەکﺎن هەندێ
 لەنزیکەﻭە ﺎﻭائ ﺗﺎئێسﺗﺎ زۆرﺑەیﺎن  دڵنیﺎم ﺑێت، رزگﺎریﺎن لەچیﺎکە ﻭ ﺑﺑن کۆپﺗەرە سﻭاری زﻭ ئەیﺎنﻭیست هەمﻭ. گرﺗﺑﻭ هەڵیﺎن دەسﺗە
 .نەﺑینیﻭە کۆپﺗەریﺎن
 
 شﺗەﻭەپ دەرگﺎی رادەیەی ﺑەﻭ ﺑێت، سﻭار خەڵک خۆی لەﺑﺎری زیﺎد کە ﻭایکرد فڕۆکەکە، نﺎﻭ چﻭنە ﺑۆ خەڵک پەلەکردنﯽ ﻭ ﻗەرەﺑﺎڵغﯽ
 خﻭارەﻭەﻭ رایﺎنکێشﺎیە لەفڕۆکەکە ﺑﻭ ﺑەدەسﺗەﻭە منداڵەکەی دﻭ لاﻭازەی ژنە ئەﻭ ﺑﻭ، جۆرێ ﺑە ﻗەرەﺑﺎڵغیەکە دانەخرێت، ﺑﺎش
 .فڕۆکەﻭانەکە سەر کردﺑﻭە کﺎری ﺗەﻭاﻭی ﺑە رەﻭشە ئەم دەکرد ﺗێﺑینم. گریﺎن ﺑە دەسﺗیﺎنکرد
 
 .ﺑﻭەﻭە لار پێشەﻭە رﻭەﻭ ەکە،شﺎخ لێژەکەی دیﻭە لای رﻭیکردە فڕۆکەکە ﺑینیمﺎن هەسﺗﺎندا لەکﺎﺗﯽ
 
 .داﻭە گەﻭرەی لەﺑەردێکﯽ  گﻭﺗم پێیﺎن کەس هەندێک پﺎشﺎن کەﻭت، شﺗێک ﺑەر فڕۆکەکە کرد هەسﺗم
 
 لەدەسﺗداﻭە ڕۆڵیﺎنکۆنﺗ کﺎﺗەی لەﻭ نەﺗەﻗێﺗەﻭە، ﻭ نەگرێت گڕ فرۆکەکە ئەﻭەی ﺑۆ یﺎریدەدەر فڕۆکەﻭانﯽ کە گﻭﺗم پێﯽ ﺗر یەکێکﯽ پﺎشﺎن
 .ەکﻭژاندۆﺗەﻭ مۆﺗۆڕەکەی
 
. ەسﺗێتﺑﻭ لەﻭەی ﺑەر خشﺎ زەﻭیدا ﺑەسەر زۆر فڕۆکەکە ﺑﺎشە، شﺗێک هەمﻭ ﻭ چیﺎیەکەین لەسەر ﻭاﺑﻭ پێم چﻭین، خﻭارەﻭە ﺑەرەﻭ کﺎﺗێ
 ﺑە دەرەﻭە، دەرکردە منﯽ ئﺎدەم ﺑڕۆم، ﺑەپێ نەمﺗﻭانﯽ من. کەﻭﺗﻭە ﺑەسەرمدا دەخیل خﺎﺗﻭ ﺑینیم کە کەﻭﺗن، ﺑەسەرمدا زۆر شﺗﻭمەکﯽ
 .ﺎپێچ سەرمﯽ ملپێچەکەی
 
 ەﺑەرئەﻭەیل فڕۆکەکەﻭە، نﺎﻭ خسﺗمیﺎنە ﻭ هەڵگرت منیﺎن کەسێک چەند. گەیشت فریﺎکەﻭﺗن هەلیکۆپﺗەرێکﯽ ﺑﻭن ﺗﺎریک دﻭنیﺎ پێش
 مﺎدام اﺑﻭﻭ پێم ﺑەڵام ﺑﻭ، زۆر یەکجﺎر ئﺎزارم. دەﺑﻭ ﺗر ئەﻭانﯽ نﺎڵەی ﻭ خۆم لەنﺎڵەی گﻭێم ﺑﻭ، زۆر ئﺎزارم گرﺗم هەڵیﺎن نەشﺎرەزایﯽ ﺑە
 .مﺑﺎش زۆرم زیندﻭم
 
 .ﺑدات یﺎرمەﺗﯽ دەیﻭیست ئەﻭ کرد؟ ئەمەی ئەﻭ چۆنە؟ فڕۆکەﻭانەکە
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 رێکﯽهەلیکۆپﺗە لەنێﻭ رۆژئﺎﻭایﯽ رۆژنﺎمەنﻭسﯽ چﻭار کﻭرد، سیﺎسەﺗمەداری پێنج فڕۆکەکە، ﺗﺎﻗمﯽ لە پێنج ئێزیدی، ٥٢ نزیکەی
 ﺑە هەردﻭکیﺎن. نەﺑﻭن هیلاک دەخیل ﻭ رﻭﺑین خﺎﺗﻭ ﻭەک هیچیﺎن. ﺑریندارﺑﻭن هەمﻭ ﺑﻭین، ٧١ -مﯽ جۆری رﻭسﯽ گﻭاسﺗنەﻭەی
 .ئەسﺗەنﺑﻭل ﺑۆ گﻭاسﺗرانەﻭە چﺎرەسەر مەﺑەسﺗﯽ
 
 .لەدەسﺗدا گیﺎنﯽ رﻭداﻭە لەﻭ ﺑﻭ کەس ﺗەنهﺎ مﺎجد جەنەرال
 
 ."دەخﻭازم ﺑریندارەکﺎن ﺑۆ چﺎکﺑﻭنەﻭەش هیﻭای دۆسﺗﺎنەکەت، مرۆڤ لەکﺎرە ﻭ پیرۆزت گیﺎنﯽ لە سڵاﻭ"  دەڵێت ﻭەرگێڕیش
 




 ەڕاستنﺎو ۆژهەڵاﺗﯽو ر ۆيدفر
  يدمﺎنفر ۆمﺎسﺗ
 فرمﺎن ەلا: ملەئینگلیزيەوە
 يەکێکە ەمە" ئیەن یەکﯽگرنگ یچه ڵێنﺑ ێتپ ەيﺎنەوێدو د ەﺑ و دو ێنﯽنه ەﺑ یسﺎسیەکﺎنس ەوەیئ ێرە"ل يەکگرﺗو ەرەﺑﯽع یمﺎراﺗﯽئ ئەﺑوزەﺑﯽ،
  ەﺑ ەیﻗسﺎن ەول مەڵا. ﺑێبگەیﺗ ێﯽو ل يتﺑگر ەڕاستنﺎو ۆژهەڵاﺗﯽر ەل ەسته ەوێﺑت ێکﺎﺗ یزانﯽﺑ ێشوەختپ ێويستەپ يﺎسﺎيﺎنەی ەوئ ەگرنگترينل
 ۆﺑﺎمﺎئ کەرۆس ۆنچ ەروەک. هێتﺑکر یﺎسیﺎنەس ەمئ ەڵسوکەوﺗﯽه و ەفتﺎرر  ینﯽنﺎس ۆﺑ ێندنەوەخو ەﺗواندرێتد ەيکەند ەڵکداخ ەنﺎوو ل ۆيﺎنخ ﯽزمﺎن
 ەک ەگريند ەگرنگﺎن يﺎريکەرە ەوئ ەکﺎنﯽﻗس ۆﺑ ێگو يەخەوەﺑﺎ ەﺑ ێمەشئ ێراق،ع ۆﺑ ەکﺎتد ەمەريکﯽئ ۆریپسپ ەنﺎردنﯽداعش ﺑﺎس ل ێکشﺎندنﯽﺗ ۆﺑ
 .ۆيەوەخ ەﺑۆچونﯽل ەريەکەشو ه ەيڵێند يەک ەسەرل ۆيﺎنخ ﯽمﺎنەزﺑ
 
 ێشویپ ێژکﺎریراو ێنﯽحوس يقسد ەمەدموح ەﻗسەکﺎنﯽل ەندێه ەيەمﺎو ەم)، لێمری(م یديﺎم يراسﺎﺗﯽد ۆﺑ ەڕاستنﺎو ۆژهەڵاﺗﯽر يمﺎنگﺎیەپ لەمبﺎرەوە،
 ونﺎوﺑرا ەرنﺎمەيەﺑ ەو. لیگوﺗبو ٤١٠٢/٩/٤٢ ەل ەيﺎدينم ەلەفیزيۆنﯽﺗ ەگەڵل ێکەوﺗنێکداچﺎوپ ەل ەک ڵاوکردەوەﺑ ەمﯽخﺎﺗ ەمەدمح ێرانئ ەرۆکﯽس
  :ەﺑ ەکﺎتد ەﺎمﺎژئ ەڕاشکﺎویﺑ
 
 ەرەبع یعەیو ش ئێران
 :ێتﺑگر ەرەﺑداع يتەختﯽچوار پﺎ ەسەرﺑ ەسەڵاتد یويەﺗﯽﺗوان ەيمﺎنەکﺎنیەوەهﺎوپ ەرێگەیل ێرانئ شیعەی
 .یزﺑوڵاوەح ەڕێگەیل ەيروتﺑ -
 .ەسەدەوەئ ەشﺎرﺑ ەلەویع ێمﯽرژ ەڕێگەیل يمەشقد -
 .ەدەسەڵاﺗدايەل یعەيەیش ەﺗەحکوم ەوئ ەڕێگەیل ەغداﺑ -
 .ڵبنزا ەکﺎنداسون ەسەرو ﺑ يەمەن يتەختﯽنﺎو پﺎ ەﺑچن یﺎنﺗوان ەيەدامﺎو ەمل یەکﺎنەوە،حوس ەڕێگەیل ەنعﺎس -
 
 گەرين،ەرﺑ ەرەکﯽس ەوەریو ﺗ ەنداوينو ک ەڕاستنﺎو ەريﺎید ێیەکﺎنﯽنو ڵتﺎنەسو ێمە"ئ ەڵێتد ەينﯽحوس ەکو یﺎزن،ن ەﺑ ەيمﺎنەکﺎنﯽو هﺎوپ ئێران
". ينرسو ەريﺎید ێیەکﺎنﯽنو ڵتﺎنەسو ێمەئ ەکێشین،د ەکەنﺎوچ ێﯽنو ەخشەین ەنعﺎس ەغداوﺑ ەيروت،ﺑ یخوارو یەنﺎرک يمەشق،د ەهران،ﺗ ەل ێمەئ
 ."ەنﺎوچونەل يکﯽنز ێڵەخ ەو"ئ ێیوايەپ ێژکﺎرەراو ەمئ يەشسعود ینﯽشﺎنش ەیرﺑﺎرەد
 
 ﺗﺎيبەﺗﯽە. ﺑێدەگرنل ێﯽگو ەجدیﺑ ەيەوه ۆیخ يەخﯽﺑﺎ ەسون ەرەﺑﯽع یلا ەڵامﺑ ێنەﺑوﺑێت،ل ێشمﺎنگو يەوا ەوەئ ەکو ێمەئ یلا ەشتﺎن ەمئ راستە،
 تﺎنەش ەمﺑدات. ئ ێرانئ ەوەويەکەین یەئﺎشت ەرنﺎمەﺑ ەﺑ ێگەر ەمەريکﺎو ئ ێننﺑه ێوانیﺎنن ڵەیسﺎ ٥٣ یسﺎرد ەڕیش ەﺑ ۆﺗﺎيﯽک ێرانو ئ ەمريکﺎئ ێککﺎﺗ
 ەکﺎنسون ەکدارەچ ٤١٠٢-١١-٣ ە: لەﺑنن يﺎرد ەسک ەندێه یلا ەنگەر ەیروداوان ەول ەندێه ۆکﺎریه ەوەیرونکردن ۆﺑ يەکهﺎوکﺎر ەﺑنەد
 .کوژران ەشیعەکﺎنل ەسک ٥ ەهۆيەوەﺑ ەسعوديەول یعەنشینش ی)ەلواحد ەل(ئ یگوند ەرس ەڵیﺎنکوﺗﺎيەه
 
 ەلافەتخ ەونﯽو خ ئەردۆگﺎن
 یﺎرەپرس مە"، و ئەڕوانبە، چﺎو"نﺎ ێتﺑوﺗر ەﺑێتد ۆدێرندا،م ەدونیﺎیل ێتﺑکر ەردۆگﺎنئ ەيبﺗ ەجەبر یﺎ،ﺗورک ۆمﺎریک ەسەرۆکﺑﺎس ل ەگەرئ ﺑﺎشە،
 :ێتﺑکر
 دروستکرا؟ ۆسپۆروسﺑ ەگەرویل ەک ەڵبژارده ەيەﺗﺎز یجیەستراﺗ ەپرد ەوئ ۆﺑ ێکﯽچ نﺎو ئەردۆگﺎن
 
 ەنﺎونﺎنﯽ. لێکشکﺎند) ﺗەفەوی(س ﯽفﺎرس یعەیش یمراﺗۆريەﺗﯽئ ٤١٥١ ەﺑو ل ەيەسون ەﺗورک ڵتﺎنەسو ەوئ ١ ەلیمﯽس ەلیم،س ڵتﺎنسو يﺎڤوس ی: پردوەڵام
 ەريتﺎنﯽﺑ يﺎیدۆپیئنسکل ەپێﯽ. ﺑەهﺎﺗوەن ەخۆوەل ەرواه ەنﺎو ەمئ ەزانند ەوان. ئەستﺎنەوەو یدژ یﺎﺗورک ەلەويەکﺎنﯽع ەمﺎيەﺗیەک ەلیمس ینﺎو ەﺑ ەپرد مەئ
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 ەکرد کﺎنﯽیەعوسمﺎن یسروم يەوسعود يﺎ،سور ەيﺎندەگ یمپراﺗۆرەکەیئ ەڵەمڕەوی) ﻗ٠٢ -٢١٥١( ەﺑو ل ﯽعوسمﺎن ڵتﺎنﯽسو يەکەم ەلیم)، سيتﺎنیکﺎ(ﺑر
و  یﺎسﯽس ەڕەشەيەکﯽه ێرانیەکﺎنئ ەوکﺎتئ ەئێران،کرد ل ەفەویس یعەیش ۆنتڕۆڵﯽو ک ۆژهەڵاتر يکردەپﺎشﺎن رو یسلامﯽ،ئ یهﺎنﯽج ەرکردەیس
 یۆخ ﯽوسمﺎنع ڵتﺎنﯽو سو یسلامئ ەلیفەیخ ەکو ەﺑو ک یشعوسمﺎن ڵتﺎنﯽسو يەکەم ەلیم. سڵمﺎنموسو ەسون ﯽعوسمﺎن ەرس ۆﺑ ەورەﺑونگ يديۆلۆجﯽئﺎ
 .نﺎسﺎند
 
 ەمەئ يﺎ،ەسورنﺎو داعش ل ۆﺑ ەچونیﺎنل یهﺎديەکﺎنج يکردنﯽهﺎوکﺎر ەکرد ﺑ ۆمەﺗبﺎرﺗ یﺎیﺗورک ێکﺎﺗ ەکردن ەڵەیه يدنﺑﺎ ۆج ۆمﺎرک ەرۆکس جێگری
 ەﺑ مەکﺎنەئیسلال ەندێه ەوﺑینینﯽخ يﺎن ێبێت،ل ەکەیجول ەموه ەوەیئ ەکو ۆژئﺎوار ەکەنﺎریل ەکەجول یشتەجێیەکﯽن ەندچ ﯽﺑون ەچێتد ەوەل ێکر
 ەزراندنﯽامد ەﺑ ەونخ ەردۆگﺎنئ ێیﺎنوايەپ یﺎﺗورک یﺎسﯽس ەچﺎودێرانﯽل ەندێ. هێتﺑ ەکﺎنسون ەموه ەونﯽئﺎوات و خ ەوەیئ ەکو یسلامیەوەئ ەﺗﯽلافەخ
 کردايەﺗﯽەرس ۆیخ ەک ەﺑینێتد ەزهەﺑەوەم ەسونن ۆدێرنەیم ەلافەﺗێکﯽخ ەﺑ ەونخ ەڵکەﺑ ینێت،نﺎﺑ يﺎو سور ەعێراقل يموکراﺗﯽد ەفر یستەمﯽس
 .ەرﺑەخۆس ێکﯽکوردستﺎن ەکن ەکەیسنور ەسەرل ەﺑﺎشتر ێپ ﯽداعش ەکو ێیەکﯽدراوس ەردۆگﺎنئ ەمەشل ەداعش. جگ ەکن ﺎتﺑک
 
 ەوازیﺑﺎنگ ﺎنﯽەگەک(ر ەنﺎونیشﺎنﯽﺑ ڵاوکردۆﺗەوەﺑ ەئەﺗلەنتیکل ەﺗێکﯽﺑﺎﺑ ەڕاست،نﺎو ۆژهەڵاﺗﯽر یﺎسەﺗﯽس ۆﺑ ینگﺑروک ەسەنتەریل ەمیدح شﺎدی
. ڵمﺎننوسوم یشتوانەکەیدان ۆرينەیز ەک ەرگرﺗوەو ێنﺎنەوەشو ەول يﺎﺗرز یسلامﯽئ ەوڵەﺗﯽد ەدروستبونﯽداعش ل یرکردنەوەی)، "ﺑیسلامﯽئ ەوڵەﺗﯽد
 ەلافەﺗێکخ رۆکەییﺑ ەڵام. ﺑەيەﺗﯽو ه ەيکﺎتد یسلامﯽئ ەلافەﺗﯽخ ۆداعش ﺑ ەک ەﺑنن یگەيشتنەﺗ ێکدانەوەول ەوئ ەگەڵل ەموسوڵمﺎنﺎنل ەشێﺑ ەنگەر ەڵامﺑ
 .ەهێزﺗرينیﺎنەﺑ -ﺑکﺎت ﯽحوکم یسلامﯽئ ەﻗﺎلیدیو ﺗ یسلامئ ەريعەﺗﯽش ەک ێژويﯽم یﺎسﯽس کﯽیﺎنێک -
 
 ەرەﺑﯽع ۆرينەیز ەک ەکردو ێبینﯽﺗ ەﺑراود ۆزيفج ەڕاستنﺎو ۆژهەڵاﺗﯽر ەل ەزاشﺎر یەکﺎنعوسمﺎن ەﺑ ەرامبەرﺑ ەسون ەرەﺑﯽع ۆچونﯽﺑ ەﺑﺎرەیل هەر
 ەڵام. ﺑیوەزان یرکەريﺎنداگ ێزێکﯽه ەﺑ ەوﺑون یەکﺎنعوسمﺎن یدژ ەواویﺗ ەﺑ ٩١ ەدەیس ﯽەکۆﺗﺎيل ەرەﺑﯽع ەیدورگ یمچەشﺎم و ن ەمیسر،ل ەسون
 ۆيەﺑ ەکەنﺎوچ یلاواز ۆﺑ ەڵامدانەوەيەکەو ەلافەتخ ەوڵەﺗەﺗﯽد ێیﺎنواﺑو) پینموسلم یخوان(ئ ەﺗﺎيەﺑەﺗﯽﺑ ەکﺎنسون یسلامیەئ ەدا گروپ ٠٢ ەسەدەیل
 .يﺎنڕشتدا ۆيﺎنداخ يینﯽئﺎ ەپەيﺎمﯽدواجﺎر ل يﺎندەوەوژ ەلافەﺗیﺎنخ یرۆکەیﺑ
 
 ەيەکدژ ﺑ ۆﺗەکەیو م ەيﺎڵو خ ەونخ ەوەندەداعش ئ ەگەڵل ەڕکردنش ەرﺑﺎرەید ەڕاستنﺎو ەرۆژهەڵاﺗﯽل ەيمﺎنەکﺎنمﺎنهﺎوپ ەﺑیریل ﯽ،کورﺗ ﺑە
  ێگومﺎنﺑ ەوائ نيﺑگر ونﺎنەەخ ەمل ێگو ەنزيکەوەل ەگەر. ئەسەرکردنیﺎنو چﺎر ێگەيشتنﺗ ەئﺎستل ەوەستﺎد ەستەوەستﺎند يﺎﺑوا ێرەل ۆيدفر ەگەرئ ەنه
 ەﺑوزەﺑﯽ،ئ ئوردن، لوﺑنﺎن، کوردستﺎن، ەک،و ﯽئﺎرام ەﺑﺎرول ەيەکﯽدورگ ەندچ  ەوەيەﺑ ێويستمﺎنپ ێمەئ ۆيە. ﺑیەن یستەکەدال ەسەرەوەیل يموکراﺗﯽد فرە
 یشداعش ەگەرئ ەيە،مﺎنم همن گو ەڵام. ﺑۆرﺑێتز ەيﺎننمون ەنﺎوچەکەل ێتﺑ ۆژيکر یوايەیه ەوﺑ ێزينداعش ﺑپﺎر ەشەڕیعومﺎن ل ەی،دوﺑ
 يﺎسور و ەعێراقل ێزەکﺎنه ێیەینو ەشبونەداﺑ ەوئ ەگەڵﺑتوانن ل ۆراوجۆرانەج ەونەخ ەوئ ەموه ﯽﺑون ەﺑ يموکراﺗەکﺎنمﺎند ەيمﺎنەهﺎوپ ێت،کبشکێﺗ
 .ێکبکەونر
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 تۆماس فریدمان
 ینیشانه خشهر نهسهناسران، لهزانراو دهترسیدار یاخود نهمهی بهو ناوچانهڕاستدا ئهكانی ناوهدهسهله
ش هیو شێوهبێگومان به!». ژدیهای تێدایه، ئهئاگاداربه«ك: یهوهڵ ئاگاداركردنهگهنا لهر دادهسهكیان لهژدیهایهئه
 .نكهده ڕاست نیشانهڵاتی ناوهموو خۆرههران ههدانهخشهنه
ت ارهبسه ئومێد بوویتایهن باریشدا بهچاكتریو لهبی، ماقوڵ بوو بێ بڕوا بوویتایهرههاری عهڵدانی بهرههدوای سه
ر گههدا ئم دواییهڵام لهبۆ دیموكراسی، به وهئۆتۆكراسییهكرد لهگۆڕانكاریی قورسیان ده كه م وڵاتانهنی ئهدیمهبه
و رهن بهر گۆڕاسهبۆچوون له كه نجامهو ئهئه یتهبێت بگهیت، دهبكه كهماشای ناوچهو دروستی تهڕاستیبه
و راقمه یتهوبكه ڵام زووش نییهنائومێد بیت، به نییه وهبێت. هێشتا كاتی ئهشبین دهو رهتاریك ریكهدیموكراسی خه
 هاووڵاتی ئاسایی كهبوو، یاخود زۆر لهنه وهبهرهنجانی عهو بوێریی گهتیهۆی ئازایهبه زانێت كه. خوا دهڕاوكێوهدڵه
م هئ بوو كه وهرئهبهخێر، لهو ئازادیدا. نهتدالهو عهترامهدوای كهڕان بهستپێكرد، بۆ گهیان دهبییهرهعه ونهم رابوئه
ڵك دركی خه ی كهوهله زۆر قووڵتره م وڵاتانهكانی ناو ئهكۆنه و بیرۆكهكانكۆنه وانهی پاسهسهلهو درۆ و دههێز
  .نتێیبگه یوهكان زۆر زیاترن لهو نموونهزگای دیموكراتیی، ترادیسیۆنبوونی دهو نهموكورتیو كهنو لێی تێبگهنپێبكه
 وتوویبۆ دیراساتی پێشكه» جۆنز هۆبكینز«ی كیی خوێندنگهرهتی ده، پسپۆڕی سیاسه»میشێل ماندلبۆوم«
 بێته رۆشهپهبه كه یهودا پیاوێكی لاواز ههڵهر پیاوێكی قهناو ههڵێت لهده یهك ههیهلهسهمه«ڵێت: تیی، دهوڵهنێوده
 ووهرهده بێته رۆشهپهبه كه یهك ههكدا دیموكراسییهر ئۆتۆكراسییهناو ههله داین كهو بڕوایهش له. ئێمهوهرهده
 ».بێتڕاستدا راست نهڵاتی ناوهخۆرههله وهئه نگهڵام رهوێت، بهربكهده
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و ڵاتوروپای خۆرههنێوان ئهله ورهڵام دوو جیاوازیی گهدا راست بوو، به 9891 ڵاتدا لهوروپای خۆرههئهله وهئه
بوو پشتی پێ كی نزیكی لیبرالیان ههوروپا رابردوویهڵاتی ئهوڵاتانی خۆرهه. زۆر لهیهڕاستدا ههڵاتی ناوهخۆرهه
و موگناتیسێكی بۆ ڵات مۆدێلێكی ناچاروروپای خۆرههها ئهروههه -می سۆڤێتی مانی كۆمۆنیزدوای نه -ستن ببه
 ، بۆیههبوویان نهوانهو ئیسلام ئهبرهی جیهانی عه. زۆربهوروپایهكێتی ئهیه پاڵدا بوو كهدیموكراسیی بازاڕی ئازاد له
ڵكو بۆ ك بۆ لیبرالیزم، بهون، نهكهپشتدا دهموو بهترازێت، ههی ئۆتۆكراسیی دهكهئاسنینه رقاپهكاتێك سه
 .ربازیرایی یاخود حوكمی سهو خێڵگهریگهفهو تایهراییئیسلامگه
ی مڕۆش ئێمهو ئهزرێنێتی خۆی دابمهكهلیبراله سیاسییه ندی پێچوو سیستمهمریكا چهیادمان بێت ئهله بێت ئێمهده
ناوی باراك بوو، باپیری  ڵبژارد كهشپێستێكمان ههره ر ئێمهوبهمه. چوار ساڵ لهسانێكی نائاساییچ كه به كردووه
 ا ئێمهكدا. ئێستیهدهسهیرانی ئابووری لهخراپترین قهربازمان بكات لهو دهنگمان بێتی پێشهوهموسڵمان بوو، بۆئه
 002 تر لهپ و ئاساییبوونهڵام ئه، بهش زۆر ئاسایی دیارههوسیحی، ئهنێكی) مه(مۆرمهبیگۆڕین به وهینهكهده وهبیر له
 .ی كردشهنگێكی ناوخۆی تێچوو تا گهو جهساڵ
كانی ڵههه لهپهسوریا رژێم بهچۆن له بینن كهمیاندان. دهكهساڵی یه 01 كان هێشتا لهفغانهو ئهكانبهرهعه
و واو ئاشتیخوازكی تهیهوهو بزووتنهچێت، ئۆپۆزسیۆنی سوریاان نهیادتفی. لهڕی تایهدیموكراسی گۆڕی بۆ شه
. ڕووی بۆوهفی رووبههری تایهو ژهكوشتند بهسهشار ئهڵام بهستیپێكرد. بهری بۆ گۆڕانی دیموكراتیی دهماوهجه
وك ك بۆ سیهك رێگهكان وهسڵمانهمو سوننه ی خۆی دژی زۆرینهكهوییهلهعه مینهر كهسه بخاته ویستی ململانێكه
كارهێنانی به وتهكه كهجیاتی چاكسازی، رژێمهی خۆی. لهی بنكهوهو هێشتنهداركردنی ئۆپۆزسیۆنكهو لهكردن
. یهفغانستانیش ههئهمان جۆر قۆرخكردن لهكان. ههو سۆزی سورییهستكارهێنانی ههو بهمیدیاكانی بۆ قۆرخكردن
ان كفغانهرۆك ئۆباما داوای لێبوردنی كرد. ئهند قورئانێكیان سووتاند. سهكان چهمریكییهئه ربازهت سهوڕێكهبه
كی یهدهركرك یان سهفغانییهكان. هیچ ئهبێتاوانه مریكییهو كوشتنی ئهوهنانهئاژاوه وتنهكه فتهك ههدرێژایی یهبه
ك یهفتهموو هههه ».یهڵههه وهستن، ئهبوه«و بڵێن: ستنیانوێرا ههیمانمانن، نههاوپه كه وهشهوانهفغانی، بهئه
كیش ناكرێت! یهكوژن، هیچ جووقهده كان موسڵمانی دیكهموسڵمانه و عیراق خۆكوژهفغانستانو ئهپاكستانله
 .وهوێتهكهڵچوونی لێدهو ههكوشتن وهكانهمریكییهن ئهلایهكان لهپیرۆزه چی سووتاندنی كتێبهكه
 نهدرێژخایه جێگرهی بۆ رزگاربوون له-حریری تهكهڕینهسوپا راپه بێت كهموو رۆژێك ئاشكرا دهمیسر ههله
ش كهو باوكهكهكوڕهله كاردێنێت. ئێستا كهمال، بهجه -كی حوسنی موبارهكهریفۆرمخوازه كوڕه-ی كهكییهرهسه
ندانی دیموكراسیی ی تاوانباركردنی كارمهڕێگهی لهكهقینهراسته ستهنیشاندانی ده وتۆته، سوپا كههرزگای بوو
ۆبی و لی)، ئیسرائیلكان (سی.ئای.ئهزگا بیانییهڵ دهگهتی كاركردن لهتۆمهو میسری، بهوروپیو ئهمریكاییئه
ی كهباربردنی داواكارییهستی لهبهڵام بۆ مه، بهیهتێكی ساختهمهتۆ مهو نائارامكردنی میسر، ئههودی بۆ تێكدانیه
  .وهكان بكێشێتهكارهست لهسوپا ده كه كانهدیموكراته
ی كانمردووه ستهده شۆڕش داین كهقووڵایی قۆناغی دژهئیسلامی كۆتاییهات. ئێستا له-بیرههاری عهقۆناغی به
ی تخۆرئاوا یارمهله چۆن ئێمه كه وهمهك بكهیهر بیرۆكهههم بیر لهدات. من ئامادهده ندهوڵی خنكاندنی ئایرابردوو هه
ێت ب. دهڕی خۆیانهشه مهدواییشدا، ئهڵام لهست بهێنن. بهدهوتن بهركهین سهت بدهرامهو كهكانی دیموكراسیهێزه
و موكان ههوهتوندڕه -ژدیهاكاندا كۆتایی دێت وڵاتی ئهك زۆر جار لهوه -ت یهنی بن، من هیوادارم كۆتایی نهخۆیان خاوه
 .و دیار نامێننڕۆنكانیش دهوهو میانڕهستدهگرنهكان دهشته
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  كیﻭڵئە فﺎمسﺗە
 
 ڵﺑژێردراﻭیهە ﺗﯽحكﻭمە چﻭار كە ﺗﻭركیﺎ رﺗﺎریﯽسكەعە. خۆشﺑﻭﻭ ﺗﻭركیﺎ پێشﻭﻭی یسﺎڵە01 مئە ،ﻭهلیﺑراڵە كﯽنیگﺎیەگۆشەلە
 .دیمﻭكراسیدا ﻭڵاﺗێكﯽ رهەلە ﺗێیداﺑێت ﺑێتده كە ییەپێگە ﻭئە خرایە رهﺑە رهﺑە ،رﻭﻭخﺎندﻭﻭه ﻭهه0691لە
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 یزییﺎنەچﺎكسﺎ ﻭئە. چﻭﻭه مﺎننە ﻭرهﺑە كیﯽ،مەره ﻭلەپەﺑە  ﺑﺎرانكردنﯽگﻭلله ﻭنجەشكەئە كﻭﻭه مرۆڤ، كﺎنﯽمﺎفە پلانﯽﺑە پێشێلكردنﯽ
 شدایەچﻭارچێﻭه ﻭلە. كردﻭﻭه فراﻭان كﺎنﯽمینەكە گرﻭﻭپە مﻭﻭهە ﻭژنﺎن ﻭكﺎنكریسﺗیﺎنە ﻭكﻭرد كﺎنﯽمﺎفە داتهﺎنیده ﻭرﻭپﺎئە ﯽكێﺗییە
  .ﺑﻭﻭه زۆرﺗر رانیﯽخۆشگﻭزه كﺎرﻭ ﺗﯽرفەده ﻭیكردﻭﻭهشەگە ﺗﻭركیﺎ ئﺎﺑﻭﻭریﯽ
 
 كﺎنﻭركەﺗ لیﺑراڵە رﻭﻭنﺎكﺑیره كە نییە رسﻭڕمﺎنسە یمﺎیە ،گۆڕانكﺎرییﺎنە مئە ﺑۆ ﺎیەمﺗمﺎن شﺎیﺎنﯽ ﻭڵاﺗدایەسەدهلە ﻭهه2002لە كە PKA
 كﺎنﺗەمﺎلیسكە شەﻭهئە رﺑەلە رهە. نكەده دیمﻭكراسیﯽ ﻭچﺎكسﺎزیﯽ یشەﺑﺎنگە ﻭهزﻭﻭهلە ﻭكردﻭﻭه یﺎنپﺎرﺗە ﻭئە پشﺗگیریﯽ مێژهلە كە
 هێڵﯽ ﻭﻭد ﻭامردهﺑە مﺎلیزمكە ﻭلیﺑرالیزم ﺗﻭركیﺎلە. ﺑردنﺎﻭده خۆفرۆش ﻭنﺎپﺎكﺑە كﺎنیﺎنلیﺑراڵە ﻭنەپﺎرﺗ ﻭسﻭێندخۆری ئە دﻭژمنﯽ كە
 .گرێتلێده یخنەره لیﺑرالیزم  ﻭكﺎتده ڵاﺗخﻭازسەده  ﺗﯽﻭڵەده پشﺗگیریﯽ  مﺎلیزمكە ﺑﻭﻭن، نﺎكۆك
 
 كە »كﻭرددا ڕﻭﻭیﺑە دیمﻭكراسﯽ یﻭهكرانە. «یكردكشەپﺎشە ﻭاﻭیﯽﺗەەﺑ  چﺎكسﺎزیﯽ مكﯽچەلە PKA راﺑردﻭﻭ سﺎڵﯽ شداﻭهئە ڵگەلە
. »ﺗیرۆر دژه« نگێزیڕهشە  ﺗﯽسیﺎسەﺑە گۆڕدرا KKP یكەنەدرێژخﺎیە ململانێ یئﺎشﺗییﺎنە ﻭلیﺑراڵییﺎنە ریسەچﺎره ﺑۆ ئﻭمێدﺑﻭﻭ یمﺎیە
 ﻭامردهﺑە رهە خنەره ﺑۆ ردۆگﺎنئە یكەپۆشینەچﺎﻭنە. سﺗگیركرانده »ﺗیرۆریزم ﺑۆ ندهپڕﻭپﺎگە« ﺗﯽﺗۆمەﺑە نﻭﻭسرۆژنﺎمە ندینچە
 .ﻭهكردیﺎنە خۆشیﺎن دۆسﺗﯽ نﻭﻭسﯽرۆژنﺎمە تنﺎنەﺗە دژیكە ﺗیﯽسﻭﻭكﺎیە دۆسێﯽ ندینچە ڵگەلە ﺑﻭﻭ،
 
 پﺎرﺗێك چیﺗر PKA كە یەﻭهئە كﺎنیشداكﺎرهﻭحﺎفیزهملە ندێكهە تنﺎنەﺗە ﻭكﺎنلیﺑراڵە ﺗﻭركەلە زۆر نﺎﻭلە ﺑڵاﻭ ﺑۆچﻭﻭنﯽ ،مﺎنەئە رﺑەلە
 ڕﻭﻭ كە یڵاﺗخﻭازیەسەده ﺗەسیﺎسە ﻭئە ﺑۆ كرێتده ئﺎراسﺗە یخنەره پﺎرﺗە ﻭئە ،ﻭهئە ﺑریلە. لێﺑكرێت چﺎكسﺎزیﯽ ئﻭمێدی نییە
 ﻭ»نﻭێ ﺗﻭركیﺎی« یرﺑﺎرهده  نیم رۆشپەﺑە  هیچ من .خۆی كﺎنﯽڵاﺗخﻭازییەسەده زراﻭهدامە درﻭسﺗكردنﯽ ﺑۆ تنﺎنەﺗە ﻭڵكشﺎنەهەلە
 .ﻗینەڕاسﺗە لیﺑراڵﯽ كﯽدیمﻭكراسییە ﺑﺑێﺗە كە ﺗﻭانﺎكﺎنﯽ
 
 ﻭهه»رایﯽئیسلامگە»لە ینكەدیدهﺑە داپﺎرﺗە ﻭلە مڕۆئە كە یكێشﺎنە ﻭلە هیچ:  ینﺑده رنجﯽسە كە یەهە گرنگ ﺗێكﯽﺑﺎﺑە شدا،ﻭهئە ڵگەلە
 ڵكﻭەﺑ ئیسلامچێﺗﯽ،لە نییە ﺑریﺗیﯽ كەﻗینەراسﺗە كێشە ڕاسﺗیدالە ،پێیﺎنﻭایە كﺎنخۆرئﺎﻭاییخﻭازه ﻭمﺎلیستكە كﻭه ڵنﺎداتەرهسە
 ﺑیردۆزیەﺑ ئﺎشقﺑﻭﻭن  ستﺑﺎڵاده كﯽیەركردهسە. ڕۆچﻭﻭن ﺗﻭركیﺎدا كلﺗﻭﻭریلە یكێشﺎنە ﻭئە دیكە كﯽﻭاﺗﺎیەﺑە. یدایەكەﺗﻭركچێﺗییەلە
 ﺗﺎﻭانﺑە كﺎنیشﺑیرۆكە تنﺎنەﺗە كە »ﺗیرۆریزم« كﯽچە ﻭكﺎتسنﻭﻭردارده رﺑڕینراده ئﺎزادیﯽ كە  فرهشە  خﻭلیﺎی ﻭهپیلانگێڕانە
 PKA .ڕﻭﻭنەیخەده یەیەده ندینچە ند،نﺎﻭه-ڕاسﺗﯽ  یﺎن ﺑﻭﻭﺑن مﺎلیستكە ﺗﻭركیﺎ ﺗﺎنﯽحكﻭمە كە نگرفﺗﺎنە ﻭئە مﺎنەئە. نێتداده
 .رنییەدهﺑە رهنقەئە یخراپﺎنە ریﺗەنە ملە كە لمﺎندیشﯽەس
 
 فریﻭدانﯽ ﻭﻭهﺑكﺎﺗە نﻭێ  خۆی كە  نﻭێنێتده ژیریﯽ هێنده یﺎن ﻗێت،چەده دانﻭێیە هﺎﻭكێشە  ملە PKA  ئﺎیﺎ: یەﻭهئە كەﻭرهگە پرسیﺎره
   .یندهده هﺎنیشﯽ ﻭینكەده ڕﻭانچﺎﻭه ؟ﻭهزیندﻭﻭﺑكﺎﺗە یكەسﺎزییەچﺎك جێندایئە ﻭﻭگیرﺑكﺎتجڵە ﺑێسنﻭﻭر ڵاﺗﯽسەده ﺑۆ خۆی
 










  namdeirF samohT… دەڵێت ەوە-کەریم نەجمدەین.د و عیراق لەبارەی چی 
 4102, 61 یرانحﻭزه:ﺑەرﻭار
  ﺑینراﻭە:09
 چەندین ﺑۆﺗەﻭە ﺑڵاﻭ semiT kroY weN ڕۆژنﺎمەی لە کە نﻭسینەکﺎنﯽ لە یەکێك لە ئەمریکﯽ نﻭسﯽ ڕۆژنﺎمە گەﻭرە فریدمﺎن ﺗۆمﺎس
 .کردﻭە ﺑەدی عیراق ﺑۆ گەشﺗێکیدا چەند لە کە ڕﻭﻭ دەخﺎﺗە ئەمریکیەکﺎن ﺑۆ گرنگ زانیﺎری
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 :کﻭردی ﺑە نﻭسینەکەی دەﻗﯽ
 ئێمەش ﻭ مەزنە زۆر ڕﻭداﻭێكﯽ كە نﺎﻭەڕاسﺗدا ڕۆژهەڵاﺗﯽ ﺑەسەر سەپێندراﺑﻭﻭ كە گەیﺎند كۆﺗﺎ ﺑە ئەﻭەی سﻭریﺎ ﻭ عێراق پەرﺗﺑﻭﻭنﯽ
 .ﺑدەینەﻭە ئەمە ﻭەڵامﯽ چۆن دەﺑێ یەكگرﺗﻭﻭەكﺎن ﻭیلایەﺗە ﻭەك
 ەگﻭزەرێئ عێراﻗدا لە كە ئەﻭەیە ﺑۆ یەكەمیﺎن. كردﻭﻭە سەرﻗﺎڵ مێشكمیﺎن ﺑنەمﺎ پێنج گەڕاﻭمەﺗەﻭە، عێراق لە ەﺑێتد هەفﺗە دﻭﻭ نزیكەی
 نە ﻭ سﻭننەكﺎن سەركردە نە نﺎﻭچەیەدا، لەﻭ نین دۆسﺗمﺎن دیكە كەسﯽ كﻭرد لە جگە. دۆست نەك ”دﻭژمنمە دﻭژمنەكەم دﻭژمنﯽ“ كە
 ەﻭەیسەندن پﺎڵپشﺗﯽ كە چەكدارەكﺎن هۆزە ﻭ ﺑەعسﯽ ﻭ سﻭننﯽ جیهﺎدییە گرﻭپە. نین ائێمەد ﺑەهﺎكﺎنﯽ ﻭ خﻭاست لەگەڵ شیعەكﺎنیش
 ﺑۆمﺎن هیچﯽ كە عێراﻗێك نﺎكەن، فرەیﯽ دیمﻭكراسﯽ عێراﻗێكﯽ لە پشﺗگیری مﻭصڵ لە عێراﻗﯽ حكﻭمەﺗﯽ لە دەكەن دەسەڵات
 ئێسﺗﺎ ﺗﺎ خۆشﯽ) مﺎلیكﯽ نﻭری( قعێرا شیعەی ﻭەزیرانﯽ سەرۆك هەرﻭەهﺎ. ﺑكەین پێشكەش یﺎرمەﺗﯽ ﺗﺎﻭەكﻭ نەهێشﺗﻭﻭەﺗەﻭە
 پۆسﺗە لە دەكﺎت شیعەكﺎن دامەزراندنﯽ ﺑۆ كﺎر دەسﺗﺑەكﺎرﺑﻭﻭنیەﻭە ڕۆژی یەكەم لە. ﺑێ فرەیﯽ عێراﻗێكﯽ پشﺗیﻭانﯽ كە نەیسەلمﺎندﻭﻭە
 ﺑە مﺎلیكﯽ ێینﺑڵ ئەﺗﻭانین ﺑۆیە. شیعیەكﺎن دامەزراﻭە ﺑۆ دارایﯽ پشﺗگیری ﻭ سﻭننە خەڵكﯽ ﻭ سیﺎسﯽ ﻭەلانﺎنﯽ ﻭ هەسﺗیﺎرەكﺎن ئەمنییە
 رگریﺑە ﻭەزیری ﻭەكﻭ دەسﺗەڵاﺗەكﺎنﯽ ﺑەكﺎرهێنﺎنﯽ ﺑەرەﻭ ﺑردی ﻭەزیران سەرۆك ﻭەكﻭ ﺑﻭﻭنﯽ ئەﻭەشدا لەگەڵ. ﺑﻭﻭە گەمژە ﻭشە مﺎنﺎی
 .داراییدا ﻭەزیری ﻭ نﺎﻭەند ﺑﺎنكﯽ ﺑەسەر گرﺗﻭﻭە دەسﺗیﺎن هﺎﻭڕێكﺎنیشﯽ ﻭ ڕەهﺎیﯽ ﺑە ﻗەﻭمﯽ ئەمنﯽ ڕاﻭێژكﺎری ﻭ نﺎﻭخۆ ﻭ
 ﺗﺎیەفەگەری ەرەنجﺎمس ﻗﺑﻭڵﺑكﺎت، فرەیﯽ ئەﻭەﺗﺎ یﺎن جێﺑەجێﺑكﺎت ﺗﺎیەفەگەری دەسەڵاﺗێكﯽ ئەﻭەﺗﺎ یﺎن هەڵﺑژێرێت، ەكیﺎنی ئەﺑﻭایە مﺎلیكﯽ
 .ﺑدەینەﻭە پﺎداشﺗﯽ ﺗﺎ نەكردﻭﻭە ئێمە پێشكەشﯽ هیچﯽ لەمەشدا ﻭ هەڵﺑژارد
 رینﺑﺎشﺗ ﺑۆچﯽ. ﺑدەینەﻭە ﻭەڵامەكەی عەرەﺑﯽ ﺑەهﺎری ڕۆشنﺎیﯽ لەﺑەر ئەﺑێ كە ﺑﻭﻭە درﻭست لەلا گرنكم پرسیﺎرێكﯽ: ﺑنەمﺎ دﻭﻭەم
 كﻭردسﺗﺎن؟ ﻭ ﺗﻭنس ﻭەك ﺗێﻭەرداﻭن، دەسﺗﯽ كەمﺗرین ئەمریكﺎ كە ئەﻭانەن نﺎﻭچەكﺎن
 یﺑریكﺎر كﻭرد ﻭ عەرەب. چییە ئێمە هەڵﺑژاردنﯽ ﻭ ﺑكەین چﯽ ئێمە كە نییە ﺑەﻭەﻭە پەیﻭەندی هیچ ئەمە نﺎ یﺎن ئەكەی ﺑﺎﻭەڕ: ﻭەڵام
 نییە، ﺗەﻭاﻭی دڵنیﺎیﯽ كەچﯽ ﺑەدەسﺗهێنﺎﻭە شیﺎﻭیﺎن ﻭ ﺑەرﻗەرار دﻭرگەیەكﯽ كﻭردسﺗﺎن ﻭ ﺗﻭنس ﯽﺑۆچ ئەﻭەی هۆكﺎری ﻭە هەیە، خۆیﺎن
 .ەداﻭ یﺎن)نییە دۆڕاﻭە كەس ﻭ ﺑراﻭە كەس( ﺑنەمﺎی جێﺑەجێكردنﯽ هەﻭڵﯽ لەكۆﺗﺎییدا دەسەڵاﺗدارەكﺎنیﺎن سیﺎسییە هێزە كە ئەﻭەیە
 ﯽهەڵﺑژاردنێك ﺑۆ ڕێگﺎخۆشكەرﺑﻭﻭن ﺑەڵكﻭ ﻭەلانﺎ نێﻭانیﺎن ەكﺎنﯽنﺎكۆكی ﺗەنهﺎ نەك كﻭردسﺗﺎن ڕكﺎﺑەرەكەی سەرەكییە هێزە دﻭﻭ
 لەسەر كە ئۆپۆزسیۆنەكﺎنیش لایەنە كە ﻭایكرد ﻭ ﺑرد خێرا هەڵكشﺎنێكﯽ ﺑەرەﻭ ئۆپۆزسیۆنەكﺎنﯽ پﺎرﺗە دﻭﻭاییﺎنەدا لەم كە دیمﻭكراسیﺎنە
 ڕژانێكﯽخﻭێن ﻭ نﺎﻭخۆیﯽ كێشمەكێشێكﯽ دﻭای نسیشﺗﻭ ﻭە. حكﻭمەﺗدا لە ﺑەشدارﺑﻭﻭن جﺎر یەكەم ﺑۆ دەكرد كﺎریﺎن گەندەڵﯽ دژە ﺑنەمﺎی
 دەسﺗﻭﻭر پێشكەﺗنخﻭازﺗرین لەسەر هﺎﻭڕاﺑن ﻭ ڕاﺑگرن ئیسلامییەكﺎن ﻭ ﺗﺎیەفییەكﺎن نێﻭان هﺎﻭسەنگﯽ ﺗﺎ دۆزیەﻭە ڕێگەچﺎرەیەكیﺎن زۆر
 خﺎﺗەدە خەندە ئەﻭكﺎﺗە نهﺎﺗە نﺎﻭەڕاست ڕۆژهەڵاﺗﯽ كە پێمﻭایە لەﺑەرئەﻭە. پێدەكرێ كﺎری ئێسﺗﺎش ﺗﺎ ﻭ عەرەﺑیدا جیهﺎنﯽ مێژﻭی لە
 شیعەكﺎن ﻭ سﻭننە. ڕﻭﻭئەدات ئینجﺎ ﺑﺑنەﻭە ئﺎشت پێكەﻭە ئەﺑێ ئەمەش پێﺑكﺎت، دەست خۆیﺎنەﻭە لە سەرەﺗﺎ خەندەیە ئەم كە لێﻭت سەر
 شینﯽجێن كێ ەك ئەكەن ئەﻭە شەڕی هێشﺗﺎ زۆرێكیﺎن ﻭ ﺑیسﺗﻭیەكە سەدەی ئێسﺗﺎ ئەﻭێت، لێمﺎن ڕاسﺗییﺎن ﺑەڵكﻭ نﺎﻭێت ئێمە لە چەكیﺎن
 ﺎﻭەكﻭﺗ منداڵەكﺎنیﺎن ﻭ خۆیﺎن لەﺑەخﺎﺗری ﺑهێنرێت پێ كۆﺗﺎیﯽ ئەﺑێت ئەمە. ژیﺎﻭە حەﻭﺗدا سەدەی لە كە محمدە پێغەمﺑەر ڕاسﺗەﻗینەی
 .هەﺑێت داهﺎﺗﻭﻭیەكیﺎن
 كە ﻭﺑﻭ ئێران ئەﻭە چﻭنكە نەﺑن، زیرەك زۆر) سﻭلەیمﺎن ﻗﺎسم( ﻗﻭدس ﺑەهێزەكەی سﻭپﺎ فەرمﺎندەی ﻭ ئێران لەﻭانەیە: ﺑنەمﺎ سێهەم
 ﻭ ﺗدالەدەس گیﺎنیﺎن ئەمریكﯽ سەرﺑﺎزی زۆرێك ﺑەهۆیەﻭە كە ﺗﺎیﺑەت ﺑۆمﺑﯽ ﺑە ئەكرد پڕچەك هﺎﻭپەیمﺎنەكﺎنﯽ شیعییە عێراﻗییە
 ەیمﺎنپ جۆرێك ﺑەهیچ ﺑەﻭەی دڵنیﺎكردەﻭە مﺎلیكﯽ كە ﺑﻭﻭ ئێران ئەﻭە ﺑڕۆین، عێراق لە ئێمە كە ﺑﻭﻭ ئێران خﻭاسﺗﯽ. ﺑریندارﺑﻭﻭن
 لە ۆیخ هەژمﻭﻭنﯽ كە ﻭیسﺗﯽ ئێران ﺑمێننەﻭە، یﺎسﺎیﯽ ﺑەشێﻭەیەكﯽ عێراق لە هێزەكﺎنمﺎن ﺗﺎﻭەكﻭ مۆرنەكﺎت ئەمریكﺎ هێزەكﺎنﯽ لەگەڵ
 لﻭﺑنﺎن ﻭ ﺎسﻭری لە ﺑەرفراﻭانﺗركردﻭﻭە هێزەكﺎنﺗﺎن ئێسﺗﺎ ﺑێ، ئێﻭە ﺑۆ هەر ﺑﺎ گﻭڵە دەسﺗە ئەم سﻭلەیمﺎن، زۆرچﺎكە. دەرﺑخﺎت نﺎﻭچەكەدا
 .ئێﻭە ﺑۆ خۆش ڕۆژێكﯽ كەﻭاﺗە ڵەﻭە،مﺎ گەڕانەﻭە ئێمەش هێزەكﺎنﯽ ﻭە عێراق ﻭ
 زۆر ئەﺑێ ﻭاﺗەكە ئەﺗۆمﯽ، چەكﯽ ﺑەدەسﺗهێنﺎنﯽ لە دەكﺎت ئێران لە ڕێگری كە ﺑین پەیمﺎننﺎمەیە ئەﻭ پﺎڵپشﺗﯽ كە لەسەرمﺎنە هێشﺗﺎ ﺑەڵام
 هەرﻭەهﺎ ﻭ هێزەكﺎنﯽ ﻭ نەئێرا لەسەر ئﺎﺑڵﻭﻗﺎنەی ئەﻭ ﺑەهۆی ﺑەڵام. ئەدەین ئێران سﻭننەكﺎنﯽ دﻭژمنە یﺎرمەﺗﯽ چەندێك لەﻭەی ئﺎگﺎدارﺑین
 .ئەمریكﺎیە ﻗﺎزانجﯽ ﺑڵێین ﺑﺎشﺗرە كەﻭاﺗە شەڕدان، لە عێراق ﻭ لﻭﺑنﺎن ﻭ سﻭریﺎ لە حیزﺑﻭڵڵاش
 .سەركردایەﺗیكردن كێشەی: چوارەم
 پێنج. لەسەری كێشەیﺎنە ﺗﻭركمﺎنەكﺎن ﻭ عەرەب ﻭ كﻭرد دﻭرﻭدرێژە مﺎﻭەیەكﯽ ﺑۆ كە شﺎرەی ئەﻭ كرد، كەركﻭكم سەردانﯽ عێراق لە 
 ﻭ ﻭێن پﺎركﯽ ﻭ ﻗیرﺗﺎﻭ ﺗﺎزەی ڕێگەﻭﺑﺎنﯽ ئەمجﺎرەیﺎن ﺑەڵام ﺑﻭﻭ، شەڕ مەیدانﯽ پیسﺗرین كەركﻭك كە ﺑﻭﻭم لەﻭێ كە لەمەﻭﺑەر سﺎڵ
 لە ﻭ نیسﺎندا مﺎنگﯽ لە ﻭ دیكە جﺎرێكﯽ) كەریم عﻭمەر نەجمەدین( كﻭرد پﺎرێزگﺎرێكﯽ ﺗیﺎیدا كە ﺑینﯽ، گەشەسەندﻭم ئﺎﺑﻭﻭرییەكﯽ
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 نەﺗەﻭەكﺎنﯽ كەمە كﻭرد لە جگە كە ئەﻭەی ﺑەهۆی هێنﺎ ﺑەدەست زیﺎﺗریشﯽ كﻭرسﯽ ﻭ هڵﺑژێردرایەﻭە ادادپەرﻭەرانەد هەڵﺑژاردنێكﯽ
 .پێدا دەنگیﺎن  ﺗﻭركمﺎنەكﺎن ﻭ عەرەب ﻭەك
 دا،٩٠٠٢ لە عێراق ﺑۆ گەڕانەﻭەی پێش كردﻭﻭە كﺎری ئەمریكﺎ لە سﺎڵ ٣٣ مﺎﻭەی ﻭ مێشكە نەشﺗەرگەری پزیشكﯽ كە نەجمەدین دكﺗۆر
 كﺎﺗژمێر ٤ لە كﺎرەﺑﺎ زیﺎدكردنﯽ ﻭە ،”كردﻭﻭەﺗەﻭە خﻭێندنگەكﺎن ﻭ نەخۆشخﺎنە ﻭ هﺎﺗﻭچۆ ﻭ ڕێگەﻭﺑﺎن ﺑﺎشﺗركردنﯽ لە جەخﺗمﺎن“ ﻭﺗﯽ
 ﻭ گرفﺗەكﺎن كردنﯽ ﺑەگشﺗﯽ ﻭ سیﺎسەت لە ﺑێزارﺑﻭﻭن كەركﻭك خەڵكﯽ“ ﻭﺗم پێﯽ هەرﻭەهﺎ. كﺎﺗژمێر ٤٢ نزیكەی ﺑۆ ڕۆژێكدا لە
 كﻭردێك ﺗﺎﻭەكﻭ ﺑەدەسﺗهێنﺎﻭە ﺗﻭركمﺎنەكﺎنمﺎن ﻭ عەرەب ﺑڕﻭای ﻭ مﺗمﺎنە ئێمە. خەڵك داﻭاكﺎرییەكﺎنﯽ ﻭردەكﺎری ﺑۆ شۆڕنەﺑﻭنەﻭە
 عەرەب ﻭ ﺗﻭركمﺎن هەڵﺑژاردنەدا لەم كە جﺎرە یەكەم ﺑۆ ئەمە ﻭ نﺎكەین جیﺎكﺎری ئێمە كە ئەكەن هەست ئەﻭان ﺑێ، پﺎرێزگﺎریﺎن
 .”كﻭرددا ﺑە دەنگیﺎن
 ﺑەﻭ ێراﻗﯽع مﺎلیكﯽ ئەگەر كە ﺑڵێم پێﺗﺎن ئەﺗﻭانم ﺑەڵام كرد، ەركﻭكﯽك ﺗەﻭاﻭی سەرﺑﺎزی كۆنﺗڕۆڵﯽ كﻭرد دﻭاییدا كێشمەكێشەی لەم
 ەرگ كەﻭاﺗە نەدەﺑﻭﻭ، درﻭست ئێسﺗﺎ ﺑێسەرﻭﺑەریەی ئەﻭ هەرگیز ئەﻭە كردﻭیەﺗﯽ نەجمەدین دكﺗۆر كە ﺑەڕێﻭەﺑﺑردایە شێﻭەیە
 .ﺑژین پێكەﻭە ئەﺗﻭانن خەڵكﯽ ئەﻭە هەﺑێ شیﺎﻭ ﻭ ﺑﺎش سەركردەیەكﯽ
 ئﺎیﺎ. نﺎگرێت ئێمە ﺑەهﺎكﺎنﯽ ڕێزی كەس كﻭرد لە جگە عێراق سەرەكییەكﺎنﯽ كﺎرەكﺗەرە لە كﺎم هیچ كﺎﺗێكدا لە كە ئەﻭەیە ﺑنەمﺎ كۆﺗﺎ
 مﺎشﺎﺗە ﻭاﻗیعﺎنە ئەگەر ﻭە ﺑۆسەرمﺎن؟ نەﺑێت هەڕەشە كە هەﺑێ سەﻗﺎمگیر عێراﻗێكﯽ ﺗﺎﻭەكﻭ ﺑجەنگێ ئێمە ﺑەهﺎكﺎنﯽ ﺑۆ هەیە كەس
 ﺑدەین؟ یﺎرمەﺗﯽ ئێمە ئەﺑێ كە كێیە ئەﻭە ﺑكەین،
 .دەسﺗێﻭەردانێك هەر لەسەر ئەﺑن ﺑەردەﻭام نیگەرانییەكﺎنم ڕﻭندەﺑێﺗەﻭە ﺑۆم ﺗﺎﻭەكﻭ ﻭ نییە ڕﻭﻭن ﺑۆم هێشﺗﺎ ﻭەڵامەكە
 
 تایمز نیویۆرك: سەرچاوە
 فرێدمﺎن ﺗۆمﺎس: نﻭسینﯽ
 ﺑەریﺗﺎنیﺎ لە زمﺎن مﺎسﺗەری خﻭێندكﺎری/  محمﻭد كریم دارا: ئینگلیزیەﻭە لە ﻭەرگێڕانﯽ
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 كۆرﺑیس: فۆﺗۆ - كﻭردسﺗﺎن رۆژئﺎﻭای لە ﻗﺎمیشلۆ شﺎری لە كﺎنكﻭرده ریﯽمﺎﻭهجە كﯽیەﻭهكۆﺑﻭﻭنە
 -ندانخە
 
 ڕۆژئﺎﻭ ﻭردیک پﺎرﺗێکﯽ ریﯽکﺎریگە زیﺎدﺑﻭﻭنﯽ یرﺑﺎرهده ﻭهرهنقەئە ﺗﯽحکﻭمە ﺗﯽسیﺎسە ﺑە دیﺎره شکرائﺎ کﯽرانییەنیگە
 ﺑﺑێﺗە ﺑﺎرﻭدۆخە مئە کە ﺗرسنده ﻭهلە ﻭڕدانشە لە دارهنقەئە ڵگەلە کە  كﻭردسﺗﺎن كرێكﺎرانﯽ پﺎرﺗﯽ ﺑە یەهە ندییﻭهپە کە ا
 . کﻭردسﺗﺎن ﻭریﺑﺎکﻭ لە کﻭرد یکێشە ریسەچﺎره ﻗﻭرسکردنﯽ زیﺎﺗر هۆی
 
 ێﻭهش ﺗﺗرینلامەسە ﺑە  ڕۆژئﺎﻭا کﻭردانﯽ د،سەئە شﺎرﺑە دژی کﺎنﯽپێکﺎدانە ﻭ خۆپیشﺎندان ڕاﺑردﻭﻭی مﺎنگﯽ 61 یمﺎﻭهلە
 ﻭئە زمﻭﻭنکردنﯽئە ﻭ خۆیﯽرﺑەسە سﺗهێنﺎنﯽدهﺑە ﺑۆ یەهە ﺑﻭارێک کە دانڕهﺑﺎﻭه ﻭلە ئێسﺗﺎش ﻭ ڕیﻭنﺗێپە پێیدا
 رسەەل دانﺎنﯽ ﻭ کﻭردسﺗﺎن ئﺎڵای کﺎنﯽﻭێنە ئێسﺗﺎش ،یﺎنەهە عیراق كﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ رێمﯽهە لە کﺎنکﻭرده کە یخۆییەرﺑەسە
 لە ﻭای ﻭ کﺎنﺗﻭرکیە میدیﺎ گرنگﯽ ﺑﺎسێکﯽ ﺗەﺑﻭﻭه رۆژئﺎﻭاﻭه کﻭردانﯽ نلایەلە یﻭهکﺎندنەشە ﻭ کﺎنحکﻭمییە زگﺎده
 کﺎنﯽیەﺗیسﺎیەکە ،یەهە دانﺎﻭچﺎنە ﻭلە خۆرﺑەسە رێمێکﯽهە درﻭسﺗﺑﻭﻭنﯽ ریگەئە ﺑڵێن کە کردﻭﻭه كەﺑﺎرﻭدۆخە رانﯽچﺎﻭدێ
 ﻭﻭهەﺗکشﺎندﻭﻭه کەسەحە ﻭ بلەحە کﺎنﯽنﺎﻭچە لە کﺎنﯽهێزه دسەئە شﺎرﺑە ڵین،ده سﻭریﺎ کﺎنﯽکﻭرده ئۆپۆزسیۆنە پﺎرﺗە
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 پﺎرﺗﯽ ڵگەەل ندییﻭهپە ﺑﻭﻭنﯽ ﺑە مﺎنئە کە ،جێهێشﺗﻭﻭهﺑە) دهیەپە(دیمﻭکراﺗﯽ کێﺗﯽیە پﺎرﺗﯽ ﺑۆ ینەنﺎﻭچﺎ ﻭئە کۆنﺗڕۆڵﯽ
 ژێر لە ﺎئێسﺗ ،عﺎمﻭﻭده دێرک، عفرین، کﻭﺑﺎنﯽ، کﺎنﯽشﺎره کﺎنﻭاڵەهە پێﯽﺑە رهە کرێن،ده ندنﺎﻭزه کﻭردسﺗﺎن کرێکﺎرانﯽ
 .دیمﻭکراﺗیدان کێﺗﯽیە پﺎرﺗﯽ کۆنﺗڕۆلێ
 
 کﺎنﯽخۆپیشﺎندنە یﻭهدامرکﺎندنە هﺎرﻭههە ﻭ دسەئە شﺎرﺑە کﺎنﯽهێزه هﺎﻭکﺎریﯽ ﺑە دهیەپە کﺎن،ئۆپۆزسیۆنە سﻭرییە پﺎرﺗە
 نﺎسراﻭی کﯽﺗییەسﺎیەکە کە مۆدا،ﺗە لشعەمە کﻭشﺗنﯽ لە ﺗیشﺗﺎیﺑەﺑە ن،کەده ﺗﺑﺎرﺗۆمە دسەئە یکەﺗەحکﻭمە دژی لە  ڕۆژئﺎﻭا
 کﯽەندیییﻭهپە هیچ ﻭهکﺎﺗەﺗیدهڕه ﻭ داتده مڵەﻗەلە نﺎڕاست ﺑە ﻭاڵانەهە مئە مﻭﻭهە دهیەپە ڵامﺑە ﺑﻭﻭ،   کﻭردسﺗﺎن ئﺎﻭایڕۆژ
 .ﺑێتهە ﻭهشە)کەکەپە( ﺑە
 
 رپرسێکﯽﺑە ڵامﺑە ،ﺑڕیﻭهرنەده دهیەپە یرﺑﺎرهده خۆیﺎن ڵﻭێسﺗﯽهە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ رپرسﺎنﯽﺑە سمﯽڕه کﯽیەشَیﻭهﺑە ﺗﺎئێسﺗﺎ ندهرچەهە
 ریگەەئ لە سﻭریﺎی نیشﺗمﺎنﯽ نﯽنجﻭمەئە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ، یﻭهرهده زیریﻭه ئۆغلۆ داﻭد کە یﺎند،رایگە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ یﻭهرهده ﺗﯽزارهﻭه
 .ﻭهﺗەکردﻭﻭه ئﺎگﺎدار نﺎﻭخۆ ڕیشە هﺎرﻭههە ﻭ ریگەﺗﺎیفە ڕیشە
 
 لە یەەه ﺗرسﺗﺎن ئﺎیﺎ" یپرسیﺎره ﻭئە ڵامﯽﻭه لە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ زیرانﯽﻭه نﯽنجﻭمەئە رۆکﯽسە ریجێگ ڵای،ﺗەئە شیرﺑە هﺎرﻭههە
 ﻭﻭدڵد جۆرێک هیچﺑە ﻭانئە :یﺎندرایگە ،"دا؟نﺎﻭچﺎنە ﻭلە خۆیﯽرﺑەسە یﺎندنﯽراگە یﺎخﻭد کﻭردسﺗﺎن ئﺎڵای یﻭهرزکردنەﺑە
 داﺎﻭچەن ندێکهە لە: "ﻭﺗﯽ ﻭ کردﺑێت کﺎنیﺎننﺎﻭچە یزۆرﺑە کۆنﺗڕۆلﯽ کﺎنکﻭرده ەگﻭای کە ﻭهﺗکردهڕه یﻭاڵانەهە ﻭئە ﻭ نین
 ."نییە ﺗییﺎنﻭاﻭهﺗە کۆنﺗرۆڵﯽ ڵامﺑە یە،هە ﺑﻭﻭنیﺎن
 
 نﺎﺑێت کە رکردﻭﻭهده ﻭاﻭیﺎنﺗە ڕێنمﺎیﯽ ﻭانئە کە یﺎند،رایگە سﻭریﺎ، نیشﺗمﺎنیﯽ نﯽنجﻭمەئە رۆکﯽسە یدا،سە ﺑدﻭلﺑﺎستعە
 .سﻭریﺎ کﯽڵخە یپێکهﺎﺗە لە شێکنﺑە کﺎنیشکﻭرده ڵﺑکرێت،چﻭنکەهە دیكە کﯽئﺎڵایە هیچ ئﺎزاد سﻭریﺎی ئﺎڵای لە جگەﺑێ
 
 ﻭلە سﻭڕمﺎﻭه ریسە زۆر رهنقەئە: "ﻭه،کردﺑﻭﻭه ﺑڵاﻭی رادیکﺎڵدا یلﯽده لە کە ﺗﻭرك نﻭﻭسێكﯽرۆژنﺎمە کﺎنﯽﻗسە پێﯽﺑە
 ﺑە ﺑﺎرﻭدۆخە مئە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ کە شلێت،ده هﺎرﻭه،هە"نکەده ی)کەکەپە( لە سﻭریﺎ کﻭردی ڵکﺎنﯽخە کە یپشﺗگیرییە
  ﺗﺎنکﻭردس رۆژئﺎﻭای ئێسﺗﺎی یﺑﺎرﻭدۆخە ﻭئە یﻭهئە ﺑۆ نﺎﻭه نگﺎﻭێکﯽهە ندچە ﻭ گﺎتﺗێده ﺗرسیدارمە ندنێکﯽسەشەگە
 .یﺎﺗﻭرک لە کﻭرد یکێشە زیﺎﺗری یﻭهﻗﻭڵﺑﻭﻭنە هۆی ﺑێﺗەنە
 
 کﻭردسﺗﺎن رێمﯽهە رۆکﯽسە ﺑﺎرزانﯽ سعﻭدمە لە هﺎﻭکﺎریﯽ داﻭای کە یەﻭهئە ﺗﻭرکیﺎﻭه ستدهﺑە چﺎرهڕێگە ﺗﺎکە: ڵێتده
 ﻭڵﯽهە ﻭ دسەئە شﺎرﺑە لاﺑردنﯽ داﻭای رهنقەئە یﺎن ڕۆژئﺎﻭا، کﺎنﯽکﻭردییە پﺎرﺗە رسە ﺑخﺎﺗە فشﺎر زیﺎﺗر یﻭهئە ﺑۆ ﺑکﺎت
 . کﺎنکﻭردییە پﺎرﺗە ڵگەلە ﺑدات ندیﯽیﻭهەپ ﻭکردنﯽپﺗە
 
 ﻭپێشرهەﺑ رێمداهە ﺗﯽﻭحکﻭمە ﺑﺎرزانﯽ ڵگەلە کﺎنﯽندییەیﻭهپە دﻭاییدا ییەمﺎﻭه ملە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ رز،ڕۆیﺗە یکەڕاپۆرﺗە پێﯽﺑە
 .نێﻭانیﺎندالە یەﻭزه ﻭ ﺑﺎزرگﺎنﯽ ﺑﻭاری ﻭپێشﺑردنﯽرهﺑە رسەلە چﺎﻭیﺎن ئێسﺗﺎ ﻭﺑردﻭﻭه
 
 ندامﯽئە ئینجە، مرهمﻭحە سﺗەﺑەمە مﺑۆئە یە،هە خۆیﺎن یﻗسە کﺎنداپێشهﺎﺗە دﻭایینلە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ کﺎنﯽئۆپۆزسیۆنە پﺎرﺗە
 ﺗﯽەﻭڵده شکەﺗەﻭڵەده یە،ڕێﻭهﺑە کﻭردی نﻭێﯽ ﺗێکﯽﻭڵەده :یﺎندﻭﻭهگە ڕای)پەهەجە( کۆمﺎری لﯽگە پﺎرﺗﯽ ﺗﯽرکردایەسە
 .یﺎیەسﻭر کﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ
 
 یکێشە رسەلە خۆی ڵﻭێسﺗﯽهە داکﺎﺗە ملە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ ﺑێتده: یﺎندڕایگە ﺗﻭركیﺎ ﺑﻭاری لێكۆڵیﺎرێكﯽ داگل، ئیحسﺎن هﺎرﻭههە
 فﺗﻭگۆگ کەکەپە ڵگەلە نیﺎزﺑﻭﻭنﺑە ڕۆژێک رﺑڕیﻭه،ده جیﺎﻭازی ڵﻭێسﺗﯽهە جﺎر ندینچە یپێیە ﻭﺑە ،ﻭهڕﻭﻭنﺑکﺎﺗە کﻭرد
 مﺎندازه یلﯽده یڕۆژنﺎمە لە کە ییەگۆشە ﻭئە یمیﺎنەلە هﺎرﻭههە. داﻭه نجﺎمئە پۆلیسﯽ شێﻭه ﺗێکﯽسیﺎسە ڕۆژێک ﻭ نﺑکە
 رگەئە ﺑێتده درﻭست داکەنﺎﻭچە لە کﻭردی ئۆﺗۆنۆمﯽ رێمێکﯽهە ڵێتده" کﻭردی؟ رێمێکﯽﺑۆهە نئﺎمﺎده ئێﻭه" نﻭﻭسیﺑﻭﻭی
 .ئﺎرادایە لە كﺎنكﻭرده ﺑۆ خۆرﺑەسە کﯽڕۆژئﺎﻭایە ریگەئە هﺎرﻭههە ﺑڕﻭﻭخێت، دسەئە
 
 ﺑۆ ییەن ﻭنێکخە چیﺗر ﻭرهگە کﻭردسﺗﺎنێکﯽ ،گۆڕاﻭه داکەنﺎﻭچە لە کﻭرد سیﺎسﯽ یخشەنە: "ڵێتده شیداکەنﻭﻭسینە لە
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 .ێتﺗێپەڕدەﺑ سﺎﺗەﻭەخﺗەدا ﺑەﻭ ئێسﺗﺎ میسر هەڵدێرەﻭە، نەكەﻭﺗنەنﺎﻭ ﺑۆ هەیە هەلێك یﺎن سﺎﺗێك نﺎﻭخۆدا، جەنگێكﯽ هەمﻭﻭ لەمیﺎنﯽ
 لێﯽ ەك ژیﺎنەی ئەﻭ گەڕانەﻭەی ﺑۆ پێنﺎكرێت ﺗرمﺎن هیچﯽ پﺎڕانەﻭە نزاﻭ جگەلە هەفﺗەیەدا، لەم پیرۆز رەمەزانﯽ مﺎنگﯽ هﺎﺗنﯽ لەگەڵ
 هﺎﻭﻭڵاﺗییەكﯽ هەر ﺑۆ دەڕەخسﺎن ﺑﻭاری كە مﺎﻭەیەك ﺑۆ هﺎﻭڕێیﺎن ﻭ خێزان لەگەڵ كۆﺑﻭﻭنەﻭە ﺑە رەمەزراندا مﺎنگﯽ لە راهﺎﺗﺑﻭﻭین
 .یشﺗمﺎنییەن ایﯽئﺎشﺗەﻭ ئەﻭیش هەڵﺑﺑژێریت، راست رێچكەی هەڵﺑژاردنﯽ ﺑە ﺑنێت ﺑەرەﻭپێش هەنگﺎﻭ ﺑچێﺗەﻭەﻭ ﺑەكﺎرەكﺎنیدا میسری
 ﺎئێسﺗﺎﺗ سﺎﺗەﻭە، لەﻭ میسرم ﻭڵاﺗﯽ ﺑەردەﻭامﯽ گەشﺗیﺎرێكﯽ ﻭ هەفﺗﺎكﺎندا سەرەﺗﺎی لە ﻗﺎهیرە لە ﺑﻭﻭم ئەمریكﯽ زانكۆی خﻭێندكﺎرێكﯽ
 ەیﺎرن گەنجﺎنﯽ فڕێدانەخﻭارەی ﻭەك دﻭایﯽ، مﺎنگەی چەند ئەم هێندەی گرﺗﺑێت میسری ﺑەرۆكﯽ كە نەدیﻭە لەﻭشێﻭەیەم كینەكﯽ ﻭ رق
 ئەﻭ ەرامﺑەرﺑ لە ﺗﻭیﺗەر لەسەر مﻭسلمین ئیخﻭان گرﻭپﯽ نەیﺎرانﯽ سﺗﺎیشكردنﯽ ﻭ ﺑﺎڵەخﺎنەكﺎن لەسەرﺑﺎنﯽ مﻭسلمین ئیخﻭان نلەلایە
 .انﻭێژكردند لەكﺎﺗﯽ مﻭسلمین ئیخﻭان لایەنگرانﯽ لە لە ﺑەزەییﺎنە ﺑێ ﺗەﻗەكردنﯽ ﺑە ئەنجﺎمیدا میسر چەكدارەكﺎنﯽ هێزە كﺎرەی
 ﺑﻭﻭنﯽ یدالەڕاسﺗ ﻗەیرانەش ئەم خۆیەﺗﯽ، میسر ﺑەڵكﻭ ﺑكﺎت، میسر لەسەر گرەﻭ نیە كەسێك ژییە،ﺗﻭندﻭﺗی پشێﻭییە هەمﻭﻭ ئەم دﻭای
 .هەیە
 سﻭریﺎ لە چۆن ﻭەك گەلەكەیەﻭە، لەلایەن دەكرێت پﺎرچە پﺎرچە یﺎن یەكگرﺗﻭﻭ دەﻭڵەﺗێكﯽ ﻭەك هەنگﺎﻭﺑنێت ئەﺗﻭانێت میسر
 ﺑێت، امەحەكد لە میسر سەﻗﺎمگیری كﺎﺗێك چﻭنكە سﺎﺗەﻭەخﺗەدا، لەم ەنی گرنگ هێندە نﺎﻭەڕاسﺗدا خۆرهەڵاﺗﯽ شﺗێكلە هیچ رﻭﻭدەدات؟،
 .دەﺑێت مەحەكدا لە نﺎﻭچەكە هەمﻭﻭ سەﻗﺎمگیری ئەﻭا
 میسر، سەرۆكﯽ نەدەﺑﻭﻭە ئەﻭان دەنگﯽ ﺑەﺑێ كە مﻭرسﯽ، محەمەد ﺑە ﺑەرامﺑەر پێدەزانم میسر لیﺑڕاڵییەكﺎنﯽ ﻭ عەلمﺎنﯽ ﺗﻭڕەﺑﻭﻭنﯽ من
 رﻭﻭخﺎنﯽ ەگەڵل هەرﻭەهﺎ ﺑەخشﯽ، ﺑەخۆی زیﺎﺗری دەسەڵاﺗﯽ ئەركەكەیدا، پەیڕەﻭكردنﯽ لە گشﺗگیر سێكﯽكە ﺑﺑێﺗە ئەﻭەی لەجیﺎﺗﯽ ﺑەڵام
 .پێدەزانم میسر حﻭكمڕانﯽ ﺑەرامﺑەر میسرییەكﺎن لە زۆرێك لەلایەن ئﺎرامیﯽ نەمﺎنﯽ میسر، ئﺎﺑﻭﻭری
 -ﻭرسﯽم سەرﺑﺎزییەكﺎنﯽ هێزە كﺎﺗێك نەمﺎ ﻭنﯽﺑﻭ شﺗێك دیمﻭكراﺗییەت، ﺑەرەﻭ عەرەﺑﯽ جیهﺎنﯽ درێژەی دﻭﻭرﻭ گۆڕانكﺎرییە لەﻭ ﺑەڵام
 ەكەمدای ﺗشرینﯽ لە پەرلەمﺎن هەڵﺑژاردنەكﺎنﯽ لەڕێگەی ﺑۆئەﻭەی نەكرد میسریﺎن گەلﯽ چﺎﻭەڕﻭانﯽ دﻭﻭرخسﺗەﻭەﻭ سەرۆكﺎیەﺗﯽ لە یﺎن
 هەڵەكﺎنیﺎن لە ﺑیر ﺗﺎ ﺎنەكﺎنمﻭسﻭڵم گرﻭپە ﺑە دەدا نمﻭنەیﯽ پﺎسﺎﻭێكﯽ كە شﺗەی ئەﻭ ﺑكەن، كﺎرە ئەﻭ سەرۆكﺎیەﺗییەﻭە هەڵﺑژاردنەكﺎنﯽ یﺎن
 .سەﻗﺎمگیر سیﺎسﯽ دەﻭڵەﺗێكﯽ ﺑﻭنیﺎدنﺎنﯽ لەپێنﺎﻭ میسر ﺑۆ ﺑنەڕەﺗییە رەگەزی ئەﻭیش كە نەكەنەﻭە گۆڕانكﺎری لە یﺎن
 .كﺎرﺑكەن پێكەﻭە ﺑەﻭەیە پێﻭیسﺗیﺎن میسر لیﺑڕاڵییەكﺎنﯽ ﻭ عەلمﺎنﯽ ﺑەڵام
 ێكدالەكﺎﺗ سەركردە، یەك كﺎری ﺑەرنﺎمەی لەسەر ﺑێت كۆدەنگ ﺗﻭانﯽنەی ﺑەڵام نﺎڕەزاییەكﺎنیدا، لە ﺑﻭﻭ گەﻭرە میسر ئۆپۆزسیۆنﯽ
 .ﺑكﺎت حﻭكمڕانﯽ ﺑﺗﻭانێت ﺑێئەﻭەی ﺑەدەسﺗهێنﺎ هەڵﺑژاردنەكﺎندا لە گەﻭرەی سەركەﻭﺗنێكﯽ ئیخﻭان
 سەڵاﺗەەد ئەم سەرﺑﺎزییە، هێزی ئەﻭیش هەڵدێر، لە ﺑگرێت ﺑەدﻭﻭر خۆی ﺑۆئەﻭەی مﺎﻭە ﺑەدەسﺗەﻭە رێگەی یەك ﺗەنهﺎ میسر لەﺑەرئەﻭە
 ێكهێنﺎنەﻭەیەپ دﻭﻭﺑﺎرە ئەﻭیش ئیسلامییەكﺎن، گرﻭپە درﻭﻭرخسﺗنەﻭەی لە رﻭﻭنﺑكﺎﺗەﻭە ئﺎمﺎنجەكەی پێﻭیسﺗە سﺎﺗەﻭەخﺗەدا لەم میسر لە
 ﯽلەنﺎﻭﺑردن ﺑەمەﺑەسﺗﯽ نەك دیمﻭكراﺗییەت، ﺑەرەﻭ هەنگﺎﻭنﺎن ﻭ دەسﺗپێكردنەﻭە دﻭﻭﺑﺎرە ﺑەمەﺑەسﺗﯽ هەرﻭەهﺎ ﺗۆڵەسەندنەﻭە، نەك
 .سیﺎسﯽ ژیﺎنﯽ لە ئیخﻭان گرﻭپﯽ
 ۆﺑ ئیخﻭان ﺑە ﺑدات دادﻭەرانە هەلێكﯽ دەرچﻭﻭە، میسرەﻭە كﺎﺗیﯽ حكﻭمەﺗﯽ لەلایەن شەممە سێ رۆژی كە دەسﺗﻭﻭرەی ئەﻭ ئﺎشكرانیە
 ﯽحﻭسن لەسەردەمﯽ رێگریكردنە ئەم نەﺑن، ئﺎیینﯽ ﺑنەمﺎی لەسەر كە حزﺑەكﺎن لە ﺑكﺎت رێگری هەرﻭەهﺎ دەسەڵات، گرﺗنەدەسﺗﯽ
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 نﺎﺑێت یرسەﻗﺎمگ میسر ﺑەدەسﺗهێنﺎ، سەركەﻭﺗنﯽ هەڵﺑژاردنەكﺎندا لە سەرﺑەخۆ لایەنێكﯽ ﻭەك ئیخﻭان گﻭپﯽ ەجێدەكرا،جێﺑ دا -مﻭﺑﺎرەك
  .ﺑخرێﺗەﻭە دﻭﻭر ئیخﻭان ئەگەر
 لەلایەن ﻭ لاﺑرد دەسەڵات كﻭرسﯽ لەسەر میسر پێشﻭﻭی سەرۆكﯽ مﻭﺑﺎرەكﯽ كە 1102 شۆڕشﯽ ﺑەﻭەكرد ئﺎمﺎژەی مﻭجﺎهید دیﺎلە
 كردنداﺑەش چﺎﻭەڕﻭاندەكرا، لێ ﺑﺎشﺗری دﻭاڕۆژێكﯽ یەكیﺎنگرت، ئیسلامییەكﺎن ﻭ لیﺑڕاڵ ﻭ چەپڕەﻭ ﺗیﺎیدا كە ،میسرەﻭە گەنجﺎنﯽ
 هۆكﺎری هەرئەﻭەش نەكراﺑﻭﻭ، ﻗۆرخ ئیسلامییەكﺎن یﺎن عەلمﺎنییەكﺎن لەلایەن شۆڕەشەكە دەﺑێت، ئێسﺗﺎدا دۆخﯽ ﻭ شۆڕشگێڕان لەنێﻭان
 .ﺑﻭﻭ سەركەﻭﺗنﯽ
 نەك ﻭژمنیﺎنە،د ئێسﺗﺎ دۆخەی ئەم ﺑكەن ﺑەﻭە درك شِۆرشگێڕەكﺎن ئەگەر دەﺑێت، فەراهەم كﺎﺗێك میسر لە دیمﻭكراﺗییەت ﺑەدەسﺗخسﺗنﯽ
 .ﺑكەن یەكﺗری دﻭژمنﺎیەﺗﯽ
 ڵامﺑە ﺑكﻭژن، ئیخﻭانەكﺎن دەﺗﻭانن چەكدارەكﺎن هێزە هەرﻭەهﺎ ﺑكﻭژن، زیﺎﺗر عەلمﺎنﯽ رەنگە مﻭسلمﻭن ئیخﻭان راسﺗدەكﺎت، ئەﻭ ئﺎیﺎ
 .رﻭﻭدەدات ﻭڵاﺗدا لە مرۆیﯽ كﺎرەسﺎﺗێكﯽ ﺑەﻭشێﻭەیەش ﺑكﻭژێت، هەردﻭﻭلا دەﺗﻭانێت ئێسﺗﺎ دۆخەی لەم ﺗر دەیەكﯽ
 چۆن رﻭەكهە ﺑگرێت، نﻭێگەری سﺗراﺗیژییەﺗﯽ ﻭ ئﺎیین لە رێز كە ﻭڵاﺗدا لە چﺎكسﺎزیكردن ﺑۆ راسﺗەﻗینە پﺎرﺗﯽ نەﺑﻭﻭنﯽ لەگەڵ
 راپﺗرینخ دەﺑێت ﺑەڵكﻭ هەڵﺑﺑژێرن، رێگە ﺑﺎشﺗرین كە رنﺎﺑننﺎچﺎ میسرییەكﺎن ئەنجﺎمیﺎندا، نۆزدەدا سەدەی لە میسر چﺎكسﺎزیخﻭازنﯽ
 .هەڵﺑﺑژێرن چﺎرەسەر
 ئﺎیین ۆرینەیز ﺑەڵام ﺑەند، ﻗﻭڵ دەﻭڵەﺗێكﯽ ﺑۆ ﺑگەڕێﺗەﻭە ﺑﺎشە پێﯽ چەكدارەكﺎن هێزە ﺑەڵام چﺎرەسەرە، ئیسلام پێیﻭایە ئیخﻭان گرﻭپﯽ
 ێتداڕێژراﺑ ﺑۆ یﺎسﺎی كە چەكدار دەسەڵاﺗێكﯽ ﺑە فەرمﺎنڕەﻭاش دەﻭڵەﺗێكﯽ هەرﻭەهﺎ ئێسﺗﺎدا، دۆخەی لەم میسر دۆخﯽ ﺑۆ نیە چﺎرەسەر
 ﻭ ﺑكﺎت ەردەسﺗەﺑ رۆشنﺑیری ﻭ كۆمەڵایەﺗﯽ ﻭ یﺎسﺎیﯽ چﺎكسﺎزی نﺎﺗﻭانێت پێشﻭﻭ، سەردەمﯽ ﻭەك ئیسلامییەكﺎن ریشەكێشكردنﯽ ﺑۆ
 .ﺑكﺎت فەراهەم میسر عەﻗڵییەكﺎنﯽ ﺗﻭانسﺗە ﻭ مرۆیﯽ ﺗﻭانﺎ ﺑۆ ﺑﻭار
 لەلایەن زۆری ﺑەشێكﯽ كە چﺎرەسەرە، 2002 سﺎڵﯽ یەكگرﺗﻭﻭەكﺎنﯽ نەﺗەﻭە ﺑە سەر عەرەﺑﯽ مرۆیﯽ نﯽگەشەپێدا راپۆرﺗﯽ لەڕاسﺗیدا
 ەك سیﺎسەﺗﺎنەی ئەﻭ ﺑﻭنیﺎدیﺎدنﯽ لەسەر چڕﺑكەنەﻭە هەﻭڵەكﺎنیﺎن دەكﺎت میسرییەكﺎن لە داﻭا نﻭسراﻭەﺗەﻭەﻭ میسرییەﻭە ﺗﻭێژەرانﯽ
 ﺎراسﺗەیەئ رێچكەﻭ ئەﻭ ئەﻭە ئﺎفرەت، ﺑەرەﻭپێشﺑردنﯽ ﻭ خﻭێندن ﻭ ئﺎزادی پەیڕەﻭكردنﯽ لە ﺑێت زاڵ لاﻭازییەكﺎنیدا ﺑەسەر دەﺗﻭانێت
 .سەرﺑﺎزی رێچكەی نە مﻭرسﯽ، رێچكەی نە مﻭﺑﺎرەك، رێچكەی نەك پێیەﺗﯽ، پێﻭیسﺗﯽ میسر كە
 مﺎمنﺎﻭەند ﯽچﺎرەسەرێك ﺗﺎ هەنگﺎﻭ ﺑە هەنگﺎﻭ یﺎرمەﺗیدانیەﺗﯽ ﺑەڵكﻭ نیە، هﺎریكﺎرییەكﺎن گرﺗنەﻭەی سﺎﺗەدا لەم میسریش دۆسﺗﺎنﯽ ئەركﯽ
 .دەدۆزێﺗەﻭە
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 عیراقە... سوریا
  فریدمﺎن ﺗۆمﺎس: ن
 خۆیﺎن ﯽپێ رسەلە خۆیﺎن ﺗێكۆشﺎنﯽ ﻭ ﻭڵهەﺑە ﻭ خێرایﯽ ﺑە سﻭریﺎ لە ئۆپۆزیسیۆن كە مﻭهئە رۆشﯽپە ﻭادارﻭهی ﻭهنﺎخەلە زانێتده خﻭا
 مەنجﺎرئەده مئە ﺗﯽرفەده ﻭ چﺎنس ندهرچەهە. ﻭنرﺑكەده داكەیدانەمە لە دیمﻭركراسیﺎنە كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە داریشین هیﻭا كﻭرﻭههە سﺗنراﻭه
 ﻭ بهەزمەفره ﺗێكﯽﻭلەده, كنیەدﻭانە عێراق سﻭریﺎﻭ راسﺗیدا لە, چێتده عێراقلە زۆر سﻭریﺎ یﻭهرئەﺑەلە. نزمدایە ﺗێكﯽئﺎس لە زۆر
 ﺑینمده ﻭای مﺑۆخۆ ﻭ, ﻭهﺗەكۆیكردﻭنە عسداﺑە ﺗﯽئﺎیدۆلۆژیە ژیر لە ﻭ پۆلاین سﺗێكﯽده ﻭ كﺎتده ﻭایﯽرمﺎنرهفە ی دیكﺗﺎﺗۆر كﯽیەمینەكە
 ێﯽپ كﻭه ڕﻭﻭیرﻭﺑە كەیدانەمەلە یﻭهئە ﺑێ ﺑە سﻭیسرا سیسﺗمﯽ ﺑۆ ﺑچیت ﻭهدامەسە حﻭكمﯽلە نﺎﺗﻭانیت.یەسﺎده عیراق یﻭانە كە
 ﺑێت ﺑﺎشەك سﺗﺑهێنیتدهﺑە كﯽرهده نێكﯽلایە پشﺗیﻭانﯽ كە ﺑێتنە ﻭهئە نهﺎﺗە) مﻭﻭانهە دژی مﻭﻭانهە نگﯽجە( ﻭهﺑﺑیﺗە" رهﻭﺑە: "ڵێنده
 یەمﺗمﺎن داﻭهگﻭاسﺗنە ﻗۆنﺎغﯽ لە كرﻭههە ن،پێﺑكە یمﺗمﺎنە ﻭ ﺑﺗرسن لێﯽ ﻭینزه گۆی رسەلە یﻭانەئە مﻭﻭهە كە ككردنخۆپڕچە ﺑۆ
 ﺗەەﻭیلای یپشﺗیﻭانیە جۆره ﻭئە كە زانمده دﻭﻭریشﯽﺑە عیراق،لە ﺑﻭﻭ كﯽرهده پشﺗیﻭانﯽ نﯽلایە كە ﺑﻭﻭ مریكﺎئە ﻭهئە. نﺑێﺑكە
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 ﻭ هێنﺎ زافﯽﻗە رژێمﯽ ﺑە كۆﺗﺎیﯽ ﻭ كراپێده كﻭمﯽحەﺗە ﻭهدﻭﻭره لە هﺎرﻭههە ﺑﻭﻭ،هە مﯽكە كﯽﺗێچﻭﻭیە كە نﺎﺗۆ ﻭ كﺎنكگرﺗﻭﻭهیە
  .ەعیراﻗ سﻭریﺎ, ﻗﻭرسﺗره كەركەئە سﻭریﺎ لە یﻭهئە رﺑەلە ﻭهﺑێﺗە دﻭﺑﺎره سﻭریﺎ لە, ﺑﻭﻭ دایك لە نﻭێ كﯽلیﺑیﺎیە
,  یەهە ﻭهكەﺗەﺑﺎﺑە ﺑە ندییﻭهپە دالێره لامﺑە, ینكەنە ﻭهیەﺑﺎرهلە یﻗسە ﺗر جﺎریكﯽ كە زانمده ﺑﺎشﻭاﺑە ﺗﺎڵە هینده زمﻭنێكﯽئە عیراق
 مریكﺎەئ مرۆئە یﻭهئە ﺑۆ ﻭهێﺗەرگەده یكەزڵەفە ﻭهۆكﺎره ﻭهئە ﺑﺎش نجﺎمێكﯽرئەده دیهێنﺎنﯽﺑە ﺑۆ یەهە ﺗێێكرفەده عێراق ﺑۆ رگەئە
 ﺗﺎكە نﺑكە كﯽچە پر ﻭ نﺑكە عێراق چﺎﻭدێری ﻭ پشﺗیﻭانﯽ كە یﻭهئە ﺑۆ نئﺎمﺎده داكەپﺎنەگۆره لە رﺑﺎزسە زارهە یﺎنده ﻭ یەكەیدانەمەلە
 ﺗﯽسیﺎسە ﻭ ﺑگۆڕێت خۆی ﺗﯽسیﺎسە عێراق كە یﻭهﺑۆئە ﻭهنەكەئە لێ سڵﯽ كﺎننەلایە مﻭﻭهە ﻭ كرێتپێده یمﺗمﺎنە زۆر كﯽیەراده
 ترفەده مﺎنهەﺑە یﻭهئە ﺑۆ یەهە رجلﻭمەهە مﺎنهە پێﻭیسﺗﯽ سﻭریﺎ كە مكەسﺗدهﻭاهە ﻭ دامرهﺑﺎﻭه ﻭلە ﺑكﺎت ﻭیڕهپە ﻭافﻭﻗﯽﺗە
 .سﺗﺑهێنێتدهﺑە
 لە مینﯽهز هێرشﯽ نجﺎمدانﯽئە مریكﺎﻭئە كﺎنﯽكگرﺗﻭﻭهیە ﺗەﻭیلایە ردانﯽسﺗﻭهده لە منﺎكە پشﺗیﻭانﯽ ﺗر جﺎرێكﯽ من یﻭهرئەﺑەلە ڵامﺑە
 ﺑم،ڵەهە مداەكﻭهشیكردنەلە هیﻭادارم نﺎكﺎت، ﻭهئە پشﺗیﻭانﯽ مریكﺎشئە گشﺗﯽ رای ﻭ ﺑیدارهعە جیهﺎنﯽلە ﺗر شﻭێنێكﯽ رهەلە یﺎن سﻭریﺎ
 كﯽیەیندهئﺎ دیهێنﺎنﯽﺑە پێنﺎﻭ لە خۆیﺎن كﯽچەﺑە ﻭ تﺗﺎیﺑە شێﻭازی ڕێﯽلە نﺑكە رسﻭڕمﺎنمﺎنسە ﻭ شۆك ﺗﻭشﯽ كﺎنسﻭریە ﺑﻭﻭه یﺎخﯽ
 دﻭاﺗر ﻗۆنﺎغﯽ سﺗﺎﻭئێ ﺑﺎرﻭدۆخﯽ ﺑۆ پێﻭیسﺗە یﻭهئە ﺑﺎسﯽ ﺑێتده ڵكﻭﺑە ،نیە سﺑە كچە ﻭ دیپلۆمﺎﺗﯽ پشﺗیﻭانﯽ لە ﺑﺎسكردن نهﺎﺗە ﺑﺎشﺗر،
 لە نگﺎﻭههە ﻭەئ كە ﺑﻭﺗرێت ﻭهئە ﺑێتده ﻭ پێﻭیسﺗە كﯽرهده ﻭ ﺑیﺎنﯽ پشﺗیﻭانﯽ كە یەﺑیرﻭڕای ﻭئە رسە دێﺗە كﺎﺗێك ڵامﺑە ِرﻭﻭﺑخرێﺗە
 ۆﺑﺎمﺎئ ﺑﺎرك لە خنەره ﺗﻭندی ﺑە سﻭریﺎﻭ لە نكەئە مریكﺎئە ردانﯽسﺗﻭهده لە داكۆكﯽ یﻭانەئە من ﺑڕﻭایﺑە ،مەسﺗەئە كﺎرێكﯽ سﻭریﺎ
 كﺎنﯽەپێداﻭیسﺗی ﺑە تﺑﺎرهسە نین ﻭاﻗعﯽ ﻭهكﺎﺗەﺗدهره سﻭریﺎ لە رﺑﺎزیسە ردانﯽسﺗﻭهده كردنﯽ ﺗﯽایەركردسە كە یﻭهرئەﺑەلە گرنده
 .ﺗیڤپۆزه ﻭ ﺑﺎش نجﺎمێكﯽئە دیهێنﺎنﯽﺑە
  0 secivreS gnirahS eroM tnirp no erahS liame no erahS rettiwt no erahS koobecaf no erahS
 ڕێﻭهﺑگە  
 22.KKA
 lmth./051/985/swen/os/gro.bpkup.www//:ptth
 لەئارادایە نوێ سنووری دروستبوونی و نوێ شەڕی روودانی ئەگەری
 2102 ,72 voN
 یەﺗكین مﻭراد
 ئەگەری لەﺑﺎرەی هۆشداریدا دﻭﻭەمدا نﯽﺗشری ی22 لە ﻭﻭﺗﺎرێكیدا میﺎنەی لە ﺗﻭركیﺎ ﻭەزیرانﯽ سەرۆك ئەردۆگﺎنﯽ ﺗەیب رەجەب
  لەعیراﻗدا ئیﺗنیكﯽ ﻭ ﺗﺎئیفﯽ نﺎﻭخۆیﯽ شەڕێكﯽ سەرهەڵدانﯽ
 ﻭەزیرانﯽ سەرۆك مﺎلكﯽ نﻭری دﻭاﺗر، رۆژی ﺑۆ. شەڕەشدا ئەﻭ پشﺗﯽ پﺎڵنەرەكﺎنﯽ ﻭ ﻭﻭزە شەڕی ﺑەڕﻭﻭدانﯽ ئﺎمﺎژەی هەرﻭەك
 دەرەﻭەی ﻭەزیری دﻭاﺗر كە) هەڵینەگیرسێنﯽ ﺗۆ ئەگەر( نﺎﻭیﺑە دایەﻭە ئەردۆگﺎنﯽ ﺗﻭندی ﻭەلامێكﯽ شیعەیە ﺑەڕەگەز كە عیراق
 .ﻭەسفكرد) خەیﺎڵﯽ( ﺑە مﺎلیكﯽ ﻭەڵامەی ئەﻭ ﺗﻭركیﺎ
 دﻭزخﻭرمﺎﺗﻭﻭ لەنﺎﻭچەی عیراق سﻭپﺎی هێزەكﺎنﯽ ﺑڵاﻭەپێكردنﯽ ﺗیﺎیدا كە ﺑڵاﻭكردەﻭە، ﻭێنەیەكﯽ مﺎلكﯽ كﺎﺗیشدا، لەهەمﺎن
 كﺎغەز لەسەر ﺑەﺗەنهﺎ لەئێسﺗﺎدا كە كﻭردسﺗﺎن، هەرێمﯽ سنﻭرەكﺎنﯽ ایﯽﺑەدرێژ كﻭردەكﺎن رﻭﻭﺑەڕﻭﻭﺑﻭﻭنەﻭەی ﺑۆ دەخﺎﺗەڕﻭﻭ،
 .لەعیراق ﺑەشێكە
 سرﻭشﺗﯽ گﺎزی ﻭ نەﻭت زۆری خەﻭﺗﻭﻭی یەدەگێكﯽ ﺗﺎئێسﺗﺎ. ﻭﻭزەیە سەرچﺎﻭەكﺎنﯽ لەسەر شەڕە ئەﻭ كە لەﻭەدانییە گﻭمﺎن
 ﻭەك جیهﺎنﯽ ﻭﻭزەی ﺑﻭاری زەﺑەلاحەكﺎنﯽ ﺎنیﺎكۆمپ لە هەریەك كەﺑەهۆیەﻭە ﺑەكﺎرنەهێنراﻭن، ئێسﺗﺎ ﺗﺎ هەن كﻭردسﺗﺎن لەهەرێمﯽ
 چەند شﺗﻭركییەكﺎنی كۆمپﺎنیﺎ ﻭ رﻭسﯽ گﺎزپرۆمﯽ ﻭ فەڕەنسﯽ ﺗۆﺗﺎڵﯽ ﻭ ئەمریكﺎ یەكگرﺗﻭﻭەكﺎنﯽ ﻭیلایەﺗە شیڤرۆنﯽ ﻭ ئیكسۆن
 یزﺑەهێ نﺎڕەزایﯽ سەرﺑﺎری ئیمزاكردﻭﻭە، كﻭردسﺗﺎن هەرێمﯽ سەرۆكﯽ ﺑﺎرزانﯽ مەسعﻭد لەگەڵ هەﻭلێر لەشﺎری گرێﺑەسﺗێكیﺎن
 .نەنﺎﻭە دﻭاﻭە ﺑۆ هەنگﺎﻭێكیﺎن هیچ ئەﻭان ﺑەڵام ﺑﺎرەیەﻭە، لەﻭ زارەكﯽ ﺑەشێﻭەیەكﯽ ﻭاشﺗنۆن نیگەرانﯽ ﻭ لەﺑەغدا مﺎلكﯽ
 ﺎﺗۆیەن ئەندامێكﯽ كە ﺑفرۆشن ﺗﻭركیﺎﻭە لەڕێگەی گﺎزەكەیﺎن ﻭ نەﻭت ﺑﺗﻭانن كﻭردەكﺎن ﻭ ﺑێت ئەگەر دەزانێت، ﺑﺎش زۆر ئەﻭە مﺎلكﯽ
 ﻭ سنﻭر گۆڕینﯽ ئەﻭیش ﻭاﻗیعە، ئەمری گۆڕانكﺎریﯽ مﺎنﺎی ئەﻭەش ئێران، ﻭ عەرەﺑیەكﺎن ﻭڵاﺗە ﻭ ﺎرﻭسی لەدەسﺗێﻭەردانﯽ دﻭﻭر ﻭ
 .نەكﺎت یﺎسﺎ حﻭكمﯽ یەكسﺎن ﺑەشێﻭەیەكﯽ ئەﻭ ﻭ ﺑێت ئەگەر عیراﻗە، سەرﻭەری
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 چهی ﻭەڕاسﺗدانﺎ لەڕۆژهەڵاﺗﯽ گشﺗیش ﺑەشێﻭەیەكﯽ ﻭ لەعیراق راﺑردﻭﻭدا سﺎڵﯽ سەد لەمﺎﻭەی ئﺎیﺎ ئەﻭەیە، لێرەدا پرسیﺎر ﺑەڵام
 نەﺑﻭﻭﺑێت؟ ﺑەﻭﻭزەﻭە پەیﻭەندی هەﺑﻭﻭە ﺗر ململانێیەكﯽ
 ییەكﺎننەﻭﺗ كێڵگە داﺑەشﺑﻭﻭنﯽ ﺑەهۆی یەكەم، جیهﺎنﯽ جەنگﯽ هەڵگیرسﺎندنﯽ هۆكﺎرەكﺎنﯽ لەكۆﺗﺎ ﺑﻭﻭە یەكێك ﻭڵاﺗێك، ﻭەك عیراق،
 ۆریەﺗﯽئیمپراﺗ لەلایەن كە ﺗﻭركﯽ ۆریەﺗﯽئیمپراﺗ كردنﯽ پﺎرچە پﺎرچە ﻭ داﺑڕین ﺑەسڕە،ﻭ حەﻭزی ﻭ میزۆپۆﺗﺎمیﺎ نﺎﻭچەكﺎنﯽ ﺑەسەر
 .لەنﺎﻭچەكەدا ﺑﻭﻭ ﻭﻭزە شەڕی یەكەمﯽ نەﻭەی ئەﻭەش. ئەنجﺎمدرا ﺑەریﺗﺎنیﺎﻭە
 ﺑﻭﻭ ﺗۆﻗﺎندن ﻭ ﺗیرۆر هﺎﻭسەنگﯽ راگرﺗنﯽ ﺑۆ ئەﻭیش ﺑﻭﻭ، ەكﺎن) 0691 – 0591( سﺎڵانﯽ لەنێﻭان كە شەڕەكﺎن دﻭﻭەمﯽ نەﻭەی
 ﻭڵاﺗﺎن ێﻭانلەن جەنگﯽ فۆڕمﯽ كە نﺎسراﺑﻭﻭ،) سﺎرد جەنگﯽ( ﺑە كە ﺑﻭﻭ سۆڤیەت یەكێﺗﯽ ﻭ ئەمریكﺎ یەكگرﺗﻭﻭەكﺎنﯽ ﻭیلایەﺗە لەنێﻭان
 جﺎرێكیش هەمﻭﻭ كە دەدا، ئیسڕائیلیﺎن ﺗەﻭاﻭەﺗﯽ لەنﺎﻭﺑردنﯽ هەﻭڵﯽ كە نەﺑێت عەرەﺑﯽ ﻭڵاﺗﺎنﯽ لەشەڕی جگە ﻭەرنەگرﺗﺑﻭﻭ،
 ﻭ نﺎﻭخۆ شەڕی ﺑەشێﻭەی رژێمەكﺎنیﺎن گۆڕینﯽ ﺗر ئەﻭانەی هەمﻭﻭ ﺑەڵام دەهﺎت، كۆﺗﺎیﯽ فراﻭانﺗر ﻭ ﺑەهێزﺗر ﺑەئیسرائیلێكﯽ
 گۆڕانكﺎرییەش شەپۆلە ئەﻭ میسر، ﻭ سﻭریﺎ عیراق، ئێران، ﻭەكﻭ لەﻭڵاﺗەكﺎنﯽ لەهەریەك ﻭەك دەهﺎت كۆﺗﺎییﺎن سەرﺑﺎزی كﻭدەﺗﺎی
 .هﺎت ﺑەكۆﺗﺎیﯽ نەﻭت گەﻭرەی ﻗەیرانێكﯽ ﺑە 3791 لەسﺎڵﯽ
 كە لەعیراق، ئیسلامﯽ شۆڕشﯽ سەرهەڵدانﯽ دﻭای ەﻭخۆراسﺗ دەسﺗپێدەكﺎت، عیراق-ئیران ﺑەشەڕی سێهەمیشﯽ نەﻭەی
 حﻭسێن سەدام رژێمەكەی ﺑەڕﻭﻭخﺎنﯽ ﻭ كﻭردەكﺎن ﺑەیﺎرمەﺗﯽ ئەمریكﺎ یەكگرﺗﻭﻭەكﺎنﯽ ﻭیلایەﺗە لەلایەن عیراق ﺑەداگیركردنﯽ
 .هﺎت كۆﺗﺎیﯽ 3002 لەسﺎڵﯽ
 ﺗكەﻭﺗنﯽدەس لەپێنﺎﻭی دەچێژن ﻭﻭزەﻭە زەكﺎنﯽزلهێ پێداﻭیسﺗییەكﺎنﯽ پڕكردنەﻭەی ﺑەدەست زۆر ئﺎزارێكﯽ چﻭارەم نەﻭەی لەئێسﺗﺎشدا
 مكە دەیەیەكﯽ چەند دﻭای دەخەمڵێندرێت ﻭا كە نەﻭت، سەردەمﯽ هﺎﺗنﯽ لەكۆﺗﺎیﯽ ﺑەر كۆن، جیهﺎنﯽ لەسەرچﺎﻭەكﺎنﯽ كەم ﻗﺎزانجێكﯽ
  .ﺑێت كۆﺗﺎیﯽ
 .دەسﺗیپێكردﻭﻭە سﺎڵ ەدس لە ﺑەر كە شەڕەی لەﻭ ﺑەشێك ﺑﺑنە رەنگە رﻭﻭدەدات، ئیسڕائیل ﻭ ئیران سﻭریﺎ، لەعیراق، ئەﻭەی
 لەهەردﻭﻭكیﺎن یﺎخﻭد سنﻭﻭرەكﺎن، لە یﺎن لەدەسەڵات گۆڕانكﺎری یﺎن جیهﺎندا ﺑەشەی لەﻭ ئەﻭا هەﺑێت، ﻭﻭزە شەڕی هەركﺎﺗێك
 .دەﺑێت جیﺎﻭازﺗر ئەمجﺎرەیﺎن ﺑڵێﯽ لێﺑكﺎت ﻭات نییە هۆكﺎریكیش هیچ. رﻭﻭدەدات
 نیﻭز دەیلﯽ حﻭرییەت: سەرچﺎﻭە
 خدر عمر: لەئینگلیزییەﻭە ﻭەرگێڕانﯽ
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  دەكات زیاد داواكارییەكانی ئۆجەلان
  یەتكین موراد/  
 كﺎﺗێك ەرلەمەﻭﺑ سﺎڵێك لە كەمﺗر, دەسﺗیپێكرد كﻭردسﺗﺎن ﯽكرێكﺎران حزﺑﯽ ﻭ ﺗﻭركیﺎ حكﻭمەﺗﯽ نێﻭان گفﺗﻭگۆكﺎنﯽ سێهەمﯽ خﻭلﯽ
  فیدان هﺎكﺎن ﺑریﺎریدا ئەردﻭغﺎن ﺗەیب رەجەب ﺗﻭركیﺎ ﻭەزیرانﯽ سەرﻭك
 ەﺗﺎیﯽه هەﺗﺎ زیندانﯽ كە كﻭردسﺗﺎن كرێكﺎرانﯽ حزﺑﯽ سەرﻭكﯽ لای ﺑنێرێﺗە نێردراﻭێك ﻭەك ﺗﻭركیﺎ هەﻭاڵگیری ئﺎژانسﯽ سەرﻭكﯽ
 . ئەسﺗەمﺑﻭڵ شﺎری لە ئیمرالﯽ ەیدﻭرگ لە ﻭ سەپێنراﻭە ﺑەسەردا
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 ﯽپﺎرﺗ حزﺑﯽ هﺎﻭشێﻭەی هەیە ﺑەرفراﻭانﯽ جەمﺎﻭەرێكﯽ كە دیمﻭكراﺗﯽ ﻭ ئﺎشﺗﯽ حزﺑﯽ لە پەرلەمﺎن ئەندامﺎنﯽ لە ژمﺎرەیەك ﻭ فیدان
 مﺎنگﯽ لە هەمﻭﻭیﺎن سەردانﺎنە ئەﻭ, ﺑﻭﻭ ئەیلﻭل ی 51 لە سەردانییﺎن دﻭایین كە كرد ئۆجەلانییﺎن سەردانﯽ كﻭردسﺗﺎن كرێكﺎرانﯽ
 . ﺑﻭﻭن سﺎڵ ئەم دﻭﻭەمﯽ كﺎنﻭنﯽ
 
 ﻭەسفﯽ ﻭ, هەیە درێژەی سﺎڵە 03 مﺎﻭەی كە كﻭردسﺗﺎن كرێكﺎرانﯽ حزﺑﯽ سەرﺑﺎزیەكﺎنﯽ چﺎلاكییە ﺑە هێنﺎن كۆﺗﺎیﯽ ﺑۆ ئۆجەلان پەیﺎمﯽ
 ێدێكﯽئﻭم ﻭ یﻭاه,  ﺗﻭركیﺎ زەﻭییەكﺎنﯽ لە كﻭردەكﺎنﯽ چەكدارە پﺎشەكشەی ﻭ ئﺎشﺗﯽ پڕۆسەی نﺎ نﺎﻭ گفﺗﻭگۆیﺎنەی ئەﻭ كە ئەردﻭغﺎن
  . ﻭڵاﺗە لەﻭ كﻭردە كێشەی هﺎﺗنﯽ كۆﺗﺎیﯽ ﻭ ئﺎشﺗیﺎنە چﺎرەسەری دۆزینەﻭەی كە ﺑەخشﯽ
 ێگﺎیڕ ﺑە كە كرد نﺎچﺎر ﺗﻭركیﺎی حكﻭمەﺗﯽ كﻭردسﺗﺎن كرێكﺎرانﯽ حزﺑﯽ ﻭ,  ﺑینﯽ ﺑەخۆﻭە ﺑەرچﺎﻭی سسﺗییەكﯽ پرۆسەكە دﻭاﺗر
 . ﺑكﺎت كﺎرە ئەﻭ دا ﺗەممﻭز مﺎنگﯽ لە پەرلەمﺎن هﺎﻭینەی پشﻭﻭی پێش ﻭ پەرلەمﺎنەﻭە لەڕێﯽ ﻭ یﺎسﺎیﯽ
 ﻭﻭكەشڕ ﺑە ﺗەنهﺎ چەكدارەكﺎنﯽ پﺎشەكشەكردنﯽ كە كرد ﺗۆمەﺗﺑﺎر ﺑەﻭە كﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ كرێكﺎرانﯽ حزﺑﯽ ﺗﻭركیﺎ حكﻭمەﺗﯽ كﺎﺗﺎنەدا لەﻭ
 . خۆگرﺗﻭﻭە لە نۆیﯽ چەكداری ڕاسﺗیدا لە ﻭ. ﺑﻭﻭە
 ﻭ خۆی نﯽﺑﺎرەگﺎكﺎ لە كﻭردسﺗﺎن كرێكﺎرانﯽ حزﺑﯽ كە لەكﺎﺗێكدا,  پێكرد دەسﺗﯽ لایەنەكە هەردﻭﻭ ﺗﺎﻭانﺑﺎركردنﯽ ﺑەرچﺎﻭ ﺑەشێﻭەیەكﯽ
 ردەﻭەك ﺑە دەكﺎﺗەﻭە دەست ﺗر جﺎریكﯽ كە ﺗﻭركیﺎ حكﻭمەﺗﯽ لە هەڕەشەكردن ﺑە كرد دەسﺗﯽ كﻭردسﺗﺎن لە ﻗەندیل چیﺎی لە ﺑەﺗﺎیﺑەت
 . یەكجﺎرەكﯽ پﺎشەكشەی دەرﺑﺎرەی كۆﺗﺎیﯽ هەڵﻭێسﺗﯽ ڕاگەیﺎندنﯽ پێش سەرﺑﺎزییەكﺎنﯽ
 ەﺗرەﻭ لایەكﯽ لە ﻭ ڕاﺑگەیەنێت دیمﻭكراسﯽ چﺎكسﺎزی كۆمەڵێك ﺑەنیﺎزە كە ڕایگەیﺎند ئەردﻭغﺎن ﺗەیب رەجەب پێشﻭﻭ هەفﺗەی
 گەیەنرێتڕاﺑ ئەﻭەی پێش ئۆجەلان دراﺑێﺗە پِڕۆژەكە ڕەشنﻭسﯽ كە ڕەﺗیكردەﻭە ڕاپۆرﺗﺎنەی ئەﻭ ﻭەزیران سەرﻭك ﺗﺎیﺑەﺗﯽ نﻭسینگەی
 .
 ردەﻭەك ﺗەئكیدی دا لێدﻭانەكەی لە ﻭ دا لێدﻭانﯽ ئۆجەلان ئەنجﺎمیشدا لە,  ﺑﻭﻭ كﺎﺗﺎنەدا ەﻭل دیمﻭكراﺗیش ﻭ ئﺎشﺗﯽ حزﺑﯽ سەردانەكەی
 ﻭ مەدەنﯽ ﺑﻭاری چﺎلاكﻭانﺎنﯽ دەخﻭازێت ﺑەڵكﻭ حزﺑە ئەﻭ ئەندامﺎنﯽ ﺗەنهﺎ نەك ﺑﺑینێت دا زیندانەكەی لە زۆر خەڵكﯽ دەیەﻭێت كە
 كﺎرﺑە دانﻭسﺗﺎندنﯽ ﻭﻭشەی ئۆجەلان جﺎرێك چەند كە نﺎكرێت شلەﻭە نكﻭڵﯽ هەرگیز. ﺑﺑینێت ڕۆژنﺎمەنﻭﻭسﺎنیش ﻭ ڕێكخراﻭەكﺎن
 ﺑەڕێﻭە ێكپ ﻭ ڕێك شێﻭەێكﯽ ﺑە ئﺎشﺗﯽ پرۆسەی ئەﻭەی ﺑۆ ﺑكرێن جێﺑەجێ داﻭاكﺎرییەكﺎنم دەﺑێت ﻭﻭﺗﯽ, دیﺎلۆگ جیﺎﺗﯽ لە هێنﺎﻭﻭە
  . ﺑچێت
 . ﺑﺑن ﻭانﺗرﺑەرفرا ﻭ زﻭرﺗر ئۆجەلان داخﻭازییەكﺎنﯽ هەﺗﺎ سﺎڵێك لە كەمﺗر لەمﺎﻭەی ڕﻭﻭیدا چﯽ ﺑﺎشە
 ەی دیمﻭكراﺗﯽ یەكێﺗﯽ حزﺑﯽ كە سﻭریﺎ لە كﻭردسﺗﺎن كرێكﺎرانﯽ حزﺑﯽ ﺑﺎڵﯽ چﻭنكە سﻭریﺎ یەكەم,  هەن هۆكﺎرێك چەند لێرەدا
 هێزەكﺎنﯽ لە هەرﻭەهﺎ دەكەن ئەسەد ﺑەشﺎر پشﺗیﻭانﯽ كە دﻭرخسﺗۆﺗەﻭە هێزانە ئەﻭ لەهەمﻭﻭ خۆی سەركەﻭﺗﻭﻭ ﺑەشێﻭەیەكﯽ
 ەنﺎﻭچ ﺑەسەر ﺑگرێت دەست هەﺗﺎ,  دەكﺎت پەیڕەﻭ خۆیﯽ ﺗﺎیﺑەﺗﯽ ئەجێندای,  دەجەنگن ەسەدئ ﺑەشﺎر لەدژی كە ئۆپۆزسیۆنیش
 ﻭ سﻭریﺎ لە ﻗﺎعیدەیە ڕێكخراﻭی ﺑﺎڵﯽ كە,  كرد ﺑەرپﺎ جەنگﯽ نﻭسرە ﺑەرەی لەدژی هەرﻭەهﺎ,  سنﻭﻭر سەر لە دا كﻭردنشینەكﺎن
 ﻭردسﺗﺎنك كرێكﺎرانﯽ حزﺑﯽ پشﺗﻭانﯽ,  ئﺎشﺗﯽ پرۆسەی ۆﺑ دەگەڕێﺗەﻭە كە,  ئەمنﯽ پرۆسەی ﺑە هێنﺎن كۆﺗﺎیﯽ لە ﻭەرگرﺗن ﺑەسﻭﻭد
 ﺎزاریئ لە ﺗﻭركیﺎ هەڵﺑژاردنەكﺎنﯽ نزیكﺑﻭنەﻭەی لەگەڵ.  كﻭردن دانیشﺗﻭانەكەی كە ڕۆژئﺎﻭا ﺑﺎشﻭﻭری لە ﺑەﺗﺎیﺑەت ﺗﻭركیﺎ لە كرا
  . دا 4102
  . داخﻭازییەكﺎنیەﺗﯽ كردنﯽ زیﺎد كﺎﺗﯽ كە دایە ﺑڕﻭایە لەﻭ ئۆجەلانیش,  نەڕژێت خﻭێن هەڵﺑژاردن پێش دەخﻭازێت ئەردﻭغﺎن
 فێركردن ئﺎیﺎ, ەخﻭارەﻭ دەهێنێﺗە هەڵﺑژاردن سەﻗفﯽ دەی سەدا لە ئﺎیﺎ گرنگﺗرە كﺎﺗێك لەهەمﻭﻭ دا ئیسﺗﺎ لە ﺗﻭركیﺎ چﺎكسﺎزییەكﺎنﯽ پﺎكێژی
 ﻭ ﻭێكەین ﺑﺎرەگﺎ ەﺑكﺎﺗ زیندانیەكەی دەﺗﻭانێت ﺑەشێﻭەیەك دەدرێت پێﯽ دەیەﻭێت ئۆجەلان هەرچﯽ یﺎن دەگرێت سەر كﻭردی زمﺎنﯽ ﺑە
  . دەكﺎت ڕێكخراﻭەكەی كﻭنﺗرﻭڵﯽ ﻭ دەﺑن ﺑەرفراﻭانﺗر پەیﻭەندییەكﺎنﯽ
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 وێتده خۆیربەسە تیوڵەده كوردێك مووهە: ساڵح مرهەبە دكتۆر
 
 ﻗﺎمەشە ڕاسﺗﯽنﺎﻭه. رزیدانﺑەلە ﻭهﺑنیﺎﺗنﺎنە كﺎنﯽكرێنە. ڕﻭﻭنە ﻭ زۆرن نگجە كﺎنﯽڵاﺗەخە ﻭلێرهە دێرینﯽ شﺎری لە كﺎنكﻭرده ﺑۆ
 ۆﺑ كەیەئﺎمﺎژه ﺗێدایە هۆڵﯽسە رسە خێزانﯽ كﯽیﺎریگﺎیە نﺎﻭیدالە كە زنمە ﺑﺎزاڕكردنﯽ مۆڵێكﯽ. ﻭزنسە ختدره ﻭ دار ﺑە ﺎنخێراك
 كﻭردسﺗﺎن رێمﯽهە مﺎنﯽپﺎرلە كە یەدیﻭاره ﻭئە ﻭهﻗینەﺗە دژی كۆنكرێﺗﯽ دیﻭاری ﺗﺎكە. مریكﯽئە سﺗﺎیڵﯽ رسەلە ﺗگﻭزاریخزمە
 .تپﺎرێزێده
 
 رگەئە ندهﺑ سﺗﯽدهلە كە ﺑن شت زۆرﺗرین نﯽخﺎﻭه نگەڕه ئێسﺗﺎ ﻭ ﺑینﻭه نگجە لە زیﺎنیﺎن زۆرﺗرین كﺎنكﻭرده كﺎنداعیراﻗییە نێﻭانلە
 .نێتﺑسە نەشەﺗە نﺎﻭخۆیﯽ ڕێكﯽشە ﺑۆ هﺎت مریكﺎدائە كﺎنﯽهێزه یﻭهكشﺎنە دﻭایﺑە كە یسیﺎسییە ﺑﺎرگرژیە ﻭئە
 
 .رانیننیگە ئێمە ڵێ،ﺑە رانین؟نیگە ئێمە ئﺎیﺎ:" ڵێتده كﻭردسﺗﺎن رێمﯽهە ﺗﯽحكﻭمە زیرانﯽﻭه رۆكسە سﺎڵح، مرهەەﺑ دكﺗۆر
 مدایەردهﺑەلە مﺎندرێژ كﯽڕێگﺎیە هێشﺗﺎ ئێمە. پڕئﺎشﺗیدایە ﻭ فیدراڵﯽ ﻭ دیمﻭكراﺗﯽ عیراﻗێكﯽ لە كﻭرد كﻭﻭه ئێمە نیشﺗمﺎنﯽ ندیﻭهرژهﺑە
 ."ﻭهﺑە یشﺗنگە ﺑۆ
 
 02 یهمﺎﻭ ﺑۆ كە كﺎنكﻭرده ﺑۆ رانییەنیگە جێگﺎی رخﺎنﯽرچەﻭه خﺎڵێكﯽ) كﻭردسﺗﺎن رێمﯽهە( لێره مریكﯽئە رﺑﺎزیسە ڕۆڵﯽ كۆﺗﺎیﯽ
 ڕێگﺎیلە 1991 سﺎڵﯽ لە فﺎرس نداﻭیكە نگﯽجە دﻭای لە ﺗﺎرهسە پﺎرێزراﻭن، مریكﺎﻭهئە كﺎنﯽكگرﺗﻭﻭهیە ﺗەﻭیلایە نلایەلە سﺎڵە
 نﻭری نلایەلە ڵاتسەده هێزكردنﯽﺑە ئێسﺗﺎ،. ڕاگرت حسێنﯽ دامسە كﻭشﺗﻭﺑڕی كە فڕیندژه رێمێكﯽهە ﻭ مرۆیﯽ راسیۆنێكﯽئۆپە
 غداﺑە لە هێزﺑە ندینﺎﻭه ﺗێكﯽحكﻭمە سﺗﯽده رسەلە كﻭرد كﺎنﯽكۆژانە نﺎخۆشﯽ ریﻭهیﺎده ﻭهعیراﻗە زیریﻭه رۆكسە مﺎلیكﯽ
 ﻭ شیعە كﺎنﯽجیﺎﻭازه گرﻭپە نێﻭان لە نﺎﻭﺑژیﻭان كﻭﻭه یﻭهئە نﺎسكﯽ ڵﻭێسﺗﯽهە خﺎﺗەده كﺎنكﻭرده ﻭهئە هﺎرﻭههە. ﻭهﻭژێنێﺗەﻭرده
 .دایەشەڕههە ژێرلە ﺗێیدا خۆیﺎن خﻭدی داهﺎﺗﻭﻭی ﻭ ڕێكەشە كە ﺑﺑینن ڕۆڵ داسﻭننە
 
 ﻭكﻭه ﻗﺑﻭڵكردﻭﻭه مﺎنﻭهئە ئێمە ڵامﺑە ﻭێت،ده خۆیرﺑەسە كﻭردی ﺗﯽﻭڵەده ردێككﻭ مﻭﻭهە ﺑێگﻭمﺎن: "ﻭﺗیشﯽ سﺎڵح مرهەﺑە دكﺗۆر
 یﻭهئە ﺎرﺑنخﻭازی كﺎنكﻭرده ﻭانییە ڕمﺑﺎﻭه مێنێت،نە هیﻭایە مئە رگەئە. ﺑژین فیدراڵیدا ﻭ پڕئﺎشﺗﯽ دیمﻭكراﺗﯽ، عیراﻗێكﯽ لە شێكﺑە
 ."ﻭهﺗرسیەمە نەﺑیخە مﺎنەهە
 
 رهە ڵداەریهسە رﻭﺑەمەلە فﺗەهە دﻭﻭ ینزیكە نﺎﻭخۆ، ڕێكﯽشە نﺎریكە ﺗەهێنﺎﻭه عیراﻗﯽ ڵێنده دارانﺗمەسیﺎسە كە ئێسﺗﺎ، یرانەیﻗە مئە
 كۆمﺎری رۆكسە جێگری هﺎشمﯽ ﺗﺎریق ﺑۆ سﺗگیركردنﯽده ﺑڕیﺎری مﺎلیكﯽ ﺗﯽحكﻭمە. ﻭهكشﺎنە مریكﺎئە كﺎنﯽهێزه یﻭهئە دﻭای
 ﺑﺎكﻭﻭر ۆﺑ هﺎشمﯽ. ﺑﺎتدهڕێﻭهﺑە ﺗیرۆركردن گرﻭپێكﯽ یﻭهﺑە كرد ﺗﺑﺎریﺗۆمە ﻭ یەسﻭننە داریﺗمەسیﺎسە ﺑﺎڵاﺗرین كە ركردده عیراق،
  .ڵﺑێتهە سﺗگیركردنده لە ﺗﺎ ڵاتهە خۆرﺑەسە نیمچە رێمﯽهە ﺑۆ
 
 .ﺑێتدرﻭسﺗده" كیەكێشە" ندچە ﻭهنەكەسﺗنەڕاده هﺎشمﯽ رگەئە یﻭهﺑە كﺎنكﻭرده دایە هۆشداری ،یەشیعە كە مﺎلیكﯽ،
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 ﻭ نەسﻭن نێﻭان نﺎكۆكﯽ نﺎﻭ ڕاﺑكێشرێنە یﻭهﺑە دڵخۆشنین ن،ﺑكە جێجێﺑە مﺎلیكﯽ یكەداﻭاكﺎرییە نییە سﺗیﺎنﺑەمە كە كﺎنكﻭرده
 ."كﺎنكێشە لە نین شێكﺑە ئێمە:" ﻭهكﺎﺗەخﺗدهجە كﻭردسﺗﺎن، رێمﯽهە رۆكﯽسە ﺑﺎرزانﯽ، سعﻭدمە. ﻭهكﺎنەشیعە
. رسەچﺎره لە شێكﺑنﺑە یﻭهلە ﻭهنەدﻭﻭرﺑخە خۆیﺎن نﺎﺗﻭانن كﺎنكﻭرده ،نﺎدیﺎره نگجە دﻭای عیراﻗﯽ داهﺎﺗﻭﻭی یﻭهئە ڵگەلە ڵامﺑە
 ﺎنﯽ،ﺑﺗﺎڵە لالجە لە داﻭایﺎن ﻭهەمﺑۆﺗكە زۆر مریكﺎﻭهئە رﺑﺎزیسە یﻭهكشﺎنە كﺎﺗﯽلە رییﺎنكﺎریگە كە كﺎن،مریكییەئە دیپلۆمﺎﺗكﺎره
  .ڕێكﺑخﺎت عیراق ﺗﯽركردایەسە كﯽیەﻭهكۆﺑﻭنە كردﻭﻭه عیراق كۆمﺎری رۆكسە ﻭ كﻭرد یركردهسە
 
 كﺎﺗێكدالە ێتسﺎزﺑكر ﺑﺎكﻭﻭر لە پێﻭیسﺗە ڵێنده كﺎنكﻭرده: كەﻭهكۆﺑﻭﻭنە سﺗنﯽﺑە شﻭێنﯽ رسەلە نییە ﻭﺗنێكڕێكە هیچ تنﺎنەﺗە ﺗﺎئێسﺗﺎ ڵامﺑە
  .ﺑێت غداﺑە لە یﻭهلە ﻭهكﺎﺗەخﺗدهجە مﺎلیكﯽ
 
 یكەكییەرهسە پێكهﺎﺗە رسێهە ﺑۆ ﺗێدایە گرنگﯽ ڕۆڵﯽ ﻭ درﻭسﺗكرا كﺎنكﻭرده ریسﺗپێشخەده ﺑە پﺎر سﺎڵﯽ كە شهﺎﻭﺑە ﺗێكﯽحكﻭمە
 كﺎنسﻭننە ﻭهئە كە درﻭسﺗﺑكﺎت شیعە یزۆرینە نﻭَێﯽ ﺗێكﯽەحكﻭم كرد یشەڕههە مﺎلیكﯽ. دایەﻭهشﺎندنەڵﻭههە لە ئێسﺗﺎ عیراق
 ێنﺎچێتﺗ ڕێگﺎی رێكەگەئە شﻭهئە ﻭ مﺎنداپﺎرلە لە كﺎنەكﻭرده پﺎڵپشﺗﯽﺑە پێﻭیسﺗﯽ مﺎلیكﯽ ﻭهئە جێكردنﯽجێﺑە ﺑۆ. خﺎتراﻭێزدهپە
 .رﺑگرێتسە
 
 كشییەهﺎﻭﺑە پێﻭیسﺗە نگﺎﻭ،هە ﺗرسیدارﺗرینمە ﺑێﺗەده مەئە: "ﻭﺗﯽ ﻭلێرهە یﻭهرهده لە یكەكۆشكە لە كدایەدیمﺎنە یمیﺎنە لە ﺑﺎرزانﯽ
 ."ﺑێتده سﺎﺗﺎﻭیكﺎره ﻭهﻭهئە یﻭانەپێچەﺑە رشﺗێكهە. ﺑێتهە كﺎنداكﻭرده ﻭ سﻭننە ﻭ شیعە نێﻭانلە
 
 ﻭایە مﺎنﺎی یزانینده ئێمە یﻭهئە كﻭﻭه ﻭهرهده ﺑكﺎﺗە كﺎننیەسﻭن كە كﻭرد ﻭ شیعە نێﻭان كﯽیمﺎنییەهﺎﻭپە: "ﻭﺗﯽ سﺎڵح، مرهەﺑە دكﺗۆر
 ."عیراﻗە كۆﺗﺎیﯽ
 
 سﻭننﯽ نﯽیﺎخیﺑﻭﻭ نگەڕه ڵاتسەده لە كردﺑﻭﻭ، ڵاﺗیﺎنسەده كۆنﺗرۆڵﯽ حسێندا دامسە ڵاﺗﯽسەده مﯽردهسە لە كە كﺎن،سﻭننە شكردنﯽﺑێﺑە
 ملانیكە داغﺑە لە كیەﻭهﻗینەﺗە زنجیره مریكﺎئە یﻭهكشﺎنە لە ڕۆژ چﻭار دﻭای. ئﺎرادایەلە یەﻭهﺑﻭژانە مەئ یئﺎمﺎژه مێژهلە كە ﻭهﺑﺑﻭژێنێﺗە
  .هێرشە خﻭێنﺎﻭیﺗرین ﻭهئە سﺎڵێكدا لە زیﺎﺗر یمﺎﻭهلە ﻭ كﻭشت سﯽكە) 36(
 
 یسﻭننییە ﺑەرهعە ﺗەحكﻭمە ﻭئە چﻭنكە ن،سﻭننە سﻭڵمﺎنﯽمﻭ خۆیﺎن كﺎنكﻭرده ندهرچەهە خۆشنﺎﻭێت، كﺎنیﺎنسﻭننە زۆر كﺎنكﻭرده
 لە كﺎنسﻭننە ﺑەرهعە ﺑﺎشە پێیﺎن كﺎنكﻭرده ڵامﺑە كﺎن،كﻭرده دژیلە جینۆسﺎید نجﺎمدانﯽئە ﺑە كرێتﺗﺑﺎردهﺗۆمە كە ﺑﻭﻭ حسێن دامسە
  .ﻭهڕێنەﺑگە ﻗﺎمگیرینﺎسە ﻭ ﺗﻭندﻭﺗیژی ﺑۆ ﻭ نﺑكە ﺗرسﯽمە كنە شدارﺑنﺑە ڵاتسەده شكردنﯽداﺑە مﺎیﺑنە رسەلە ﺗێكداحكﻭمە
 
 كیەنﺎگەەپ ﺑۆﺗە دﻭاییﺎنە مﺑە كﺎن،پێكهﺎﺗە مﻭﻭهە كﺎنﯽﻭسﺎﻭهچە ﺑۆ شﺗێكەهەﺑە ﻭ ییەلێﺑﻭرده ڵایﻗە درێژه كﯽیەمﺎﻭه ﺑۆ كە كﻭردسﺗﺎن،
 .ﺑﻭﻭه جێنیشﺗە سلێمﺎنﯽ شﺎری یﻭهرهده كﺎنﯽرزاییەﺑە ەل ﺑﺎنﯽﺗﺎڵە یﻭهﻭانەحە شﻭێنﯽ لە هﺎشمﯽ. كﺎنسﻭننە ﺑۆ
 
 دﻭای ندی،نﺎﻭه ﺗﯽحكﻭمە لە ﺑێتهە زیﺎﺗری كﯽخۆییەرﺑەسە ﻭڵیداهە ﻭ ڵەﺗێكە كﯽیەنﺎﻭچە كە ،دیﺎلە پﺎرێزگﺎی كﺎنﯽسﻭننە ركردهسە
  .ﺗنڵاهە كﻭردسﺗﺎن ﺑۆ ﻭهﺗەﻭڵەده ئﺎسﺎیشﯽ كﺎنﯽهێزه نلایەلە هێرشێك
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 كﺎنەمریكییئە یپلﻭرالیسﺗیە ڵگﺎكۆمە ﻭئە نﯽدیمە لە شدارنﺑە ڕێگﺎ زۆرﺑە ﻭ یەهە مریكﺎدائە ڵگەلە ﻗﻭﻭڵیﺎن ندییﻭهپە كﺎنكﻭرده
  .نﺑكە درﻭسﺗﯽ عیراق لە ﻭڵیﺎنداهە
 
 كﻭرد یكێشە رسەلە كﺗێﺑێكﯽ كە ﺑﻭﻭ نزیك ﻭهه-چنزهیﺗ ركریسﺗۆفە رنﻭﻭسە لە ﻭ ژیﺎ ﻭاشنﺗۆن لە سﺎڵ ندینچە ﺑۆ سﺎڵح مرهەﺑە دكﺗۆر
 .نﻭﻭسیﻭه
 
 ەﺑ یﺎنچﻭێنێتده سﺎڵح مرهەﺑە دكﺗۆر ،خۆیﺎنە یﯽﺑۆمﺎﻭه مﺎفﯽ ﺗﯽركردایەسە یﻭهﺑە عیراق سﻭننﯽ ینﻭخﺑە ﺑۆچﻭﻭنﯽ ﺑە تﺑﺎرهسە
  .مریكﺎئە كﺎنﯽپێسﺗە سپﯽ نگلۆسﺎكسۆنەئە پرۆﺗسﺗﺎنﺗە
 
 
 كنە ﻭهرزكردۆﺗەﺑە مریكﯽئە كﯽئﺎڵایە یﯽكراﻭه ﺑە مریكﯽئە كﯽیەﻗﻭﺗﺎﺑخﺎنە ﻭ دانراﺑﻭﻭن، كریسمس داری ﺗر شﻭێنﯽ لە ﻭ كەمۆڵە لە
 .كﻭژراننە رێمەهە ملە مریكﯽئە رﺑﺎزێكﯽسە ﺗﺎكە. ﻭهدڕكﺎﻭیە لﯽﺗە ﻭ پشكنین خﺎڵﯽ ﻭ كۆنكرێﺗﯽ دیﻭاری پشت لە
 
 یراﻗﯽع مریكﺎئە سﻭپﺎی ڵێنده ﻭائە یت،ﺑكە كﺎنكﻭرده یزۆرینە لە پرسیﺎر ﺗۆ رگەئە:" ﻭﺗﯽ ردسﺗﺎنكﻭ رێمﯽهە ﺗﯽحكﻭمە رۆكﯽسە
 ."جێهێشتﺑە زﻭﻭ زۆر
 
 ردﻭﻭەه كە نﺑﺎرئە ﻭ دیﺎلە كﻭﻭه نكەده ﺗر پﺎرێزگﺎكﺎنﯽ كﺎنﯽﻭڵەهە لە پشﺗگیری ﻭ یەهە فیدراڵیزم ﺑە ﺑڕﻭایﺎن كﻭرد كﺎنﯽركردهسە
 ﻭئە ﺗﯽدژایە شیعﯽ ڵاﺗﯽسەده رﺑۆسە كیەشەڕههە كﻭﻭه مﺎلیكﯽ ﻭ دیﺑهێننﺑە خۆیﯽرﺑەسە ﺗﺎ سﻭننین، یكەدانیشﺗﻭانە یزۆرینە
 ﺗرسﯽمە خۆیﯽرﺑەسە ﻭ ڕﻭﻭه نگﺎﻭهە ﺑێت،هە خۆیﺎن ﺗﯽﻭڵەده خﻭازنده خۆزگە دﻭاجﺎر كﺎنكﻭرده یزۆرﺑە كﺎﺗێكدالە. كﺎتدهﻭشەڕه
 ﺗﺎنەەﻭڵده مئە. ﺗێدایە یﺎنﻭرهگە كﻭردی یمینەكە داﻭڵاﺗﺎنە ملە كە ﻭرﻭژێنێتده سﻭریﺎدا ﻭ ﺗﻭركیﺎ ﻭ ئێران ڵگەلە یﯽﻭچەنﺎ ڕێكﯽشە
 .ﺑیننده ﺑێزاركردن ﻭ كردنﺗﻭڕه كﻭﻭه ﻭهعیراﻗە كﺎنﯽكﻭرده نلایەلە تﻭڵەده یﺎندنﯽراگە
 
 كگرﺗﻭﻭداەی عیراﻗێكﯽ یچﻭارچێﻭه لە خۆیﺎن خۆیﯽرﺑەسە یﻭهدرێژكردنە لە خۆیﺎن هیﻭای نﺑﺎشﺗری كﺎنكﻭرده ئێسﺗﺎ كﺎﺗﯽ ﺑۆ ملانیكە
  .ﻭهﺑیننەده
 
 كﺎنﺑەرهعە ﻭ كﺎنكﻭرده نێﻭانلە ركﻭككە شﺎری ﻭ یەهە مریكﯽئە یزنﺎمەگەڕه ﻭ ركﻭكەكە پﺎرێزگﺎری ئێسﺗﺎ كە ریم،كە دینجمەنە
 ڵكﻭەﺑ ﻭێت،ده یﺎنﻭهئە كﺎنكﻭرده نییە ﻭهﻭهئە هۆیﺑە ﻭهئە شﺑكرێتداﺑە دﻭاجﺎر عیراق رگەئە: "ڵێتده ،كراﻭهشداﺑە كﺎنداﺗﻭركمﺎنە ﻭ
 ."ﺑژین ﻭهپێكە نﺎﺗﻭانن ﺗر ﻭانﯽئە یەﻭهﻭهئە هۆیﺑە
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 ێمانیسل هل ینتهرناسیۆنالئ ۆسیالس ڕێكخراوی هل یكورد ۆمیتهیك ۆبونهوەیك
 21 ەل ۆیخ ۆﺑونەوەیك يەكەم ۆنگرێسەوەك يەنلا ەل ڕيﺎرێكﺑ یادو ەزراوەدام ەنجومەنەوەئ ەلايەنل ەكورد ك ەلﯽگ ەﺑ يبەتﺗﺎ یئﺎ ێسئ ۆمیتەیك
 ﯽﺑوانەشدارﺑ ە) ك ەیك يوو ﯽ( پ ێكخراﺑوور ەوەكوردستﺎن یشتمﺎنﯽن يەكێتﯽ  یئﺎ ێسئ ەندامﯽئ ەلايەنل ۆنفرانسەكەكرد ك ێمﺎنﯽسل ەل 3102 یسﺎنﯽن ی
 . ۆكردﺑۆوەك ەيەكەوەﺑ یﺎو ﺗورك يﺎسور و ێرانو ئ ێراقع ﯽكوردستﺎن یكورد ێخراویو ر یﺎسﯽس ﯽپﺎرﺗ 02 ەل يﺎﺗرز
 يوو ﯽپ ریێو سكرﺗ ێراقع ۆمﺎریك ەرۆكس ڵەﺑﺎنﯽﺗﺎ ۆنﺎرد ﺑ ۆیخ ێزیر ڵاوس یئﺎ ێسئ ﯽگشت ێریسكرﺗ يﺎلائﺎ يس, لو ۆنفرانسەكەداك لەسەرەﺗﺎی
 . دﺑووكر ێﺗﺎوﺗو ۆﺑونەوەيەیك ەمئ ﯽو سﺎزكردن ەستنﺑ ەسەلەیم ەودائ ەگەڵل ەك یئﺎ ێسئ ەرۆكﯽس ێگریو ج ەیك
 . خواست ﺎنﯽڵەﺑﺗﺎ ەرۆكس ۆﺑ ەوەيﺎنزوو چﺎكبون یوایه يﺎلائﺎ ﯽهﺎوشﺎن ەشدارﺑوانﺑ ۆكﺎنیشداگفتوگ ەكﺎﺗﯽو ل ێدەكراپ ەستﯽه ۆرز ڵەﺑﺎنﯽﺗﺎ غیﺎﺑﯽ
 ەپﺎرﺗ ەل ۆریز ەشێكﯽﺑ یكﺎر ەجێندایو ئ یﺎسەتس ەيﺎندگ یرا  ەﻗینەوراست ۆﺗەﺑ ۆمیتەيەك ەوئ ێستﺎئ ەرووخست ەوەیئ ۆشحﺎڵیەوەخ ەﺑ يﺎلائﺎ لويس
 یمﺎف و ئﺎزاد ەديهێنﺎنﯽﺑ ێنﺎوپ ەل ەشەهﺎوﺑ ەﺑﺎتخ ەكﺎﺗێكدال ەمەئ ەخۆدەگرێل یﺎوەج ۆچونﯽﺑ یروﺑ ەﺑ ەكەنﺎوچ ەسەرﺗﺎسەریل يەكﺎنكورد
 . يەكتری ﯽكردن ەمﺎهەنگﯽو ه ديموكراسﯽو
 ەول نتەرنﺎشنﺎڵیشﯽیئ ۆسیﺎلیستس ەندﺑونﯽپﺎﺑ يﺎلا. ئﺎ دێكەنه ۆﺑ ەنیﺎﺗ ەكن ێتﺑ ەراهەمف ەموانه ۆﺑ ێويستەو پ ێﺑكر ەرامۆشف ێتنﺎﺑ ۆڤمر مﺎفەكﺎنﯽ
 . ەوەدووپﺎﺗكرد ەوەرو
 ەﺑﺎﺗﯽخ راقێع ە. كورد ليﺎلۆگەو د یﺎسەتس ﯽكرد كﺎﺗ یئﺎشكرا يﺎلائﺎ يس, لو ەڕێوەيەﺑ ەراستنﺎو ۆرهەڵاﺗﯽخ ەل ەك ۆرانكﺎریگ ەپۆلﯽش ەﺑ سەﺑﺎرەت
 ەكﺎنگرنگ ەسەلەم ەڵامرووخﺎ ﺑ ەدامص ێمﯽرژ ەمەوﺑەرل ڵسﺎ 01 ەوكﺎﺗەوەیل ێنێتﺑ ەدەستﺑ ۆیخ يیەكﺎنﯽمﺎف و ئﺎزاد ەوەیئ ۆﺑ ەكردو ۆریز
 . ێمﺎونج ۆیخ ەكو
 يموكراسیشو د ێﺑكر ەجێﺑ َﯽج ەﺑو ێويستپ ەستوورد ی 041 ەی,مﺎدد ەﺑوەن ڵﻗبوو ێگەیج ەغداوەﺑ يەنلا ەل ەركوكك ەﺑ ەﺑﺎرەتس هەرەشەكﺎن
 .یرێﺑگ ێل ێزیر
 ۆخەكەد ۆرانكﺎريیەكﺎنﯽگ يیندوا ەسەرل ۆيﺎنخ یو را ۆچونﺑ ەوێئ ەكﺎنﯽكورد ۆستەد ەرەﺗﺎكرد س یكردو داوا يﺎسور یاردژو ۆخﯽد ەل ﯽﺑﺎس ئﺎيﺎلا
 ەك ەيەكێشروو ك ەنەﺑخ یﺎﺗورك ەل ەستپێشخەريیەكﺎند ەسەرل یﺎریزان يیندوا ەوەیئ ۆكرد ﺑ ەدەپەشﺑ ەل ەندامەكﺎنمﺎنئ ەل یو هﺎوكﺎت داوا ەرﺑبڕند
 . ﺑن ەرشوێنێكه ەل ێكەكورد ەمووه ﺎنﯽێگەرانیەكن ەﻗﯽچ
 ەوێشل ەخواست ك یوایو ه ێستﺎئ ەل ەرﺑ ڵسﺎ ەندينچ ەكو ەﺑێتﺗﺎو ن ڕپ ەسەلەيەكﯽم ێستﺎدائ ەل ەوانەيەل ەكﺎنكورد ەﺑ ەﺑﺎرەتس ێرانئ ەل دۆخەكە
 یرﺗﺎسەەسەرل ەﺑەستند ەندامەكﺎنیﺎنو ئ یﺎئ ێسئ ەمﺎهەنگﯽه ەپشت ﺑ ەوانئ ەوەكرد ﯽدوپﺎﺗ يﺎلائﺎ يس. لو ێتﺑ ەدیﺑﺎش ﺑ ەنگﺎویو ه ەوﺗنك ێشپ
 . یهﺎنداج
 ێنﺎه ەخێرﺑ وانﯽەشدارﺑﺑ ەگەرمﯽﺑ ەكەيەوەپﺎرﺗ ەنﺎویكوردستﺎن  ﺑ یشتمﺎنیﯽن يەكێتﯽ یﺎسﯽس ەكتەﺑﯽم ێریكﺎرگ ەستەید ێپرسراویل ەختیﺎرﺑ مەلا
 . كرد یئﺎ ێسئ ﯽگشت ێریرﺗسك ەیئﺎراست ۆشﯽخ يشﯽو سوپﺎس و ستﺎ ەصفكردو ەگرنگﺑ یئﺎ ێسئ ێشخەريیەیپ ەستد ەمو ئ
 ەمئ خواست یوایه ەكو ەر, ه ەﺑو ۆستد ێﺑ ەشكراوەوو داﺑ ەﺑو ەنﺎپشت و پ ێﺑ ەراستنﺎو ۆرهەڵاﺗﯽخ ەكورد ل ێستﺎﺗﺎ ئ ەيﺎندگ یرا ەختیﺎرﺑ مەلا
 .ەسەلەكەيﺎنم  ۆﺑ ەنگەرێكیشس ێتەو ﺑب يەكبخﺎت ەلەگ ەمئ ێیەنو ۆمیتەك
 ێوەش ەهەمﺎنﺑ يشﺗر ەكﺎنﯽخواست پﺎرﺗ یوایو ه ێنﺎه ەدەستﺑ یئﺎ ێسئ ەل ەواویﺗ ەندامێتﯽكوردستﺎن ئ تمﺎنﯽیشن يەكێتﯽ ێژدورودر ەﺑﺎﺗێكﯽخ دوای
 .ەشیﺎنﺑ ێتەﺑب ەستكەوﺗەد ەوئ
 يﺎنێكﯽژ ەستەﺑەركردنﯽد ەپێنﺎول ەكەند ەﺑﺎتخ ەلانگ ۆرﺑەیو ز يداوەروو ۆرز ۆرانكﺎریگ ەراستنﺎو ۆرهەڵاﺗﯽخ ەل ەيﺎندگ یرا ەختیﺎرﺑ مەلا
.  داەكەنﺎوچ ەل ەچند ێشپ ەرەوﺑ ەنگﺎوەكﺎنه ێستﺎو ئ يموكراسیداو د ەلگ ەگەڵل يكتﺎﺗۆرﺑوند ەك ەسەرچووﺑ ەﺗﺎنەحكوم ەوئ ەردەمﯽ. س ﺑﺎشتر
 ەيﺎندگ ﯽراش ەراستنﺎو ۆرهەڵاﺗﯽخ ەل يموكراسیەو د ﯽئﺎشت ەديهێنﺎنﯽﺑ یلﯽكوردستﺎن كل ەكەیچوار پﺎرچ ەره ەكورد ل ەسەلەیم ەسەركردنﯽچﺎر
 . یهﺎنداج ەسەرﺗﺎسەریل ەسەلەيەم ەمفراوانتر ل ێگەيشتنێكﯽﺗ ێكل ەديهێنﺎنﯽﺑ ۆﺑ ەﺑێتگرنگ د یئﺎ ێسئ ۆڵﯽر
خواست  یواشﯽد . هكور یﺎسیەكﺎنﯽس ەپﺎرﺗ ێون ەل یژيكستراﺗ ﯽدانﺎن ۆ) ﺑ ۆرم( پلاﺗف ەكۆيەكس ێتەﺑب ێیەنو ۆمیتەك ەمئ ەك یشﺎندان ۆشﯽخ خۆشحﺎڵﯽ
  .ۆﺑببنەوەك يداو ئﺎزاد ﯽئﺎشت ەداهﺎﺗودا ل ەل يیەكﺎنكورد ەپﺎرﺗ ەك
 دارﺑوانەشﺑ ەمووروو . ه ەخست ۆشیﺎنخ ۆچونﯽكرد راو ﺑ ۆكﺎنیﺎنگفتوگ ەشداریﺑ ەﺑووئﺎمﺎد ەكﺎنﯽپﺎرﺗ ەمووه ەداراشكﺎوان ەوكراو ۆيەكﯽگفتوگ لە
 . ەڵەمﻗ يەدا ێژوويﺎنم ێكﯽسﺎﺗ ەكرد و ﺑ ۆﺑونەوەكەك ەسﺎزكردنﯽل ێشوازيیﺎنپ ەرمﯽگ ەﺑ
و  ەكردو یكورد ەسەلەیم ەل ەك ڵپشتیەیو پﺎ یوانﯽپشت ەوئ ەپﺎیكرا ل یئﺎ ێسئ ەیئﺎراست ۆرز یو سوپﺎسگوزار ۆزەﺗیڤپ یو را ۆچونﺑ ﺑیرو
 ەكﺎنیﺎنئﺎمﺎنج ەديهێنﺎنﯽﺑ ەرەونﺎن ﺑ ەنگﺎوكورد و ه ەلﯽگ ەمووه ۆﺑ ەروەریدادپ ەديهێنﺎنﯽﺑ ۆﺑ ەوەدووپﺎﺗكرد ۆیخ ﯽﺑون ەندﺗر پﺎﺑ ێكﯽجﺎر ەمەشﺑ
 ەوئ نﺎنﯽەديهێﺑ ەﺑ ەندنپﺎﺑ ەك يەكبخﺎت يەكﺎنكورد ەپﺎرﺗ ەمووه ەك ەكراو ەدايەكﯽمونت ەﺑێتەد ۆمیتەكە. ك يیەكﺎنیﺎنمﺎف و ئﺎزاد لەدەستەﺑەركردنﯽ
 يەكتر يﺎﺗرزﺑن و  يەكتر یوانﯽپشت ێويستەپ يیەكﺎنكورد ەپﺎرﺗ ەمووه ەك يەوەدووپﺎﺗكرا ەوەش. ئيموكراسیﺎنەداد ێكﯽپلان ێوەوچوارچ ەل ەئﺎمﺎنجﺎن
.  ەﺑێته شﯽەهﺎوﺑ یژێكﯽو ستراﺗ يەكبێتكورد  ەﺑوو ك ێويستپ ەيرانەكﺎنﻗ ﯽو ﺑون ەراستنﺎو ۆرهەڵاﺗﯽخ ەل ۆخەكەد ۆڕانﯽ. گ ۆﺑبنەوەو ك نینﺑب
 . دانرا ەيەئﺎراست ەوﺑ ێشوازیپ ەنگﺎویه يەكەم ەﺑ ۆمیتەيەك ەمئ
 ەرچەندەكرا ه ەوەﺑ ەو ئﺎمﺎژ ەدامص ێمﯽرژ تﺎﺗۆريیەﺗﯽيكد ەستﯽد ەكورد ل ەلﯽگ یئﺎزاد ۆسەیپر ڵەیسﺎ 01 يﺎدی ە, ل ێراقع ەﺑ سەﺑﺎرەت
 ەك كەركوك يبەﺗﯽﺗﺎ ۆخﯽ. د ەﺗەوەمﺎو ەندانﺎو  ەﺗﯽحكوم ەگەڵل ێشەكﺎنك ەڵامﺑ ەﺑو ەرﻗەراركوردستﺎن ﺑ ەرێمﯽه ەل یو ئﺎزاد ﯽو ئﺎشت يموكراسﯽد
 ەك  ەﺑینرێد ەستوورد ی 041 ەیمﺎدد ﯽكردن ەجێﺑ ێج ﯽخستن ێروون پشتگو ەشێوەيەكﯽﺑ يەدا ەغدادﺑ ۆنترۆڵﯽك ێرژ ەل یداريیەوەئ یوەرول
 ەرلەمﺎنپ ێشەكﺎنﯽوك یشتمﺎنﯽن ەیﺑودج ەﺑ ەيوەستپ ەسەلەكﺎنﯽ, م ەكورد ﺑو ەلﯽگ ەكﺎنﯽمﺎف ﯽكردن ێشێلپ ەمەشئ ەيەه ەركوكەكەوەك ەﺑ ەيوەندیپ
 ەرﺑﺎزیس زیێه ﯽو ﺑون ێگیركردنج ەﺗﺎيبەتﺑ یگەرانیەن ێگەیج ەﺗﺎيبەتﺑ ەركوكك ۆخﯽ. د ێرۆريزمو ﺗ يەفﯽﺗﺎ ەﺗرسﯽم ەرەسەندنﯽغداد و پەﺑ ەل
 .ەكرێد ەمﺎشﺎﺗ ەكەنﺎوچ ۆنترۆڵكردنﯽك يﺎدكردنﯽو ز ەرەشەيەكه ەكو ەك ەكرێد ەدیﺑ ەكﺎنسنور  ەل
 ەشﺎر ەول ێﯽنو ەڵبژاردنﯽه ﯽسﺎزكردن ەغدادﺑ ەكﺎﺗێكدا, ل ەﺗەوەمﺎو ۆیخ ەكو ەو 5002 ڵﯽسﺎ ەل ەركوكك ێزگﺎیپﺎر ەنجومەنﯽئ ەكرا ك ەوەﺑ ئﺎمﺎژە
ش ەويئ ێﺑكر ەوەل ەمترك ێشت یچه ێتكرد نﺎﺑ یئﺎشكرا ۆﺑونەوەكەك یدوا ۆژنﺎمەيیدار ێدوانێكﯽل ەل یئﺎ ێسئ ﯽگشت ێری. سكرﺗ ۆﺗەوەكرد ەتر
 . ەﺑو ڵكردنﻗبو ێگەیج ێگەردپﺎك و ﺑ ەڵبژاردنێكﯽه ﯽو سﺎزكردن ەستورد ی 041 ەیمﺎدد ەواویﺗ ﯽكردن ەجێﺑ ێو ج ێزه ەكشێﯽپﺎش
 نﯽەوڵەكﺎ. ه ەيەه ێژەیدر ڵاﺗەو ەوكورد ل ەلﯽگ ەهﺎمەﺗیەكﺎنﯽن ەوسﺎندنەوەوچ ەوەیكرد ﺑ ەيﺎنئﺎمﺎژ ێرانئ ەكورد ل یﺎسیەكﺎنﯽس ەپﺎرﺗ نوێنەرانﯽ
 ۆشیﺎریه ەوەۆمیتەيك ەمئ ێگەیر ەخواست ل یوايﺎنه ەموانكرا و ه ێوەل ﯽﺑﺎس ێﺑنر ەكﺎنیﺎندامﺎف ەگوشﺎر ﺗﺎ دان ﺑ ێشتنەوەیه ۆﺑ ێودەوڵەﺗﯽن ۆمەڵﯽك
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و  ڕچ ریيەكت ەگەڵو كﺎركردن ل ەمﺎهەنگیەكﺎنه ەك ێكرال يﺎنداوا ەشدارﺑوەكﺎنﺑ ە.پﺎرﺗ ێتﺑ يﺎﺗركورد ز ەكﺎنﯽمﺎف ەﺑ ەﺑﺎرەتس ێودەوڵەﺗﯽن ﯽگشت
 ەشداریﺑ تﺎنكوردس يموكراﺗﯽد ﯽو پﺎرﺗ  ێرانئ ﯽكوردستﺎن يموكراﺗﯽد ﯽپﺎرﺗ ەك يبەﺗیەﺗﺎ يیەكﯽداواكﺎر ەشەوەرو ەمل يەكبخەن ۆيﺎنو خ ەنەوەﺑك ڕپ
 . ەكەند یئﺎ ێسئ یكﺎر ەل
 ۆزينەوەید ۆﺑ ەنرێداد ەرفەﺗێكد ەﺑەك یﺎﺗورك ەﺗﯽحكوم ەگەڵل ەريوەﺑ ەوێل ێستﺎئ ێنو ۆسەيەكﯽپر ەك یﺎﺗورك ی ەدەپەﺑ ەگرت ل ێشﯽگو ۆمیتەكەك 
 ۆﺑ ێنو ﯽنونﻗﺎ ێوەيەكﯽچوارچ ﯽدراشتن ۆﺑ ەنێند ەنگﺎوو ه ێتد ەدیﺑﺎش ﺑ ێدیئوم ەڵامﺑ ەرﺗﺎيدانس ۆنﺎغﯽﻗ ەل ێستﺎش. ﺗﺎ ئ یﺎنەئﺎشت ەسەرێكﯽچﺎر
 ۆﺑ ێودەوڵەﺗﯽن ۆمەڵﯽك ەل یوانﯽپشت ﯽ. گرنگ ێتكوردستﺎن ﺑﺎش ﺑ یﺗر ەشەكﺎنﯽﺑ ەگەڵل ەيوەنديشیﺎنو پ ەكەند يموكراﺗﯽد ۆﺗۆنۆمﯽئ یكورد و داوا
 یﺎﺗورك ﯽومەﺗحك ۆﺑ ێودەوڵەﺗﯽن ۆمەڵﯽك ەل ەيەك. ئﺎمﺎژ ەكەنﺎوچ ەواویﺗ ۆگرنگ دانرا ﺑ ێكﯽكﺎر ەكو و یوەكرال ﯽﺑﺎس ۆيﺎنەگفتوگ ەمئ ەرخستنﯽس
 .دانرا يەخﺑﺎ ڕگرنگ و پ ەﺑ  ﯽئﺎشت ۆسەیپر ەكردن ل یوانﯽپشت ێنﺎوپ ەل
 ﺎيسور ەكﺎنﯽ.كورد ەسەدئ ێمﯽرژ ەدژ ﺑ ەكەند ەڕش ەكدارەكﺎنچ ێزەه ﯽهﺎوشﺎن ەمرۆو ئ يبەتﺗﺎ ۆنﺎغێكﯽﻗ ەيشتۆﺗەگ يﺎسور ەل ەكﺎنكورد دۆخﯽ
 ەل كەنەد یدراڵﯽف یستەمێكﯽس ی. داوا ۆيﺎنخ ۆنترۆڵﯽك ێرژ ەوﺗونەﺗەك ەكﺎننﺎوچ ەك ەجﺎر يەكەمو  ەكەنكﺎرد يەكتر ﯽهﺎوشﺎن ەكرد ك ەەول یﺎنﺑﺎس
 . كرد ەوڵەشیﺎنه ەوئ یوانﯽو پشت ڵپشتﯽپﺎ یو داوا يﺎداسور چوارچێوەی
 ەشێوەيەكﯽﺑ وپﺎەورو ئ ەمريكﺎ. ئ ێتﺑ ەندامێنتﺎڵﯽف ێمێكﯽرژ گەرەئ ەﺗﺎيبەتﺑ ێتەوەﺑگر ەسەدئ ێنﯽشو ێمێكرژ ۆرەچ ج ەك یشﺎندان نیگەرانیشیﺎن
 ەكرد ك یﺎئ ێسئ ەل يﺎن. داواەﺑەستم ەمﺎنه ۆﺑ ێننﺑ ەسەدئ ێمﯽرژ ەﺑ ۆﺗﺎیﺗﺎ ك ۆپۆزيسیۆنئ ﯽكردن یوانﯽپشت ەل ەكردوەن يﺎنكﺎر ەرەوەك ەكلایﺑ
 . ايﺎدسور ەل ێنكوردا ﺑن ەكﺎنﯽمﺎف ەدان ﺑ ێستﺎئ ەوەیئ ۆﺑ ۆپۆزيسیۆنئ ەرس ەﺑكﺎﺗ ەردەوامﺑ یﺑكﺎت ﺗﺎ گوشﺎر ێشكەشپ یهﺎنﯽج ۆمەكﯽك
  .ەنﺑك ێمرژ ﯽروخﺎن ۆكﺎر ﺑ ەموانكرد ه یﺎن, داواش يداروو ێراقع ەل ەك ەداتروون ەوەئ يﺎسور ەل یرێﺑگ ێگەكرد ر داوايﺎن
 ەكﺎنﯽيیمﺎفو ئﺎزاد ەوەیئ ۆﺑ ەيەئﺎمﺎد يشكورد ەلﯽگ ەرەﺑﯽع ەهﺎریﺑ ەنﺎویﺑ ەمﺎڵێراد ەكەنﺎوچ ەراستنﺎو ۆرهەڵاﺗﯽخ ەل ۆرانكﺎريیﺎنەیگ ەوئ لەگەڵ
 ەل ەگرنگ ك یﺗر ەسەلەيەكﯽ. م ێتﺑ ەردەوامﺑ ەمیشەه ﯽئﺎشت ۆﺑ يﺎلۆگو د ەدەنﯽم ەﺑﺎﺗﯽخ ەڵكوﺑ ەكداریچ ۆكﯽنﺎك ەوەك. نەستەﺑەرﺑكﺎتد
 یﺎسیشس ێزانێكﯽخ ەكو و ێتﺑ يﺎدز یﺎيداژن ﺗ ايەﺗﯽێنەرنو ێويستەكورد پ ەلﯽگ ەزراوەكﺎنﯽو دام یﺎسیەكﺎنس ەژنﺎن ﺑوو . پﺎرﺗ ۆڵﯽﺑون ر فتوگۆكﺎنداگ
 .ەژنﺑ ەخشینﺑ ەسەڵاتو د ەگەزیر يەكسﺎنﯽ ەﺑون ل ەندپﺎﺑ
 ەندامﯽئ یﺎسیەكﺎنﯽس ەپﺎرﺗ ێوانن ەل ێژراو یو دوا ەڵدەﺑژێرێه ەرۆكەكﺎنس ێگریو ج ەرۆكس ۆمیتەكﺎنك ەك یئﺎ ێسئ ەنجومەنﯽئ ڕيﺎرەكەیﺑ دوای
 ﺗوركیﺎ ەدەپەیﺑ ەگور ل ەزمﯽن ەڵبژێردراوه ۆمیتەكەك ەرۆكﯽس ەككوردستﺎن  و یشتمﺎنﯽن يەكیـَتﯽ ەل ەختیﺎرﺑ ەلا. مروو  يەخرا ێشنیﺎرێكپ یئﺎ ێسئ
 ێوانن ەل ەيەكراو ۆسەكەپر ەك ەوەیل ێگەيشتنﺗ ەﺑ  ەڵبژێردرانه ەرۆكس ێگریج ەكو ێرانئ ﯽكوردستﺎن يموكراﺗﯽد ﯽپﺎرﺗ ەل ەحمەدیولوﻗمﺎن ئ
 .ەنﺑك يەكتر ەمﺎهەنگﯽو ه ێزنﺑپﺎر يەكڕيزی) ﺗﺎ ێرانئ ﯽپ ید ەی( پ د ك ئ ) و (ك
 ەپﺎرﺗ ەگەڵل یﺎئ ێسئ ەكورد ل ۆئەندامﯽدروست ﺑكﺎت  ﺑ ۆرمێكپلاﺗف ێويستەكورد پ ەلﯽگ ەﺑ يبەتﺗﺎ یئﺎ ێسئ ۆمیتەیك ەك ەئكیدكرايەوەﺗ ئەوەش
 يشێژراو یو دوا ەيەه ێراقع ﯽكوردستﺎن ەرلەمﺎنﯽپ ەل ﺎنێنەرينو ەك ێﺑگر ەخۆل یوانم ﯽپﺎرﺗ ەك ەرووداو ەمئ ێوەی, هﺎوش ەكﺎنكراو ێشتﺑﺎنگه
 .ەنﺑك ەشداریﺑ یوانەكﺎنﺗر و م ەكﺎنﯽپﺎرﺗ
 یﺎلیستۆسس ێكهﺎﺗەیپ ەچوارچێوەیل ەك ەرزدەكﺎﺗەوەﺑ یئﺎ ێسئ ۆﺑ ێخراوو ر ەردەوامﺑ ێوەیش ەﺑ ۆیخ ۆرﺗﯽراپ ۆدەﺑێـتەوەوك ەنﺎونﺎوﺑ كۆمیتەكە
 .ەكﺎتﺎر دك یﺎسەﺗەكﺎنﯽس ەگوێرەیو ﺑ ینتەرنﺎشنﺎڵئ
 ەگﺎیﺑﺎر ەل  ێكبخﺎتر ەمسﺎڵدائ ۆﺗﺎیك ەكورد ل ەلﯽگ ەﺑ ەﺑﺎرەتس ێودەوڵەﺗﯽن ۆنفرانسێكﯽك یئﺎ ێسئ ەك ەوەیئ ەسەرل ێكەوتر كۆﺑونەوەكە
 . ەيەه ێنراویدانپ ێگەيەكﯽو پ ەكﺎتد یهﺎوكﺎر یئﺎ ێسئ ەك ێودەوڵەﺗﯽن ەزراوەيەكﯽدام
 ختیﺎرەﺑ ەلام ەگەڵل ۆﺑونەوەیك ەوانەشكرد . ل ۆﺑونەوەیك یرەيەكزنج ێمﺎنﯽسل ەل یئﺎ سێئ ﯽگشت ێریسكرﺗ ۆﺑونەوەكەك ەل ەرﺑ ۆژێكر چەند
 ەريمك جمەدينەكوردستﺎن و ن ەرلەمﺎنﯽپ ەرۆكﯽس يزﺑﺎ ەرسەلانكوردستﺎن و ئ یشتمﺎنیﯽن يەكێتﯽ یﺎسﯽس ەكتەﺑﯽم ێڕیكﺎرگ ەستەید ێپرسراویل
 ەگەڵل یئﺎ ێسئ ﯽگشت ێریكوردستﺎن .  سكرﺗ ەرێمﯽه ەﺗﯽحكوم ێشمەرگەیپ ارەﺗﯽەزو ەﺑێژیووﺗ ەمیندارئ يﺎوەر ەﺑﺎرو ج ەركوكك یرێزگﺎپﺎر
 ديیەكﺎنﯽەيوەنپ ۆخﯽد ەﺑ ەﺑﺎرەتس ۆكردنگفتوگ ۆﺑ ۆﺑۆوەكوردستﺎن ك يموكراﺗﯽد ﯽپﺎرﺗ ەرۆكﯽكوردستﺎن و س ەرێمﯽه ەرۆكﯽس ﯽﺑﺎرزان ەسعودم
    . ەغدادﺑ ەﺗﯽو حكوم ەرێمه
 
 ەمیددانﺎ ح
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 ، ێنو ەﺗێكﯽو حكوم ەرلەمﺎنپ ەڵبژاردنﯽه ۆكرد ﺑ ەنگداند ەكﺎنﯽسندوﻗ ەل ڕويﺎن ەممەچوارش ۆژیر یراﻗیەكﺎن*عۆلشﺎئ ینج
و  یﺎسیەكﺎنس يەنەلا ەمووه ﯽو هﺎندان یوانﯽتپش ەﺑ يەفەگەريداﺗﺎ یو ﺑﺎرگرژ یرۆريستﯽﺗ ەﻗینەوەیو ﺗ یعﯽواﻗ ۆيﯽنﺎوخ ەنگﯽج ۆخێكﯽﺑﺎرود لەژێر
  .ەڕدەكەنش یراقع ەیوز ەزنەكﺎنﯽم ەرچﺎوەس ۆنترۆڵكردنﯽك ۆﺑ ەك ەرەكیەكﺎنیﺎن،د یوانەپشت
 تەون ەنﺎردەكﺎرانﯽه ەوڵەﺗﺎنﯽد ێكخراویر ەل ەوﺗەن ەرهەمهێنﯽﺑ ڵاﺗﯽو ەمینو دوو یهﺎنە،ج ەوﺗﯽن يەدەگﯽ ەورەﺗرينگ ێنجەمینپ ەنﯽخﺎو عیراق
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 .ەكﺎتد يەداسعود ەرەﺑستﺎنﯽع ەگەڵل ێبڕكێك ێستﺎو ئ ێپەڕاندﺗ ێرانﯽئ ەوﺗدان ەﺑەرهەمهێنﺎنﯽل ەمدوايیﺎنە، و ﺑ) CEPO -ێكۆپ(ئ
 ەكﺎنﯽﺑنك ۆچوون ﺑ ەل ەوەﺑكﺎﺗ يﺎنو سﺎرد ێنێتﺑترس ەنگدەراند ۆكوژیخ ێرشﯽو ه ۆمبڕێژكراوﺑ ۆﺗۆمبێلﯽئ ەوەیئ ەوەیدوورخستن ۆﺑ ەوڵێكداه لە
 یﺎنردستﺎنكو ەرێمﯽه ەرﺑەخۆیس ەینﺎوچ ێشمەرگەپ ێزەكﺎنﯽو ه ەﺑﺎشییەوە،ئﺎمﺎد ڵەﺗﯽحﺎ ەخست يشﯽسوپﺎ و ئﺎسﺎ ێزەكﺎنﯽه یراقع ەنگدان،حكومەﺗﯽد
 .ەپﺎندس ەغداﺑ ەل ۆﺗۆمبێلیﺎنو ئ ەسەكﺎنك ۆیهﺎﺗوچ ەدەغەكردنﯽپﺎراست، و ﻗ ڵاتو یﺑﺎكوور ەل
. ڕوويﺎندا يﺎلەو د ەﻗین،خﺎن ەغدا،ﺑ ەكﺎنﯽشﺎر ەل ەمﺎوەريیەكﺎنج ەوەگردﺑوون ۆسەرﺑ ۆمبﺑ ەﺑ ێرشه 04 یكەملان ەڵبژاردنەكﺎنداه ەشەیﺑﺎنگ لەمﺎوەی
 ەل ەنگداند ەیﺑنك ەوتح ەرس ێرشكرايەه ەنگیﺎندا،د يبەﺗداﺗﺎ ەنگدانﯽد ەل یراقع ەمنیەكﺎنﯽئ ێزەه ێكﺎﺗ ۆژەیر ەوئ یسﺎندا،ن ی82 ڕۆژی ەل
، )SISI -و شﺎم (داعش یراقع ەل یسلامﯽئ ەوڵەﺗﯽ. دێكەوﺗەوەل ﯽﻗورﺑﺎن 05 ەل يﺎﺗرز ڵو موس ەلاحەدين،س ەنبﺎر،ئ ەركوك،ك ەغدا،ﺑ ێزگﺎكﺎنﯽپﺎر
  .ڕاگەيﺎند ێرشەكﺎنه ۆرﺑەیز ەل ۆیخ ەرپرسیﺎرێتﯽﺑ یدەيە،ﻗﺎع ێكخراویر ەرﺑەس ێكﯽگروپ ەك
 ﯽسونن یسلامیەئ ەرﺑەس رانﯽەكداچ ەلايەنل ەشێكﯽﺑ ەندچ ەك ەنبﺎر،ئ ێزگﺎیپﺎر ەكﺎنﯽنﺎئﺎرام ەنﺎوچ ەل ەنگداند ێستگەكﺎنﯽو ی 07% ﺗەنهﺎ
و  ڵسمو ەغداوﺑ ێزگﺎیپﺎر ەكﺎنﯽنﺎئﺎرام ەنﺎوچ ەل ەنگداند ێستگەكﺎنﯽو ەكﺎﺗێكداﺑوون، ل ەكراو ۆنترۆڵكراوە،ك یدەوەو ﻗﺎع ێڵەكﺎنو خ ەزهەﺑەكﺎنم
 .داخراﺑوون ديﺎلە
 ﯽگﺎرانت ەك یﺎنهێنﺎشكست ەوەیئ یدوا ەوە،كشﺎن یراقع ەلدا  1102 ڵﯽسﺎ ۆﺗﺎيﯽك ەل ەيمﺎنەكﺎنﯽو هﺎوپ ەمريكﺎئ ەوكﺎﺗەیل ەڵبژاردنەه يەكەمین ئەمە
 یراﺗیەكﯽم ەسەركردنﯽچﺎر ۆﺑ يەوەمﺎ ەنیﺎﺗ ەﺑ یراقع ەلﯽ. گەنﺑك ۆگەرمس ەمێننەوەد یراقع ەل ەمريكیﺎنەیئ ەرﺑﺎزيیەس يەكە ەوئ ۆﺑ يﺎسﺎيﯽ ەسﺎنەیح
 .انكردێرو یراﻗﯽع ەڕەﺗﯽﺑن یئﺎﺑوور ێرخﺎنﯽژ ەك ەرﺑﺎزیس ییركﺎرداگ ەل ڵسﺎ ەد يكەیو نز ێنحوس ەدامس ێمﯽرژ ڕووخﺎندنﯽ ۆﺑ ەنگێكج ڵﯽﺗﺎ
پﺎك  یئﺎو و ەﺑﺎكﺎر ەكوو ەرەكیەكﺎنﯽس ەﺗگوزاريیەخزم ەﺑوونﯽن ەژاريﯽ،ه يﯽ،كﺎر ێﺑ ەﺑ ەﺑﺎرەتس ەﻗﺎمگیرینﺎس ەڵكشﺎنﯽه ەل يتیەﺑر ئەنجﺎمەكەش
 ﯽمﺎنگ ێس ەل ەسك ەزاره 002 ەل يﺎﺗرز ەدەستدانﯽل یﺎنگ ۆیه ۆﺗەﺑ ەو ك یژیﺗوندوﺗ ەڵكشﺎویه ەوژمێكﯽﺗ ەندەڵﯽ،ولافﺎو،گ ەل ڕزگﺎرﺑوونو 
 .یسﺎندان ﯽمﺎنگ ەل ەنهﺎﺗ ەﺑ ﯽﻗورﺑﺎن 057و  ەمسﺎڵدا،ئ يەكەمﯽ
 ەڵبژاردنەكﺎنه ێنﺎچێتپ ەك يەوا ەڕيﺎنﺑﺎو یﺎسﯽس ێرانﯽو چﺎود ەنگدەراند ەردووه يﺎنیﺎندا،ژ ڕەوشﯽ ەل ێكﺑﺎشترﺑوون یچه ێشبینیكردنﯽپ ەل ﺑەدوور
 .ەسەرﺑكﺎتچﺎر یمپريﺎلیزمە،ئ ەستێوەردانﯽو د ەنگج ڵسﺎ 53 ەل يﺎﺗرز یراﺗﯽم ە،ك ڵاتو ەختﯽس ۆمەڵايەﺗﯽو ك یﺎسﯽس ەيرانﯽﻗ
  .تێنﺎكر ەڵبژاردنه ەرمیەكﺎنﯽف ەنجﺎمەئ ێشبینﯽپ يﺎر،ئﺎ ﯽمﺎنگ ەڕاستﯽنﺎو ەﺗﺎه يەوا یمﺎنﺎ یراقع ڕێژەيﯽ ێنەرايەﺗﯽنو ڵۆزیئﺎ سیستمﯽ
 ۆرينەیز يەنێكلا یچه ێتنﺎكر ێشبینﯽپ ەرلەمﺎنﯽ،پ ﯽكورس 823 ەوەیﺑردن ۆﺑ یﺎوازەكﺎنج ەيمﺎنێتیەهﺎوپ ەل ديكﺎند 00009 ەل يﺎﺗرز ەﺑوونﯽه لەگەڵ
و  يەنەكﺎنلا ۆی،خ یعەیش يﺎسﺎی ەوڵەﺗﯽد ەيمﺎنﯽهﺎوپ ۆنترۆڵكردنﯽك ەل ەردەوامەﺑ یكﯽمﺎل ینور ەزيرانو ەرۆكس ەكﺎﺗێكدا. لەوەﺑبﺎﺗ ڕەهﺎ
 .ەدروستكردوو يكەيﺎند یستﯽو ل ەيمﺎنﯽو هﺎوپ ەشبوونو كورد داﺑ ەنو سون یعەش يكەید هﺎوپەيمﺎنێتیەكﺎنﯽ
و  راقیع ێشووﺗریپ ەزيرانﯽو ەرۆكس ەلاوی،ع ەيﺎدئ ەیﻗس ەپێﯽ. ﺑەنه ەڵبژاردنداه ۆسەیپر ەل ەكﺎریسﺎخت ەشەیو ﺑﺎنگ ڵاسكﺎ ۆرز ژمﺎرەيەكﯽ
 ەشداريكردنﺑ ەل یستەكەیل ەل ڵێوراوپﺎ 83 ەوە،دا ﺑرد 0102 ڵﯽﺎس ەڵبژاردنﯽه ەل ەرلەمﺎنﯽپ یەكﺎنﯽكورس ۆرينەیز ەك یراﻗیە،ع یستﯽل ەرۆكﯽس
 .ۆﺗەوەدوورخست یستەكﺎنل ەرجەمس ەل ڵێوراویپﺎ 43 ەك ەكﺎتد ەوەئ یديعﺎیئ یراقع ەڵبژاردنەكﺎنﯽه ۆمسیۆنﯽ. كەﺗەوەدوورخراون هەڵبژاردنەكﺎندا ەل
 ۆمەڵايەﺗیەو ك یئﺎﺑوور ۆخەﺑﺎرود ەسەرل یشﯽئ يەنێكو لا یستل یچ. هەووكرد يەفەگەريﯽﺗﺎ ﯽكﺎرﺗ ەسەرل يﺎنكﺎر یﺎسیەكﺎنس ەو گروپ يەنلا هەموو
 يﺎدیز ەكﺎنو داهﺎﺗ ەوتن ەرهەمهێنﺎنﯽﺑ ەكﺎﺗێكدال ەﺑێتەوە،ﺗەنﺎنەتد یراقع ەڵكﯽخ ۆریز ۆرينەیز ڕوﺑەڕووی ەك ەكردووەن ەﺗرسیدارەكﺎنم
  .ووەكرد
 ﯽڕەشنووسگروپدا،  یكۆنۆمیستئ ۆمپﺎنیﺎكﺎنﯽك ﯽگروپ ەنﺎول ەرﺑەخۆيەس ییكۆڵینەوەل ەزگﺎيەكﯽد ە،ك )UIE( یئﺎﺑوور یﺎریزان يەكەی ﺑەپێﯽ
 ەوﺗﯽن ەرمیلﺑ یۆنمل يەك ەل يﺎﺗرواﺗﺎ ز ەنﺎردەﺑكرێت،ه ۆژێكدر ەل ەوتن ەرمیل) ﺑ4.3( ەل يﺎﺗرز ەكردوو ێشبینﯽپ یراقع ەمسﺎڵﯽئ ەیﺑودج
  .ڕاﺑردوودا ڵﯽچﺎو سﺎ ەاو لەنﺎردەكره
-یكﯽمﺎل ەﺗەكەیحكوم یﺎستەكﺎنﯽس ڕاستەوخۆی ەئەنجﺎمﯽل ەوەشو ئ ەڵكشﺎندايەه ەل ێستﺎدائ ەل ڕاگیراﺑوو، يكﺎداەمرئ یركﺎریداگ ەژێرل ەك هەژاريﯽ
 ەڕیش ێكﺎرانكر يەكێتیەكﺎنﯽو  ێكخراوەكﺎنر ەكﺎتد ڕێگری ەك ەئﺎراو ێنﺎيەه يﺎسﺎيەكﯽ ەندئﺎزاد و چ ڕیﺑﺎزا یﺎسەﺗەكﺎنﯽس ەﺑ ەرەيداپ ەك يەوە
 .ەنﺑﺎشتر ﺑك نﯽەراگوز ڕەوشﯽﺑﺎشتر و  ەیمووچ
 ۆﺑ ەيەه ەيمﺎنﯽهﺎوپ ەل ەندێكه ێكهێنﺎنﯽپ ەﺑ ێويستﯽپ یكﯽمﺎل ەوە،ﺑبﺎﺗ ەنگەكﺎند ەیژمﺎر ەرزﺗرينﺑ یكﯽمﺎل یستەكەیل ەكرێتد ێشبینﯽپ ێكداكﺎﺗ لە
 ەندچ گەڕەن ەك ێنێتەهد ۆيداخ ەدوایﺑ یﺎسﯽس ﯽدانوستﺎن ۆسەيەكﯽپر ەمەش. ئەزيرانو ەرۆكس ێهەمﯽس ﯽو خول ەرلەمﺎنﯽپ ۆرينەیز ەدەستهێنﺎنﯽﺑ
 ەوەدا ﺑرد 0102 ڵﯽسﺎ ەڵبژاردنﯽه ەل ەنگەكﺎنﯽد ۆرينەیز یستەیل ەوئ ەﺑەرئەوەیل یە،ن ڵنیﺎيﯽد ێگﺎیج ەمەشئ ەنﺎنەتﺗ ەڵام. ﺑيەنێتﺑخﺎ ێكمﺎنگ
 ەرۆكﺎيەﺗﯽس ەﺑ ێتیەكەيمﺎنهﺎوپ ۆﺑوو ﺑ ۆیخ ﯽمﺎف ەستبەرداریمﺎنگ د ەوتح یو دوا ێكبهێنێتپ ەﺗێكحكوم ەيتوانﯽ)، نەلاویع یراﻗیەیع یستﯽ(ل
 .یكﯽمﺎل
 ێچەوانەیپ ەواوﺗ یﺑﺎر ەڵام. ﺑێڵێتەوەﺑه يەكێتﯽ ەﺑ یراقع ەﺗوانﺎيدايەل ەوئ ەنهﺎﺗ ەكﺎتد ەوەئ ەشەیﺑﺎنگ ەچونك ینیوەﺑ ەهێزەكەیﺑ یﺎوەپ ڕۆڵﯽ مﺎلیكﯽ
 ێشپ ەل یعەكﺎنش یریپشتگ ردنەوەیۆكك ۆﺑ یكﯽمﺎل ەﺗەكەیحكوم ەمريكﺎ،ئ یركﺎريﯽداگ ەل ەسەڵاتد ەروەريﯽس ەرگرﺗنﯽو ی. دواڕاستە ەمەئ
 .ەژيند ڵاﺗداو ۆژئﺎوایر ەل ەزۆریﺑ ەكرد ك ەرمترگ ەكﺎنداسونن ەمینەیو ك یعەش ێوانن ەل يەفەگەريﯽﺗﺎ یﺑﺎرگرژ ەڵبژاردنەكﺎندا،ه
 ەﺑ ۆپیشﺎندانەكﺎنﯽخ ەمووو ه ەزهەبم ەسونن ەڵكﯽو خ ەكﺎنسونن ەكﺎنﯽگرنگ یﺎسەﺗمەدارەس ەركوﺗكردنﯽپﺎكتﺎوكردن و س ەكرد ﺑ ەستﯽد مﺎلیكﯽ
 .كرد ۆمەﺗبﺎرﺗ ەكدارەكﺎنچ یريكردنﯽپشتگ ەﺑ يەیسعود ەرەﺑستﺎنﯽو ع ەﻗەڵەمدال یدەﻗﺎع ێكخراویر یكﺎر
 ەك یشﺎندەرانۆپخ ەكﺎنﯽكﺎمپ ڵاوەپێكردنﯽو ﺑ ەوانەكﺎنﯽ،پﺎس ەل ێنجو پ ەیﺑراك ﯽو كوشتن ﯽسونن يﺎرید یﺎسەﺗمەدارێكﯽس ەستگیركردنﯽد لەدوای
 و ێڵەكﯽ،خ ەكدارانﯽو چ یكﯽمﺎل ەﺗەكەیحكوم ێزەكﺎنﯽه ەنێوانل ەچوار مﺎنگ ەیمﺎو ۆﺑ ەنبﺎرئ ێزگﺎیپﺎر ەل ۆنﺎوخ ەڕیش ﺎند،يخﺎ ڵێكﯽسﺎ ەیمﺎو
 .ەئﺎراو ۆﺗەهﺎﺗ ەكەند يەكترو  یكﯽمﺎل ەﺗﯽحكوم ەل ەريەكه ەڕیهﺎوكﺎت ش ەك ییەكﺎنو سونن ۆنﺎوخ یسلامﯽئ چەكدارانﯽ
 ەرەكﯽس ێكخراویر 21 ەل یكەملان ێیە" نویراﻗییەع يﺎخیبوونە" ەمواشنتن، ئ یشﺎر ەل )SISC( ودەوڵەﺗﯽێو ن یژستراﺗ ێكۆڵینەوەیل ەنتەریس ﺑەپێﯽ
 ەمەشئ یراﻗﯽ،نﺎع يﺎخیبوانﯽ ەل يتینﺑر ەگروپﺎن ەوئ ی%01 ەل ەمترك ەنتەرەكەس ەمڵاندنﯽخ ەپێﯽ. ﺑێكدێتپ یﺎوازج ﯽگروپ 04 ەل يﺎﺗرز ەگەریو ئ
 .ەڕوانند ێﯽل يەخﺑﺎ ەمو واشنتن ك ەغداﺑ ەك ڕاستیەكە
 يتەختﯽپﺎ ڕومﺎدی، ەكﺎﺗێكدال ەجێبهێڵن،ﺑ ۆيﺎنخ ڵﯽو حﺎ ڵنﺎچﺎركراون مﺎ یراﻗﯽع ەزاره 000004 ەل يﺎﺗرز ەڕەكەش ەرەنجﺎمێكﯽد ەكوو ﺑەڵام
 .يﺎخیبوواندايە ەسەڵاﺗﯽد ەژێرل ەلوجەف یشﺎر ەردەوامە،ﺑ ێداﺗ ێكدادانﯽپ ەڕوش ەنبﺎر،ئ ێزگﺎیپﺎر
 ەل ینو چ ڕوسیﺎ ەژموونﯽه ﯽو لاوازكردن ێرانئ ەراوێزخستنﯽپ ۆﺑ ەكەیفراوانتر ۆژەپر ەل ەشێكﺑ ەكوو ەلقﺎعیدەئ یدروستكراو ەڕەشەیه ﺑەڵام
 یەكﺎنسونن ەیسلامیئ یلیشیﺎكﺎنﯽم ۆنسەیسپ ەك ەرێمﺎيەﺗیەكﺎنێتﯽه ەيمﺎنێتیەو هﺎوپ ۆنواشنت ەرئەنجﺎمﯽد ۆریز ەشێكﯽ، ﺑ ەڕاستدانﺎو ۆژهەڵاﺗﯽر
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 .يﺎسوور ەرۆكﯽس ەسەدیئ ەشﺎرﺑ ڕووخﺎندنﯽ ۆﺑ -ەنوسر ەرەیداعش و ﺑ ێوانیشیﺎندان ەل -ێدراوس يﺎیسور ەل ەكەند
و  یكﯽﺎلم ەﺗەكەیحكوم ەكداركردنﯽچ ۆﺑ ێكپﺎسﺎو ەكوو ەكﺎردەهێنێتﺑ ۆكﺎنﯽو پﺎشك ەلقﺎعیدەئ ەڕەشەیه ۆرەوە،ز ڕەشبینییەكﯽ ەﺑ ۆﺑﺎمﺎ،ئ ئیدارەی
 ەسەڵاﺗﯽد ەژێرل ۆنتراكتك ەﺑ ەك ۆیخ ۆڕەكﺎیپسپ یمەﺗ ەﺑ ەشەدەداتگ ۆﺑﺎمﺎئ دارەیی. هﺎوكﺎت ئەكﺎنﯽو سﺎمﺎن یراقع ۆنترۆڵكردنﯽك ەوەشﺑ
و  ەو ووز ﯽﺑﺎزرگﺎن ۆژەكﺎنﯽپر ەروەهﺎه ەواڵگری،ه یكﺎریو ش ەرﺑﺎزی،س ەشقﯽم يش،ئﺎسﺎ ەراهەمكردنﯽف ۆﺑ ەكەنكﺎرد یراﻗداع مەﺗﯽحكو
 ندەرەەڵێﺑ ەﺑ ەركەكەیئ ەوئ ەدوورزانﯽ،ﺑ ڵاﺗەكەیو یسوپﺎ ێزەكﺎنﯽه ڕانەوەیەگ ەمريكﺎ،ئ ەرەوەید ەزيریو یری،ك ۆنج ەكﺎﺗێكدا. لەدانكردنەوەئﺎو
 ەمﯽدوو ﯽكﺎنوون ﯽمﺎنگ ەل ێكراوەپ ەیئﺎمﺎژ ۆرنﺎڵەوەژ يتستر ۆڵ ۆژنﺎمەیر ەلايەنل ەیئﺎمﺎران ەوئ ەپێﯽﺑ ەك ە،سپﺎردوو ۆنپنتﺎگ ﯽﺎنەكیەكلاو
 .ەڵێندەرﺑ 00521 ەل ەﺑوو يﺎﺗردا ز 3102 ڵﯽسﺎ
 ەنﺎردەه ەوتن ڕاستەوخۆ ەوڵیداوەه يﯽدوا ەمەیئ ەك يﺎﺗرﺑووە،كوردستﺎندا ز ەرێمﯽه ەﺗﯽو حكوم یكﯽمﺎل ڕژێمﯽ ەنێوانل يیەكﺎنﺑﺎرگرژ هەروەهﺎ
 ەم. ئردووەيﺎﺗركز ەغداﺑ ەندینﺎو ەﺗﯽحكوم ەل ۆﺗﺎيﯽك یﺎﺑوونەوەیج یگەرانﯽﺑكﺎت، و ﺗرس و ن ێبەشﺑ ەوتن ۆشتنﯽفر ەكﺎنﯽپشك ەل ەغداﺑكﺎت و ﺑ
 ەوێشل ەريكەخ ەك ەهێزەﺑ ەوەندەو گﺎز، ئ ەوتن ﯽسﺎمﺎن ۆشتنﯽو فر ەرهەمهێنﺎنﺑ ەكﺎنﯽو مﺎف ەكﺎنسنوور ەسەرل ڵەﺗﺎ یريیەەمﺎرگد ململانێ
 .ۆنﺎوخ ەڕیش ۆﺑ ەشەنەدەسەنێتﺗ
 ۆخنﺎو ەﺗﯽەزارو ەرگريﯽ،ﺑ ەزارەﺗﯽو ەزيران،و ەرۆك: سەڕێوەدەﺑﺎتﺑ ۆستچوار پ ەهەمﺎنكﺎﺗداو ل ۆرغكردووەﻗ ۆيداخ ەدەستﯽل ەسەڵاﺗﯽد مﺎلیكﯽ
 ەﺑەرئەوەیل ڕووكەش ەشێوەيەكﯽﺑ ەمەش. ئەودايەئ ەسەڵاﺗﯽد ەژێرل يشئﺎسﺎ ەندیكﺎرم 000039و  ۆيەنﺎوخ يشﯽئﺎسﺎ ەزگﺎید ەرۆكﯽس ەروەهﺎو ه
 ەسەڵاﺗﯽد یكﯽمﺎل ەروەهﺎ. هەستنیشﺎنكراوند ۆستﺎنەپ ەوئ ڕكردنەوەیپ ۆﺑ ەسﺎنەیك ەوئ ۆﺑ ێنێتﺑه ەدەستﺑ ەرلەمﺎنپ ڕەزامەندی ەيتوانیوەن یكﯽمﺎل
ﺑكﺎت  یكﯽمﺎل ەل ڕێگری ەيتوانﯽد ەك ێشنیﺎركراﺑووپ ەرلەمﺎنەوەپ ەلايەنل ەك ەڵبكﺎﺗەوەپووچ يﺎسﺎيەك ﯽﺗوان ەوئ ەئەنجﺎمدا،. لەژێردەستدايەل ەريﯽدادو
 .ێنێتەوەﺑم ۆستەكەيداپ ەل ێیەمس یجﺎر ۆﺑ
 یێژەر ەرزﺗرينﺑ ێیەمینس ەك ەيەه يكتﺎﺗۆرید ەﺗێكﯽحكوم یراقع ێن،حوس ەدامس ڕژێمﯽ ڕووخﺎندنﯽو  ەمريكﺎئ یركﺎریداگ یدوا ڵسﺎ يﺎنزە
 یستمێكﯽ: سیراق(ع یشﺎنﯽنﺎون ەﺑ ۆيداخ ی3102 ڵﯽسﺎ ڕاپۆرﺗﯽ ەل ۆچ ڕايتس یومﺎنه ێكخراوی. ریهﺎنﯽج ﯽئﺎست ەسەرل ەيەه ەسێدارەدانﯽل
 ۆپۆزسیۆن،ئ دارانﯽیﺎسەﺗمەس ەدژیل ڕندانەد ێوشوێنﯽ"ر ەكﺎرهێنﺎنﯽﺑ ەﺑ یكﯽمﺎل ەﺗﯽكشكﺎو) حكومێﺗ ەروەريﯽدادپ
 ەيیو ئﺎزاد ەرﺑەخۆس ەدەنﯽم ۆمەڵگﺎیك یﺑوار يگەركﺎر ەشێوەيەكﯽو ﺑ ەسفكردووە،" وۆژنﺎمەنووسﺎنو ر ەستبەسەركراوەكﺎن،خۆپیشﺎندەراند
 مترەك ێوشوێنﯽو ر ەڕواتد ڕەویﺗﺎك ەرەوﺑ يﺎﺗرز ەك ەﺑنەوەد ەﺗێكحكوم ڕوﺑەڕووی ەمڕۆئ یراقع ەڵكﯽ... خەرﺗەسكردۆﺗەوەﺑ یﺎسیەكﺎنﯽس
 .ﺑكﺎت ێزراوﺗرپﺎر ڵیﺎنو حﺎ ڵو مﺎ يﺎنژ ەوەیئ ۆﺑ ەنجﺎمدەداتئ
 يﺎسﺎيە ۆژەپر ەمئ ەپێﯽﺑ ەك ەسەندكرد،" پیشتمﺎنﯽن ەلامەﺗﯽ"س يﺎسﺎی ۆژەپر ڕەشنووسﯽ یراقع ەﺗﯽحكوم ەڵبژاردنەكﺎن،ه ێشپ ەفتەيەكه چەند
 ەﺗرسیەم ﯽچ ەوەیل ڕيﺎردانﺑ ۆﺑ ەﺑەخشێتد ەزيرانو ەرۆكس ەﺑ ڕەهﺎ ﯽەسەڵاﺗد ەل يكنز ەسەڵاﺗێكﯽد ەند" و چيﯽنﺎئﺎسﺎ ی"ﺑﺎر ڕاگەيﺎندنﯽ ەسەڵاﺗﯽد
 ەركوﺗكردنﯽس ۆﺑ يﺎسﺎيە ەمئ ێتﺑتوان ڕەنگە ەتحكوم ەك ەرزكردۆﺗەوەﺑ ۆریز یگەرانﯽﺗرس و ن ەوەشو ﺑ يیە،نﺎئﺎسﺎ یﺑﺎر ڕاگەيﺎندنﯽ ەﺑ ێويستﯽپ و
  .ەكﺎرﺑهێنێتﺑ ەكﺎنﯽو دوژمن ەيﺎرن
 ۆﺑ ەڕەخسێنند ۆخﺑﺎرود ێنراون،وروژ ەرێمﺎيەﺗیەكﺎنیﺎنەوەه ەيمﺎنێتیەو هﺎوپ ەڕەنسﺎ،ف ەريتﺎنیﺎ،ﺑ ۆن،واشنت ەلايەنل ەعیراﻗدال ێشﺎنەیك ئەو
 .تەدەگلێێوﺗ ەنداويشﯽك ەوﺗیەكﺎنﯽن ەوڵەﺗەو لوﺑنﺎن و د يﺎسور ەڵكوﺑ ەگرێتەوە،د یراقع ەره ەكن ەفراوانتر ك ەيرانێكﯽو ﻗ یراقع ەشبوونﯽداﺑ
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 ەل ەنقەرەئ ﯽکست. شۆپۆزيسیۆنیشەوەئ ڕچەککردنﯽپ ەﺑ ەنﺎنەتﺗ ێڵێتەوەﺑه ەيﯽکراو ەﺑ يﺎسور ەل ەستێوەرداند ۆﺑ ەکﺎنﺑژارد ەمووه ێدەچێتپ ﺗورکیﺎ
ﺗﺎ  ردووەۆشکخ يەنەکﺎنیترلا ۆﺑ يگەيﺎنر ەسەڵات،د ەل ەوەمﺎن ۆﺑ ەسەدئ ەشﺎرﺑ ێﯽململان ويﺎسور ەکورد ل ﯽپرس ەرەسەندنەکﺎنﯽپ ێريکردنﯽچﺎود
  .ەنﺑک یﺎدەپ ڵاﺗەداو ەول ۆيﺎنخ ەجێندایئ
 ﺎنﯽەرکردەک. سەرەپێدەداتپ یﺎﺗورک ەدژ ﺑ ۆیخ ەرﺑﺎزیس ەرەیﺑ ەکەکە،کوردستﺎن، پ ﺎرانﯽێککر ﯽپﺎرﺗ يﺎ،سور ینەکﺎنﯽکوردنش ەنﺎوچ لە
  .يﺎسور ەل ەدەند یکورد ەرێمێکﯽه ەزراندنﯽدام ۆﺑ ەوڵه وەدەند ۆيﺎنخ یﺎسﯽس ەستڕۆيشتوويﯽد ەﺑ ەرەپ ێراﻗیشع ﯽکوردستﺎن
 ەهێزکردنﯽﺑ وۆﺗۆنۆمﯽئ ۆﺑ یﺎنداواکﺎن يﺎدکردنﯽز ەﺑ ەوەشئ ەﻗێننەوە،ﺑت ﺎیﺗورک ەکورد ل ەسەلەیم ەﺗوانند ێراقع ﯽکوردان وەکەکەپ ئەجێنداکﺎنﯽ
 ەﺎ ﺑيسور ۆخﯽﺑﺎرود ەرس ەﺑ ێکردنکﺎرﺗ ۆﺑ ەهێننکﺎر د ەﺑ ۆکﺎرێکه ەمووه ەسەڵاﺗدارانﯽد وەﺑﺎشیدايەئﺎمﺎد یﺑﺎر ەل یﺎ. ﺗورکەکداریچ ەﺑﺎﺗﯽخ
  .داڵاﺗەکەيﺎنو ۆینﺎوخ ەل ەيرانێکﻗ ۆرەج ەره ەوەیدوورخستن ەﺑەستﯽم
 وێکدەهێننپ یﺎﺗورک یشتووانﯽدان ی%02 يکەی. کورد نزەﺑینێتد ۆیخ ەﻗﺎمگیریس ەرس ۆﺑ ەﺗرسﯽم ەرەکیترينس ەککورد و ﯽپرس ﺗورکیﺎ
 ەزيرانو ەرۆکس ەوە،7002 ڵﯽسﺎ ەوەﺗەی. لیﺎﺗورک ەوڵەﺗﯽد ەل یﺎﺑوونەوەج ەگەنەد ەﺗﺎه ێدەکەنپ ەستد يیەوەکولتوور ﯽمﺎف ێدانﯽپ ەل يیەکﺎنیﺎنداخواز
 ەوڵﯽه ەهﺎوکﺎت ل ەڵامکوردان، ﺑ ەﺑ یکولتور ێکﯽمﺎف ەندچ ەخشینﯽﺑ ەﺑ ەويشئ ەﺑوو ەداپرس ەمئ ەوەیسﺎرکردن ەوڵﯽه ەل ەردۆغﺎنئ ەيبب ﺗەجەر
  .ەنگﺎوەج يداجوداخواز یدژ ەو لکورد يەنلا ەل ەﺑوو ۆﺗۆنۆمﯽئ ەدەستهێنﺎنﯽو ەل ێگرﺗنر
 ێﯽر ەل تێﺑوو ﺑتوان یواداره یﺎ. ﺗورکيﺎسور یکورد ەرس ەل يگەریکﺎر ﯽدروستکردن ۆﺑ ەزانێتد ەرفەﺗێکد ەﺑ ەسەدئ ێمﯽرژ ەوﺗنﯽک ﺗورکیﺎ
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 ﯽپﺎش رووخﺎن داڵەﺗحﺎ ينﺑﺎشتر ەل ەک ێدەوارەئوم ەنقەرەﺑکﺎت. ئ یکورد ﯽپرس ەکﺎنﯽدانوستﺎن ێریچﺎود يﺎسور یشتمﺎنﯽن ەنجومەنﯽئ یوانداريکردنﯽم
 ەمووه ﺎنﯽەدەستهێنو ەل يﺎسور ﯽکوردان ەمشێوەيە. ﺑێداﺑنرێتپ ﯽ" دانيﺎسور ەوڵەﺗﯽد وويﯽيەکگرﺗ" ێوەیچوارچ ەکورد ل ەکﺎنﯽمﺎف ەسەد،ئ ژێمﯽر
 ڕگو يﺎﺗرز یﺎشﺗورک یجوداخواز ڤﯽﺑزا وەکرێتلاواز د یشتمﺎنﯽ،ن يەکێتﯽ ﯽپﺎرﺗ ەواﺗ يﺎ،سور ەل ەکەکەپ ﯽلق وەکرێند ێبەشﺑ ۆﺗۆنۆمییەکئ ۆرەج
 ەسەندکردنﯽپ ەﺑ يکردنیﺎنراز ۆﺑ ەکﺎرﺑێننﺑ يﺎسور يیەکﺎنﯽکورد ەپﺎرﺗ ەرس ەﺑ يﺎننفوز ەک ەستبووﺑ ێراقع ﯽکوردان ەﺑ ﯽپشت یﺎ. ﺗورکێتنﺎگر
  .ەکﺎندانوستﺎن
 یکورد ﺑوو. ەخوازئﺎواﺗ یﺎﺗورک ەوەیئ ەکو ەڕوخﺎوەن ێشتﺎه ەسەدئ ێمەکەی. رژێکەوﺗەوەل ێچەوانەیپ ەرەنجﺎمﯽد یﺎﺗورک یژيیەکەیستراﺗ ﺑەڵام
 ەڵائﺎو يﺎسور ەل ەکەکەیپ ەستﯽد ەڵامدانەوەيەکو ەکو ەسەدئ ەشﺎرﺑ يشەوەﺗر يەکﯽلا ەل وۆيﺎنخ ەجینداکﺎنﯽئ نﯽێبەجێکردج ۆﺑ ەوڵدانه ەل ێراﻗیشع
  .ەکردوو
 يیەکﺎندکور ەپﺎرﺗ ەمدا،دو ﯽکﺎنون ﯽمﺎنگ ە. لۆيداخ ەلایکورد ل ەندامﺎنﯽئ ێشتنەوەیه وێشﺎنراک ەل ێنﺎوەه ﯽشکست يﺎسور یشتمﺎنﯽن ئەنجومەنﯽ
ﺎ ەنهدا، ﺗئﺎکﺎم ە. لێراقع یکورد یریپشتگ ەﺑ ێکهێنﺎپ يﺎنکورد یشتمﺎنﯽن ەنجومەنﯽئ يﺎنزەيﺎن ەڵپەسﺎردوه ەنجومەنەکەئ ەل ۆيﺎنخ ەندامێتﯽئ
 ﯽسﺎزدان ۆﺑ ەستداوەد ەل ۆیخ ەرعییەﺗﯽش ەنجومەنەکەئ ەﺗەوەومﺎون يﺎداسور یشتمﺎنﯽن ەنجومەنﯽئ ەکورد ل ەندامﺎنﯽئ ەل ەمک ەيەکﯽژمﺎر
  .ەکﺎندانوستﺎن
 ێشترپ ەرچەندە. هەرەپێداوەپ يﺎداسور یکورد یﺎسەﺗﯽس يەیکﺎ ەل ۆيﺎنخ یﺎسﯽس ێگەیکورد پ یشتمﺎنﯽن ەنجومەنﯽئ ێوەیچوارچ ەل ێراقع کوردی
 يﺎسور ەرد لکو یشتمﺎنﯽن ەنجومەنﯽئ ێبەجێکﺎریج ەستەید ەڵامکراﺑوون، ﺑ ەﺗیسﻗ ەرکەزيیەﺗدالام ێوەیچوارچ ەل يﺎسور ەکورد ل يیەکﺎنﯽداواکﺎر
  .ەيەه ێراﻗداع ەل ەوەیئ ەکو يﺎسور ەل يیەکورد ەرێمﯽه ۆدێلﯽم ەسپﺎندنﯽچ ەمەشو ئ ەکﺎتد ۆﺗۆنۆمﯽئ ەرزیﺑ ژەيەکﯽێر وایدا
. ڵاﺗەداو وەکورد ل ﯽداواکﺎن ێنەرینو ەﺗﺎﻗ ەککوردن و یشتمﺎنﯽن ەنجومەنﯽئ ەهێزکردنﯽﺑ ەرﻗﺎڵﯽس ێراقع یکورد يﺎ،سور ەيرانﯽﻗ ەردەوامﯽﺑ لەگەڵ
 ەوەیئ ۆﺑ ﺑێتەکورد د ەﺑ ێويستﯽﺑکﺎت پ يﺎسور ﯽحوکم يکدانز يندەيەکﯽئﺎ ەل یەوێتﺑ ەک ەﺗﺎز ەسەڵاﺗێکﯽد ەره ەئﺎگﺎدارن ک ەوەل ێراقع ﯽکوردان
 ﯽداواکﺎن ەﺎت کﺑک ەڵەمﺎم يەنەدالا ەوئ ەگەڵل ەنیﺎو ﺗﺑکﺎت يﺎﺗرداواکﺎن ز ﯽئﺎست ەوانەيەل يیەکەکورد ەنجومەنە. ئێنیتﺑنﺎس ەرعﯽش ێزێکﯽه ەکو ۆیخ
  .ەکﺎتد ەسەندپ ەرفراوانﺑ ۆﺗۆنۆمییەکﯽئ ەﺑ ەﺑﺎرەتس
 ﺑﺎزيیەکەیەرس ەرەﺑ ەرەپێدانﯽپ وەوکردنپت ۆﺑ ەﺑینێتد ەئﺎمﺎد ەيمﺎنێکﯽهﺎوپ ەﺑ ەسەدئ وۆیخ ەجێندایئ ﯽﺑردن ەرەوپێشﺑ ەل ەردەوامەﺑ پەکەکەش
 کوریﺎﺑ ەل ينعفر ەینﺎوچ ەل ۆیخ ییەکﺎنﯽچﺎلاک ﯽەنجﺎمدانئ ۆﺑ ەﺑوو ەڵائﺎو ەواوەﺗﯽﺗ ەﺑ ەستﯽد ەکەکەراﺑردودا، پ ﯽمﺎنگ ەندچ ەسنور. ل ەسەرل
 ەکﺎنﯽشﺎر ەل ەیﺗﺎز ەگﺎیﺑﺎر ەرەپێداوەوپ ۆژهەڵاتر ەرەوﺑ ۆیخ یسنور ەکەکەپ ەﺑ ەرس يموکراﺗﯽد يەکێتﯽ ﯽپﺎرﺗ ينەوە،عفر ە. ليﺎداسور ۆرئﺎوایخ
 ەﺑ ۆیخ ەکەیيیسور ەلق ەرفراوانبوونﯽﺑ ێستﺎئ ەکەکەپ ەنگە. ریﺎﺗورک ەگەڵل يﺎسور یسنور ەرس ەل ەﺗەوەکردوو ەلعەرەبئ ەينع وەلعەينئ ەئسر
  .ەﺑێتەوەد ێژدر ێراقع ۆژهەڵاﺗﯽر ەﺗﺎه وەستپیدەکﺎتد يﺎوەسور ۆژئﺎوایر ەل ەک ەرﺑﺎزیس ەرەيەکﯽﺑ ەزراندنﯽدام ۆﺑ ێنێتکﺎر ﺑه
و ﺑکﺎت وەپت ۆیخ ینفوز ەوەیئ ۆﺑ ەڕەخسێنێتد ەکەکەپ ۆﺑ ەرفەتد ينﺑﺎشتر ێژخﺎيەندر ۆینﺎوخ ەڕێکﯽش ەرەوﺑ يﺎسور ەنگەژەیﺗ هەڵکشﺎنﯽ
 ﯽپﺎرﺗ ەخشێتەﺑب يﺎﺗرز ەسەڵاﺗﯽد ەوانەيەل ۆی،خ ەسەڵاﺗﯽد ﯽپﺎراستن ۆﺑ ێدايەململان ەل ەسەدئ ێکداکﺎﺗ ە. ليﺎدانﺎو سور ەﺑکﺎت ل ەشەکردنگ ەﺑ ەستد
 يیەکﺎنکورد ەنﺎوچ ەکداريشچ ەڕیش ەرەگ. ئيﺎسور یﺑﺎکور ەل ینەکﺎنکوردنش ەنﺎوچ ۆنتڕۆڵکردنﯽک ۆﺑ ەرەکﯽس یئﺎمراز ەکو يموکراﺗﯽد يەکیتﯽ
 ەڵگرﺗنﯽه یوانﺎﺗ ەک یکورد ﯽپﺎرﺗ ەﺗﺎک ەک. وەکەدانﺎوچ ەل ۆیخ ەگوڕيشەیر ﯽداکوﺗﺎن ۆﺑ ەداتد يموکراﺗﯽد يەکێتﯽ ﯽپﺎرﺗ يﺎرمەﺗﯽ ەوائ ەنێتەوە،ﺑت
  .نییەکﺎنەدەم ەکورد ێزەریپﺎر ەکو ێنێتﺑه ەدەستﺑ ەرعییەتش ەﺗوانێتد يموکراﺗﯽد يەکێتﯽ ﯽپﺎرﺗ ەيە،ه ەکﯽچ
 ۆﺑ یریپشتگ ەسەلەیم ەشسﺎﺗ ەمئ ەﺗﺎه ەڵام. ﺑەرﺑداتو يﺎداسور ەيرانﯽﻗ ەل ەستد ێودەوڵەﺗییەوەن ەرەیﺑ ەمﺎمکﯽد ێرژ ەل ەوڵیداوەه ﺗورکیﺎ
 ينرﺎشتﺑ ەکرێتد یسور یشتمﺎنﯽن ەنجومەنﯽئ ەهێزکردنﯽﺑ ۆيە. ﺑەﺗەوەﺑوو ۆرز ەرەنگﺎرﺑونەوەیﺑ ەڕویروﺑ ۆيﯽمر يﺎن ەرﺑﺎزیس ەستێوەردانﯽد
  .کورد ﯽپرس ێژەيﯽر ۆنترۆڵکردنﯽک يﺎوسور ێون ەچوون ۆﺑ یﺎﺗورک ۆﺑ ێتﺑ ێگﺎر
 یدژ ەﺎزاد لئ يﺎیسور یسوپﺎ ێزەکﺎنﯽه ێکخستنﯽر ەل ەﺑێتد ەرپرسﺑ ەک ەکﺎﺗەوەد ەرﺑﺎزیس ەکتەﺑێکﯽم يﺎسور یشتمﺎنﯽن ەنجومەنﯽئ ئێستﺎ
 ۆﺑ ێنێتﺑ ەدەستﺑ يەسوپﺎ ەوئ ەمەکداریو ئئﺎزاد ﺑدات يﺎیسور یسوپﺎ ﯽيﺎرمەﺗ ەﺗوانێتد یﺎﺗورک ەستەيەوە،د ەمئ ێﯽر ە. لەسەدئ ێمەکەیرژ
  .ێتﺑگر ەکەکەپ ەرﺑﺎزيیەکﺎنﯽس ێشکەوﺗنەپ ەل ێگﺎشر ويﺎسور یﺑﺎکور ێزگﺎکﺎنﯽپﺎر ﯽنۆنتڕۆڵکردک
 ەندامەئ ەکوﺎوﺗ ەرچﺎوﺑ ەﺎﺗﺑخ يﺎسور ەل ۆپۆزيسیۆنئ ەرعﯽش ﯽگروپ ەﺗﺎﻗ ەکو يﺎسور یشتمﺎنﯽن ەنجومەنﯽئ ێﺑتوان ەک ێتﺑ یواداره ەنگەر ﺗورکیﺎ
  .يﺎداسور ەکورد ﺑکﺎت ل ﯽپرس ەرس ەکﺎنﯽدانوستﺎن ەرپەرشتﯽس وۆیخ ێفﯽرک ێرژ ەڕێنێتەوەﺑگ ەکﺎنکورد
 وەکەکەپ ێنداکﺎنﯽەجئ ەل ێگرﺗنر ۆﺑکﺎت ﺑ یﺎﺗورک ەرژەوەنديیەکﺎنﯽﺑ ەﺗﯽخزم ەوانەيەل يﺎسور یشتمﺎنﯽن ەنجومەنﯽئ ێگەیر ەل ەرﺑﺎزیس يﺎرمەﺗیدانﯽ
 ەوەئ ەفەیموجﺎز یﺎﺗورک ەسەد،ئ ێمەکەیرژ ﯽروخﺎندن ۆﺑدات ﺑ ۆڕشگێڕەکﺎنش يﺎرمەﺗﯽ ەوەیئ یﺎﺗﯽج ەل ەنگەکﺎت ر ەوئ ەڵام. ﺑێراقع یکورد
 .ﺑبﺎت ۆيﯽنﺎوخ ەرفراوانﯽﺑ ێیەکﯽململان ەرەوﺑ يﺎسور ەک دەکﺎت
 
 




 *هانا ۆن... ج كورده به ێویستیپ كایمرئه
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 یراقع یكورد یۆنﺎنمل ﺑە دا،يەفتەم هەك ئەوه كﯽيەفتەهەر و لەوﺑەمەلە ڵسﺎ 12 یوهلە يتیەﺑر وهيﺎديبكرێتە ێتﺑده ییراﻗیﺎنەع ڵیﺎدهو سﺎئە نێوانلە
دام ەس ڕژێمﯽنداودا، كە مﯽكەيە نگﯽەج لە یكەشكستە ی.دواڵاﺗنهە ێرانو ئ یﺎﺗورك ﯽكﺎنسنووره يكنز یﺎكﺎنﯽچ ۆﺑ ێندام حسسە یسوپﺎ ﯽﺗرسلە
 .یكەيكتﺎﺗۆريەد ەڵاﺗسەده ۆيﯽنﺎوخ ۆپۆزسیۆنﯽئ ﯽركوﺗكردنسە ﺑە یكردستده ێرايﯽخﺑە
 
 یینەمكە یپسﺎوهنە ستەرﺑەو ﺑەئە يەﺗﺎﺗﺎهەهە ۆو ﺑ كﯽكجﺎرهۆيەﺑ يويستو ده ڕوونبوو،دام سە ﯽستﺑەمە ،يەهە وهكﺎنەكورده ﺑە ندیيوهپە یندهوهئە
 8891 ﯽڵسﺎ كە ێكركئە ﯽواوكردنﺗە لە يتیبووئﺎراداﺑوو و ﺑرلە ینۆسﺎيدنﺎوﺑبﺎت. جلە یكردﺑوودروست یكەيكتﺎﺗۆريەد ڵاﺗەسەده ۆكﺎن ﺑكورده
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 لە ێتﺎوانﺑ یﺎوانﯽو پ ڵژن و مندا یدژلە یمیﺎويﺎنك ﯽككوشت و چە يﺎنكەڵكەختكرد و خەﺗە يﺎنزاران گوندهەﺑە یراقع كﺎنﯽێزهه ێكﺎﺗ یپێكرد،ستده
 .ێنﺎكﺎرهﺑە ﺑجەڵەهە یۆچكەشﺎر
 
 .ﺑوو يكدامدا نزسە ڕژێمﯽ ێزیموو ههە یوهڕوﺑونەڕوﺑە كﺎن لەكورده ﯽشكست يدا،شﺎخﺎو یسﺎرد كﯽيەواشوهەكە ەو ل داۆخەﺑﺎرود ولە
 
 .گﺎركردڕز ﯽكﺎنكورده يﯽسﺎده ﺑە كﺎنكگرﺗووهيە ﺗەيلايەو يمﺎنﺎنهﺎوپە ﺑچووك لە ێكﯽگروپ ﯽنگمﺎئﺎهەهەو ﺑە ێر،خنە ﯽوﺗ يكﺎمرئە یكﺎﺗە وﺗﺎئەهە
 ێگیركرانج قیراع یﺑﺎكوور لە يكﺎمرئە كﺎنﯽیﺎدهپ ێزه. هوهێتەﺑده ێنو یگورز ڕویڕوﺑە ینﺎگئە ێنێتﺑه كﺎنﯽێرشەه دام وازلەسە یسوپﺎ رمﺎنكرا ﺑەفە
ﺗﺎ را و هەدروستك ڕينفدژه یﺎوچەكوردستﺎندا ن ﯽر ئﺎسمﺎنسە. ﺑەنۆمﺎرﺑكەﺗ ێژووداملە ۆيﯽمر وﺗنﯽيﺎكەفر یۆسەپر ينزنترمە لە كێكيە یﺎنو ﺗوان
 ڵاﺗﯽهﺎو یۆنمل 03 يكﺎمرئە 3002 ڵﯽكرد، و دواجﺎر سﺎده ستﺎنكورد ێمﯽرهە ﯽئﺎسمﺎن لە ێزگﺎريیﺎنو پﺎر ێریچﺎود يكﺎمرئە كﺎنﯽڕۆكەف 3002 ڵﯽسﺎ
 .ڕزگﺎركرددام سە ڕژێمﯽ یڕندهد ڵاﺗﯽسەده كﺎن، لەكورده ێوانیشیﺎندانلە یراﻗﯽ،ع
 ێﺑﺑە راقیع ﯽكﺎنكورده مینجﺎركەۆيەﺑ ڵدامسﺎلە ﺗﯽيبەﺗﺎﺑە ،وهێتەﺑخر يكﯽمرئە ﺗﯽيەركرداسە یریﺑ ڕزگﺎركردنە یرۆكﯽم چئە ﺗﯽۆيەخ جێگﺎی
 لە ﯽكﺎنﺗر كورده جﺎرێكﯽ یراقع لە يكﺎمرئە كﺎنﯽێزهه یوهكشﺎنە ۆﺑ ۆﺑﺎمﺎئ ۆكرسە یكەڕيﺎره. ﺑوهیننەﺑده ۆيﺎنخ يكﯽمرئە وخۆیڕاستە ﯽپﺎراستن
 ، چونكەوهﺗەكﺎن مﺎوهكورده یئﺎزارﺑە ێژوویم ریێبە، سوهدام نﺎﺑنەسە یرۆریﺗ ڕویڕوﺑە یدیچ ێكداكﺎﺗ. لەوهێشتەه یﺎيﯽنﺗە ﺑە ۆيﺎنداخ یشتمﺎنﯽن
 يﺎورو س ێرانكو ئوه كﺎنﯽێزههﺑە ێدراوس ڵگەلە ڵكوﺑە یراﻗدا،ع ﯽﺑرهعە یۆرينەز ڵگەنهﺎ لەك ﺗەنە يەئﺎراداكراو لەرنەسەچﺎره یﺑﺎرگرژ ينندچە
 .ێدانو ململان ێشەكلە كﺎنیﺎنداڵاﺗەو یكورد یینەمكە ڵگەلە كە یﺎداو ﺗورك
 
ش وهئە .ئﺎراوه ێنێتەدا ﺑهشكەنﺎوچە و ﺑگره یراقع ۆینﺎوخلە ێكنگجە يﺎن كيەوهڕوﺑونەڕوﺑە ،وهیەكرهده ردانﯽێوهستو ده ڕقﺗرس و  ۆیهﺑە نگەڕه
 .يكﺎمرئە كﺎنﯽنەێژخﺎيەدر يەندوهرژهكﺎن و نﺎوﺑﺎنگ و ﺑەكورده ۆﺑ ێتﺑده يدیﺗراژ ۆرز ڕاستﯽﺑە
 
 هﺎنﯽیج ﯽنگجە یﺑﺎشوور دوا ۆريﺎیو ك ۆنو ژاپ ڵمﺎنیﺎئە كو لەروههە ێتﺑﺗوودهركەكوردستﺎن سە لە یراقع لە يكﯽمرئە یۆژهپر جێكردنﯽجێبە
 .ڕوويدام دووه
 
 كﯽيەرهﺎ ئﺎﺑووروه، و هەداوهستنەدهلە یﺎنﯽگ داێمەرم هەلە يكﯽمرئە ێكﯽرﺑﺎزسە ﺗﺎكە ڕاستیداو لە يەهە یریﻗﺎمگسە يشێكﯽكوردستﺎن ئﺎسﺎ رێمﯽهە
 يمۆكراسیەم دئە ێكداكﺎﺗو لە يەهە یندووسەشەگە كﯽكراسیەيمۆهﺎ دروهكﺎت. هەدهشەگە یﺎنﯽﺑ ێنﺎنﯽرهﺑەوه ﯽكﺎنئﺎستە كە يەهە یندووسەشەگە
 ﯽﺑوونو نە ڵﯽ،ندهەگ ڵێ. ﺑەینیوهﺑ وهۆيەخﺑە یندووسەشەگە یديﺎیو م ﯽندهمە ڵگﺎیۆمەو ك ﻗینەڕاستە ۆپۆزسیۆنﯽئ ﯽپﺎرﺗ ينندچە ڵامﺑە ،یەن ێرفێكتپ
 لە یەكﺎن خراپترن 0791 ڵانﯽسﺎ یﺑﺎشوور ۆريﺎیك لە ﯽگشتﺑە وهڵنیﺎيیەدﺑە ڵام، ﺑەوهﺗەمﺎونە یجد یێشەكو كوه ڕێكنﺎ وﺗنﯽێشكەو پ وهێپرسینەل
 .يكﺎدامرئە ڵاﺗﯽسەده ێرژلە ڵاﺗەو وئە ﯽزموونئە لە داێوههﺎوش ڵێكﯽخﺎ
 
 ڕۆڵێكﯽ لە ﺑووﺑنڵنیﺎنەد ۆرز یراقع ﯽكﺎنﺑەرهعە نگەڕه. يكﯽمرەئ یژیستراﺗ ێزێكﯽه ێتەﺑب ێدايەﺗ یوهئە كﺎنﯽێداويستیەموو پهە یراقع كوردستﺎنﯽ
 يﯽیشەمهە یوهمﺎنە ۆﺑ ووهيﺎندڕاگە ۆيﺎنخ ﯽكورد خواست ﯽكﺎنركردهو سە ین،ن يەێوهو شكﺎن ﺑەكورده ڵامﺑە يكﺎ،مرئە كﺎنﯽێزهه نﯽێژخﺎيەدر
 ێرانئ ڵگەەل ﯽشهﺎوﺑە یسنوور یوهرئەﺑە. لەيكﺎنمرئە ۆستﯽد ﯽگشتﺑە ێتﺑده یۆنمل ێنجپ یيكەنز كە ێمەرم هەئە یشتوانﯽو دان يكﺎمرئە كﺎنﯽێزهه
و دوو ئە كﺎنﯽڕژێمەلە ێشتﺎئ یشﺎنەڕهو هەئە یدژلە نگﺎنجە ۆﺑ يكﺎمرئە یژیستراﺗ لە ینێتگرنگ ﺑب ڕۆڵێكﯽ ێتﺗوانكوردستﺎن ده ،يەهە يﺎداو سور
 یهﺎوكﺎرلە ڵسﺎ ينندچە یو دوا يەهە ڕيﺎنشە ﯽزموونﺗوانﺎن و ئەكورد ﺑە ڵگریواو هە يشئﺎسﺎ كﺎنﯽێزه. هێتگردهرچﺎوهسە كﺎوهيمرئەدژه ڵاﺗەو
 یوهرئەەﺑە. لیدهلقﺎعئە ڕێكخراوی یدژلە ڕكردنشە ێوانیشیﺎندانلە دروستكردووه یﺎنداكﺎنەيكیمرهﺎوﺗﺎ ئە ڵگەلە ۆرﺑﺎشیﺎنز ﯽكﺎركردن ندیيوهپە
 ﯽكرهسە ﯽێكشداروت و ﺑەنە كﺎنﯽرهێنەمهرهەﺑە ڵاﺗەو ينزنترمەلە كێكيە ێتەﺑب ێتﺗوانده ێمەرم هەئە ،ێدايەﺗ ﯽوﺗنە یلرمﺑە یﺎرمل 05-04كوردستﺎن 
 .یهﺎنﯽج یوزه يشﯽئﺎسﺎ لە
 
 يكﺎمرئە یلەپەﺑە یوهكشﺎنە ڵام. ﺑەیراقع یﺗر ﯽكﺎنشەﺑە يمۆكراﺗﯽد وﺗنﯽەێشكپ ریێنەﺑزو ﺑە ێتﺑب ێتﺗوانكوردستﺎن ده يكﺎ،مرئە پشتگیریﺑە
 .ێتچردهده ۆنترۆڵكلە ﯽئﺎسﺎنﺑە كە رێرانكەو یكردار ۆﺑ رهڕێگﺎخۆشكە كە ێهێشتووهج یداریﺗرسمە كﯽۆشﺎيیەﺑ
 
. یراﻗداع ﯽكﺎنكورده ڵگە" لەﺗﯽيبە"ﺗﺎ ێﯽنو كﯽنديەيوهپە ﯽدانﺎن ۆﺑ وهكرێتەڕﺑپ يكﯽمرئە ێزیهﺑە یژێكﯽستراﺗ ﺑە ێجستبەده ێويستەپ ۆشﺎيیەﺑ وئە
وژمنﺎن د ێتﺗوانده يكﺎيەمرئە ﺎڵایﺑ ﺗێكﯽيەوولەئە داﻗینەڕاستە یدراڵﯽف یراﻗێكﯽع یێوهچوارچكوردستﺎن لە ﯽﺗلامەسە كە یوهئە یوهڕونكردنە
 .اغدﺑە یڕۆژانە كﺎنﯽﺗەیﺎسەس یﺑﺎرگرژ ﯽركردنسەچﺎره كﺎن لەكورده یو ئﺎرامگرﺗن و هﺎوكﺎر ۆداگرﺗنخددانبە ۆﺑ رهو هﺎوكﺎت هﺎنده وهدورﺑخﺎﺗە
 
 ۆﺑ وهۆزێتەﺑق لەو هەئە ۆﺑﺎمﺎئ ییدارهئ كﺎت، ﺑﺎشترهده يكﺎمرئە ﯽردانداهﺎﺗوو سە ﯽكوردستﺎن، مﺎنگ ێمﯽرهە ۆكﯽرسە ﯽ،سعود ﺑﺎرزانمە كﺎﺗێ
 ێوانن ﯽكﺎنۆڵیەدووﻗ يەنديوهپە یكردنﯽرشترپەسە ۆو كورد ﺑ يكﺎمرئە ێوانن كﺎنﯽنديەيوهپە ت ﺑەﺑﺎرهسە ێنو ﯽشهﺎوﺑە كﯽيەیژنەل ﯽدنزراندامە
 ڵایﺑﺎ ێكﯽرەرمﺎنبفە نيەلاكوردستﺎن لە لە يكﺎمرئە یڵخﺎنەكونسو ێويستە. پێكبێتردولا پهە ڵایﺑﺎ ﯽرپرسﺎنﺑەلە ێويستەپ يەیژنەم لردولا و ئەهە
 يكﯽمرئە ﯽمنئە كﺎریيهﺎر یشﺎنﯽنﺎون ێرژ. لەێبكرێتل یریپشتگ نشینﺎنەخ ڵێكﯽرانەژه ﺑە ێتﺗوانرو ده ﺑبرێتڕێوهﺑە ڵیۆزﺑﺎ یپلەﺑە وهرهده ﯽﺗزارهوه
 ێوانیشیﺎندانلە ێنرێتزركوردستﺎن داﺑمە ێمﯽرهە ڵگريﯽواەو ه يشئﺎسﺎ كﺎنﯽێزهه ڕاهێنﺎنﯽو  ككردنڕچەپ ۆﺑ ۆگرامپر ينندچە ێويستەپ یراق،ع ۆﺑ
 ێنﺎنﯽرهﺑەهو ﯽفراوانكردن ۆش ﺑهﺎوﺑە كﯽريیەێشخەستپده ێويستە. پيكردنهﺎوكﺎر یﺗر كﺎنﯽوڵەو هە یﺎریزان یوهۆڕينەگ ۆﺑ ێزهﺑە ڵﯽنﺎكە ينندچە
 ۆﺑ ێكراوپمتمﺎنە یوزه ێكﯽكﺎرنﺎردهكو هەوه كەێمەرهە ڵكشﺎنﯽهە ێدانﯽپرهر پەەسلە وهێتەختبكرو جە ێبكرێتستپكوردستﺎن ده لە يكﯽمرئە
و  ڵﯽندهەگ كێشكردنﯽڕيشە ۆكوردستﺎن ﺑ ێمﯽرهە كﺎنﯽڵەوهە یريكردنﯽپشتگ ۆﺑ ێتمبكرراهەفە یكﯽكنﺗە یهﺎوكﺎر ێويستە. پڕۆژئﺎوا كﺎنﯽڕهﺑﺎزا
 .ۆڤمر ﯽكﺎنﺎفەم ﯽو زامنكردن يﺎسﺎ ﯽحوكم ێزكردنﯽهﺑە
 
 یژیستراﺗ نﯽێژخﺎيەدر كﯽنديەيوهپە يكﺎمرئە يەوهئە ﯽكﺎﺗ ،وهڕينەنﺎوﺑردن و سلە لە یراقع ﯽكﺎنكورده ڕزگﺎركردنﯽ لە يەدوو ده لە يﺎﺗرز دوای
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 یﺎدا،ند ێزیزله ﺗﺎكە ڵگەلە كﺎنﯽيەدنيوهپەلە ۆﺑووخﺑەو متمﺎنە ندمەڵەوو ده رانۆشگوزهئﺎرام و خ ێكﯽ. كوردستﺎنێنێتزركﺎندا داﺑمەكورده ڵگەلە
 استﯽڕنﺎوه ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهەو  یراقع یررانسەسە لە ۆدێرنیزمو م یریﻗﺎمگسە ۆﺑ ێزێكو ه يكﺎمرئە كﺎنﯽيەندوهرژهﺑە ۆﺑ ێكﻗﺎزانج ێتەﺑب ێتﺗوانده
 .فراوانتردا
 
 یوهرهده ﯽﺗزارهوه لە يەهە ﯽكﺎركردن ﯽزموونئە ڵسﺎ 02 لە يﺎﺗرو ز كﺎنيمۆكراسیەد لە نەيكردرگرﺑە یزراوهدامە ڵایﺑﺎ ێكﯽندامهﺎنﺎ: ئە ۆنج*
 ۆﺑ يكﺎ،مرئە ۆكﯽرسە یگرێج ینﯽ،چ يكد كﺎنﯽێكراوهپمتمﺎنە رهدهيﺎريده لە ﺑووه كێكيە 9002 ۆﺑ 1002 ێوانن ڵانﯽسﺎ یمﺎوهو لە يكﺎ،مرئە









 یكجبه ۆكهانكورد ... گ یاسییس یایفجوگرا
 2102/52/4
 
 .ۆڕیكﺎن گر كوردهرامبەﺑە یﺎیﺗورك ڵوێستﯽهە ڕاكێشرنجسە كﯽيەێوهش ﺑە یراقع يرانﯽزوه ۆكرسە یكﯽمﺎل نوری
 یژهستراﺗ ۆرهو جئە ێراندا،ئ ڵپﺎ لە یعەش ﯽێژوويم يدۆلۆژيﯽئﺎ ﺑە وهێتەستﺑبە وهیوپۆلۆﺗیكەج یروو لە یراقع كە يەوهئە یكﯽمﺎل یورهگە خواستﯽ
 يﺎﺗرز یراﻗدا،ع رچﺎون لەﺑە كﯽيەۆرينەن زكﺎیعەش ویەن ﺑنﺎغە ێﺑ یواوﺗە ﺑە گیرێت،ێدهل یخنەره یﺎوهك ﺗوركوه ڵاﺗﯽو ێكندهە نيەلالە ندهرچەهە
 یكﯽمﺎل یكەیژهستراﺗ ڕۆ،مئە یريیەگەفەيەو ﺗﺎئە ۆﺑ وهكرده یێگەوﺗﺎن و رفە یراﻗﯽع ﺗﯽڵەوده يكﺎمرئە يﯽرراﺑە ﺑە ۆرئﺎوايﯽخ ردانﯽێوهستده وهلە
 ۆكورد، ﺑ یشەێك یرﺑﺎرهده یعﯽواﻗ ۆچوونێكﯽو ﺑرهﺑە ێتنده یﺎوهﺗورك ﺑە ڵپﺎ ڵام، ﺑەیراقع كێتیﯽيە ت ﺑەﺑﺎرهسە یراقع یيندهئﺎ ۆﺑ ۆرهز یﯽﺗرسمە
 یﺎﺗورك راق،یع ﯽكﺎنًل َ كوردهگەلە ێزههﺗوندو ﺑە يﯽهﺎوكﺎر ﺑە ێويستﯽدا پكەنﺎوچە لە یڵاكەﺑﺎ يیەندوهرژهﺑە كە يشتووهێگەﺗ ستﺎێئ یﺎﺗورك نموونە
 كەيیەكورد مەێرەه ڵگەلە ۆیخ یلتیزامﺎﺗﯽئ یوهڵكردنەﻗوو لە ێتنﺎﺑ ڵدوو د ڵامﺑە ێكبدات،و ﺗ ێوێنێتﺑش یراقع كێتﯽيە ﺎكﺎتن ۆوﺗئە ێكﯽكﺎر یچه
 ەل یراقع یۆكەخرﺑەسە يیەكورد ێمەرهە ۆكﯽرسە ﯽسعود ﺑﺎرزانمە ڵگەلە رهنكەئە يیكردنﯽ، هﺎوكﺎرغداوهﺑە نيەلالە ڵستیكردنرهەﺑە ڕایرهسە
 كورد دا؟ یێشەك یر خودسەﺑە ونڵبوزا ۆﺑ سەﺑە وهئە يﺎئﺎ ڵام، ﺑەوهكﺎﺗەمدهكە یﺎر ﺗوركسەلە يﯽنﺎوچە یگوشﺎر یداراست
كﺎم  یچه ،ينژده ێراندائ يﺎوو سور یراقع یﺎوﺗورك كﺎن لەكورده ڕۆمئە ،وهیبكﺎﺗەكﺎن شكورده یﺎسﯽس یﺎیجوگراف ێويستەپ ۆڤمر ،وهڵادانەوه لە رﺑە
 ﺗﺎنەڵەوهم دموو ئەكورد هە ﯽپرس ﺑە تﺑﺎرهسە یدیئ ن،كبخەيە كسﺎنيە ڵاﺗﯽك هﺎوووان وهئە كە كردووهرنەﺑەستەده یۆكمەﺗ یژێكﯽستراﺗ ڵاﺗﺎنەم ولە
 ۆدێرنم يﺎن یديﯽﻗلك ﺗەوه وهێژهم كﺎن لەكورده ﯽ،گشتﺑە كﺎنەكورده ییﺎسیەس ینكردنەچ و ﺑەئە یﺎرﺗرهستهە یوهشدا ئەمەئە ڵگەلە ،ێنﺎوهه یﺎنشكست
 ێمﯽرژ نيەلارا لەنﺎو ﺑواو لەﺗە ڵامﺑە یﺎدا،ﺗورك ﯽكﺎننﺎو كوردهلە ﺑووه ريگەكﺎر ۆرز مەیسلائ يینﯽئﺎ ێبﺎزێكﯽر كە يﯽندبەﻗشنە نموونە ۆﺑ ۆلێنكراون،پ
 یسلامدائ ڵگەلە ۆیخ ێﯽململان يەﺑواهە ۆشیۆلۆژيﯽس يﯽو دانﺎ ڵﻗئە ۆزێكﺗ یزممﺎلر كەگە، ئە0691 یﺗﺎكەكوده یدوا ﺗﯽيبەﺗﺎ ﺑە وهیستەمﺎلكە
 .یﺎوهﺗورك كﺎنﯽورديەك نﺎوچە ێنﺎيەهدهنە
 وهینییەشو شﺎرن یسلامئ ﺑوو ﺑە ستيوهپە يداوكەۆرهج ﺑوو لە ۆشیۆلۆژيترم سرهەﺑە ێنﺎيەه ی) ۆدێرن) و (میديﯽﻗل(ﺗە ۆركﯽم ییﺎوازيیكردنەج وئە
 وون، لەﺑ نگێدهﺑ كﺎنیﺎسییەس لەسەمە رسە، لەلكﺎوه وهیسلامەئ ﺑە يﯽﺗوندﺑە كە كەيیەكورد یديیەﻗلﺗە ﺑنكە كراڕواندهك چﺎوهروههە كدا،يە یدواﺑە
نﺎو  چوونە ێجستبەده يﺎن،یديەﻗلﺗە ێكخستنەر ﺑوون لەنە ێكشﺑە یترچ كە یﺎﺗورك ﯽكﺎنكورده ینەو شﺎرنش كﺎنۆدێرنەم يیەكورد نجﺎمدا گروپەئە
 ۆیه ﺑوو ﺑە یﺑژارده ﺗﺎكە ئﺎشكرا كرد كە ۆیخ يداكەیلمﺎنیەو ع وڕهپچە شێوازه لە ﺑردنە ۆنﺎ ﺑم پەگونجﺎو ئەنە كﯽيەێوهش ﺑە ،هویۆنﺎلیزمەنﺎس
نﺎو  یوانەێچەپ ﺑە ك،يەك راست وه ڵﯽﺑﺎ كﺎنﯽیﺎسییەو س كﺎنیزكﺎرهموحﺎف یﺎسییەس یﺑﺎره كورد لە یلەسەر مەسەلە یﺎﺗورك لە یﺎسﯽس يﯽژارهە
 يﯽكورد یﺎسﯽس ﺎییجوگراف وهرئەﺑەكرد، لەده وايﯽێشەپ ﯽﺑﺎرزان -یێوهش كﺎنﯽيینیەئﺎ یديەﻗلﺗە گرووپە یراﻗداع لە يﯽكورد یۆنﺎلیزمﯽنﺎس ،یﺎوهﺗورك
 نوخبە یێگەر لە يﯽكورد یۆنﺎلیزمﯽ) و نﺎسﯽﺑﺎرزان ۆدێلﯽ(م كﺎنیديەﻗلﺗە نوخبە یێگەر لە يﯽكورد یۆنﺎلیزمﯽ: نﺎسيەهە یﯽكرهسە ۆدێلﯽدوو م
 .)لانۆجەئ ۆدێلﯽ(م وهكﺎنەییەنیلمﺎع
 ێململان ێستﺎ؟ ﺗﺎئوهونەدوورﺑكە لانۆجەئ ۆدێلﯽم كﺎت لەده یراز یﺎﺗورك ﯽكﺎنكورده ێكﺎت: كدروستده یﺎﺗورك ۆﺑ یجدد یﺎرێكﯽپرس ێشووﺗرپ ﺗﺎﺑلۆی
 ﺗیڤﯽرنەڵتەەئ یچه ویەن ێداﺗ يﯽكورد ێكخراوێكﯽر یچه یﺎﺗورك ﺗﯽڵەودا دهمﺎنەئە ڵگە، لەﺑووه یﺎداﺗورك كﺎنﯽییەمنزگﺎ ئەده نﯽيدامە لە دايەلەسەم مەلە
 یۆرﺑەك زهو ،يەدا هەلانەسەمە ۆرهمجلە يﺎنسنووردار ۆڵﯽﺗر ر كﺎنﯽییەگشت ﺗییەيەسﺎو كە یرﺑﺎزسە ﯽرانفسەو ئە ێزگﺎرانپﺎر ،یەن ێداﺗ يشﯽكورد
 وانیوهيتنە یﺎﺗر، ﺗورك كﯽيەواﺗﺎ ﺑە ێت،ﺑوامدهردهﺗردا ﺑە كﺎنﯽڵۆزيیەموو ئﺎهە ەل يﺎنژ ڵامﺑە ێت،ستوهراده ڕۆیوهپﺎشن ی4عﺎت سە ﺗر، لە ﺗﺎنﯽڵەوده
و  ﺗخوازیڵاسەك (دهوه كﺎنﯽ،ۆيیەنﺎوخ ێشەك ڕایرهسە یدیئ ،لانۆجەئ یكەۆدێلەم ﯽكردن ﯽنگهﺎوسەدژه ۆم ﺑرهەﺑە ێنێتەﺑه رنﺎﺗیڤڵتەئە ۆدێلێكﯽم
 یيەمﺎ يەۆﺑ ،یەﺗر ن ۆدێلێكﯽم یچه ،ۆرخكردووهﻗ ۆیخ ۆﺑ یﺎﺗورك ﯽكﺎنر كوردهسەلە ريﯽيگەكﺎر لانۆجەئ ۆدێلﯽ)، ميزمریرۆت ﺗنﺎنەو ﺗە ڵﯽندهگە
 يﺎننگر يەر لاسەشبوون ﺑەكﺎن داﺑەﺑن،.. كورده یدژ يﺎند ﺑن سەئە ر ﺑەسە يﺎئﺎ ینرت نكﺎن پەكورده ینینﺑب ڕۆدامئە یشلﯽﻗﺎم لە كە یەن ڕمﺎنرسوسە
 .پ.ك.ك دا-دژه
 یێشەك یەن ﺗیﺎنڵايەۆمەك يﺎن یﺎسﯽس یﺗوانﺎ وهكﺎنەیستەمﺎلكە یزكﺎروموحﺎف ﺑە یﺎ) ﺗوركێرخ(نە لە يتییەﺑر كەڵامەوه ێت؟ﺑده ﯽچ كەڵامەوه واﺗەكە
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  مالكه ... ن/ لاله كهییهكورد یژهستراتت بهبارهسه یاتورك یتناو حكومهله كانۆچوونهب یرتبوونپه
 2102/3/4
 
ﺗدا ومەحك ﯽندامﺎننﺎو ئەلە یﺎوازج ۆچوونﯽﺑ كە وﺗووهركەهد ڕوو،نەخەده كەێیەنو یژهستراﺗ یرﺑﺎرهده واشەچە ێبینﯽت ﺗحكومە ڵاكﺎنﯽﺑﺎ رپرسەﺑە
 .ڵاتو یيندهئﺎ یكورد ﺗﯽیﺎسەس یرﺑﺎرهده يەهە
دا مﺎنكﺎﺗهەرد، لەك ێنو ێكﯽپلان ﯽﺑوون لە ۆڵﯽنك يۆنیدافزلەﺗە وﺗنێكﯽێكەچﺎوپ )، لە.پە.كە(ئە ێدانپرهت و پەدالەعە ﯽپﺎرﺗ ێژیﺑوﺗە یكلچە ينحوسە
كرد  كەپلانە ەل یدیئكﺗە يرانزوه ۆكرسە ردوگﺎنﯽنهﺎ ئەﺗە ویەئﺎرادا ن لە ێنو ێكﯽشت ويەكﺎردا لە ێستﺎئ لمﺎند كەسە یو پلانەئە كﺎنﯽڕگەﺑ لە ێكندهە
 ۆرﺗەراپ یرﺑﺎرهده ێبینﯽرنج و ﺗەنﺎو حكومتدا سلە ێكسكە یچردوگﺎن هئە لە جگە كﺎندا،ۆژنﺎمەر لە یوهڵاوﺑوونەﺑ لە ۆژدوو ر یدوا
 مﺎنكەیژهستراﺗ نووسێكۆژنﺎمەند رچە وێمەئ یوهئە یدوا ۆژر 6( ۆژهو رئﺎزار، ئە ی 92ﺗﺎ  يﺎندووهگەرانە كەيیەكورد یژهستراﺗ كﺎنﯽوانییەۆژنﺎمەر
 !یەن ێنو كﯽیژێستراﺗ یچه كە يﺎندراگە ﯽر ﺗوركﺑەخە یڤﯽﺗ ڵﯽنﺎكە ﺑە یكلﺑﺎسكرد) چە
 ینﺎهش یمعنە یدريسو ئ يرانزوه ۆكرسە ێگریج یلاﺗەكرد، ئە كﺎننديدارهيوهپە يرهزموو وههە لە یﺎرمپرس كەێیەنو پلانە یرﺑﺎره: "من دهوﺗیشﯽ
 ."یمن ێیەنو و پلانەئە یم و ئﺎگﺎداركەپﺎرﺗە ێژیﺑوﺗە ۆمكرد، من خ كەپلانە لە ڵیﺎنوان نكوئە ۆ،نﺎوخ يریزوه
 وهۆيەخ ﯽكﺎنﻗسە یوانەێچەپشدا ﺑەوهئە ڵگەلە ڵام، ﺑەكردووه يﺎنكەڵەواهە ڵﯽروومﺎ كرد كە نووسﺎنەۆژنﺎمەو رلە يﯽ، گلەوهئە یﺑر لە لیكچە
 ڕشە پێدانﯽێژهدر ەل يتییەش ﺑروهئە ێت،رگۆدهخلە ێیەنو و پلانەئە كﯽيەڕگەند ﺑچە كە كﺎتجێدهێبەج ێنو یژێكﯽستراﺗ ێستﺎئ یﺎﺗورك كە يﺎنديگەرا
 كەڕهشە پێدانﯽێژهدر ڕيﺎریراﺑردوو ﺑ ڵﯽسﺎ كە وهوكﺎﺗەلە ین،كوردنش یﺎیﺗورك ڵاﺗﯽۆژهەر ۆرئﺎوایخ ﯽكﺎنشەﺑەلە ﺗﯽيبەﺗﺎ(پ.ك.ك)، ﺑە یدژ
هﺎ من روه، هە9002 ی)كەيەكورد وه(كرانە ێنﺎنﯽشكسته یدوا ﯽمنئە ﺗﯽیﺎسەس ۆﺑ هوﺗەڕاوهگە كە وهﺗەﺑووه خنەره ڕوویروﺑە یﺎ، ﺗوركدراوه
و كورد یێشەك یوهڕووﺑونەروﺑە ۆﺑ كردووهئﺎمﺎده كیﺎنێگﺎيەر خشەنە ،ێدايەﺗ ۆگﺎنﯽردئە ﺗدا كەنﺎو حكومەﺑچووك لە ێكﯽﺗﺎﻗم كە وتركەۆمدهﺑ
 یكەەێینو یژهو ستراﺗئە یكەﺗەزارهوه كە ڵێتده یكلچە ۆ،نﺎوخ يریزوه ینﯽكدوغﺎن و شﺎهئە يﺎڵچن) .پە.كەە(ئ ﯽپﺎرﺗ ریێنەنو ڵگە(پ.ك.ك)و لە
 كەپلانە ڵامفراوانتر، ﺑە كﯽيەودامە ﺑە یچﺎكسﺎز ﯽنجﺎمدانئە یشدامﺎنكﺎﺗهە(پ.ك.ك)و لە یوهگژداچوونەﺑە یمﺎر ﺑنەسەلە ڕگەﺗەخستووه ێستﺎئ
 .ێندنگﺎكﺎنداخو م لەدووه ﯽك زمﺎنوه یكورد ﯽزمﺎن ێرﺑوونﯽف ﯽمﺎف ێنﺎنﯽستهدهك ﺑەوه ێت،نده لاوهﺑە كﺎنيیەكورد رۆكییەسە يیەداواكﺎر
 ێستﺎوو و ئﺑ ۆنﺎوخ يریزوه ێككﺎﺗ یپێكرد،ستده 9002 ڵﯽسﺎلە يرانزوه ۆكرسە ێگریج یلاﺗەئە نگﯽێشەپ ﺗدا، ﺑەنﺎو حكومەﺗر لە گروپێكﯽ
 ینداریمئە ێگریج یدانﻗﺎن فكﺎت، هەده ﯽمنئە ﺗﯽیﺎسەر سسەخت لەجە ۆرز یوهرئەﺑەﺑوون لە كەێیەنو یژهستراﺗ یدژ م گروپەئە ،یهێنﺎوهشكست
 يیەردكو یژهر ستراﺗسەﺗەخستووه ێتكرهك ﺑﺎسدوه ۆيﺎن،خ ۆركﯽكﺎت مده نگﯽێشەپ ۆگﺎنردئە كە یمەو ﺗئە ،يەدا یلاﺗەئە یكەیمەنﺎو ﺗ) لەیت(م
 .كردده ڵستیﺎنرهەﺑە یلاﺗەئە یكەەیمﺗ دات كەده ﯽمنئە ﺗﯽیﺎسەسﺑە تيەوولەت ئەحكومە كە يەوهرئەﺑەش لەوهئە ،كەێیەنو
 
 
 مﺎنزه یﺗوده یۆژنﺎمە/ ررچﺎوهسە
 




    عهرەبی بکهنڕەنگه کوردەکان ڕابهیهتی بههاری       :
 
ين ﺑەشێوەيەکﯽ هێواش و لەسەرخۆ ێەو لەکﺎﺗێکدا گۆڕانکﺎری سەرﺗﺎپﺎی رۆژهەڵاﺗﯽ نﺎوەڕاستﯽ گرﺗۆﺗەوە و شﺎدی دەرﺑڕ
 دژه و ڕۆژئﺎوا دژه یجندائه كە كﺎنوهﺗوندڕه ئﺎينییە گروپە نیگەرانییﺎی ئﺎشکراکردووە کە ئﺎژاوە سوود داگەيەنێت ﺑە
  يە.هە یانمۆدێرنیزه
 لمﺎنﯽعە ﯽسروشت كووه ﺑكﺎت، كۆنترۆڵ ﺎنەگروپ جۆره وئە ریكﺎريگە يەوانەلە كە نكەده هێز ندينچە ستنیشﺎنﯽده شبینﺎنگە
 خۆيﺎنلە ريﯽمﺎوهجە پشتگیری يﺎنتوانیوهنە وانﺗوندڕه و ڕووخﺎندووه كﺎنیﺎنكۆنە ڕژێمە كە یهێزانە وئە یزۆرﺑە
 .وهنەكۆﺑكە
 لە ویﺎنڕهمی پێدانﯽرهپەلە رﺑێتﺗیدهەيﺎرم ﺗوانێتده كە ﺗر كﯽگۆڕانكﺎريیە رسەلە وهختیﺎنكردۆﺗەجە مكە كﯽيەژمﺎره ڵامﺑە
 .كەنﺎوچە كوردی دانیشتوانﯽ ندوویسەشەگە ڕۆڵﯽ: لە ﺑريتیە ويشئە داكەنﺎوچە
 كووه گشتﯽ كﯽيەشێوهﺑە جیهﺎن لە ﺗێڕوانین ﺑۆ خۆيﺎن ﻗلیدیﺗە شێوازی پێويستە وروپﺎئە و مريكﺎئە لە رانداڕێژه تسیﺎسە
 كﺎن،دهكور ﺑە خشینﺑە ڵاتسەده پشت كﺎنﯽﺗرسییەمە و كﺎنرهگەئە ﺑە دانبنێن و لانێنوه كﺎنوهﺗەنە ﺗﺎنﯽوڵەده یكۆكراوه
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 یوهئە ﺑێﺑە نستبهێندهﺑە داكەنﺎوچە لە زيﺎﺗر ریكﺎريگە یوهﺑۆئە دۆستە ڕۆژئﺎوا لەگە مئە هﺎندانﯽ ﺑۆ ﺑنیﺎﺗبنێن ستراﺗیژێك
 .وهوێتەلێبكە یخنەڕه و وهكﺎردانە
 ﺎئومێدكراون ويستﯽ و خواست و ركوﺗكردنسە كۆﺗﺎيﯽ ﺑێ چیرۆكێكﯽ لە ﺑريتیە ڕاستدانﺎوه ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهە لە كﺎنكورده مێژووی
 لە وهئیتنیكیە ڕوویلە و موسڵمﺎنن زۆریﺑە و ملیۆن 03 لە زيﺎﺗرن كە ڕاست،نﺎوه ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهە كﺎنﯽكورده. ﺗراژيديﺎ و
 ەﺗحكومە ڵاﺗﯽسەده لە ئۆﺗۆنۆمﯽ ستهێنﺎنﯽدهﺑە ﺑۆ دورودرێژه كﯽيەمﺎوه جیﺎوازن، كﺎنﺗوركە و كﺎنفﺎرسە و كﺎنﺑەرهعە
 نگن.جەده واوﺗە خۆيﯽرﺑەسە ﺑۆ تنﺎنەﺗە و كﺎندووژمنكﺎره
 
 نلايەلە یﺎيﯽكیم كﯽچە هێرشﯽ جینۆسﺎيدی نێوانیشیﺎندالە و ﺑن دنﺎوﺗرينیﺎنﺑە چێتپێده عیراق كﺎنﯽكورده كﺎنﯽﺗییەينەمە
 ینﺎسنﺎمە پﺎراستنﯽ ﺑۆ كردووه ﺑﺎﺗیﺎنخە كورد ملیۆن 2 ینزيكە دراوسێدا ی-سوريﺎ لە. شتﺎكﺎنداهە سﺎڵانﯽ لە وهحسێنە دامسە
 لە لێبكﺎت زۆريﺎن ﺗﺎكو تومەحك یديكە كﺎنﯽوهكرده و كﺎتده غەدهﻗە وانئە زمﺎنﯽ یيﺎسﺎيﺎنە وئە دژی لە خۆيﺎن ئیتنیكﯽ
 ﺎنگﯽم ﺗﺎیرهسە لە ﺗﺎكو شكراونﺑێبە سوريﺎ هﺎوڵاﺗیبوونﯽ مﺎفﯽ لە مێژهلە كﺎنكورده یزۆرﺑە. وهﺑتوێنە ﺑدارهعە یﺑۆﺗە
 000003 ەﺑ خشﯽﺑە یزنﺎمەگەڕه یكەرزۆكەلە ﺗەحكومە پشتگیريكردنﯽ ﺑۆ وڵێكداهە لە دسەئە شﺎرﺑە رۆكسە نیسﺎندا
 .كورد
 ،رپﺎكردووهﺑە تحكومە دژیلە كداريیﺎنچە ﺗێكﯽڵمەهە كە ﺑچووك كﯽيەمینەكە ﺗوركیﺎ، كوردی ملیۆن 51 ینزيكە
 ملیۆن 5 لە زيﺎﺗر. ﺗوركیﺎوه سوپﺎی نلايەلە ركردنده زۆرﺑە و كراوه نگﯽجە و يﺎخیبوون لە نكەده كمێژوويە یشەﺑﺎنگە
 ﺗداوڵەده ڵگەلە ﺗوندوﺗیژانە هﺎروههە ،يەهە خۆيﺎن زمﺎنﯽ كﺎرهێنﺎنﯽﺑە مﺎفﯽ زيﺎﺗر ديكە ﺗﺎنﯽوڵەده لە نئێرا كوردی
 .ڕيﺎنكردووهشە
 و رنگگ شێوازیﺑە يەوانەلە ئێستﺎ گۆڕانكﺎری لە كيەزنجیره ،شتويﺎنەچە مێژوو درێژايﯽﺑە یكۆژانﺎنە مووهە وئە رﺑەلە
 يﺎنﻗینەڕاستە ئۆﺗۆنۆمﯽ 1991 سﺎڵﯽ نداویكە نگﯽجە دوایلە كە عیراق كﺎنﯽكورده. ﺑگۆڕێت كﺎنكورده ختﯽەﺑ پێويست
 سیﺎسﯽ سیستمێكﯽ دروستكردنﯽ ﺑۆ دواﺗر كﺎنﯽوڵەهە داو3002 سﺎڵﯽ لە حسێن دامسە ڕژێمﯽ ڕووخﺎنﯽ لە ستهێنﺎوهدهﺑە
 ﯽيمﺎنێكهﺎوپە هێنن،كﺎردهﺑە گرنگ ڵاﺗﯽسەده غداﺑە لە ئێستﺎ كﺎنورديیەك پﺎرﺗە. كردووه دروێنە زۆريﺎن سوودی نوێ،
 .عیراﻗە رۆكﯽسە ﺑﺎنﯽ،ﺗﺎڵە لالجە كوردێك، وهه5002 سﺎڵﯽ لە. ﺗێكداحكومە مووهە لە گرنگن
 ئۆﺗۆنۆمﯽ پﺎراستنﯽ
 و ڕامیﺎری خۆيﯽرﺑەسە لە رزﺑە تێكﯽئﺎس عیراق ﺑﺎكووری لە كوردستﺎندا رێمﯽهە ﺗﯽحكومە یسﺎيە ژێرلە كﺎنكورده
 ﺎراستنﯽپ ﺑۆ شهﺎوﺑە ﺗﯽسیﺎسە و وايﯽرمﺎنڕهفە كﯽيەلەسەمە ندچە پێويستە وانئە ندهرچەهە. پﺎراستووه خۆيﺎن ڕۆشنبیری
 ﺑكﺎت عیراق ﯽكوردستﺎن رێمﯽهە ردانﯽسە سێككە رهە و كﺎتدهشەگە وانئە ئﺎﺑووری رﺑگرن،وه ندهەﺑە خۆيﺎن هێزی
 وهكەەلاي مووهەلە ینوێیﺎنە ﺑیزنسە وئە و ئﺎﺑووری ژێرخﺎنﯽ كﺎنﯽپرۆژه و گشتﯽ رهێنﺎنﯽﺑەوه ﺑە ﺑێتده ركﺎريگە وائە
 .كرێتده ﺗێبینﯽ
 كە يەهە وهەئ ریگەئە ڵامﺑە زموونین،ئە زيﺎﺗر داكەرێمەهە ریرانسەسە لە كورد كﺎنﯽوﺗەستكەده لە ديكە ندێكﯽهە
 ۆﺑ سﺎڵدا يﺎنده یمﺎوه لە ﺑن سﺎﺗدا ﺑﺎرﺗرينلە لێواری لە نگەڕه كﺎنكورده ﺗوركیﺎ لە. ﺑن گرنگ كسﺎنيە كﯽيەشێوهﺑە
 ی)پﺎرﺗﯽ كئﺎ( پێدانشەگە و داد پﺎرﺗﯽ ﺑۆ رچﺎویﺑە وﺗنێكﯽركەسە يەفتەهە مئە كﺎنﯽڵبژاردنەهە. كﺎنیﺎنكێشە ركردنﯽسەچﺎره
 مﺎنﯽرلەەپ شﯽهﺎوﺑە ﺑە پێويستﯽ داهﺎﺗوودالە پﺎرﺗﯽ ئﺎك شيەوشێوهﺑە تنﺎنەﺗە. كرد رمسۆگە ئیسلام دۆستﯽ وایرمﺎنڕهفە
 .تستبهێنێدهﺑە ستووریده ڕيفۆرمﯽ نجﺎمدانﯽئە ﺑۆ پێويست سێﯽ رسەلە دوو یزۆرينە ﺑتوانێت یوهئە ﺑۆ ﺑێتده
 نﺑده هوئە هێزی و لهە و ﺑگێڕن ڕۆڵە مئە چێتپێده كﺎنكورده خۆرﺑەسە ﺗیەسﺎيەكە ،)پەدهەﺑ( ديمۆكراﺗﯽ و ئﺎشتﯽ پﺎرﺗﯽ
 مێژهلە انوئە. نﺑكە رسەچﺎره ڵگﺎداكۆمە لە يﺎنپێگە و جێگە ﺑە ستيوهپە كﺎنﯽكییەرهسە كێشە یزۆرﺑە وڵات كﺎنﯽكورده ﺑە
 و ڵاتهەڕۆژ ﺑﺎشووری كﺎنﯽكورديیە نﺎوچە لە كﺎنرﺑﺎزيیەسە راسیۆنەئۆپە كۆﺗﺎيیهﺎﺗنﯽ ﺑۆ وهڕوونكردۆﺗە خۆيﺎن خواستﯽ
 زيﺎﺗر. سیﺎسﯽ ئۆﺗۆنۆمﯽ
 دەسئە ڕژێمﯽ رگەئە. ئﺎراوهﺑێتە وێئە كﺎنﯽكورده ﺑۆ لێكهە ندچە يەوانەلە دات،ڕووده سوريﺎ لە یوهﺑە ستنپشتبە ﺑە
 -سوريﺎدا كﺎنﯽئﺎينییە و ئیتنیكﯽ پێكهﺎﺗە نێوانلە ڵاتسەده شیكردنﯽهﺎوﺑە مﺎیﺑنە رسەلە ﺎسﯽسی شوێنێكﯽ و ڕێ ﺑڕووخێت،
 .خشێتﺑەده كﺎنكورده ﺑە ﻗینەڕاستە كﯽيەپێگە گفتوگۆكﺎندا لە - دامسە دوای عیراﻗﯽ یوهئە كروههە
 
 ململانێ ریگەئە
 كﺎنﯽكورده. ئﺎراوه هێنێتەده ململانێ و كێشكێشمە تنﺎنەﺗە و زيﺎﺗر ڵۆزیئﺎ ریگەئە كﺎنكورده ڵكشﺎویهە ریكﺎريگە
 ۆﺑ ندروستبكە فشﺎر یوهئە ﺑۆ كەنﺎوچە كﺎنﯽگۆڕانكﺎريیە لە رگرنسوودوه نﺑڕيﺎرﺑده نگەڕه ڕاستنﺎوه ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهە
 نگﺎوێكهە. ﺑووه كوردی شیعری و گۆرانﯽ كﯽرهەس ﺗﯽﺑﺎﺑە مێكەده زۆر كە خۆرﺑەسە كوردستﺎنﯽ ﺗﯽوڵەده زراندنﯽدامە
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 زوویﺎرهئ و شتويﺎنەچە كﺎنكورده یﺗیﺎنەينەمە و ختﯽسە وئە هۆیﺑە ويشئە نﺎﺑێت كراوڕواننەچﺎوه شتێكﯽ دايەئﺎڕاستە مﺑە
 را.نكەئە و شقديمە و غدادﺑە ڵاﺗﯽسەده لە ڕزگﺎرﺑوون ﺑۆ وانئە
 یراﻗداع كﺎنﯽكورده نێوانلە یوهئە كروههە ،ئﺎراوهﺑێتە دانوێیە هێزه مئە ڵگەلە سیﺎسﯽ ئﺎڵۆزی چێتپێده وهديكە كﯽلايەلە
 كرێتپێب دركﯽ ديمۆكراﺗدا عیراﻗێكﯽ یچوارچێوهلە ﺗوانرێتده كە یوﺗﺎنەستكەده وئە عیراق كﺎنﯽكورده یزۆرﺑە. ڕوويدا
 ﺗﯽدژايە كە كﺎنيیەنﺎوچە هێزه وروژاندنﯽ ﺗرسﯽمە ریگەئە ررامبەﺑەلە وهنەكەده رسەلە ختﯽجە و نرخێننرزدهﺑە
 .نكەده خۆرﺑەسە كوردی ﺗێكﯽوڵەده
 ردوونﯽ.گە ستراﺗیژێكﯽ
 ڵبنێتهە ەكنﺎوچە كﺎنﯽكورده ركﺎريگە زيﺎدكردنێكﯽ يەوانەلە كوردی، ﺗێكﯽوڵەده ﺑۆ نوێ هﺎواری پشتگیريكردنﯽ جیﺎﺗﯽلە
 و تنﺎسێنێده جیهﺎندا ریرانسەسەلە توڵەده كﺎنﯽسنووره گرنگﯽ شێوازه مئە. نﺑكە ويڕهپە" ردوونﯽگە" ستراﺗیژێكﯽ
 ،"نزيك" كوردستﺎنﯽ ﺗﯽوڵەده و ڕووه كﺎركردن. ئﺎﺑووری و ڕۆشنبیری ریستەﺑە دروستكردنﯽ رسەلە وهكﺎﺗەختدهجە
 ﺑە درك كەنﺎوچە كﺎنﯽهێزهﺑە ﺗەوڵەده يﯽﺗوڕه زموونكردنﯽئە ﺑێﺑە نگەڕه گۆڕاو ڕاستﯽنﺎوه ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهە كﺎنﯽكورده
 .نﺑكە كﺎنیﺎنخواستە و هیوا یزۆرﺑە
 كﺎن،ردهكو ﺑۆ ﺑێتده ﺑﺎش شتێكﯽ یوهرئەﺑەلە سﺎنﺎيﯽ ﺑە كنە ن،ندﺑكەسەپە نجﺎمەرئەده مئە پێويستە كﺎنﯽيمﺎنەهﺎوپە و مريكﺎئە
 ستﯽدهﺑە خۆيﺎن شﯽڕه مێژووی رﺑەلە كﺎنكورده چێتپێده. خۆيﺎن كﺎنﯽنديیەوهرژهﺑە ﺑۆ ﺑێتده ﺑﺎش شتێكﯽ وهئە ڵكوﺑە
 ﯽﺗحكومە زيﺎﺗر وانئە چێتپێده دڵسۆزن، موسڵمﺎنﯽ كﺎنكورده یزۆرﺑە كﺎﺗێكدالە. وﺑنمیﺎنڕه نزﺑكەحە كﺎن،وهﺗوندڕه
 ﺑزانن. ترﺑﺎشﺑە لمﺎنﯽعە
 ولە كنكێيە عیراﻗدا، ﺑﺎكووری رسەﺑە مريكﯽئە فڕينﯽ-دژه ینﺎوچە لە ﺑینیوه سووديﺎن سﺎڵ ده لە زيﺎﺗر ﺑۆ كە كﺎن،كورده
 پێشوازی و نكەده ﺑیزنس ﺑە زحە عیراق كﺎنﯽكورده هﺎروههە. مريكﺎنئە دۆستﯽ زۆر كە وڕاستنﺎوه ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهە یلانەگە
 .نكەده ڕۆژئﺎوايﯽ و مريكﯽئە رهێنﺎنﯽﺑەوه لە
 مريكﺎئە يمﺎنﯽهﺎوپە
 ن،ڕڕاپە ﺗﺎران ڕژێمﯽ دژی لە ﺑدات هﺎن ئێران كﺎنﯽكورده سوريﺎ و ﺗوركیﺎ و عیراق كﺎنﯽكورده كﺎنﯽوﺗەستكەده رگەئە
 .ﺑﺎشتره وهئە وائە
 ڕاستنﺎوه ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهە ﺑۆ خۆی نوێﯽ ستراﺗیژی لە كوردی كﯽيەگۆشە ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ ﺑﺎراك یئیداره كﺎتواده مﺎنەئە مووهە
 و غداەﺑ نێوان كﺎنﯽسێرراوهڵپەهە كێشە ركردنﯽسەچﺎره هﺎندانﯽ لە وامبێتردهﺑە مريكﺎئە پێويستە ﺗﺎرهسە. وهجێگﺎﺑكﺎﺗە
 وﺗركردنﯽەپت لە ﺑێتده رﺗیدهيﺎرمە وتنە كﺎنﯽداهﺎﺗە شیكردنﯽهﺎوﺑە ﺑۆ كيﺎسﺎيە ندكردنﯽسەپە تﺗﺎيبەﺑە. عیراق كﺎنﯽكورده
 .وانئە ﺑۆ وڵات كﺎنﯽفراوانە داهﺎﺗە و رچﺎوهسە لە شێكﺑە زامنكردنﯽ ﺑە ويشئە عیراﻗدا یچوارچێوهلە كﺎنكورده یوهمﺎنە
 سیﺎسﯽ ڵاﺗﯽسەده ندێكهە شوهئە و سوريﺎ لە دسەئە دوای سیﺎسﯽ ڕێوشوێنێكﯽ ﺑۆ ﺑێت پشتیوانێك ﺗوانێتده مريكﺎئە م،دووه
 ێكداكﺎﺗلە. ﺑێتده سوودﺑە كﺎنكورده نهﺎﺗە كنە كﺎنسوريیە مووهە ﺑۆ شمەئە و وڵاﺗە وئە كﺎنﯽزۆره پێكهﺎﺗە ﺑە خشێتﺑەده
 ويشئە چێتپێده وائە ،وهێتەمێنده ڵاﺗداسەده لە مﺎنگێك ندچە تنﺎنەﺗە و كيەفتەهە ندچە ﺑۆ كە لمێنێتﺑیسە نگەڕه دسەئە
 .وهﺗەدوورخراونە ڵاتسەده لە وهﺑیەرهعە هﺎریﺑە نلايەلە یركردانەسە وئە لیستﯽ نﺎو ﺑخرێتە
 ﺑۆ درێنده ئێستﺎ یوڵانەهە وئە مووهەلە گرنردهوه سوود فراوان كﯽيەشێوهﺑە كەنﺎوچە و سوريﺎ دێت، ڕۆژه مئە كﺎﺗێ
 كێكدا،رۆسە ڵگەلە يەهە درێژی كﯽنديەيوهپە مريكﺎئە وێلە كە وهنەمەيە یوانەپێچەﺑە. كﺎﺗﯽ سیﺎسﯽ كﯽڕێسﺎيە نﯽداڕشت
 يەئﺎڕاستە مﺑە تهﺎنبدرێ پێويستیشە و وايە ﺗوركیﺎ سوريﺎ، نزيكﯽ يمﺎنﯽهﺎوپە ڵامﺑە ﺑێت، سوريﺎ ڕاوێژكﺎری مريكﺎئە پێنﺎچێت
 كﺎرﺑكﺎت.
 داوڵاﺗە وئە كوردی یمینەكە ڵگەلە رمﯽنە ﺑە ﺑدات ﺗوركیﺎ نوێﯽ ﺗﯽحكومە هﺎنﯽ هێمنﯽﺑە پێويستە مريكﺎئە م،سێیە
 بجەڕه. ردوولاداهە نێوان كﺎنﯽئﺎڵۆزه و ندمەوڵەده نديەيوهپە لە ریوهەجە خﺎڵێكﯽ ﺑكﺎﺗە وجۆرهلە كﯽيەڵەمﺎمە ﺑكﺎت،ڵەمﺎمە
 نوێكﺎن وڵەهە لە پشتگیری مريكﺎئە پێويستە. كورد یكێشە ركردنﯽسەچﺎره پێويستﯽﺑە دانینﺎ ڕاﺑردوودالە ﺎنردۆغئە يبﺗە
 ۆيﺎنخ زمﺎنﯽ ﺑە خوێندن مﺎفﯽ كﺎن،كورده كدارهچە ﺑۆ لێبووردنێك ﺑە تﺑﺎرهسە گونجﺎو رێكﯽسەچﺎره یوهدۆزينە ﺑۆ ﺑكﺎت
 رﺑكرێت.ﺑەستەده ﺗوركیﺎ كوردی رێمﯽهە ﺑۆ زيﺎﺗر خۆيﯽرﺑەەس و ﺑكرێت مراهەفە كﺎنكورده ﺑۆ
 اتیزمپراگم كردنﯽئﺎڕاستە ﺑۆ كﺎرﺑهێنێتﺑە عیراﻗدا كﺎنﯽكورده ڵگەلە خۆی ﺑﺎشﯽ ندیيوهپە ﺗوانێتده مريكﺎئە دواجﺎر،
 يﺎنوهەشیمﺎنكردنپە لە وامبێتردهﺑە مريكﺎئە پێويستە. نگێننسەڵدههە كﺎنﺗییەرێمﺎيەهە نوێیە هێزه كﺎنكورده كﺎﺗێكدالە
 كوردی. ﺗێكﯽوڵەده ﺑە يشتنگە و كردنشەﺑﺎنگە ﺑە تﺑﺎرهسە
 كﺎنەكﺎرهەشرۆڤ خواستﯽ یئﺎوێتە و گۆڕا خێرا ڕاستﯽنﺎوه ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهە ﺑۆ نوێ ستراﺗیژێكﯽ داڕشتنﯽ لە نگئﺎستە ندينچە
 ڵامﺑە ن،ﺑڕوان جیهﺎن لە كﺎنﺗییەوڵەنێوده هێزه چﺎوكردنﯽڕه كنە وهكﺎنەيیەوهﺗەنە ﺗەڵەوده ڕوویلە گشتﯽ كﯽيەشێوهﺑە ﺗﺎكو
 خشرێتﺑبە ڵاتسەده یوهﺑۆئە ﺑبینن لێكهە وانئە يەوانەلە ﺑڕوانن، ﻗلیديﺎنەﺗە متركە كﯽيەشێوهﺑە رانداڕێژه تسیﺎسە رگەئە
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 و ﺎزادیئ و ڕۆژئﺎوا كﺎنﯽنديیەرژوهﺑە و كﺎنكورده ﺗﯽيﺎرمە كە كيەشێوهﺑە مريكﺎئە كﺎنﯽدۆستە و ومیﺎنڕه لەگە لە كێكيە ﺑە





  دیموكراسی بۆ مۆدێلێك ببێتە توانێتده كوردستان
 هاڵفۆن ڕۆبێرت
 
 كﺎنكگرﺗﻭﻭهیە ﻭهﺗەنە ﺑۆچﯽ. ﻭهسڕیەده خشەنە رسەلە كﻭردی دامسە ،ﺑﻭﻭایەنە نداﻭكە مﯽكەیە نگﯽجە رگەئە
 نﺎنﺎسێنێت؟ جینۆسﺎید كﻭﻭه دامسە ﺗﻭندﻭﺗیژی
 گﺎردیﺎن یڕۆژنﺎمە نمﻭﻭنە ﺑۆ". دیمﻭكراسﯽ ﺑۆ نییەئﺎمﺎده" ڕاستنﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهە ﻭﺗراده زۆرجﺎر عیراق نگﯽجە دﻭای
 ﻭا یﻭهەرئﺑەلە ،خەﺑێﺑﺎیە ئﺎرگیﻭمێنﺗێكﯽ مەئە ڵامﺑە ،ڕاسﺗە ﺑۆچﻭﻭنە ﻭئە ﻭهعیراﻗە یﺑﺎرهلە پێیﻭاﺑﻭﻭ دا3002 سﺎڵﯽ لە
 نﯽڕﻭﻭﺑە زۆر كﻭردسﺗﺎن ینمﻭﻭنە ﻭ نین دیمﻭكراسﯽ شﺎیﺎنﯽ ﻭهﺑﺎكگراﻭندیﺎنە هۆیﺑە ڵكخە ندێكهە كە كﺎتپێشنیﺎرده
 .یەڵەهە ندهچە مەئە خﺎتریدهده
 
 ﯽلێكگە ﻭ ﻭڵاﺗێك ڵكﻭﺑە پﺎراست، ﻭهجینۆسﺎیده هۆیﺑە ﻭﺗﺎنفە لە كﻭردی نیﺎﺗە كنە حسێن دامسە ڕژێمﯽ ڕﻭﻭخﺎندنﯽ
 .گۆڕێهێنﺎیە كﻭردسﺗﺎندا یشێﻭه لە ئﺎزادی ﻭ دیمﻭكراﺗﯽ ﻭ خۆرﺑەسە
 
 ردانﯽسە دﻭﻭجﺎر كرد، كﻭردسﺗﺎنیﺎن ردانﯽسە كە ریﺗﺎنیﺎﺑە كﺎنﯽفراكسیۆنە مﻭﻭهە گرﻭﻭپﯽ رۆكﯽسە جێگری كﻭﻭه
 لە خۆرﺑەەس ﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽك یﯽ،نﺎﻭچە ﻗﺎمگیرینﺎسە ڕایرهسە. ﺑینیﻭه جینۆسﺎیدم یﻗینەڕاسﺗە یڵگەﺑە ﻭ كردﻭﻭه كﻭردسﺗﺎنم
 خۆی ﺑە تﺗﺎیﺑە سﻭپﺎی كۆنﺗرۆڵﯽ ﻭ كﺎتردهده خۆی یﺎسﺎی كﻭردسﺗﺎن رێمﯽهە ﺗﯽحكﻭمە. زرێنرادامە دا3002 سﺎڵﯽ
 ﺗری كﺎنﯽشەﺑە یزۆرﺑە یﻭانەپێچەﺑە. داتده خۆی ﺑە تﺗﺎیﺑە ئﺎﺑﻭﻭری ندنﯽشەشەگە نگﺎﻭیهە لە ﺑڕیﺎر ﻭ كﺎتده
 .نییە ﺗێدا ﺗیرۆریسﺗﯽ یﯽڕێژه كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە كﻭردسﺗﺎن ێمﯽرهە ،ﻭهعیراﻗە
 
 ن،ژنﺎ ﺑە تﺑﺎرهسە كسﺎنﯽیە یﺎسﺎ، حﻭكمﯽ ئﺎیینﯽ، یﯽلێﺑﻭرده مﻭڵكدارێﺗﯽ، كﺎنﯽمﺎفە لە ڕێزگرﺗنﯽ هۆیﺑە دﻭاجﺎر
 ﺑە ﺗﻭانرێتده ﻭردسﺗﺎنك رێمﯽهە هێزﺑە سیﺎسﯽ ئۆپۆزسیۆنێكﯽ ﻭ ئﺎزاد كﯽمیدیﺎیە خﻭێندن، ﺑۆ كسﺎنیە یشﺗنﯽسﺗڕاگەده
 .ﺑدرێت مڵەﻗەلە دیمﻭكراسﯽ
 
 :كﺎتجێدهجێﺑە نسیپﺎنەپره ملە ندێكهە ندﺗﺎچە كﻭردسﺗﺎن رێمﯽهە ﺗێﺑینیكردنە شیﺎﻭی
 موڵكدارێتی كانیمافە
 ﻭ ﺎنكمینەكە ﯽپﺎراسﺗن ﺑە تﺑﺎرهسە خۆگرﺗﻭﻭهلە یمﺎدده ندینچە) شنﻭﻭسەڕه هێشﺗﺎ( كﻭردسﺗﺎن سﺗﻭﻭریده شنﻭﻭسﯽڕه
 ﺗێكﯽرینە تنﺎنەﺗە ﻭلێر،هە پﺎرێزگﺎی لە كﺎنسیحییەمە كﯽرهسە كﯽڕهگە نكﺎﻭا،عە لە. كﺎنمﻭڵكدارێﺗییە ﻭ سیﺎسﯽ مﺎفە
 .یەهە مﻭڵكداری پﺎراسﺗنﯽ ﺗﯽﺗﺎیﺑە
 
 ئایینی ییلێبورده
 ﻭ كﺎنﺗﻭركمﺎنە كﻭﻭه ﺗردا كﺎنﯽﺗیەﻭایەﺗەنە مینەكە نﯽكﺎمﺎفە ﺑە دانینﺎﻭه سمﯽڕهﺑە ئێسﺗﺎ كﻭردسﺗﺎن رێمﯽهە مﺎنﯽرلەپە
 ﺑۆ ﺎنكنﺎگەپە ﺗﺎكەلە كێكەیە كﻭردسﺗﺎن ڕاسﺗیدالە. یەهە ﺗیﺎنرایەنﻭێنە ڵﺑژاردنداهە سیسﺗمﯽ لە مﺎنەئە ﻭ كﺎنئﺎشﻭریە
 .داكەنﺎﻭچە لە كﺎنكەجﻭلە ﻭ كﺎنسیحییەمە
 
 ازیﺎنپێشﻭ كﻭردسﺗﺎندا لە ﻭانئە ،ﻭهﻭسێنرێنەچەده ﻭ كﻭژرێنده ئێراندا ﻭ عیراق ریرانسەسەلە كﺎنسیحییەمە كﺎﺗێكدالە





 رێمﯽهە پۆلیسﯽ ڵاﺗدارانﯽسەده ﺗﯽیﺎرمە ریﺗﺎنیﺎﺑە ﻭ نزمە زۆر دراﻭسێ عیراﻗﯽ ﺑە ردكردنراﻭﺑە ﺑە ﺗﺎﻭان ئﺎسﺗﯽ
 سیسﺗمﯽ". انداﺗﺎﻭ ﺑە داننﺎن" ﻗلیدیﺗە ﺗﯽسیﺎسە ﺑە سﺗنپشﺗﺑﺑە یﻭهلە كﻭه ﺑنیﺎﺗﺑنێن زانسﺗﯽ زایﯽشﺎره داﻭه كﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ
 .پﺎراسﺗﻭﻭه ئﺎزادی خۆپیشﺎندانﯽ ﻭ ﻭهكۆﺑﻭﻭنە مﺎفﯽ ﺑیدارهەع هﺎریﺑە یمیﺎنەلە ﻭ خۆیەرﺑەسە كﻭردی ریدادﻭه
 
 ژنان كانیمافە
 ژیﺗﻭندﻭﺗی دژیلە ڕاندﻭﻭهﺗێپە ﺗﻭندی كﯽیﺎسﺎیە ندچە كﻭردسﺗﺎن مﺎنﯽرلەپە دﻭاییﺎنە مﺑە ژنﺎن كﺎنﯽمﺎفە ﺑە تﺑﺎرهسە
 .مداﻭهڵەﻗەلە ﺗﺎﻭان ﺑە مجﺎركەیە ﺑۆ منداڵانﯽ كردنﯽكﺎر ﻭ شﻭﻭدانﺑە زۆرﺑە ﻭ مێینە كردنﯽنەﺗەخە شمەئە. خێزانﯽ
 خوێندن بە ئازاد یشتنیستڕاگەده
 ﻭ فۆكیﻭس كڕێگریە ندچە ڕایرهسە ﻭ ﻭﺗندانپێشكە لە زانكۆكﺎنیش ،دایەﻭهﺑﻭژانە لە كﻭردسﺗﺎن ئﺎﺑﻭﻭری كﺎﺗێكدالە
 ﺑۆ ﻭه%73 لە ﻭه3002 سﺎڵﯽ لە ﻭاریخﻭێندهنە یڕێژه. ﻭێندنخ ﺑﺎشﺗركردنﯽ ﺑۆ یەهە ﻗینەڕاسﺗە كﯽیەﻭهخﺗكردنەجە
 .نەندهلە شﺎری ی1102 سﺎڵﯽ یڕێژه مﺎنهە ینزیكە ﻭاریخﻭێندهنە یڕێژه ئێسﺗﺎ ،زیﻭهداﺑە %61 نهﺎﺗە
 
 گﯽنجە رگەئە ﻭ ﻭهﺗەﺑمﺎیە ڵاﺗداسەده لە دامسە رگەئە. ﺑژی ڕاﺑردﻭﻭدا لە كنە ،فێرﺑﻭﻭه ڕاﺑردﻭﻭ لە ﻭڵاﺗێكە كﻭردسﺗﺎن
 كﺎنﯽشەﺑە نگﺑﻭﻭڕه ﺑﻭﻭایەنە 2991 ﻭ 1991 سﺎڵانﯽ لە كﺎنكﻭرده ﺑۆ كﺎنئﺎرامە نﺎﻭچە درﻭسﺗكردنﯽ ﻭ عیراق مﯽكەیە
 .ﻭهشﺎرنەﺑیﺎن ﻭ ﺑیﺎننێژن رﺑیلدۆزه ﺑە ڵێنیﺎنداﺑﻭﻭﺑە دامسە كﺎنﯽپیﺎﻭه ﻭ داپۆشرایە) عسﺎبئە گﺎزی( ﺑە كﻭردسﺗﺎن ﺗری
 
 ﯽمﺎف داﻭای ﻭ ﺑن ریﺗﺎنیﺎشﺑە لە نگەڕه ﻭ ﺑژین ﻭرﻭپﺎئە لە جینۆسﺎید رانﯽنجﺎمدهئە لە ندێكهە كرێتڕدهﺑﺎﻭه تنﺎنەﺗە
 نلایەلە تﺗﺎیﺑەﺑە ﻭ ﻭهﺗیەﻭڵەنێﻭده ڵگﺎیكۆمە نلایەلە كﺎنكﻭرده جینۆسﺎیدی نﺎمۆ كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە. كردﺑێت رێﺗییﺎننﺎﺑەپە
 .نﺎسراﻭهنە جینۆسﺎید كﻭﻭه ﻭهكﺎنەكگرﺗﻭﻭهیە ﻭهﺗەنە
 
 ﺎیدجینۆس ﺑە كﺎنكﻭرده كﻭشﺗنﯽ ﻭاﻭیﺗە ﺑە پێﻭیسﺗە كﺎنكگرﺗﻭﻭهیە ﻭهﺗەنە جێﺑكرێت،جێﺑە ریرﻭهدادپە یﻭهئە ﺑۆ
 .ﺑنﺎسێنێت
 
 كە نێتیەﻭانﺎگە شﻭهئە ﻭهدڵنیﺎییەﺑە. دیمﻭكراسﯽ ﺑۆ یەئﺎمﺎده ڕاستنﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهە خﺎتریدهده ﺑﯽرهعە هﺎریﺑە
 ەل ڕاستنﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهە ڵكﯽخە ڵامﺑە ﺑێت،ده داڕێگﺎكەلە نﺎئﻭمێدﺑﻭﻭن زۆر داهﺎﺗﻭﻭدا لە ﻭ دیدێﺗە جێسﺗﺑەده مﻭﻭیهە
 .ﻭێتده ئﺎزادیشیﺎن ڵامﺑە ﻭێت،ده نﺎنیﺎن ﻭانئە. نین جیﺎﻭازﺗر ﺗر سێكﯽكە هیچ
 
 ﻭﻭخﺎﺗ ﻭ رگﺎرنە یڤیدده هﺎﻭی،زه نﺎزم مﺎنﺗﺎررلەپە سﻭامس، نیكۆلاس مﺎنﺗﺎررلەپە ڵگەلە مداكەرﺗەپﺎ كۆنفرانسﯽ لە من
 .ڕﻭﻭمەخەده یسەكە مئە ریﺗﺎنیﺎ،ﺑە لە كﻭردسﺗﺎن رێمﯽهە ﺗﯽحكﻭمە ﺑﺎڵای رینﻭێنە حمﺎن،ﺑدﻭلڕهعە سﺎمﯽ یﺎنﺑە
 ڕیمﺎڵپە لە هﺎرلۆ، ڵﺑژاردنﯽهە  ینﺎﻭچەلە یﺎیەریﺗﺎنﺑە مﺎنﯽرلەپە ندامئە: هﺎڵفۆن ڕۆﺑێرت*
 .ﻭهكﺎﺗەﺑڵاﻭده كﺎنﯽﻭﺗﺎره moc.topsgolb.noflahtrebor
 
 نمﯽمە یبﺗە دانﺎ: ﻭهئینگلیزییە لە
 








میرنشینی خشكرد و ئاشكرایكرد كی په) خوله71سمی سوریا فلمێكی دۆكیومێنتاری (فزیۆنی رهلهمدا تهكهكۆتایی مانگی تشرینی یه له
  .یهوت مانگی رابردووی سوریاوهكانی حهڕین و خۆپیشاندانهپشت راپه ر، لهتهنداوی فارس، قهبچووكی كه
ب و رهجیهانی عه وت لهركهك دهیهسات و كێشهكو كارهجارێك وه ر كهتهناوی قه كه دا هاتووهكهتای فیلمهرهسه له
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 وهپشتگیریكردنی بزوتنه دات بهوڵدهن و ههكاو بچووكه ورهگه كێشه داتهردهستوهر دهته. قهوهبێتهموسوڵماندا بڵاوده
ی وهری بۆ خۆی دروستبكات. هاوشانی بڵاوكردنهكان كاریگهكدارهچه ئیسلامیه كان و گروپهوهیاخی و توندڕه
 ش بهكی پێشكهتی دارایی و چهر یارمهتهن "قهمهمیسر و تونس و سودان و یه شوێنانی تر له گێڕی" له"ئاژاوه
كی یهخشهنه شێك لهكو بهنداو وهی كهندهمهوڵهده و وڵاته". ئێستا ئهتی لیبیا كردووهرۆژهه كان لهیاخیبووه وهبزوتنه
  كات.ی سوریا دهڕاستی نوێ" ئیهانهڵاتێكی ناوهبۆ دروستكردنی "ڕۆژهه دوژمنكارانه
. دواجار رژێمی وهشق لێكبدرێتهدیمه كی نائومێد لهتیهركردایهسه یی دڕندانهكو قسهوه یهو شێوهئیدیعای له نگهڕه
كۆپیكردنی  ی بهوهكات بهتباردهكات، تۆمهر پشتیوانی لێدهتهتی قهحكومه واڵهتۆڕێكی هه ، كهزیرهناڵی جهسوریا كه
ی بارهله یهم ههند شتێكی كه. چهوهستوڵبهردا شۆڕشی سوریای ههتهبیابانی قه كانی سوریا لهمایی شارهسینه
  ربخات.ڕینی ئیسلامی دهری و راپهماوهری شۆڕشی جهكو هاندهوه و وڵاتهكات ئهواده كه وهرهتهقه
ئێستا  ر، كهتهو قه نگاوێكی گرنگههه بی بۆ سزادانی سوریا كهرهی عهی جامیعهمدواییهی ئهكهیاندنهڵ راگهگهڵام لهبه
بینین. كانی سوریادا نهرووداوه راستی له شێك لهبه ختهبوو شتێكی سهستی تێداههكات، دهده كهتی جامیعهرۆكایهسه
كانی ماڵه زیرهكاتێكدا جهبووبێت. له 1102كانی ساڵی ڕینهرێكی راپهنها بینهی تهوهله ر دوورهتهڕاستیدا قهله
ن و سوریا بۆمبارانكرد، شێخ یوسف مهكانی تونس و میسر و لیبیا و یهڕینهی راپهوێنه ی بهڕاستڵاتی ناوهرۆژهه
 م پارتهكان زیاتركرد و ئهئیسلامیه نیشێت پشتگیری بۆ پارتهر دادهتهقه لهرزاوی ، زانای ئاینی میسری كهقه
نجامی ئه س زیاتر سوود لهموو كهههله -وهنهكهدهیدهئكته وهكانی تونس و میسر ئهڵبژاردنهكو ههوه-ئیسلامیانه
كو تی وهرێمایهنێكی ههنجومهند ئهری چهبهبه ر رۆحی نوێی كردووهتهگرن. هاوكات قهردهكان وهڵبژاردنههه
كو ند گروپێكی وهتی چهیهدیپلۆماس به رقاڵهمان كاتدا سهههبی، و لهرهی عهنداو و جامیعهنی هاریكاری كهنجومهئه
 یی لهمیشهی ههزراندنی بنكهدامه له وهردوو گروپ بیریان كردۆتهكان ههی راپۆرتهگوێره. ( بهوهماس و تاڵیبانهحه
 ڵگهكانی لهندیهیوههاوكات په تی سوریا كهبۆ حكومه ربووهش بیزاركهوهئهند مانگی رابردودا كهچه ر لهتهقه
  .)شق لاوازبووهدیمه ماس لهتی حهركردایهسه
ڕینی لیبیادا راپه ڵكو هاوشانی ناتۆ له، بهگرتووهدوورنهربازیی خۆی بهردانی سهستێوهده ر لهتهتی قهها حكومهروههه
ڕینی ی راپهوهبۆ دامركاندنه پشتیوانی سعودیه ی بهو هێزانهشداریكرد لهنهێنی بهجێ و بهستبهڕیكرد، و هاوكات دهشه
ب رهر گرنگترین پشتیوانی عهتهقه تاوهرهسهرلهرنج بوو. ههلیبیا جێگای سه ر لهتهشداریكردنی قهین نێردرا. بهحرهبه
. كانیلیشیا لیبیهشقپێكردنی مكانی بۆ مهتهتایبه كان و هێزهنگیهجه ناردنی فڕۆكه ویش بهلیبیا ئه ركی ناتۆ لهئه بوو له
 وهبڵاویكرده مدواییانهی ۆڵ ستریت ژۆرناڵ بهك رۆژنامهروهكانی شكاند، ههكگرتووهیه وهتهمارۆی نهر گهتهڵام قهبه
م ریی ئهكاریگه خته. شتێكی سهكی شۆڕشگێڕانی لیبیا ناردووهیهركردهند سهكی بۆ چهچه ن لهزار تههه 02ی نزیكه
 كانهو چهئه نگهبوو و رهری ههسهفوزیان لهحهكانی ناتۆ تههێزه ندێك لههه مبگرین كهكهبه انهكچه
  زافی.دژی رژێمی قه مینی لهڕی زهشه نوسسازبوبێت لهچاره
 
مین بچووكترین ێك، دووهی ئامارگوێرهكانی خۆی ،بهكدارهچه و هێزه مترهلجیكا كهی بهنیوه ری لهرووبه بۆ وڵاتێك كه
ریان نداو سهپسپۆڕانی كه ت وایكردووهنانهختی وا تهبارودۆخی سه گلان لهڕاستدا، و تێوهڵاتی ناوهرۆژهه له سوپایه
ری ركهستی كار دهتهتی. قهبارگرژی سیاسی پاراستویه له وادیاره كه یهكی ههندییهتمهتایبه ڵهر كۆمهتهسوڕبمێنێت. قه
) و یهمیان ههند مافێكی كهچه كرێكاری كۆچكردوو پێكدێت كه ی لهكهی دانیشتوانهزۆربه ندهرچه( هه نائومێدی نیه
 ی كهكهدانیشتوانهلی كار بهتوانێـت ههبازاڕی جیهانی غازی سروشتی شلدا ده و له یهی فراوانی غازی ههرچاوهسه
ر تهها قهروهخشێت. ههجیهاندا ببه ی تاك لهری داهاتی ساڵانهپێوهران بهزترین ئاستی گوزهربه سهزار كههه 522
بی زههڕوی بارگرژی مهروبه نگهش رهوهئه یهی سوننهكهی دانیشتوانهو زۆربه مهی كهی دانیشتوانی شیعهژماره
  گرێت.ده رچاوهسه وهو سعودیه ینحرهكو بهتانی دراوسێی وهوڵهدهله كه وهبكاته
 
زنی ی مهن پێشبینی بیرۆكهگمهده به ر شوێنێكهتهندی قهمهوڵههۆتێل ده ختی بهری بازرگانی و پایتهنته، سهدۆحه
ر تهنی قهنجای زانیاری راپرسی نوێ گهگوێرهكرێت و بهدیدهن بهگمهده كان بهنیهدهمه یت. رێكخراوهكهسیاسی لێده
ی زۆر زیرهواڵی جهڕای تۆڕی ههرهدیمۆكراسی. سه له یهزوویان ههمترین ئارهبدا كهرهچاو وڵاتانی تری عهله
 مریكی لهربازی فراوانی ئهكی سهیهند بنكهپێشبڕكێی حوشتر و چه له بریتیه كانی دۆحهندیهتمهوتوو، تایبهركهسه
مان هه وهمینههه 91ی دهسه ر لهتهقامگیری دۆستی رۆژئاوا (قهم و سهژاری كهر بۆ ههتهبیاباندا ،ناوبانگی قه
ی تیادا وهكات كۆبونهزدهرێكخراوی بازرگانی جیهانی حه شوێنێك بێت كه كات) وایكردووهوایی دهرمانڕهفه ماڵهبنه
  جیهانی تێدا سازبكات.دا جامی  2202ساڵی  له سازبكات و و فیفا بڕیاریداوه
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ی و ساتهكان. لهڵستیكردنی پێشبینیهرههبۆ به یهكی ههر، خوویهتهمیری قهم، ئهی دووهلیفهد بن خهمهڵام شێخ حهبه
 د لهمهست، شێخ حهدهوایی گرتهرمانڕهركارلابردنی باوكی) فهسهله ڵكو بهوت، بهرێكه ك بهدا (نه 5991ساڵی له
ندی یوهپه یهمشێوهن. بهكی درێژخایهخۆشیهنه جوڵان بۆتهتیایدا نهكه گلاوهدا تێوهكهناوچه دا لهكانهكی زیرهاریهی
بێ ، و بهمریكا بنیاتناوههای ملیارێك دۆلار بۆ ئهبه كی ئاسمانی بهیهڵام بنكه، بهڵ ئیسرائیلدا بنیاتناوهگهئاست نزمی له
ی وهندین مافی نوێ بۆ ژنان، نوسینهنێوانیشیاندا چهله نجامداوهك ریفۆرمی سیاسی ئهیهژماره هیچ فشارێك
وروپا دڵی واشنتۆن و ئهش بهمانهموو ئهدا. و هه 3102ساڵی  مانی لهڵبژاردنێكی پارلهستورێكی نوێ و پلانی ههده
  هابی.و ئیسلامی وه ریعهش یاسای شهوانهله میرنشینی هێناوهكی سیستمی مایهند بنهچه كاتێكدا وازی له، لهبووه
 
 تهحكومه گرتن لهخنهره و ناترسێت له بیهرهواڵی عهتۆڕێكی هه كه -دازیرهكاربوونی جهستبهڵ دهگهمانكاتدا لهههله
 ر جۆرێك لهتهرگرت و قهتی خێرای وهداقیهڕاستدا میسڵاتی ناوهری رۆژههرانسهسهر لهتهمیری قهئه -كانبیهرهعه
 زیرهها تۆڕی جهروه). ههسهبه مهكانی ویكیلیكسدا بۆ ئهنامهڵگهبه ك بهیهوه.( چاوخشاندنهوهوی بردهعنههێزی مه
ند كدارانی ئیسلامی و چهچه رخانكرد بۆخشی تههێزكرد و كاتی پهكاندا بهرادیكاڵه ڵ گروپهگهری لهتهكانی قهندیهیوهپه
رزاوی، زانای فغانستان تا لوبنان و پیشاندانی شێخ یوسف قهكانی ئهكێشه له وهبێتهدرێژده كی سیاسی تر كهتیهسایهكه
  .یهڕاستدا ههڵاتی ناوهرۆژهه ری لهزۆرترین بینه ك كهتیهسایهكو كهژی، وهران دهندهههلهئاینی كه
 
تی دیپلۆماسیه ی خێرای رۆچوون لهمینهر زهتهمیری قهها دۆستی رۆژئاوا و دۆستی ئیسلامدا، ئهوتی وهستكهڵ دههگله
ڵ ئێران و گهوتوێژ له ی كهو وڵاتهكو ئهرگرت وهوشێكی وهخێرایی ره ر بهتهش قهوهیی دا خۆشكرد و بهناوچه
ی وهرئهبهماس، دا بكات. لهرۆكی حهل، سهشعهۆزسیۆنی ئیسرائیل و خالد مهرۆكی ئۆپمریكا و تزیپی لیڤنی، سهئه
كان حیزبوڵایان قایلكرد ریهته.كاتێ قهئارادایهله كهو كێشهروه ی تێگرتنی پارهبژارده میشههه یهداهاتی زۆری غاز هه
دا،  8002ساڵی  كانی تری دۆستی رۆژئاوا لهانیهلوبن نهڵ لایهگهله گرێكوێره مانگ له 81 كۆتایی بهێنێت به
  خشی.باشووری لوبنان به تی بهكو یارمهدان ملیۆن دۆلاریان وهسهكان بهریهتهقه
 
لێك بۆ پیشاندانی نیازی دیمۆكراتی و : ههخۆگرتووهلێكی لهند ههچه 1102كانی ڕینهراپه وهرهتهی قهڕوانگهدواتر، له
درێت. خی پێدهكانی بایهندیهوهرژهی بهوهله وهمانكاتدا دڵنیابونهههتی و لهوڵهڵگای نێودهر بۆ كۆمهتهقهدیپلۆماسی 
بۆ  ڕۆیشتووهر بۆ شۆڕشگێڕان نهتهكانی قهشێكی زۆری هاوكاریهبه ، كهكو لیبیا روون نیهك وههیچ كوێیهله مهئه
ڵ گهندیان لهیوهپه كه رۆیشتووه و ئیسلامیانهوخۆ بۆ ئهكی راستهیهشێوهڵام بهبه نی نیشتمانی كاتی،نجومهخودی ئه
یكرد بۆ رزاوی قسهك قهدوای روخانی موبارهند رۆژێك لهچه میسریش روون بوو، كه له مهڵام ئه، بهیهدا ههدۆحه
هێزكردنی پشتگیری بۆ ر بۆ بهتهی قهم پایزهكانی ئهوڵههه ها لهروهحریر و ههیدانی تهمه س لهزار كهدان ههسه
  ماس.ی حهوهبزوتنه
 
دا كهناوچه ی داهاتوو لهورهكو هێزی گهوه نگهكانی رهبرایانی موسوڵمان و لقه گات كهیی تێدهكراوه ر بهتهقه
شق دیمه ی سوننی سوریا لهكانی گرێدراوی زۆرینهئاینیه پارته نگهد بڕوخێت رهسهر رژێمی ئهگهون، ئهربكهده
كرێت و زۆر پشتگیریان لێده وهنداوهتانی كهوڵهن دهلایهله مێژهله وانهم بزوتنهئه ها راستهروهس بهێنن، ههرههه
  ر و دراوسێكانی بێت.تهدڵی قهبه ر كهبهتێك بگرنهند سیاسهچه چێت كهرێیتێده
 
بۆ  وهینهحرهناو خاكی بهنداو چوونهتانی كهوڵهی دهوهكی كورت لهیهدوای ماوه پێكردنهجێگای ئاماژه هبۆنموون
ی وهك ئهوه ریهگهفهین زیاتر تایهحرهڕینی بهیاند راپهرزاوی رایگه، شێخ قهو وڵاتهپاراستنی رژێمی سوننی ئه
  ران پیشاندا.دژی خۆپیشاندهت لهی حكومهركوتكردنی دڕندانهنی بۆ سهش پشتگیری ئایوهری بێت و بهماوهجه
ڵام خات، بهردهب دهرهكانی عهر بۆ شۆڕشهتهئامێزگرتنی قهكانی لهترسیهیندا مهحرهبه ردان لهستێوهده وهدڵنیاییهبه
 ك لهیهبۆ نوخبه كه زیرهشی ئینگلیزی تۆڕی جهبه روماڵی فراوانی به وهگرتن كپكرایهخنهین رهحرهبه ت لهنانهته
ی راپۆرتی وهبڵاوكردنه كو خۆی لهوه كهبی تۆڕهرهشی عهی بهوانهپێچهكات، و بهخشدهتی پهوڵهری نێودهبینه
وا ، ئهوجۆرهوازێكی لهشێگێڕانی رۆڵی دووفاقی به وامبێت لهردهر بتوانێـت بهتهر قهگه. ئهڵبژێرراو پاراستووههه
  ب.رهكانی جیهانی عهریهماوهجه كانی شۆڕشهندهسوودمه رههه كێك لهیه نداو بكاتهدیمۆكراتی كه ی دژهناوچه نگهره
 
  نمییب مه: دانا تهوهئینگلیزییهله
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 كۆرﺑیس: فۆﺗۆ - كﻭردسﺗﺎن رۆژئﺎﻭای لە ﻗﺎمیشلۆ شﺎری لە كﺎنكﻭرده ریﯽمﺎﻭهجە كﯽیەﻭهكۆﺑﻭﻭنە
 -ندانخە
 
 ڕۆژئﺎﻭ ﻭردیک پﺎرﺗێکﯽ ریﯽکﺎریگە زیﺎدﺑﻭﻭنﯽ یرﺑﺎرهده ﻭهرهنقەئە ﺗﯽحکﻭمە ﺗﯽسیﺎسە ﺑە دیﺎره ئﺎشکرا کﯽرانییەنیگە
 ﺑﺑێﺗە ﺑﺎرﻭدۆخە مەئ کە ﺗرسنده ﻭهلە ﻭڕدانشە لە دارهنقەئە ڵگەلە کە  كﻭردسﺗﺎن كرێكﺎرانﯽ پﺎرﺗﯽ ﺑە یەهە ندییﻭهپە کە ا
 . کﻭردسﺗﺎن ﻭریﺑﺎکﻭ لە کﻭرد یکێشە ریسەچﺎره ﻗﻭرسکردنﯽ زیﺎﺗر هۆی
 
 ێﻭهش ﺗﺗرینلامەسە ﺑە  ڕۆژئﺎﻭا کﻭردانﯽ د،سەئە شﺎرﺑە دژی کﺎنﯽپێکﺎدانە ﻭ خۆپیشﺎندان ڕاﺑردﻭﻭی مﺎنگﯽ 61 یمﺎﻭهلە
 ﻭئە زمﻭﻭنکردنﯽئە ﻭ خۆیﯽرﺑەسە سﺗهێنﺎنﯽدهﺑە ﺑۆ یەهە کﺑﻭارێ کە دانڕهﺑﺎﻭه ﻭلە ئێسﺗﺎش ﻭ ڕیﻭنﺗێپە پێیدا
 رسەەل دانﺎنﯽ ﻭ کﻭردسﺗﺎن ئﺎڵای کﺎنﯽﻭێنە ئێسﺗﺎش ،یﺎنەهە عیراق كﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ رێمﯽهە لە کﺎنکﻭرده کە یخۆییەرﺑەسە
 لە ﻭای ﻭ کﺎنﺗﻭرکیە میدیﺎ گرنگﯽ کﯽﺑﺎسێ ﺗەﺑﻭﻭه رۆژئﺎﻭاﻭه کﻭردانﯽ نلایەلە یﻭهکﺎندنەشە ﻭ کﺎنحکﻭمییە زگﺎده
 کﺎنﯽیەﺗیسﺎیەکە ،یەهە دانﺎﻭچﺎنە ﻭلە خۆرﺑەسە رێمێکﯽهە درﻭسﺗﺑﻭﻭنﯽ ریگەئە ﺑڵێن کە کردﻭﻭه كەﺑﺎرﻭدۆخە چﺎﻭدێرانﯽ
 ﻭﻭهەﺗکشﺎندﻭﻭه کەسەحە ﻭ بلەحە کﺎنﯽنﺎﻭچە لە کﺎنﯽهێزه دسەئە شﺎرﺑە ڵین،ده سﻭریﺎ کﺎنﯽکﻭرده ئۆپۆزسیۆنە پﺎرﺗە
 پﺎرﺗﯽ ڵگەەل ندییﻭهپە ﺑﻭﻭنﯽ ﺑە مﺎنئە کە ،جێهێشﺗﻭﻭهﺑە) دهیەپە(دیمﻭکراﺗﯽ کێﺗﯽیە پﺎرﺗﯽ ﺑۆ ینﺎﻭچﺎنە ﻭئە کۆنﺗڕۆڵﯽ
 ژێر لە ﺎئێسﺗ ،عﺎمﻭﻭده دێرک، عفرین، کﻭﺑﺎنﯽ، کﺎنﯽشﺎره کﺎنﻭاڵەهە پێﯽﺑە رهە کرێن،ده ندنﺎﻭزه کﻭردسﺗﺎن کرێکﺎرانﯽ
 .دیمﻭکراﺗیدان کێﺗﯽیە پﺎرﺗﯽ کۆنﺗڕۆلێ
 
 کﺎنﯽخۆپیشﺎندنە یﻭهدامرکﺎندنە هﺎرﻭههە ﻭ دسەئە شﺎرﺑە کﺎنﯽهێزه هﺎﻭکﺎریﯽ ﺑە دهیەپە کﺎن،ئۆپۆزسیۆنە سﻭرییە پﺎرﺗە
 نﺎسراﻭی کﯽﺗییەسﺎیەکە کە مۆدا،ﺗە لشعەمە کﻭشﺗنﯽ لە ﺗیشﺗﺎیﺑەﺑە ن،کەده ﺗﺑﺎرﺗۆمە دسەئە یکەﺗەحکﻭمە دژی لە  ڕۆژئﺎﻭا
 کﯽەندیییﻭهپە هیچ ﻭهکﺎﺗەﺗیدهڕه ﻭ داتده مڵەﻗەلە نﺎڕاست ﺑە ﻭاڵانەهە مئە مﻭﻭهە دهیەپە ڵامﺑە ﺑﻭﻭ،   کﻭردسﺗﺎن ڕۆژئﺎﻭای
 .ﺑێتهە ﻭهشە)کەکەپە( ﺑە
 
 رپرسێکﯽﺑە ڵامﺑە ،ﺑڕیﻭهرنەده دهیەپە یرﺑﺎرهده خۆیﺎن ڵﻭێسﺗﯽهە ﻭرکیﺎﺗ رپرسﺎنﯽﺑە سمﯽڕه کﯽیەشَیﻭهﺑە ﺗﺎئێسﺗﺎ ندهرچەهە
 ریگەەئ لە سﻭریﺎی نیشﺗمﺎنﯽ نﯽنجﻭمەئە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ، یﻭهرهده زیریﻭه ئۆغلۆ داﻭد کە یﺎند،رایگە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ یﻭهرهده ﺗﯽزارهﻭه
 .ﻭهﺗەکردﻭﻭه ئﺎگﺎدار نﺎﻭخۆ ڕیشە هﺎرﻭههە ﻭ ریگەﺗﺎیفە ڕیشە
 
 لە یەەه ﺗرسﺗﺎن ئﺎیﺎ" یپرسیﺎره ﻭئە ڵامﯽﻭه لە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ زیرانﯽﻭه نﯽنجﻭمەئە رۆکﯽسە جێگری ڵای،ﺗەئە شیرﺑە هﺎرﻭههە
 ﻭﻭدڵد جۆرێک هیچﺑە ﻭانئە :یﺎندرایگە ،"دا؟نﺎﻭچﺎنە ﻭلە خۆیﯽرﺑەسە یﺎندنﯽراگە یﺎخﻭد کﻭردسﺗﺎن ئﺎڵای یﻭهرزکردنەﺑە
 داﺎﻭچەن ندێکهە لە: "ﻭﺗﯽ ﻭ کردﺑێت کﺎنیﺎننﺎﻭچە یزۆرﺑە کۆنﺗڕۆلﯽ کﺎنکﻭرده گﻭایە کە ﻭهﺗکردهڕه یﻭاڵانەهە ﻭئە ﻭ نین
 ."نییە ﺗییﺎنﻭاﻭهﺗە کۆنﺗرۆڵﯽ ڵامﺑە یە،هە ﺑﻭﻭنیﺎن
 
 نﺎﺑێت کە رکردﻭﻭهده ﻭاﻭیﺎنﺗە ێنمﺎیﯽڕ ﻭانئە کە یﺎند،رایگە سﻭریﺎ، نیشﺗمﺎنیﯽ نﯽنجﻭمەئە رۆکﯽسە یدا،سە ﺑدﻭلﺑﺎستعە
 .سﻭریﺎ کﯽڵخە یپێکهﺎﺗە لە شێکنﺑە کﺎنیشکﻭرده ڵﺑکرێت،چﻭنکەهە دیكە کﯽئﺎڵایە هیچ ئﺎزاد سﻭریﺎی ئﺎڵای لە ﺑێجگە
 
 ﻭلە سﻭڕمﺎﻭه ریسە زۆر رهنقەئە: "ﻭه،کردﺑﻭﻭه ﺑڵاﻭی رادیکﺎڵدا یلﯽده لە کە ﺗﻭرك نﻭﻭسێكﯽرۆژنﺎمە کﺎنﯽﻗسە پێﯽﺑە
 ﺑە ﺑﺎرﻭدۆخە مئە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ کە شلێت،ده هﺎرﻭه،هە"نکەده ی)کەکەپە( لە سﻭریﺎ کﻭردی ڵکﺎنﯽخە کە یپشﺗگیرییە
  ﺗﺎنکﻭردس رۆژئﺎﻭای ئێسﺗﺎی یﺑﺎرﻭدۆخە ﻭئە یﻭهئە ﺑۆ نﺎﻭه نگﺎﻭێکﯽهە ندچە ﻭ گﺎتﺗێده ﺗرسیدارمە ندنێکﯽسەشەگە
 .ﺗﻭرکیﺎ لە کﻭرد یکێشە زیﺎﺗری یﻭهﻗﻭڵﺑﻭﻭنە هۆی ﺑێﺗەنە
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 کﻭردسﺗﺎن رێمﯽهە رۆکﯽسە ﺑﺎرزانﯽ سعﻭدمە لە هﺎﻭکﺎریﯽ داﻭای کە یەﻭهئە ﺗﻭرکیﺎﻭه ستدهﺑە چﺎرهڕێگە ﺗﺎکە: ڵێتده
 ﻭڵﯽهە ﻭ دسەئە شﺎرﺑە ردنﯽلاﺑ داﻭای رهنقەئە یﺎن ڕۆژئﺎﻭا، کﺎنﯽکﻭردییە پﺎرﺗە رسە ﺑخﺎﺗە فشﺎر زیﺎﺗر یﻭهئە ﺑۆ ﺑکﺎت
 . کﺎنکﻭردییە پﺎرﺗە ڵگەلە ﺑدات ندیﯽیﻭهپە ﻭکردنﯽپﺗە
 
 ﻭپێشرهەﺑ رێمداهە ﺗﯽﻭحکﻭمە ﺑﺎرزانﯽ ڵگەلە کﺎنﯽندییەیﻭهپە دﻭاییدا ییەمﺎﻭه ملە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ رز،ڕۆیﺗە یکەڕاپۆرﺗە پێﯽﺑە
 .نێﻭانیﺎندالە یەﻭزه ﻭ ﺑﺎزرگﺎنﯽ ﺑﻭاری ﻭپێشﺑردنﯽرهﺑە رسەلە چﺎﻭیﺎن ئێسﺗﺎ ﻭﺑردﻭﻭه
 
 ندامﯽئە ئینجە، مرهمﻭحە سﺗەﺑەمە مﺑۆئە یە،هە خۆیﺎن یﻗسە کﺎنداپێشهﺎﺗە دﻭایینلە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ کﺎنﯽئۆپۆزسیۆنە پﺎرﺗە
 ﺗﯽەﻭڵده شکەﺗەﻭڵەده ،یەڕێﻭهﺑە کﻭردی نﻭێﯽ ﺗێکﯽﻭڵەده :یﺎندﻭﻭهگە ڕای)پەهەجە( کۆمﺎری لﯽگە پﺎرﺗﯽ ﺗﯽرکردایەسە
 .سﻭریﺎیە کﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ
 
 یکێشە رسەلە خۆی ڵﻭێسﺗﯽهە داکﺎﺗە ملە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ ﺑێتده: یﺎندڕایگە ﺗﻭركیﺎ ﺑﻭاری لێكۆڵیﺎرێكﯽ داگل، ئیحسﺎن هﺎرﻭههە
 فﺗﻭگۆگ کەکەپە ڵگەلە نیﺎزﺑﻭﻭنﺑە ڕۆژێک رﺑڕیﻭه،ده جیﺎﻭازی ڵﻭێسﺗﯽهە جﺎر ندینچە یپێیە ﻭﺑە ،ﻭهڕﻭﻭنﺑکﺎﺗە کﻭرد
 مﺎندازه یلﯽده یڕۆژنﺎمە لە کە ییەگۆشە ﻭئە یمیﺎنەلە هﺎرﻭههە. داﻭه نجﺎمئە پۆلیسﯽ شێﻭه ﺗێکﯽسیﺎسە ڕۆژێک ﻭ نﺑکە
 رگەئە ﺑێتده درﻭست داکەنﺎﻭچە لە کﻭردی ئۆﺗۆنۆمﯽ رێمێکﯽهە ڵێتده" کﻭردی؟ رێمێکﯽﺑۆهە نئﺎمﺎده ئێﻭه" نﻭﻭسیﺑﻭﻭی
 .ئﺎرادایە لە كﺎنكﻭرده ﺑۆ خۆرﺑەسە کﯽڕۆژئﺎﻭایە ریگەئە هﺎرﻭههە ﺑڕﻭﻭخێت، دسەئە
 
 ﺑۆ ییەن ﻭنێکخە چیﺗر ﻭرهگە کﻭردسﺗﺎنێکﯽ ،گۆڕاﻭه داکەنﺎﻭچە لە کﻭرد سیﺎسﯽ یخشەنە: "ڵێتده شیداکەنﻭﻭسینە لە
 سﻭریﺎدا کﻭﻭه کراﻭیڕﻭاننەچﺎﻭه شﻭێنێکﯽ لە خۆرﺑەسە رێمﯽهە مکەیە چێتده ﻭهلە" شڵێتده ،".کﻭردان یزۆرﺑە
 ."ﺑﺑیسﺗین
 








 ربریده  داو وڵاتەئە یكەتیەرۆكایەسە ڵبژاردنەهە لە ن روحانیسەحە وتنیركەر سەرامبەخۆیان بە ستیكان هەكاتێكدا ئێرانیەلە
 كە چێده وه،لە بووه وێنە رابردودا بێ ند ساڵیچە لە جۆرێك كە نگیان گێرا بەئاهە وهیەو بۆنەكان و بەقامەر شەسە رژانە و
  .بێ گۆرێ لە ریفۆرمیستی شۆرشی جۆرێك لە
 
 پڵەچە پۆپ وژنانیش بە مۆسیقای ر ئاوازیسەما كردن لەسە هۆرن لێدان وپیاوان بە كان بەوڵاتدا ،شۆفێره ریرانسەسە لە
 ڵ جیهانیگەباشتر لە كیندییەیوهزیاتر و پە ئازادیی دیی گێرا بۆ هێنانەیان ده رێز روحانیبە كانیڵێنەبە نگیرێزان ئاهە
  دا. وهرهده
 
گرنگ   لاوهیان زۆر بەوهئێرانیش ئە كانیركرده،و سە ەخت نییرسەسە ساڵ ،ریفۆرمخوازێكی 46ن مەتە رێز روحانیڵام بەبە
توڵا ئایە یوهرلەت بەنانە،تە راندووهكاندا گوزهموحافیزكاره یزراوهدامە یرگەناوجە لە سیاسیی ردا ،ژیانیرامبەبە.لە نیە
رێز بە یپێشینە لە تیویەولەڵێن ئەكان دهرهبكا. شیكە ریبەشتادا راهە ساڵانی لە یكەئیسلامیە شۆرشە ینیروحوڵڵا خومە
 كیگۆرانكارییە نجامدانیك ئە،نەبێئێران ده تی و هاوڵاتیانیركردایەنێوان سە گرژو ئاڵۆزی ندیییوهپە یوهچاككردنە روحانی
  زن.مە
 
 تییركردایەسە ندییوهرژهبە ك پراگماتیستێك لەوه تیگێراویە یو رۆلەلە ەگوزارشت -دیپلۆماسی شێخی- شیكەت نازناوهنانەتە
 دا یاخود لەكەرهماڵوێرانكە رزهلەبومە ساتیكاره خوێندكارانداو لە ڵ خۆپیشاندانیگەكرنیدا لە ڵەمامە ئیسلامیدا.جا چ لە
  083
وام بوو ردهكاتێكدا ئێران بەكان ، لەتیەوڵەنێوده گوشاره بۆ سوك كردنی كانیوڵە،وهە تۆمیئە ك وتووێژكارێكییدا وهكەركەئە
 دیهێنانیپێناو بەلە پراكتیكی كییەیەچارهرێگە یوهكرد بۆ دۆزینەده كاری رێز روحانی،بەیكەتۆمیەئە رنامەر بەسەلە
  یدا. كەتیەركردایەسە كانیئامانجە
 
لاویدا بوو،  تافی ئێران لە یوهناوه یبۆ ناو بازنە نگاویم هەكەلاَم یە، بەریالیست ناسراوه سێكیكە بە كە ندهرچەهە
  ست پێكرد.ك دهركێشیەسەبە شیكەنگاوههە
و سالاَن بووه 81 نیمەتە یمەودهكات ئەده خۆی ترسیداریمە رێكیفەسە باس لە رێز رۆحانیكانیدا، بەرییەوهبیره لە
تووڵلا َئایە بۆ دیداری وهعێراقە ناو سنوری كردۆتە یچۆن دزه كە وهیگێرێتە. دهبووه ئایینی كییەخوێندنگە خوێندكاری
  بینرێت. نە باشیدا بەكەاو ئوتۆمبێلەننێت، تا لەداكە ریسە یكەمامەعە لێكردووه داوای كەنفا، و قاچاخچیەمە لە ینیخومە
 
 یوهبوو لەلاو دوو دڵ نە لاَم رۆحانی، بە وهكردهت دهیان رهوجۆرهلە كیش داوایەشیعە ئایینی ت دۆگماترین پیاوانینانەتە
  .وهبكاتە ریسە لە یكەسپیە مامەجێ عەستبەده
 
  ش گرنگ بوو)وه، ئەجێ یشتینەگە تیلامەسە: (بە تینوسیوێ وهیەو بارهلە رۆحانی
  و پێشچووندا.رهبە ی رێست لەربەبە ببێتە رگیز ئایدۆلۆژینابێت هە كات كەده وهبە كانیدا، ئاماژهرییەوهبیره ر لەهە
 
  ڵیدا بوو.گەنسا لەرهفە لە ڕێز رۆحانی، بەنفامە لە ینیتووڵلا َخومەئایە كانیدوایین مانگە دا، لە9791ساڵی لە
 
مریكا بكڕێت، تا پشتیوانی ئە ك لەنابێت ئێران چە كە رز كردبۆوهیان بەوهئە س دروشمیندێك كەنووسێت: ( هەده وهیەوبارهلە
مۆدێرن  كیچە لۆجیایكنەتە ین لەحروم بكەمە نابێ خۆمان لاَم من پێم ووتن كەین، بەكەنە و وولاَتەئە كیسازیی چەپیشە لە
  ).م هێنراوهرهەمریكا بەئە لە كە یوهرئەبەرلەهە
 
 زراوهی دامەو باڵەر بەسە ڕێز رۆحانیخۆیان، بە تیسیاسە مایبنە ئێران ئیسلامیان كردۆتە كانیركردهكاتێكدا سە لە
  تر بێت.  ئیسلام داینامیكی پێویستە وایە پێی كە یەكەئایینیە
 
 یوهئە یگوێره، بەهێناوه ستیدهندا بەسكۆتلە گلاسكۆی زانكۆی لە 7991ساڵی  ستووریدا كەده قانونی یدا لەتێزی دكتۆراكە لە
 تەو مرونە. ئەت ) بووهریعەشە تی( مرونە نیناونیشابە یكەتە، بابەی خۆیدا نووسراوهكەوێبسایتە یدا لەكەیە سی ڤی لە كە
 یناوچە ردانیسە ڕێز رۆحانیبوو كاتێك بە ستەرجەبە باشی دا زۆر بە3002ساڵی  ر ئایدۆلۆژیادا لەرامبەبە لە شیپراگماتیە
و ئە رایرهبوو. سە ییوهتەنە ئاسایشی بالاَی نیومەنجئە سكرتێری یمەو دهكرد، ئە م)ی(بە لیدراوی رزهلەبومە ساتباریكاره
ڕێز ت بەنانەوتن دابنێن، تەفریاكە كییەخۆشخانەكاندا نەمریكیەئە ی بەبوو، ئێران رێگەمریكادا هەڵ ئەگەی لەو ئاڵۆزییە گرژی
كات ده خۆی شتێكیگە باس لە ڕێز رۆحانیكاندا گرت. بەمریكیەئە ڵ پزیشكەگەلە كیشییەند وێنەكردن و چە ردانیشیرۆحانی سە
 كە بووه ریفەخۆی هاوڕێی سە دۆستی ئایینی ، پیاوێكییشتەو گەئە درێژایی دا. بە7691ساڵی  ر لەفەندهمەشە سواری بە
  . ەئینەلی خامەتوڵلا َعەئایە ست رۆیشتوویرۆكی ئۆفیسی دهئێستا سە
 
  . ولاَتە گشتی ئێستا داواكاری كە دا بووهرهفەندهمەو شەناو ئەرلەتریش هە سێكیكە
 كە ئێرانە پێشووی رۆكیسە نجانیفسەره ر هاشمیكبەئە لیشۆرشدا عە ر لەسالاَنی بەلە تری ن نفوزیخاوه كیهاوڕێیە
  .تیرۆكایەمواركرد بۆ سەمدا هەردهبەلە دا رێ یەڵبژاردنم هەلە لێی پشتیوانیكردنی
 
  .ئێران بووه ئایینی پیاوانی ڵاتیسەده یكەبچوكە ناو بازنە سێكیكە كە یو پیاوهئە یژیاننامە ك بوو لەیەكورتە مەئە
 . لەوهرز َبۆتەبە خێراییبە ڕێز رۆحانیبە ختیبە یستێره، ئەكانیتینەبە ندییەیوهو پە سیاسیی بۆ ئیسلامی ر دڵسۆزییبەلە
، كردووه ئێران كاری مانیپارلە ساڵ لە 02 ی، ماوهعێراق بووه -ئێران نگیجە بونیادی رۆكیسە شتادا جێگریهە سالاَنی
  ن.و ولاَتەئە كانیست رۆیشتووهده زراوهدامە موویان لەهە ئێراندا، كە ئاسایشی نینجومەئە ساڵیش لە 61 یماوه
 
یش تیایدا نەتوڵلا َخامەو ئایە نجانیفسەڕێز رهبە ك لەریەهە تاران، كە لە ستراتیژیە یوهلێكۆڵینە ندیناوه رۆكیئێستاش سە
 لە روحانی خا كەردهده وهئە یكەژیاننامە ریفۆرمخوازهدارێكی تمەسیاسە راد كە شاخوری لیعە یوتە . بە كرێراوێژیان پێ ده
 ڵێت راستییها دهروهئیسلامی ئێران. هە كۆماری بە تكردن بووهخزمە وئامانجیشی ئێراندا بووه سیاسیی لاَتیسەده ندیناوه
  .كرێلێ ده واویتە وانیپشتی وهن ئێمەلایەلە لمێنێت كەیسەده ڵبژێردراوههە كە یوهئە
 
 وولاَت لە كانیكێشە كە وهدووپاتیكردۆتە ڕێز رۆحانیرۆك بەسەبە ڵبژاردنیهە م لێدوانیدا دوایكەیە ، لەممەكشەیە رۆژی
كاندا رماندهئایینی و فە وانیكان و پیازگا حكومیەڵ دام و دهگەلە كە كردووه وهبە یر ناكرێن، وئاماژهسەوو رۆژێكدا چارهشە
  كات. و راوێژیان پێ دهوهبێتەكۆده
  183
 
، مۆدێرنە ئایینی و پیاوێكی: ئەڵێكا دههار) دا كار ده(بە ریفۆرمخوازی یرۆژنامە لە ساڵان كە 13ن مەتە رهادیانیسروش فە
  .وهرهناوخۆو ده تیبۆ سیاسە سوودهو بەدیپلۆماتكاره
 
 ڵام وڵاتانیدا،بە 4002 ساڵی یۆرانیۆم لە یخشانەخۆبە ساردنیڵپەهە یلەسەمەلە گێراوه تییرهبنە دیپلۆماتكار رۆڵێكی خیشێ
  ئێران كرد. زیاتیان لە خۆراوا داوای
كاندا وتووێژه لە توندتری ڵوێستێكیران هەئێ تییركردایەسە وهو كاتەم درا،و لەڵەقەشكست لە بە نگاوهو هەناو ئێراندا ئەلە
  ر.بە گرتۆتە
 
 تینوسیویە تۆمیئە ك دانوستكارێكیوه ڵوێستیهە یربارهده ) كەتۆمیئە تیدیپلۆماسیە ییوهتەنە یدا: (ئاسایشیكەكتێبە لە
 لە هاتووه دیدا بەتۆمیەئە رنامەو بەلە یدراماتیكیانە ێشچوونەوپرهو بەموو ئەهە ڵێكاودهده خۆیلە داكۆكی رێز روحانیبە
كاندا تیەوڵەنێوده ڵ گوشارهگەدروست لە یڵە: توانیمان مامەنووسێده وهیەو بارههاتوون.لە دیدا بەساردنەڵپەو هەئە كاتی
  پاراست.  ناوخۆییشمان كریزییەمان كاتدا یهەبوو و لەهات زیاتر دهتا ده ین كەبكە
 
 
  : تۆماس ئێردبرینك نوسینی
  بدوڵڵا:ئاوات عە رگێرانیوه  












 ،كەڕاپۆرﺗە رۆكﯽنﺎﻭه شێكﯽﺑە كردنﯽدزه ﺗﺎیرهسە ڵگەلە ر،ﺑﺎلمە یكەڕاپۆرﺗە یﻭهﺑڵاﻭﺑﻭﻭنە پێش زۆر كﯽیەمﺎﻭه
 یﻭهكردنەﺑڵاﻭنە داﻭای ڵگەلە ئﺎشكراكرا، لێﺑﻭردن داﻭای ﺑۆ ئیسرائیل لە ﺗﻭركیﺎ داﻭای یﻗینەڕاسﺗە هۆكﺎری
 یداﻭاكە رسەلە ڕازییە ﻭهرهكلاكەیە كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە رﺑﺎلمە یكەڕاپۆرﺗە كە ﻭهڕﻭﻭنﺑﻭﻭه ﻭكﺎتئە ،كەڕاپۆرﺗە كﺎنﯽنجﺎمەئە
 ﺗێدا ﯽشﻭهئە ڵكﻭﺑە ندهﻭهئە رهە كنە ،ززهغە رﺗﯽەك رسەلە یكەریﺎییەده ئﺎﺑڵﻭﻗە یﺎسﺎییﺑﻭﻭنﯽ ﺑە ستیﻭهپە ئیسرائیل
 ﻭهرﺑە ڕهڕمەمە شﺗﯽكە ﺑە كﺎنﻭهﺗﻭندڕه چﺎلاكﻭانە رچﻭﻭنﯽده لە ڕێگرﺗن ﺑۆ كردﻭﻭهنە پێﻭیسﺗﯽ كﺎری ﺗﻭركیﺎ هﺎﺗﻭﻭه
 ێﺑﻭردنێكل داﻭای ﺑﺗﻭانن كەڕاپۆرﺗە یﻭهﻭنەﺑڵاﻭﺑﻭ دﻭای كە نییە كیەگریمﺎنە هیچ شكردﻭهﺑە دركیﺎن كﺎنﺗﻭركە ئیسرائیل،
 شمەئە فشﺎره ﻭەﺑ ررامﺑەﺑە ڕاگرت خۆی ئیسرائیل ڵامﺑە سﺗپێكرد،ده سیﺎسییﺎن هێرشێكﯽ ﺑۆیە سﺗﺑێنن،دهﻭه ئیسرائیل لە
 .ﺑكﺎت لێﺑﻭردن داﻭای ئیسرائیل كە ﺑﻭﻭنە كهۆیە هیچ چﻭنكە خراپﺑﻭﻭ، مهە ﻭ ﺑﺎش مهە شﺗێكﯽ
 
 اﻭیڕێكخرﺑە ﺗﻭركﯽ ﺗﯽحكﻭمە ندییﻭهپە كﺎﺗێك ﺑۆیﺎن كردی رﺑﺎلمە یلیژنە یزڵەفە ﻭﺑە ﺑن منﻭنمە ﺑێتده كﺎنﺗﻭركە
 كﺎﺗﯽلە كردﺑﻭﻭ ردۆغﺎنﯽئە ﺑە شپێشكە ڕێكخراﻭه ﻭئە یﺗیﺎنەیﺎرمە ﻭئە زیﺎﺗر شﻭهلە پشﺗگﻭێخست، HHI
  كەڕاپۆرﺗە كیەخنەڕه رهە چﻭنكە ،ڕﻭﻭنە كەڕاپۆرﺗە كۆﺗﺎیﯽ نجﺎمﯽئە شداﻭهئە ڵگەلە خست، پشﺗگﻭێ كﺎنداڵﺑژاردنەهە
 .دایەلەسەمە ﻭلە ئیسرائیل ڵﻭێسﺗﯽهەﺑە ڕازییە ڵامﺑە ئیسرائیل، سﻭپﺎی كﺎری رسەلە یﺑێتهە
 ﺗﻭركیﺎ چﻭنكە ،هﺎﺗﻭﻭه ﺗﻭركیﺎ ﺑە تﺑﺎرهەس داكەڕاپۆرﺗە لە كە یەﻭرهگە ﻭ ﻗﻭرس زۆر شﺗییەسﻭﻭكﺎیە ﻭئە ئﺎسﺗﯽ
 ئیسرائیل كردﻭﻭه یﻭهئە ئیدیعﺎی كردﻭﻭه ﺗێدا شداریﯽﺑە یدایﺎنەمﻭنﺗە ﻭئە مﻭﻭهە لە ڕاﺑردﻭﻭدا مﺎنگﯽ ندچە یمﺎﻭهلە
 ەك نێتیەڕایﺑگە ردۆغﺎنئە ﻭهگﻭرزه ﻭئە هۆیﺑە نییە رسﻭڕمﺎنسە جێﯽ ﺑۆیە ،كردﻭﻭه ﺗﯽﻭڵەنێﻭده یﺎسﺎی پێشێلﯽ




 كەیرانەەﻗ هێشﺗنﯽنە ﺑۆ ﺑﺎشە پێ ﻭای ئیسرائیل یعﺎدیلانە ڵﻭێسﺗﯽهە ڵگەلە كرد یﺎنﻭهئە ئیدیعﺎی سێككە ندچە دﻭاﺗر
 .پخرا زۆر كﯽیەڵەهە ﺑﺎسكردنﯽ ،كەسیﺎسییە ﻭ جﻭگرافﯽ ندییەﻭههرژﺑە پێنﺎﻭیلە ﺑكﺎت لێﺑﻭردن داﻭای ئیسرائیل
 شﻭهەئ كﺎتده ززهغە رﺗﯽكە رسە یئﺎﺑڵﻭﻗە لاﺑردنﯽ داﻭای ﺗﻭركیﺎ چﻭنكە پێنﺎهێنێت، كۆﺗﺎیﯽ كەیرانەﻗە لێﺑﻭردن داﻭای
 هﺎﻭڵاﺗیﺎنﯽ حسﺎﺑﯽ رسەلە ﺑگرێت ﺑﯽرهعە نﯽجیهﺎ یركردهسە یپێگە كﺎتده خۆش ردۆغﺎنئە ﺑۆ ڕێگە نگﺎﻭێكەهە
 .ﻭهﺑیننەده ﺗرداﻭرهگە یپرۆسە ﻭ كمﻭشە یشەڕههە ژێرلە خۆیﺎن كە ئیسرائیل
 نﺑﻭﻭ ﻭانئە رهە ﺑكﺎت كﺎنﺗﻭركە ﺑۆ نﺎزﻭلﺗە ئیسرائیل ﺑێتده كە كردده یﺎنﻭهئە ئیدیعﺎی ڕۆژ ﻭ ﻭشە یﻭانەئە دﻭاﺗر
 .نییە زینﯽداﺑە ﺑﻭاری ئێسﺗﺎ كە رزداﺑە خﺗێكﯽدره رسەﺑە ﻭﺗنركەسە ﺑۆ یﺎندارهنقەئە ﺗﯽیﺎرمە
 مﺎسیﺎنەدیپلۆ ﻗﻭرسﯽ ﺑﺎجێكﯽ ﺑە ﺗﻭركیﺎدا ڵگەلە كﺎنندییەیﻭهپە ﺑﺎشكردنﯽ شێﻭازی ڕاسﺗدا،نﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهە گﻭﺗﺎری لە
 یﺎرێﺗﯽرپرسﺑە چﻭنكە ر،ﺑﺎلمە یكەڕاپۆرﺗە رسە ﺑكﺎﺗە هێرش ئیسرائیلە رسەلە ﺗﻭركیﺎ، یكﺎره ﻭئە رسەلە كﺎتسﺗپێدهده
 ﺗﯽﻭمەحك سلﺑﯽ ڕۆڵﯽ ﺑكﺎت ئﺎشكرا جیهﺎنیشﯽ مﻭﻭهە ﺑۆ ﺑێتده ،كەریﺎییەده كﺎرﻭانە یرانﯽﻗە لە كردﻭﻭه سﻭﻭك ﺗﻭركیﺎی
 .یگێڕێتده ڕاسﺗدانﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽخۆرهە ینﺎﻭچەلە ردۆغﺎنئە
 ڵكﻭﺑە ،كەنﺎﻭچە لە نییە كﺎنكێشە ریسەچﺎره شێكﯽﺑە ﻭ ﻗﺎمگیریسە ریفﺎكﺗە ﺗﻭركیﺎ كە رچﺎﻭﺑە ینەﺑخە ﻭهئە ێمەئ ﺑێتده
 .یەئﺎژاﻭه ریدرﻭسﺗكە ﻭ ڕاﻭكێدڵە ریفﺎكﺗە
 رسەەل ﺑۆیە نێت،یەگەده ﻭركیﺎﺗ خﻭدیﺑە زیﺎن تﺗﺎیﺑەﺑە یكەﻭڵاﺗە ﺑۆ ﻭهرهنقەئە لە ئیسرائیل ﺑﺎڵیۆزی یﻭهگێڕانە
 یكۆنگره ندینچە پێش كە رﺑگرێتسﻭﻭدﻭه غریبمە ﻭ ممﺎنعە لە كریەهە پێشﻭﻭﺗری كﺎنﯽزمﻭﻭنەئە لە ردۆغﺎنەئە
 لە یلئیسرائ ﺑە ﺎنكﺎنیندییەیﻭهپە ﺑچڕانﯽ ڵامﺑە ڕاﺑردﻭﻭدا، یدهسە كﺎنﯽدهﻭهنە لە ﻭﺗنكە جیهﺎن یركردهسە ﻭ ﺗﯽﻭڵەنێﻭده
 ﺗێكﯽﻭڵەده ڕاﺑردﻭﻭدا لە كە ﺗﻭركیﺎ هﺎرﻭههە ،ﺗﯽﻭڵەنێﻭده دیپلۆمﺎسﯽ یخشەنە رسەلە ﻭنﺑﻭﻭنیﺎن هۆیﺑﻭﻭه 0002 سﺎڵﯽ
  .كردﻭﻭه كۆنﺗرۆڵﯽ رپرسیﺎرنﺎﺑە ﻭیﺗﻭندڕه ﺑێكﯽزهەمە ئێسﺗﺎدالە ﺑﻭﻭ، زیركەمە
 مﺎنەمﻭسﻭڵ ﻭڵاﺗە لە یدﻭاییە مئە كﺎنﯽنگﺎﻭههەﺑە ﻭرﻭپﺎئە كێﺗﯽیە نﺎﻭ چﻭﻭنە ﺑۆ كﺎنﯽڵەﻭهەلە شكسﺗﯽ پﺎڵلە كە ﺗﻭركیﺎ
 چﻭنكە ،مﺎسدایەحە ﻭ حزﺑﻭڵڵا ﻭ سﻭریﺎ ﻭ ئێران ﻭیﺗﻭندڕه یڵەكۆمە مﺎنهەلە ئێسﺗﺎ ،ﻭهﻭﺗەدﻭﻭركە كﺎنیشﻭهمیﺎنڕه
 سﺗﺎدائێلە ،یەلەسەمە ﻭﺑە ﺑێت نﯽلەعە دانپێدانﺎنێكﯽ یەﻭهئە یهﺎﻭشێﻭه ﻭهئیسرائیلەﺑە كﺎنﯽندییەیﻭهپە ﺗێكچﻭﻭنﯽ
 .نداﻭكە ﻭڵاﺗﺎنﯽ ششێﻭه مﺎنهەﺑە نییە ﺗﻭنسدا ﻭ میسر لە كﯽهﺎیەﺑە هیچ رهنقەئە كﺎنﯽﺑۆچﻭﻭنە
 سﺗدانﯽدهلە ،یەهە زافﯽﻗە یشێﻭههﺎﻭ ﻭﺗﯽڵسﻭكەهە كە ﺑینێتده كیەركردهسەﺑە ردۆغﺎنئە نﻭێ ﺑﯽرهعە جیهﺎنﯽ
 ﺎﺗﻭركی ﻭ ﻭهئﺎگﺎﺑێنەﺑە ﺑكﺎت كﺎنراﻭێزخراﻭهپە كﻭرده لە ﻭا نگەڕه ﻭڵاﺗە ﻭئە لاﻭازی ﻭ سﻭریﺎ ڵگەلە یمﺎنێﺗیشهﺎﻭپە
 .ﺑداتپێ ﻭامﯽردهﺑە گێڕیئﺎژاﻭه ئﺎگری یﻭهئە پێش ﻭهﺑێﺗە كﺎنﯽنﺎﻭخۆییە كێشە ڕﻭﻭیڕﻭﻭﺑە نﺑكە نﺎچﺎر
 ﺎریفش كﺎرهێنﺎنﯽﺑە ﺑە هێرشكردن ﺗﯽسیﺎسە ﺑۆ ﻭهﺑگﻭازێﺗە ﻭهلێدانە ﻭ ﻭﺗنركەﺑە ﺗﯽسیﺎسە لە ئیسرائیل ﺑێتده
 ﺗﺎ ﻭ ﺑێت كۆﺗﺎیﯽ ەكییەﺗﻭڕه ﺗﺎ ینﺑكە ڕﻭانچﺎﻭه سرﻭشﺗییە زۆر ئیسرائیلﯽ یئێمە ﺑۆ كﺎﺗێكدالە ﺗﻭركیﺎ، رسەلە دیپلۆمﺎسیﺎنە
 .ڕێﻭهﺑە چێتده ﺗر كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە ﺗﯽرێمﺎیەهە خیﺗﺎﺑﯽ ﻭائە ﺗێﺑگﺎت خۆی كیﺎﺗﻭر یﻭهئە
 ﺑﺎجێكﯽ ئێسﺗﺎ یرانﯽﻗە كە ﺑكﺎت ﻭهﺑە در ﺗﻭركیﺎ كە كﺎتسﺗپێدهده ﻭهكﺎﺗە ﻭلە نهﺎﺗە ﺗﻭركیﺎدا ڵگەلە كﺎنندییەیﻭهپە ﺑﺎشﺑﻭﻭنﯽ
 كﯽیەپێگە هیچ كە ﺑكرێت ژمﺎرهە ﻭڵاﺗێك ﺑە ﻭ راﻭێزﺑخرَێتپە كﺎتﻭاده ﻭ ﺗﯽﻭڵەنێﻭده ئﺎسﺗﯽلە ﻭهﻭێﺗەكەلێده یﻭرهگە
 .ﺗﯽرێمﺎیەهە پﺎنﯽگۆڕه رسەلە ﺑێتنە
 ﻭێئە ﻭرهﺑە ﺗﻭركیﺎی ردۆغﺎنئە كە راﻭێزخراﻭهپە ﻭهﺗﻭندڕه شﻭێنە ﻭئە رسە خسﺗە ﺗیشكﯽ رﺑﺎلمە یكەڕاپۆرﺗە كﻭرﺗﯽﺑە
 چﺎككردنﯽ ﺑە ﺑگۆڕێت خۆی ﺗﯽسیﺎسە كﺎتده نﺎچﺎر ﺗﻭركیﺎ نهﺎﺗەﺑە دیپلۆمﺎسﯽ فشﺎری ﻭامﯽردهەﺑ كرد، لكێشپە
 .دائﺎیندهلە ﺑڕﻭات ئیسرائیل ڵگەلە كﺎنندییەیﻭهپە
 ﻭهه)الیﻭم اسرائیل( لە
 ﺗحﯽفە گۆران. ﻭ
 
 








 ؟ئاسۆدایەلە زنمە كوردستانی تیوڵەده
 *ئێسكۆﺑﺎر پێپ
 خۆیرﺑەسە ﺗﯽﻭڵەده یﻭهئە ﺑۆ كﺎنكﻭرده ﺑۆ ﺑێت لهە ۆﺗﺎك مەئە نگەڕه ،ﻭهڕێژرێﺗەداده ڕاستنﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهە یخشەنە كﺎﺗێكدالە
 .ﺑێتهە خۆیﺎن
 نگەڕه كردﻭﻭه یﺎن ﺗﺎران لە نﺑێلایە ﺗﺎنﯽﻭڵەده یﻭهﺑزﻭﺗنە یلﻭﺗكە یﻭهكۆﺑﻭنە چﺎﻭدێری ڕاﺑردﻭﻭ یفﺗەهە كە كﻭرد ملیۆنﺎنﺑە
 "...ﻭداهﺎﺗﻭ یﻭهكۆﺑﻭنە نگەڕه ﺑێن، ﻭێلە ئێمە پێﻭیسﺗە ﺑێت؟ده چﯽ ئێمە یكەلەگە نﻭﻭسﯽچﺎره یئە ؟ئێمە یئە:" پرسیﺑێﺗیﺎن
 ﻭا نگەڕه مێژﻭﻭش ﻭ نكەكﺎرده ﻭهپێكە دﻭاجﺎر نﺎﻭخۆدا، ڕیشە لە خراپیﺎن نﺎﻭﺑﺎنگﯽ ﺑە نێنده ددان خۆیﺎن كە كﺎن،كﻭرده نگەڕه
 ﺑۆ ﺑێت لهە دﻭا مەئە نگەڕه كﺎندا،كﻭرده لە یكﻭشنده گﻭرزێكﯽ كە شﻭهئە پﺎش ﻭ مكەیە جیهﺎنﯽ نگﯽجە لە كیەدهسە دﻭای ﺑڵێ
  .ﻭرهگە كﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ ﺗﯽﻭڵەده درﻭسﺗﺑﻭﻭنﯽ
 ۆﺑ ﻭاژۆكرد ﻭﺗنیﺎنڕێكە كﻭردسﺗﺎن، رێمﯽهە رۆكﯽسە ﺑﺎرزانﯽ، سعﻭدمە پشﺗگیری ﺑە سﻭریﺎ كﻭردی پﺎرﺗﯽ ردﻭﻭهە یﻭهئە دﻭای
 نكەهد نگﯽمئﺎهەهە ریكەﻭاخە ئێرانیش كﺎنﯽكﻭردییە پﺎرﺗە ن،ﺑﺑەڕێﻭهﺑە) ڕۆژئﺎﻭا كﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ( سﻭریﺎ یﺑﺎكﻭر شﯽهﺎﻭﺑە ﺑە یﻭهئە
 .ﻭنكەڕێكده ﻭ
 .كﺎتده ﻭتڵسﻭكەهە رﺑێسە مریشكﯽ لە گرﻭپێك كﻭﻭه رهنكەئە هﺎﻭكﺎت
 تنﺎنەﺗە ندهرچەهە كرد، ﺑﺎیكۆت نﯽﺑێلایە ﺗﺎنﯽﻭڵەده یﻭهﺑزﻭﺗنە یكۆنگره رهنكەئە چۆن یﻭهﺑە ندهخدهﺑﺎیە ﻭهﻭریﺎییە ﺑە كﺎنكﻭرده
 .ﺑﺎنگهێشﺗكراﺑﻭﻭ ﺗﯽﺗﺎیﺑە كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە ﻭهئێرانە رۆكﯽسە ژاد،نە دیحمەئە حمﻭدمە نلایەلە ﺗﻭركیﺎ، رۆكﯽسە گﻭیل، ﺑدﻭڵاعە
 ﻭركیﺎﺗ ﻭڵاﺗﺎنﯽ لە سﻭریﺎ ندییﻭهپە گرﻭپﯽ كرد پێشنیﺎریكە ﻭهكۆڵنەده میسر، رۆكﯽسە مﻭرسﯽ، دمەمحە یكەپێشنیﺎره لە هﺎرﻭههە
 .نرﺑكەسەچﺎره سﻭریﺎ ﺗراژیدیﺎی نﻭڵﺑدههە یﻭهئە ﺑۆ درﻭسﺗﺑكرێت ئێران ﻭ سعﻭدیە ﻭ میسر ﻭ
 نﺎﻭخۆی یڕشەلە ﻭهكﺎﺗەده نﺎﻭﺑژیﻭانﯽ لە ﺑیر مﻭسلمیندا ئیخﻭان رۆكێكﯽسە ﺗﯽﻭایەرمﺎنڕهفە ژێرلە میسر كە نێتیەگەده ﻭهئە شمەئە
 كردنﯽدرﻭسﺗ ﺑە نهﺎﺗە شﻭهئە ﻭ ﻭهكﺎﺗەده سﻭریﺎ ڕژێمﯽ گۆڕینﯽ سﺗراﺗیژی لە ختجە كﻭێرانە ﺗﻭركیﺎ هﺎﻭكﺎت ﺑیدا،رهعە ﺗێكﯽﻭڵەده
  .ڕﻭﻭنﺎدات ﻭهئە من ﺑڕﻭای ﺑە ڵامﺑە ﺑێت،ده نﺎﺗۆﻭه نلایەلە فڕین دژه كﯽیەنﺎﻭچە
 .رﺑگرنﻭه رهنكەئە كﺎنﯽنگﺎﻭههە مﻭﻭهە لە سﻭﻭد چۆن یﻭهلە ﺑێتده ﺑریﺗﯽ كﺎنكﻭرده ﺑۆ جدی پرسیﺎری یەﺑۆ
 ئیسرائیلە ﺑراﻭه
 ﺑە ،ﻭڵاﺗە ﻭئە ڕژێمﯽ گۆڕینﯽ لە ﺑێجگە ،سﻭریﺎﻭه یﺑﺎرهلە رهنكەئە ﺗﯽسیﺎسە یچﻭارچێﻭه نﺎزانن ﺗﻭركیﺎ ریمﺎﻭهجە تنﺎنەﺗە
) كەكەپە( كﻭردسﺗﺎن كرێكﺎرانﯽ پﺎرﺗﯽ ریلاكﺎنﯽگە شقدیمە كﺎتده ﻭهئە ئیدیعﺎی گﻭیل ﺑدﻭڵاعە رۆكسە. چیە راﻭیدیﺎریك
 .ڕشە ڵگیرسﺎندنﯽهە ﺑۆ پﺎسﺎﻭێكە نهﺎﺗە ﻭهئە ﻭ) نیە ﻭهئە ﺑۆ كیەڵگەﺑە هیچ هﺎیﯽڕهﺑە( كﺎتكدهپڕچە
  .نﺎﻭێت ﺗﻭركیﺎدا ڵگەلە ڕیشە ﻭهخۆیە نلایەلە شقدیمە
 ڕایە ﻭەئ پشﺗگیری هێشﺗﺎ" دراﻭسێكﺎندا ڵگەلە یەكێشە سفر" ﺗﯽسیﺎسە نﯽخﺎﻭه كە ﺗﻭركیﺎ، یﻭهرهده زیریﻭه ئۆغڵﻭ، داﻭد دحمەئە
 .رﺑگرێتﻭه سﻭری رینﺎﺑەپە زارهە 001 لە زیﺎﺗر نﺎﺗﻭانێت یكەﻭڵاﺗە كە كﺎتده
 پێﻭیسﺗە نﺎڕﻭﻭن ی" ئﺎرام كﯽیەنﺎﻭچە" داﺗەحﺎڵە ملە ﻭ چێتده ڵكشﺎنهە ﻭرهﺑە ﻭ ﺗﻭركیﺎدایە لە سﻭری رینﺎﺑەپە زارهە 07 مێژهلە
 كﯽیەﻭهكۆﺑﻭنە لە راننﺎﺑەپە یرانﯽﻗە كﺎنﯽئﺎڵۆزییە لە ﻭهكﺎﺗەخﺗدهجە رهنكەئە ،یەممەپێنجشە مئە. درﻭسﺗﺑكرێت سﻭریﺎدا خﺎكﯽ لە
  .كﺎندارﺗﻭﻭهكگیە ﻭهﺗەنە
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 ﻭ ﺎﺗﻭركی خﺎكﯽ نﺎﻭ لە كە نكەده كەكەپە ریلاكﺎنﯽگە لە پشﺗگیری یﻭهﺑە كﺎتده ﺗﺑﺎرﺗۆمە شقدیمە ﻭ ﺗﺎران ﻭامﯽردهﺑە ﺑە رهنكەئە
 یمﺎنﯽهﺎﻭپە ﺗر جﺎرێكﯽ ﺎمۆن ﻭ نﺎمۆ، چیرۆكێكﯽ ﺑە یداﻭهرهپە رهنكەئە هﺎﻭكﺎت ڵامﺑە ن،كەده چﺎلاكﯽ كﺎندافراﻭانە سنﻭرییە نﺎﻭچە
 .لانراﻭهﻭه ئێسﺗﺎ ڕهڕمەمە مﺎڤﯽ ڕﻭﻭداﻭی ﻭ ئیسرائیلە سﺗراﺗیژی
 دﻭای سﻭریﺎی یلەسەمە لە ژمﻭﻭنهە نخﺎﻭه یﯽنﺎﻭچە هێزێكﯽ ﺑﺑێﺗە رهنكەئە كﺎتدهﻭهئە رسەلە ﻭگره ﻭهرۆشیەپەﺑە ﺑیبئە لﺗە
  ...دداسەئە
 53 نهﺎﺗە ،كە لێگ گركە كﻭﻭه كﯽیەنﺎﻭچە ندچە رسەﺑە ئێسﺗﺎ كﻭردی ردیزه ﻭ ﻭزسە ﻭ سﻭر ئﺎڵای سﻭریﺎ لە مﺎنكﺎﺗداهەلە
 یﺎسﻭر كﻭردی ملیۆن سێ ینزیكە ئێسﺗﺎ. ﻭهكێﺗەشەده ،دﻭﻭره ﺗﻭركیﺎﻭه سنﻭری لە ﺗركیلۆمە 51 نهﺎﺗە ﻭ عیراق سنﻭری لە ﺗركیلۆمە
 .سﻭریﺎ عسﯽﺑە پﺎرﺗﯽ رمﯽفە ﺑكردنﯽرهعەﺑە ﺗﯽسیﺎسە یﻭهﺗكردنەڕه ﺑۆ یننﺑده ﺑێﻭێنە كﯽیەﻭهكرانە
 ﺎرشﺑە ڕژێمﯽ ڵگەلە ﺗﺎكﺗیكﯽ ﻭﺗنێكﯽڕێكە ﻭهكﺎﺗەﺗیدهڕه ﺗﻭندیﺑە كﻭردی )DYP( دیمۆكراﺗﯽ كێﺗﯽیە پﺎرﺗﯽ رۆكﯽسە مﻭسلیم، لاحسە
 ق،شدیمە كﺎنﯽهێزه رسەنەكەنە هێرش سﻭریﺎ كﺎنﯽكﻭرده یكﺎﺗە ﻭئە ﺗﺎهە ،ﺑﻭﻭهە ﻭﺗنێكڕێكە ڕاسﺗیدالە ڵامﺑە. ﺑﻭﻭﺑێتهە دداسەئە
  .ڕﻭاتده خۆرﺑەسە رێمێكﯽهە ﻭرهﺑە ئێسﺗﺎ كە سﻭریﺎ كﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ لە ننجﺎمیﺑدهئە ﻭێتﺑیﺎنە كرچیەهە ﺗﻭاننده
 ﻭاید سﻭریﺎی لە تنﺎنەﺗە ﻭ یﺎندﻭﻭهگە رهنكەئە ﺑە یكەیﺎمەپە پێشﺗر مریكﺎ،ئە یﻭهرهده زیریﻭه كلنﺗۆن، هیلاری ،ﻭهﺗره كﯽلایەلە
  .چﺎﻭﺑكرێتڕه ﻭیزه رسە كﯽڕاسﺗیە كﻭﻭه مەئە ﺑێتده دیشداسەئە
 .ﺑێتده رﻭێرانكە كﺎنكﻭرده یكشەپﺎشە ﺑكﺎت؟ چﯽ ﺗﻭانێتده رهنكەئە ﺑۆیە
 ﻭركیﺎﺗ سﻭپﺎی یﻭره. نیە ئﺎسﺎن ڕۆژئﺎﻭا كﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ داگیركردنﯽ ﺑۆ ﺗﻭركیﺎ كﺎنﯽهﺑژارد رمﯽ،فە یكێشە ﻭ راهە ندینچە ڕایرهسە
 ﺑە كراﻭن ﺗﺑﺎرﺗۆمە ﻭ زینداندان لە نراڵژه 06 لە زیﺎﺗر ئێسﺗﺎ. مﺎلﯽكە داریپلە ریفسەئە ندینچە یﻭهدﻭرخسﺗنە دﻭای ﻭیشئە نزمە
 ﻭهنەكەﺗیدهڕه كﺎنكﻭرده رﺑﺎزهسە ﻭ كﺎنﻭیەلەعە. ﻭهنەﺑده ﺗﺎكﻭده ﻭڵﯽهە دﻭﻭﺑﺎره نگەڕه كﺎننزمﺗره پلە رهفسەئە ﻭ ﺗﺎكﻭده نجﺎمدانﯽئە
 ﻭهدڵنیﺎییەەﺑ -شﺗﻭگﻭزارگە لە ﺑێجگە – ﺗﻭركیﺎ ئﺎﺑﻭﻭری هﺎرﻭههە. ﺑگیرسێنێت ڵﯽهە پێدانشەگە ﻭ داد پﺎرﺗﯽ كە نگنﺑجە ڕێكداشەلە
  .ڕﻭاتده داڕمﺎن ﻭرهﺑە
 ؟یەوهماڵەلە كیەركردهسە ئایا
 یگۆشە سەﺑە ﻭئە ﺑۆ كﻭردسﺗﺎن، رێمﯽهە رۆكﯽسە ﺑﺎرزانﯽ، سعﻭدمە سیﺎسﯽ یخشەنە ئﺎیﺎ ﺑكﺎت ﻭهئە ﻭێنﺎی ﺗﻭانێتده سێككە
 .ڵﺑكشێتهە یەﺑۆنە ﻭئە ﻭ رهﺑە ﻭ ﺑگرێت ئﺎمێزلە مێژﻭﻭ
 یﻭهەئ ﺑۆ ڵامﺑە. كﺎنﺗﻭركە ﻭ كﺎنفﺎرسە ﻭ كﺎنﺑەرهعە لە ﺑێت خۆرﺑەسە كە دایەﻭرهگە كﻭردسﺗﺎنێكﯽ ڵگەلە ﻭهدڵنیﺎییەﺑە ﺑﺎرزانﯽ
 رێمﯽهە لە نهﺎﺗە كنە ﻭ ﺑكﺎت فﺗﺎرڕه مﻭﻭانهە یﻭهرهكۆكە ﻭ ركخەیە كﻭﻭه خۆی پێﻭیسﺗە فراﻭان ئﺎسﺗێكﯽ رسەلە ڕﻭﻭﺑدات، ﻭهئە
 شمەئە .ﺑﺑﺎتڕێﻭهﺑە ﺗﻭركیﺎ ﻭ ئێران ﻭ سﻭریﺎ لە كﺎنكﻭرده كﺎنﯽنﺎكۆكە ئﺎمﺎنجە ﻭ هیﻭا ڵكﻭﺑە پێﺑكﺎت شﯽهﺎﻭﺑە ڵاتسەده كﻭردسﺗﺎن
 .یەهە زنمە دیپلۆمﺎسﯽ كﯽﺗﻭانﺎیە ندچە ﺑە پێﻭیسﺗﯽ
 ڕۆكسلﺑ نگﺗردره یﺎن ﻭﻭﺗرز نێتیەگەﻭاده شمەئە ﻭ گلاﻭنﺗێﻭه كەلەسەمەلە ﺑیبئە لﺗە ﻭ ﻭاشنﺗۆن یەﻭهئە ﻭئﺎشكرایە رﻭﻭن یﻭهئە
 ﺗﯽﻭڵەده لە ﺑریﺗیە مكەیە. یەهە پێشهﺎت دﻭﻭ دالێره. نین دژیلە دیﺎریكراﻭی ﺑە چین ﻭ ڕﻭسیﺎ. گلێتدهﺗێﻭه ﻭهكەلەسەمە لە
 مینەكە لە ڕێز ﻭ ﺑێت لاكچﺎ ﻭ لمﺎنﯽعە كﯽیەﻭارهﻗە ﺗەﻭڵەده مئە كە ڕاستنﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽرۆژهە ﺑۆ مۆدێلێك كﻭﻭه زنمە كﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ
 .ﺑینینده ڕۆژئﺎﻭا ﺗری كﯽكۆمیدیﺎیە یﺎن. ﺑگرێت كﺎنئﺎینیە
 ییەسﻭر هێزه ككردنﯽپڕچە یﻭانەپێچە ریكﺎریگە لە ﻭهدڵنیﺎییە ﺑە ﺗﻭركیﺎ. دایەﻭهﻗینەﺗە لە ﺗر كﯽرهسە جﻭگرافﯽ گڕكﺎنێكﯽ
  .هێنرێنكﺎردهﺑە ﺗﻭركیﺎ خﻭدی دژیلە ﻭهكەكەپە نلایەلە كﺎنەچە مئە نینﺑیده رئێسﺗﺎهە ﻭ ﻭهﺗەكۆڵیﻭهنە كﺎنﯽسﻭنیە
 .كﻭرد چﺎلاكﯽ لە یشﺗنﺗێگە ﺑۆ ﺑیـَت سﻭﻭدﺑە زۆر نگەڕه ئیمپریﺎلیسﺗیە دژه شیكﺎریە مئە
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 كﺗێﺑﯽ رینﻭﻭسە ﻭ رهكەنئە لە نتﺑیلكە زانكۆی لە ڕاستنﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهە ﺗﯽسیﺎسە ﻭ مێژﻭﻭ پرۆفیسۆری سﺎڵت، جێرمﯽ
 مجۆرهﺑە) سﺗﺎمپﺎ لا( یڕۆژنﺎمە لە نﻭﻭسڕۆژنﺎمە گﺎلۆ، كلاﻭدیۆ ڵگەلە ﻭﺗﻭێژێكدا لە" ڕاستنﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهە یﻭهڕێكخسﺗنە"
 :ﻭهكﺎﺗەپﻭخﺗده كەلەسەمە
 ڵگەلە ﺑگﻭنجێت كە شكردداﺑە یﺎریكراﻭد كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە ڕاسﺗیﺎننﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهە كﺎنئیمپریﺎلیسﺗە هێزه دا 8191 سﺎڵﯽلە "
 ڵگەلە ندهﻭڵدههە دﻭﻭﺑﺎره ﻭ ﻭهكێشنەده یەنﺎﻭچە مئە یخشەنە دﻭﻭﺑﺎره ئێسﺗﺎ ﻭانئە. داكﺎﺗە ﻭلە خۆیﺎندا كﺎنﯽندیەﻭهرژهﺑە
 یسرائیلدائ خﻭدی كﺎنﯽنەدرێژخﺎیە سﺗراﺗیژییە شەخنە ڵگەلە پرۆگرامە مئە كە نیە ﻭتڕێكەﺑە. ﺑگﻭنجێت خۆیﺎندا كﺎنﯽندیەﻭهرژهﺑە
 كﻭﻭه ﺗﻭانرێتده ئێسﺗﺎ یﻭشەڕه مئە شﻭهرئەﺑەلە ﻭ رێت،گﻭزهده چﯽ نﻭهئە ئﺎگﺎداری ﻭاﻭیﺗە ﺑە چین ﻭ ڕﻭسیﺎ. ﻭهگرێﺗەكدهیە
  .ﻭهلێكﺑدرێﺗە دا 12 یدهسە لە زنمە ریﺗﺎنیﺎیﺑە ﻭ ڕﻭسیﺎ نێﻭان ی" ﻭرهگە یﺎری" یدرێژكراﻭه
 كﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ ﺗﯽﻭڵەده ﻭﺗنﯽركەده لە ﺑێتﺑریﺗیده یە" ﻭرهگە یﺎری" مئە نﻭێﯽ كۆپﯽ كﺎنﯽنجﺎمەرئەده ڕۆژ دﻭایﺑە ڕۆژ نیە ڵەهە
  .زنمە
 
 و ،یەهە زۆری رێكیخوێنە "eyE gnivoR ehT"یكەوامەردهبە ستوونە و تایمز ئاسیا یڕۆژنامە یامنێریپە: ئێسكۆبار پێپ*
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    مووانەهە یڵەهە..مالیكی و كینمە و ئۆباما
  كریسﺗۆف نیكۆلاس         4102/60/51
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 .مﺎلیكییە نﻭری یڵەهە ﻭانئە پێش ڵامﺑە ﺑﻭﻭ، كﺎنكۆمﺎریە ﻭ ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ رۆكسە یڵەهە عێڕاقلە شكسﺗخﻭاردن
 ﻭئە نگﺎﻭهە مكەیە ﻭ ﻭهاﻗەعیر خﺎكﯽ نﺎﻭ چﻭﻭه كە ﺑﻭﻭ سكە مكەیە یﻭپێیەﺑە نكەده ﺑﻭش ﺑلیﻭده جۆرج یلۆمە كﺎنپەچە لە ندێكهە
 ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ رۆكسە كە زانێتده پێﻭیسﺗﯽﺑە ﻭ زانێتده شكسﺗە ﻭئە رپرسیﺎریپە ﺑە سپﯽ كۆشكﯽ ككینمە جۆن سینﺎﺗۆر ﻭهخۆشیە لای نﺎی،
  .ﺑگۆڕێت یﯽﻭهﺗەنە ئﺎسﺎیشﯽ یسﺗەده
 ڵدێرداهە لە) سنكە ملیۆن 33 كە( یكەلەگە یﻭپێیەﺑە ،ﺑﻭﻭهنە سیﺎسﯽ كﯽرهسە كﯽیەپێكهﺎﺗە رگیزهە عیراق كە یﺎدﺑێتلە مﺎنﻭهئە ﺑێئە
" ﺗدا؟سدهلە عیراﻗﯽ كێ" ﺑپرسین رگە ﻭه. ﻭهرهده ﺑە كﺎنیداندیەیﻭهپە لە یەهە زۆری یكێشە ﻭﻭڵاﺗە مئە ﻭهداخەﺑە. رێننگﻭزهده ژیﺎن
". سﺗدا؟دهلە چینﯽ كێ: " كراده مداﺑیسﺗە یدهسە ینیﻭهلە كە ﺑێتده پرسیﺎره ﻭئە مﺎنهە ﺑێت،ده مژانەگە پرسیﺎرێكﯽ كە دڵنیﺎﺑن ﻭائە
 .ینﺑده سﺗﯽدهلە ﺗﺎ نییە ئێمە مﻭڵكﯽ عیراق مڕۆشئە ین،ﺑده سﺗﯽدهلە ﺗﺎ ﺑﻭﻭنە ئێمە مﻭڵكﯽ چین خۆ جﺎ
 ییدارهئ رپرسﺎنﯽﺑە چۆن كە ﺑﻭﻭ داﻭهلە شكەكێشە كرد، دۆمینە كﯽیﺎریە ﺑە ﺗﯽسده ﺑﻭش جۆرج كﺎﺗێك ڵداریهەسە ﻭێﻭهلە كەچیرۆكە
 شﻭانەئە مﻭﻭهە ﻭ ﺑﺎیﯽﺗە ﻭ ئﺎشﺗﯽ لە پڕ ﻭﻭڵاﺗێكﯽ ﺗەﺑﻭه عیراق كە یﺎنﻭتده ﻭ كردده شﺎنﺎزییﺎن سﺎڵ دﻭﻭ پێش ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ كﯽﺗەحكﻭمە
 .ﺑﻭﻭ سﺎتكﺎره یﺎننگﺎندنەڵسەهە مئە ڵامﺑە. ﻭهكﺎیە هﺎﺗﺑێﺗە ﻭانئە مﺎندﻭﻭﺑﻭنﯽ ﺑە گﻭایە
 سﺎڵﯽەل مریكﺎیئە سﻭپﺎی كﺎﺗێك ﻭهسڕیە یﻭﺗﺎنەسﺗكەده ﻭ ئﺎﻭات ﻭ هیﻭا ﻭئە گشت ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ رۆكسە كە ﺑﻭﻭﻭهئە كﺎنكۆمﺎریە ﺑۆچﻭﻭنﯽ
 ی)ێزه جێگیركردنﯽ(ﻭﺗنﯽڕێككە مﺎلیكﯽ یێیەﻭپﺑە ﺑﻭﻭ شیﺎﻭ زۆر خۆیدا كﺎﺗﯽلە  ﺑۆچﻭﻭنە ﻭئە ﻭادیﺎره. ﻭهكشﺎنە عیراق لە دا1102
 ﺑێتهە كرپرسیﺎرێﺗیەﺑە رگە. ﻭهﺑمێنێﺗە عیراﻗدا لە ش1102 سﺎڵﯽ دﻭای كﻭﺗﺎﻭه داده مریكﺎئە سﻭپﺎی ﺑە یڕێگە كە ﺑﻭﻭنە ندسەپە لا
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 ﺎﺗێكك كرد یڵەهە ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ ڕاﺑردﻭﻭدا یمﺎﻭهلە -ﻗەعیرا مڕۆیئە كﺎنﯽﻭێرانكﺎریە هۆكﺎری كە -سﻭریﺎیە ﻭائە ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ سﺗۆیئە ﺑخرێﺗە كە
 پۆزسیۆنﯽئۆ ككردنﯽپڕچە پێشنیﺎری كە كرد ﺑﺗرایۆس یڤدده راڵنەجە ﻭ ﻭهرهده زیریﻭه كلینﺗۆنﯽ هیلاری یكەپێشنیﺎره لە ڕێگری
 .كرد سﻭریﺎیﺎن
 زارهە 0671 كە ڵێنده كﺎننیەدهمە چﺎلاكﻭانە. هێنﺎ شكسﺗﯽ دانەلایە ملە ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ ڵامﺑە نﺎ، یﺎن گرێتردهسە ﻭهئە كە زانﯽیدهنە سكە
 .ﻭهﺗەكردﻭه هێزﺑە خۆی دسەئە شﺎرﺑە هﺎرﻭههە ﻭ كﻭژراﻭن سﻭریﺎدا لە سكە
 كﺎنیﺎنكەەی ﻭ كﺎنركردهسە لە كندێهە تنﺎنەﺗە ،ﻭهﺗەمﺎﻭنە هیﻭا ﺑێ ﻭ نهﺎﺗەﺑە سﻭریﺎ ئﺎزادی سﻭپﺎی ،ﻭهكیەرهده پﺎڵپشﺗﯽ ﺑﻭﻭنﯽنە هۆیﺑە
 یەﻭهئە شكەەنجﺎمئە. ﺗﻭانﺎﺗریشنﺑە كرﻭههە ﻭ پێیە ﻭﺗﻭﺗریﺎنپێشكە ﻭ ﺑﺎشﺗر كﯽچە یﻭهرئەﺑەلە كﺎنشێﻭێنەگێره كدارهچە پﺎڵ ﺗەچﻭﻭنە
 ﺎكﻭﻭریﺑ لە ﺗﯽﺗﺎیﺑەﺑە داتده مﻭﻭانهە یداڵده ﻭ هێزكردﻭﻭهﺑە خۆی داعش نێﻭیشیﺎندالە كﺎنشێﻭێنەگێره كدارهچە گرﻭپە -یﺑیننده كە
 .عیراق ﺑﺎشﻭﻭری رسە هێرشیكرده دﻭاییدا یڕۆژه ندچە ملە ﻭهﻭێشەلە ﻭ سﻭریﺎ
 كە داﺑدات عیراق سﻭپﺎی ﺑە چۆك ﺗﻭانﯽ ﻭهكدارهچە زارهە چﻭار ﺑە داعش كﺎﺗێك ﺑﻭﻭ، رسﻭڕمﺎنسە یمﺎیە ڕﻭﻭیدا دﻭاﺗر یﻭهئە
 .ﺗێكشكﺎندن ﻭاﻭیﺗەﺑە ﻗێكﯽیلەفە ندچە ﻭ رﺑﺎزهسە زارهە 002 ﯽنخﺎﻭه
 
 ﺎڵﯽس ندچە یمﺎﻭهلە. رﺑﺎزیسە كنە سیﺎسییە یسێكﯽكە مەئە یﻭهرئەﺑەلە ﻭێتكەردهده زیرانﻭه رۆكسە مﺎلیكﯽ نﻭری ڕۆڵﯽ شدالێره
 كدارانﯽچە لاﻭازﺑﻭﻭنﯽ هۆكﺎری ﺑﻭﻭهده كرﻭههە خست،پشﺗگﻭێده ﯽكﺎنسﻭننە مﺎلیكﯽ داڕێژراﻭ، ﺑۆ پلان كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە ڕاﺑردﻭﻭدا
 ﺑە لە نگﺎﻭهەﺑە نگﺎﻭهە هﺎرﻭههە كﺎندا،شێﻭێنەگێره كدارهچە یﻭهڕﻭﺑﻭنەڕﻭﻭﺑە لە ﺑﻭﻭ گرنگ كﯽیەپێگە كە حﻭهسە یﻭهﺑزﻭﻭﺗنە
  .ﻭهكردهده مكە كﺎنﯽكداریەچە هێزه گرنگﯽ ﻭ یﯽكﺎرامە
 ﺗەەحكﻭم ﻭئە یهێنده یﻭهرئەﺑەلە ﺑﻭﻭ ندﺗرسەپە لالە داعشیﺎن كە ﺗرسﺎنده یﺎنكەﺗەحكﻭمە لە ندهﻭهئە كﺎنسﻭﻭنە لە ندێكهە تنﺎنەﺗە
 ییەهﻭرگە ﺗرسییەمە ﻭئە هێمﺎكﺎنﯽ درﻭسﺗكرد ﺑۆخۆی یﺎرینە خۆی سﺗﯽدهﺑە مﺎلیكﯽ ﺑڵێین ﺗﻭانینده ﺑۆیە. نییە قڕه ﻭ ﺗﻭند
 .ﻭهكردهده دﻭﻭﺑﺎره دامﯽسە كﺎنﯽﻭهكرده دامﺎنەئە مﻭﻭهە لە. ﺑێت كﺎنڕاسﺗیە نگﯽده لە گﻭێﯽ ﻭێتﺑیە یﻭهئە ﺑێ پشﺗگﻭێخست،
 ﻭكﺎتەئ. ﺑﻭﻭم غداﺑە لە كﺎﺗێك ﻭهﺑڵاﻭكرده دامسە یكەﺗەحكﻭمە دژیلە ئﺎگرینم ﻭﺗﺎرێكﯽ دامدا،سە حﻭكمﯽ كﺎﺗﯽلە ﻭ دا2002 سﺎڵﯽلە
 یریەس ﻭه ڵﻭاسیﺑﻭﻭهە ﻭهیەكەدیﻭاره ﺑە دامﯽسە یﻭینە رپرسەﺑە ﻭئە -غداﺑە لە خۆی یكەئۆفیسە كردمە ﺑﺎنگﯽ حكﻭمﯽ رپرسێكﯽﺑە
 مﯽكەﻭﻭﺗﺎره مﻭﻭهە رپرسەﺑە ﻭئە ﻭادیﺎرﺑﻭﻭ كردنم، نشترزهسە ﺑە كرد سﺗﯽده رزﺑە نگێكﯽدهﺑە پﺎشﺎن كردین،ئە چﺎﻭی نﺎﻭ
 ﻭﺑە زۆرم كﯽیەپﺎره. ﻭهﺑخﻭێنێﺗە ﺑۆ ﺑﯽرهعە زمﺎنﯽ ﺑە یكەﻭﻭﺗﺎره مﻭﻭهە كە كرد كەرگێڕهﻭه لە داﻭام منیش ﺑۆیە ،ﻭهخﻭێندﺑﻭهنە
 مﯽكەﻭﻭﺗﺎره شﯽﺑە ندێكهە رگێڕانداﻭه كﺎﺗﯽ لە ﺑۆیە ﺑكرێم زیندانﯽ یﺎن رﺑكرێمده ﻭﻭلاﺗە ﻭلە ﻭیستیدهنە رگێڕهﻭه ﻭئە ﺑۆیە داده رگێڕهﻭه
 ییسﺗمﺎنەس ﻭئە كە ﻭتركەده ﺑۆم كﺎﺗە ﻭئە. ﻭهﺗﻭنده یكﯽﻭهئﺎگﺎداركردنە ﺑە ڵامﺑە ﺑكﺎت ڵامرهﺑە دا ﺑڕیﺎری رپرسەﺑە ﻭئە ﺑۆیە. ڕاندپەده
 .نكەده ردانرگەسە خۆیﺎن خۆیﺎن سﺗﯽدهﺑە چۆن ﺑﻭﻭن شێﺗﯽ ﺗﻭﻭشﯽ كە
 كە كﺎتهد مریكﺎدائە ڵگەلە گفﺗﻭگۆ داكﺎﺗە ملە. ﺑﻭﻭه ﻭازهرﺗەپە جۆرێك چﯽ ﺑە یسﻭپﺎكە كە ئﺎگﺎدارنییە مﺎلیكﯽ ادیﺎرهﻭ شێﻭه مﺎنهەﺑە
 .ﻭهﺑێنینە خۆمﺎن ﺑیر مﺎلیكﯽ نﻭری كﯽرهسە ڕۆڵﯽ دالێره ﺑﺎ ﺑكﺎت، چﯽ پێﻭیسﺗە
 
 ﺗێكﯽﻭڵەهد درﻭسﺗﺑﻭﻭنﯽ ﻭ پێكهﺎﺗن خۆمﺎن چﺎﻭیﺑە ئێسﺗﺎدالە ئێمە سﺎت،كﺎره ﺑﺑێﺗە یەهە ﺑۆی كە نكەڕاسﺗده كۆنگریچس ندامﺎنﯽئە
 كردنﯽنەەشﺗە ﻭ ﻭتنە نرخﯽ یﻭهرزﺑﻭﻭنەﺑە لە جگە مەئە نﺎكرێت، سفﻭه كە ﺑینینده كﻭشﺗﺎرێك كرﻭههە ﺑینین،ده ﻭﺗﻭندڕه ﺗﯽلافەخە
 .جیهﺎندا لە ﺗیرۆر
 ﯽنﺎكﺎم نگڕه ﺑۆردﻭمﺎنە مئە ڵامﺑە كﺎرﺑێنێت،ﺑە ئﺎسمﺎنﯽ ﺑۆردﻭمﺎنﯽ مریكﺎئە كە ﺑﺎشە پێیﺎن نگرێسكۆ ندامﺎنﯽئە دا،میﺎنە ملە
 هێزی كﺎرهێنﺎنﯽﺑە مئە نگەڕه كرﻭههە. ﺑننە ڕاست كﺎنمﺎنﻭاڵگریەهە زانیﺎرییە رگە تﺗﺎیﺑەﺑە یﻭپێیەﺑە ﻭهﻭێﺗەلێﺑكە ﺗرسیداریمە
 ﺑلۆمﺎسﯽدی فشﺎری نگﺎﻭیهە ﻭهئە پﺎش پێﻭیسﺗە ڵكﻭﺑە. نییە سﺑە ﻭهئە رهە ڵامﺑە داعش، یﻭهدامركﺎندنە ﺑۆ ﺑێت گرنگ زۆر ئﺎسمﺎنﯽ
 كرﻭههە ڵاﺗداسەده لە سﻭننە شداریپێكردنﯽﺑە ﻭ مﺎلیكﯽ یﻭهﺑﻭﻭنە شیمﺎنپە لە ﺑریﺗییە ﻭیشئە ین،ﺑگە ئﺎمﺎنج ﺑە ﺗﺎ رﺑە ﺑگیرێﺗە
 .حﻭكمكردندا لە تزیەركەلامە جێكردنﯽجێﺑە
 جگە نهﺎ،ﺗەﺑە ئﺎسمﺎنﯽ هێزی كﺎرهێنﺎنﯽﺑە ،نگﺎﻭههە ﻭئە ﺑێﺑە ڵامﺑە. ﺑكرێت ڕزگﺎر عیراق ﺗﻭانرێتده ﻭائە ﺑكﺎت، ﻭهئە مﺎلیكﯽ رگە
 .سﺗدادهلە ﺗێیدا شﺗمﺎن زۆر كە ﻭﻭڵاﺗێكدا لە نییە دیكە هیچﯽ هیلاككلادن خۆ لە
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    بوو ندزامەره كانتوركە بارمتە ئازادكردنی لە داعش بۆچی
      4102/90/32  ئوسلو ئێمری 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
.  ێتبووب تووشی كیەوهتەنە رهە كە یرانقە یرترینسە و گوماناویترین لە كێكەیە داعش توركیاو نێوان  كانیبارمتە یرانیقە
 بارمتە تیانتایبە وانەپاسە و كانتوركە دیپلۆماتە بە سكە 94 ریداگیراوسە بە ستده موسڵ لە توركی گشتی ریكونسوڵگە كاتێ
 كرا؟چۆڵنە كەشوێنە و وهگوازرانەنە سانەكە مئە بۆچی – كردئە یپرسیاره مئە سكە زۆر  كران،
 توركیا" وتی  وهخۆبوونەبە رباوه زۆر بە)  ردۆغانئە(  ونانەلێد ولە كێكیە لە و پێكرد ستیده ركردنده یاننامەبە و لێدوان 
 ".بننە جیهان تێرۆریستی وترینتوندره ستیده لە مانەئە یوهئە كوه ،وهگێرێتەئە كانبارمتە ئاسانی بە زۆر
 ئازادكردنی رسەلە بوون ندزامەڕه داعش و  )PKA() پێدانشەگە دادو(  پارتی كە بیننئە سیاسی داستانی بە مەئە سكە ندێهە
 .كانبارمتە
 توركیا كونسوڵی نموونە بە. كراوهنە ڵگەلە یانڵەمامە بارمتە كوه رگیزهە لامبە داعشدابوون ستیژێرده لە كانبارمتە راستە
 نییە مژهگە نەوهئە داعش. بوو زیاتر رۆژ 001  لە كە یەماوه وئە درێژایی بە بووه تخە رسەلە خۆی یكەمۆبایلە بە ردوامبە
 والگریهە زانیاری كوه كە وهوێتەكەئە لێ ساتێكیكاره چ رچێده مانەئە یوهمانە شوێنی لە ی) سیگنال( هێماكاری بهێلێ كە
 بۆ داتنە نجامئە دژ ربازیانسە ئۆپراسێۆنی كە كردوون دڵنیایی توركیا كە یوهئە قالبی خرایە شمەئە. رێنگەئە بۆی
 . كانبارمتە ئازادكردنی
 كرد ئازاد كانیبارمتە داعش.. بوو گومان یمایە شیانوهڕانەگە, بوو گومان جێگای گرتنیان بارمتە بە تادارهسەلە چۆن كوه
 جێهێشت؟ خۆی دوای ڵامیوه بی پرسیاری ندینچە ڵامبە
 كانبارودۆخە ڵامبە ، ئازادكران كانبارمتە كە بوو باش والێكیهە"  ووروژاند یپرسیاره مئە مریكیمئە دیپلۆماتی یكهاورێە 
 ربازیسە گوشارێكی هیچ ، قێنراتەنە كێفیشە هیچ.  ڕوو نەناخە كانراستیە ، نرێتیەگەئە  توركیاوه میدیای  ناو لە كوه
 رێ؟رامبەبە هیچ بێ كرد ئازادیانی بۆ و گرت بۆ یمانەئە داعش واتەكە ، درانە رانسۆمێ هیچ ، كرانە جێجێبە
 ! داكاره ملە بووبێ كودایەسە جۆره بێئە 
 بۆ داتنە نجامئە دژ لە ربازیانسە ئۆپراسێۆنی كە كردووه دڵنیایانی توركیا كە چنئە وهئە بۆ كانرهبلگە لە زۆر بۆچوونی
 .كانبارمتە ئازادكردنی
 زیاتر  داعش لگەلە  رانوداكەسە لە جگە شقۆناغە مئە ، و وهمێننەئە ڵاموه بێ و نارۆشنی بە پرسیارانە لەگە مئە داكاتە ملە
 . نیە لا لە كانیانڵامەوه تر سیكە
 انخٶی كوه كانراستیە بتوانن تنحكومە نگریلایە یوانەئە یییبەتا بە و توركی میدیای كە مبرواناكە ، گرنگتر مووشیهە لە
 .وداكەسە یپرٶسە باكگراوندی بە ترهبەسە ستمانده یینەبگە
 یسەلەده درٶو و تیوانیەپاڵە شاكاری دروستكردنی بە كات ستده توركی میدیای مرٶوهئە لە كە ریتێكەنە و ئاشكرایە كوه
 وئە ات تر سالێكی تا مكە نیلایە بە مبكە تەبابە مئە لگەلە ماملە ووریایی بە بێئە بٶیە ، یەپرٶسە مبە تبارهسە ستراوڵپەهە
 >وهگێرنەئە ڕووداوه مئە كانیقینەراستە رهاتەسەبە توركی میدیای یكاتە
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 یوههێنانە باسی چٶن بیرمانە لە موومانهە ئٶجالان یسیكە لە.  توركی میدیای اون لە نیە نامٶ و تازه كەیەدیارده مەئە
 ستگیركردنیده لە شێوه هامانبە. كراده ئاساكان وانپاڵە یوهگێرانە باسی و ڵتەمە و توركی میدیای لە كرائە لانئٶجە
 .كەكەپە ناو لە)  ساكیك مددینشە(
 بێ تحكومە بە نزیك واڵیهە كانیرچاوهسە ، داعش توركیاو نێوان لە ڕوویداوه چی بزانی دروستی و تراس بە یوهئە بۆ
 نگریلایە كە یڕانەماڵپە وئە و ئۆپۆزسیۆن كانیرچاوهسە لە كانواڵەهە وایە باشتر بٶیە واڵن،هە یرچاوهسە متمانترین
 . ربگرموه  داعشن
 لە كێكەیە شمەئە كە ،  كاتكارئە توركیا ناو لە  ئازادی بە و ئاشكرا بە و داعشە نگریلایە كە ten.rebahdihveT وێپسایتی
 لە خنەهڕ  یسانەكە وئە ریتویتە كانیككاونتەئە و نخەدائە یوتیوپ و رتویتە توركیا لاتدارانیسەده ، تر كانیگوماناویە تەبابە
 – وركیات ناو لە بكات تێروریستان تجنیدی بكات ندهپروپاگە ئاشكرا بە داعش دائە رێگە لامبە خادائە گرنئە تحكومە تیسیاسە
 .داعش بە دژ ییوهتەنیونە یمانیهاپە پاڵ بچێتە بوونە رازی كە یتوركیایە وئە
 هداو چی لێنیبە توركیا یوهئە كانیرهگەئە بە ررامبەبە رچاوەب مەخەئە خٶم یبٶچوونانە ولە ندێهە ئاسایش كیزایەشاره كوه
 : بكات ئازاد بارمتانە مئە یوهئە بۆ داعش بە
 لە شداریبە داعش یوهكردنە دڵنیا كانیجٶره لە جٶرێك كوه ، پێكردووه كییەئاماژه داعش یكەسایتە كوه:   مكەیە
 زیاتر كاتی و زیاتر ویزه بتوانێ داعش یوهئە بۆ بخات دوا كەئۆپیراسێۆنە كە یەوهئە تریشی رێكیگەئە و ناكات كەیمانیەهاوپە
 اییكٶت بٶ خائە رده ناوبژیوانێك كوه خٶی توركیا وهئە گرتنە ریسە ش مەئە رگەئە و  بێنێ ستده بە سوریا قوولایی  ناو لە
 . توندوتیژی بە هێنان
 ەل. عیراق سوریاو لە بێنێ داعش دوژمنانی بە شكست یوهئە بۆ بدات داعش بە ستراتیژی زانیاری توركیا یەوانەلە:  مووهد
 و انیكۆب لە دهیەپە و پكك كانیتۆكمە گاباره وبنكە رسە بكاتە هێرش یوهئە بۆ و سوریا ناو بۆ داعش پاڵنانی دووباره راستیدا
 دهیەەپ و كەكەپە جموجۆڵی بە تبارهسە پێكراو متمانی واڵگریهە زانیاری بێبە ستراتیژی شوێنی ندینچە راگرتنیسەبە ستده
 . ڕاهێنراون زاوشاره هێزێكە كە كەكەپە تیتایبەبە حاڵەمە
 ، زانیاری ، ربازیسە ، دارایی تییارمە یەانەولە توركیا ، داعش بە وخۆراستە تییارمە و هاوكاری پێدانی بری لە:  مسێیە
 .رێكخستووه كانیاندانوستاندنە شمانەئە و داعشن نگریلایە كە یتانەشیرهعە رۆكسە و خێڵ وئە تەداوه
 
 




 شەرمە بۆ تورکیا لە جیاتی کوردان داعشی هەڵبژاردوە
 هێنری لێڤی-بێرنارد
 
 لە ماوەی چەند سەعاتێکی دیکە یان چەند رۆژێکی دیکە كۆبانێ دەگیرێت.
وە گاڵتەجاڕییەکانی سەرۆکی تورکیا، رەجەب تەیب ئۆردوگانە، کە بە جوڵە بەگیرانی ئەم شارەی سوریا کە قوربانییەکی لێکدانە
و دانانی سوپا بەهێزەکەی لەسەر سنورەکانی سوریا وەک تەماشاکەرێک، تەنیا چەند کیلۆمەترێک لە شارە شەهیدبووەکە، لێبڕین
 واپێدەچێت لە جیاتی کوردان، ئەو داعشی هەڵبژاردبێت. 
  
ەمە دووسەرییەکەی تورکیا. لەکاتێکدا تورکیا رێگەی بە هەرچی جیهادی ناوچەکە هەیە دا بۆ چوونە ناو کۆبانێ دەبێتە قوربانی گ
سوریاو چاوپۆشیشیکرد لە ناردنی چەکی قورس بۆ داعش لەملاوئەولاوە بۆ سەر شارە گەمارۆدراوەکە، ئەو چەکانەی کەوا ئێستا 
و قوژبنێکی داخستوەو رێگەی لە هەموو رکیا هەموو دەرگاو کونبەکاردێن بۆ بۆردومانکردنی کۆبانێ، لە هەمانکاتدا، تو
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و بەستەزمان نیشاندەدا. ئا لەم کاتانەشدا جوڵەی لە هێزە سەربازییەکانی و خۆشی وەک بێتاوانهاتوچونێک بڕیوە بۆ ناو کۆبانێ
 و رزگارکردنی.راستو ئەو دە هەزار کوردە خۆبەخشەش بڕیوە کە هاتونەتە تورکیا بۆ چوون بۆ کۆبانێ بۆ پاخۆی
  
ەک بە و پشتیوانییبەرخودانە لە رادەبەدەر سەرسوڕهێنەرەکەی کۆبانێ کە تا ئێستا سەرکەوتوبووە لەکاتێکدایە کە هیچ کۆمەک
بەرگریکاران نەکراوە لەبەرابەر توندوتوژییە بێوێنەکەی داعش. پێشگرتن لە بەرەوپێشچوونی شەمشەمەکوێرە ئایینییەکان 
و و چەقاندنی ئاڵای ڕەشی خەلافەت نەک تەنیا لە گەڕەکەکانی رۆژهەڵاتو گرتنی کۆبانێە بەرگەنەگرێت. کەوتنلەوانەیە چیدیک
و گردەکانی شارەکە، ئەو شوێنانەی کە لێرە بەدواوە بەڕاستی نیشانەو مانای سیمبولیان باشوری شارەکە بەڵکو لەسەر دوا تەپۆڵک
تا ئێستا کاریگەرییەکانی وەک پێویست درک پێنەکراون، لەوانەیە لە هەندێک شوێن  هەیە، کارەساتێکی جەرگبڕ لە خۆدەگرێت کە
 هەستی پێکرابێت بەڵام بە دڵنیاییەوە لە هەموو وڵاتێک نا. 
  
و ئازایەتییەکی لەباوەڕبەدەر لە و پیاوەکان کە ماوەی چەند هەفتەیەکە تێدەکۆشنئەمە کارەساتێک دەبێت بۆ شەڕڤانە ژنەکان
و نرخێکی لەبەرابەر هێزێکی لەخۆیان پڕچەکتر کە وای لەو شەڕڤانانە کردوە کە قارەمانەتییەکی بێوێنە نیشانبدەن دنخۆنیشاندە
 زۆر ئازیز بدەن. 
ئەمە کارەساتێک دەبێت بۆ شارەکە خۆشی، چونکە داعشییەکان، ئەگەر سەرکەون، ئیدی گل نادرێنەوە، وەک جارانی پێشوو، 
و پەیڕەوانی کەمینە ئایینییەکانیش بەزۆرو زۆرداری لە ئایینەکانیان و سەری سەرکردەکان دەبڕننئەوان ژنان بە کۆیلە دەبە
وەردەگێڕن. ناوی کۆبانێش دەچێتە سەر ئەو لیستە درێژەی شارە شەهیدبووەکان کە لە چەند دەیەی رابردوودا شەهیدکراون، 
) noigeL rodnoCلەلایەن فڕۆکەکانی کۆندۆر لێگیۆن ( )، شارێکی باسکەکان لە ئیسپانیا، کەacinreuGوەک: گورنیکا (
)، شارێکی ئینگلیزیی کە لەلایەن فرۆکەکانی ئەڵمانیا لە شەڕی دووەمی yrtnevoCخاپورکرا؛ کۆڤێنتری ( ٧٣٩١ی ئیسپانی لە 
ایتەختی کەس؛ سەراییڤۆ، پجیهانی تەختکرا؛ ستالینگراد، کە لەلایەن ئەڵمانییەکانەوە گەمارۆدراوو بوو بە مایەی کوژرانی ملیۆنان 
بۆسنە، کە لە ژیاندا ما، بەڵام لە سەرەتای نەوەتەکان یازدە هەزار کەسی تێدا مرد لە ئاکامی گەمارۆ هەزار رۆژییەکەی سەری 
لەلایەن سربییەکانەوە؛ گرۆزنی لە چێچنیا کە کرا بە شاری تارماییەکان لەلایەن شەڕانگێزەکانی پوتین؛ حەلەب لە سوریا کە بە 
و بۆمبەکانی فڕۆکەکانی بەشار ئەسەد بە زیندویی نێژرا؛ ئێستاش ناپالم  و جوانییەکانی لەڕێگەیەموو گەوهەرو شارستانیه
 ) دەکرێت. edicibruکۆبانێ، کە زۆربەمان تا ماوەیەک پێش ئێستا هەر بە بوونیشمان نەدەزانی، وا خەریکە شارکوژ (
  
گەرییەکانی دەگاتە ئەودیو جوگرافیای کۆبانێ. بۆ کوردستانێکی عەلمانی دووبارە شارکوژکردنی کۆبانێ کارەساتێکە کە کاری 
و رێزگرتن لە یاسا، ئەو بەهایانەی کە دیبلۆماتە رۆژئاواییەکان زیندوبوونەوەی (ئەگەر بوونی هەر هەبێت) بەهاکانی میانڕەوی
ە پڕ بە مانای وشە تاکە هێزی وەگەرکەوتون لە دژی خۆزگە بە بوونیان دەخوازن لە دنیای ئیسلامدا، لەگەڵ ئەو پێشمەرگانە ک
سەربەخۆ راگەیندراوەکەیان. وەک -، لەسەر سەنگەرەکانی وڵاتە خۆبەخۆو ڕووبەڕوو لە دژیان دەجەنگنحەشاماتەکەی داعش
 بەئاشکرا ئاگادارین ئەوان لەوێدا نەک بەرگری لە کوردستان بەڵکو لە تەواوی مرۆڤایەتی دەکەن.
کۆبانێ تەنیا سیمبوڵێک نییە بەڵکو کلیلێکە، بۆیە کەوتنی کارەساتێکە نەک هەر بۆ کوردان بەڵکو بۆ هاوپەیمانان، لەبەرئەوەی   
کە بۆ ئەوان سەنگەرێکی پێشەوەی دابڕاوە. هاوپەیمانییەک کە ئێستا بە چاوی خۆی دەبینێت داعشە بەربەرییەکان خاکێکی 
و ستراتیجی سەدان کیلۆمەتر دەبێت لەسەر سنورەکانی تورکیا، گرنگی تاکتیکیبەربڵاویان بۆ خۆیان قرتاندوە کە درێژییەکەی 
 کۆبانێ ئا لێرەدا دەردەکەوێت. 
  
 بۆ رێگریکردن لەو ماڵوێرانییە، ئێمە نەک هەر کاتێکی ئێجگار کەممان بەدەستەوەیە، بەڵکو قسەکردن لە کات هەر مانای نەماوە. 
ان چڕبکەنەوە، بەڵام چۆن هێرشی ئاسمانی ئەنجامدەدەیت لە کاتێکدا کە شەڕ لەنێو هاوپەیمانەکان دەکرێت هێرشە ئاسمانییەک
 کۆبانێ بووە بە شەڕی دەستەویەخە، کۆڵان بە کۆڵان، ماڵ بە ماڵ لەناو و قەراغەکانی شار. 
ەکان توانای هاوپەیمانەکان دەکرێت بڕیاردەن کە چەک بنێرن بۆ شەڕڤانەکان. تەنانەت بەبێ هاوکاری تورکیاش، هاوپەیمان
و هاوکارییەکان نەبن بە مایەی راستکردنەوەی تەرازوی هێز لۆجستیان هەیە ئەم کارە ئەنجامبدەن. خۆ ئەگەر ئەم کارە نەکەن
، و تابە دەستکەوتووە)و ساروخی پێشکەوتوو دەبابەیان لە جبەخانەکانی موسڵ(کە چەکی قورس لەلایەک لەنێوان جیهادییەکان
و چەند هاوەنێکیان بە دەستەوەیە) ئەوە و دی ئێف دی ئێس(کە تەنیا کڵاشینکۆف  ردییەکان، لە لاکەی دیکەلەبەرابەر هێزە کو
و مافی ئەوەیان هەیە ئەو کارە بکەن کە کاتی خۆی لە بۆسنیا نەیانکرد، ئەو بۆسنیایەی، کە وەک خەڵکی ئەم دنیایە ئازادی
گریکردن لە خۆی، بەڵام ئەوەی بەدەستمانەوە نەماوە ئەوە کاتە. کاتمان کۆبانێی کوردان، کە بەرگری لە ئێمە دەکرد بە بەر
و گەیاندنی چەک لەڕێگەی ئاسمانەوە بۆ خەڵکە گەمارۆدراوو لە مەنگەنەدراوەکەی کۆبانێ... کات... کات، پێویستە بۆ رێکخستن
 ئەوەیە کە بەدستمانەوە نییە.
  
 وە ماوە بۆ رزگارکردنی کۆبانێ، ئەو رێگایەش تورکیایە.ئا لەم دوا ساتەوەختەدا، تاکە یەک رێگە بەدەستە 
و حوکمەکانی تەمومژاوی بوون بە خولیایی ترسی دیتنی دەوڵەتێکی ساوای کوردی راست لە دەرەوەی ئۆردوگان، کە تێگەیشتن
نێ ەنگەی کۆباسنورەکانی، دەبێت جارێکی دیکە بەهۆش خۆی بهێنرێتەوە کە داعش کەمتر دوژمنی تورکیا نییەو ئەوە دەنگەد
 ئەوە راست بۆ تورکیایە. 
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ە لە زیادبووندان، ئەو رژێمەی ک ئەو دەبێت تێبگەیەنرێت کە ئەگەر رژێمە تاریکەکەی، کە رۆژبەڕۆژ مەیلە ئۆتۆریتارییەکانی 
نێتەوە کە بمێئێستا لە هەموو کاتێک زیاتر لە بنەما عەلمانییە کەمالیستەکان دوورکەوتۆتەوە، ئەگەر بیەویت شانسی ئەوەی بۆ 
ببێت بە شەریکێکی ئابوری لەگەڵ ئەوروپا (دواتریش، شەراکەتی سیاسی دروستبکات)، ئەوەی نوخبەی سیاسی تورکی خەونی 
رە لە خۆی و بەرگری ئەو شاو وڵاتەکەی بە جدی پێویستیی پێیەتی، ئەوە دەبێت بزانێت کە ئەو شانسەی بە کۆبانێپێوەدەبینێت
یاوەکانی و پو کۆمەکانەی پێشکەش بە شەڕڤانە قارەمانە ژنەکانتورکیا دەوەستێتە سەر ئەو یارمەتیتێپەڕدەبێت. ئەو شانسەی 
 شارە ئابڵوقەدراوەکە دەکرێن.
و بە ئۆردوگان بڵێین، جا بە فەرمی یان بە نافەرمی، کە شەڕ لە دژی داعش ساتەوەختی بەڵام دەبێت لەوەش زیاتر بڕۆین
نەبێت قەت دەرناکەوێت. مەبەست لێرە دەرکەوتنی راستییەکانە بۆ ئەو هاوپەیمانییەو ئەو سیستمی دەرکەوتنی راستییەکانە، ئێستا 
ئاسایشە دەستەجەمعییەی کە لە سەروبەندی کۆتایی شەڕی دووەمی جیهانی لە ناوچەکە دامەزرا، سیستمێک کە تورکیا تێیدا 
 وەوە. ٢٥٩١رۆژهەڵاتی ناتۆ لە ئەندامێکی لە ئاسایی زیاترە، بەوەی کە تورکیا بووە بە کۆڵەگەی 
  
 ، تورکیا زۆر بە نابەدڵی بەشداری ئەو ئۆپەراسیۆنانەی کرد کە بۆ پاراستنی مەدەنییەکانی باکوری عێراق رێکخران.١٩٩١لە  
تەو ڵا، پەرلەمانی تورکیا، لە دەنگدانێکدا کە تارماییەکی درێژخایەنی خستە سەر پەیوەندییەکانی نێوان ئەو و٣٠٠٢ی ئازاری ١لە 
هەزار لە سوپای ئەمریکادا بە تێپەڕبوون بە ناو خاکی تورکیا لە  ٢٦هاوپەیمانەکانی لە رۆژئاوا، دەنگی لە دژی رێگەدان بە 
 رێگەیاندا بۆ هێرشکردنە سەر عێراق، رێگەیان بە دانانی بنکەش بۆ هێزەکانی ئەمریکا لەناو تورکیا نەدا.
ئەگەر کۆبانێ ببێت بە ناوێک بۆ فەڵتەیەکی دیکەی تورکیا، ئا ئەوەیان جێگەی ئەگەر تورکیا بۆ جاری سێیەم رێگری بکات، 
 دوارۆژی لە ناتۆ دەکەوێتە ژێر گومان. –لێبوردن نییە 
  
 نێردراوە تایبەتییەکانی سەرۆک باراک ئۆباما کە لەم رۆژانە گەیشتونەتە ئەنقەرە دەبێت ئەمانە بە ڕوونی بە تورکیا بگەیەنن. 
فرانسۆ هۆلاند، کە چەندین نیشانەی دۆستایەتی بە تورکیا نیشانداوە، دەبێت رۆڵی قسەکەری هاوپەیمانەکانی  سەرۆکی فەرەنسا،
 و بە ئۆردوگان بڵێت کە کۆبانێ شورای ئەوروپایە.فەرەنسا ببینێت
 ئا لێرە، وەک ئابڵوقەکەی مەدرید، هەموو دنیا دەبێت رابگەیەنێت: "نابێت لێرە تێپەڕبن." 
   
 هێنری لێڤی-ەورە فەیلەسوفی فەرەنسی بێرناردنوسینی: گ




    كوردی اریهبە بە بوو بیرهعە هاریبە
  چﺎﻭ چﯽ ﺗﺎنگ 
 4102/90/31
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 رێمەهە ﻭﺑە شپێشكە هﺎﻭكﺎرییﺎن ﺗیشڵەنێﻭده ڵﯽكۆمە كﻭردسﺗﺎن، رێمﯽهە رسەكرده ﺗﻭندی هێرشﯽ داعش رێكخراﻭی مدﻭاییەﺑە
 .راكێشﺎ خۆیدا لایﺑە كﺎنیشﯽچینییە سۆزی داعش، یهێرشﺎنە ﻭئە ڵكﻭﺑە ،مەئە رهە كنە كرد،
 
 ﺗﻭركیﺎیﺎن ڵاﺗﯽخۆرهە ﺑﺎشﻭﻭری كﺎنﯽكﻭرده نﺎﻭچە لە چینﯽ ندیﺎزیﺎریئە سێ رفﺎندنﯽ ﻭاڵﯽهە میدیﺎكﺎن ﺑردنە یندهﻭهئە
 ئﺎمﺎنج؟ ﺗەكردﻭﻭه كﺎنﯽچینییە كﻭردسﺗﺎن كرێكﺎرانﯽ پﺎرﺗﯽ ﺑۆچﯽ :ﺑڵێن ﻭ نﺑكە پرسیﺎر كرد كﺎنچینییە لە ﻭای شمەئە ،ﻭهﺑڵاﻭكرده
 كە ڕاسﺗدانﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽخۆرهە لە نﻭێیە كﯽدایەحەﺗە ،دایەﻭهرزﺑﻭﻭنەﺑە لە میشەهە كە كﻭرد یلەسەمە ﻭائە ﺑێت، رچۆنێكهە كەڵامەﻭه




 یەنزیك یەكێشە مئە ،ڵداﻭهریهەسە ﻭهڕاسﺗەنﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽخۆرهە ئﺎڵۆزی دۆخﯽ هۆیﺑە كە یییﺎنەﻭهﺗەنە كێشە ﻭلە كێكەیە كﻭرد پرسﯽ
 كﺎنﯽەﺗحكﻭمە لە داﻭا كﻭرد كە ﻭهﺑینێﺗەده داﻭهلە خۆی شﻭهئە كﻭرد، یلەسەمە ﻭﺗرێتده پێﯽ ﻭ كۆنﺗره سﺗنلەفە یكێشە لە دهسە نیﻭ
 .ندهﺑ پێ خۆییﺎنرﺑەسە یﺎن ئۆﺗۆنۆمﯽ یرێگە ﻭ نﺑكە زیﺎد كﺎنیﺎنییەﻭهﺗەنە مﺎفە پﺎنﺗﺎیﯽ ﻭ ﺑنێن یﺎنداكەنﺎسنﺎمە ﺑە دان كﺎتده
 
 ڵاﺗﯽخۆرهە یﻭهﺗەنە ﺗرینﻭرهگە مچﻭاره ﻭ ﺑﻭﻭن شداﺑە ئێران ﻭ عیراق ﻭ سﻭریﺎ ﻭ ﺗﻭركیﺎ ﺗﯽﻭڵەده رچﻭارهە نێﻭانلە كﻭرد
 .كرێتده ندهزهمە سكە ملیۆن 03 ﺑە یﺎنژمﺎره كە سﺗەڕانﺎﻭه
  
 ڵامﺑە دا، كﻭرد ﺑە ﺗیﺎنﻭڵەده ڵێنﯽﺑە یمﺎنهﺎﻭپە ﻭڵاﺗﺎنﯽ كﺎﺗێك پێكرد، سﺗﯽده جیهﺎنﯽ مﯽكەیە نگﯽجە دﻭای لە كﻭرد یكێشە
 ،ﻭهپﺎرشە چﻭار ﺑە كرد كﻭردسﺗﺎنیشﺎن ڵكﻭﺑە ،ﻭهئە رهە كنە ،ﻭهزﺑﻭﻭنەپﺎشگە ڵێنەﺑە ﻭلە ﻭهﺗﻭركە زایﯽنﺎڕه هۆیﺑە یمﺎنﺎنهﺎﻭپە
 جۆری ندینچە ﻭ زیگەره جیﺎﻭازیﯽ ڕﻭﻭیرﻭﺑە كﻭرد نرێت،نە دا كﻭرد ینﺎسنﺎمە ﺑە دان زۆر كﯽیەمﺎﻭه ﺑۆ ﻭایكرد شمەئە
 ﺑۆ ﯽكرهسە رێكﯽفﺎكﺗە ﺗەﺑﻭﻭه ﻭ ﻭهﺗەمﺎﻭه رسەهچﺎر ﺑێﺑە كﻭرد یلەسەمە ﺗﺎئێسﺗﺎ ﻭﻭهﺑﻭﻭنە ﺗﯽڵایەكۆمە ﻭ ئﺎﺑﻭﻭری ﻭﺗﻭﻭیﯽدﻭاكە
 .ﻭهكﻭرده یكێشە ﺑە ندیدارنیﻭهپە كە داﻭڵاﺗﺎنە ﻭلە ﻗﺎمگیرینﺎسە
 
 ﻭﻭ،ﺑ مكەیە جیهﺎنیﯽ نگﯽجە دﻭای ﻗۆنﺎغﯽ ش،لانەهە ﻭئە ﺑﺎشﺗرین ،ﺑﻭﻭههە خۆیﯽرﺑەسە ﺑۆ زێڕینﯽ لێكﯽهە ندچە كﻭرد مێژﻭﻭدا، لە
 ﺑﻭﻭنە عیراق لە مریكﺎئە نگﯽجە ردﻭﻭهە 3002 ﻭ 1991 سﺎڵانﯽ لە پﺎشﺎن. سﺗچﻭﻭدهلە یلەهە ﻭئە كﻭرد ﻭهداخەﺑە مڵاﺑە
 ﻭ ﻭﻭهنغرۆكرد ڕاسﺗﯽنﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽخۆرهە كە ئێسﺗﺎ یییەرهرﻭﺑەﺑێسە مئە ڵگەلە كﻭرد، نﻭﻭسﯽچﺎره یﻭهﺑﻭﻭنە كلایﯽیە ﺑۆ دﻭﻭڕیﺎنێك
 ۆیەﺑ ست،ده ﺗەﻭﺗﻭﻭهكە یدیكە سﺗراﺗیژیﯽ لێكﯽهە كﻭرد دا،كەنﺎﻭچە لە جﻭگرافﯽ ﻭ جیۆسیﺎسﯽ یخشەنە یﻭهێشﺎنەك شﺎنﯽشﺎنﺑە
 ."كﻭردی هﺎریﺑە" ﺑۆ گۆڕدرا رپﺎﺑﻭﻭ،ﺑە 1102 سﺎڵﯽ یﺑییەرهعە هﺎرهﺑە ﻭئە ﺑﻭﺗرێت كرێتده
 
 نﺎﻭچە رسەﺑە سﺗگرﺗنده ﻭ خۆی كداریچە هێزی زراندنﯽدامە ﺑۆ ﻭهﻗۆسﺗە یییەرهرﻭﺑەﺑێسە ﻭئە لﯽهە سﻭریﺎ لە كﻭرد
 عیراق، كﻭردی یهﺎﻭشێﻭه ﻭانئە ئێسﺗﺎ زراند،دامە خۆیرﺑەسە خۆجێیﯽ ﺗێكﯽحكﻭمە ﻭ سﺗﺎنﻭهنە ﻭهشەمەﺑە رهە كﺎندا،كﻭردییە
 مكەیە ﻭپێنراﻭهسە ریﺎنداسەﺑە سﺎڵە 001 یمﺎﻭه یمﺎرۆیەگە ﻭئە شكﺎندنﯽ لە ﻭﺗﻭﻭﺑﻭﻭركەسە كﻭرد ﺗﻭركیﺎش لە ن،ﺑەدهڕێﻭهﺑە خۆیﺎن
 ڵگەلە. ڵگرﺗﺑێتهە كﻭردی یﻭشە یداكەنﺎﻭه لە مجﺎرهكەیە كە زرادامە یﺎسﺎیﯽ ﺑە) كﻭرد دیمﻭكراﺗﯽ پﺎرﺗﯽ( نﺎﻭیﺑە كﻭردی حزﺑﯽ
 ﻭرﻭپﺎئە ﻭ مریكﺎئە كە شكﺎنەچە ﻭئە تنﺎنەﺗە م،ردهﺑەﺗەﻭههﺎﺗﻭ خۆیﯽرﺑەسە لﯽهە كﻭرد عیراق، نﺎﻭ ململانێكﺎنﯽ یﻭهﻗﻭڵﺑﻭﻭنە
 نڵێده زۆرێك كﻭرد، ررامﺑەﺑە خۆرئﺎﻭا ﺗﯽسیﺎسە گۆڕینﯽ ﺑۆ ﻭهدرێﺗەلێكده گرنگ كﯽیەئﺎمﺎژه كﻭه كﻭرد، ﺑە نیدهده ﻭخۆراسﺗە
 .رێتگﻭزهده پیﺎیدا عیراق یییەرهرﻭﺑەەﺑێس ﻭئە ﺗﯽسﺎیە لە تﺗﺎیﺑەﺑە نییە ﻭخە كﻭرد یﻭهجیﺎﺑﻭﻭنە چیﺗر
 
 ەحﺗە جۆر چﻭار لە خۆی كە ،ﻭهﺗەﺑﻭﻭه ڕﻭﻭیرﻭﺑە چین ﺗﯽدیپلۆمﺎسیە كە یدایﺎنەحەﺗە ﻭلە كێكیە كﻭرد، پرسﯽ ڵگەلە كردنڵەمﺎمە
 ﺑﺎس كە هﻭگرێﺗەكنەیە چین یمﺎیەﺑنە ﻭئە ڵگەلە ﻭردك یﻭهجیﺎﺑﻭﻭنە نگەره م،كەیە: ﻭهﺑینێﺗەده چین ﺗﯽسیﺎسە مردهﺑە نگﯽئﺎسﺗە ﻭ
 ندنﯽسەشەگە ڵگەلە م،دﻭﻭه. یەهە ﻭهچینە ﺑە ندییﺎنیﻭهپە كە داترنەﻭه ﻭڵاﺗﺎنە ﻭئە نﺎﻭخۆی كﺎرﻭﺑﺎری لە ستده چین كﺎتده ﻭهلە
 كﺎنیدایەكیەرهده ندییەﻭهرژهﺑە پﺎراسﺗنﯽ نگﯽئﺎسﺗە مردهﺑەلە چین عیراق، لە تﺗﺎیﺑەﺑە كﺎندا،كﻭردییە نﺎﻭچە لە چین كﺎنﯽندییەﻭهرژهﺑە
 یﯽشەمیهە ندامﯽئە چین یﻭپێیەﺑە م،سێیە. ﺑپﺎرێزێت عیراق ندیﯽنﺎﻭه ﺗﯽحكﻭمە ﻭ كﻭرد نێﻭان سﺗیﺎریهە نگیﯽهﺎﻭسە ﻭێتیەده ﻭ
 ﻭ كﺎنﯽمرۆییە پرسە ئﺎست لە خۆی رپرسیﺎرێﺗیﯽﺑە پێﻭیسﺗە ،یشﺗﻭﻭهپێگەﺗﺎزه یهﻭرگە ﻭڵاﺗﺎنﯽ ﻭ ﺗﯽﻭڵەنێﻭده ئﺎسﺎیشﯽ نﯽنجﻭمەئە
 سﺗﺎنﻭهسﺗەهد ڕاسﺗدانﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽخۆرهە كﺎنﯽﻭرهگە منییەئە كێشە ئﺎست لە نﺎشﺑێت كە یﻭهلەجگە مەئە سﺗۆ،ئەﺑگرێﺗە كﺎنمینیەكە مﺎفﯽ
 ینچ ڕﻭﻭیرﻭﺑە كە یكێشﺎنە ﻭئە ررامﺑەﺑە ڕاستنﺎﻭه ڵاﺗﯽخۆرهە ﻭڵاﺗﺎنﯽ لە ندێكهە ﻭێسﺗﯽڵهە رچﺎﻭگرﺗنﯽﺑەلە ﺑە م،چﻭاره. ﺑێت
 كﻭه كەیراده ﺗﺎ شمەئە ﺑكﺎت، كﻭرد لە پشﺗیﻭانﯽ ككینپە ﺗﯽحكﻭمە خﻭازیﺎرن رنێتئینﺗە رسەلە كﺎنچینییە لە زۆرێك ،ﻭهﺗەﺑﻭﻭه
 .چین ﺗﯽدیپلۆمﺎسیە رسەﺑخرێﺗە كە دێت لێ یﻭڵاﺗە ﻭئە گشﺗیﯽ رای گﻭشﺎری
 ریﺗەنە ﻭ ﻗﺎمگیریسە ﻭ ئﺎسﺎیش ﻭ چین كﺎنﯽییەﻭهﺗەنە ﻭ منﯽئە ندییەﻭهرژهﺑە ﺑە ندیشﯽیﻭهپە ﻭ ئﺎڵۆزه زۆر كﻭرد پرسﯽ كﻭرﺗﯽ،ﺑە
  .ەنیی سﺗداده رﺑەلە یﺑژارده ندهﻭهئە ﻭخۆ،راسﺗە یﻭهڕﻭﺑﻭﻭنەرﻭﺑە لەجگە چینیش ،یەهە ﻭهشەكەنﺎﻭچە كﺎنﯽمرۆییە ﻭ ﺗﯽﻭڵەنێﻭده
  293
 كﺎنﺗییەڵایەكۆمە زانسﺗە ﺑۆ چین كﺎدیمیﺎیئە – ئﺎسیﺎ خۆرئﺎﻭای ﻭ فریقﺎئە یﻭهﺗﻭێژینە رینﺗەسە لە پسپۆڕ – چﺎﻭ چﯽ ﺗﺎنگ
 




 بۆ دەبێ ئەمەریکا یارمەتی کوردان بدا؟ 
 فەرید زەکەریا
 
یاتر ووەكان لەوه زئایا پێویستە وڵاتە یەكگرتشڵەژاو و سەرلێشێوێنەره. بارۆدوخەكە لە عێراق زۆر مەترسیداره، لەگەڵ ئەوەشدا 
 دەسوەردەدات، دەی مرۆیی ئەگەر ئەمەریكا لەبەر لایەنیداڕوخاندان.  ئەو كۆمەلگایانەی لە ژیر هەڕەشەی بكەن بۆ یارمەتیدانی
 لەمڕووەوه ئەبێ بیرمان بۆچی تیدایە؟  بۆ لە سوریا نایکا؟ كە زۆر ترسناكتر و خراپتر دەرئەکەوێ و هەروەها كومەڵكوژیشی
 ڕوا؟ب
  
بۆ عێراق، لەگەڵ ئەوەشدا پێموایە لەم  ئەمەریكا سەبارەت بە گەڕانەوەی من بە وریایەوە ئەڕوانمە ئەو جەختكردنەوەیەی
كەش ، ڕاهێنان پێشبەكاربێنی ئاسمانی ئوباما زۆر بەهێزتر و بە ئومێدەوه دەسوەربدات، هێزی ئێستادا، دەبێ ئیدارەی بارودۆخەی
 بۆ؟ كرد.  ئەگەر پێویستی بكات و چەك ببەخشێ
 
 ئەو قەیرانە مرۆییەی عێراق زۆر مەترسیدار و سامناكە، لە هەمان کاتدا، هاوشێوەی سوریا، ئایا دەسوەردانی دەركەوتنی
 یوئێستا لە عیراق ڕێڕەوێك هەیە، كە وادەكات پاساڕوون هەیە كە بە كارببرێ؟  لە ڕاستیدا یارمەتیدەره، ئایا پلانێكی سەربازی
کە  -ئەمەریكا هەیە بۆ بەرژەوەندییەکانی ئێستا لە عێراق ئەگوزەرێ مەترسی ببەخشێ بە كردەی ئەمەریكا. ئەوەی ستراتیجی
 كوردستانە لەو وڵاتەدا.  هەرێمی
  
كومەڵگاکەیان هێرشیان بكرێتە سەر و  لە عێراقدا پاراستووه لەوەی ساڵ ئەڕوا، ئەمەریكا كوردەكانی ٣٢ەوە، بۆ ١٩٩١لە ساڵی
 ئەمەریكا و ڕۆژئاوا لە بیبابانی مۆدێرنی لیبراڵی هاوپەیمانی ساڵەدا، كوردەكان توانیان مێرگێكی ٣٢ئەو  لە ماوەیداروخێت. 
 ڕۆژهەڵاتدا،بینابكەن.
  
ئەمەو  لە ئاینده.  ، جیهانیی، چاوكراوەی عێراق لەوەدایە ببێتە شوێنێكی كوردستانی زۆر خودموختاری تارادەیەكی هەرێمی
 خواردنی ، پیشانگا زەبەلاحەکانی ئۆتۆمبیل هەروەها كۆشكیبیناسازی گەورەی باش، كەرەستەی ئابورییەكی پەرەسەندنی
 خێرا(ماکدۆناڵدی ئەمەریکی)، ڕۆژانە لە گەشەدایە. 
  
 مودێرن و جێگایەکە بۆ گفتوگۆی یبەوە دەستنیشان ئەکرێ کە شوێنێکە بۆ پەروەردە ئەمەریكیش لە سلێمانی زانكۆی
 رانەگەیەنن، كاربكەن خۆیان بكەن، سەربەخۆیی دواڕۆژی ئەوەیان گرتووەتە ئەستۆ كە گرەنتی سەركرده كوردەكان ئەركیكراوه. 
 نیبو سەپاندسوریا بکەن. كوردەکان هێزێك بوونە  لە توركیا، هاوکاریی مرۆیی ئاوارەكانی كوردی تیرۆری هێنانی بۆ كۆتایی
 بێ سەروبەردا.  لە ناوچەیەكی سەقامگیری
  
ئەبێ كە  ڕابردوود ئەوه بووه دەستیوەردان كاتێك سوودی ساڵی ٠٦ ئەمەریكا لە ماوەی دەرەوەی سیاسەتی یەكێك لە وانەكانی
ها بكرێن هەروە اساوه ڕێبەرایەتیو پشت ئەستور بە ی میللی خەڵکی ئەو ناوچانەی دەسیان تێوەردەدات لە لایەن سەركردەیەكی
 سودی ڤێتنام دەستێوەردان بكە بە باشوری باشور بكەرەوه و بەراوردی بیر لە كوریایبیانەوێ بۆ مەبەستێك و ئامانجێك بجەنگن. 
 دەڤەرەكە خۆیان شەڕیان نەئەكرد.  نەبوو كاتێ خەڵكانی
  
ییش. ئەوان سوپایەکی بەهێز و مەشقپێكراویان هەیە. سەركردەكانیان بجەنگن، بۆ سەربەخۆ كوردەكان ئەیانەوێ بۆ ئازادی
ئۆباما  رەیئیدا ئەمەریكایە.  ئەمەریكابوون و ئێستا زۆریان پێویست بە یارمەتی نزیكی جەماوری و یاسایین، ئەوان هاوپەیمانێکی
 * ------------------------------------------------------------ئەبێ بە دەنگیانەوه بچێت. 
 
 erauqs cilbup labolgفەرید زەکەریا، ڕۆژنامەنوسێکی ئەمەریکی بە ڕەچەڵەک هندییە، پێشکەشکاری بەرنامەی( 
 .NNCە لە کەناڵی )SPG
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 خۆدا ربەوتی سەتێكی نەوڵەده م بوون بەردهبەكوردستانی عێراق لە
 ر هێلمانكریستۆفە
 
 ركووكدا جێگیربوون،كه ش لهرگهكانی پێشمهی داعش شاری موسڵیان گرت و هێزهوهی ڕابردوو پاش ئهممهپێنج شه
دا. م دواییهی ئهو كێشانهبن له ناچێت دۆڕاوه وهرێمی كوردستان لهتی ههحكومه ی كهوهت بهبارهووتارێكم نووسی سه
بێت. بێگومان پێنج یان هیچ كڕیاری نهكهوتیهنه شتیهك دوو كهروهبێت. ههڕكردنی نهتوانای شه رگهكانی پێشمههێزه
ژێر هێرشی  وێتهوز) بكهی سهتی ناوچهتایبهغدا (بهبه بدات كه رۆك ئۆباما ڕێگهچوو سهدههن وهی پێشوو لهممهشه
  تی عیراق؟قامگیری و فیدراڵیهتی و سهلامهسه مریكا مالیكی لانابات تا دڵنیلبێت لهڵام ئایا ئه. بهوهداعشه
 
 بوو. وادیارههه و ووتارهر ئهسهمان بۆچوونیان لهر ههین خوێنهندك چهروهبوو. هه ڵهی پێشووم ههو وتارهخێر، ئهنه
ژێر هێرشدا بێت. غدا لهی بهخانهفڕۆكه كه یههه وهنگۆی ئه. دهكانی خۆیان گرتووهباشی ناوچهكان زۆر بهكورده
ی ناوچه كانی لهمریكاش دیبلۆماتهتی ئهبارانكرد. حكومهتیان گوللهری حكومهفسهدان ئهسه حمانهداعش زۆر بێ ڕه
 نوری مالیكی كرد كه رۆك ئۆباماش داوای لهغدا. سهبه تهئێران پاسداریان ناردوه وترێت كه. دهوهكشێنێتهوزدا دهسه
  ر بكات.سهكی دیبلۆماتی چارهیهشێوهبه كهیرانهقه
 
بێ به وهریتانیهری بهن داگیركهلایهڕابردوودا لهكانی لهوت، سنوورههكردهكی ئاسان دهك پارویهوه تاوهرهسهعێراق له
 یهوهكان، ئهت كوردهتایبهیزانن، بهموان دهئێستا هه ی كهو ڕاستیه. ئهكان كێشراوهتیهچینایه جیاوازییه گوێدانه
  ناگرێت. وهكهیهكی زۆر خۆی بهیهبۆ ماوه م عێراقهئه  كه
 
كۆمپانیاكانی  ك لهریه. ههوتی لیبیا زیاترهی نهڕێژهش لهمه، ئهوتهنه رمیلهملیار به 54نی ئێستادا خاوه ردستان لهكو
م و ئه وهبدۆزنه وتی تازهنه كو بیرهتاوه رفكردووهكوردستان سهئێكسۆن و شێڤرۆن و تۆتاڵ ملیاران دۆلاریان له
  كرێت.ند دهسهپه وهرێمی كوردستانهتی ههمهن حكولایهش لهیهپرۆسه
 
ساڵ ده ركوكدا، كهكانی كهلاحهبهزه وتهنه ر بیرهسهبه گرتووهستی نهرێمی كوردستان تا ئێستا دهتی ههحكومه
ی وتێكی دیكهنه ر بیرههك ههێنا. وهم دهرههڕۆژێكدا بهوتی لهنه رمیلهزار بههه 056ڕی توانایدا وپهر و لهوبهمهله
ڵ گهستی لهساڵی پێشوو گرێبه غدادا بوون كهوتی بهتی نهزارهڵاتی وهسهژێر دهركوك لهكانی كهباشوور، بیره
یان  وهركوكهكه دا، به PB ڵ گهبوون له ستهم گرێبهكان دژی ئهكان. كوردهی بیرهوهمۆركرد بۆ بوژاندنه PBكۆمپانیای 
  م بێنێت.رههرمیل بهزار بههه 004 ڕۆژانه كه توانایدایهرێمی كوردستان لهركووك، ههكه بێبه
 
 نیاز نییهبه رگهی ئێستا هێزی پێشمهوپێیهمیژوو، به ئێستا ببێته غداوهن بهلایهركوك لهكۆنتڕۆڵ كردنی كه نگهڕه
ی زراوهدامه ت بهتایبه نگافورهزانكۆی نیشتیمانی سه دداد لهننار حهجێیبهێڵێت. فهببێت و به و شارهرداری ئهستبهده
و م ئهكهستدهوا هه نها منم كهتی :"ئایا تهر نووسیویهتی تویتهڵایهی كۆمهر پێگهسهڕاست لهڵاتی ناوهخۆرهه
م ڵام لهكرێت بهر دهسهداهاتوودا له ی لهورهڕێكی گهشه ك وادیار بوو كهروهبوو ههورهكی گهیهكێشه ی كهركووكهكه
  !"وهكلاكرایهیه كهوو ڕۆژێكدا كێشهی شهماوهدا لهدواییه
 
 واتهتوانێت خۆی یاسا بۆ خۆی دابنێت. كهركوك دواجار دهكه ی ڕابردوو، وادیارهند رشۆژهم چهكانی ئهدوای ڕووداوه
ی غدا ئیدانهبه ی كهوانهتوركیا پڕكراون، ئه له ی كهوانهپڕ كراون؟ ئه دێت كه ردیانهوكه وتییهنه شتییهو كهچی له
 ئێستاش له نگهبیانكڕێت؟ ڕه سێك تۆمار بكات كهر كهر ههسهداوای یاسایی له ی كرد كهوهی ئهشهڕهكردن و هه
، كردنهشهگه خۆیی كوردستان ڕووی لهربهی سهلهسهمه ستادا كهئێ ڵام له. بهوهغریب و ماڵتا بسوڕێنهكانی مهنارهكه
غدا ی بهوهران نابن لهنێن و نیگهلا دهكانیان وهوت گشت دوودڵیهتێیدا كڕیارانی نه بێت كه وهئه یهفتهم ههئه نگهڕه
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  وتی كوردستان.نێن بۆ كڕینی نهنگاو دهڵكو هه، بهوهوتهشی نهلیستی ڕه بیانكاته
 
رێمی كوردستان تی ههو حكومه وهكرێتهڕووی كوردستاندا دهكردن بهناردهرگای لافاوی ههدات، دهڕووده مهكاتێك ئه
لاحی بهتێكی زهوڵهده و بوونهرهنێت بهنگاو دهئێستادا هه له ی كهتهو حكومهندی، ئهمهوڵهڕی دهوپهئه نێتهیهگهده
  جیهاندا. وت لهنه
 
  حمودوا مهرگێڕانی: ڕهوه




 ێنێتدەه شکست داعش بەرەنگاربوونەوەی لە مریكائە تیستراتیژیە
 31  4102/01/  :84:01 
 دحمەئە هﺎﻭڕاز – ندانخە
 ۆﺑﺎنێ،ك كۆنﺗڕۆڵكردنﯽ لە یﺎنﻭهنزیكﺑﻭﻭنە ﻭ ختپﺎیﺗە غدایﺑە ڕۆژئﺎﻭای لە عیراق سﻭپﺎی لە كﻭشنده گﻭرزێكﯽ شﺎندنﯽﻭه دﻭایلە 
 .نكەده پۆشردهپە یﺎنكەشكسﺗە جیﺎﻭاز ﻭﻭیﺑیﺎنﺑە شكەﻭڵاﺗە رپرسﺎنﯽﺑە ﻭ ﻭهﺑۆﺗە نزیك مریكﺎئە یكەﺗەسﺗراﺗیژیە رگﯽمە
 مریكﺎﻭئە كە شئﺎسمﺎنیﺎنە هێرشە ﻭئە ﻭ ڵاﺗیدایەسەده سنﻭﻭری  فراﻭانكردنﯽ لە داعش سﻭریﺎدا ﻭ عیراق ﻭڵاﺗﺎنﯽ ردﻭﻭهە لە
 یهﻭسڕینە ﻭ لاﻭازكردن" سﺗﯽﺑەمەﺑە مﺎشئۆﺑﺎ یپلانە ﻭئە. ﺑﻭﻭهنە ﻭای نجﺎمێكﯽئە سﻭریﺎ، ﻭ عیراق لە نجﺎمیﺎنداﻭهئە یمﺎنﺎنهﺎﻭپە
 .هێنﺎﻭهسﺗنەدهﺑە  ﻭﺗۆیئە ﻭﺗنێكﯽركەسە هیچ ئێسﺗﺎ ﺗﺎ دایڕشﺗﺑﻭﻭن" كەگرﻭپە
 رەسﺑە ﻭﺗنیﺎنركەسە كە لمێننﺑسە ﻭهئە ﺗﺎ ﻭهچڕكردۆﺗە كۆﺑﺎنﯽ گرﺗنﯽ ﺑۆ كﺎنیﺎنﻭڵەهە داعش كدارانﯽچە دﻭایدا، یڕۆژه ندچە ملە
 .سﺗیﺎنهێنﺎﻭهدهﺑە ڕاﺑردﻭﻭدا یچﻭارمﺎنگە ملە كە یﻭﺗنﺎنەركەسە ﻭئە ڕیزی نەﺑخە شمەئە ﻭ سﺗهێنﺎﻭهدهﺑە نﺎنداڕڤﺎشە
 لە كە یشكسﺗە ﻭلە یﻭهدزنەده خۆیﺎن مریكﺎئە ﺑﺎڵای رپرسﺎنﯽﺑە ،ﻭهنزیكﺑۆﺗە كۆﺑﺎنﯽ لە داعش ﻭﺗنﯽركەسە كە كﺎﺗێكیشدا لە
 . هﺎﺗﻭﻭه ﺗﻭﻭشیﺎن سﻭریﺎدا كﻭردی ڕڤﺎنﺎنﯽشە ﻭ كەشﺎره پﺎراسﺗنﯽ
 سﻭریﺎ لە مﺎنكﺎنئﺎسمﺎنیە هێرشە ئﺎمﺎنجﯽ"  كە ﻭهدێنێﺗە ﺑیﺎنﻭﻭه ﻭئە  مریكﺎئە یﯽﻭهﺗەنە ئﺎسﺎیشﯽ ڕاﻭێژكﺎری جێگری ﺑلینكن، ﺗۆنﯽ  
 ."كﺎنشﺎره پﺎراسﺗنﯽ كنە داعشە كﺎنﯽركردهسە ﻭ ﻭﺗﯽنە رچﺎﻭهسە ﺗێكشكﺎندنﯽ
 ﺑكﺎت، ۆشیﺎنپردهپە ﺑیﺎنﻭانە جۆره ﻭﺑە ﺗﺎ هێنﺎﻭهنە شكسﺗﯽ كۆﺑﺎنﯽ لە نیﺎﺗە ﺑە كﺎنﯽئﺎسمﺎنییە هێرشە كە دایەﻭهلە مریكﺎئە خﺗﯽدﺑەﺑە
 ﻭامﯽردهﺑە ڕایرهەس سﺗێنن،ﺑﻭه داعش كﺎنﯽﻭیەپێشڕه عیراﻗیشدا لە یﺎنﺗﻭانیﻭهنە كﺎنئﺎسمﺎنیە هێرشە كﺎن،ڕاپۆرﺗە یگﻭێرهﺑە ڵكﻭﺑە
 كە نكەﺑ كۆنﺗڕۆڵ  نﺑﺎرئە پﺎرێزگﺎی ﺑە رسە كﺎنﯽشﺎرۆچكە شﺎرﻭ مﯽرجەسە ﺗﻭانیﻭیﺎنە داعش كدارانﯽچە ڵامﺑە كﺎنئﺎسمﺎنییە هێرشە
 غدا،ەﺑ ڕۆژئﺎﻭای ەل ﻭهفﻭراﺗە ڕﻭﻭﺑﺎری لە نزیكن كە شدیكە یشﺎرۆچكﺎنە ﻭ شﺎر ﻭئە ﻭ ﺑﻭﻭن عیراﻗدا سﻭپﺎی سﺗﯽده ژێر لە پێشﺗر
 سﻭپﺎی لاﻭازیﯽ دیكە جﺎرێكﯽ شمەئە ﻭ داعش سﺗﯽده ﻭﺗنەكە میﺎنرجەسە عیراق، سﻭپﺎی نﯽكﻭرﺗخﺎیە ﻭ مكە كﯽرگریەﺑە دﻭای
 .كردﻭﻭه پﺎڵپشﺗﯽ یمﺎنﺎنیشهﺎﻭپە یفڕۆكە كە یﻭهئە ڕایرهسە ،ﻭهجیهﺎندایە نیشﺎنﯽ عیراﻗﯽ
 یهﻭرهده لە زرامە مپﯽكە ﻭ هیت نزیك لە دسەلئەئە رﺑﺎزیسە یﺑنكە  ﻭ دیسەحە شﺎری نیﺎﺗە  نﺑﺎرئە پﺎرێزگﺎی لە ئێسﺗﺎشدا لە
 .عیراﻗدایە ﺗﯽحكﻭمە كۆنﺗڕۆڵﯽ ژێر لە لﻭجەفە شﺎری
 سﻭپﺎی رسەلە ﺑﻭﻭ ﺗرسﯽمە ینﺗرﻭرهگە 3002 سﺎڵﯽ لە ﻭهعیراﻗە داگیركردنﯽ ﺗﺎیرهسەلە رهە كە یپﺎرێزگﺎیە ﻭئە نﺑﺎر،ئە ڕیشە
 نﯽگرﺗ داعش داهﺎﺗﻭﻭی ئﺎمﺎنجﯽ چێتپێده ش،پﺎرێزگﺎیە ﻭئە كۆنﺗڕۆڵكردنﯽ دﻭای ﻭ هﺎت كۆﺗﺎیﯽ داعش ﻭﺗنﯽركەسە ﺑە مریكﺎ،ئە
 .ﺑێت ختپﺎیﺗە غدایﺑە رسە هێرشكردنە پﺎشﺎن ﻭ ﺑﻭغرێبئە
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 ڵامەﺑ ن،ﺑكە داعش ﺑە كشەپﺎشە داﻭڵاﺗە ﻭئە ﺑﺎكﻭری ﻭ ڕاستنﺎﻭه لە ﻭانیﻭیﺎنەﺗ كە خۆشە ﻭهﺑە دڵیﺎن یمﺎنﺎنهﺎﻭپە ﻭ عیراق ﺗﯽحكﻭمە
 نیەلالە ڵكﻭﺑە ،ﺑﻭﻭهنە ﻭهعیراﻗە سﻭپﺎی نلایە لە هﺎﺗﻭﻭن ستدهﺑە داكەﻭڵاﺗە ڵاﺗﯽڕۆژهە ﺑﺎكﻭری ﻭ ﺑﺎكﻭر لە كە یﻭﺗنﺎنەركەسە ﻭئە
 .عیراﻗدا یسﻭننە دانیشﺗﻭانﯽ ﻭ داعش نێﻭان لە ننﺎكە كجیﺎﻭازیە هیچ كە ییشیﺎیﺎنەمیل ﻭئە ،ﺑﻭﻭه ﻭهكﺎنەشیعە میلیشیﺎ
 ،یﺎلەد  كﻭه ﺗێدایە یشیعە ﻭ سﻭننە كە یپﺎرێزگﺎیﺎنە ﻭلە نكەده كﺎنسﻭننە نﺎﻭﺑردنﯽلە لە ﺑﺎس ئﺎشكرا ﺑە زۆر كﺎنشیعە میلیشیﺎ
 ﺎنداژی لە ﻭێتﺑیﺎنە رگە نﺎﺑێت، سﺗداردهﺑەلە یﺎندیكە كﯽیەچﺎره هیچ عیراق كﺎنﯽسﻭننە كە ﻭهﻭێﺗەكەلێده ینجﺎمەرهده ﻭئە شمەئە
 .ڵﺑگرنهە خۆیﺎن ریسە ﻭ ﺑڕۆن یﺎخﻭد ﻭهداعشە كدارانﯽچە ﺑە نﺑكە ندیﯽیﻭهپە یﺎن ﺑێتده ﻭائە ﻭهﺑمێننە
 ﻭئە ڕاسﺗیدا،ەل. هێنێتده خۆیدا دﻭایﺑە رﺑﺎزیسە ﻭ سیﺎسﯽ سﺎﺗێكﯽكﺎره اﻭئە دا، كۆﺑﺎنێ پﺎراسﺗﯽ لە شكسﺗﺑێنێت مریكﺎئە ﻭ رﺑێتگە
  .كﺎنئﺎسمﺎنییە هێرشە پﺎڵ ﺑدرێﺗە ﺗرهﻭرهگە ﻭهلە زۆر كۆﺑﺎنێ سﺗدانﯽدهلە هۆی ﺑۆﺗە یرجەلﻭمەهە
 ﻭركیﺎ،ﺗ كﻭه كﺎنﯽسﻭننیە ﻭڵاﺗە پشﺗیﻭانﯽ نﯽسﺗهێنﺎدهﺑە لە ﺑﺎسﯽ ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ ﺑﺎراك سﻭریﺎ، رسە ﺑۆ كﺎنئﺎسمﺎنیە هێرشە ﺗﺎیرهسەلە
 .كردده ینحرهﺑە ﻭ ئیمﺎرات ن،ردهئە ر،ﺗەﻗە سعﻭدی، ﺑسﺗﺎنﯽرهعە
 دهنرچەهە ،یە نﯽ یﺎنپێشینە ئﺎمﺎنجﯽ داعش نﺎﻭﺑردنﯽلە كﺎمیﺎن هیچ ﻭ یەهە خۆیﺎن ﺗﯽﺗیﺎﺑە جیندایئە ﻭڵاﺗﺎنە ﻭلە كریەهە ڵامﺑە
 نەﻭڵاﺗﺎ ﻭئە"  پێداﻭه یئﺎمﺎژه عیراﻗﯽ چﺎﻭدێرێكﯽ كﻭه ڵامﺑە ﺑێت،نە داعش لە زیﺎنحە سﻭننﯽ ﺑﯽرهعە ڵاﺗدارانﯽەسﺗده چێتپێده
 ."كﺎنسﻭننە ﺑۆ یە نﯽ ﺗرسﯽمە هێنده كﺎتده درﻭست كﺎنشیعە ﺑۆ كێشە یهێنده داعش كە دێتڕاسﺗیە ﻭلە خۆشیﺎن
 درێژایﯽ ەﺑ سنﻭرێكﯽ ﺗﻭریكﺎ یﻭهئە هۆیﺑە ،گرنگﺗرینیﺎنە ﺗﻭركیﺎ ،كردﻭﻭه یﺎنكەﺗیەیمﺎنییەهﺎﻭپە یشدارﺑە كە یﻭڵاﺗﺎنە ﻭئە نﺎﻭ لە
 ﺎكﯽخ نﺎﻭ ڕۆشﺗنەده ﻭهلێیە ئﺎسﺎنﯽﺑە ﺗﻭلنﻭسرهﺑهەجە ﻭ داعش كدارانﯽچە ﻭێﻭهلە پێشﺗر كە یەهە سﻭریﺎدا ﻭڵاﺗﯽ ڵگەلە میل 015
  .سﻭریﺎ
 داعش، ڕاﺑردﻭﻭی یمﺎنگە ندچە مئە كﺎنﯽﻭﺗنەركەسە دﻭای ڵامﺑە كرد، زیﺎﺗر كﺎنﯽسنﻭﻭره ئﺎسﺎیشﯽ ﺗﻭركیﺎ سﺎڵدا ملە ندهچە رهە
 .نﺎﺑێت كﯽرهده ﺗﯽیﺎرمە ﺑە پێﻭیسﺗیﺎن جﺎران كﻭه كﺎنكدارهچە چیﺗر
 ﺑە) گەپەیە ﻭ دهیەپە( كﺎنﯽرﺑﺎزهسە هێزه ﻭ سﻭریﺎ كﺎنﯽكﻭردهسیﺎسیە هێزه ﺗﻭركیﺎ كە ڕﻭﻭنﺑۆﻭه ﻭهئە ڕاﺑردﻭﻭشدا یفﺗەهە لە
 رسە ۆﺑ كﺎنیﺎنﺗرسیەمە لە زیﺎﺗره ﺗﻭركیﺎ رسە ﺑۆ هێزانە ﻭئە ﺗرسﯽمە ﻭایە پێﯽ ﻭ یﯽكەﻭڵاﺗە رسە ﺑۆ زانێتده ﻭرهگە كﯽﺗرسیەمە
 .داعش
 ﺑردنﯽ ڕێﻭهﺑە خۆ داﻭای ﻭهه 4891 سﺎڵﯽ لە كە یپﺎرﺗە ﻭئە ،)كەكەپە( كﻭردسﺗﺎن كرێكﺎرانﯽ پﺎرﺗﯽ لە شێكنﺑە) دهیەپە( ،ﻭهلە زیﺎد
 .ﺗﻭركیﺎدا نﺎﻭلە كﺎتده كﻭردان
 ﺗرسﯽ رهنقەئە یكەﺗەحكﻭمە دا، 2102  سﺎڵﯽ لە ﺗﻭریكﺎدا سنﻭﻭری لە كﺎنكﻭرده كﺎنﺗۆنە لە سﻭریﺎ ﺗﯽحكﻭمە یﻭهكشﺎنە دﻭای
 .ﺑێتده ملیۆن 51 یﺎنژمﺎره كە ﺗﻭریكﺎ كﻭردانﯽ  رسە ﺑكﺎﺗە كﺎر سﻭریﺎ انﯽكﻭرد ﺑردنﯽ ڕێﻭهخۆﺑە كە لێنیشت
 .دهیەپە لە كﻭه ﺑﺎشﺗره ﺑكﺎت كۆﺑﺎنﯽ كۆنﺗڕۆڵﯽ داعش ﻭایە پێﯽ ردۆغﺎن،ئە یبﺗە بجەڕه
 ڕێﯽ لە ﻭیسﺗیﺎن ،ﻭهسﺗﺎنەﻭه داعش كﺎنﯽهێرشە ڕﻭﻭیڕﻭﻭﺑە زۆر كﯽیەمﺎﻭه یڕڤﺎنﺎنەشە ﻭئە دا،یەپە ڕڤﺎنﯽشە پێنج كﺎﺗێكیش
 .نﺎسﺎندن ﺗیرۆریست كﻭه ﻭانﯽئە ﺗﻭركیﺎ سﻭپﺎی ،ﻭهڕنەﺑپە ﺗﻭركیﺎﻭه سنﻭﻭری
 ركیﺎﺗﻭ مریكﺎ،ئە لە كﺎتده زۆر نرخێكﯽ داﻭای ﺗﻭركیﺎ دا،كەﺗیەیمﺎنیەهﺎﻭپە نﺎﻭلە ركﺎریگە كﯽیەشێﻭهﺑە شداریكردنﯽﺑە یﺑﺎره لە
 تهﺎﻭكﺎ ﻭ كﺎنسﻭریە ئﺎﻭاره جێكردنﯽنیشﺗە سﺗﯽﺑەمە ﺑە ﺑكرێت، درﻭﻭست سﻭریﺎدا خﺎكﯽ نﺎﻭ لە فڕین ژهد كﯽیەنﺎﻭچە ﻭێتیەده
 .ﺗێیدا سﻭریﺎ ئۆپۆزسیۆنﯽ پێكردنﯽ شقمە
 شكرایەئﺎ ﻭ ڕﻭﻭن چﻭنكە ﺑهێنێت، كﺎرﺑە شقدیمە یكەﺗەحكﻭمە دژی لە داهﺎﺗﻭﻭدا لە فڕینە دژه نﺎﻭچە ﻭئە ﻭێتیەده ردۆغﺎنئە
 سمﺎنﯽئﺎ هێزێكﯽ هیچ نﯽخﺎﻭه داعش خۆ رنﺎگەئە شق،دیمە كﺎنﯽفڕۆكە لە ﺑێتده ڕێگری ﺑۆ نیﺎﺗە فڕین دژه ینﺎﻭچە درﻭﻭسﺗكردنﯽ
 .نییە
 سﻭریﺎ ئۆپۆزسیۆنﯽ هﺎﻭشﺎنﯽ ﻭ سﻭریﺎﻭه ﺗﺎیفﯽ ڕیشە نﺎﻭ چێﺗەده مریكﺎ،ئە پﺎڵپشﺗﯽ ﺑە ﺗﻭركیﺎ ﻭائە ر،سە ﺑچێﺗە ﺑۆ شﯽمەئە رگە
 .نگێتجەده شقدیمە یكەﺗەحكﻭمە دژی
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 ﺎیﺗرهسەلە ،كردﻭﻭهنە كﺎنسیﺎسیە پێشهﺎﺗە ﺑۆ ﺑﺎشﯽ كﯽیەﻭهخﻭێندنە ﺗﻭركیﺎ ، 1102 سﺎڵﯽ لە سﻭریﺎﻭه كﺎنﯽیرانەﻗە ﺗﺎیرهسەلە رهە  
 ﻭئە ۆزسیۆنﯽئۆپ ﻭ دسەئە شﺎرﺑە ﺗﯽحكﻭمە ڵگەلە كﺎنﯽەندیییﻭهپە ﺑﺎڵانسﯽ ﻭ ﺑكﺎت ندگیرینێﻭه یﻭهئە جیﺎﺗﯽلە ﺗﻭركیﺎ كﺎندا،شۆڕشە
 دسەئە كە ﻭﻭاﺑﻭ پێﯽ ﻭ كرد كﺎنﯽجیهﺎدییە هێزه پشﺗیﻭانﯽ هﺎﻭكﺎرﻭ كردﻭﻭرﺑﺎزییەسە زمەئە ﻭلە پشﺗگیری ﺗﻭركیﺎ ڕاﺑگرێت، داﻭڵاﺗە
 .چێتده نﺎﻭلە زﻭﻭ
 ردۆغﺎنئە كە ﻭایە پێیﺎن كە یكﻭردانە ﻭئە ﺑخﺎت، پشﺗگﻭێ ﺗﻭركیﺎ انﯽكﻭرد یﯽﺗﻭڕه ﻭ ڕﻗﯽ ﺗﻭانێتده كە ﻭایە پێﯽ ردۆغﺎنئە
 .سﻭریﺎ كﻭردانﯽ دژی لە داعش ﺑە رامﺑەﺑەلە یەهە نﺎڕۆشنﯽ ﺗێكﯽسیﺎسە
 ﻭﺗنﯽكە ریگەئە لە ﻭ كﻭژران كۆﺑﺎنﯽ دۆخﯽ ررامﺑەﺑە كﺎنﯽزاییەنﺎڕه لە كﻭردی ریخۆپیشﺎنده 33 كە كﺎﺗێك ﻗﻭڵﺗرﺑﻭﻭ گۆمە ﻭئە
 .ﻭهﺑێﺗەده سﺗﺗرخە كەﻗﻭڕه كۆﺑﺎنیشدا،
 پێﯽ ﻭركیﺎﺗ یەﻭانەلە كﻭردسﺗﺎندا؟ كرێكﺎرانﯽ پﺎرﺗﯽ ڵگەلە ئﺎشﺗﯽ یپرۆسە شكسﺗهێنﺎنﯽ ریگەئە لە یە نﯽ راننیگە ﺗﻭركیﺎ ﺑۆچﯽ
 ﺗﻭانننە ﻭ مﺎﺑێتنە جﺎرانیﺎن یﺗﻭانﺎیە ﻭ هێز ﻭئە چﺗر داعشدا، دژی ڕیشە لە شدارهﺑە ﻗﻭرسﯽ ﺑە كەكەپە یﻭهئە هۆیﺑە ﻭاﺑێت
 .ﺗﻭركیﺎدا ﺗﯽحكﻭمە ڵگە لە ڕشە ﻭهﺑچنە دیكە جﺎرێكﯽ
 ﻭئە نﺎﻭخۆی ڕیشە شداریﺑە ﻭ سﻭریﺎدا ڵگەلە ﻭهڕهشە ﺑچێﺗە ﺗﻭركیﺎ رگە یﺎندﻭﻭهڕایگە ئێران ﺗﯽحكﻭمە ﻭهشەدیكە كﯽلایەلە  
 ."داتده یەكﺑﺎجە"  ﻭائە ﺑكﺎت ﻭڵاﺗە
 ﻭائە سﻭریﺎدا خﺎكﯽ نﺎﻭ لە ﺗﻭریكﺎ ردانﯽسﺗێﻭهده ریگەئەلە كە ڵﺑگرێتهە مﺎنﺎیە ﻭئە ئێران رپرسﺎنﯽﺑە ییەﻭﺗە مئە یەﻭانەلە
 .رهنقەئە دژی لە ﺑدات ﺗﻭركیﺎ نﺎﻭ كﺎنﯽكﻭردیە هێزه ﺗﯽیﺎرمە ﺗﺎران ﺗﯽحكﻭمە
 هێرشﯽ كﺎﺗێك ﻭ ﻭهكردهدﻭﻭﺑﺎره ردۆغﺎنﯽئە یبﺗە بجەڕه یڵەهە مﺎنهە عس،ﺑە رژێمﯽ ﯽرۆركسە حسێن دامسە ڕاﺑردﻭﻭشدا لە
 دامسە یگەڕژێمە لاﻭازكردنﯽ سﺗﯽﺑەمەﺑە ﻭ كیەﻭهرچدانەرپەﺑە كﻭه ﺗﺎرانیش یكەﺗەحكﻭمە دا، 0891 سﺎڵﯽ لە ئێران رسە ﺑرده
 .دا عیراﻗﯽ كﺎنﯽكﻭرده هێزه ﺗﯽیﺎرمە حسێن
 یەﻭانەلە ڵكﻭﺑە سﻭریﺎ، نﺎﻭخۆی نگﯽجە هێنﺎنﯽ پێ كۆﺗﺎیﯽ هۆی ﺑﺑێﺗە نیە ﻭانەلە سﻭریﺎدا نﺎﻭ لە ﺗﻭركیﺎش رﺑﺎزیسە ردانﯽسﺗێﻭهده





 هێننيدهدﺑە يﺎنكەونەكﺎن خە: كوردهرزۆيتەر
 –  ندانخە
 
 ﻗەﺗە ێﺑو ﺑە ێكداعﺎﺗند سەچە یمﺎوه و لە يبهێنندﺑە يﺎنڵەند سﺎچە ﯽونخە ییﺎنﺗوان كﺎنيیەكورد ێزهه یراق،ع كﺎنﯽيیەرﺑﺎزسە ێزهه یوهكشﺎنە یدوا 
 .ركوكداكە یر شﺎرسەستبگرن ﺑەده
 
 مﺎ،نە یراﻗداع یﺑﺎكوور ﯽكﺎنر نﺎوچەسەﺑە ڵاﺗﯽسەده یراقع ﯽﺗحكومە كﺎن،وهڕهﺗوند كدارهچە ێرشﯽه ی"دوا كە وهڵاويكردهﺑ زرۆيتەر ئﺎژانسﯽ
 لە يكترﺑووننز يﺎﺗرز مووكﺎتهەەزانن و لده ۆيﺎنﯽخ ﯽﻗودس ﺑە كە یێژوويیەم و شﺎرهر ئەسەست ﺑگرن ﺑەخسﺎ دهرهكﺎن كورده ۆل ﺑش هەمەﺑە
 ."ۆيﺎنەخ ﺑە تيبەﺗﺎ ۆیخرﺑەسە ﺗﯽڵەدو ﯽزراندندامە كە ییﺎنكرهسە ﯽئﺎمﺎنج يهێنﺎنﯽدﺑە
 
شﺎم  و یراقع لە یسلامﯽئ ﺗﯽڵەوده ێكخراویر ﯽكدارانچە نيەلالە یراﻗەع یﺑﺎكوور یشﺎر ينﺗرورهەگ كە ڵموس یشﺎر ﯽرداگرﺗنسەستبەده دوای
 يﺎنروروﺑەده ﯽكﺎنركوك و نﺎوچەكە یشﺎر یواوﺗەو ﺑە كﺎنیﺎنێزهه یوهۆكردنەك ۆدا ﺑنە یڕۆفﺑە یﺎنكﺎن كﺎﺗغدا، كوردهو ﺑەرهﺑە یﺎن"داعش" و چوون
 .فراوان كرد ستیﺎنێردهژ ﯽكﺎن، نﺎوچە04دا سە یڕێژهﺑە ڕكردنشە ێﺑكرد و ﺑە ۆڵۆنترك
 
 ۆیخرﺑەەس ﺗێكﯽڵەور دههە ﯽزراندندامە یمﺎﺑنە كﺎن ﺑەكورده كە ێدايەﺗ ییﺎنوﺗنە یێڵگەك ينندكرد چە ۆنترۆڵیﺎنكﺎن ككورده یێیﺎنەنو يیەوزه وئە
 .زاننده دايندهئﺎ لە
 
 ﯽكﺎنپەلوك و كەر چەسەﺑە یﺎنستكرد و ده ۆڵكرانركوك چكە یشﺎر لە كرد كە ۆنترۆڵك یراﻗیﺎنع یسوپﺎ یيیﺎنەرﺑﺎزسە و ﺑنكەكﺎن ئەكورده هﺎوكﺎت
 .دا گرتو ﺑنكﺎنەئە
 .مﺎوهنە یراقع يﯽكپﺎرچەيە یمﺎﺑنە كە يﺎندیﺎنگەن، راشكەده ێداهﺎﺗوو ﺗﺎووﺗو ۆنﺎغﯽﻗ ۆﺑ یﺎنستردهﺑە ﯽكﺎنكﺎن ﺑژاردهكورده ێستﺎدائ لە
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 كردنڵەمﺎمە ۆنێتﯽچ ێﯽكﺎن ﺗﺎووﺗوو كورده ێوهنو ۆنﺎغێكﯽﻗ ﺗەچووه یراق: "عﯽكوردستﺎن وﺗ ێمﯽرهە ﺗﯽۆكﺎيەرسە يوانﯽد ۆكﯽرسە ێنحس فوئﺎد
 ."نكەده داێیەنو یراﻗەو عئە ڵگەلە
 
 ێرانو ئ یراقر عسەو ﺑە سەكە یۆنمل 03 يﺎنژمﺎره كﺎن كەو كورده وهڕێژرايەدا ڕاستنﺎوه ڵاﺗﯽۆژهەر یخشەراﺑردوودا نە یدهسەلە یوهوكﺎﺗەلە
 .ندهده ۆيﺎنخﺑە تيبەﺗﺎ ﺗﯽڵەوده ﯽزراندندامە ڵﯽوشكران، هەداﺑە یﺎداو ﺗورك يﺎو سور
 
 چونكە يﺎن،كەونەخە يهێنﺎنﯽدﺑە لە يكترننز ێتﺑس دهكە یۆنچوار مل يﺎنژمﺎره كە یراقع ﯽكﺎنكورده ،وهێنەدام حسسە ێمﯽرژ ﯽرووخﺎن دوایلە
 .يەهە یراﻗیﺎنع ﯽگشت یﺑودجە ی71دا سە یێژهو ر رارهرﻗەﺑە یﺎيداﺗ يشئﺎسﺎ كە ۆيﺎنخ ﯽكﺎننﺎوچە لە يەهە ۆيﺎنخرﺑەسە یمچەن ڵاﺗێكﯽسەده
 
 .وهيەمﺎ ڕشە پﺎنﯽۆڕهك گوه یراقع ختﯽيتەپﺎ یغداﺑە كە ێكداكﺎﺗكرد لە یشەگە ێمرهە ختﯽيتەپﺎ ێریولهە یوهئە ۆیهﺑوونە شۆڕانكﺎريیەگ مئە
 
 لە ۆڵیﺎنر كﺎنیﺎنیﺎسییەس و حزﺑە ﺑردووهڕێوهﺑە یﺎنیراﻗع یوهرهده يریزو وه ۆمﺎرك ۆكرسە ۆستﯽكﺎن پكورده ،وهێنەدام حسسە ﯽرووخﺎن دوایلە
 ڵامﺑﺎت، ﺑەده یڕێوهﺑە یعەش یﺗەو حكومەﺑە یریگشتگ یمﺎیس ێدانﯽپ و هﺎوكﺎرﺑوون لە ﺑووههە یراﻗداع ﯽﺗحكومە ڵاﺗدارانﯽسەده يﺎريكردنﯽد
 .وامەردهردوولادا ﺑەهە ێواننكوردستﺎن لە ێمﯽرهە یوت و سنوورنە ﺑردنﯽڕێوهﺑە ڵاﺗﯽسەده ت ﺑەﺑﺎرهسە كﺎنۆكییەنﺎك
 
 وهەێندام حسسە ڵاﺗﯽسەده نيەلالە يﺎسﺎيﯽنﺎ كﯽيەێوهشركوك ﺑەكە یشﺎر ێويﺎندانلە ێمرهە یوهرهده كﺎنﯽڕاوهداﺑ نﺎوچە یۆرﺑەز ڵێنده كﺎنكورده
و  ﺎنەو نﺎوچر ئەسەﺑە ڵاﺗﯽسەده ﯽپﺎندنسە ﯽئﺎمﺎنجﺑە جێكرد،یشتەن ێداﺗ ﯽكﺎنﺑەرهو عە ۆچپێكردك و نﺎوچﺎنەەل ﯽكﺎنكورده " كراون كەيبعر"ﺗە
 .يداكەوﺗەنە
 
كورد  یندوههرژﺑەلە كﺎنیﺎنۆكییەنﺎسراون نﺎك رگەێشمەپ ﺑە كە كﺎنيیەكورد ێزهو ه مﺎوهدا نەو نﺎوچﺎنەلە یراقع ﯽﺗحكومە ێستﺎدائ لە
 .وهﺗەكلايیكردووهيە
 
 ینوورس ێستﺎدائ لە دا كەوهﺑە ﯽشئﺎمﺎژه ێم،رهە رسەێنەخرده و نﺎوچﺎنەم ئەرجەسە كە يﺎنديگەرا رگەێشمەپ ﯽﺗزارهوه ﯽگشت ینداریمئە ريﺎوه ﺑﺎرجە
 .مﺎوهنە یراقع ﯽﺗحكومە ڵگەلە ێكﯽسنوور یچو ه يەشﺎم "داعش"داو  یراقع لە یسلامﯽئ ﺗﯽڵەوده ێكخراویر ڵگەلە ێمرهە
 
 .یراقع یﺗر ﯽكﺎننﺎوچە ﯽكﺎنرووداوه ریيگەكﺎر لە كوردستﺎنە ێمﯽرهە ﯽپﺎراستن ﺗیﺎنيەوولەئە ێستﺎدائ لە يﺎنديﺎنگەكورد را رپرسﺎنﯽﺑە
 
و  راقیع لە یسلامﯽئ ﺗﯽڵەوده ﯽكدارانچە یراﺑردوو یفتەهە یكەيیەرﺑﺎزسە ێرشەه ێشبینﯽر پوﺑەمەلە ڵێكسﺎ یيكەنز كە داوهوهﺑە شیﺎنئﺎمﺎژه
 .نجﺎم ﺑووهئە ێﺑ ڵامغدا، ﺑەﺑە ﺗەداوه ۆشداريیﺎنو ه كردووه یﺎنشﺎم
 
 ییەن ﺎزيﺎنین يﺎرهو واد ێتﺑده ﺗریلۆمەزار كهە لە يﺎﺗرز كە كردووهدروست ڵو موس يﺎو سور ێرانئ یر سنوورسە لە ییﺎنمنئە كﯽيەێنەپشت كﺎنكورده
 .نﺑكە ڕشە ڵر موسسەلە
 
 ."نڵاﺗیﺎسەده ێرژ یسنوور ﯽفروانكردن ﺑن لەوام دهرده.. ﺑەییەكﺎن نكورده خﯽيەﺑﺎ ێج ڵ"موس كە يﺎنديگەرا يكﯽمرئە ێشوویپ رپرسێكﯽﺑە
 
 ﯽﺗحكومە يكردنﯽهﺎوكﺎر ۆكرد ﺑ یكﺎرئﺎمﺎده رگەێشمەپ كرا كە ێبینﯽ، ﺗوهداعشە ﯽكدارانچە نيەلالە ڵموس ﯽرداگرﺗنسەستبەده لە ژێكۆند رچە دوای
 سمﯽهڕغدا ﺑەﺑە كە يﺎنديﺎنگەاكﺎن رم كوردهڵاكرد، ﺑە دووره وهێرهولهە لە ۆﺗۆمبێلئ ﺑە ێكعﺎﺗسە كە ڵداموس یر شﺎرسەﺑە وهستگرﺗنەو ده یراقع
 دايیەﺗگوزارو خزمەر ئەرامبەﺑەﺑكﺎت لە ﯽكﺎنكورده شﯽێشكەپ ییەن ێكﯽشت یچﺑكﺎت، ه یهﺎوكﺎر یغداش داوار ﺑەگەئە كردوون،ێنەل یهﺎوكﺎر یداوا
 .وتستكەركوك دهك كەوه یﺎنوﺗستكەده ينندچە يﯽكرده كﺎن ﺑەكورده كە تيبەﺗﺎﺑە
 
 ژايﯽێدركورد ﺑە یﺎسﯽس كﯽيەركردهند سەچە نگەره كە يﺎنديگەرا یراقع لە ﺑووه يكﺎمرئە یسوپﺎ ێشوویپ یﺎسﯽس ێژكﺎریراو كە یسكﺎ ئیمﺎی
كرد و ده يرانیﺎنزك وهۆرسە یكﯽﺎلم ینور یهﺎوكﺎر چونكە ێت،كردﺑ یراﻗیﺎنع وایڕهرمﺎنفە ێمﯽرژ ێنﺎنﯽسهرههە ڕێﯽراﺑردوو چﺎوه یمﺎوه
 .كردده ڵاﺗیداسەده یيەسﺎلە یراقع ێنﺎنﯽسهرهر هەسەلە يﺎنوگره
 
 ەك يەسەو كەئە یكﯽو مﺎل دیێتەكﺎن دكورده ۆيﯽخرﺑەسە یراﻗداع ێنﺎنﯽسهرههە ڵگەلە كە ێیوايەكورد پ یركردهسە ێكند: "هەﯽوﺗ یسكﺎ ئیمﺎی
 ."يكەكﺎن نزكورده ۆيﯽخرﺑەكﺎت. سەده ێرانو یراقع
 
 ژايﯽێدرﺑە ییژيیەو ﺗوندوﺗئە ێژاویگ و ﺑچنە وهیننەداعش ﺑب ﯽكدارانچە ڵگەلە ڕشە یرهﺑە لە ۆيﺎنخ كﺎن كەكورده ۆﺑ یدارهﺗرسش مەكﺎره مئە
 .پﺎراستووه ێل ۆيﺎنخ كەيەيەده یمﺎوه
 
 ﯽئﺎرام ن كەﺑكە ڵكﺎن ﻗبوكورده ڕانﯽحوكم ێكیﺎنندهە نگەره ين،ژركوكدا دهكە یو شﺎر كﺎنڕێنراوهداﺑ نﺎوچە لە سوننە ﯽﺑرهعە ۆرز كﯽيەژمﺎره
 یسوپﺎ نيەلالەلە ن، كەو شﺎم ﺑده راقیع لە ﯽمیسلائ ﺗﯽڵەوده یوانﯽپشت ێنﺎنﯽستهدهﺑە ڵﯽوهە يﺎنﺗر ێكﯽندهە نگەره ڵامﺑكﺎت، ﺑە ینداﺑ ۆﺑ يشیﺎنو ئﺎسﺎ
 .ێنﺎوههنە یﺎنستدهﺑە وهیراﻗەع
 
ﺎت و رﺑخده كﺎنۆكەنﺎك ێج نﺎوچە لە سوننە يگريكﺎرێكﯽرك ﺑەوه ۆیو شﺎم خ یراقع لە یسلامﯽئ ﺗﯽڵەوده كە يەداوهلە كەییەﺗرس: "مەڵێتده سكﺎی
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 ."ێتكﺎن ﺑب و كوردهرهعە ێوانن ڕیشە یﺗﺎرهسە نگەره كە كﺎتێبستپكﺎن دهكورده یدژ ڕشە
 
 .ێشییەركسە یيستەشﺎ كﺎنداوهڕهﺗوند كدارهچە ڵگەلە ێنو كﯽێیەململان ڵدانﯽرهەسە ﯽﺗرسكﺎن مەكورده رپرسەﺑە ۆﺑ ڵامﺑە
 
 كﯽێلهە مەئە ڵامﺑە ين،كەده رانﯽیگەن ست ﺑەمووان هە: "هەﯽوﺗ ێت،ئﺎشكرا ﺑكر ینﺎو يويستنە كوردستﺎن كە ێمﯽرهە ﯽﺗحكومە لە كيەرچﺎوهسە






 کوردستان سەر بۆ قاعیدە مەترسیی
 
 3102/21/8 ﻭیلخنﺑێرگ ڤﺎن ﻭلادیمێر لەلایەن
 
 ێکۆڵینەﻭەل ﺑۆ پێکﺑهێنن کۆمیﺗەیەک کە ەکردﻭﻭ کﻭردسﺗﺎن حکﻭمەﺗﯽ لە داﻭای کﻭردسﺗﺎن، ﻭەزیرانﯽ سەرۆک ﺑﺎرزانﯽ، نێچیرڤﺎن
 کە هەیە کێشەیەی ئەﻭ هەمﺎن کﻭردسﺗﺎن هەرێمﯽ حکﻭمەﺗﯽ. سﻭﻭریﺎ دەچنە جیهﺎد ﺑۆ دەگﻭﺗرێت کﻭردانەی گەنجە ئەﻭ لەﺑﺎرەی
 رەکﺎنﯽﻭسنﻭ لە ﺑەڵکﻭ نەکردەﻭە، نزیکﺗر ئەﻭرﻭپﺎ سنﻭﻭرەکﺎنﯽ لە هەر ﻗﺎعیدەی سﻭﻭریﺎ لە جیهﺎد شەڕی. هەیﺎنە ئەﻭرﻭپﺎش ﻭڵاﺗﺎنﯽ
  .دەرکەﻭت هەﻭلێر لە) ﺗەﻗینەﻭەکە ﻭاﺗە( هێرشیﺎندا دﻭایین لە ئەﻭەش. کردەﻭە نزیکﯽ کﻭردسﺗﺎنیش
 
 ۆﺑ ﺑردراﻭن ﻭ ئﺎمﺎدەکراﻭن سلێمﺎنییەﻭە پﺎرێزگﺎی مزگەﻭﺗەکﺎنﯽ لە جیهﺎدی گەنجﯽ زۆر کە دەکەن ﺑەﻭە ئﺎمﺎژە راپۆرت چەندین
 هەﻭاڵیش ۆرز هەرﻭەهﺎ سﻭﻭریﺎ، لە دەسﺗگیرکردﻭﻭە عێراﻗیﺎن کﻭردسﺗﺎنﯽ خەڵکﯽ کﻭردی چەندین گەل پﺎراسﺗنﯽ یەکینەکﺎنﯽ. سﻭﻭریﺎ
 ەڵاﺗﯽدەس ژێر ئیسلامییەکﺎنﯽ زۆر نﺎﻭچە خەڵکﯽ ئەﻭانە زۆرﺑەی. دەکەن سﻭﻭریﺎ سەفەری کﻭردانەی جیهﺎدییە ئەﻭ دەرﺑﺎرەی هەﺑﻭﻭن
  .دەکەن ڵکۆنﺗرۆ نﺎﻭچﺎنە ئەﻭ یەکێﺗﯽ ئەمنییەکﺎنﯽ هێزە ﻭ کﻭردسﺗﺎنن نیشﺗمﺎنﯽ یەکێﺗﯽ
  -
 
 لە رﺗنرێگەگ لە نەﺑﻭﻭﺑن سەرکەﻭﺗﻭﻭ پێدەچێت کﻭردییەکﺎن ئەمنییە هێزە ﺑەڵام هەﺑﻭﻭ، هەڕەشﺎنە لەﻭ ئﺎگﺎیﺎن ﺑەرپرسﺎن هەرچەندە
 هﺎﺗە ئەمریکﺎ کە ،3002 سﺎڵﯽ دﻭای زۆرﺑەیﺎن کﻭردییەکﺎن جیهﺎدییە گرﻭﻭپە. کﻭردسﺗﺎن لە جیهﺎدییەکﺎن جمﻭجۆڵﯽ گەشەکردنﯽ
 ئەﻭ کە کردﻭای کﻭردسﺗﺎندا سیﺎسیﯽ سیسﺗمﯽ لە ئیسلامییەکﺎن هێزە ﺑەشداریپێکردنﯽ هەرﻭەهﺎ. کﻭردسﺗﺎن دەرەﻭەی ەچﻭﻭن عێراﻗەﻭە،
 ەﺑ دەسﺗﺑکەنەﻭە سەرلەنەﻭێ ﺑۆئەﻭەی جیهﺎدییەکﺎن داﻭەﺗە زۆرﺗری هەلﯽ سﻭﻭریﺎ شەڕی ئێسﺗﺎ. نەﺑن ﺑەهێز جیهﺎدییﺎنە هێزە
  .ﺑەکﺎرﺑهێنن ﺗﻭﻭندﻭﺗیژی ﻭ هێرشەکﺎنیﺎن
 
 لە ﻭەسلێمﺎنییە فڕۆکەخﺎنەی لە کە دەسﺗگیرکرد جیهﺎدییەکیﺎن کﻭردسﺗﺎن ئەمنییەکﺎنﯽ هێزە یەکەمجﺎر ﺑۆ ،3102/11/81 رۆژی
  .دەگەڕایەﻭە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ سەفەری
 
 یلەدژ راگەیﺎندنەﻭە شەڕێکﯽ نێﻭ کەﻭﺗﻭﻭنەﺗە ئێسﺗﺎ کﻭردسﺗﺎن دیمﻭکراﺗﯽ پﺎرﺗﯽ ﻭ KKP کﻭردسﺗﺎن کرێکﺎرانﯽ پﺎرﺗﯽ هەرچەندە
 پﺎرﺗﺎنە ەﻭل هیچیەک ﻗﺎعیدە ﺑۆ ﺑەڵام نێﻭەڕاسﺗدا، رۆژهەڵاﺗﯽ لە ﺑکﺎت کﻭرد رێﺑەرایەﺗیﯽ کﺎمیﺎن کە ئەﻭەیﺎنە ێﺑڕکێﯽک ﻭ یەکدی
  .دﻭژمنن هەمﻭﻭیﺎن ﻭ نییە جیﺎﻭازییﺎن
 ﺎﻭیەنﺑ کەسێک ﺑڵاﻭکراﻭەﺗەﻭە،) کﻭردی( سۆرانﯽ زاراﻭەی ﺑە شﺎم ﻭ عێراق ئیسلامیﯽ دەﻭڵەﺗﯽ لەلایەن کە ڤیدیۆییدا پەیﺎمێکﯽ لە
 ئەمنییەکﺎن هێزە ﻭ یەکێﺗﯽ ﻭ پﺎرﺗﯽ ئەندامﺎنﯽ هەمﻭﻭ ﻭ کﻭردسﺗﺎن دەگەڕێینەﻭە چەکﺎنەﻭە ﺑەم: “دەڵێت ئەلکﻭردی حﺎرس ئەﺑﻭﻭ
  .”دەکﻭژین
 لە ەڕەشەه ﻭایکردﺑێت ﻭ کردﺑێت ﺑەهێز ﻗﺎعیدەشﯽ ﺑەڵکﻭ نەکردﺑێت، ﺑەهێز سﻭﻭریﺎی کﻭردەکﺎنﯽ ﺗەنیﺎ عەرەﺑﯽ ﺑەهﺎری پێدەچێت
 ەﺗەکردﻭﻭ هێرشﯽ ﻗﺎعیدە راﺑردﻭﻭدا مﺎﻭەی لە. ﺑکﺎت سﻭﻭریﺎ کﻭردەکﺎنﯽ لەگەڵ شﺗیش هەمﺎن. ﺑکﺎت ﻭردسﺗﺎنک هەرێمﯽ ئﺎسﺎیشﯽ
 ئﺎکرێ لە هێرشێکیش هەرﻭەهﺎ هەﻭلێر، ﻭ مەعرﻭﻭف ﺗەل کۆﺑﺎنﯽ، ﻗﺎمشلۆ، لە کﻭردییەکﺎن پﺎرﺗە هەمﻭﻭ جیﺎﻭازی ئﺎمﺎنجﯽ سەر
  .پﻭﻭچەڵکراﺑﻭﻭەﻭە
 گﻭﺗییﺎن ئەمنییەکﺎن هێزە هەرچەندە. ﺗێداﺑﻭﻭن کﻭردیشﯽ هەندێک هەﻭلێردا هێرشەکەی لە کە هەن ئەﻭە لەسەر دەنگۆ هەندێک
  .مﻭﻭسڵن خەڵکﯽ گﻭمﺎنلێکراﻭەکﺎن
 نەکەن، لەسەر ئیشﯽ ئەگەر چﻭنکە. مەسەلەیە ئەﻭ لەسەر کﺎرکردنە ﺑە پێﻭیسﺗیﺎن کﻭردییەکﺎن پﺎرﺗە کە پیشﺎندەدات راسﺗییە ئەﻭ ئەمە









  كیمیاییەكان چەكە لێڵیی
   3102/9/6     رۆمﺎنۆ دەیڤید لەلایەن
 
 پێشكەشﯽ ئەمڕۆ سﻭریﺎی دیكەی دڵﺑزﻭێنەری نیگﺎیەكﯽ دیمەشق ﺑﺎشﻭﻭری نﺎﻭچەی ئﺎﺑﯽ ی12 كیمیﺎییەكەی هێرشە ڤیدیۆی ﻭ ﻭێنە
 سﺎڵﯽ لێدﻭانەكەی لەﺑەرچﺎﻭگرﺗنﯽ ﺑە. ﺑەرچﺎﻭ دێﺗە مەحﺎڵ ﺗێپەڕینﯽ اﻭ هەر مەدەنﯽ، هﺎﻭﻭڵاﺗﯽ 006 ﻗﻭرﺑﺎنﯽ ﺑەﺑﻭﻭنە. دەكﺎت جیهﺎن
 ێنﺎنﯽﺑەكﺎره ﺑە دژ جیهﺎنﯽ یەكەمﯽ جەنگﯽ دﻭای پیرۆزەكﺎنﯽ نێﻭدەﻭڵەﺗییە رێككەﻭﺗننﺎمە ،’’سﻭﻭر هێڵﯽ‘’ لەﺑﺎرەی ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ راﺑردﻭﻭی
 ﻭ ئەمریكﺎ مﺗمﺎنەی پێدەچێت دایڕشﺗﻭﻭە، ﻭەكﺎنیەكگرﺗﻭ نەﺗەﻭە دا5002 سﺎڵﯽ كە ’’پﺎراسﺗن ﺑەرپرسیﺎرێﺗﯽ“ هەرﻭەهﺎ كیمیﺎیﯽ چەكﯽ
 .ﺑێت مەﺗرسیدا لە نێﻭدەﻭڵەﺗﯽ كۆمەڵگﺎی
 
 نییە ﻭﻭنر ﺑەﺗەﻭاﻭی شﺗێك، هەر لە ﺑەر. جیﺎﻭازن زۆر شﺗﯽ دﻭﻭ ﺑكەین چ دەﺑێ زانینﯽ ﻭ ﺑكەین شﺗێك پێﻭیسﺗە ﺑەﻭەی هەسﺗكردن
 یشﺎنﺑدەنن دڵنیﺎیﯽ خۆیﺎن هەﻭڵدەدەن فەرەنسﯽ ﻭ ریﺗﺎنﯽﺑە ئەمریكﯽ، ﺑەرپرسﺎنﯽ چۆن نییە گرنگ -ﺑﻭﻭ هێرشەكە ﺑەرپرسیﺎری كێ
 ئەسەد رژێمﯽ ﺑۆچﯽ دەپرسن ئێران، ﻭ رﻭﻭسیﺎ ئەسەد، رژێمﯽ لەگەڵ هﺎﻭڕێ هەیە، گﻭمﺎنیﺎن كە ئەﻭانەش. ﺗەلەڤزیۆنەكﺎن لەسەر
 ەﺗرسﯽم ﺑۆچﯽ دەشكێﺗەﻭە؟ ﻭئە ﺑەرژەﻭەندی ﺑە خەریكە جەنگەكە كۆﺗﺎییدا لە لەكﺎﺗێكدا كیمیﺎیﯽ، چەكﯽ ﺑەر پەنﺎدەﺑﺎﺗە كﺎﺗەدا لەم
 پشكنەرانﯽ لەكﺎﺗێكدا ﺑەكﺎردێنﯽ چەكە ئەﻭ ﺑۆچﯽ دەیﺑەیەﻭە؟ خەریكە كە جەنگێكدا لە زیﺎددەكەی خۆرئﺎﻭا دەسﺗﺗێﻭەردانﯽ
 پشكنەران؟ مﺎنەﻭەی شﻭێنﯽ لە كیلۆمەﺗر 5 ﺗەنیﺎ ﺑەكﺎریدێنﯽ دیمەشق نزیك لە ﺑۆچﯽ هەرﻭەهﺎ ﻭڵاﺗدان، لە نەﺗەﻭەیەكگرﺗﻭﻭەكﺎن
 
 ەﻭەل گﻭمﺎنم هیچ دەجەنگن، رژێم دژی لە كە ﺑن یﺎخییەكﺎن گرﻭپە لە یەكێك دەﺑێ ئەﻭكﺎت هێرشەكە، لە نییە ﺑەرپرس ژێمر ئەگەر
 ﺑە. ﺑێنن ﺎنخۆی خەڵكﯽ ﺑەسەر شێﻭەیە لەﻭ شﺗﯽ ﺑﺗﻭانن كە مۆڕاڵن ﺑﯽ ﻭ دڕندە هێندە سﻭﻭریﺎ ئۆپۆزیسیۆنەكﺎنﯽ گرﻭپە لە هەندی نییە
 ﺗێكﯽخﻭاس رﻭﻭنﯽ ﺑە سﻭﻭریﺎ یﺎخیﺑﻭﻭانﯽ پەرﺗەﻭازەیﯽ، زیﺎدﺑﻭﻭنﯽ ﻭ جەنگ مەیدانەكﺎنﯽ ﻭاییەیئەمد دۆڕانەكﺎنﯽ لەﺑەرچﺎﻭگرﺗنﯽ
 لێكۆڵەرێكﯽ پۆنﺗێ دێل كﺎرلا 3102 مﺎیسﯽ مﺎنگﯽ. ﺑێت رێگﺎیەك هەر ﺑە جﺎ خۆرئﺎﻭا دەسﺗﺗێﻭەردانﯽ راكێشﺎنﯽ ﺑۆ هەیە ﺑەهێزیﺎن
 لە هەندێك ەل ﺑەكﺎرهێنﺎﺑێت سﺎرینیﺎن گﺎزی سنﻭﻭرداری رێژەیەكﯽ نیﺎخیﺑﻭﻭا پێدەچێت رایگەیﺎند سﻭﻭریﺎ، لە نەﺗەﻭەیەكگرﺗﻭﻭەكﺎن
 .هێرشەكﺎنیﺎندا
 
 ێدەﺑ راگەیشﺗﺑێت، كﻭشندە گﺎزی زیﺎﺗری زۆر رێژەیەكﯽ ﺑە دەسﺗیﺎن ئۆپۆزسیۆن چەكدارانﯽ دەﺑێ دﻭایﯽ، هێرشەی ئەم ﺑۆ
 ەسەرداگیرانﯽدەسﺗﺑ لەﺑﺎرەی نییە راپۆرﺗێك هیچ ﺑەﺗﺎیﺑەت ﺗێنﺎچێت، رێﯽ ئەمە ﺑەسﺎدەیﯽ. ئەنجﺎمداﺑێت ﺑەنهێنﯽ ئۆپەراسیۆنەكەیﺎن
 ﺑە زۆر هەﻭاڵگری ئﺎژانسﯽ ژمﺎرەیەك هەرﻭەهﺎ -جەنگەكە مﺎﻭەی درێژایﯽ ﺑە یﺎخیﺑﻭﻭانەﻭە لەلایەن ئەسەد رژێمﯽ ئەﺗۆمﯽ چەكﯽ
 .لەمجۆرە ئەگەرێكﯽ ﺑۆ ﺗەنیﺎ دەكەن رژێم كیمیﺎییەكﺎنﯽ چەكە كۆگﺎی چﺎﻭدێری ﻭردی
 
 ﺎﻭاییەﻭەخۆرئ دیكەی ﻭڵاﺗﺎنﯽ ﻭ یەكگرﺗﻭﻭەكﺎن ﻭیلایەﺗە لەلایەن ئەسەد رژێمﯽ ﺑێگﻭمﺎن. ئەسەد رژێمﯽ لای ەدەمﺎنگێڕێﺗەﻭ ئەمە هەمﻭﻭ
 ئێمە ﺎﺑێتن هەرچەندە. دەكﺎت كێش ﻭاشنﺗن دەسﺗﯽ لێكەﻭﺗەﻭە، زۆری گیﺎنﯽ زیﺎنﯽ كە لەمجۆرە، كیمیﺎیﯽ هێرشێكﯽ نﺎكرێت، ﺑۆمﺑﺑﺎران
  .هەڵسەنگێنین مەﺑەسﺗێك ﺑۆ رﻭﻭداﻭێك هەمﻭﻭ
 
 ﺑەشﺎر یگچكە ﺑرا مﺎهیری ﺑە كیمیﺎییەكﺎن، چەكە یەكەی سەركێشﯽ فەرمﺎندەیەكﯽ. جەنگدا غﻭﺑﺎری لەنێﻭ ﺑەﺗﺎیﺑەت دەﻗەﻭمێن، رﻭﻭداﻭ
 لە رئﺎﻭەزﺗ كەم ﺑە مﺎهیر نﺎﺑێ ئەﻭەی ﺑەلەﺑەرچﺎﻭگرﺗنﯽ رێیﺗێﺑچێت، ئەمەش ﻭاینﺎﺑینم من. ئەگەرەكﺎن لە یەكێكە ئەسەدیشەﻭە،
  .كۆنﺗڕۆڵدەكرێن ﻭردی ﺑە رژێمیشەﻭە لەلایەن یەكﺎنە جۆرە ەمئ. ﺑزانرێت ﺑراگەﻭرەكەی
 
 ەلەفۆنﯽﺗ پەیﻭەندییەكﯽ ﺑدات جیهﺎنﯽ نیشﺎنﯽ ئەمریكﺎ دەرەﻭەی ﻭەزیری كێری جۆن ﺑڕیﺎرە كە ﺑەڵگەیەی ئەﻭ ئەمەش، نﻭﻭسینﯽ ﺗﺎﻭەكﻭ
 ندییەكەدا،پەیﻭە لە. مﺎهیر دەسﺗﯽ ژێر ﯽدیمەشق كیمیﺎییەكﺎنﯽ چەكە یەكەیەكﯽ ﺑۆ سﻭﻭریﺎﻭە ﺑﺎڵای ﺑەرپرسێكﯽ لەلایەن لەخۆدەگرێت
 .ﺑێت یەكەﻭە ئەﻭ كیمیﺎییەكەی هێرشە ﻭردەكﺎرییەكﺎنﯽ ﺑەدﻭای زیﺎﺗر دەردەكەﻭێت ﻭا رژێم ﺑە سەر ﺑەرپرسەی ئەﻭ
 
 رانﯽحﻭزەی لە. دەكرد چﺎﻭەڕێﯽ لەﻭەی گەﻭرەﺗرﺑﻭﻭن دەرەنجﺎمەكﺎنﯽ سﻭﻭریﺎ حكﻭمەﺗﯽ كیمیﺎییەكەی هێرشە ئەﻭ لێكدانەﻭەكﺎن ﺑەپێﯽ
 ژەیەكﯽرێ ﺑە كیمیﺎیﯽ چەكﯽ ﺑەكﺎرهێنﺎنﯽ لەﺑﺎرەی راگەیﺎندﻭﻭە خۆیﺎن ﺑﺎﻭەڕی ئﺎشكرا ﺑە خۆرئﺎﻭاییەكﺎن هەﻭاڵگرییە دەزگﺎ ﻭە،3102
  004
 ەﺑﻭﻭن ئﺎرەزﻭﻭیەكیﺎن هیچ لەﺑەرئەﻭەی دانیپێداﺑنێت، كە نەﺑﻭﻭ سپیدا كۆشكﯽ ﺑەرژەﻭەندی لە. ئەسەدەﻭە رژێمﯽ لەلایەن سنﻭﻭردار
  .سﻭﻭریﺎ لە ﻭاﺗﺎدار دەسﺗﺗێﻭەردانێكﯽ ﺑۆ كێشﺑكرێن ئۆﺑﺎمﺎدا ﻭﻭرەكەیس هێڵە ﺑەسەر ﺑۆئەﻭەی
 
 گﻭﺗنﯽ ەﺑ كرد فراﻭانﺗر خۆی سﻭﻭرەكەی هێڵە یەكگرﺗﻭﻭەكﺎنیش ﻭیلایەﺗە رەﺗﺑكرێﺗەﻭە، ﺑﺗﻭانری كە ﺑﻭﻭ رﻭﻭن هێندە هەر ﺑەڵگەكە
 .نین شەڕەﻭە نێﻭ چﻭﻭنە شﺎیەنﯽ كە رژێمەﻭە لەلایەن ﺑەكﺎرهێنراﻭن سنﻭﻭردار ﻭا ﺑەرێژەیەكﯽ كیمیﺎییەكﺎن چەكە ئەﻭەی
 لێ كیمیﺎییەكﺎنﯽ چەكە سنﻭﻭرداری ﺑەكﺎرهێنﺎنﯽ ﺑیركردﻭﻭەﺗەﻭە ﻭای ئەسەد كە دیمەشق ﺑە دەﺑەخشێت ﻭاﺗﺎیەك رﻭﻭەشەﻭە لەﻭ
 .ﻗﻭرﺑﺎنﯽ كردنە یﺎخیﺑﻭﻭانﯽ لایەنگری مەدەنﯽ خەڵكﺎنﯽ چەكەكﺎن. ﻗﺑﻭڵدەكرێت
 
 ێﺑهێڵنج پۆسﺗەكﺎنیﺎن ئﺎرەزﻭﻭدەكەن یﺎخییەكﺎن جەنگﺎﻭەرە مەدەنییەكﺎن، نﺎﻭچە سەر ۆﺑ كیمیﺎیﯽ هێرشﯽ ئەگەری ﺑە ئﺎمﺎژەدا لەیەكەم 
 ۆﺑ راسﺗەﻗینە ئێشەی سەر ﺑﻭﻭنەﺗە دیمەشق ﺑﺎشﻭﻭری هێرشكراﻭەسەرەكﺎنﯽ ﺗﺎزە نﺎﻭچە. ﺑچن كەسﻭكﺎریﺎنەﻭە سەلامەﺗﯽ ﺑەپیر ﻭ
 سﺎڵﯽ ەل هێرش دﻭای لە هێرش ئەﻭەشدا لەگەڵ. ﻭیسﺗﯽپێ كردە ﺑێت، نرخێك ﺑەهەر شﺎرەكەی كۆنﺗڕۆڵﯽ ﺑەدەسﺗهێنﺎنەﻭەی كە ئەسەد،
  .ەرس چﻭﻭﺑنە ﺑۆ پێشﻭﻭﺗری كیمیﺎییەكﺎنﯽ هێرشە رژێم ﻭاشدەردەكەﻭێت. ﻭەدەرنێن نﺎﻭچﺎنە لەﻭ یﺎخیﺑﻭﻭان نەیﺎنﺗﻭانﯽ راﺑردﻭﻭدا،
 
 ئێمە رێگەپێدراﻭ، چەكﯽ ﺑە مەدەنینشینەكﺎن نﺎﻭچە مﻭشەكﺑﺎرانكردنﯽ لە ئەسەد ﺑەشﺎر هێزەكﺎنﯽ سنﻭﻭری ﺑەرفراﻭانﯽ لە رﻭانین ﺑە
 ەﺑ كراﺑێت فرمﺎن راﺑردﻭﻭش هەفﺗەی پێدەچێت. ﻭێرانكەرەكﺎن چەكە ﺑەرامﺑەر هەﺑێت ئەخلاﻗیمﺎن پەسەندكردنێكﯽ هیچ نﺎﺑێ
 ﺑﺎركراﻭ ﺎدزی فڕۆكەیەكﯽ ﺑە سﻭﻭریﺎ سﻭﻭپﺎی ﺑە سەر نﺎﻭچەیﯽ یەكەیەكﯽ فەرمﺎندەی دﻭاﺗر سنﻭﻭردار، كیمیﺎیﯽ هێرشێكﯽ ئەنجﺎمدانﯽ
 پەیﻭەندییە ئەم لەﺑەرئەﻭە. هەردﻭﻭكیﺎن یﺎن پێكﺎﺑن، ئﺎمﺎنجەكەی ﻭردﺗر پێﻭیست لە زیﺎد كەمێك یﺎن هەڵفڕیﺑێت، كیمیﺎیﯽ شەكﯽمﻭ ﺑە
 .كراﺑێت پێﻭە ﺗەلەفۆنییەی
 
 ﺗەﻭەنە ﺑە ەرس ئﺎسﺎیشﯽ ئەنجﻭﻭمەنﯽ. ﺑكەین لەﺑﺎرەﻭە چﯽ دەﺑێ كە دەمێنێت پرسیﺎرە ئەﻭ هێشﺗﺎ ﺑێت، راسﺗیش من لێكدانەﻭەكەی ئەگەر
 ئەﻭەی ەڕایسەر. چینەﻭە ﻭ رﻭﻭسیﺎ ڤیﺗۆی ﺑەهۆی ئەﻭەش مەسەلەیەﻭە، ئەم لەﺑﺎرەی دەمێنێﺗەﻭە ﺑنﺑەسﺗگەیشﺗﻭﻭ ﺑە هەر یەكگرﺗﻭﻭەكﺎن
 اﺗیژیسﺗر پلانﯽ ﺑەﺑﯽ ئەﻭەش ئەنجﺎمدانﯽ ئەسەد، رژێمﯽ ﺑە ﺑهێنێت كۆﺗﺎیﯽ زەحمەﺗە مﻭشەكهﺎﻭێژ كەشﺗﯽ ﻭ فڕۆكە هەندێ نﺎردنﯽ
 گەڵلە كەمﺗر پێدەچێت ئەمریكیش دەنگدەرانﯽ. دەﺑێت پەلەكردن راﺑردﻭﻭ هەفﺗەی رﻭﻭداﻭەكەی لەﺑﺎرەی ﺗرزیﺎ رﻭﻭنكردنەﻭەی یﺎن
 یسلامﯽئ زۆر ژمﺎرەیەكﯽ سﻭﻭریﺎ ئۆپۆزسیۆنﯽ كە ﺑەﺗﺎیﺑەت پێﻭیسﺗنﯽ، رێكخراﻭ سەرﺑﺎزی هێرشێكﯽ كە ﺑن هەﻭڵانەدا جۆرە ئەﻭ
  .دەگرێت لەخۆ ﺗﻭﻭندڕەﻭ
 








   توركیا قومارەكانی
    3102/8/03     رۆمﺎنۆ دەیڤید نلەلایە
 
 ێشەك سفر" سیﺎسەﺗﯽ. خۆرئﺎﻭاش ﻭ نێﻭەڕاست رۆژهەڵاﺗﯽ لەسەرﺗﺎسەری هﺎت ﺑۆ دەسﺗخۆشﯽ ﺗﻭركیﺎ لەمەﻭﺑەر، سﺎڵێك چەند ﺗەنیﺎ
 رهە سەردانﯽ ئەردۆغﺎن. نﺎﻭچەكەدا لە رۆڵﯽ ﻭ ﺗﻭركیﺎ پێگەی لە ﺑﻭﻭ گۆڕانكﺎری شۆڕشێكﯽ ﻭەك داﻭدئۆغڵﻭ ی"دراﻭسێكﺎن لەگەڵ
 ەركردەكﺎنﯽس ﺗێكچﻭﻭن، ئیسرائیل لەگەڵ پەیﻭەندییەكﺎن كە هەر. رەﺑﺎت ﺗﺎ ﺑەیرﻭﻭﺗەﻭە لە هەڵگﻭﺗراﻭە، پێیدا كردﺑێت عەرەﺑﯽ شﺎرێكﯽ
 .دەﺑینێﺗەﻭە كەنﺎرگیریدا لە خۆی زیﺎﺗر كﺎﺗێك هەمﻭﻭ لە جﻭلەكەنشینە دەﻭڵەﺗە ئەﻭ كە دا هۆشدارییﺎن ﺗﻭركیﺎ
 
 راگەیﺎندنەﻭەی ﺑە. ﺑەرچﺎﻭن زۆر هەمﻭﻭیﺎن ئێسﺗﺎ كە هەڵدەگرێت مەﺗرسﯽ چەندین ۆیداخ لەگەڵ ﺑەكردەﻭە، دەرەﻭەی سیﺎسەﺗێكﯽ
 ئەﻭ ﺎﺗ ﺑمێنێﺗەﻭە لەدەسەڵاﺗدا دەﺑێ عەرەﺑﯽ ﺑەهﺎری دیكﺗﺎﺗۆرەی كﺎم كە لەﻭێﻭە مەسەلەیەك، هەر لەسەر هێزەﻭە ﻭ رﻭﻭنﯽ ﺑە پێگەكەی
 دﻭژمنﯽ ،دۆست پەیداكردنﯽ لە خێراﺗر ئەنقەرە دەردەكەﻭێت ﻭا ت،ﺑكﺎ غەززە كەرﺗﯽ لەگەڵ مﺎمەڵە چۆن پێﻭیسﺗە ئیسرائیل كە شﻭێنەی
  .كردﺑن پەیدا ﺑۆخۆی
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 لە ﻭﻭﺑ خۆپﺎرێز پڕكراﺑﻭﻭەﻭە، دیپلۆمﺎﺗیﺎنە هۆشداری ﻭ لێدﻭان ﺑە ﺑﻭﻭ، نزمﺗر لەمە زۆر كلیلێكﯽ ﺗﻭركیﺎ دەرەﻭەی سیﺎسەﺗﯽ جﺎران
 ەردۆغﺎنئ هەركﺎﺗێك دەرەﻭە ﻭەزارەﺗﯽ نێﻭ دیپلۆمﺎﺗكﺎرەكﺎنﯽ دەچم ﺑۆ ﻭای ئێسﺗﺎ. نﺎﺗۆ ئەندامێﺗﯽ لەدەرەﻭەی شﺗێك هەر لە ﺗێﻭەگلانﯽ
  .دەچەمێنەﻭە مﺎیكرۆفۆنێك دەسﺗﺑداﺗە
 
 نزیك ەل كﺎرﺗەكﺎنیﺎن یﺎریزانەكﺎن زیرەكﺗرین دەﺑینێت، ﺑەخۆیەﻭە خێرا ئﺎﻭا پێشڤەچﻭﻭنﯽ ﻭ گۆڕانكﺎری ئەزمﻭﻭنﯽ كە نﺎﻭچەیەكدا لە
 لە زیﺎﺗر ﻭ زیﺎﺗر ﻭەزیران سەرۆك ئەردۆغﺎنﯽ كردﻭﻭە، دەسﺗەمۆ نەیﺎرەكﺎنﯽ ﻭﻭپەگر ﻭ سﻭپﺎ لەﻭكﺎﺗەﻭەی. دەهێڵنەﻭە سنگیﺎن
  .دەردەكەﻭێت ﺑەخۆ ﺑﺎﻭەڕ زۆر ﻭ هەڵەشە ﻗﻭمﺎرچییەكﯽ
 
 ﻭ فەلەسﺗینﯽ حەمﺎسﯽ سﻭﻭریﺎ، ئۆپۆزسیۆنﯽ میسر، لە مﻭرسﯽ لەسەر گرەﻭەﻭە خسﺗە مﺎڵەكەی نیﻭەی ﻭ فڕێدا كﺎرﺗەكﺎنﯽ هەمﻭﻭ
 زۆریﺎن ێﯽﺑڵ كە رامﺎﻭن لەﻭە ﺗﻭركیﺎ دیپلۆمﺎسﯽ ﻭ ﺑﺎزرگﺎنﯽ كۆمەڵگﺎی دۆڕاندنەكﺎنﯽ، كەڵەكەﺑﻭﻭنﯽ لەگەڵ. عێراق سﻭنییەكﺎنﯽ لایەنە
 .ئەردۆغﺎن گرەﻭەكﺎنﯽ داپۆشینﯽ ﺑۆ لێﺑكرێت
 
 هەرێمﯽ حكﻭمەﺗﯽ. كردﻭﻭنﯽ كﻭرد لەسەر كە ﺑﻭﻭﺑن ئەﻭانە پێدەچیت ئەردۆغﺎن سەركەﻭﺗﻭﻭەكﺎنﯽ گرەﻭە ﺗﺎكە سﺎﺗە، ئەم ﺗﺎﻭەكﻭ
  .سﺎﺗەدا لەم لانیكەم نییە، لەگەڵدا كێشەیەكﯽ هیچ ﺗﻭركیﺎ كە دەركەﻭﺗﻭﻭە كەمﺎنە دراﻭسێ لەﻭ یەكێك ﻭەك ﺎنكﻭردسﺗ
 
 ەیەه شكسﺗهێنﺎنﯽ ئەگەری هێشﺗﺎ هەرچەندە ئەنقەرە، لەگەڵ ئﺎشﺗﯽ نەخشەڕێگﺎی لەسەر ﺑﻭﻭە رازی KKP كﻭردسﺗﺎن كرێكﺎرانﯽ پﺎرﺗﯽ
 سﻭﻭریﺎش كﻭردی ﺗەنﺎنەت. دیمﻭكراسیﺎنە چﺎكسﺎزی ﺑە KKP كشﺎنەﻭەی ەﻭەچﻭﻭنﯽﺑەپیر لە شكسﺗﺑهێنێت ﺗﻭركیﺎ حكﻭمەﺗﯽ ئەگەر
 جەخﺗكردنەﻭە ﺑە سەر، دەكەنە هێرشیﺎن كە ﺗﻭندڕەﻭەكﺎن ئیسلامییە لە ﺗﻭركیﺎ پشﺗگیری ﺑە ﺑن دڵگرانییەك هیچ ﺗﻭﻭشﯽ رەﺗیﺎنكردەﻭە
 .ﺗﻭﻭەنەﻭیس ﺑﺎكﻭﻭریﺎن دراﻭسێﯽ لە هیچیﺎن دۆسﺗﺎنە پەیﻭەندی لە جگە ئەﻭەی لەسەر
 
 یەئﺎڵۆزی پﺗرﺑﻭﻭنﯽ ﻭ دەرەﻭەیﺎن سیﺎسەﺗﯽ ﺗێكشكﺎنﯽ كەڵەكەﺑﻭﻭنﯽ لەگەڵ دەكەن كﺎرێك چ داهﺎﺗﻭﻭدا لە حكﻭمەﺗەكەی ﻭ ئەردۆغﺎن
 .ﺎنەدەسﺗپێﻭەگرﺗنی ﻭ كردﺑﻭﻭیﺎن كﻭرد لەسەر كە گرەﻭانەیە ئەﻭ ﺑەری چنینەﻭەی ﺑدەن، ﺑۆ هەﻭڵﯽ كە شت ﺑﺎشﺗرین نێﻭخۆییەكﺎن؟
 
 ﺑەردەﻭام دۆڕاﻭەكﺎن گرەﻭە لەسەر زیﺎﺗر پﺎرەی فڕێدانﯽ لەسەر ﻭ ﻗﻭمﺎركردن لەسەر چﺎلاكﺎنەﺗر كە دەﺑێت ئەﻭە هەڵەشەكەش شﺗە 
 كﺎﺗێك ﺎتﺑك ئیسرائیل ﻭ خۆرئﺎﻭا لۆمەی پﺎشﺎن لەخۆﺑگرێت، كﻭردیش سەر گرەﻭەكﺎنﯽ دۆڕاندنﯽ سﺗراﺗیژیەﺗە ئەم پێدەچێت. ﺑێت
 .هەرەسدێنێ دەرەﻭە ﻭ نێﻭخۆ لە شﺗێك هەمﻭﻭ
 
 لە مﻭرسﯽ ەﺑ دژ كﻭدەﺗﺎی ئەنجﺎمدانﯽ ﺑە ﺑﻭﻭ ئیسرائیل ﺗۆمەﺗﺑﺎركردنﯽ لەﺑﺎرەی یەكێكیﺎن دﻭاییەی، ئەم لێدﻭانەكﺎنﯽ لە ەندێكه لەنێﻭ 
 .پێكرد ئﺎمﺎژەم سﺗراﺗیژەی ئەم ﺑەرەﻭ ئەردۆغﺎن چەمﺎنەﻭەی لە دەكﺎت زیﺎﺗر گﻭمﺎنم ئەﻭە میسر،










  " دیمﻭکراسﯽ" لە راکردن ﺗﻭنێلﯽ
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 ینینﯽﺑ ﺑە خۆشحﺎڵﺑﻭﻭم دیکە، کەسﯽ زۆر ﻭەک. ﺑنﻭﻭسم کﻭردسﺗﺎنەﻭە هەڵﺑژاردنەکەی ﺑﺎرەی لە هەفﺗەیەم ئەم گۆشەی ﺑەنیﺎزﺑﻭﻭم





. هەیە درێژﺗری مێژﻭﻭیەکﯽ یﺎسﺎ حﻭکمﯽ ﻭ هەڵﺑژاردن لەﻭێ کە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ، لە ﺑکەم ئەمدﻭاییە رﻭﻭداﻭێکﯽ ﺑﺎسﯽ حەزدەکەم ئەﻭە، لەﺑری
 رێمﯽهە زیندانﯽ لە ﺗﻭنێلەﻭە لێدانﯽ رێﯽ لە  پەکەکە ﺑە سەر ﺑەندکراﻭی 81 کە ﺑڵاﻭیﺎنکردەﻭە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ میدیﺎکﺎنﯽ ئەیلﻭل ی52 رۆژی
 08 یەکەیدرێژی کە دەخﻭێندەﻭە ﺗﻭنێلەکەیﺎن لێدانﯽ چۆنێﺗﯽ هەﻭاڵﯽ ﺗﺎمﻭچێژەﻭە ﺑە ﺗﻭرک خﻭێنەرانﯽ زۆرﺑەی. رایﺎنکردﻭﻭە ﺑینگۆل
 ۆڵﯽخ لە ﺑەشێک هیچ زیندانەکە ﺑەرپرسﺎنﯽ. ئﺎﻭەڕۆ کەنﺎڵﯽ ﺑەرەﻭ درێژﺑﻭﻭەﺗەﻭە زیندان دیﻭارەکﺎنﯽ دەرەﻭەی ﺑەرەﻭ ﻭ ﺑﻭﻭە مەﺗر
 ﻭێنش ﻭ ﺑێسەر ﺑەندکراﻭەکﺎن دەرچﻭﻭنﯽ دﻭای زﻭﻭییش ﺑە نەدۆزیﻭەﺗەﻭە، هەڵکەندنیﺎن ئﺎمرازەکﺎنﯽ ﻭ پێمەڕە ﻭ پﺎچ یﺎن ﺗﻭنێلەکە





 ەک زانیﻭمﺎنە: "رﻭﻭداﻭەکەﻭە لەﺑﺎرەی ادەد ﻭەزیری ئەرگین، سەعدﻭڵڵا لێدﻭانەکەی سەر، ﺑخﺎﺗە سەرنجﯽ خەڵک پێﻭیسﺗە کە ئەﻭەی
 ﺗەنیﺎ هەڵاﺗﻭﻭەکە، 81 لەکۆی کە ئەﻭەیە داد ﻭەزیری مەﺑەسﺗﯽ ﻭادیﺎرە." حﻭکمدراﻭ چﻭار ﻭ راگیراﻭ 41 رایﺎنکردﻭﻭە، ﺑەندکراﻭ 81
 چﻭارکەسﯽ. راﻭنحﻭکمنەد هێشﺗﺎ ﺑەڵام دەسﺗگیرکراﻭن، راﺑردﻭﻭدا لە کەسیﺎن 01. ﺗﺎﻭان ئەنجﺎمدانﯽ ﺑە ﺗﺎﻭانﺑﺎرکراﻭن چﻭاریﺎن
 یندانەکەز نێﻭ خزێنراﻭنەﺗە ئەﻭان سﺎڵێک، لانیکەم ﺑۆمﺎﻭەی. دەسﺗگیرنەکراﻭن فەرمییەﻭە ﺗۆمەﺗﺑﺎرکردنﯽ لەرێﯽ هەرگیز دیکەیﺎن





 زۆرﺑەی ەپێﯽﺑ( دەمێنێﺗەﻭە سﺎدەیﯽ ﺑە هەر ﻭرکیﺎﺗ لە مۆدێلەکە. پێشمﻭانییە ﺑەڵام. ﺗێﺑگەم داد ﻭەزیری لێدﻭانەکەی لە هەڵە ﺑە من رەنگە
 سﺎڵ نچەندی ﺑۆمﺎﻭەی یﺎن دەسﺗگیرکراﻭن، ﺗۆمەت ﺑەﺑێ خەڵک). چﻭﻭە خراپﺗر ﺑەرەﻭ ئەردۆغﺎندا حﻭکمڕانﯽ لەژێر لێکدانەﻭەکﺎنیش
 لە ﺑﻭﻭنە خەﺑﺎرﻭدۆ ئەﻭ ﺗﻭﻭشﯽ کە کەسﺎنەی ئەﻭ. ﺑکەن خۆیﺎن لە ﺑەرگری ﺑۆئەﻭەی دەکەن دادگﺎییەک چﺎﻭەڕێﯽ ﻭ ﺑەندکراﻭن
 ﻭانێتدەﺗ ﺑێنێت، کەس هەندێ ﺑەسەر ئەمە ﺑﺗﻭانێت کە حکﻭمەﺗێک. کﻭردن زۆرینەشیﺎن ئەردۆغﺎنن، حکﻭمەﺗەکەی ﺑەرهەڵسﺗﺎنﯽ





 ﻭڵاﺗﯽ یﺎکﺗﻭر" دﻭﻭﺑﺎرەکردنەﻭەی ﺑۆ شەیدان زۆر ﻭادیﺎرن کە کەﻭﺗﻭﻭە ﺗﻭرکیﺎ ﺑەرپرسﺎنﯽ لە زۆر ﺑە چﺎﻭم سﺎڵێک، چەند ﺑەدرێژایﯽ





 مﺎنگە ەندینچ ﺑۆ ئێسﺗﺎ. رﻭﻭ ﺑخﺎﺗە دیمﻭکراﺗﯽ چﺎکسﺎزی پﺎکێجیکﯽ ئەیلﻭل کۆﺗﺎیﯽ ﺗﺎﻭەکﻭ دا ﺑەڵێنﯽ ﻭەزیران سەرۆک ئەردۆغﺎنﯽ
. دیکە ئەﻭانﯽ ﺑەشداری ﺑەﺑێ پﺎکێجەکەن، درﻭسﺗکردنﯽ خەریکﯽ داخراﻭەﻭە دەرگﺎی پشت لە ﻭ نهێنﯽ شێﻭەیەکﯽ ﺑە دارﻭدەسﺗەکەی
 ێگﺎینەخشەڕ"لەﺑﺎرەی درﻭسﺗﺑﻭﻭە لا گﻭمﺎنﯽ پەکەکە کە ﺑەﺗﺎیﺑەت دیمﻭکڕاﺗﯽ، چﺎکسﺎزی ﺑۆ دەچێت دەست لە خەریکە کﺎت ﺑەڵام
 ەمەک ﺑۆ هﺎﻭشێﻭەیە مﺎفﯽ ﻭ" دایک زمﺎنﯽ ﺑە خﻭێندن" لەسەر سەرنجیﺎن ئﺎشکرا ﺑە کﻭرد سەرکردەکﺎنﯽ هەرچەند. حکﻭمەت" ئﺎشﺗﯽ
 ﺑەردەﻭام ﯽدادگﺎی ﺑەﺑێ ﺑەندکردن ﻭ ﺗۆمەت ﺑەﺑێ دەسﺗگیرکردنﯽ ئﺎخۆ دەﺑێت ئەﻭە لەسەر سەرنجم زیﺎﺗر من پﺎکێجەدا، لەﻭ نەﺗەﻭەکﺎن
 ".سەرﻭەردا یﺎسﺎ" ﺗﻭرکیﺎی لە دادەنرێت ﺑۆ یﺎسﺎییﺎن رێکﺎری
 







 یسلامیزمو ئ ەلمﺎنییەتع
 3102/7/02 ۆمﺎنۆر یدەيڤد لەلايەن
 ەوەیو ن ۆكسفۆردئ ۆیزانك ەل یسلامﯽئ ێژينەوەیﺗو ڕۆفیسۆریپ ەمەزان،ﺗﺎرق ر یزار ەﺑوو ل ەمريكﯽئ ەﺑڵیكﯽپ ەشنﺎڵن يۆیراد ەل ێمگو ێنێدو
 كردەستیپێد ۆرەج ەمل ەيەكﯽﻗس ەندچ ەﺑ ەكرد،د یسریم يیەیدوا ەمئ ەكﺎنﯽرووداو ﯽﺑﺎس ەمەزانر ۆر. دكتیسرم یمینﯽموسل یخوانئ ەزرێنەریدام
 ەڕۆكﯽنﺎو مەەئ ەڵامﺑ ەمﺎون،ن ەﺑیرل ۆیخ ەكوو ێكر ەكﺎنیم(وش” ﺑن. يەكتر ڵكردنﯽو ﻗبو يﺎنژ ێكەوەپ ێریف ەلمﺎنییەكﺎنو ع یسلامﯽئ ێويستەپ“ 
 یرێف يستەێوپ ێمەئ“  ەیێو. هﺎوشەڵكەوەخ ەلایﺑ ێتﺑ ەﻗلانﯽع ۆرز يدگﺎيەكﯽد ەنگەر ەمە.) ئێتﺑ ۆراستگ ەگەڵمدال يﺎدەوەريم ەگەرﺑوو، ئ ەكﺎنﯽﻗس
 .”ەڕش ەكن ین،ﺑ ەوايﯽئﺎشت
  
 دانوستﺎندن ﺑكﺎت يﯽخوا يستﯽو يدگﺎید ەسەرل ەيەوێتد كێ
 ێئﺎخنینﯽﺗ ﯽەمەﺑەستﺑ ەكەند یﺎسەتس ەشداریﺑ ێنﺎسدا،پ ەل یسلامییەكﺎن،. ئێكدژيیەل ەرﺑڕينداد ەل ەره يﺎرە،وا د ەلمﺎنﯽ،و ع یسلامﯽئ يﺎنﯽژ پێكەوە
 ەهەمﺎن. ﺑديكەدا یﺎسﯽس يەنﯽلا ەنێول ەئﺎينﺑ ەندپﺎﺑ یﺎسەﺗمەداریس ەﺑ ەﺑووند ەسﺎدەيﯽﺑ ەﺑووايە،ن ەوانئ یﺎزین ەمەئ ەگەر. ئﯽتگش یﺎسەﺗﯽس ەل ينئﺎ
 ەسیحییەم ینﺑ وازەخئﺎواﺗ ێمەشئ ەنگەﺑكﺎت. ر ڕاستەئﺎ ﯽگشت یﺎسەﺗﯽس ێتﺑدر ەئﺎينﺑ ێگەر ێنﺎكر يەوا ڕوايﺎنﺑ ەلمﺎنییەكﺎنیشع ێنﺎس،پ ەﺑ ێوە،ش
 .ێنﺑسﺎز ێكەوەپ ەفريقییەكﺎنئ ەرەچەڵەكﺑ ەمريكییەئ ەگەڵل ەكﺎنڕەوﺗوند
 
 وەكﺗﺎو!” ەلمﺎنیشع یﺎوازیج ۆریج ێوەش ەهەمﺎنﺑ ەن،ه یﺎوازج یسلامیﯽئ ۆرج ەندين! چەڕێكەچﺎو‘’ ڵێنﺑ ڵەداخﺎ ەمل ێنەران،خو ەل ەندێكه رەنگە
 خۆداەدانب ۆریج ەروەهﺎه ،”ەكەند يﺎسﺎكﺎن ەيڕەویپ“ ەكﺎن،گر ەخۆداان ﺑد ۆریج -ەنه یسلامﯽئ ۆردوو ج ەنیﺎﺗ ەڕاستﯽﺑ ڵێمﺑتوانم ﺑ ەيەیرادد ەوئ
 ﯽو ئﺎست یسلامئ يﺎسﺎكﺎنﯽ یسلام،ئ ۆﺑ ەنه یﺎوازج ۆرز ۆرز ەفسیریﺗ ێگومﺎن. ﺑ”ەستد ەگرنەد ەسەڵاتد ێت،ﺑ ێكئﺎمراز ەهەرﺑ“ ەگرەكﺎن،ن
: ﺑێتەد یﺎدەپ ۆجیكﯽل ەمﺎیﺑن ەمﺎنه یسلامییﺎنەدا،ئ ەوئ ۆریج ەردووه ە. لۆمەڵگﺎداك ەل ينییەكﺎنئﺎ ێسﺎر ەپﺎندنﯽس ۆﺑ ەنه ەمﺎسەﺗیشح یﺎوازیج
 .ێتﺑ ێگﺎيەكر ەره ەجﺎ ﺑ ﯽگشت یﺎسەﺗﯽس ۆﺑ ەرﺑگێڕدرێنو ەﺑێد ەمﺎنەشئ ە،خراپ ەل ێگەگرﺗنو ر ەچﺎك ەﺑ ەرمﺎنكردنف
 
 ەنێنﺗوند داد نﯽێوشوێر یسلامییەكﺎنئ ەل ەندێه ەرئەوەەﺑﺗﺎوانن. ل يكەد ﯽشت ەندێه ەگەڵل يبﺎ،و ر ينﺎز یرۆزيیەكﺎن،پ ەﺑ ێڕێزیكحول، ﺑ یسلامدا،ئ لە
 ەكوو ،ەرﺑ ەگرنەد ەوخۆنﺎ راست ۆرﺗرز ێوازیش يكەد یسلامﯽئ ەندێه ەكﺎﺗێكدال ەرەﺑﯽ،ع يەیو سعود ێرانئ ەل ەكو ە،كرداران ەمئ يﺎسﺎغكردنﯽ ۆﺑ
 ەكو ەدات،كحول د ەكﺎرهێنرانﯽﺑ ەمكردنەوەیك ەوڵﯽه )PKA( ەشەپێدانداد و گ ﯽپﺎرﺗ ەلمﺎنییە،ع ەرمﺎنڕەوايﯽف یﺎﺗورك ەستوورید ەپێﯽ. ﺑیﺎﺗورك
 ەينێكﯽەمپك ەل ەشێكﺑ ەكو يﺎسﺎ، ەل ەرچووند ەﺑ ينﺎو ز یرۆزيیەكﺎنپ ەرامبەرﺑ ێڕێزیﺑ ەڵەمدانﯽﻗ ەل ەروەهﺎه ەندروستﯽ،ﺗ ەڵمەﺗێكﯽه ەل ەشێكﺑ
سوود  ێژەیر يﺎدكردنﯽز یدژ ەل ەرفراوانﺑ ەڕەشەیو ه ەرەﺎمموئ ەروەهﺎه ينﺎ،ز ۆسنووردانﺎندان ﺑ ەهەوڵﯽل ەمڕۆشئ ەكوﺗﺎو ﯽگشت ەخلاﻗیﺎﺗﯽئ
. ”ێترﺑك ڕاستەئﺎ ەريعەﺗەوەو ش ينئﺎ ەلايەنل يﺎنژ“ ییەگشت ێستگەیو ەمﺎنه ەرەوﺑ ڕاستەكەیئﺎ )PKA( ەرمﺎنڕەوايﯽف ەﺑ یﺎ. ﺗوركەندینﺎو ﯽﺑﺎنك ەل
 .يﺎﺗرداز ێچﺎوپێچﯽپ ەو ﺑ رێواشته ەمەندەفەرێكﯽش ەﺑ ەڵامﺑ ەرەﺑﯽ،ع يیەیو سعود ێرانئ ێوەیش ەمﺎنه ەﺑ
 ﯽگشت یﺎسەﺗﯽس ەل ينئﺎ ێئﺎخنینﯽﺗ ەمەﺑەستﯽﺑ ەكەند یﺎسەتس ەشداریﺑ ێنﺎسدا،پ ەل ئیسلامییەكﺎن،
 
 ێكﯽشت ينﺎئ ێگەيشتنەوە،ﺗ ەم. لەلمﺎنییەتع ۆﺑ ەڕەنسییەكﺎنف ێبﺎزیر ێوازیش ەگەڵل ەيەه ێكچوونﯽل ەداﺗەوەد ەنگر يمەنەوەد ەمل ەك ێنەيەیو ئەو
 ۆكرد، ﺑەد ەيڕەوپ ێبﺎزیر ەمﺎنه یﺎﺗورك ەل ەمﺎلیزم. كەنێتداد ينئﺎ ۆﺑ يشو سنوور ێوشوێنر ەنﺎنەتﺗ یﺎسەتس ڕانیدا،و حوكم ەوڵەتد ەل ەكییەلاو
كرد  ﺎسﺎغي ەچەیپ ۆشینﯽپ ەوڵەت،د یسنوورداركراو ۆكترينﯽد ەپێﯽﺑ ڵات،و ەرﺗﺎسەریس یمﺎمەكﺎنﯽئ ەﺑ ەخشﯽﺑ ۆڵەﺗﯽو م ێنﺎنراه ێككﺎﺗ ەنموون
 ییەكﺎنداملایسئ ەنێول ۆریز ڕەيﯽﺗوو ەك ەلمﺎنییەﺗەيەع ۆرەج ەم. ئێڵنەوەﺑه يشر ییەكﺎنحكوم ەرپرسەﺑ ەگرت ل ێگەیر ییەكﺎندا،حكوم ەزگﺎددامو ەل
. اوێزخستەرپ ێمەيﺎنئ ڕواكﺎنﯽكرد. ﺑ ێشێلپ ێمەيﺎنئ ەهﺎكﺎنﯽﺑ ڵسﺎ ەندينچ ۆﺑ ”ﯽگوﺗ ێككﺎﺗ ێكرد،پ ەیئﺎمﺎژ يیەدوا ەمﺑ ەردۆغﺎنیشو ئ ەچﺎندوو
 ەكﯽێوەيیهﺎوش ەردۆغﺎنیشەوە،ئ ەخۆداگرەكەیدانب ۆرەج ەﺑ یسلامیزم،ئ”. كرد ەﺑیرل ێمەيﺎنئ ەڕوانییەكﺎنﯽو چﺎو یداواكﺎر یﺎكﺎن،خول ەكﺎن،ﺑژارد
  .ينﺑژ ێكەوە. نﺎﺗوانن پەسەپێنند يكەداد ەوانﯽئ ەسەرﺑ ێكگروپ ەهﺎكﺎنﯽﺑ ەردووكیﺎنه ەك ەلمﺎنییەﺗە،ع ۆرەج ەمئ ەگەڵل ەيەه ەرچﺎویﺑ
 
 ەرمﺎنڕەوايﯽ،) و فەوتمزگ يﺎن( ەنیسەك ێكهەڵبڕينﯽواﺗﺎ ل ەلمﺎنییەتع ەمريكییەوە،ئ ێگەيشتنﯽﺗ ەل ەمريكﯽ؟ئ ەلمﺎنییەﺗﯽع ێوازیش ەﺑﺎرەیل ەیئ
 ەكو ێنﺎﺑ ينیشﺎئ ينیدا،ئﺎ ۆكترينﯽد ەل ڵبكﺎتزا ەفسیرێكﺗ ۆرەج يﺎن ينێكئﺎ ەوڵەتد ێتنﺎﺑ ۆنچ ەكﺑكﺎت. و ێشێلپ ەويدیئ یچكﺎمیﺎنه ەوەیئ ەﺑێﺑ
 ەنسیپەپر مەئ ەمريكﺎ،ئ ەل ەﺑێتەوەد ەردەوامﺑ ەحەدیﺗ ەڕوویرووﺑ ێكهەڵبڕانەل ەمئ ەوەیئ ەگەڵ. لینرێتﺑب ێل یسوود ﯽگشت یﺎسەﺗﯽس يﺎريكەرید
 ﯽنﺎنﺎڵمسوم ەمﺎوەريیﺎنج ەیﺑنك یﺎسییﺎنەیس يەنەلا ەوئ ڵنیﺎيیەوەد ە. ﺑێكدەشكێنێتﺗ یﺎسەتس ينیشئﺎ ەكﺎت،د یسپ ينئﺎ یﺎسەت: سەروون ەواوﺗ
  ەڵبكەن؟ه ەلمﺎنییەﺗەع ەمجۆرەئ ەگەڵل ەكرێد یسلامییەكﺎن،ئ ەپێچەوانەیﺑ ێزكﺎرن،پﺎر
 
 ەۆزگ. خەمريكییەكەيدائ ەروو ەﺑ ەكەن،د ەلمﺎنییەتع یوانﯽپشت ۆرز ێیﺎنگوﺗمپ ەمكرد،ﻗس PKA ەرپرسﺎنﯽﺑ ەگەڵل 9002و  8002 ڵانﯽسﺎ كﺎﺗێك
 ەزهەﺑﯽم ەگەرئ ەنﺎﺑﺎ،ن یﺎتﺑن يﺎسﺎغكراو یسلامﯽئ ەفﺎیر ﯽپﺎرﺗ ەكﺎنﯽپﺎشمﺎو ەسەرل ﺎسییەكەيﺎنیس یزﺑەح ەگەرئ ەنگە. رێبكەمپ ەڕيﺎنﺑﺎو ەمتوانﯽد
 ێنەكەن،پ ەڕيﺎنﺎوﺑ یدیچ یﺎﺗورك ەل ۆنیشﺎندەريشخ یۆنﺎنمل ێدەچێت. پەمﺑك ەڕﺑﺎو ەمتوانﯽد ەكەيﺎن،پﺎرﺗ ەندینﺎو ﯽسروشت ەكردﺑﺎن یسلامییﺎنئ ﯽسونن
  .ەمﺎن یمینموسل یخوانئ ەﺑ ڕوايﺎنﺑ یدیچ یسرم ۆپیشﺎندەریخ یۆنﺎنمل ۆنچ ەكو
 ﺑكﺎت ڕاستەئﺎ ﯽگشت یﺎسەﺗﯽس ێتﺑدر ەئﺎينﺑ ێگەر ێنﺎكر يەوا ڕوايﺎنﺑ عەلمﺎنییەكﺎنیش
 
كﺎت، ﺑ ێڵو ەڵكخ ەداتد ەڵێنﺑ يەنێك. لاەوەداخ ەﺑ ین،ن ەڵكەره ێكەوەهﺎوﺗﺎ و پ یﺎنڕەويشم یسلامیزمﯽو ئ ەمريكﯽئ ەلمﺎنیەﺗﯽع ێوازیش ﺗەنﺎنەت
 ﺎرەێزكپﺎر ەكچۆنو ەﺑنەوە،د ێشەك ەروویرووﺑ ەندێجﺎره ەڵێنﺎنەشﺑ ەمئ ەنﺎنەتﺗ ەرچەند(ه ەڵكخ يﺎنﯽژ ێوازیو ش ەڕﺑﺎو ەرﺑﺎسﯽس ەێتد ێككﺎﺗ
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. یەێپ ەخواو ەلايەنل ەستوورێكﯽد ەك ەخۆيەﺑ ەڕیوا ﺑﺎو يكەد يەنێكﯽ). لاەكەنەوەد ڕاستﯽپشت ەمريكﯽئ ۆمﺎریك ﯽپﺎرﺗ ێون مەسیحییەكﺎنﯽ
 ۆژانەیر يﺎنﯽژ ەل ەرەوەد ەچوون يﺎن یﺎسﯽس ەسەڵاﺗﯽد ەشكردنﯽداﺑ ەسەردانوستﺎندن ل ەنجﺎمدانﯽئ ێون ێنرێتەنﺎخز ەئﺎسﺎنﯽخوا ﺑ تﯽيسو ەجێگەيﺎندنﯽﺑ
 یمینموسل خوانیئ ەك ۆكﺎرێكەه ەمەدانوستﺎندن ﺑكﺎت؟ ئ يﯽخوا يستﯽو يدگﺎید ەسەرل ەيەوێتد ێ. كیﺎنڕەوانەنم ەندەچ یكەكﺎنتﺗﺎكت ییەگرنگ ن ەڵك،خ
 یخوانئ ەكوو يﺎﺗرو ز يﺎﺗرز ڵێكسﺎ ەره یﺎﺗورك ەل PKA ۆچﯽﺑ ەك ەروەهﺎه ەرەپێدا،پ ەڵكداخ ەنێول ڕەزايیەینﺎ ەمووه ەوئ ەداكورﺗ ەمﺎو ەمل
  .ێدێتل یمینﯽموسل
 
 ﯽئﺎسمﺎن وورێكﯽەستد ەﺑ ەڕيﺎنﺑﺎو ەوەﺑن ەل ەره ەگەرئ ەیئ یﺎسﯽ؟س ڵپشتﯽپﺎ ەدەستهێنﺎنﯽﺑ ۆﺑ ەكﺎرﺑهێننﺑ ينئﺎ یسلامییەكﺎنئ ەگەرئ ﯽچ ەیئ ﺑەڵام
 ەرەكﯽس ەكﯽەشێوەيﺑ ێكهێنﺎوە،پ ينیﺎنئﺎ ەمﺎﺑن یﺎسﯽس ێكﯽپﺎرﺗ ەدا،ﺑﺎر ەمل ەسەلەيەك؟م ەمووه ەسەردانوستﺎندن ل ەنجﺎمدانﯽئ ۆﺑن ﺑ ەشئﺎمﺎد ەﺑێت،ن
 ەل ەلمﺎنییەكﺎنع ڵەگەل ەڵكردنه ۆﺑ ەﺑێته ۆرﺗرز یوایه ەچێتد ەوە. لەسپیوچ ێسﺎيەكﯽر ۆرەج ەره ەﺑەرل ەكن یجﯽستراﺗ ۆكﺎریه ەﺑەرل
 ەﺑێتن ڵﻗبو ەنﺎزولەكﺎنیﺎنﺗ ەل ۆرز ەنگەر ،’’یسلامییﺎنەئ“ ەركردەس ۆرەج ەمﺑ ەنگیﺎنداد ەك ۆرز ەڵكێكﯽخ ەرچەندەه ەشنەدا،چ ەمل ینﺎريۆيەكﯽس
 ەچنﺑ ەوەیل ەرﺑ ەنﺎنەتﺗ یسلامییﺎنەش،ئ ەركردەس ەمجۆرە. ئیسلامﯽنواندن ئ ەﺑ یﺎنڕەو،م یﺎواز،كەمترج ەركردەيەكﯽس ەﺑ ەنﺑد ەنگد ەوەیل ەرﺑ






 ێیە؟كورد ك ۆﺑ یﺎﺗورك ەلتەرنﺎﺗیڤﯽئ
 3102/5/7 يلخنبێرگو ڤﺎن يمێرولاد لەلايەن
 ەﺗﯽحكوم ۆﺑ ەلێكه ەﺑێتەد ەمەئ ۆڕدرێت،ﺑگ يﺎسوور ێمﯽرژ ەگەرئ ێوەڕاستدا،ن ۆژهەڵاﺗﯽر یكﺎروﺑﺎر ەل ۆڕەپسپ ە، ك یرووﺑﺎ حوسﺎر ەیﻗس ەپێﯽﺑ
 ەول ەوئ .ێوەڕاستن ەريﺎید ەﺑ ەيﺎندنﯽو گ ەوﺗەكەین ەوەیگواستن ۆﺑ ەستێتﺑب يﺎورسو ەپشت ﺑ یﺎﺗورك ەجیﺎﺗﯽل ۆئەوەیكوردستﺎن ﺑ ەرێمﯽه
  .یمن يەداار ەوئ ەگەڵمن ل ەڵام. ﺑەﺑێتدروست د يﺎسوور ﯽكوردان ۆﺑ ۆﺗۆنۆمئ ەيەكﯽنﺎوچ يندەدائﺎ ەل ەك ەستووەﺑ ییەراست ەوﺑ ﯽپشت ەيدانۆچووﺑ
 ێتەبﺑ ەمەئ ەكرێ، د ەڕێراست يەك ەرس ەونەﺑك ێراقو ع يﺎسوور ﯽكوردان ەرژەوەندیﺑ ەرەگئ ەك ەكﺎتد ەوەئ يمﺎنەیگر یحوسﺎر ینێكیدا،نووس لە
  .ەستێتﺑب یﺎﺗورك ەپشت ﺑ ەمترو غﺎزدا ك ەوتن ەوەیگواستن ەسەلەیم ەل ەكوكوردستﺎن ﺗﺎو ەرێمﯽه ەﺗﯽحكوم ۆﺑﺎش ﺑ ەلێكﯽه
 
 ەيەه یﺎنڕيﺎردانﺑ یﺗوانﺎ يﺎسوور ﯽكوردان ەندچ ەكوﺗﺎو ەك ەكﺎتد ﺎنﯽەستنیشد ەريدەگرنو يﺎسوور ەكورد ل ۆﺗۆنۆمییەیئ ەوئ ۆری"ج ەوئ ﺑەگوﺗەی
ﺎش نەﺗ ێگەيەكﯽر ەمە. ئەريﺎنس ەيخەنەد ەغداو ﺑ ەنقەرەئ ەل ەريەكەه ەیگوشﺎران ەول ەنرزگﺎرﺑك ۆيﺎنﺑتوانن خ ێراقع ﯽكوردان ەك ەوەیئ ەسەرل
 ."يﺎدانسوور ﯽكوردان ەستﯽەﺑندل ەینﺎوچﺎن ەوئ ەڕێگەیو غﺎز ل ەوتن ەوەیگواستن ۆﺑ ەكﺎتد ینداﺑ
 
 ۆنﺎچﺎرن ﺑ يندەدائﺎ ەل ۆشیﺎنخ ەروەهﺎه ەيە،ه يﺎنو غﺎز ەوتن ۆيﺎنداخ ەكﺎنﯽنﺎوچ ەل يﺎشسوور ﯽكوردان ەك ەچوو ەﺑیریل یحوسﺎر ﺑەڵام
 ەكﺎنﯽﺎوچن ەك ن،ەستكوردستﺎن ﺑب يموكراﺗﯽد ﯽپﺎرﺗ ەﺗﺎيبەﺗیشكوردستﺎن (ﺑ ەرێمﯽه يﺎن يﺎسوور یﺎ،ﺗورك ەپشت ﺑ ەوﺗەكەيﺎنن ەنﺎردەكردنﯽه
 ەنەوەیردەكوا ﺑ ێوەڕاستن ۆژهەڵاﺗﯽر یكﺎروﺑﺎر ەزايﺎنﯽشﺎر ەل ۆر. زەريﺎد ەرس ەنﺎچن ۆخۆيﺎنﺑ ەﺑەرئەوەیل ەستن،) ﺑبيﺎسوور لەگەڵهﺎوسنوورن 
 .ییەراست ن ەمەئ ەڵامﺑ ەريﺎ،د ەرس ەگەنەد يﺎسوور ﯽكوردان ەك
 
 ۆﺑ ەردەوامﺑ ۆيەشﺑ ەريﺎ،د ەرس ەنەو نﺎگ یراوەگ ەوريﺎن) چوارديﺎسوور ﯽكوردان ﺗیشەﺗﺎيبەكورد (ﺑ ەك ەچێتەوەد ەﺑیريﺎنجﺎر ل ۆرﺑەیز ئەوانە
 كوردستﺎن و يموكراﺗﯽد ﯽپﺎرﺗ ێوانن يیەیدوا ەمئ ۆرەكﺎنﯽز ەستەوەريیەه ەروەهﺎ. هەﺑەستند ەوروﺑەريﺎند ەپشت ﺑ ەوﺗەكەيﺎنن ەنﺎردەكردنﯽه
ئﺎگﺎدارن  ەوﺗیشن ەورەكﺎنﯽگ ۆمپﺎنیﺎ. كێتﺑ ەحمەتز يﺎو سوور ێراقع ﯽكوردان ێوانن یهﺎوكﺎر ەك ەكﺎتواد KKP كوردستﺎن ێكﺎرانﯽكر ﺎرﺗﯽپ
 يموكراﺗﯽد ﯽپﺎرﺗ ەكن ە،كردوو ەكەینﺎوچ ۆنترۆڵﯽك ەشپﺎرﺗ ەوو ئ يەداDYP يموكراﺗﯽد يەكێتﯽ ﯽپﺎرﺗ ەدەستل يﺎسوور ﯽكوردان ەوﺗﯽن ەك
 .كوردستﺎن
 
 ،ەورامﯽه ﯽئﺎشت ەوێ. لەنجﺎمدراكوردستﺎن ئ ییەكﺎنﯽسرووشت ەرچﺎوەس رەیەرﺑﺎد ۆيەكواشنتن گفتوگ یشﺎر ەل ەمسﺎڵ،ئ یسﺎنﯽن ی٨ رۆژی
 یﺎﺗورك ﺎﺗیڤﯽەلتەرنئ ێتەﺑب ێنﺎﺗوان ڵاﺗێكو یچه ەﺗەكەیحكوم ۆﺑ ەك ەوەروونكرد ەوەیكوردستﺎن ئ ەرێمﯽه ەﺗﯽحكوم ییەكﺎنﯽسرووشت ەسﺎمﺎن ەزيریو
 یهﺎنج ڕەكﺎنﯽﺑﺎزا ەرەوكوردستﺎن ﺑ یو غﺎز ەوتن ەوەیگواستن ۆﺑ يﺎشو سوور ێرانئ ەل ەريەكەه ەكرێد ﯽ،گوﺗ ەوئ ەك، و ەرچەندە، ه
 ەوەیواستنگ ێڵەكﺎنﯽه ێك،شت ەره ەل ەر. ﺑۆكﺎره ۆرز ەﺑەرل ەويش، ئ ەينكﺎرﺑك یﺎﺗورك ەگەڵل ەك ەزوومەندينئﺎر ۆرﺗرز ێمەئ ەڵام: "ﺑەكﺎرﺑهێندرێنﺑ
 ."ەكﺎرهﺎﺗووەﺑ ريشێشتپ ەك ەوەگواستن ۆﺑ ەيەه ەئﺎمﺎد ێگەيەكﯽر ەروەهﺎن . هەئﺎمﺎد ەوز
 
 ەخۆيﯽەرﺑس یداوا يەكسەر ەك يیەئﺎسﺎ ێیﺎنپ یۆنﺎلیستنﺎس یكورد ەندێكه ەڵامﺑ یراوە،گ ەوریكوردستﺎن چوارد ەك ەروون ەﺗەواویﺑ ەوەئ هەرچەندە
 وازكردنﯽلا يﺎن ەوەﺑووژاندن ەل ەﺑووەه ۆڵیﺎنر ەمﺎو ۆﺑ ەمﺎو ڵاﺗﺎنەشو ەو. ئەسەرﺑێتل يﺎیسوور يﺎن ێرانئ يﺎن یﺎﺗورك ەزامەندیر ەوەیئ ەﺑێﺑ ەن،ﺑك
 یﺎﺗورك یەین ێدئوم ەرگﺎيەكﯽد یچه ێراقع ﯽكوردان ۆﺑ ﯽگوﺗ يیﺎنەدوا ەمكوردستﺎن ﺑ ەرێمﯽه ەﺗﯽحكوم ەرۆكﯽس ۆيەشەﺑ ەركوردستﺎن. ه يﯽئﺎﺑوور
 .ەﺑێتن
 
 ەستەﺑوونﯽاﺑو ەرەنتﯽگ ۆڕيیﺎنەشﺑ ەو. ئێويستنپ ەوەيﺎنگواستن ۆڕيﯽﺑ ەوان. ئەرەوەد ێرنەو غﺎز ﺑن ەوتن ەخۆيﺎنەوەل ەروانﺎﺗوانن ه ێراقع كوردانﯽ







 KKP ینﺎو ەرنەهێنﺎنﯽو د یرۆرﺗ یستﯽل یﺎسەﺗەكﺎنﯽس
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 * ۆمﺎنۆر ەيڤدد
 
 ێكخراوەر ەو. ئەرهێنﺎد ۆريستەكﺎنیرﺗ ێكخراوەر یستﯽل ەنێول ێرانﯽئ ەلقﯽخ یدينﯽموجﺎه ێكخراویر ەمريكﺎئ ەرەوەید ەزارەﺗﯽو ەمەوﺑەرل مﺎوەيەك
 ﯽنەكﺎێرشه ێودارﺗرينن ەل يەكێك. ێرانییەكﺎنئ ەرس ۆﺑ ێرشه ەندينچ ەنجﺎمﯽئ ەل ەسك ەزاره ەيﺎند ەڵكوﺑ ەزارانه ەكن ﯽكوشتن ەل ەرپرسیﺎرەﺑ
 ەهۆيەوەﺑ ەنجﺎمداوئ ەﻗینەوەيﺎنﺗ یكﺎر ەندينچ یدينموجﺎه ێزەكﺎنﯽه ێككﺎﺗ ەنجﺎمیدا،ئ 1891/8/03 ەكوﺗﺎو 6/82 ەل ەك ەوەﺑووئ ێكخراوەر ەوئ
 ە. لێرانئ ەوكﺎﺗﯽئ ەرلەمﺎنتﺎریپ ەندينو چ ەرلەمﺎنپ ەرۆكﯽو س ەزيرانو ەرۆكس ەنێويشیﺎنداكوژران، ل ێرانﯽئ ەرپرسﯽﺑ ەورەگ 07 يكەینز
 ەل گرﺗنەرسوود و ەو ﺑ یركردداگ ێرانیﺎنئ ﯽخﺎك ێنحوس ەدامس ێزەكﺎنﯽه ەشﺎنﯽشﺎنب ەلقخ یدينﯽموجﺎه ێران،و ئ ێراقع ێوانن ەنگﯽج ەروەختﯽس
 ۆكرد ﺑ ەدامیﺎنس یهﺎوكﺎر ەلقخ یدينﯽموجﺎه يشدا1991 ەسﺎڵﯽ. لەكردد ێرانئ ەدژیل ەڕيﺎنش ێراقع یسوپﺎ ەرﺑﺎزيﯽس ەلوپەلﯽو ك ەكچ
 .یعەكورد و ش راپەڕينﯽ ەركوﺗكردنﯽس
 
 يەگوا ەك ەنگۆيﺎنەید ەول ەجگ ەﺑینیوە،ن ەوانمئ يیﺎنەیدوا ەمئ ییەكﺎنﯽچﺎلاك ەك ڵێمﺑ ەوەشئ ەﺑێ. دۆڕاﺑنگ ەلقخ یدينﯽموجﺎه ەوكﺎﺗەوەل رەنگە
 ﺎمپﯽك ەهﺎﺗوون ل یدووچﺎر ەندامەكﺎنیﺎنئ ەحمەﺗەیز ەوشەر ەوو ئ ێرانئ ەنێول ەمريكﯽو ئ یسرائیلﯽئ ێنﯽنه یكﺎر ەل ەشدارﺑوونﺑ ەندامەكﺎنیﺎنئ
 ەريكﯽخ ەوكﺎتئ ەكرد ك یدينموجﺎه ەندامێكﯽئ ەندچ ەگەڵل مەﻗس ێژدر ەيەكﯽمﺎو ۆﺑ ێڤجن ەشﺎریل 1102 ەسﺎڵﯽ. لەو3002 ڵﯽسﺎ ەدوایل ەشرەفئ
 یرۆريستینﺗ ێكخراوێكﯽر ێشتﺎه ەگرووپ ەوئ ۆئﺎخ ەوەیئ ەﺑﺎرەیل ەرﺑگریﺑﺎش و یرۆكەيەكﯽﺑ ۆئەوەیﺑ ییەن ێوەرپ ەوەشئ ەڵامﺑوون، ﺑ ۆپێشﺎندانخ
 .نﺎ يﺎن
 
 یكﺎنەیتﺗﺎك ەوئ ەرﺑﺎرەید يﺎنیش ەستبكەوێ،د ەكدارەكﺎنچ ەگرووپ ﯽچﺎلاك ەﺑﺎرەیوردت ل یﺎریزان ەحمەﺗەز ێكﯽكﺎر ەمیشەه ەك ەوەيەئ راستییەكەی
 سﺎریەنئ یدە،(ﻗﺎع ەكﺎنﯽگرووپ ەروەكه ڤیلەس ەڵكﯽخ ەوئ ەكﺎنﯽئﺎمﺎنج ەك ڵێئﺎشكرا ﺑ ەو ﺑ ێتﺑ ڕەوﺗووند ۆرز ەكەگرووپ ەگەرم ەيگرنەﺑەر،د
 یۆخ ەرپرسیﺎریﺑ ێك ینﺑزان ەكوﺗﺎو ەگەڕێیند ۆرﺗەكﺎنداراپ دوایەﺑ ەمیشەمن ه ەكو ەكﺎديمﯽئ ەسﺎنﯽ). كەوانئ ێوەیهﺎوش ﯽو گرووپ سوننە
 یدينﯽموجﺎه ێستﺎكوژران، ﺗﺎئ ێداﺗ ێرانﯽئ ڤیلﯽس ەڵكﯽو خ ەرپرسﺑ ۆرز ەك 1891 ڵﯽسﺎ ێرشﺎنەیه ەوئ ەنﺎنەتﺗ ەڵامﺑ ێرشەكﺎن،ه ەل ەيﺎندووەراگ
 .ەگەيﺎندووەران ەنجﺎمدانیﺎنئ ەل ۆیخ ەرپرسیﺎرێتﯽﺑ ەلقخ
 
 ﺑەرچﯽەل ەزانیند ەمووشمﺎننﺎ. ه يﺎن یرۆريستەﺗ ەگرووپ ەوﺑدات ئ ڕيﺎرﺑ ەكﺎديمﯽئ ەسێكﯽك ەك ییەن ەحمەتز ێندەشه ێكﯽشت مەرئەنجﺎس ﺑەڵام
 رينخراپت ەل انێرئ ێمﯽرژ ەگەڵل ەمريكﺎئ ەيوەنديیەكﺎنﯽ: پەرهێنﺎد یستەل ەوئ ەنێول ەلقﯽخ یدينﯽموجﺎه ێكخراویر ەمريكﺎئ يەكگرﺗووەكﺎنﯽ يەﺗەولا
 ۆﺑیكﺎریل ەهێزیﺑ ەڵمەﺗێكﯽه ﯽهﺎوشﺎن ەمە. ئینننﺎﺑ ێرانییەكﺎنو ئ ۆيﺎنخ ەنێواندانوستﺎندن ل ۆﺑ ێديكئوم یچه ەمريكییەكﺎنئ ێستﺎشو ئ یدايەئﺎست
 ﺎەمريكئ ڕێﯽوهﺎ ێتەﺑب ێرانئ ﯽدوژمن ەك ێكەوﺗەوەل ەوەیدواجﺎر ئ ەمريكییەكﺎنئ ۆنگرێسمﺎنەو ك ینﺎﺗۆرس ەنێول ەلقخ یدينﯽموجﺎه ەندامﺎنﯽئ ەلايەنل
 ێككﺎﺗ كەنەد ەمريكﺎئ ێشكەشﯽپ ۆرز يیەكﯽهﺎوكﺎر ەلقیشخ یدينﯽموجﺎه ێكخراویر ێگومﺎن. ﺑەسوور ەخوێنﺑ ەندەچ ەستﯽد ەك ەوەیئ ێدانەگو ەﺑێﺑ
 يكﺎەمرئ نەیاستەﻗیر یەﺗﯽن ێگومﺎنﺑ ەﺑەرامبەردال ێرانیشئ ەلاكﺎنﯽ. مێرانئ ەنێول ێنﯽنه ﯽچﺎلاك ەستپێكردنﯽو د یﺎریزان ۆكردنەوەیك ەرس ێتەد
 .یستەل ەوئ ەنێول ەلقخ یدينﯽموجﺎه ێكخراویر ینﺎو ەدەرهێنﺎنﯽل ەزانند
 
. ەكەنروستدد یرۆريستەكﺎنﯽﺗ ێكخراوەر ۆﺑ يكەد ڵاﺗێكﯽو ەرو ه ەوروپﺎئ يەكێتﯽ يﺎن ەمريكﺎئ ەك ەكﺎتلاواز د یستﺎنەل ەوئ ەنگﯽس یﺎسﯽ،س نیﺎزی
 ۆﺑ ەك ەمﺎسح ەرپرسێكﯽﺑ ەل ێشوازيكردنپ ۆﺑ ڕۆكەخﺎنەف ێتەﺑچ ەوەیئ ێشپ ەمەئ یرۆريست،ﺗ یKKP ەڵێد ەردەوامﺑ یﺎﺗورك ەزيرانﯽو ەرۆكس
 ۆﺑ تووەەڵڕشه ەيﺎنپﺎر ۆيﺎنخ ەك ەیكﺎﺗ ەول ەكەن،د ەلقخ یدينﯽموجﺎه ێزەونەكﺎنﯽﻗ ەكﺎر ەﺑﺎس ل ێرانئ ەركردەكﺎنﯽ. سیﺎﺗورك ێتەد یوەڕۆن ێكﯽخوان
 .ەفغﺎنستﺎنو ئ ێراقو ع ەلەستینف یهﺎديیەكﺎنﯽج ەگرووپ
 
 ەﺑووايەد ەوەئ ﺎنە،یرۆريستﺗ یكﯽﺗﺎكت ەﺗەكردوو ﯽپشت ێكخراوەر ەوئ ەك يەﺑووا ەمﺎيەﺑن ەوئ ەسەرل یرۆرﺗ یستﯽل ەل ێكخراوێكر ینﺎو ەرهێنﺎنﯽد رئەگە
 يﺎنەو كرد ۆڕیگ ێكخراوەكەشیﺎنر ینﺎو ێكجﺎر ەندچ ەنﺎنەتﺗ KKP ەركردەكﺎنﯽ. سەرهﺎﺗبﺎيەد ینﺎو ێكجﺎر ەندچ ەو9991 ەسﺎڵﯽل ەره KKP
 ەیڕۆسپ ەل يكبوونەوەو نز ەرﺑﺎزیس یكﯽﺗﺎكت ەل ەوﺗنەوەو دوورك ەكچ ەكﺎرهێنﺎنﯽﺑ ەل ەوﺗنەوەدوورك ۆ، ﺑ3002و  2002 ڵانﯽسﺎ ەل ەلگ رەیكۆنگ
 ەمريكﺎئ يكەكەینز ڕێهﺎو ەﺗﺎه ەﺑەرئەوەیل ەسەڵاﺗیش،د ێﺑ ێریكو ڕێكﯽكچ و كو ەندچ يەﺑبووا KKP ەگەرئ ەﺑووگرنگ ن ەوەئ ەڵامدانوستﺎندن، ﺑ
 ﯽو چ ﺎتەكد ﯽچ ێكخراوەر ەوئ ەوەیئ ێگوێدانەنﺎكﺎت ، ﺑ یستەكەل ەستكﺎرید ەمريكﺎئ ێنێتەوە،ﺑم یستەل ەوئ ەنێول KKP ینﺎو یەوێﺑ یﺎيەوركﺗ كە
 .نﺎكﺎت
 
 ەول ەرهﺎﺗند و یستەل ەوئ ێون ەچوون ەچونك ۆڕن،ﺑگ ۆيﺎنخ ەريلايیەكﺎنﯽگ یكەﺗﺎكت ێبكﺎتل يﺎنوا ینننﺎﺑ ێكهﺎندان یچه ەكدارانەچ ەگرووپ ەوئ ﺑۆيە
   .ﺑكﺎت يفۆرمر ۆیخ ێﺑتوان ەﺑووەه ێكخراور ەمك ێستﺎﺗﺎئ ەرەشەفﺎكت ەمئ ەﺑەرل ەره ییە،ن ەوانەوەئ ییەكﺎنﯽچﺎلاك ەﺑ ەيوەندیپ یستەل
 
 ەﺗەوەین یوەە(ﺑزووﺗن ێبﯽكت ەریو نووس ەمريكﺎئ ەل یمزوور يەﺗﯽولا ۆیزانك ەل ێوەڕاستەن ۆژهەڵاﺗﯽر یﺎسەﺗەكﺎنﯽس ۆفیسۆریپر ۆمﺎنۆ،ر ەيڤدد *
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 * ۆمﺎنۆر ەيڤدد
 
 ەول ێبووردەيﯽل ﯽدروستكردن ۆیه ەﺑووەن ەڵامﺑ ێنﺎ،ه ۆيداخ ەگەڵل ۆریز ەڕوانﯽو چﺎو ۆشﯽخ يكتﺎﺗۆرەكﺎند ﯽرووخﺎن یبیﺎو ﺗونس و ل یسرم لە
ت ێرت ﺑچگ ەڕاوەگ ەﺗﺎراوگ ەل ەكەيەكﯽجول ەل ێگەيﺎنر یبیﺎل ەل ەكدارەكﺎنچ یﺎوەپ ێرش،ه ەرﺑ ەوﺗنەﺗونس ك ەل ەكەجوول ەرستگەكﺎنﯽ. پڵاﺗﺎنەداو
 ەرس ەﻗﺎوەكﺎنﯽش ەلايەنل ەﺑنەوەد يﺎﺗرز یژیﺗووندوﺗ ەڕوویرووﺑ ییەكﺎنﻗبت یسريش،م ە. لەوەﺑكﺎﺗ ێنخﺎو ەراﺑلوسﺗ ەل ەكەجوول ۆنﯽك ەرستگەيەكﯽپ
  .و سوپﺎ ەﻗﺎمش
 ۆكﯽەپچ ەژێرل ێژدوورودر ڵانێكﯽسﺎ ەڵكخ ێككﺎﺗ ەچونك ڕەوانە،ﺗﺎك ەسەڵاﺗﯽد ەيەد ەندينچ ڵپﺎ ەﺑداﺗ ەمﺎنەئ ەمووه ەﺗﺎیخ یەوێﺑ ەوانەيەل مرۆڤ
. ەﺎرانكەركوﺗو س يننﺎشر ەزوویو ئﺎر ەيلم ەندێكه ەرهەڵدانﯽس ۆیه ەﺑێتەد ەسەرەﺗﺎدال يكتﺎﺗۆرەكﺎند ەمﺎنﯽن ەژين،د ۆسێنەرانەداداپل ەسەڵاﺗێكﯽد
 ەكەمجﺎري ەرەنسﯽف ۆڕشﯽش ەدوایﺑكﺎت. ل ەيﯽێبووردو ل یبرالیزمل ەڕێﯽچﺎو يەكسەر يكتﺎﺗۆرەكﺎند ﯽپﺎش رووخﺎن ۆژیر يەكەم ەل ێنﺎﺗوان ەسك
  .ەريهەڵداس يەكسﺎنﯽو  یئﺎزاد يەﺗﯽ،ﺑرا ینجﺎئ يەوە،كﺎ ەهﺎﺗ ۆﻗﺎندنﺗرس و ﺗ ەردەمێكﯽس
 ۆڤەیرش ۆنچ ەﺑێد ەوائ يكە،د ێنەكﺎنﯽو شو یرەﻗﺎه ەل ێتراﺑردوو ﺑ ەفتەیه ينەكﺎنﯽنﺎشر ەرووداو ەجێﯽﺑ یكردنەوەيەكﯽش ەرەوەیس ەمەیئ ئەگەر
 ﯽپﺎرﺗ ێوانن ۆینﺎوخ ەڕیش ەكﺎﺗﯽل ەنﺎنەت؟ ﺗ1991 ڵﯽسﺎ ەل ێنحوس ەدامس ینﯽئﺎسن ەسەڵاﺗﯽد ەل یﺎنپﺎش رزگﺎرﺑوون ەل ێتكورد ﺑكر ﯽەزموونئ
 ەكوون و وﺑ ۆﻗرەيیدائ ەكوردستﺎن ل ەرەﺑەكﺎنﯽو ع ەيﯽو كﺎك ێزدیو ئ ەسیحﯽم ەوەﺗەكﺎن،ن ەكوردستﺎن ل یشتمﺎنﯽن يەكێتﯽكوردستﺎن و  ﯽوكراﺗيمد
  .ڵەكﺎنیﺎنو مﺎ ەﻗوﺗﺎﺑخﺎن يﺎن ەرستگەپ ەرس ێرشبكەنەه ڕەﺗوو ەڵكﯽخ ينەداروو ەد. ﻗڵكراﺑوونﻗبو ۆمەڵگەك ەل ەشێكﺑ
 ەگرووپﺎن ەوئ يەكەمین ەنێول ێزديیەكﺎنو ئ ەسیحﯽرزگﺎر ﺑوون، م ێنحوس ەدامس ەسەڵاﺗﯽد ﯽچنگ ەل ێراقع يكەید ەكﺎنﯽنﺎوچ ڵسﺎ یﺎنزەپﺎش س كﺎﺗێك
 ﯽەشێوەيەكﺑ ەوەیئ ۆﺑ ەڕاونەﺗەوەگ ێراﻗییەكﺎنع ەكەجول ەك ڵاوﺑووەوەﺑ ەغداﺑ ەﻗﺎمەكﺎنﯽش ەوا ل ەنگۆی. دێرشه ەرﺑ ەوﺗنەك يەكسەر ەﺑوون ك
 حییەكﺎن،ەسیم ﯽپﺎراستن ەل ەﺗﺎيبەتﺑ ینﺎ،ه ەرچﺎويﺎنﺑ ەرەسێكﯽه ێراﻗﯽع ۆمەڵگەیو ك ەتحكوم ەوادا ك ۆخێكﯽد ە. لڕنو زار ﺑك ەویز یلانگێڕانەپ
  .ەنﺎند ەدەريﺎنو ەڕەكگ یدوا ەل ەڕەكو گ ەسیحیبەكﺎنم ەرس ەكردەد رشیﺎنێه ڕەوەكﺎنﺗووند یسلامییەئ
 ەمینە. كەيەه ەژاريﺎنه ۆرز ەيەكﯽكﺎرنﺎم یﺎسییەكﺎنس یسلامییەئ ەمﺎوەرەوە،ج ەلايەنل ەمینەكﺎنك ڵكردنﯽو ﻗبو ێبووردەيﯽل ەرس ێتەد ەكەﺑﺎس كﺎﺗێك
 ۆﺑ ێتد ەﺑیرﺎ ﺑﺎنییسپئ ەل یروڕاﺗﺎنﺑ ینﯽ(پشكن ەئﺎراو ەهﺎﺗەن ەوڵەتو د ڵێسەك ﺎكردنەوەییج ەكوﺗﺎو ەﺑوو،ن ۆشیﺎنخ يﺎنێكﯽژ ەوروپﺎشئ ەل ينییەكﺎنئﺎ
 ەكەﺎجوولن ەڵكﺎنﯽخ ەﺑ ەرهەقد ێزرﻗئﺎم ﯽﺗﺎوان ەك ەﺑینیند یسرائیل،ئ یﺎسەﺗﯽس ەل يندارەكﺎنئﺎ ەكەجوول ێگەیپ ەهێزﺗرﺑوونﯽﺑ ەگەڵ). لە؟نموون
 ندستﺎنیه شوێنﯽ ەندينچ ەل ێوەیهﺎوش يﺎردەيەكﯽد یﺎسیشس یندويزمﯽه ەڵكشﺎنﯽ. هەلجەلیلئ یەنﺎوچ ەل ەوﺗێكمزگ ﯽسووﺗﺎندن ەكو ەريهەڵداوەس
 ۆيﺎنﺑﺎش خ ەیژنﺎن ەوئ ەرس ۆﺑ ێرشەكﺎنه ەرزﺑوونەوەیﺑ ەڵگ ەهﺎوكﺎت ﺑوو ل ەشەپێدانداد و گ ﯽپﺎرﺗ ەرهەڵدانﯽس یﺎش،ﺗورك ەل ەنﺎنەتخولقﺎند. ﺗ
 .ەﺑوونن ێزراوپﺎر ەشﺎنێره ەول ەنرێن" دادێئەخلاق"ﺑ ەﺑ ەك ەوانیديكەشنﺎسراو) و ئ ەرمەنﯽئ ەریسنوو ينكهﺎرانت د ەك(و ەسیحییەكﺎنو م ۆشندانﺎپ
 ەل ن،ەمینەكﺎك ەرامبەرﺑ ێبووردەيەل يﺎﺗرز ەمڕۆئ ﯽكوردستﺎن ەك ەوەیئ ەرەكﯽس ۆكﺎرێكﯽنﺎﺑن. ه ێكەڵﺗ ێكەوەﺑﺎش پ يینو ئﺎ یﺎسەتس واديﺎرە
 يینئﺎ ەيڕەویو پ ەڕدارنﺑﺎو ەسﺎنﯽكورد ك یﺎسییەكﺎنﯽس ۆرﺑەیز ەرچەندە. هەگرێتد ەرچﺎوەس یەوەەرەكییەكﺎنیس یﺎسییەس ەپﺎرﺗ ەلمﺎنیبوونﯽع
 ەورەكﺎنگ ۆپۆزيسیۆنەئ ەپﺎرﺗ ێیداﺗ ەك ەرەﺑییەع یهﺎنﯽج ۆرﺑەیز ێچەوانەیپ ەمەش. ئەننﺎك یﺎسەتس ەﺑ ێكەڵﺗ يینئﺎ ەيەراد ەوﺑ ەڵامﺑ ەكەن،د
  .ێتﺑ یسلامﯽئ يﺎﺗرز ەﺗوانێد ەيﺎنكﺎم ەوەیئ ەسەرل ۆپۆزيسیۆنئ ەگەڵل شبڕكێدانێپ ەل ەﺗەكﺎنیﺎنحكوم ەئەنجﺎمداو ل یسلامینئ
 یرۆكەيەﺑ ەوئ یژد ەواویﺗ ەﺑ یشلاهوﺗ يﺎنﯽزانﺎ ۆر. زیﺎسەتس ەلكﺎویز ێون ۆﺑ ەلكێشكردنﯽپ ەﺑكﺎت ﺑ ێشێلپ يینئﺎ یرۆزیپ ۆڤمر ەﺑێد ۆچﯽﺑ ﺑەڵام
 پێغەمبەر ێگرﺗنەوەیج ەواﺗ یﺎسﯽ،س ﯽپرس ينگرنگتر ۆچﯽﺑ یﺎسییەس ێندەه یسلامئ ەگەرئ ەڵێند ەوان. ئیﺎسییەس ينێكﯽئﺎ ەنﺎخەوەل یسلامئ ەك ەوەستند
 ۆرەیز ژيیەیﺗووندوﺗ ەوو ئ ەو سونن یعەش ﯽدروستبوون ۆیه ەﺑوو ەڕەﺗییەﺑن یﺎسییەس ەپرس ەمئ ەره ێڵدراوەﺗەوە؟ه ەڵامو ەﺑێﺑ يﯽ،دوا ۆچﯽپﺎش ك ەل
  .هﺎت ەدوايداﺑ ەك
 ەرنجدانس ە. ﺑەدەرنﺎو تیﺎسەس يەیكﺎ ەل يینﯽئﺎ ەك ێنێﺑ ێپ ۆﺗﺎيﯽك ۆﺗێستﺎنتەكﺎنو پر ۆلیككﺎﺗ ێوانن ێنﺎويیەكﺎنﯽخو ەڕەش ﯽانﺗو ێككﺎﺗ ەنهﺎﺗ ئەوروپﺎ
 ەﺑ هﺎنیج زۆرﺑەی ەكﺎﺗێكدا. لەرنەگیراوەو ەهەندﺑ ەرەﺑەوەع ەلايەنل ەندەپ ەمئ ەﺑینیند يكە،د ێنﯽشو ەندێكو ه یسرم يیەیدوا ەمئ ەكﺎنﯽرووداو ەل
و  ۆنترينك ەك نەﺑینید ڵدەكﺎت،ﻗبو يینﯽئﺎ یو ئﺎزاد يینییەكﺎنئﺎ ەگرووپ ەمووه ەنێوانل ەدەنﯽم يەكسﺎنﯽ ەكو ەڕەﺗییەكﺎنﯽﺑن یبرالییەل ەمﺎﺑن ەواویﺗ
 نﯽەسیحییەكﺎم یەیﻗبت ەرندۆپیشﺎخ یكوشتﺎر ەیسﺎد ەركۆنەكردنێكﯽس یﺗوانﺎ ەنﺎنەتﺗ یسر،م ینﯽموسلم یخوانئ ەواﺗ یسلامﯽ،ئ ﯽگرووپ ەورەﺗرينگ
 .ییەن
 
 ەﺗەوەین وەیە(ﺑزووﺗن ێبﯽكت ەریو نووس ەمريكﺎئ ەل یمزوور يەﺗﯽولا ۆیزانك ەل ێوەڕاستەن ۆژهەڵاﺗﯽر یﺎسەﺗەكﺎنﯽس ۆفیسۆریپر ۆمﺎنۆ،ر ەيڤد* د





 ەكﺎتكورد د يەكگرﺗووی ەوڵەﺗﯽد یريﯽپشتگ ینپوﺗ
 4102/4/4 ۆمﺎنۆر ەيڤیدد ەلايەنل
 ێیداﺗ یهﺎنەیج ەوئ .ەگەيﺎندووەكورد ران يەكگرﺗووی ڵەﺗﯽەود ۆﺑ یريیەكﯽپشتگ یچه ینپوﺗ ڤلاديمێر ەڕاستیدال ەﺗەكە،ﺑﺎﺑ ۆﺑ ێشﺎنراك ەرنجمس ێستﺎئ
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 ەمەئ ەوەجﺎران ۆڤیەﺗﯽس يەكێتﯽ ﯽرووخﺎن یدوا ەل ﯽگوﺗ ینپوﺗ ەوەیئ ەڕاستیدا. لیﺎوازج ەﺗەوەیگرووپ و ن ەرامبەرﺑ ەروەرینﺎدادپ ەل ڕەپ ەژيند
 ."ێتەوەكردﺑ یﺎیج ەكﺎنسنوور ەك یهﺎنداج ەل ەﺗەوەن ەورەﺗرينگ ەﺑوو یﺎرووس ەﺗەوەیﺑوو: "ن
 
 ێتراست ﺑ ینپوﺗ ەكەیﻗس ەك ەكﺎتواد ەژين،د ەوروپﺎئ ۆژئﺎوایو ر ەمريكﺎئ ەل ەك ەوانەشەوەﺑ یﺎ،رووس ەرەوەید ەل ﯽرووس یۆنمل 72 ﺑوونﯽ
 ەيەكژمﺎر ەﺑﺎس ل ەگەرئ ەڵام. ﺑێتەوەكردﺑ یﺎیج ەكﺎنسنوور ەك ەﺗەوەن ەورەﺗرينگ ەﺑ ەﺑوو ﯽرووس ەﺗەوەین ەوە1991 ڵﯽسﺎ ەدوایل ەڵێتد ێككﺎﺗ
 ﯽ. ﺑوونایهﺎندج ەل ینن ەﺗەوەن ەورەﺗرينگ ﯽرووس ەﺗەوەین ەوائ ەكﺎندا،سنوور ەل ۆڕانكﺎریگ ەهۆیﺑ ڕێندراونداﺑ ۆيﺎنخ ڵاﺗﯽو ەل ەك ەينﺑك ەڵكخ ەل
 وەیە. پﺎش ئەداتد كورد ەﺑ ەخوازراوەن ەرەفەش ەوئ یهﺎندا،ج ێنێكﯽشو یچه ەل ەرﺑەخۆس ەوڵەﺗێكﯽد ﯽﺑوون ەﺑێﺑ یهﺎنداج ەكورد ل یۆنمل 04ﺗﺎ  03
  .یهﺎنداج ەل ەوڵەتد ێﺑ ەﺗەوەین ەورەﺗرينگ ەكورد ﺑوون ەرگرت،و ەرﺑەخۆيﯽس 1991 ەسﺎڵﯽل ۆكرانیﺎئ
 
 ڕيﺎردانﯽﺑ ﯽمﺎف ەﺑ ەﺑێته ەهێزیﺑ ڕوايەكﯽﺑ ینپوﺗ ەك ەردەكەوێواد ڵاﺗەكەيەوە،و ەﺑ ەرێمەه ەوئ ﯽو لكﺎندن يمیﺎكر ەرێمﯽه يفراندۆمەكەیپﺎش ر لە
 ەكو یﺎ،رووس ەوڵەﺗﯽد ەل ەشێكﺑ ێتەﺑب ەرێمەكەيﺎنه يﺎرﺑوونخواز يمیﺎكر ەرێمﯽه یەكﺎنﯽرووس ەگەزر ەﺑ ۆرينەی. زەﺗەوەكﺎنن ۆﺑ ەنووسچﺎر
 4591 ەسﺎڵﯽل ۆكرانیﺎوەئ ەﺑ يمیﺎكر ﯽلكﺎندن ەكﺎن،رووس ەیوﺗ ەپێﯽ. ﺑەرێمەه ەوئ ەكﺎنﯽرووس ەونﯽخ ەديهێنﺎنﯽﺑ ۆﺑ ینﯽنﺎچﺎر ﺑ ۆیخ ینپوﺗ ەﺑینن،د
  .ەﺑێته ەوەراستكردن ەﺑ ێويستﯽپ ەڵەيەه ەوئ ەردەكەوێوا د ۆيەﺑوو، ﺑ وويﯽێژم ەڵەيەكﯽه
 
 يەخیﺎنﺑﺎ یهﺎنج يﺎريكراوەكﺎنﯽد ەسنوور ەﺗﺎه ەوەيەئ ۆكﺎرەكەشﯽرووﺑدات. ه یهﺎنداج ەل ەشتﺎن ۆرەج ەمئ ەزدەكەنكورد ح ۆرينەیز ەك دەزانم
 ۆمەڵگەیك ەك يﺎﺗرەز ەوەئ ﯽچﺎنس ەن،ﺑك ەﺗەوەكﺎنن ەنووسﯽچﺎر ڕيﺎردانﯽﺑ ﯽمﺎف ەلﺑﺎس  ەڵكخ يﺎﺗرز ەﺗﺎه يە،وا ەڕيﺎن. ﺑﺎوەﺑﺎشتر ێتەوەﺑب ەمترك
 يەكەمﯽ گﯽەنپﺎش ج یﺎسییەكﺎنﯽس ەسنوور ێشﺎنﯽك ەل ەدالەﺗییەكﺎننﺎع ەك ەهیوانﺑ ەروەهﺎ. هيشكورد ۆﺑ ێﺑن ەدامﺎف ەودان ﺑ ۆﺗﺎيیداك ەل ێودەوڵەﺗﯽن
  .كورد ێﯽگو ۆﺑ ۆسیقﺎنم ەمووه ەمﺎنەئ ۆسۆڤۆ،و ك ەيموورﺗ هەڵاﺗﯽۆژسوودان، ر یﺑﺎشوور يمیﺎ،. كرێتەوەراستبكر یهﺎنﯽج
 
 يەكﯽەﺗەوەگرووپ و ن ەرامبەرﺑ ەك ەدالەﺗیﺎنەننﺎع ەوئ ڵاڵﯽزو ەنگﯽو د یهﺎنج ڕوويﯽدوو ەويش: ئەيەه ۆسیقﺎيەدام ەوئ یئﺎواز ەل ەواويەكنﺎﺗ ﺑەڵام
ﺎن ﺗڵاو ۆینﺎوخ یكﺎروﺑﺎر ەل ەستێوەرنەدانخﺎك و د ەروەريﯽس ەﺑﺎس ل ینﺗپو يﺎ،سوور ەسەلەیم ەرس ێتەد ێككﺎﺗ ەنموون ۆ. ﺑەكرێد يﺎريكراود
 یﺎیرووس ەﺑ یهﺎنج ێزەكﺎنﯽزله ڵاﺗەو ەل یچكﺎمه ەكەن،سﺎزد ەڵبژاردنه ەندو چ ەكەند يفراندۆمر ەندەچ يﺎسوور یكورد ییە. گرنگ نەكﺎتد
 ﺎەوروپئ ۆژئﺎوایر ەل ەيمﺎنەكﺎنﯽو هﺎوپ ەمريكﺎ. ئێننﺎن يﺎداوورس یكورد ۆششﯽو ك ەمﺎفدان ﺑ ەنووسیشەوەچﺎر ڕيﺎردانﯽﺑ ﯽمﺎف ەل ۆكیكەرداك
گرنگ  ەەلايﺎنەوﺑ یچه ەكرد،د ۆسۆڤۆك ۆمﺎریك ﯽو دروستكردن ۆسۆڤۆيیەكﺎنك ۆﺑ ەنووسچﺎر ڕيﺎردانﯽﺑ ﯽمﺎف ەل یريیﺎنپشتگ ێوەيەكش ەمووهەﺑ
 ەيمﺎنﯽهﺎوپ ﺎییرووس ەك ێكداكﺎﺗ ەل یﺎسرﺑ ۆردومﺎنﯽﺑ ەوﺗنەك نەتەنﺎ. ﺗيەﺑووا یەكﺎنسرﺑ ﯽمﺎف ێشێلكﺎریپ ەوارەيەﻗ ەوئ ﯽدروستكردن ەگەرئ ەﺑوون
 ەكو ەﺗﯽﺎﺑﺑ ڕێكداپ ەل ەدات،د ەدەستل ەرێمێكﯽه ڕێكﺎنیﺎنو هﺎو ەيمﺎنهﺎوپ ەل يەكێك ەك ێستﺎ. ئەﺑێته ەوەيەكﯽكﺎردان یچه ەوەیلاوازﺗر ﺑوو ل ﺑیﺎسر
  .ۆيﺎنﺑ ﯽگرنگ ێﯽج ەﺑێتە" دۆكرانیﺎيەئ ەروەريﯽس ەواویﺗ ێشێلكﺎريﯽپ ەمە"ئ
 
 ەو رووداو نسیپەپر يﺎسﺎو ەﺑ ەﺑەستێپشت ن ۆرز ەدا، ﺑﺎشتر ەرﺑەخۆیس ەوڵەﺗﯽد ەيﺎندنﯽراگ ڕيﺎریﺑ ەگەركوردستﺎن ئ ەشەكﺎنﯽﺑ ەل ەشێكﺑ ەره ﺑۆيە
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 * ۆمﺎنۆر ەيڤدد
 ەوكﺎﺗیشئ ەنﺎنەت. ﺗێداخراﺑ ۆڕانكﺎريداگ يكەید ەوڵێكﯽه ەمووه ەڕوویﺑ یﺎسﯽس یستەمﯽس ەك ەوايەر ەكﺎﺗێكدال ەنیﺎﺗ یژیﺗووندوﺗ ۆﺑ پەنﺎﺑردن
 ﯽسیﺎس یستەمﯽس ەك ەيەه ەوەل ﯽگومﺎن ەسك ەم. كەكداریچ ەڕووﺑوونەوەیرووﺑ ەل ەسەندﺗرەپ ەدەنیﺎنەم ەرﺑڕينﯽد ڕەزايﯽو نﺎ ێمنﺎنەه ۆپیشﺎندانﯽخ
 ﺗیشێودەوڵەن ۆزیو س یننﺑب ەخۆوەﺑ ەورەگ ۆپیشﺎندانﯽخ ڵاﺗﺎنەو ەوئ ەك ەوەیئ ۆیه ەﺑوو ەمەئداخراوﺑوون،  ێكەوەروو ەهەموول یسرﺗوونس و م ەل
 .ەدەستبێننﺑ
 ەروەك. هەگورگ يﺎنﯽگر ەككوردستﺎن و ەﺗوونس ل ەینموون ەكردنەوەیدووﺑﺎر ۆﺑ ۆڕانگ ەوەیﺑزووﺗن يیەیدوا ەمئ ەوڵەكﺎنﯽه ﺑەڵام
 یەوەێودەوڵەﺗین ێرانﯽچﺎود ەلايەنل ەراﺑردوودا كرد ك ەڵبژاردنەكﺎنﯽه ەل ەشداریﺑ ۆڕانگ ێداوە،پ ەيﺎنئﺎمﺎژ ۆژنﺎمەيەر ەمئ يكەید ۆشەنووسەكﺎنﯽگ
 ۆریز ەرەڕایس ێراق،ع ﯽكوردستﺎن ەل یﺎسﯽس یستەمﯽس يكە،د ەمﺎنﺎيەكﯽ. ﺑڵكردﻗبو ەنجﺎمەكەيﺎنو ئ ەسفكرائﺎزاد و پﺎك و ێكﯽژاردنەڵبه ەﺑ
نﺎچﺎر  ەوائ ەﺑووايە،ه ەختیﺎنﺑ ەوەندەئ یسريیەكﺎنو م ﯽﺗوونس ەگەر. ئەداتد ۆڕانكﺎریو گ يﺎسﺎيﯽ ەوڵدانێكﯽه ەﺑ ێگەر ێشتﺎه ەموكورﺗییەكﺎنﯽ،ك
 .ەﻗﺎمەكﺎنش ەرس ڕژێنەﺑ یۆنﺎنیﺎنمل ەﺑ ەدەﺑوونن
 ڵەامند ەوئ ەكو ۆڕان. گیچەه ەڵكەوەخ ۆرينەیز ەلایﺑ ەرلەمﺎنكوردستﺎن و پ ەرێمﯽه ەﺗﯽحكوم ەڵوەشﺎندنەوەیه ۆﺑ ەڕواننەكراوچﺎو داوايەكﯽ
 .ۆڕاندووەد يﺎريیەكەی ەزانێد ێككﺎﺗ ەڵدەگێڕێتەوە،ه يﺎريیەكە ەختەیﺗ ەك ەكﺎتد ەڵسوكەوته
. وەەرنەگرﺗوكوردستﺎندا و ەرێمﯽه ییەكﺎنﯽحكوم ەزگﺎداوود ەنێول ۆستێكیﺎنپ یچه ەكەیپﺎرﺗ ێون ەسﺎنﯽك ەك ەوەیل ەردەﺑڕێد ڕەزايﯽنﺎ گۆڕان
 ۆڕانگ ەوەیئ یدوا ەكﺎت؟د ۆستپ ەڕێﯽچﺎو ۆڕانگ ۆچﯽﺑ ەﺑﺎش ییە،ن ەمیینەك یئتیلافﯽئ ەﺗﯽكومكوردستﺎن ح ەرێمﯽه ێستﺎیئ ەﺗﯽحكوم ەكﺎﺗێكدال
 ەڵكخ ێشتﺎه ەﺑزانن ك ەﺑەختەوەرﺑ ۆرز ۆيﺎنخ ەﺑێد یﺎﺑووەوە،ج ﯽكوردستﺎن یئتیلافﯽئ ەل ەوەیكرد، ﺑ ەﺑەغداكورد ل ەﺗەوەيیەكﺎنﯽن ەئﺎمﺎنج ەل ﯽپشت
  يەاێیﺎنوپ ییەكﺎنیشكوردستﺎن ۆرﺑەیز ەروەهﺎه ەﺑێتەوەود ەورەگ ەﺗرسﯽم ەڕوویرووﺑ ێشتﺎه ێراقع ﯽتﺎنكوردس ەك ەكﺎﺗێكدا. لەكﺎتد ەگەڵل ەيﺎنﻗس
 .ەڵبوەشێنیەوەه ەتحكوم ەوێﺑت ەزگﺎيﯽنﺎ د ەشێوازیﺑ ەك ەمژانەيەگ یﺎسەﺗێكﯽس ەمەئ
 ەرێمﯽه ەﺗﯽحكوم یدژ ەرعﯽش ڕەزايﯽﺎن ۆرز ۆڕانەوە،گ ەورەكراوەكەیگ ەوەكرد ەهۆیﺑ ەك ەوەيەئ ەكﺎتخراپتر د ۆرز ەرووداو ەمئ ئەوەی
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 گەوەێشمەرپ ەكوردستﺎن ل ەرێمﯽه ەﺗﯽحكوم ەكﺎنﯽگرنگ ەزگﺎداوود ەل ۆرز ەك ەڵێتد ێككﺎﺗ ەكﺎتراستد ەفﺎمست ەوشیروانكوردستﺎن ونبوون. ن
 ێشتﺎه ین،حكوم ەك یﺎنەیومنﺎحك ێكخراوەر ەوئ يﺎننﺎسراون  ”ەسﺎخت یOGN“ ەﺑ ەك ییەكﺎننﺎحكووم ێكخراوەر ۆرﺑەیز يﺎن سﺎيشئﺎ ەﺗﺎه ەﺑگر
 ەكﺎنەوەپﺎرﺗ ەلايەنل یديﺎكﺎن،م ەرجەمس ەكن ۆشبەخﺎﺗەخ ەڵامﺑ ۆرﺑەی،. زەرﺑڵاوەﺑ یو پﺎوانخواز ەندەڵﯽگ ێشتﺎ. هيەكێتیدانو  ﯽپﺎرﺗ ۆنتڕۆڵﯽك ەژێرل
و  روەردەەپ یﺑوار ەﺗﺎيبەﺗﯽﺑ كﺎنەﺗگوزاريیە). خزمۆڕانەگ ەوەیﺑزووﺗن یديﺎیم ەك ەگرێتەوەد ەشوش ۆمپﺎنیﺎیك ەمەئ ێگومﺎنراون (ﺑۆنتڕۆڵكك
 ەرەوگونجﺎو ﺑ ەشێوەيەكﯽﺑ ۆمەڵگەنﺎدات ك ێگەر ەندەڵﯽگ ەكﺎﺗێكل ەنرووﺑد ەحمەﺗەز ێشكەوﺗنﺎنەشپ ەمئ ە،كﺎركردن ەﺑ ێويستیﺎنپ ێشتﺎه ەندروستﯽﺗ
 .ﺑڕوات ێشەوەپ
 ڵاﺗﺎنەیو ەوئ ۆرﺑەیز ە. لەنه یسرﺗوونس و م ەل ەوانەیئ ەكن ەﺗەوە،كوردستﺎن ﺑوون ەوانەیئ ەكو ێشەیك ەڕوویرووﺑ یهﺎنج ڵاﺗﺎنﯽو زۆرﺑەی
 مﺎنە،یستەس ۆرەج ەو. لەستدەكەوێد ەروەرانەینﺎدادپ ﯽﻗﺎزانج ۆمەڵێكك ەسەڵاﺗدارد ﯽپﺎرﺗ یبراڵە،ل یمچەن یﺎسﯽس یستەمﯽو س ەنكراو یمچەن ەك
 يشگونجﺎو ەڵامدانەوەيەكﯽ. ویسرﺗوونس و م ەكو دانﺎنەیۆپیشﺎنخ ەوئ ﯽدروستكردن ۆیه ەﺑێتەد ەك ییەن يكتﺎﺗۆرانەد ەسەڵاﺗێكﯽد يﺎخود ییەن راویداخ
) و ۆڕانگ ۆﺑ ەسوودنﺑ ۆرز NNK ەنﺎڵﯽو ك ەوش ۆمپﺎنیﺎیك ەيسەشداك ەم(ل ێﺑكر ەيڕەوپ ەرﺑڕينراد یئﺎزاد ﯽمﺎف ەك ەوەيەئ ێوازەش ەمئ ۆﺑ
 .ەڵبگێڕيتەوەه ێستﺎئ يﺎريیەكەی ەیداوا ﺑك وەیەئ ەجیﺎﺗﯽل ەی،ﺑك ەشداریداهﺎﺗوودا ﺑ ەڵبژاردنﯽه ەل ەكوﺗﺎو ێﺑدر ۆريشز ەوڵێكﯽه ەهﺎروەه
 .ێبگﺎتﺗ ییەراست ەول ەكو، ﺗﺎو ێتﺑب ڵكﺎم یﺎسییەوەس ەڕوویل ەك ەكەيند ۆڕانگ ەوەیﺑزووﺗن ەڕێﯽچﺎو ەپەرۆشەوەﺑ ەموومﺎنه ئێمە
 
  
 ەﺗەوەین وەیە(ﺑزووﺗن ێبﯽكت ەریو نووس ەمريكﺎئ ەل یمزوور يەﺗﯽولا ۆیزانك ەل ێوەڕاستەن ۆژهەڵاﺗﯽر یﺎسەﺗەكﺎنﯽس ۆفیسۆریپر ۆمﺎنۆ،ر ەيڤد* د
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 * ۆمﺎنۆر ەيڤدد
 ڵاﺗەكەو يﺎسﺎی ینۆسﺎيدانەیج ەوئﺎشكرا ل ۆڵیكردنﯽنك ەمەوپﺎشل ەك ڕيﺎريداﺑ ەنگد ۆرينەیز ەﺑ ەرەنسﺎف ەرلەمﺎنﯽ) پێسەمبەرد 22راﺑردوو ( هەفتەی
 یدژ ەل ینﺎز ێمﯽرژ ەك ۆلۆكۆستەه يەكێكیﺎن ینۆسﺎيدانەش،ج ەو. ئەدرێتسزاد ريشۆڵیكﺎو نك ەنرێنداد يﺎسﺎ ێشێلكردنﯽپ ەﺑ ێدانﺎونپ ﯽدان
 مپراﺗۆرییئ ەلايەن) لەسیحییەكﺎنە(و م ەرمەنەكﺎنئ ەﺗڵوعﺎمكردنﯽﻗ ەشﺗﺎز ەویو ئ ێدانﺎوەپ ﯽدان ێشترپ ەرەنسﯽف يﺎسﺎیو  ەنجﺎمیدائ ەكەكﺎنجوول
  .5191 ڵﯽسﺎ ەل ﯽعوسمﺎن
 ەسەڵاﺗدارد ە" دانﺎ و پﺎرﺗێژوويﯽم ێكۆڵینەوەیو ل ەرﺑڕينراد یئﺎزاد ەرس ۆﺑ ێرشیك"ه ەﺑ يﺎسﺎكەی ڕۆژەپ ەستبەجێد ەنقەرەئ ەرەسەندنە،پ ەوئ دوای
 ەيبﺗ ەجەبر ەرۆكوەزيران. سیننﺎس يﺎنە" داێژوويﯽو م ەسەندنەكراوپ ەزن،م ەڵەيەكﯽ"ه ەككرد و و ەركۆنەيﺎنس ێكەوەپ ۆپۆزيسیۆنەكﺎنو ئ
 یشوركﺗ ۆپیشﺎندەرێكﯽ". خێگﺎنەﺑ ەو ﺗرس ل یﺎكﺎریج ەژادپەرستﯽ،ن ەمﺎیﺑن ەرس ەل یﺎسەﺗێكە"س ەرخەرید ﺎكەيﺎس ڕۆژەپ ەك ﯽگوﺗ ەردۆغﺎنیشئ
 ەرﺑڕید ۆپیشﺎندەرەخ ەمئ یﺑكﺎت". را ۆرمن سﺎنس ەرﺑڕينﯽراد یئﺎزاد ەيەوێد ەرەنسﺎف ۆچﯽﺑ ێنﺎگەمگوت "من ﺗ ی)ۆيتەرز(ر ﯽئﺎژانس ەﺑ يسپﺎر ەل
  .ەڵكەخ ەل ۆرز ۆچوونﯽﺑ
 نﺎمەوانﯽۆژر ەيمﺎنگەیپ یﺎريیەكﺎنﯽزان ەپێﯽ. ﺑەيرەس ێكﯽشت ەگوﺗرێن،د ەﺗەﺑﺎﺑ ەمئ ەرس ەل ەﻗسﺎن ۆرەج ەمئ ەنقەرەئ ەل ەك ەوەیئ یخود هەڵبەت
 ەل .ینو چ ێرانئ ەكو ڵاﺗﺎنﯽو ەل يﺎﺗرز ەنﺎنەتﺗ ەكﺎت،د يندانﯽز ۆژنﺎمەنووسﺎنر یهﺎنج يكەید ڵاﺗێكﯽو ەمووه ەل يﺎﺗرز یﺎ، ﺗوركIPIێودەوڵەﺗﯽن
" وڵەتەد ەزگﺎكﺎنﯽو "داوود ەرۆكوەزيرانسوپﺎ"، س ەﺑ يەﺗیكردنﺗوركبوون"، "سووكﺎ ەﺑ يەﺗیكردن"سووكﺎ ەرﺑﺎرەید ەنه يﺎسﺎيەك ۆمەڵەك یﺎركﺗو
 ﯽروودان ەﺑﺎس ل ێرنﺑو ەك ەسﺎنەیك ەو. ئەڵكخ ەسەرحوكمدان ل ۆﺑ ەكﺎردەهینرێنﺑ ۆرجﺎرز ەك يكە،د یرۆزەكﺎنﯽپ ە" و شتەﺗﺎﺗوركئ يﺎدیو "
 ەﺗﺎﺗوركئ ەك ەوەیئ ﯽگوﺗن ەنﺎنەت. ﺗەكرێند يندانﯽز يﺎسﺎيﺎنە ەمئ ەپێﯽﺑ ەنكورد ﺑك ەدژ ﺑ ۆراوجۆرەكﺎنﯽج ۆمەڵكوژيیەك يﺎن ەرمەنەكﺎنئ دیجینۆسﺎي
  .ەندينخﺎنەوەﺑ ۆشەیگ ەﺑخﺎﺗ ەڵكخ ەﺗوانێد ە،و پﺎوانخوازﺑوو ەسەڵاﺗخوازد ەركردەيەكﯽس
 یگرنﺑ ەوێیﺎنﺑ ەك ێكداكﺎﺗ ەهەرل ەسێكك ەره ەﺗوانند یﺎﺗورك ەسەڵاﺗدارانﯽد ەك یكینو لاست وەرﺑڵاﺑ ێندە) هیرۆرﺗ ەدژ يﺎسﺎی( ەكو يكەد يﺎسﺎكﺎنﯽ
 عدایواﻗ ەل ەك ەكردوو ڕوونﺎنەنﺎ ێسﺎو ر يﺎسﺎ ۆرەج ەول ۆرز ەل ەيﯽگل يیﺎنەدوا ەمﺑ ەوروپﺎئ ۆڤﯽمر ەكﺎنﯽمﺎف ۆمیسیۆنﯽ. كەكەنواد يشجﺎر ۆرو ز
 ڕوپﺎگەندەپ ەك ەسێكك ەره ۆﺑ ڵسﺎ ێس ەكوﺗﺎو يەك ەنێوانل ەكﺎتد يندانیكردن"ز ەﺑﺎس ل يﺎسﺎيﺎنە ەول يەكێك .ەكوشتوو یﺎﺗورك ەل ەرﺑڕينیﺎنراد یئﺎزاد
 ێژوويﯽ،م نﺎوچەيەكﯽ ەيەﺑك ەسەنكێفح ەكو ێرينﯽد ێكﯽشﺎر ەوێﺑت ەگەرئ ەواﺗ ەمەش. ئڵاودەكﺎﺗەوەﺑ ەكﺎنﯽئﺎمﺎنج يﺎنﺗﺎوانكﺎر  ێكخراوێكﯽر ۆﺑ
 ﯽﺎرﺗ)، هﺎوكﺎت پەيكﺎتد یﺎﺗورك ەﺗﯽحكوم ێستﺎئ ەوەیئ ەكو ەوێتئﺎو ﺑك ێرژ ەوەیئ ۆﺑ ەیدروستبك ۆﺑ كﯽەنداوێﺑ ەك(ن یو كولتور ﯽسروشت
   .ەستگیرﺑكرێﯽد یرۆريزمﺗ ۆكﺎریه ەﺑەرل ەكرێد يﺎسﺎكە ەپێﯽﺑ ەوائ ەﺑێت،ه ێوەیهﺎوش ێكﯽئﺎمﺎنج یشكوردستﺎن ێكﺎرانﯽكر
 ەﺑەرل ەڵكخ ەيەه ۆیﺑ ەك ەرفراوانەﺑ ێندە، ه6002 ەسﺎڵﯽل ەمواركردنیشﯽپﺎش ه ەل تەنﺎنەﺗ یﺎدا" ﺗوركیرۆریﺗ ە"دژ يﺎسﺎی ەل یرۆريزمﺗ پێنﺎسەی
 ەك ەوەتەگرێد ەوانەكرد ەوئ ەمووه یرۆريزم: "ﺗيﺎسﺎكە ێون ێنﺎسەیپ ەپێﯽﺑبن. ﺑ يیكردندادگﺎ ﯽﺗووش ەيەه یﺎﺗورك ەكورد ل ەمینەیك ەك ەوەیئ ﯽگوﺗن
 ەل ەك ەوشێوەيەیﺑ ۆمﺎرەك يبەﺗمەنديیەكﺎنﯽﺗﺎ ۆڕينﯽگ ەكەیئﺎمﺎنج ەﺑن ك ێكخراوێكر ەﺑ رەس ەك ەنجﺎمبدرێنئ يﺎﺗرەوەز يﺎن ەسك يەك ەلايەنل
 یﺎ،ﺗورك ەﺗﯽەوڵد يەكگرﺗوويﯽ ەﺑ يﺎنز يﺎنئﺎمﺎنج  ەنەﺑك ڵاتو یو ئﺎﺑوور ەلمﺎنﯽع ۆمەڵايەﺗﯽ،ك يﺎسﺎيﯽ، یﺎسﯽ،س یستەمﯽو س یكراوەﺑﺎس ەستوورد
 تﯽەسو د ەنﺑب ەنﺎویل يﺎن ەنلاوازﺑك ەوڵەتد ەسەڵاﺗﯽو د ەﺗرسییەوەم ەنەﺑخ یﺎﺗورك ۆمﺎریكو  ەوڵەتد ﯽﺑوون يﺎن ەيێنن،ﺑگ ەوە،و خﺎك ەلگ ەﺑ
 ەن،دﺑ ﯽگشت ەندروستﯽو ﺗ ەڵكخ ەوڵەت،د ەرەوەیو د ۆنﺎوخ يشﯽئﺎسﺎ ەل يﺎنز يﺎن ەرن،ﺑ ەنێول ەڕەﺗییەكﺎنﺑن يیەﺑگرن و مﺎف و ئﺎزاد ەسەرداﺑ
من  ەك اتیشﺎنبدپ یوا یەوێﺑ یﺎﺗورك ەل ﯽگشت ێكﯽداواكﺎر ەگەر". ئێكردنل ەڕەشەو ه ﻗﺎندنۆﺗ یرۆر،ﺗ یژی،ﺗووندوﺗ ێز،گوشﺎر، ه ێﯽر ەل ەمەشئ
 ێنﺎسەيەپ ۆرەج ەمئ ەڵێمد ەﺑەرئەوەیل ەنهﺎﺗ ێ،ﺑب ێشەك ﯽﺗووش ەوانەيەمن ل ەكو ۆشەنووسﯽگ ەم،ﺑد یﺎﺗورك یرۆریﺗ ەدژ ەﺑﺎﺗﯽخ ەل يﺎنز ەواﺑوو یﺎزمن
 ەوشێوەيەﺑ ﺎنیشﯽەوەكو كرد ەپشت ﻗس ەﺑەستﯽم ەگەرئ ەنﺎنەت" وا ﺗﯽ"ﺗﺎوان ەﺑ ێتﺑكر ەرپرسیﺎرﺑ ەوانەيەل ۆڤئﺎشكرا. مر ﯽگرفت ەل ڕەپ یرۆريزمﺗ ۆﺑ
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 یﺎداﺗورك ەرد لكو كەمینەی يﺎنەگوﺗوو ەﺑەرئەوەیل ەنهﺎﺗ يیكراوندادگﺎ يﺎن يندانز ەﺗەخراون یﺎﺗورك ەل ﯽگشت ەسﺎيەﺗﯽو ك ۆشنبیرر ۆر. زەﺑووﺑێتن
  .ەژيتد
 ییەكﺎنەرەنسف ەك ۆﺑەهەﻗزانﯽخ ەيەیشووش ڵەمﺎ ەوو ئ ەرەنسﯽف ینۆسﺎيدیج يﺎسﺎی ەﺑگرن ەردﺑ ەك ەيەه ەوەيﺎنئ ﯽﺗورك مﺎف ەمﺎنە،ئ ەمووه سەرەڕای
 ۆنچ ەك ەێنمەوﺑ ەﺑیرﺑ یتلەرﺗﺎنه ەردەمﯽس ەرەنسﺎیف ەﺗﯽحكوم ێويستدەكﺎتپ يﺎن ێت؟د ەﺑیرﺑ ەزائیرﺗﺎنج ەڕی. شیﺎنكردووەدروست ۆيﺎنخ ۆﺑ
(چﺎرلز  ﯽەوڵەكﺎنه ەشێد يﺎن ڕكردنیﺎن؟و ﻗ ەكەكﺎنجوول ۆكردنەوەیك ۆﺑ ەداد يیەكﺎنیﺎننﺎز يﺎرمەﺗﯽ ەزرۆيیەوەﺗﺎم ەﺑ ەرەنسﺎف ەوكﺎﺗﯽئ ﺎرﺑەدەستﺎنﯽك
 ەكﺑوون (ن ێوچﺎنﺑ ەكدارانەیچ ەرخۆدانﯽﺑ ەرﻗﺎڵﯽس ەڵمﺎنیﺎدائ یركﺎریداگ ەژێرل ەرەنسییەكﺎنف ەيگوتد ەك ێنمەوەﺑ یرﺑ ەدوگول)ﺗﺎن ﺑ
 ەروﺑەندیس ەل ێكر ینۆسﺎيدەكەج يﺎسﺎی ڕۆژەپ ەك ەوەيەئ ییەن ەشﺎراو ەسك یو لا ەسەلەكەيەم ﯽراست ەك ەوەی)؟ ئيیەكﺎننﺎز ﺎوكﺎريكردنﯽه
 ەمﺎنﯽەرلپ ەیكﺎر ەو. ئەژيند ەرەنسﺎف ەل ەك ەرمەنییەئ ینﯽنش ەﺗﺎراوگ ۆرەیز ەژمﺎر ەوئ يكردنﯽراز ەوەشل ەﺑەستو م ەسەندكراپ ەڵبژاردنەكﺎنداه
 وەختﯽەسﺎﺗ ەل ییەكﺎنعوسمﺎن ەك ەوانەیكرد ەوئ ەرﺑﺎرەید ەگەيێنێد ێويستو پ ۆيﺎنەراستگ ە،كراو ۆیگفتوگ ەلێكﯽه ەمووه ەﺑ يﺎنز ەرەنسﺎف
 يەﺗییەسﺎەك ە(ﺑ ﺎیﺗورك یبراڵەكﺎنﯽل ڵاﺗییەهﺎوو ەل ۆرز ۆكﺎرە،ه ەمئ ەﺑەرل ەر. هيﺎننواند ەسیحییەكﺎنم ەمینەك ەﺑ ەرامبەرﺑ یمپراﺗۆريیەكەيﺎنئ ﯽرووخﺎن
 ۆرەیز ەژمﺎر ەوئ ﯽﺑﺎس ەيەه ەوەيﺎنئ ﯽمﺎف یشﺗورك ێوانەدا،ن ەم. لەگرند ەرەنسﺎف يﺎسﺎكەی ەل ەخنە) رڵاﺗەشەوەو ەوئ ەنەكﺎنﯽەرمئ ەنﺎسراو
 ەﺑیرو ﺑەرچﺎوە ۆڵەر ەوئ ەﺑێد ەئەنجﺎمدا،كران. ل ەﺗلوعﺎمﻗ ەردەمەداس ەول ەرمەنەكﺎنئ ەل ەندێكو ه یﺎرووس ێزەكﺎنﯽه ەلايەنل ەك ەنﺑك ڵمﺎنﺎنموس
  .ۆژهەڵاتر ەنﺎﺗۆلیﺎیئ ەسیحییەكﺎنﯽم ۆمەڵكوژیك ە، ل ەكردد ییەكﺎنعوسمﺎن ۆﺑ يﺎنو كﺎر ێڕايﺎنكورد گ ۆزیه ەندێكه ەك ێنرێتەوەكورد ﺑه
 ەكن ەركۆنەكردنس ەﺑ ەنسنووردار ﺑك ۆيﺎنخ ۆڵﯽر ەوﺑﺎرەوەل ەوانئ ێژوونووسﺎن،و م ۆمەڵگەك ۆﺑ ێبگەڕێنل ێژووم ەﺗەكﺎنحكوم دەﺑێ
 ينەداروو ۆسنیﺎﺑ ەل ێبینیچﺎسر ۆمەڵكوژیك ڵێﺑ يﺎنﺑكﺎت  ۆلۆكۆسته ەل ۆڵﯽنك ەيەوێد ەسێكك ەگەر. ئەﺑێتن ڵیﺎند ەﺑ ەك يەكيدگﺎد ەره ەدەخەكردنﯽﻗ
 نفﺎلەئ ەگەزیر یپﺎكتﺎو ۆسەیپر يﺎنﯽشﺎ ێراقع يﺎخیبووەكﺎنﯽ ەكورد ڵێﺑ يﺎنﺑدات  ەرمەنەكﺎنئ ینۆسﺎيدیج ەﺑﺎرەیﻗ ەمكردنەوەیك ڵﯽوەه يﺎن
 ەسﺎنەك ۆرەج ەوئ ەك ەردەكەوێد ۆتﺑ ێرايﯽخ ەﺑ ڵەﺗەداحﺎ ەول ە. چونكەدەخەﺑكرێنﻗ ەكن ێتﺑ ۆچوونﺎنەيﺎنﺑ ەول ێمگو ەﺎشترﺑ ێممن پ ەواﺑوون، ئ
  .یستنو فﺎش ەگەزپەرستر يﺎن یسلامەئ ەل یﺎنﺗرس يﺎنن ەسﺎمیدژ
 ەل نەرﺑڕيراد یئﺎزاد ەرس ەل ەك ەنﺑك ەووندانﺗ ۆﺗوﺑەندەك ەوئ ەيریو س ۆيﺎنخ ەكەیشووش ەخﺎنوو ۆﺑ ەڵگرنه ەردەكﺎنیﺎنﺑ ەل ەندێكه ەﺑێد ﺗورك
 یر،ئەزاج ەل ەرەنسﯽف ەﺗﯽحكوم ەجێكﺎنﯽنﺎﺑ ەوەكرد ەﺑكﺎت و ﺑﺎس ل یﺎسەﺗرس پ ەﺑێﺑ ەﺗوانێد ۆڤمر ەﺑێن یچه ەره ەڕەنسﺎف ە. لەيەه ڵاﺗەكەيﺎنداو
شت  ەمﺎنه یﺎداﺗورك ەﺗرس ل ەﺑێﺑ یﺎنﺗوان ەڵكخ ێككﺎﺗ ەردا ﺑكﺎت. ه 4791 ەسﺎڵﯽ) لڤێندێﯽ( ۆمەڵكوژيیەكﺎنﯽو ك ێمنه ەريﺎیز ەینﺎوچ يﺎن ڤێتنﺎم
 ێژوويﯽم ێكۆڵینەوەیو ل ەرﺑڕينراد یئﺎزاد ەرس ۆﺑ ێرش"ه ەل ەيﯽگل ەﺗوانند ەﺗەكەیو حكوم ەردۆغﺎنئ ەرۆكوەزيرانس ێگومﺎنﺑ ەوائ ەن،ﺑك
 ".ەنﺑك
 ەﺗەوەین وەیە(ﺑزووﺗن ێبﯽكت ەریو نووس ەمريكﺎئ ەل یزوورم يەﺗﯽولا ۆیزانك ەل ێوەڕاستەن ۆژهەڵاﺗﯽر یﺎسەﺗەكﺎنﯽس ۆفیسۆریپر ۆمﺎنۆ،ر ەيڤد* د





 ﻗوﺑرس یو ﺑﺎكوور ۆﺑﺎنﯽ.. كیﺎﺗورك
 4102/01/42 ۆمﺎنۆر ەيڤیدد يەنەلال
 ۆڵﯽﺑن. نك ێڕايەڵو گو ڵسۆزد ەكردوو ەكەیسنوور ێون یكورد ەل یداوا ەردەوامﺑ ەنكەرە، ئ3291 ڵﯽسﺎ ەل یﺎوەﺗورك ۆمﺎریك ەزراندنﯽدام ەل ەره
و  تەيﺎنويسد ەوانئ ەك ەنﺑك ەﻗس ەنزمﺎ ەوﺑ ێبكەنل يﺎنوا ەوەیئ ۆﺑ ەڕێوەﺑرد،كورد ﺑ ەدژیل ەوەیﺗواندن ەورەیگ ەڵمەﺗێكﯽكرد و ه یﺎنشونﺎس ەل
 .ۆڕنﺑگ ێژوويﺎنو م ەلتوورك
 
 ەلتووریو ك ێژوو. زمﺎن و مڵاﺗینﺎمەو ەكن ە. ﺗوركبوون شونﺎسەﺗورك ی،ﺑژ یﺎﺗورك ەل ەسك ەره ەك ەكردەوەد ەوەل ەختﯽج ەوڵەتد يدۆلۆژيﺎیئﺎ 
 ۆمەڵەك ەﺗەگەرايﯽچ ەڵكوﺑ ین،ن ۆڕشش ەوانەئ ەشیﺎنگوتو د ەوەكپ كرد ۆڕشیﺎنش ەندينﺗورك. چ ەگەزیر ەﺑ ەستراﺑووەوە" ﺑیﺎﺗورك ڵاﺗﯽ"هﺎوو
  ".كردوون ینداﺑ ۆیﺑ ەوڵەتد ەك ەرﺑگرنو ەسوودان ەوئ ینن ەو ئﺎمﺎد ییەن ڵﻗبوو یەﺗیﺎن"شﺎرستﺎن ەك ەسێكنك
 
 ەكﺎنﯽكﺗور ەﺑوون،ن ڵاﺗﯽهﺎوو ەگرﺗبوو ك ەگیﺎنو ﺑ ەدڵﺑ ەيﺎنﺗوركﺎن ەوئ ەنووسﯽچﺎر يكەوەد ەلايەكﯽل ﯽﺗورك ۆمەڵگەیو ك یﺎﺗورك ۆمﺎریك كەچﯽ
 ەل ەجگ نﯽزمﺎ ەﺑ ەك ەدەدان ڵاﺗیﺎنەیهﺎوو ەوئ ەكﺎنﯽمﺎف ەﺑ یﯽگرنگ یچه یﺎﺗورك ێكداكﺎﺗ ە. ليكەد ێنەكﺎنﯽو شو ەڵمﺎنیﺎو ﻗوﺑرس و ئ يۆنﺎنو  يﺎﺑولگﺎر
دا 0791 -0691 ڵەكﺎنﯽسﺎ ەل ێك. كﺎﺗەكردد يكەد ڵاﺗﺎنﯽو ەكﺎنﯽﺗورك ەمینەك ەل ۆكییﺎنداك ێوچﺎنﺑ یﺎﺗورك ەركردەكﺎنﯽس ەكرد،د ەيﺎنﻗس ﯽﺗورك
. ەﺑنن ێدەنگﺑ ەك ەكردد ەجیهﺎنل يﺎنداوا یﺎﺗورك ەرپرسﺎنﯽو ﺑ ۆمەڵگەك ەيە،دوورگ ەول ەكردﺗورك د ەمینەیك ەل ەڕەشەيﺎنﻗوﺑرس ه یلیشیﺎكﺎنﯽم
و ﺗﺎ  یركردداگ یﺎنﻗوﺑرس ێﯽس ەسەرل يەكو  ەنﺑك یەكﺎنﻗوﺑرس ەﺗورك يﯽهﺎوكﺎر ۆئەوەیﻗوﺑرس ﺑ ەنﺎرد ۆريﺎنز ێزێكﯽدا ه 4791 ەسﺎڵﯽدواجﺎر ل
  .ەﺗەوەمﺎو ەوێل یﺎﺗورك یسوپﺎ ێستﺎشئ
 
كورد  ەﺑەرامبەرل یﺎﺗورك ەرمیﯽف یﺎسەﺗﯽس ەل ۆڕانكﺎریگ ۆرز ەكرد، دواجﺎر ﺑ ەﺑﺎتخ ەﺑ ەستﯽد 4891 ڵﯽسﺎ ەل ەكوردستﺎن ك ێكﺎرانﯽكر پﺎرﺗﯽ
كرد ەدەن ێويستﯽپ ێەواﺑك یترئ ەﺑوو،ن ﯽكورد ﺑوون ەگەركورد ﺑكﺎت. ئ ﯽﺑوون ەل ۆڵﯽنك یﺎﺗورك ۆﺑ ێتﺑ ەستەمئ یترئ ەك ەوەیئ ەيشتەدروستكرد. كﺎر گ
 ەكورد ل ەك ەوەدانﺎﺑ ﯽدواجﺎر دان یﺎﺗورك 1991 ڵﯽدروست ﺑكﺎت. سﺎ ەنكەرەئ یلا ڵەڕاوكێﺗرس و د ەوەندەئ ەكەكەداپ ینﺎو ە"كوردستﺎن" ل ەیوش
  .ێكدێننپ یﺎﺗورك وانﯽیشتودان ی%02كورد  ەكﺎﺗێكدال ەوە. ئەيەه ڵاﺗەكەيداو
 
 ێكﯽجﺎر ەكەكەدا پ5002 ەوروﺑەرید ەل ەڵاممتبوون كرد، ﺑ ﯽﺗووش ەكەكەیپ ەوەﺗەكﺎن،ن ۆﺗﺎيﯽك ەل ەكەكەپ ەرۆكﯽس يندانیكردنﯽو ز دەستگیركردن
 ﯽﺎرﺗپ یسلامیەكەی،ئ یەننسو ەو پﺎرﺗ ەردۆغﺎنئ ەيبﺗ ەجەبر ەزيرانو ەرۆكس ێريﯽچﺎود ێرژ ەل یترئ ەﺑوو ك ەﺑەرئەوە. لۆڕەپﺎنگ ەڕايەوەگ يكەد
 ﯽمﺎف ەندێكه ەﺑ ێگەیر ەردۆغﺎن. ئێنێتﺑه یژیﺗوندوﺗ ەﺑ ۆﺗﺎيﯽك ۆئەوەیﺑ يكەد ێگەچﺎرەیر ەدوایل ەڕانگ ەﺑ ەستیكردد ەنكەرەئ ەشەپێدان،داد و گ
 ی"كﺎنە"ﺑرا كورد ﯽﺑوون ەﺑ ﯽانئﺎشكرا د ە. ﺑیكورد ﯽزمﺎن ەسنووردار ﺑ ەخشﯽپ ەﺑ ێگەدانر ەوانەل ەيﺎند،راگ یچﺎكسﺎز ۆمەڵێكدا و ك ەوانﯽزمﺎن
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 ەك ێككﺎﺗ ەڵامﺑوو، ﺑ ێداﺗ ۆریز ەڵێنﯽﺑ ەستیپێكرد،د 7002 ەل ەك ﯽئﺎشت ۆسەی. پرەنﺑك يەكسﺎنﯽ ەﺑ ەستكورد ه ەﺑكﺎت ك ێكدا كﺎر ەڵێنﯽدانﺎ و ﺑ
 هﺎﺗنەوەیێرخەﺑ ەڕێﯽچﺎو یﺎﺗورك ەكﺎنﯽڵاﺗیهﺎوو ەنﺎوﺑ ەل ەندێكو ه یﺎو ﺗورك ێراقع ێوانن یسنوور ەيشتنەدانﺎ و گ ەكیﺎنچ ەكەكەپ ﯽگرووپ يەكەم
  .كورد ەستگیركردنﯽد ەﺑ ەستیكردەوەو د ەزﺑووەوەپﺎشگ ۆسەكەپر ەرﺗﺎپﺎیس ەل ەتﺑوون، حكوم ەكەگرووپ
 
 ﯽەكدارەكﺎنو چ ێتراگر ۆیخ یەكﺎنﯽﺑوو چﺎلاك یراز ەكەكەپ 3102 یئﺎدار ەو ل ەيﺎندراگ ﯽئﺎشت ۆﺑ ێﯽنو ەنگﺎوێكﯽه ەردۆغﺎندواﺗر، ئ ڵێكسﺎ چەند
 ﯽ،ﺎشتئ ۆسەیپر ەرەوپێشبردنﯽﺑ ۆﺑ ەتحكوم ڕوونﯽنﺎ ەڵێنﯽﺑ ەﺑەرامبەرل ەوەكشﺎن ەوان. ئەوەكوردستﺎن كشﺎند ەرێمﯽه ەرەوﺑ یﺎوەﺗورك ﯽخﺎك ەل
. ەكرانن ێبەجێكورد ج يیەكﺎنﯽداواكﺎر ەل یچیەك. هێنێتﺑه ﯽئﺎشت ەﺑوو ك ﯽئﺎشت ۆسەيەكﯽپر ەمﯽخ يﺎﺗرز ەردۆغﺎنئ ەﺗەكەیحكوم ەداخەوە،ﺑ ەڵامﺑ
كران و  يندانز ەوانەیو ر ەستگیركراند یﺎسەﺗمەدارو س ێندكﺎرخو ەدەنﯽ،م ﯽكورد، چﺎلاكوان یخوازیئﺎشت ۆژنﺎمەنووسﯽر ەزارانه ەوەئ ەﺑریل
  .یﺎننسزاكﺎن ەسەرﺑردنﯽﺑ ەڕوانﯽچﺎو ەندێكه ێستﺎشئ ﺗﺎ
 
 ۆﺑﺎنﯽ. كﺎيسوور ﯽكوردستﺎن ەل ۆﺑﺎنﯽك ۆنﯽكﺎنت ەرس كﺎﺗەەد ۆیخ ێرشﯽه ەورەﺗرين(داعش) گ یسلامﯽئ ەوڵەﺗﯽد یترئ ەك یرۆكەكەدايەچ ڵەیخﺎ لەم
 ەك وەەنﺎن ەداسنووران ەوﺑ یﺎندان ەرگیز. كورد هيزﺗرەئﺎز ۆرز ۆﺑﺎنﯽكورد، ك ی. لاێتنﺎكر ەيرس ەكﺎنﺗورك یﻗوﺑرس لا یﺑﺎكوور ەكوكورد و یلا
  .ەەيه ەكەداسنوور يوید ەهەردوول يكیﺎننز ڕێﯽو هﺎو سوكﺎرەخزم و ك ەوان. ئیﺎدەكﺎﺗەوەج یﺎﺗورك ﯽخﺎك ەنێوسوروج ل ەكوو ەكﺎنﯽشﺎر ەل ۆﺑﺎنﯽك
 
 ۆﺑﺎنﯽك ەرس ەخﺎﺗەد ەمﺎرۆگ يەكسﺎنن، ڵاﺗﯽكورد هﺎوو ەك ەكﺎﺗەوەد ڵنیﺎيﺎنو د ەكﺎتكورد د ەل ڵسۆزید یداوا ەوڵەﺗەید ەوئ ەمﺎنه ێشتﺎ،ه ﺑەڵام
 ێنڕێژﺗرينوخ یفشﺎر ەژێرو ل ەمﺎوەن ێپ ەكﺎنیﺎنسووك ەكەچ ۆﺑ مەنییﺎنەﻗەﺗ ەكەشﺎر ەل ەرگريكﺎرانﺑ ەسەرەول ێرشیﺎنه یشتووانەكەیدان ەك ەكﺎﺗێكدال
 يەكسﺎنەكﺎنﯽ ەڵاﺗیكورد (هﺎوو ەمﺎنەشدائ ەگەڵ. لەوەسنوور ەﺑ ێنراوەنووس یﺎنپشت ەﺑینیوە،ن ەخۆيەوەﺑ ێستﺎﺗﺎ ئ یهﺎنج ەك ەككراوداچ ڕپ یرۆريستﯽﺗ
 ﺎنێگەير ەكەنداوا د ەنیﺎﺗ ەوان. ئيﺎنﻗوﺑرس كرد یﺑﺎكوور ەل ەوەیئ ەكوكﺎت وﺑ ەستێوەرداند یﺎﺗورك یسوپﺎ ەننﺎك ەوەئ یداوا ێشتﺎ) هیﺎﺗورك
 ﯽئﺎشت ۆیدا گفتوگ3102 ڵﯽسﺎ ەل ۆخۆیﺑ ەك ەكەكەپ ەوە،ئ ەﺑرینﺎدات و ل ێگەر ەنكەرەئ ەڵام. ﺑێرنﺑن ۆيﺎنخ ﯽﺑراكﺎن ۆﺑ یهﺎوكﺎر ۆيﺎنخ  ێبدرێتپ
 ەیمﺎنﺎنەﻗﺎر ەرگريﯽﺑ ەهﺎیﺑ ەمكردنەوەیك ەوڵﯽه ەفتەيەداه ەمل یﺎشركﺗو ەزيرانﯽو ەرۆكس ێگری. جەچوێنێداعش د ەﺑ ە،كردوو ەگەڵل
 اﻗﯽێرع یسوپﺎ یوەیراﺑردوو ن ەيرانﯽحوز ﯽمﺎنگ ەل ۆژێكدار ەندچ ەیمﺎو ەل ەك ێزێكداعش، ه یهﺎديیەكﺎنﯽج ێزەه یدژ ەدا ل ۆﺑﺎنێﯽك ەكﺎنﯽكورد
  .راونﺎ ەغداﺑ ەرەوﺑ
 
كورد  ۆچﯽﺑ ەوەیل ڕمﺎوەسو ەريﺎنس ﯽﺗورك ۆمەڵگەیو ك ەنكەرەئ ەرپرسﺎنﯽﺑ ەوە،كورد یشﺎندەرانﯽۆپخ ەلايەنل یﺎﺗورك ەكﺎنﯽشﺎر ەژاندنﯽه لەگەڵ
 ﯽكﺎﺗ ەل ەنكەرەئ ۆكورد ﺑ ڵاﺗﯽهﺎوو ڵسۆزيﯽد ێتنﺎﺗوان ەﺑێت،ن ەڕﺗ یشﯽو ﻗﺎچ ێتﺑگر ﯽمﺎس ێتنﺎﺗوان ەنكەرەئ ەك ێنﺎگەنﺗ ەوان. ئڕەنﺗوو ێندەه






 يسكر ەدژ كێكﯽەرۆس
 4102/9/21 ۆمﺎنۆر ەيڤیدد ەلايەنل
 ۆرينەیز ەڵامﺑ ێراق،ع ی3002 ڵﯽسﺎ یركردنﯽداگ ەنگﯽج ەل ینن ەشیمﺎنپ ەرگیزه ێراﻗیەكﺎنع يكەید ۆرێكﯽو ز یعەكورد و ش ەرچەندەه
  .ەشیمﺎننپ ەنگەج ەول ەپێچەوانەوەﺑ ەمريكییەكﺎنئ
 
 ەسەرل ەا كد ەفیڕۆﺑ ەنگێكداج ەل ڵاﺗەكەیو ﯽو سﺎمﺎن ێنخو ەل ۆرز ڕێكﯽﺑوو، ﺑ ەڵەشەه ۆكێكﯽەرس ڕكو ﯽﺑوش ۆرجج ەمريكیەكﺎنەوەئ لەﺗێڕوانینﯽ
 دەكرد، ﺎنێشبینییپ ەسك ۆرز ەك ەوەیئﺎسﺎنتر ﺑوو ل ەدامس ێمﯽرژ ﯽرووخﺎن ەكﺎﺗێكدا. لەكراﺑوون ۆﺑ ﯽﺑﺎش ەكﺎريﯽئﺎمﺎد ەوەیل ەجگ ﺑوو، ۆدر ەمﺎیﺑن
 .ﺑچووك ۆرز ێكﯽشت ەﺑەرامبەرل ێچووﺗ ەمريكیەكﺎنئ ۆﺑ ۆریز ێكﯽنرخ ێراقع یركردنﯽداگ ەڵامﺑ
 
 ەمﺎیﺑن ەسەرل ۆﺑﺎمﺎئ ەڵبژاردنﯽ. هەڵبژارده ڵاﺗەكەيﺎنو ێﯽنو ەرۆكﯽس ەكو ۆﺑﺎمﺎيﺎنئ 8002 ڵﯽسﺎ ۆيەﺑ ەڕ،ش ەو مﺎندوو ﺑوون ل ێزارﺑ ئەمريكیەكﺎن
'' ەﺗوانیند ەڵێ'ﺑ' ەكەيﺎن. دروشمێتﺑ ەرسوڕمﺎنس يەیمﺎ ێتنﺎﺑ ەرەوە،د یﺎسەﺗﯽس ێشەكﺎنﯽك ەﺑریل ۆنﺎوخ یكﺎروﺑﺎر ەرس ەركیزخستنەﺗ ۆﺑ ەڵێنەكﺎنﯽﺑ
 ەرۆكەكەیس ەپێچەوانەیﺑ ۆﺑﺎمﺎئ ەك ەﺑێتن ەرسوڕمﺎنس ێﯽج ەﺑێتد ەروەهﺎ. هەمريكﺎئ ەرەوەید ەل ەﺑوون ێنو يسكﯽر ێبەجێكردنﯽج ۆﺑ ڵنیﺎيیەوەد ەﺑ
 یسرائیلئ ەڕیش ﺗﺎ ۆكراينﺎئ ەل یﺎرووس ێشڕەويیەكﺎنﯽپ يﺎن ێت،ﺑ ێرانئ ەﺗۆمﯽئ ێشەی. چ كەرەوەداد یﺎسەﺗﯽس ەنﺎكﺎت ل يسكو ر ەرنﺎكەوێد ۆیخ ێشپ
 ەداتن نێكەڵێﺑ یچو ه ێتﺑ ەسەندپ ەلاوەﺑ يﺎيﯽور ەردەكەوێوا د ێیەنو ەرۆكەس ەمئ يكە،د ەرشتێكﯽو ه يﺎسوور ۆینﺎوخ ەڕیو ش ەلەستینییەكﺎنو ف
  .ەرﺑﺎزیس ەكﺎریل ێوەگلانﺗ ەرﺑﺎرەید
 
 ەوەكﺎنﯽنكﺎردا ەل ﯽروون ەﺑ ۆرز ەمە(داعش) ئ یسلامﯽئ ەوڵەﺗﯽد يیەیدوا ەمئ ێشڕەويیەكﺎنﯽو پ ەرهەڵدانس ە،گوﺗووم داێشوومپ ینەكﺎنﯽنووس ەل وەك
 ﺎوچەین ۆرو ز ڵداعش مووس ەيرانداحوز ﯽمﺎنگ ەل ێك. كﺎﺗەﺑینﯽن ەكەنﺎوچ ۆﺑ ێشەيەكك ەكو ﯽداعش ۆﺑﺎمﺎئ ەسەرەﺗﺎدا،. لەداتد یشﺎنن ﯽسپ ۆشكﯽك
وردستﺎن ك ێشمەرگەیپ ێزەكﺎنﯽه ێكهﺎﺗن. كﺎﺗ ەرسوڕمﺎنس ﯽﺗووش ێراقع یسوپﺎ ێوەیش ەهەمﺎنﺑ ەمريكییەكﺎنكرد، ئ ترۆڵۆنك ێراﻗﯽع ۆژئﺎوایر
 ەركەوﺗند ڵدوود ەمريكییەكﺎنئ ەئﺎﺑدا، دووﺑﺎر ﯽمﺎنگ ەسەرەﺗﺎیداعش ل ەستﯽد ەسەرل ەوەﺑوون ۆيﺎنخ ڕووچوونﯽو ئﺎﺑ ەرسوڕمﺎنس ەڕوویرووﺑ
  .ۆخەكەداﺑﺎرود ەﺑەرامبەرل ەﺑێته ەوەيەكیﺎنو كﺎردان ێستەڵوچ ه ەوەیل ەﺑوونن دڵنیﺎو 
 
 ۆكﯽەرخوارد، س یريﺎنشنگﺎل گ یﺎیچ ەل ۆژر ێنجپ ەیمﺎو ۆﺑ ێزدیئ ڵاﺗﯽهﺎوو ەزاره ەدەيﺎنو ﺑ ەڕەشەدايەه ەژێرل ەولێره ەركەوتد ەوكﺎﺗەیئ ﺗەنهﺎ
  .ﺑكﺎت ەڵوێستەيەكو ه ڵێﺑ ەوﺑﺎرەيەوەل ێكدا شت ڕيﺎریﺑ ەمريكﺎئ
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 ەمەشگﺎل. ئشن یﺎیچ ێزديەكﺎنﯽو ئ ێراقع ەل ەمريكﯽئ ڵاﺗیﺎنﯽهﺎوو ەل ەرگريكردنﺑ ۆسنووردار ﺑوو ﺑ یﯽئﺎسمﺎن ێرشﯽه ەڵیبژارده ستەیەڵوێه ئەو
رد ەكد یﺎنعشدا ەڕیش ەكورد ك ۆﺑ ەرﺑﺎزیس ێداويستﯽو پ ەكچ ﯽ. نﺎردنێراقنﺎو ع ۆﺑ ەمريكﯽئ ەرﺑﺎزێكﯽس یچه ەنﺎردنﯽن ەل ەڵێنەكﺎنﯽﺑ ەشﺎنﯽشﺎنب
  .هﺎت ێوانیﺎنن ێنیﯽنه ێككەوﺗنﯽو ر ەغداﺑ ەزامەنديﯽر ەپﺎشل ەمريكیەكﺎنەوەئ نەلايەل
 
 یﯽئﺎسمﺎن ێزیه ینەو نﺎﺑ ینن ێراقع یسوپﺎ ێمە''ئ ﯽو گوﺗ ەكەنﺎوچ ڵاﺗﺎنﯽو ۆﺑ ێشەيەداعش ك ەك ەوەﺑووئ ۆﺑﺎمﺎئ ەڵوێستﯽئﺎب، ه ﯽمﺎنگ لەسەرﺗﺎسەری
 ەرۆكس يیەدوا ەم''. ﺑێزێﺑپﺎر ۆیخ يشﯽئﺎسﺎ ۆیخ ێراقع ەكۆﺗﺎيیدال ەره ەﺑێتو د ەمريكﺎمئ ەكدارەكﺎنﯽچ ێزەه ەرۆكﯽ''من س یشﯽ''. گوﺗێراﻗﯽع
 .''ییەن یژمﺎنستراﺗ ێشتﺎ. هەسپەكەوەئ ێشپ ەمەﺑخ ەرەﺑﺎنەكەع ەوێت''نﺎم ﯽگوﺗ یسلامﯽئ ەوڵەﺗﯽد ەڕوﺑوونەوەیرووﺑ ەرﺑﺎرەید ۆﺑﺎمﺎئ
 
 ﺎسەﺗﯽیس ەﺑوو ل ەردەوامﺑ ەدا،د یژێكﯽستراﺗ ۆزينەوەید ەوڵﯽو ه ەڵدەسەنگﺎندەوەه ﯽاعشد ﯽﺗوانﺎكﺎن ەدووﺑﺎر ۆﺑﺎمﺎئ ەكﺎﺗێكدال يكە،د يەكﯽواﺗﺎ ﺑە
 ئەوەندە ﺎيﯽيور یﺎسەﺗﯽ. سیكﺎتنﺎچﺎر كرا ﺑ ەك ەوكﺎﺗەیئ ەنیﺎﺗ ەويشئ ەرەوە،د یﺎسەﺗەكﺎنﯽس ۆﺑ يﺎدكردز ﯽﺑچووك ێكﯽو شت ەڵێننەدانو ﺑ يﺎيﯽور
  .داعش ەنﺎوﺑردنﯽل ۆﺑ ییەن یژیستراﺗ ەنﺎ ك ەوەشداﺑ ﯽدان ەڵكوﺑكﺎت، ﺑ ێراقع ەوانەیرسوپﺎ  ەدان ڕيﺎریﺑ ەكن ەنﺎنەتﺗ ەردەكەوێ،د ڵﻗوو
 
 ێو نﺎزان ەیین ێكﯽپلان یچه ەك ێﺑن ەوەدائﺎشكرا دان ﺑ ەپﺎشﺎن ﺑ ێ،داﺑن ﯽﺗوانﺎكﺎن ەسەرسنوور ل ەك ێﺑگل ێیەكەوەململان ەل ەيەوێتد ۆچﯽﺑ ﺑەڵام
ست نﺎكﺎت ويێپ ەدڵنیﺎيیەوەﺑ ەڵامﺑكﺎت، ﺑ يﺎسوور يﺎن ێراقع ەوانەیر ەرﺑﺎزس ۆرز ەيەكﯽژمﺎر مريكﺎەئ ەكﺎتن ێويستپ ەنگەﺑكﺎت؟ ر ﯽچ ەوﺑﺎرەيەوەل
 ەمريكﺎئ ەكﺎنﯽەيمﺎنهﺎوپ ەیور ەﺗوانێد یژستراﺗ ەﺑوونﯽن ەئﺎشكرا ﺑ ێدانﺎنﯽدانپ يﺎنﺎدات؟ ئﺎ ەنجﺎمئ ەوەئ ڵێتﺑ ەكﺎنﯽدوژمن ەﺑ یﺎنوويەكداﺑ یچه ەژێرل
 يەواداعش ﺑكرد ەل ەڕەشەیه ۆﺑﺎمﺎئ یژ،ستراﺗ ێو ﺑ ڵدوود ەكو ەركەوﺗند ەﺑریل ەگەرئ ەﺑوود ﯽچ ەرزﺑكﺎﺗەوە؟اعش ﺑد یهﺎديیەكﺎنﯽج یدژ ەڕیش ەل
 ەﺑێتد ەك ێڵكورد ﺑ ەﺑ ەنهێنﯽﺑ ەيتوانﯽكﺎﺗدا، د ەهەمﺎنل ەكﺎت؟كورد د ەكو ەيمﺎنەكﺎنﯽهﺎوپ ڵپشتﯽپﺎ ەرجسنوور و م ێو ﺑ ەﺗەواویﺑ ەك يگەيﺎندﺑﺎيەرا
  .ەڕەداش ەمل ەمريكﺎئ یسنوور ێﺑ يﯽهﺎوكﺎر ەرگرﺗنﯽو ۆﺑ ەداەيمﺎو ەول ەنﺑك ﯽچ
 
 ڕوویەرووﺑ ەك ێیەكململان ەمووه ۆﺑ ێتدروست ﺑ ەڵامێكﯽكﺎت و ەمووه ییەن ەحﺎڵم ەرەوەد یﺎسەﺗﯽس ەﺑچووك ل ۆڕانكﺎريﯽو گ يپلۆمﺎسﯽد وريﺎيﯽ
 یيﺎﺗرز يﺎن ێندەه ەنگەر يسكن،ر ەدژیو ل ەكﺎردێننﺑ ەندازەئ ێﺑ يﺎيﯽور ەك ەردەكەونوا د ەرۆكﺎنەیس ەو. ئەﺑێتەوەد يەكگرﺗووەكﺎن يەﺗەولا






 ﻭ ێراقع لە ئیسلامﯽ دەﻭڵەﺗﯽ ئەﻭەی ﻭەك نیشﺎنﺑدەن ﺑەڕﻭﻭنﯽ ﺗێگلاﻭەكﺎن لایەنە ئەخلاﻗﯽ ﻭ سﺗراﺗیژ كە جەنگﺎنەی ئەﻭ كەمن زۆر
 انینەكﺎنیﺎنﺗێڕﻭ ﻭ پشﺗگیری لەﺑﺎرەی ﺑكەن ﻗسە شەڕە كۆﺗﺎیﯽ ﺗﺎ دەﺗﻭانن ﺑەشەﻭە دﻭﻭ ﺑﻭﻭنەﺗە ئەﻭانەی. دەدات نیشﺎنﯽ حﺎزر حﺎڵﯽ شﺎم
. ەمەﻭەك زۆر كردەﻭەیەكﯽ ﺑە ﺑەڵام دەﺑێت، نێﻭدەﻭڵەﺗﯽ زۆری ﻗسەﻭﺑﺎسێكﯽ دەرئەنجﺎمەكەی كە فەلەسﺗین ﻭ ئیسرائیل جەنگﯽ ﺑۆ
 ریﺎسﻭﻭ. ﺑیكەن كەی كێشەیەﻭ ئەم لەسەر ﺑكەن چﯽ لەﻭەی دڵنیﺎن كەم كەسێكﯽ چەند ئەﻭەی لەگەڵ مﺎﻭەﺗەﻭە، شێﻭاﻭی ﺑە ئۆكرانیﺎ
 ﯽﺑڕیﺎرﺑەدەسﺗﺎن كرد ﻭای هەرﻭەهﺎ جیهﺎدییەكﺎن، یﺎن شەیﺗﺎنە ئەسەد ئﺎیﺎ ﺑەﻭەی سەﺑﺎرەت ۆژئﺎﻭار ﺑەردەم خسﺗە سەخﺗﯽ ﺑژارەیەكﯽ
 .كێشەیە ئەﻭ ﺑۆ رێگﺎچﺎرە دۆزینەﻭەی لە ﺑن ئیفلیج دیكە شﻭێنەكﺎنﯽ ﻭ ﻭاشنﺗن
 ەرچەندەه ئەﻭان، سﺗراﺗیژی راداری ژێر نەكەﻭﺗﻭﻭەﺗە هەرگیز دﻭﻭرە، ﻭ ئﺎڵۆز ئەﻭەندە ئەفریقﺎ ﺑیﺎﺑﺎنﯽ نﺎﻭچەی پێكدادانەكﺎنﯽ شەڕﻭ  
  .كۆنگۆ ﻭ دارفﻭر ﻭ رﻭاندا ﻭەك شﻭێنەكﺎنﯽ لە نەﺑﻭﻭ هەڵﻭێسﺗێكﯽ هیچ كە دێﺗەﻭە ﻭەﺑیری كﺎﺗێك دەكﺎت ﺗﺎﻭان ﺑە هەست هێشﺗﺎ جیهﺎن
. مریکﺎئە ﺑەتﺑەﺗﺎی ﻭ جیهﺎن ئەسﺗۆی خسﺗە رﻭﻭنﯽ ئەركێكﯽ ئیسلامﯽ دەﻭڵەﺗﯽ دڕندەیﯽ دیكەﻭە، نێﻭدەﻭڵەﺗییەكﺎنﯽ كێشە ﺑەپێچەﻭانەی
. دەكەنەﻭە ﻭیﺑڵا ئینﺗەرنێت ﺗۆڕەكﺎنﯽ لە خۆیﺎن داعش ﺗیرۆرسﺗﺎنﯽ كە ﺑكەین ڤیدیۆییەكﺎن گرﺗە ﻭ لێدﻭان سﻭپﺎسﯽ دەﺑێ ئەﻭەش ﺑۆ
 جیﺎﻭازە نیﺎنئﺎی كە ئەﻭانەی سەرﺑڕینﯽ مەدەنﯽ، هﺎﻭﻭڵاﺗیﺎنﯽ ﻭ دەسﺗگیركراﻭان گﻭللهﺑﺎرانكردنﯽ: كێن ئەﻭان كە نییە لەﻭە گﻭمﺎنﯽ كەس
 مەزارە ﺗەﻗﺎندنەﻭەی مەدەنﯽ، هﺎﻭﻭڵاﺗیﺎنﯽ لە هەڕەمەكﯽ ﺗەﻗەكردنﯽ غەنیمە، ﻭەك ﺗەمﺎشﺎكردنیﺎن ﻭ ژنﺎن سەر ﺑۆ ﺗدرێژیدەس لەﻭان،
 سﻭﻭریﺎ ەل كە ئیسلامﯽ خەلافەﺗﯽ ﺑۆ دەﻭڵەﺗﺎن گۆڕینﯽ ﻭ نﺎﻭچەكە لە نﺎنەﻭە ئﺎژاﻭە خۆكﻭژی، ﺗەﻗینەﻭەی شﻭێنەﻭارەكﺎن، ﻭ ئﺎینییەكﺎن
 هەر ەل ﺑﺗﻭانن ئەﻭەندەی شەڕەكەیﺎن مەﻭدای فراﻭانكردنﯽ دەكشێ، غەززە ﻭ ئﻭردن ﻭ لﻭﺑنﺎن ﺑەرەﻭ سﺗﺎئێ ﻭ دەسﺗیپێكرد عێراﻗەﻭە ﻭ
  .جیهﺎن شﻭێنێكﯽ
 لە كە دەكەن گﻭندنشینﺎنە ﻭ لێقەﻭمﺎﻭ لەﻭ كۆمەڵكﻭژی هەڕەشەی داعش ﻗەسﺎﺑەكﺎنﯽ ئێسﺗﺎ نەﺑن، ﺑەس هەمﻭﻭ ئەمﺎنە ئەﻭەی ﻭەك
 راﻭە،چۆڵك مەسیحﯽ دانیشﺗﻭﻭانﯽ لە ﺗەﻭاﻭی ﺑە مﻭسڵ حﻭزەیرانەﻭە مﺎنگﯽ لە رەگەزی ﺎكﺗﺎﻭیپ چﻭارچێﻭەی لە. هەڵاﺗﻭﻭن نﺎﻭچەكﺎنیﺎن
 زدیشئێ دانیشﺗﻭﻭانﯽ كردﻭﻭە، كۆنﺗرۆڵ شنگﺎلﯽ شﺎری داعش لەﻭكﺎﺗەﻭەی. نیشﺗەجێن لێﯽ سﺎڵە هەزار دﻭﻭ مﺎﻭەی ﺑۆ كە شﺎرەی ئەﻭ
 مێژﻭﻭەكەی ﻭ هەیە كۆنیﺎن ئﺎینێكﯽ كە جیهﺎن ێزدیەیئ هەزار سەد چﻭار ئەﻭ نیﻭەی. كۆمەڵكﻭژی هەڕەشەی ژێر كەﻭﺗﻭﻭنەﺗە
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 لە ﺎندﻭﻭرخسﺗنەﻭەی ﺑۆ راگﻭاسﺗندان پرۆسەی لە ﻭ ﺑﻭﻭن حﺎڵ ﻭ مﺎڵ ﺑێ ئێسﺗﺎ ئیسلام، ﻭ مەسیحیەت پێش سەردەمﯽ ﺑۆ دەگەڕێﺗەﻭە
 گەرمﺎ پلەی كە چیﺎیەك ەسەرل پیرەﻭە ﻭ گەنج ﺑە ئێزدی هﺎﻭﻭڵاﺗﯽ هەزاران هێشﺗﺎ نﻭﻭسینەم، ئەم سەرﻗﺎڵﯽ لەكﺎﺗێكدا. داعش هەڕەشەی
  .داﻭە چیﺎكەی گەمﺎرۆی داعش خﻭاردﻭﻭەﻭ گیریﺎن پلەیە، 54 لەﻭێ
 ﺑێﺑەری لێ خۆی ﻗﺎعیدە كە ﺑێت لەﺑەرئەﻭە رەنگە دەركەﻭن، منداڵ كۆمەڵێك ﻭەك ئەلقﺎعیدە ﻭایكردﻭﻭە داعش دڕندەیﯽ ﺑەكﻭرﺗﯽ
 ەل خۆیﺎن زیﺎﺗر داعش چەكدارانﯽ. زیﺎﺗرە لەﻭە زۆر داعش ﺑەڵام ﺑﻭﻭن، پەرﺗەﻭازە كۆمەڵێكﯽ ﻭ ئﺎیدیۆلۆژیﺎ زیﺎﺗر ﻗﺎعیدە. كردﻭﻭن
 ئەﻭ ەگەڵل لەدەسﺗە زۆریﺎن كﺎشﯽ پﺎرەیەكﯽ. عێراق ﻭ سﻭﻭریﺎ خﺎكﯽ زۆری ﺑەشێكﯽ لەسەر رێكخسﺗﻭﻭە دەﻭڵەﺗیدا نیزامیﯽ سﻭپﺎیەكﯽ
 كردﻭﻭەﻭای گرﻭﻭپەكە دﻭاییەی ئەم سەرﺑﺎزییەكﺎنﯽ پێشڕەﻭییە. جێهێشﺗﻭﻭن ﺑۆی عێراق هەڵاﺗﻭﻭەكەی سﻭپﺎ كە ئەمریكیﺎنەی چەكە
 لاﻭازەكﺎن لایەنگری نﺎیەﻭێت نﺎﻭچەیە لەم كەسیش دیكەﻭە، لەلایەكﯽ. ﺑكەن ﺗەمﺎشﺎ گرنگ ﺑە رۆڵیﺎن ﻭ داعش سﻭننەكﺎن عەرەﺑە
 ەمڕۆئ نگەرە. نﺎﻭدەﺑەن'' چﺎﻭەڕﻭاننەكراﻭ رﻭﻭداﻭێكﯽ'' ﺑە داعش پێشڕەﻭییەكﺎنﯽ دەكەن، شﺗﺎنە ئەم چﺎﻭدێریﯽ ﺗﻭێژەرانەی ئەﻭ. ﺑكﺎت
  .نﺎﻭچەكە ﺗەﻭاﻭی ﺑۆ ﺑێت هەڕەشە جددیﺗرین ئەﻭە
 هێزە: دەﺑێت كە ﺑﺎﻭەڕەی ئەﻭ گەیشﺗﻭﻭنەﺗە دەكەن، ﺑﺎرﻭدۆخە ئەم چﺎﻭدێریﯽ ئەكﺎدیمیﺎنەی ﻭ رۆژنﺎمەنﻭﻭس ﻭ ﺗﻭێژەر ئەﻭ هەمﻭﻭ  
 ﻭ داﺑەغ لەلایەن ﺑﻭدجەكەیﺎن ﺑڕینﯽ ﺑەهۆی. دەﺑنەﻭە داعش رﻭﻭﺑەڕﻭﻭی ئێسﺗﺎ كە ﺑكرێن پڕچەك دەﺑێ كﻭردسﺗﺎن عەلمﺎنییەكﺎنﯽ
 ﻭەیپێشكەﻭﺗﻭ ﺗەﻗەمەنییە ﻭ چەك هەمﻭﻭ ئەﻭ لەﺑەرامﺑەر ﺑﻭﻭن شكست ﺗﻭﻭشﯽ عێراق كﻭردی سەرﺑﺎزی، یﺎرمەﺗییەكﯽ هیچ نەﺑﻭﻭنﯽ
 شئەﻭانی ﺑەڵام داعش، دژی لە عێراق كﻭردی یﺎرمەﺗیدانﯽ ﺑۆ كردﻭﻭە پێشڕەﻭییﺎن سﻭﻭریﺎ كﻭردی. داعشدایە دەسﺗﯽ لە كە ئەمریكﺎ
  .شەڕدەكەن داعش دژی لە سﻭﻭریﺎ لە سﺎڵە دﻭﻭ ﺑۆمﺎﻭەی ئەﻭەی سەرەڕای پێنەگەیشﺗﻭﻭە یﺎرمەﺗییەكیﺎن هیچ
 ﺑەﺑﺎشﯽ یﺎن ئەﻭانیش رەنگە دەردەكەﻭن، ﺑﺎشﺗر لەﻭ كەمێك كۆمﺎرییەكﺎنﯽ نەیﺎرە ئۆﺑﺎمﺎن، سیﺎسەﺗەكﺎنﯽ ﺑەرهەمﯽ ئەمﺎنە هەمﻭﻭ
 ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ خۆﺑەدﻭﻭرگرﺗنﯽ. ﺑهێننەﻭە خەڵك ﻭەﺑیری 3002 سﺎڵﯽ جەنگەكەی نﺎیﺎنەﻭێ یﺎن حﺎزر، حﺎڵﯽ دەگﻭزەرێ چﯽ لەﻭەی ﺗێنەگەن
 ۆﺑ سیﺎسەﺗەكﺎن كرد ﻭای, ﺑكﺎت لەگەڵ مﺎمەڵەی نەیﻭیسﺗﻭﻭە هەرگیز كە سەرئێشەیەك عێراق، كێشەكﺎنﯽ پشﺗگﻭێخسﺗنﯽ ﻭ
 مەرجەكﺎنیﺎن ﺑێ پشﺗگیرییە لە ننەﺑﻭﻭ هەڵە كە ئەﻭەیە سەلمﺎندنﯽ ئەمﺎنیش ئەﻭلەﻭیﺎﺗﯽ. جێﺑهێڵرێت دەرەﻭە ﻭەزارەﺗﯽ ﺑیرۆكراﺗەكﺎنﯽ
 زیﺎﺗر كەسێكە، هەمﻭﻭ لەسەر گەﻭرەیەی هەڕەشە ئەﻭ ﻭ كۆمەڵكﻭژی لەدژی راﻭەسﺗﺎنەﻭە لەﺑری. سﺎڵە هەمﻭﻭ ئەﻭ لەمﺎﻭەی مﺎلیكﯽ ﺑۆ




    كۆبانێ دەربارەی راستییەكە
   4102/01/51     رۆمﺎنۆ دەیڤید لەلایەن
 یﺎﻭخۆن شەڕی ﺑە كۆﺑﺎنێ گەمﺎرۆدانﯽ ﻭ سﻭﻭریﺎ كﻭردی دۆخﯽ ﻭﺗﺎرێكدا لە گرەیﺑەر دەیڤد گﺎردیﺎن، كۆڵۆمنﻭﻭسﯽ هەفﺗەیەدا لەم
 ێﺑ جیهﺎن كە ئەﻭەش. پێ ژێر دەخرێﺗە داعشەﻭە لەلایەن دیمﻭكراﺗیك ئەزمﻭﻭنێكﯽ سﻭﻭریﺎدا شەڕی لە: "دەكﺎت ﺑەراﻭرد ئیسپﺎنیﺎ
  ."سكﺎنداڵێكە ﺑۆخۆی ئﺎگﺎیە
 ﯽﺗنپﺎراس یەكینەكﺎنﯽ جەنگ، ﺑەرەكﺎنﯽ نﺎردە ژنیﺎن سەرﺑﺎزی ﻭ كرد درﻭست ژنﺎنیﺎن هێزی ئیسپﺎنﯽ شۆڕشگێڕانﯽ چۆن هەرﻭەكﻭ
  .دەكەن كﺎر هەمﺎن ش)یەپەگە( گەل
. ەندەك شﺎم ﻭ عێراق لە ئیسلامﯽ دەﻭڵەﺗﯽ فﺎشیسﺗەكﺎنﯽ شەڕی مﺎڵ ﺑە مﺎڵ سﻭﻭكەكﺎنیﺎنەﻭە چەكە ﺑە یەپەگە شەڕڤﺎنﺎنﯽ ئێسﺗﺎ
 یﺎەنﺗ هەر نەك كە حكﻭمەﺗێك -ﺑپﺎرێزن دیمﻭكراﺗیك حكﻭمەﺗێكﯽ ﻭ ﺑپﺎرێزن خۆیﺎن خﺎكﯽ ئەﻭەی ﺑۆ دەكەن شەڕ یەپەگە شەڕڤﺎنﺎنﯽ
 ەكێﺗﯽی پﺎرﺗﯽ. دیكەش كەمینەكﺎنﯽ ﻭ عەرەب كریسﺗیﺎن، ﺗﻭركمﺎن، ﺑۆ پەنﺎگە ﺑﻭﻭەﺗە ﺑەڵكﻭ كردﻭﻭن، ﺑەهێزی ﻭ پﺎراسﺗﻭﻭە كﻭردی
 ئەﻭان. ننی فریشﺗە دنیﺎ دیكەی شۆڕشﯽ زۆر ﻭ ئیسپﺎنییەكﺎن شۆڕشگێڕە هەرﻭەكﻭ ﺑەڕێﻭەدەﺑﺎت، یەپەگە هێزەكﺎنﯽ كە دیمﻭكراﺗﯽ
 ﻭردیك ﻭ ئەمریكﺎ ﻭ ﺗﻭركیﺎ لەلایەن كە پﺎرﺗﺎنەی ئەﻭ ﻭاﺗە دەگرن، دیكە سیﺎسﯽ پﺎرﺗﯽ لە رێگە كە پﺎڵ دەدرێﺗە ئەﻭەیﺎن ﺗۆمەﺗﯽ
  .یەهە) پەكەكە( كﻭردسﺗﺎن كرێكﺎرانﯽ پﺎرﺗﯽ لەگەڵ ﺑەهێزیﺎن ئۆرگﺎنیﯽ پەیﻭەندی هەرﻭەهﺎ ئەﻭان. دەكرێن پشﺗگیری عێراﻗەﻭە
 ەﻭانئ. ﺑكەن داگیر خﺎكەكەیﺎن دەیﺎنەﻭێت كە ئیسلامیﺎنەی لەﻭ جگە ،لایەنێك هیچ سەر نەكردﻭﻭەﺗە هێرشیﺎن سﻭﻭریﺎ كﻭردی ﺑەڵام
 ﻭ كۆﺑﺎنﯽ كﺎنﺗۆنﯽ هەرسێ لە لۆكﺎڵیﺎن حكﻭمەﺗێكﯽ ئەﻭە لەﺑری. نﺎكەن سﻭﻭریﺎش لە جیﺎﺑﻭﻭنەﻭە ﻭ كﻭردی دەﻭڵەﺗﯽ داﻭای ﺗەنﺎنەت
 نﺎﻭخۆی شەڕی گەردەلﻭلﯽ لەنﺎﻭ لێﺑﻭﻭردە ﻭ دیمﻭكراﺗیك هەرێمێكﯽ ﻭەكﻭ كﺎنﺗۆنە سێ ئەﻭ. درﻭسﺗكردﻭﻭە عفرین ﻭ جزیرە
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 هەمﻭﻭ ﻭ هەﺑێت ژنیﺎن ﻭ پیﺎﻭ ﺑەرپرسﯽ پێﻭیسﺗە ﺑەڕێﻭەﺑەرایەﺗیەكﺎن هەمﻭﻭ خۆیﺎن، پەیەدە یﺎسﺎكﺎنﯽ ﺑەپێﯽ. دەركەﻭﺗﻭﻭە سﻭﻭریﺎدا
  .ﺑكەن ﺑەشدار ﺑڕیﺎرداندا لە نﺎﻭچەكە ئﺎینییەكﺎنﯽ كەمینە
 دەﻭڵەﺗە هەمﻭﻭ نزیكەی ﻭ ئەﻭرﻭپﺎ ﻭ ئەمریكﺎ امەزراند،د لۆكﺎڵییﺎن دەسەڵاﺗﯽ 2102 سﺎڵﯽ لە كە لەﻭكﺎﺗەﻭە هەر ﺑەڵێ
 ﯽهﺎﻭشێﻭەیەك ئەمڕۆدا جیهﺎنﯽ لە ئەگەر: "دەپرسێت گرەیﺑەر. خسﺗﻭﻭە پشﺗگﻭێ سﻭﻭریﺎیﺎن كﻭردی جیهﺎن ەكﺎنﯽ"پێشكەﻭﺗﻭﻭ"
 ژنﺎنﯽ( سلیﺑرێ ێسمﻭهێر هﺎﻭشێﻭەی ئەگەر ﺑێت؟ كێ دەﺑێ داعش لە جگە ﺑكﻭژ ﻭ ئﺎینپەرﻭەر سﺎخﺗە ﺑە فرانكۆیەكﯽ هەﺑێت، فرانكۆ
 لە ﻭ جیهﺎن ئﺎیﺎ كۆﺑﺎنﯽ؟ لە ﺑەرگریدان سەنگەرەكﺎنﯽ لە كە ئﺎزایﺎنەی ژنە لەﻭ جگە ﺑێت كێ دەﺑێت هەﺑێت، ئیسپﺎنیﺎ ی)ئﺎزاد
  "ﺑكﺎﺗەﻭە؟ دﻭﻭﺑﺎرە خۆی مێژﻭﻭ دەدەن رێگە ﻭ دەﺑن ﺑێدەنگ نێﻭدەﻭڵەﺗﯽ، چەپﯽ رەﻭﺗﯽ خراپﺗر هەمﻭﻭی
 ئەنكەرە ﻭ ﻭاشنﺗن كﺎرﺑەدەسﺗﺎنﯽ كە ﺑێت هەڵخەڵەﺗﺎندنە ئەﻭ ﺑەپێﯽ ﺑﻭێت، ژﻭﻭیﺎنمێ دﻭﻭﺑﺎرەﺑﻭﻭنەﻭەی كەس زۆر پێدەچێت
 میﺎنڕەﻭانەی ئەﻭ زۆرﺑەی ﺑەڵام. دەدەن" سﻭﻭریﺎ میﺎنڕەﻭەكﺎنﯽ چەكدارە" ﺑە چەك دەڵێن ئەﻭان ﺑدەن، ئێمەی دەرخﻭاردی دەیﺎنەﻭێت
 ەﻭەئ ﺑﻭێت، چەكیﺎن سﻭﻭریﺎ عەلمﺎنییەكﺎنﯽ كﻭردە ەگەرئ ﺑەڵام. ﺗﻭندڕەﻭﺗرن داعش لە كەم زۆر شﺗێكﯽ پێدەدەن چەكیﺎن ئەﻭان كە
. ﺑێنن دیكە كەمینەكﺎنﯽ ﻭ كﻭرد مﺎفﯽ ﻭ خۆجێیﯽ حﻭكمﯽ ﻭ ئۆﺗۆنۆمﯽ داﻭاكﺎریﯽ لە ﻭاز دەﺑێت دەڵێن پێیﺎن ئەنكەرە ﻭ ﻭاشنﺗن
 گۆڕنﺑ عەرەﺑﯽ عەلەﻭی ەﺗﯽدیكﺗﺎﺗۆری ﺗێیدا كە ﺑن شەڕێك ﺑەشداری ﺑۆئەﻭەی میﺎنڕەﻭ ﺑە دەیﺎنكﺎت ئینجﺎ داﻭاكﺎریﺎنە لەم ﻭازهێنﺎن
  .عەرەﺑﯽ سﻭننﯽ دیكﺗﺎﺗۆریەكﯽ ﺑۆ
 ﺗەنیﺎ دەكرد ﺑۆردﻭمﺎنﯽ ﺑﻭﻭ ﺗێدا داعشﯽ كە نﺎﻭچﺎنەی ئەﻭ هەمﻭﻭ سﻭﻭریﺎ، لە ئﺎسمﺎنییەكﺎنﯽ هێرشە ﺑە دەسﺗیكرد ئەمریكﺎ كە كﺎﺗێك
 ﺑەسەردا دەسﺗﯽ عێراق لە كە كﺎنﯽچەكە ﻭ ﺗﺎنك دﻭﻭدڵﯽ ﺑەﺑێ داعش. داﺑﻭﻭ سﻭﻭریﺎیﺎن كﻭردی گەمﺎرۆی كە نەﺑێت شﻭێنﺎنەدا لەﻭ
 رۆژئﺎﻭاییەكﺎنەﻭە فڕۆكە لەلایەن ئﺎسﺎنﯽ ﺑە هەمەرانە ﻭ ﺗﺎنك ئەﻭ هەرچەندە دەسﻭﻭڕاندەﻭە، كۆﺑﺎنﯽ دەﻭرﻭﺑەری لە گرﺗﺑﻭﻭن
 ەﺑ ﺗﻭركەكﺎن سەرﺑﺎزە كە ئەﻭكﺎﺗەی ﺗﺎ گرﺗﻭﻭە، ڤیدیۆ ﺑە دیمەنەكەیﺎن هەمﻭﻭ سنﻭﻭرەﻭە لەﻭدیﻭی رۆژنﺎمەنﻭﻭسﺎن. ئﺎمﺎنج دەكرێنە
 رسە كردە هێرشیﺎن كۆﺑﺎنﯽ دەﻭرﻭﺑەری لە ئەمریكیەكﺎن فڕۆكە هەفﺗەیەدا لەم كە دﻭاجﺎر. پێدەكەن ﺑڵاﻭەیﺎن فرمێسكڕێژ گﺎزی
 ەل داﻭای ﺗﻭركیﺎ كە دەگﻭﺗرا خەڵكﯽ ﺑە جیهﺎدییەكﺎن، دەسﺗﯽ دەكەﻭﺗە ﻭردە ﻭردە شﺎرەكە ئیﺗر كە كﺎﺗێكدا لە داعش، مۆڵگەكﺎنﯽ
  .ﺑكﺎت دراﻭە گەمﺎرۆ شﺎرە ئەﻭ هﺎﻭكﺎری ئەﻭەی ﺑۆ ﺑكﺎت شﺗێك كردﻭﻭە ئەمریكییەكﺎن
 خەریكە داعش كۆﺑﺎنﯽ لە. ﺑێت ﺗﻭركیﺎ حەزی پێچەﻭانەی ﺑكەن شﺗێك داﺑێت ﺑڕیﺎریﺎن دﻭاجﺎر ئەمریكییەكﺎن كە پێدەچێت زۆر ﺑەڵام
 كە ندەردەخەی خۆمﺎن ﻭا ێتگﻭﺗﺑ ﺗﻭركیﺎیﺎن ﺑە رەنگە. نییە ﺑﺎش ئۆﺑﺎمﺎ هەڵمەﺗەكەی ﺑۆ ئەمەش ﺑكﺎت، ﺗۆمﺎر گەﻭرە سەركەﻭﺗنێكﯽ
 داعش ەل دەیﺗﻭانﯽ خۆی ئەﻭا كۆﺑﺎنﯽ، دەﻭرﻭﺑەری لە ﺑدرێت داعش لە ﻭیسﺗﺑێﺗﯽ ﺑەڕاسﺗﯽ ﺗﻭركیﺎ ئەگەر چﻭنكە. پێكردﺑن پرسمﺎن
 ﺎنی. دەﺑﻭﻭ ﻭێنەی ﺑێ كﺎریگەرییەكﯽ ﺗۆپێك گﻭلله چەند هەر. دﻭﻭرە سنﻭﻭرەكﺎنیەﻭە لە مەﺗرێك سەد چەند ﺗەنیﺎ داعش خۆ ﺑدات،
 ەیەدەپ چۆن هەرﻭەكﻭ كۆﺑﺎنﯽ، هﺎﻭكﺎری ﺑچنە ﺗﻭركیﺎدا خﺎكﯽ ﺑە ﺑدات پێشمەرگە هێزەكﺎنﯽ ﺑە رێگە دەیﺗﻭانﯽ ئەنكەرە نەﺑێت هیچ
 ﺑە شﺎرەكە كە لەﻭەی ﻭەكﻭ كۆﺑﺎنﯽ، هﺎﻭكﺎریكردنﯽ ﺑۆ هەن لەﺑەردەسﺗدا ﺑﺎشﺗر زۆر ﺑژارەی. عێراق لە كرد هﺎﻭكﺎری
 ﺗێكدانﯽ ﺑۆ كە ئﺎرامەی نﺎﻭچە ئەﻭ. ئﺎرام نﺎﻭچەی درﻭسﺗكردنﯽ ﺑۆ ﺑچێت كیﺎﺗﻭر زەمینیﯽ هێزی یﺎن ﺑمێنێﺗەﻭە گەمﺎرۆدراﻭی
  .دیكە شﺗێكﯽ هەر لە زیﺎﺗر دەﺑێت سﻭﻭریﺎ كﻭردی ئۆﺗۆنۆمﯽ
 ەﺑ ﻗﺎچﺎخەكەی نەﻭﺗە ﻭ دەهێنێت ﺗﻭركیﺎﻭە لە چەكدار داعش كە كﺎﺗێكدا لە ﺗەنﺎنەت داعشە، دژی ئەﻭ كە دەڵێت هەر هێشﺗﺎ ئەنكەرە
 سنﻭﻭرە لە جگەرە ﺑردنﯽ ﻗﺎچﺎخ ﺑە لەﺑەر زیندانەﻭە دەخرێنە كﻭرد سەدان سﺎڵێك هەمﻭﻭ دەكﺎت، ﻭانەرە ﺗﻭركیﺎدا خﺎكﯽ
 لەﺑری .ﺑگیرێت ﺗﻭركیﺎدا ﻭ سﻭﻭریﺎ نێﻭان ﺗەخﺗﯽ سنﻭﻭری لە داعش ﻗﺎچﺎخچیەكﯽ نﺎﺑینین ﺑەڵام عێراﻗەﻭە، ﻭ ئێران شﺎخﺎﻭییەكﺎنﯽ
 ەك دەدات پێشﺎن خۆی ﻭا كﺎﺗیشدا لەهەمﺎن. دەگرێت كۆﺑﺎنﯽ لە رگریكﺎرانﺑە ﺑۆ خﻭاردنەﻭە ﻭ خﻭاردن نﺎردنﯽ لە رێگە ﺗﻭركیﺎ ئەﻭە
  .داعش دەست ﺑكەﻭێﺗە كۆﺑﺎنﯽ نﺎیەﻭێت
 ەیهەفﺗ كەچﯽ. ﺗﻭركیﺎ لەگەڵ كرد ئﺎشﺗﯽ گفﺗﻭگۆی ﺑە دەسﺗﯽ ﻭ راگرت ئەنكەرە دژی لە خۆی شەڕی پەكەكە 3102 ئﺎداری مﺎنگﯽ
 شﺗرﻭایەﺑﺎ كەﻭایە ﺑێت، راست ئەﻭە ئەگەر. شﺗن هەمﺎن پەكەكە ﻭ داعش ﺗەكﺎنﯽﺗیرۆریس ﺗﻭركیﺎ ﺑۆ گﻭﺗﯽ ئەردۆغﺎن سەرۆك راﺑردﻭﻭ
 ەل پﺎرێزگﺎری ﻭ سﻭﻭریﺎ ﺑۆ دەرەﻭە ﺑچنە ﺗﻭركیﺎ سنﻭﻭری لە ﺗﺎ ﺑگیرێت، لێ رێگەیﺎن نەك ﺑكرێت كﻭردەكﺎن چەكدارە هﺎﻭكﺎری







The Excel sheets which are used for the analysis of the corpus are all put on a CD and 
are available with this thesis.  
 
